ML20168A713

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Final ASP Analysis - Point Beach 1 (LER 266-71-LTR-2)
ML20168A713
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach 
Issue date: 06/16/2020
From: Christopher Hunter
NRC/RES/DRA/PRB
To:
Littlejohn J (301) 415-0428
References
LER 1971-002-00
Download: ML20168A713 (4)


Text

PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AnD DATA NSIC Accession Number:

65757 Date:

June 30, 1971

Title:

Failure of Containment Sump Isolation Valves at Point Beach 1 (Semi-Annual Operations Report for January-June, 1971)

The failure sequence was:

1. During a reactor heatup, the control room operator attempted to open both containment sump isolation valves.
2. Both valves failed to open due to air-binding in their hydraulic operating mechanisms.

In addition, both hydraulic units were found to be installed 90% from their upright positions.

Corrective action:

The valve hydraulic mechanisms were re-oriented and the suction piping re-routed to take suction from the bottom of the oil sumps.

Design purpose of failed system or component:

The valves isolate the containment sump from the low pressure in~jection/

recirculation system during normal operation. After the RWST Is emptied following a LOCA, these valves are opened to provide suction flow to the low pressure recirculation system.

Unavailability of system per WASH 1400:

Low pressure recirculation:

1.3 x 10-2 /D Unavailability of component per WASH 1400: *Valves, motor operated, failure to operate:

1 x 10-3 /D Valves, air-fluid operated, failure to operate:

3 x 10-4 /D Unavailabilities are in units of per demand D-1.

Failure rates are In units of per hour HR-1.

Reactor in Operator Successfully Heatup j

Opens Containment Sump Isolation Valves During Testing Potential Severe Core Damage No I

WTh No event existed which required the use of these valves NSIC 65757 -

Actual Occurrence for Failure of Containment Sump Isolation Valves at Point Beach I

Small Reactor Auxiliary High Low Pressure LOCA Trip Feedwater and Pressure Recirculation Secondary Injection and LPR/HPI Heat Removal Cross-Connect Potential Severe Core Damage Sequence No.

2 3

4 5

6 7

NSIC 65757 -

Sequence of Interest for Failure of Containment Sump Isolation Valves at Point Beach 1 a

CATEGORIZATION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSORS NSIC ACCESSION NUMBER:

63757 DATE OF LER: June 30, 1971 DATE OF EVENT: April 16, 1971 SYSTEM INVOLVED:

Low pressure recirculation COMPONENT INVOLVED: Containment sump isolation valves CAUSE: Valves failed closed due to air-bound hydraulic operators SEQUENCE OF INTEREST: LOCA ACTUAL OCCURRENCE: Sump Isolation valves failed closed during testing REACTOR NAM~E:

Point Beach 1 DOCKET NUMBER: 50-266 REACTOR TYPE:

PWR DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING: 497 MWe REACTOR AGE:

.45 yr VENDOR: Westinghouse ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS:

Bechtel OPERATORS: Wisconsin Electric Power Co.

LOCATION:

.15.mi:lea,iorthief ilanitowoc, Wisc.

DURATION:

360(a) hours PLANT OPERATING CONDITION:

Reactor heatup SAFETY FEATURE TYPE OF FAILURE:

(a) inadequate performance; (b) failed to start; (c) made Inoperable; M9 failed to open DISCOVERY METHOD: Testing COMMENT: