ML20168A471

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Final ASP Analysis - Fort Calhoun (LER 285-78-045)
ML20168A471
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 06/16/2020
From: Christopher Hunter
NRC/RES/DRA/PRB
To:
Littlejohn J (301) 415-0428
References
LER 1978-045-00
Download: ML20168A471 (4)


Text

PRECURSOR DESCRIPTION AND DATA NSIC Accession Number:

145209 Date-December 20, 1978

Title:

Both Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) Open During Troubleshooting at Fort Calhoun 1 The failure sequence was:

1. During a heatup from cold shutdown, one of the two PORV channels failed to respond to system pressure changes.
2. A technician, while troubleshooting the problem, pulled recorder fuses.
3. This caused both PORVs to open.
4. The operator closed both PORV isolation valves.

Corrective action:

1. Since the PORVs were being used for NDT overpressure protection, additional administrative controls were established to ensure an overpressure condition could not occur.
2. System modifications to prevent reoccurrence were being considered.

Design purpose of failed system or component:

1. During normal operation, the PORVs provide relief protection for the RCS and prevent lifting the pressurizer safety valves during pressure transients.
2. During cold shutdown, the PORVs provide NDT overpressure protection.

Unavailability of system per WASH 1400:*

Unavailability of component per WASH 1400:

relief valve, imadvertant opening:

1 x 105'/hr Unavailabilities are in units of per demand D-.

Failure rates are in units of per hour HR-1.

Reactor Heating PORV Pressure Technician Pulls Both PORVs Fail Operator Closes Up from Cold Channel Fails Recorder Fuses Open Due to Both PORV Shutdown to Respond During Trouble-Pulled Recorder Isolation Valves shooting of PORV Fuses Pressure Channel Potential Severe Core Damage No I.___No-reactor in cold shutdown L

[N40

[ NO No NSIC 145209 -

Actual Occurrence for Both Power Operated Relief Valves Open During Troubleshooting at Fort Calhoun 1

Small Reactor Auxiliary High Low Pressure LOCA Trip Feedwater and Pressure Recirculation Secondary Injection and LPR/HPI Heat Removal Cross-Connect Potential Severe Core Damage Sequence No.

2 3

4 5

6 7

NSIC 145209 -

Sequence of Interest for Both Power Operated Relief Valves Open During Troubleshooting at Fort Calhoun 1 initiating evemt requires operator failure to close PORV isolation valves.

CATEGORIZATION OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCE PRECURSORS NSIC ACCESSION NUMBER: 145209 DATE OF LER:

January 2, 1979 DATE OF EVENT:

December 20, 1978 SYSTEM INVOLVED:

reactor coolant COMPONENT INVOLVED:

power operated relief valves CAUSE:

Technician error in pulling recorder fuses during troubleshooting resulted in both PORVs failing open, human error SEQUENCE OF INTEREST:

two stuck open PORVs ACTUAL OCCURRENCE:

two stuck open PORVs during cold shutdown REACTOR NAME:

Fort Calhoun 1 DOCKET NUMBER:

50-285 REACTOR TYPE:

PtWR DESIGN ELECTRICAL RATING:

457 MWe REACTOR AGE:

5.5 yr VENDOR:

CE ARCHITECT-ENGINEERS:

Gibbs & Hill, Inc.

OPERATORS:

Omaha Public Power District LOCATION:

19 -miles north of Omnaha,.Nebraska DURATION:

N/A PLANT OPERATING CONDITION: Cold shutdown SAFETY FEATURE TYPE OF FAILURE:

(a) inadequate performance; (b) failed to start; (c) made inoperable; 0 failed open DISCOVERY METHOD:

During operation COMMENT:

-