ML20155G639
| ML20155G639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/02/1986 |
| From: | Aamodt M AAMODTS |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#286-063, CON-#286-63 LRP, NUDOCS 8605070062 | |
| Download: ML20155G639 (4) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
Before the Presiding Board i
DgCMETED J3NRC In the Matter of
)
INQUIRY INTO U -6 A10:57 Docket No.
R TilREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2
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LEAK RATE FALSIFICATION
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Maygi1986 BRM.Cu 1
AAMODT RESPONSE Concerning Open Items From April 24 Conference This filing is to provide a response to a number of open items from the April 24 pre-hearing conference.
The Board asked that suggestions of prior statements of 1
employees to be included in the record be made by today.
Since it is the technical record that is being compiled, the statements of the employees who are under investigation weald not be appropriate for inclusion. The prior statements are appropriate to the second phase of the hearing, i.e., con-siderations of culpability of employees.
We requested an opportunity to respond concerning the GPU Assessment Panel Report on leak rate testing. We find that this report would not advance the record. First, it is not an investi-gation but an assessment of the Stier report. Second, it is entirely directed toward culpability of individuals, hence it is inappropriate as part of the technical record.
Now provided is a newspaper article which I had intended to provide to the Board at the prehearing conference, Attachment 1.
This editorial, which appeared in the Harrisburg paper on September 8605070062 860502 PDR ADOCK 05000320 G
~
19, 1985, is evidence that the Board's sponsorship of Mr. Stier ~
as a witness would appear improper to the public that will be most affected by the outcome of the instant hearing.
We, therefore, add to our objections to Mr. Stier the appearance of impropriety.
Concerning our proposed documents for the record of the first phase of the hearing, we stand corrected on the matters surrounding the NRC October 18, 1978 inspection. We request (instead of an inspection report and NOV and response) LER 78-62 of October 19, 1978, the sign-off sheet accompanying this report and an Operations Memo of October 20, 1978 issued by the Supervisor of Operations to Unit 2 shift supervisors and shift foreman concerning " proper interpretation of leak rate technical specifications." We would narrow the request for all Het Ed internal menos to one.of October 27, 1978 concerning leak rate testing. We would narrow our request for THI Training Instructors to one instructor responsible for training in leak rate testing. We would delete POD records and maintainance records as more appropriate as the Phase II record.
In support of our request for Tim Martin and his investigative materials, the transcript of tne commission Meeting on May;24,1983 (Tr.15-16) supports our position that Martin had completed his investigation of the technicak aspect of leak rate falsification.
7 I apologise for the delay in providing the transcript pages promised as Attachment 2 to our filing of April 17, 1986 (Supplement to Aamodt Motion for Dismissal of Attorneys).
Respectfully submitted, A
/
dc WW
' Marjorip M. Aamodt May 2, 1986
GPU can't salvage much a
.w from self-sery.mg study
~e
_ w ks..d or to the 1979 acddent at 2e GPU ATTEMPT 5 to downplay the seriousness of these violanons M
N,
Three MUe Island Unit 2 nuclear "E q power station, plant persont. -l st by noting that the evidence indi-4 regularly discarded test results In-cates that only on rare emelans did leaks actuaDy exceed stand-M
&cating that water was leaking from the reactor s ca.iant eyst,m
. HERB '
i ards and that,,ompi action was aa la excess of the allowable limit.
taken to correct them. But it also gul RM.
Additional tests would then l'e
/
malatains that management had M
takes, and often they were manty-noidea beyondtheoneincident ulated. antu the"right" result mas with the inspector - that any.
g obtsaned.
prow its case in coun.
thing was amiss with the leak TMs practice was " established But it seems clear that GPU tests.
at TMI 2 from the beginning of its knew enough about the leek rate operation." according to the re-falsifkadon that it preferred the Certainly, management should suits et an investigat on into leak, embarrassment of pleading guilty have known and despite the deni-D rate tesung at Unit 2 done for to the embarrassment of having its als,it remains efficult to believe TMI operator GPU Nuclear by Eg.
operational conduct the subsect of that it &da't. considering au that wta 50er, a New Jersey attorney daily meta attenues during the was at stake la bringing the plant and forsser director of that state's cr"::;aef a tnal. How much eamer lato commerctal operauon by the
' Dvisloa of Criminal Justice. The it ne to foster a dual percepdos of end of 1973 and keeping it run.
report runs to 32 volumes and cost corporate ignorsace of the facts tn ning. However, it is even more 12 mi! Don. And la its own way it 2e case. ce the one band, and a frightening to beheve that the op.
represents another attempt by commitment to tacover the eraung personnel had so httle du TMI owner General Pubhc Uttle " truth" on the other. And bow rect supervisaon that they could Q
ties to achieve the *right" result much more comforting it is to hire run the plant accorteg tg their from evidence that persistently your owa investigator to deter. ews Rube Goldberg procedures and convincingty warned that mine the truth than to leave that ather than those estabhshed by there was sometbag wrong.
task to Oe unpredictable forum of the company and the NRC.
our adversarial legal system. The IN f13RUARY 1984. Metro-company lamsts it would have had GPU also maintains. as did the pohtan FAana the CPU subel&ary to undertake tu own inglepth in.
US. attorney in a statement made la charge of the plant before and mdgadosof thetechnicalaspects when M&Ed pleaded guilty to test during the accident, pleaded guilty of the case anyway, but it was un.
falsficataan, that there is no con-in U1 Middle Dstrict Court to der no ob!!aation - legal or regu.
secuoshetmeentheconductof the one count of falsifytag leat-rate latory - to produce a 32-volume operators in regard to the tests and tests at TMI 2. and entered a no report that tew people are itkely to the accident. Certainly, la the
{
contest plea to sz other related read.
physical sense the manipulation of g
counta. As part of the plea-bar, tests ed act lead to the accident, THE STIER RIPORT tends to But it tan't 6fficult to detect an I
galaing arrangementc Met Ed agreed to pay a 540.000 fine and downplay the significance of the attitude at work at the operational
- s contribute 51 milhoa to e fund ear.
Beak. rate falsification on the level that was prepared to accept
- s marked to assist emergency plan. grounds that the tests were sarell.
less than optimal plant con &tions.
3 I
ming in the area around the plant.
able, actualleakage ed act exceed violate rules if need be to keep the standards is most cases and plant going and allow operators to The very seat day CPU made the extraordinary request that se.
prompt efforts were made to re-overnde w arning signals.The best cret tesumony before the grand pair leaks when identified.
. hat can be said about manage-But on the one occasion an mentis that is was so remote from jury invesugating the case be turned over toit.a roquest that.to NRC Inspector happened to es-the daily operauons of the plant no one's surprise, was rejected by cover, by chance, that operational.that it d d not have effective core then US. Attorney Davkl Dart personnel were not responding to trol over the facility and that it what tests showed to be excessive failed is its most basc responsibil.
Queen.
On the face of it, the Stier re-leakage be ed not take it lightly. ity as a supervisor.
port is intended N complete GPU Unidentified leakage was sup.
. Nuclear's understanding of leak pond to be reduced to the proper THE ST!ER REPORT is 11 umi-rate testing at TMI 2 during the standard within four hours or the nating for those who take the trou-period pnor to the accident and to plant was suppceed to be shut ble to read it. But it is so substitute fully understand the causes of any down. Plant personnet, however, for the independence and power deficiencies. lacluding specifically were operating under the errone-that a court trial would have whether they were the result of cus assumpuon that they had 72 brought to the task of getting to improper attitudes or inadequate hours to come up with a satisfacto-the bottom of this tsaue. Stier tells performance." The three main ry test result.
us, at some length, that manage.
findings of the invest!gauon are.
The inspector did not cite Met-ment didn't know what was goms Ed for the vnotation but he did on, but the more pertinent ques-accor&ng to the company.
I - The test itself was defec-bring the incident to the attention bon of why management edn't
- ggye, of upper management. This is the know is left unanswered. We are 2 - Operations personnel only time 6t is acknowledged that told by GPU Nuclear President viewed the test as unrehable and the problem with leak rate tesung PhiUp R. Clark that the Stier re-not necessary for the safe oper, mched management level, port " fulfill (s) the cornpany's com-mitment that the farts would tw tion of the plant. Testa were ma-But if the plant should have fuW dmloped and made known.
nipulated and discarded-been shut down because tests yet the tone of this report and 3 - Senior management was abov ed encessive leakage. consid-GPU's presentauon ofitis one that not aware or involved in the test-er what the repercussions could Ing or its mampulation.
have been if the inspector had seems to excuse the company's known, as he apparency edn't..: conduct and downplay the sertous.
sees ofits criminal actions.
THE COMPANY acknowl-.
that personnel were systemaucal-edges that the Suer report "hast-ly escareng and manipulaung the There is no doubt that Stier re-caw confirms,,the results of prior tests. Stier was able to find 222 ported exactly what he saw. Nev.
Investigations by the Nuclear documented leak-rate tests, some ertheless, the report represents an Regulatory Commission staff, of which show clear evidence of attempt by GPU to manipulate NRC Office of investigations, the manipulation, but he estimates pubhc perceptions by purchasing Department of Justice and GPU. that at least 50 percent of the time as investigation of corporate con-Thus the Stier report goes over the personnel discarded tests for duct it did not want expoW and same ground.though in greater de*
wtuct there are no known records. scruunized in the arena of a pubhc tail, covered in four previous in-trial. And in doing that. GPU dem-vestigations. And what those four
!! nothing else, plant personnel onstrates, once again, a capacity earher lovestigations ed not tell.were engaged in covertog up a sit-for ben &ng the rules and devising GPU could well have been learned, sation over the course of a year its own tests that first brought it.
protably at less cost,by the simple that the NRC at least, considers and the people of this area. So expedient of allowing the criminal serious enough to warrant putting much &fficulty and gnef.
justice system to run its full the plant in " hot standby" with:n course. Instead of plea &ng gultty six hours and in " cold shutdown" and noto coerendere, GPU could within 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> if excessive leak-have forced the government to ing is not correc'ed.
9
b UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Presiding Board In the Matter of
)
)
INQUIRY INTO
)
Docket No. tRP THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 2
)
LEAK RATE FALSIFICATION
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that copies of AAPODT RESPONSE Concerning Open Items From April 24 Conference were served on the following parties by U.S. Mail, first class, postage prepaid, today May 2, 1986.
Chief, Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulat,ory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 4 James D.
Burns, Esq.
Isham, Lincoln & Beale Presiding Board, the Honorables 3 First National Plaza James L. Kelley, Chairman Suite 5200 Glenn O. Bright Chicago, IL 60602 Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. Michael W. Maupin U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ilunton & Williams Washington, D.C.
20555 707 E. Main St.
P.O.
Box 1535 Jack R. Goldberg, Esq.
Richmond, VA 23212 Mary Wagner, Esc.
Office of tne Executive Legal Director-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washing ton, D.C.
20555 Ernest L.
Blake, Esq.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge s
1800 M Street, N. W.
g Washington, D.C.
20036 Marjo1-ie M. Aamodt Harry H.,Voigt, Esq.
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae May 2, 1986 1333 New Hampshire Ave., N./u.
Suite 1100 Washington, D.C.
20036 Smith B.
Gephart, Esq.
Killian & Gephart 216-210 Pine Street Gox 886 t u rr i sbu rg, l'A l'/108
. i t