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Category:Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) Analysis
MONTHYEARML20168A7072020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-78-035) ML20168A7062020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-78-003) ML20168A7052020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-75-034) ML20156A1392020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-87-014) ML20156A1292020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-069) ML20156A1312020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-080) ML20156A1322020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-82-023) ML20156A1332020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-82-042) ML20156A1342020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-007) ML20156A1352020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-039) ML20156A1362020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-052) ML20156A1372020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-85-027) ML20156A1382020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-86-027) ML20156A1302020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-079) ML20135H3062020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-90-013) ML20135H3072020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-91-024) ML20135H3082020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-93-004) ML19212A6512019-08-12012 August 2019 Transmittal of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Report (Licensee Event Report 293-2019-001) ML19169A2792019-08-12012 August 2019 Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing 2020-06-04
[Table view] Category:Final
MONTHYEARML20168A7072020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-78-035) ML20168A7062020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-78-003) ML20168A7052020-06-16016 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-75-034) ML20156A1392020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-87-014) ML20156A1292020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-069) ML20156A1312020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-080) ML20156A1322020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-82-023) ML20156A1332020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-82-042) ML20156A1342020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-007) ML20156A1352020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-039) ML20156A1362020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-83-052) ML20156A1372020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-85-027) ML20156A1382020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-86-027) ML20156A1302020-06-0404 June 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-80-079) ML20135H3062020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-90-013) ML20135H3072020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-91-024) ML20135H3082020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Pilgrim (LER 293-93-004) ML19212A6512019-08-12012 August 2019 Transmittal of Final Accident Sequence Precursor Report (Licensee Event Report 293-2019-001) ML19169A2792019-08-12012 August 2019 Final Accident Sequence Precursor Analysis- Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing 2020-06-04
[Table view] |
Text
B-46 2
.PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AND DATA NSIC Accession Number: 135932 Date: February 6, 1978
Title:
All Offsite Transmission Lines Lost at Pilgrim 1 The failure sequence was:
The reactor was operating at 24% power when high winds and ice caused all the transmission lines to fail. This event, caused the reactor to trip.
Corrective action:
The insulators were washed with fresh water and the reactor was returned to service. A plant design change was issued to resolve the flashover problem on standoff insulators.
Design purpose of failed system or component:
The transmission lines connect Pilgrim 1 with the New England Grid.
These lines provide power to the reactor when the station isn't generating.
Unavailability of system per WASH 1400:
- loss of offaite power 2 x 10-5 /hr Unavailability of component per WASH 1400:*
Unavailabilities are in units of per demand D-1. Failure rates are in units of per hour HR-1 .
Reactor operating All off site trans- Reactor scra Diesel str Potential at 24% power mission lines lost due to load and load Severe Core weather Damage No Yes -when fully loaded the batteries last 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. It required 1,39 hours4.513889e-4 days <br />0.0108 hours <br />6.448413e-5 weeks <br />1.48395e-5 months <br /> to return offsite power.
to No -at less than 50% power BWR's can survive an ATWS Yes - see comment on sequence /#2.
No NSIC 135932 - Actual Occurrence of the Loss of All Transmission Lines at Pilgrim 1 1
It is presumed the diesels started and loaded properly.
Loss of Reactor Diesel Reactor Made Sub- RCIC/HPCI ADS/LPCI ILong Potential Sequence Powier Sca Loartad SBcSrica Rod Are S Initias tesCre Severe No.
Powier Scam Sartad SBcSrica byd the CTer Initiates Core jManually Driven In .Cooling Damage No 1 Yes 2 No 3 Yes 4
'Yes 5 No 6 Yes 7 to Yes 8 No 9 Yes 10 No 11 Yes 12 Yes 13 Yes 14 Yes 15 NSIC 135932 - Sequence of Interest of the Loss of All Transmission Lines at Pilgrim 1
B-46 5 CATEGORIZATION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSORS NSIC ACCESSION4 NUMBER: 135932 DATE OF LER: February 23, 1978 DATE OF EVENT: February 6, 1978 SYSTEM INVOLVED: electric power COMPDONENT INVOLVED: offsite transmission lines CAUSE: insulator flashover due to inclement weather SEQUENCE OF INTEREST: loss of offsite power ACTUAL OCCURRENCE: loss of offsite power REACTOR NAME: Pilgrim 1 DOCKET NUMBER: 50-293 REACTOR TYPE: BWR DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING: 655 NWe REACTOR AGE: 5.7 yr VENDOR: GE ARCH ITECT-ENGINEERS: Bechtel OPERATORS: Boston Edison LOCATION: Four miles SE of Plymouth, Mass.
DURATION: N/A PLANT OPERATING CONDITION: 25% full power SAFETY FEATURE TYPE OF FAILURE: (a) inadequate performance; (b) failed to start; Omade inoperable; (d)____________
DISCOVERY METHOD: operational event COMMENT:-