ML20155E663
| ML20155E663 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/11/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8604180025 | |
| Download: ML20155E663 (91) | |
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ORIGINAL.
f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
I In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Periodic Briefing by Adivsory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS)
(Public Meeting)
Docket No.
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s Location: Washington, D.
C.
Date: Friday, April 11, 1986 Pages:
1 - 86 1
8604180025 860411 PDR 10CFR PT9.7 PDR ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C.
20006
s i
l 1
D i SCLA I M ER 2
3 4
5 l
1 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the l
7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Catsmission held on 3
4/11/86 in the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public 10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain I
12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or betiefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may i
21 authorire.
22 23 24 25
1 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
4 PERIODIC BRIEFING BY ADVISORY COMMITTEE i
l 5
ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS (ACRS) 6 7
PUBLIC MEETING 8
9 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 Room 1130 11 1717 "H" Street, N.W.
12 Washington, D.C.
13 l
14 Friday, April 11, 1986 15 l
16 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to l
17 notice, at 10:07 o' clock a.m.,
NUNZIO J.
PALLADINO, Chairman 18 of the Commission, presiding.
19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
20 NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, Chairman of the Commission 21 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 22 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission 23 FREDERICK M.
BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 24 25
s 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2 T. ROTHSCHILD T
3 D. WARD 4
D.
OKRENT 5
F. REMICK 6
G.
REED 7
H.
LEWIS 8
J.
EBERSOLE 9
M.
CARBON 10 C.
SIESS 11 C.
WYLIE 12 W.
KERR 13 C. MICHELSON 14 D. MOELLER 15 C. MARK 16 H.
ETHERINGTON 17 18 AUDIENCE SPEAKERS:
19 R.
FRALEY i
20 21 4
22 23 24 25 1
u <
l 3
1 PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Good morning, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
Commissioner Asselstine has been detained but he 4
will be here in a few minutes.* His office suggested we start 5
without him.
As you may know Commissioner Zech is on travel.
6 This morning we are holding one of our periodic 7
meetings with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and 8
we are pleased to welcome them to the Commission meeting room 9
again.
10 Our last periodic meeting with the Committee was on 11 November 7, 1985 with a special meeting on safety goals on 12 March 28th of this year.
13 We have a rather ambitious agenda for today's 14 meeting.
There are five subjects scheduled for discussion, 15 anticipated ACRS activities and resources in light of budget 16 reductions, the scope of ACRS activities regarding TVA, the
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17 responses to recommendations of panel on ACRS effectiveness, 18 the ACRS review of the GESSAR II Report and the proposal for a 19 national training academy.
20 I suggest that if we do not have time to cover all 21 five topics today, we schedule another meeting in the near 22 future.
I understand that copies of the three relevant ACRS 23 letters to the Commission and the agenda for today's meeting 24 are available on the table in the back of the room.
25 We look forward to hearing the ACRS views on these
4 1
important topics.
Let me ask my fellow Commissioners if they 2
have any additional opening remarks?
3 (No response.)
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Then let me turn 5
the meeting over to Dave Ward, the chairman.
6 MR. WARD:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and 7
Commissioners.
We are pleased to be here again with you, 8
also.
The first three topics fall in one sort of envelope and 9
I will address those.
We would like to spend about half of 10 the meeting time or 45 minutes on that package of three things 11 if that is reasonable.
12 The second topic on GESSAR, perhaps 30 minutes or so 13 and Dr. Remick and Dr. Okrent will take the lead on that and 14 then the item on the proposed federal academy, about 15 15 minutes is what we have in mind and Mr. Reed will take the 16 lead on that.
17 (At this point in the proceedings, Commissioner 18 Asselstine entered the meeting.)
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
all right.
20 MR. WARD:
I will go ahead with the first topic 21 which is priorities for ACRS and the use of ACRS resources.
I 22 think there are two significant influences that have caused us 23 recently to study and to develop a fairly explicit plan for he 24 scope and content of our future committee activities.
25 The first of these is the changing nature of the
5 1
regulatory scene.
There are a few operating license reviews 2
and many operating plants.
In this, we have had help from the 3
Effectiveness Panel which we appointed last year and I will 4
address that in more detail a little later.
5 The second influence has been the rather drastic 6
reduction in the manpower and resources budgeted for the
?
7 committee for fiscal 1987.
Our FTE allotment is being reduced 8
from 54 of about two years ago to 42 in 1987.
Our FTE total 9
includes the members and our professional consultants and also 10 the technical staff and the administrative staff under Ray 11 Fraley.
That is included in the total of 42.
12 There have been commensurate cuts made in the budget 13 allowances for travel and related expenses and this, of 14 course, is an item highly critical for members.
None of us 15 are privileged to live in Washington so travel is important to 16 us.
17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Was there a note of irony in 18 that?
19 (Laughter.)
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We like that outside view, I 21 think.
22 MR. WARD:
I would like first to describe how we 23 plan to make cuts in control to the lower budget and then discuss what we plan to work on and what we plan to drop in 24 25 the future.
6 1
Our first cut is one which we have already started 2
on.
It is a fairly deep one in our administrative and 3
clerical services provided to the members.
We have reduced 4
and plan further reductions in the amount of documentation and 5
the sorting of documentation supplied to members and we will 6
make some reductions in the comprehensiveness of the technical 7
records we keep of our activities, of our meetings.
8 This, I think, has two negatives associated with 9
it.
First, we are going to be more dependent on the NRC staff 10 and other sources for raising issues and less on the 11 initiatives that members are able to develop out of their more 12 comprehensive review of documents.
13 Second, there is going to be less support for 14 members, administrative support for members, meaning a 15 decrease in their individual efficiency and effectiveness.
16 Our second cut, somewhat less deep, will be in our 17 technical staff.
Combined with the decrease in allotments for 18 travel and related expenses, this is going to make necessary a 19 decrease in our program activities.
=
20 I can best express this as a decrease in the number 21 of subcommittee meetings which have averaged about 110 per 22 year in recent years down to about 85 in fiscal 1987.
We 23 believe we can maintain the level as high as 85 by more 24 efficient scheduling, more back-to-back meetings, for example, 25 filling up weeks with meetings.
7 l
1 However, I should comment that these changes, less 2
support for members and then this rescheduling, more efficient 3
scheduling of subcommittee meetings, can present a problem for 4
members.
Many of the members have other jobs to which they 5
must attend and there is considerable inconvenience.
I think 4
6 this may be regarded as not the world's most attractive job as 7
it is and I think we don't want to make it too much less I
8 attractive by undesirable restrictions on the freedom that 9
members have with their time.
10 Well, back to the subcommittees.
Traditionally, it 11 is our subcommittees that furnish the program leadership in 12 each specific area, technical area, or set of issues for the 13 overall committee.
Thus, the most straight forward way we i
14 have to control and prioritize the use of our more limited 15 resources in the future is to control our subcommittee 16 activities.
17 We have divided our program activities into six mission areas and beginning now and extended into fiscal 1987, 18 19 we intend to devote approximately the following proportions of 20 our total ACRS effort to each and I will have to apologize for 21 the two digit accuracy of these estimates but it is our 22 attempt at budgeting our resources.
23 First of all, for operating reactors, we intend to 24 spend about 30 percent of our effort in the future; for 25 generic issues and unresolved safety issues, about 28 percent; I
I
- - -l
8 l
l 1
safety research, nine' percent; the area of high level waste, l
2 12 percent; control of radioactive exposure, three percent; 3
and future plant designs, six percent; and then we have set 4
aside 12 percent for contingencies.
5 Let me say a word about at least some of these.
6 This attention t'o operating reactors, 30 percent of our total 7
effort, represents a significant increase from a year or two 8
ago.
This includes in addition to really just one or two NTOL 9
reviews that are anticipated in the coming year, it includes 10 our review of TVA efforts which I will speak more on in a few 11 minutes and also the bi-monthly meetings we have with your 12 staff in reviewing recent operating events.
13 To extend this, we have formed two or three new 14 subcommittees, I guess, four new subcommittees actually and we 15 intend to have some limited activity with each of these.
16 The first is going to be a subcommittee which will 17 address itself to what is called a systematic assessment of i
18 operations.
We want to pay more attention to the work that 19 the AEOD is doing.
We would like to pay more attention to 20 similar work that is being done in the industry, particularly 21 by INPO, rather than looking at individual events on an 22 anecdotal basis.
We would like to pay more attention to kind 23 of the integrated experience that the industry is having.
24 Second, we plan to spend a little time with the new
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25 subcommittee looking at plant operating procedures especially
9 1
the new emergency operating procedures that have been 2
developed.
3 Third, we want to since a major part of the 4
regulatory activities that are going on are actually being i
5 conducted by programs in the regions, we would like to have 6
somewhat more contact with these regional activities and we 7
plan to do that through a new subcommittee.
8 Then finally, we believe that in the past we have 9
not paid enough attention to the inspection and enforcement 10 programs and we know there are some new initiatives that are 11 being undertaken there and we plan to devote the time of a 12 subcommittee to a study of that work.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Could I just ask a question 14 about plant operations?
How often to members of the ACRS 15 actually get into operating nuclear power plants?
16 MR. WARD:
Well, of course with every NTOL there is t
17 a plant visit by the subcommittee for that project.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Right.
19 MR. WARD:
Once the plants are operating, the visits 20 are less frequent.
We don't really have a method to 21 systematically visit more plants.
When there has been a 22 significantly event at a plant or something particularly 23 unique, we do but there are not many of them.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Isn't that going to be 25 necessary if you are going to adopt a broader role in plant i
10 1
operations and evaluation of operating procedures and things 2
like that to spend more time on site so-to-speak?
Maybe that l
3 is not necessary but it would seem to me that it is kind of I
4 hard to do that unless you do.
5 MR. WARD:
I think so and we really -- part of the 6
intent of this regional subcommittee is not only to review i
7 regional programs but through contact with the regional 8
inspectors and get a closer association with the plants.
9 MR. EBERSOLE:
Dave, let me make a statement.
I 10 think the notion that going to a plant, the thought may be 11 that you learn a great deal, you know, by simply physically 12 being there and walking around.
But remember, you arrange 13 your visit and what you see at the plant is always -- you i
14 don't really see near as a composite picture of the plant when 4
15 you go into it and start probing around there unless you are 16 looking for a specific detail like the lousy way that they 17 keep the cleanliness matters or the maintenance records or j
18 whatever.
19 I think the notion of physically going into the i
20 plant has to mostly be associated with pointed objectives to 21 look at something rather highly specific and you don't get the 22 general view thet might be-thought by many that you now 23 understand the plant because you visited it.
You get a lot 24 more out of that by going to paper.
i 25 COMMISSIONER BERUTHAL:
Yes, I agree with that.
l l
. - -. ~ -. -.--.
11 1
Nevertheless, other things being equal, it seems to me that it 2
would be better to have been there than not to have been 3
there.
4 MR. EBERSOLE:
Oh, yes.
Iu gives you a flavor of 5
what is going on.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
7 MR. EBERSOLE:
Like the Japanese plants, for 8
instance, you instantly know that everything is probably well 9
done just by the physical view of how wells things on the lo surface look.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
But aside from that and 12 perhaps more important than that and unfortunately less 13 practical than that would, of course, be to have members that 14 have actual operating experience.
I doubt whether any of you 15 are interested in a post doctorate and becoming senior reactor 16 operators at this point.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But there is some of that 18 experience on the committee.
19 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, there is.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
There is what?
l f
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There is some of that 22 expericace on the committee.
23 MR. LEWIS:
There is an intermediate position.
24 I never really thought about this in this context but always i
i 25 from the aviation experience, I remember I used to carry and I
12 1
don't have it anymore since people got hijacking nervous, I j
2 used to carry a cockpit pass for commercial airlines which 3
would enable me to just go up and sit through a flight and I 4
have sat through emergencies in* cockpits and talked to pilots 5
when they were on auto-pilot and, therefore, really had 4
6 nothing to do and that sort of thing.
t 7
You learn an awful lot that way that you don't learn 8
by going in.
I don't know whether we have the authorization 9
or not to go sit through a shift in a control room, just a 10 typical shift, you know, spend the damn eight hours and 11 whatever happens, happens.
That would probably be very useful 12 experience.
13 MR. EBERSOLE:
It might be very boring though.
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. LEWIS:
Well, so is flying.
1 16 MR. EBERSOLE:
If it would be interesting, we are in 17 trouble.
18 MR. LEWIS:
No.
That is not true, Jesse, because 19 based on the flying experience, during the boring parts you 20 get to speak rather informally with the operators and you 21 learn a lot of things that you don't learn when you are a VIP 22 taking a tour that you guys will never learn when you go 23 through a plant because you can establish your credentials and i
24 in the end they find out you are really a good guy who is not 25 going to go snitch and they tell you things that you would not
13 1
otherwise hear and if, for a moment, it is exciting which 2
occasional airplane flights are, too, you are there when it 3
happens.
4 It is just better than walking in with a tour guide 5
and saying, "Oh, aren't those nice knobs."
I don't know l
6 whether we have the authorization to do that kind of thing.
7 MR. REED:
I would like to make a point as an j
8 operator type and pick up on the word, " practical."
I don't 1
9 think it is practical and it might be disruptive and 10 hindsighting and all kinds of things to have ACRS people I
11 perform what I think should be performed by resident 12 inspectors and I&E personnel.
13 MR. LEWIS:
I am not talking about inspections.
14 MR. REED:
Monitoring of plants or going into plants 15 and it is going to be a very superficial scene as Jesse has 16 pointed out and I wouldn't think that there would be any 17 benefit from ACRS members unless they had lots of time and we 18 had a huge budget.
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
This sounds like a good subject 20 to give some attention to on the part of the Committee.
f 21 MR. WARD:
I think I would like to correct that 22 impression though.
I don't think any of us would expect to go I
23 into a plant to audit that plant.
24 MR. LEWIS:
No.
25 MR. WARD:
We are going into the plant to provide
.,-~_.--_,.m..
9 14 1
ourselves with s,ome background.
2 MR. LEWIS:
Glenn was attacking the wrong idea.
In 3
aircraft, right behind the pilot's seat there is what is 4
called the " jump seat."
It is precisely for people who are 5
not going to interfere with the handling of the airplane but 6
are there to sort of be observers and gab.
i l
7 It is also true that the FAA inspector when he is 8
there sits in the jump seat but then he is there as a 9
credentialed inspector.
That is certainly not what I was 10 suggesting.
11 MR. WARD:
Let me mention one other thing.
The INPO 12 has for several years put together these teams that make 13 in-depth, I guess, two-week audits of operations in a plant.
14 MR. REMICK:
Evaluation systems.
15 MR. WARD:
Evaluations, yes.
Some of our members 16 have participated in those and others of us are scheduled to i
17 participate in some in the near future and it is really to do 18 the sort of thing that I think you are suggesting, 19 Commissioner Bernthal, help us to calibrate ourselves and get 4
20 our feet on the ground a little bit.
i 21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Dade Moeller had his hand up l
22 earlier.
23 MR. MOELLER:
I merely wanted to comnent on what 24 Dave Ward has just mentioned.
Carlyle Michelson and I and i
25 perhaps others have joined INPO evaluation teams.
I spent a
15 1
I week at Farley in October of 1984 and a week at Pilgrim in 2
October of 1985.
I k
3 The way we worked it out was that they evaluate
)
i 4
some, let's say, ten or 12 different subject areas or programs l
5 within the plant and I was able to spend a half of a day with 1
1 6
each different team.
I found it extremely valuable and I hope i
I 7
to go back.
8 I think, too, personally I would like to go with an l
j 9
NRC inspection team and compare what they do to what I have 1
i 10 seen INPO do.
l 11 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I comment?
I have long endorsed j
12 the idea since we can't go to plants which are in emergency
)
13 states and see what happens that we have something like a i
l 14 cockpit scanner and I am talking about a video monitor which
{
15 will scan control room activity triggered by the initiation of 16 an emergency to enable us to see really what physically went a
i 17 on, what the operators knew.
You get the record later on to 18 compare with the video screen and see just how physically even 19 the sweat on the brow of the operator if you want it, how he i
i 20 responds to whatever emergency state he gets in.
i 21 I would always endorse that sort of documentation as 22 I would in an airplane cockpit.
1 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Forrest.
I 24 MR. REMIC10:
I just want to emphasize the fact that l
25 some of us do get into plants.
I would guess in the last 12 l
16
{
1 or 13 months I can think of five U.S.
plants not counting 2
Japanese plants that I have been in and I would say on an 3
annual basis, I probably have averaged three and I do think it i
4 is extremely valuable but some of us are doing that type of 5
thing.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You might want to address this 7
in the Committee a little further.
All right.
Do you want to i
8 go on?
i 9
MR. WARD:
Yes.
I mentioned that we intended to 10 spend or we are budgeting about six percent of our effort for 11 the next year in review of future plant designs.
The extent i
12 to which we do that is going to depend to a large extent on 13 whether the staff -- on what the staff intends to do and what 14 you intend to have the staff do in that area.
15 Our present understanding is that there is no staff 16 effort budgeted for these activities and I am talking about i
17 both advanced reactor concepts and advanced LWR designs.
We 18 have some concerns about whether it is really wise to zero out 19 the effort in this area and we may comment on that later.
i 1
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
The cutback was on research i
j 21 with regard to these units.
If we get a real case to address, 22 we are going to have to address it, I presume.
l 23 MR. CARBON:
Excuse me, Joe.
I think also if I J
24 understand correctly, there is a cutback in the NRR peoole d
25 working with DOE people on the advanced liquid metal and gas l
17 1
reactor activities.
T' hat is not research.
That is NRR.
t 2
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Yes.
That is why I crossed out l
l 3
the word " entirely" as I started to speak because we did have 4
some cutbacks in following what other people are doing.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
My mind was somewhere else 6
when this discussion began but I gather we are talking about i
f 7
advanced reactor work within our own staff.
I 8
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The fact is that our staff j
10 sent a letter to DOE saying they,are not going to be able to l
11 do the work that DOE wants us to do.
To my knowledge, that
{
12 has not yet been addressed.
If we are not going to do it, j
13 then Congress ought to be aware of the fact that we are not 1
14 even meeting the minimal internal administration requirements 15 for reviewing advanced reactors in this Agency.
f 16 To me, that is unacceptable.
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That is.*xactly the view I I
18 have.
j 19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We have a lot of j
20 unacceptables.
We will have to choose among them.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is a small amount of 22 money.
1 23 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
True.
I 24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I am convinced that there is i
i 25 that amount of money to be saved in administration in this i
t
1 i
18 1
Agency.
We just need to do it.
That is all.
2 MR. CARBON:
Let me add that the Committee has not 3
discussed this, just my own personal view.
I strongly share 4
your view, Commissioner Bernthal.
I think we really ought to 5
be spending some of our resources to look at advanced plants, 6
seed money, so-to-speak.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
The point is that the FAA, i
8 the amazing thing to me is that when I came to this Commission 9
there was great resistance to doing any of that kind of work.
10 It was said by some that it simply was not our responsibility f
11 and even the law was interpreted as prohibiting it.
- Well, 12 that simply was not true.
13 The FAA makes a practice and a habit and has for 14 years as I understand it of sitting down with airframe 15 manufacture'rs along the design steps that are taken in 16 developing new airframes and for us not to do that ahead of 17 time in the process of new plant design just means that the 18 odds are high that in the 1990's for any new design, we will 19 be right back where we were in the 1960's and 1970's.
l 20 I think that would be a terrible mistake.
I think 21 we should be prepared to sit down with these people and tell
{
22 them what we think is good and what is bad about safety l
23 characteristics as the designs are developed.
{
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think whatever advice or l
25 comments you might want to provide to us on what kind of an
)
19 1
approach or program the Agency should have on reactors would 2
be very helpful.
It might help focus Commission attention on i
3 what resources can useful be provided in this area.
4 MR. WARD:
All right.
Thank you.
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes, I agree, obviously.
6 MR. WARD:
I mentioned that we set aside 12 percent 7
of our resources for contingencies.
This is a reaction to 8
events that develop in response to Commission requests or l
9 Congressional requests.
10 Historically, we have really spent somewhat more 4
11 than that each year and I think you may find that in the 12 future we will be a little more sparing in some of our 13 responses to requests but I think that will just have to be an 14 efficiency we accomplish.
15 We intend to spend no ACRS effort on the following 16 list of items.
Low level waste is one although Dr. Moeller
)
17 thinks he may be able to squeeze out some effort by devoting a 18 little bit of time in subcommittee meetings on other topics to 19 this.
But certainly there is not going to be any major 20 effort.
21 In the past we have spent a little bit of time on a i
22 sort of bundle of activities that might be called the 23 regulatory process and we don't plan to spend any effort on 24 that.
25 Of course, fuel fabrication and mill tailings, no i
20 1
ACRS activity is planned for that.
2 Probably more significant, we will be spending 3
significantly fewer resources on the unresolved safety 4
issues.
This is still going to be an important area but we 5
won't be spending nearly as much time as we had in the past on 6.
unresolved safety issues, the long list of generic issues and I
7 the investigation and exploration of issues that individual 8
members would like to pursue.
9 I think that is kind of a negative that we just 10 won't have as much flexibility and freedom for probing into 11 areas that I think in the past have sometimes shown to have 12 been useful that we probed into.
13 Then we will be spending significantly less time on 14 the safety research program and that is probably not 15 inappropriate but there is a reduction in the effort that we 16 are going to spend there.
17 I would like to turn next to second topic which is 18 described to you what we plan to do insofar as a review of the 19 TVA situation.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me make a ccmment on 21 budget.
You know, we are facing cutbacks and we are going to 22 have to learn from our experience whether we have cut back in 23 the right places and I would suggest that the chairman of the 24 ACRS meet periodically with say the Chairman of the NRC to 25 discuss changes that appear to be taking place either for the
21 1
good or the bad that might be based on resources.
2 I think it is important for us to understand what 3
you are doing and what you are not doing and I appreciate the 4
efforts you are making to cope With our reductions.
5 All right, go ahead to topic number two.
6 MR. WARD:
You have recently asked that we describe 7
the natu.e of the proposed ACRS review of TVA's reorganization 8
or restart plans.
On April 7th, I wrote a letter to Chairman 9
i lladino on this subject and let me just summarize what was 10 said there.
11 We understand from preliminary briefings and from 12 the very extensive documentation that a number of safety 13 issues have been identified at the TVA plants.
These have 14 been identified by the NRC staff and, of course, by TVA 15 itself.
l 16 These include equipment qualification issues, 17 operational readiness, design control, QA, safety concerns of 18 employees and others.
l 19 The common thread among these seems to be again and 20 is acknowledged by both TVA and the staff, the common thread 21 seems to be problems in management and organization of TVA 22 efforts.
23 These are concerns apparently occurring at both the 24 plant and at corporate levels.
25 The ACRS is interested in reviewing information
22 1
about these problem areas and about the possible causes.
We 2
believe we have a responsibility to the commission to provide 3
it with our perspective on any safety problems that have 4
existed, the causes and the effectiveness of actions and 1
1 5
programs proposed to correct the problems.
6 The review we plan is, I believe, consistent with 7
our charter and certainly is within the envelope of issues 8
that we have reviewed many times in the past.
i 9
For example, in every operating license review the 10 Committee must consider the applicant's FSAR and the SER l
11 provided by the staff.
Important chapters and sections in 12 these documents are concerned with, for example, management i
13 and technical support organizations, operating organizations, 14 qualification of nuclear power plant personnel and j
15 administrative procedures.
16 Our reports to the commission have often included I
17 advice or comments related to these matters.
In a report of four or five years ago for a particular operating license 18 19 application, we stated, for example, and I will just give you 20 a few quotes, " Management has not been successful in putting 21 together a team of experienced and qualified personnel we l
22 believe will be necessary."
j 23 Another quote, "An extraordinary effort will be i
24 required to prepare the management and staff for operation."
25 Another one, "A more concerted effort is needed to build an i
i
23 1
integrated organization."
Another one, "Better use should be 2
made of resources other than the applicant's organization and 1
3 its contractors to provide professional expertise for its 4
safety review committee."
"The training program has suffered 5
from a lack of professional direction."
6 All of these concerns were addressed by the 7
Commission, by your staff and by the applicant and extensive l
8 changes were made in that applicant's organization over the 9
course of two or three years actually before the operating 10 license was granted.
d 11 My understanding is that these improvements, these 12 changes were improvements and the operation of the plant has 13 been successful.
14 As you know the ACRS does not have the resources to 15 make in-depth first party investigations.
Instead, we depend 16 on second hand information, reviews of documentation and 17 interactive meetings with applicants, licensees, staff and 18 consulting experts.
19 This is exactly what we plan for our TVA review.
20 After several delays our initial subcommittee meeting is l
21 planned for May 20th with a possible full Committee meeting in 22 June.
Depending on what we hear and on the program in i
23 progress by TVA and the staff, there may or may not be another 1
i 24 meeting or meetings following that.
25 j
If we have something to report as a result of these
i h
24
}
j 1
meetings, we will write you a letter on the subject in June or 2
perhaps somewhat later.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Are you dovetailing your plans j
4 with regard to reviewing TVA with NRC staff so that things go I
5 in the sequence that is most efficient to all?
l 6
MR. WARD:
We certainly intend to do that.
There is 7
no reason why we shouldn't.
I don't think there is anything j
8 pushing us to do otherwise.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
As you know or may not know, I
l 10 I assume you know, I was one that wondered whether the ACRS i
f 11 would be able to make a timely contribution to the problems 12 that TVA has had.
I guess it touches on a larger concern and l
1 13 that is why with all the Monday morning quarterbacking that 14 has been done on the TVA problem, when our staff clearly laid 15 out the depth of those problems last summer, that is something
)
16 that has been forgotten by the press conveniently and by a lot l
17 of others, those problems were laid out in great detail last 18 July by the staff of the NRC.
I
{
19 Perhaps the Commission can ask itself why it wasn't 20 more attentive to its own staff even at that time but one l
1
{
21 wonders why we are all sort of coming in late and therefore 22 my question was whether with all of the second guessing 23 particularly on management, how did the management system 24 allow this to arise, what is to be done about it, not the 1
25 least of the second guessing, of course, is going on at 1
k
=_.
25 1
Capital Hill with bills being proposed, drafted to reorganize 2
the entire board structure and Lord knows what else.
3 I guess my question was simply one of whether or 4
what you could do in that regard at this date now that would 5
be timely and make sense in terms of resource utilization.
6 MR. EBERSOLE:
May I make a comment?
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
8 NGr. EBERSOLE:
I worked for that outfit for 38 l
9 years.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Can you speak into the 11 microphone, Jesse, because people in the back can't hear.
12 MR. EBERSGLE:
In all those years, people worked in 13 a highly compartmentalized areas.
There was no overview, no i
14 integral central control, there was no master of anything.
15 As a matter of fact, the fundamental philosophy of 16 that whole operation was and I once investigated it, was the 4
17 theory of individual initiatives which, you know, is the kind 18 you have in an ant bed or a honey hive.
l 19 (Laughter.)
3 20 MR. EBERSOLE:
Somehow instinct will produce the i
21 product.
So I think we never asked the right questions l
because nobody had the prerogative to do it.
Is there a 22 4
23 closure on this particular effort?
I initiate a concept, a i
24 design, a detail and mine is design, will I ever see it come l
l 25 back to me in reality on paper that it was confirmed and is in i
- - - - - - - - - -l
26 1
place and will be run the right way.
2 There was no closure.
It was an open ended stream 3
that went to the ocean and never came home.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Typical bureaucracy.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
Yes.
So there was no one in charge 6
anywhere.
There was a horror of being in charge.
If 7
anything, there was a search for ambiguity.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Refresh my memory, when did i
9 you retire?
10 MR. EBERSOLE:
I saw the thing coming on in 1976 and l
11 I had a chance to join this esteemed outfit here and I left in 12 great happiness to get away.
I was followed later by my 13 colleague, 40r. Michelson.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I would expect that your thrust 15 would be at looking at the interaction of the organization 16 that is going to run this TVA system and the safety issues 17 involved, in other words, looking forward rather than backward 18 as a major thrust.
19 MR. WARD:
Yes, definitely.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I was just going to say that 21 it sounds like it is very interesting to hear you say that, 22 7 esse, it sounds like maybe you ought to write a letter to 23 Mr. Dingell right away expressing that.
24 MR. EBERSOLE:
To go back in history, I think you 25 can build hydro plants that way and that was the first effort
e 27 1
back in the 1930's.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Yes.
3 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think you can build coal plants 4
that way and you can compartmentalize the technical effort and 5
nobody looks at the integral picture.
I can tell you some 6
fascinating stories about some details that come out of this 7
compartmentalization and the operational consequences, you 8
know, when a $40.00 limit switch smears ten units in three 9
minutes.
10 I think it was an extrapolation of history and 11 practice thought by the management at that time that could be 12 applicable to the nuclear effort.
The effort, they were told, 13 you are going to have to increase your costs for personnel, 14 for review, for paper by a factor of two to four.
Even the 15 party who said that was a Mr. Culver who is still down there.
16 He told the management then that you must take a totally 17 different view.
He was not listened to.
18 So the old system of open-ended fire an arrow into 19 the air and never look at where it went anyway because in 20 essence you have sold it to the next participant and it went 21 into the darkness.
There was no focal point of integral 22 control.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It does seem to me that 24 there are a number of interesting questions that need to be 25 answered for us to ensure ourselves that these problems have
i 28 i
j 1
really been identified and have been fixed this time and fixed 2
once and for all.
j 3
I have no problem with the approach that you have i
4 outlined in your letter and it seems to me that the ACRS may 5
well be able to make a contribution on some of those 6
questions.
7 One, for example, that strikes me as particularly 8
interesting is how valid are the criteria that TVA will be 9
using in terms of going about doing their corrective program, l
10 design control, for example.
Are they going to be using the l
right standards in terms of how broad a look they take so that 11 12 we really have the assurance that when they start back up,
)
l 1
13 they will have a plant where they really know what is there, 14 that the drawings match what is there in the field and the i
15 plant as it now exists really matches the design basis for the i
i 16 plant so that we can have a high degree of assurance that we t
17 are not going to see more of these problems down the road.
]
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
To the extent that that is 19 the sort of thing that we focus on, I couldn't agree more, 20 Jim.
I think that is the sort of thing that I would hope that 21 we can get out from any group frankly that might look at TVA 22 and particularly from ACRS.
{
23 I was just concerned.
Jesse, you clearly have 24 special expertise in this area and perhaps ought to speak as 25 an individual as well as speaking through ACRS.
But I was
\\
.~
29 1
just concerned that when the railroad is well down the track 2
we have an extraordinarily capable individual now down there 3
trying to do the job, I*am concerned that on pure management 4
questions there are lots of ways to skin a cat managerially 5
and on a pure management issue, the history is very important 6
and very interesting and it will be, I suspect, especially to 7
Mr. Flippo and some others that are looking at legislation.
8 We don't want to interfere with someone that I 9
believe has a firm management hand now and is headed in the 10 right direction and second guessing that process.
That is 11 really, I guess, the seed of my concern.
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Tom.
13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
At the risk of cffending 14 anybody, I will just have to tell you that I do not think that 15 the ACRS should be looking into TVA and I will tell you 16 precisely why.
The Panel on'ACRS Effectiveness, the first l
17 recommendation was and I am quoting, "We believe an advisory 18 group as the ACRS will still Le strongly needed in the 19 future.
However, ACRS should turn its attention to 20 concentrate on the broad technical policy questions on which 21 the Commission needs wise counsel."
22 I do not think that a specific utility, I don't care 23 if it is five or seven plants or however you want to count it, 24 I don't consider that a broad, technical policy question.
25 I certainly would not say that there is nothing
i l
1 30 i
i 1
amiss at TVA and this Agency does not have some responsibility i
2 to carry out its regulatory requirements.
I am not saying 3
that in any way but you told us, you bleed all over the table 4
t 4
over the budget cuts.
We are sydpathetic to that.
I 5
certainly am.
6 (Laughter.)
\\
j 7
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I don't consider the TVA a l
8 bread, technical policy question.
.I j
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I wonder if I could make a
\\
}
10 comment.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I would love to sit down and j
12 spend a day with you and hear war stories about TVA, believe 13 me, along with Carlyle but we are talking about something 14 different.
l
{
15 MR. EBERSOLE:
Commissioner Rcberts, I was going to 16 tell you that just yesterday we were talking about such a minute matter as detonators which get poisoned into boiling 17 l
l 18 water reactors and how they are mal-designed and mal-connected l
19 and shouldn't be that way.
J 20 MR. LEWIS:
You shouldn't have been doing that I
21 either.
22 (Laughter.)
23 MR. EBERSOLE:
Then I want to say this.
I examined j
24 the report of this committee that looked at this committee and 1
l 25 I was really interested in their adherence to this thesis of J
31 1
broad cosmic matters and examining man-by-man-by-man that was 2
on that, I concluded that is the only kind of thing they ever 3
knew anything about.
4 (Laughter.)
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I would like to make an 6
observation or two.
I think that looking at broad issues is fine but if you don't keep up to date of what is going on in 7
8 the plants, you are sort of working in a little bit of 9
isolation.
10 I think that issues related to safety matters and 11 there are important safety matters involved at TVA is an area 12 in which we should get Committee guidance, counsel or advice 13 or recommendations.
I think whatever it takes, whatever the 14 Committee thinks it takes, to give us sound realistic advice, 15 they should undertake to do.
16 If in the process of looking at safety issues, the 17 interaction of management, and maintenance, for example, or 18 management in operator training or management in anything 19 else, to the extent those are important to giving us the 20 advice on safety issues, I think they should be apart of the 21 Committee's activities.
22 MR. MARK:
Joe, I think it was our chairman who coined what is an actually marvelous phrase and I would hate 23 24 to have it not recognized for what it really is.
We are directed to examine the state of tnc forest but it is prudent 25
.~
32 1
in that connection to at least look at a few of the trees.
2 (Laughter.)
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would have to say that, 4
Tom, I disagree with --
5 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I am aware of that.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
-- your view that there 7
aren't some fairly broad technical policy questions involved 8
in the whole TVA experience.
It seems to me that one of the 9
things that all of us, Commission and the ACRS, ought to be 10 thinking about is what role management plays as a major 11 contributor to the quality of plant operations and how in the 12 world we can change both the industry philosophy and the 13 regulatory approach to ensure that where there are pervasive 14 prc'-lems and breakdowns in that area that is such a vital 15 contributor to plant risk that we can identify and fix those 16 things early on.
17 To a certain extent that requires a backward look 18 and a look at specific cases like TVA but I can't think of a 19 better use of our time and the ACRS' time quite frankly than 20 focusing in on an issue like that and making sure that in the 21 future we have a regulatory approach and an industry philosophy that means that we won't end up in this kind of a 22 23 mess with other utilities down the road.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNIHAL:
If we ever have an analogous 25 circumstance in any other utility, Jim.
This is unique.
o 33 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There certainly seems to 2
be attention on the part of others to make sure --
3 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
There is no question about 4
the amount of attention but I would think a more useful 5
exercise would be for the ACRS to address the allegation and i 6
use that word advisedly that the regulatory process of the NRC 7
completely broke down and quote " allowed this situation at TVA 8
to develop."
9 I would be more interested in that approach.
There 10 are plenty of people looking at TVA.
11 MR. EBERSOLE:
These are closure questions.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, that is at least part 13 of the question I raise.
That is right.
14 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Nevertheless, the charter of 15 the ACRS has among other things that it shall advise the 16 Commission with regard to the hazards of. proposed or existing 17 reactor facilities and these are existing reactor facilities.
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think that if you 19 integrate everything that has been saic there may be some 20 sense in all of it.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. LEWIS:
That is really high praise.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MR. CARBON:
He didn't say he was praising us!
25 (Laughter.)
\\
34 1
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There clearly is a useful 2
role.
It seems to me there clearly is'a role that perhaps TVA 3
has had enough of already and that was my fundamental 4
concern.
Enough said, at least on my part.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
Any more on this 6
topic?
7 MR. WARD:
I think we have no intention of joining 8
in the beating of TVA.
We would like to understand whether 9
the programs and the changes that are going to be proposed, we 10 would like to give you our perspective on whether they are 11 really going to be effective in addressing those real safety 12 problems to the extent that they have been identified.
13 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I was going to shut up but 14 one more sentence here.
I think Tom has made a good point and 15 I sense that Jim agrees with it and on thinking a minute, I 16 agree strongly with it as well that it might be worth having 17 ACRS taking a look at how the NRC and the NRC staff and 18 perhaps the commission itself performed in this whole thing.
19 I wouldn't mind an outside authoritative opinion on 20 exactly what more this Agency could have or should have done 21 especially on some of these technical matters early on.
It is 22 very interesting to go back and read what our staff had to say 2'
along the road here and it ain't as bad as it has been 24 portrayed by a lot of people to be.
25 Our problem is inability to deal with these things
e 35 1
because it is fundamentally management.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
As a person about to depart the 3
NRC, I encourage not to invite any more investigations of how 4
NRC does business because we are having a tough time having 5
time to do the business.
6 (Laughter.)
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We are a little bit in the same 8
position as TVA.
I am not saying that we shouldn't look 9
introspectively into our operations but it seems like we are 10 doing that every time we turn around or there is another group 11 doing it.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I take it back.
Maybe you 13 can't make any sense out of all of this.
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. LEWIS:
The answer to what you just said, Joe, is we are going to make trouble for you anyway.
Should it be 16 17 on this subject or some other one?
18 (Laughter.)
19 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think you have different 20 points of view and I would encourage the Committee at least as 21 far as I am concerned to follow its charter and what it takes 22 to do the job is what it takes to do the job as you see it.
23 MR. LEWIS:
You know the mathematical definition of 24 that, that there exist people whose horizon has radius of zero 25 and they call it a point of view.
l r
l j
36 1
(Laughter.)
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It does seem to me though 3
that there is an opportunity here to take a look without 4
necessarily being critical or finding fault with performance 5
of individuals or even groups at how effectively or 6
ineffectively we deal with something like management, what 7
contribution it really makes, how we deal with it, how we find 8
it difficult to deal with the question like that and how we 9
might improve our ability to deal with management problems and 10 management's contribution to safety.
11 I guess I am coming =cre and merc to the conclusion 12 that it is a fundamental aspect and probably the single 13 biggest determinant between those companies that have a very 14 successful program and those that end up on the other end of 15 the scale.
16 MR. CARBON:
I have been sitting here thinking about 17 injecting and saying something along the same lines.
1 18 I personally think that the heart of safety in a 19 nuclear power plant operation is the attitude of management.
20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
21 MR. CARBON:
If they really want a safe operation 22 and push for it and if they are reasonably competent, they 23 will get it.
If they think that this is all just a bunch of 24
" bull," we will get that, too.
I think it is really rlynt at 25 the heart of safety.
a
-37 1
MR. EBERSOLE:
Here, here!
I agree with that.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, and I think it is i
I 3
sometimes easier to identify the areas or the instances in 4
which there are weaknesses than to deal very effectively with i
5 turning the situation around short of a major calamity.
6 MR. CARBON:
Let me add one more point to this, 7
too.
Management can accomplish their objective in a lot of I
8 different ways.
There is hands-on management and there is 9
hands-off management and all that sort of thing but their lo attitude, their attitude, I think, is really the basic thing 11 in here, if they really are shooting for safety, if they 12 really want to stress it and push it and so on, in contrast to 13 so what.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
Let me add a little color to this you 15 might enjoy.
When TVA undertook its first plant, Browns 16 Ferry, that was in 1966, they had a cadre of about 40 people 17 that I had put together at Oak Ridge and they took them up and 18 distributed them all over the place and the portion that went 19 to the design department were put in a dark corner, a 20 subordinate corner of the mechanical branch, having a degree 21 of influence and control equivalent to that of the heating and 22 ventilating section.
23 It is a piece of accurate history!
24 (Laughter.)
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
i
-,_..,...e
.~
38 l
1 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That showed the attitude!
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Quality assurance is 3
another example as well.-
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
All I can say and I hope 5
this all is of some assistance to the ACRS as it begins its 6
deliberations, all I can say is that having identified that 7
there was a problem long ago, technical problems at TVA, 8
having realized long ago as many of us did and many of us 9
worked quietly to try and bring about change that there was a 10 management problem, having failed at that all I can say is 11 that you are going to have to start looking at some 12 legislative change if you really want this Agency to be 13 starting to tell private and other federal entities who they 14 are going to keep and who they are going to fire in 15 management.
16 That is finally what this issue comes down to.
We 17 can complain, we can put pressure on but finally, you are 18 talking about people, you are talking about salaries in the 19 case of TVA and this Commission was unwilling to say anything 20 strong even about salaries, Jim.
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I know that but I am not 22 convinced that salaries was the biggest part of the problem.
23 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You have to learn to walk 24 before you can run.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
There was an attitudinal
i 39 1
problem there.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You won't get people until 3
you pay them something close to market value.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think there are more 5
fundamental problems at TVA than just what they can pay 6
people.
7 COMMISSIONER DERNTHAL:
No, but my point is that on 8
the one issue that this Commission could have spoken out on j
9 very strongly, it watered down last summer.
We remember that 10 well.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You know I agree with you 12 on that one, yes.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We spoke as loudly as the 14 Commission would allow us to speak.
15 Yes, Chet.
16 MR. SIESS:
On what basis has it been decided that 17 the TVA plants are unsafe?
18 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I said that there were safety 19 problems.
20 MR. SIESS:
No.
I mean the statement has been 21 made--
22 MR. LEWIS:
It is a good question.
23 MR. SIESS:
-- that there is a safety question there 24 and I think that a very important broad technical policy 25 matter would be to determine how and even if the management
40 1
problems at TVA have changed the risk to the public.
2 If the risk to the public has not been changed by 3
management, we have learned something very important.
If it 4
has been changed, we have learned something equally 5
important.
We know how to factor management into PRA's, a i
l 6
subject that I think we discussed last week.
j 7
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Your question suggests to me 8
why you should be into it and your comments on it would be 9
very important.
I could give quick answers but they come from 10 what I have learned from other people.
Your assessment o#
i i
11 what the problems are is very important to this group.
l 12 MR. SIESS:
We have not so far as I know looked at i
13 the deficiencies in the plant.
We have seen allegations of QA 14 deficiencies but we have not to my knowledge looked at the 15 deficiencies in the actual plant that could affect risk.
16 MR. EBERSOLE:
Chet, there is a great field though 17 of deficiencies on record.
1 I
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes, I think there is, 19 Chet.
20 MR. SIESS:
I don't think the Committee has looked 21 at them and evaluated them to see their effect on risk.
22 MR. LEWIS:
But leaving the question of TVA aside, 23 Chet is raising a very important question which is the extent 24 to which failure to meet regulatory requirements is related to 25 an increase in risk.
That is a deep question that goes way l
l
.~
41 1
beyond TVA and has,come up many times.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
But there is a mix, I 3
think.
First, I think we all have to acknowledge that with 4
some inducement or encouragement perhaps it was really a TVA 5
decision to shut down those plants and there were some 6
specific instances that triggered those decisions.
7 In the case of Browns Ferry, it was a realization 8
that they could not or had not succeeded in getting across to 9
their people even the most fundamental message that if you 10 find you are having a difficulty, if you find you are in an 11 area of operational uncertainty, you stop and sort it out 12 before you proceed.
13 They found when they were starting up one of the 14 units that the operators had not absorbed even that 15 fundamental message and then I think that led TVA to the 16 conclusion they just didn't have confidence that they had in 17 place an operational system that could bring about both 18 compliance with our requirements and safe operation of the 19 plants.
20 I think in the case of Sequoyah, it was a pervasive 21 breakdown in their environmental qualification program that 22 led them to conclude that they just couldn't reach a positive 23 or a negative conclusion on whether the equipment in the plant 24 would function if they encountered an accident situation.
25 I think since then as they have turned up more and
42 1
more of these problems when you look at the scope of the 2
corrective program, there are big question marks in a variety 3
of areas.
4 I was just at Sequoyah last Thursday and Friday and 5
from TVA's own description, the design control question, that 6
is whether they have lost configuration control of the plants, 7
is a very large open area right now and it is going to take a 8
major amount of work even for the Sequoyah plant which is in 9
the best shape of all of them to decide whether they have a 10 plant that they know what they have, whether it matches the 11 design basis and whether it matches the drawings the drawings 12 that the operators are using in terms of operating the plant.
12 So I think the manifestations of the management I
14 problem that has existed over a number of years are 15 sufficiently serious that they do raise valid questions about 16 the ability of those plants to operate safely.
17 MR. SIESS:
I think there is a good basis for 18 judging that the TVA plants probably would not meet the safety goalsbutIwonderifthereisanywaywecoukdever 19 20 demonstrate that other than just the judgment.
21 You see, we are putting a great deal of emphasis on 22 meeting the regulations as if all the regulations are met, 23 everything else is great, fine and dandy which I am not 24 convinced.
We are putting equal emphasis in another direction 25 on meeting safety goals or risk as calculated by probabilistic
43 1
methods and I have never seen any way of evaluating these 2
things that we are talking about in that context.
3 I think it is a major issue.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
5 MR. SIESS:
I think we are going down two paths, the 6
prescriptive deterministic regulatory path which by itself I 7
don't think will produce a guaranty of safety.
We may feel 8
good.
9 We are going down the safety goal PRA approach which 10 we can't correlate with the other one.
I think it is a 11 dilemma here and TVA epitomizes some of it, 12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You make some very interesting i
i 13 observations and this is one of the reasons I think input from 14 the Committee is very valuable.
15 MR. SIESS:
I think that goes a lot farther than 16 looking at organization charts and personnel qualifications.
17 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I agree but we didn't limit --
18 at least from my perspective, I am not limiting you in what 19 you need to do.
20 MR. SIESS:
That is what they have always done in i
21 the past.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
An important point which you 23 made Jim, TVA made the determination to shut those plants 24 down.
The NRC did not and that should not be lost sight of.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Don't discount the
i 1
i 44 1
encouragement.
In fairness, there was some strong arm 2
twisting there but you are right.
They made that initial
)
3 judgment.
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let's face it.
At least in 5
the initial case it was sort of "Wouldn't you fellows like to 6
shut down your plants?"
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
"Before we issue a show i
l 8
cause order in the next-couple of days."
That is right.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me suggest unless there is 10 another burning point that we try another topic.
i 11 MR. WARD:
All right.
We have three topics left.
12 One was we wanted to discuss with you our responses to the 13 Effectiveness Panel recommendations, GESSAR and the training 14 academy.
15 I would like to spend at least ten minutes on the 16 training academy one.
As far as the response to the 17 recommendations of the panel, we sent you a letter and I could i
j 18 summarize that but maybe I could just ask for questions.
i 19 Let me point out that I think that this letter and 20 our responses are going to serve the ACRS probably for the 21 next -- the middle future as kind of a guide to our own 22 practices and internal informal policies and so forth.
23 So if you have some serious problems with any of the 24 responses we have made or any of the recommendations 25 themselves, it would be useful for us to hear about them.
It
E 45 1
may have some effect on what the ACRS does in the next few 2
years.
3 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me just ask you, are you 4
going on a trial basis for having chairmen for two years?
5 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
There he is.
6 MR. WARD:
Yes.
This is my second year.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I thought you have been around 8
here for a while!
9 (Laughter.)
10 MR. WARD:
It has been a trial.
11 (Laughter.)
12 MR. LEWIS:
It also seems longer than it really has t
i 13 been.
14 (Laughter.)
15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It seems like forever.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Anyone want to comment or raise 17 any question on this?
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I will make one comment and 19 that is again on this issue of timeliness and I had forgotten, 20 I did actually go through and read a fair number of the 1
21 recommendations and the responses.
22 One of my principal concerns that I guess you all 23 must know by now, some of you certainly do, is the question of 24 timeliness of ACRS input.
For an example, not so long ago I 25 think on Indian Point where we really rather an important l
46 1
opinion given to the Commission six months or even longer 2
after the final decision was made on Indian Point.
3 There are other areas that one cculd point out and 4
perhaps TVA that we just got done talking about or at least I 5
hope we are done talking about it is another example.
6 We don't always have the perspective and time to 7
devote the attention to catch things when we should and at the 8
very least I would hope that that is something that the ACRS 9
pays great attention to.
10 For example, practical things.
I have always 11 wondered why the ACRS isn't represented in our acheduling 12 meetings and following our scheduling very closely to see what 13 are front burner issues for the commission and have a really 14 good sense of what is uppermost in our minds because that is 15 when we need the input and influence it seems to me.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That is a good suggestion.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I would invite that.
18 MR. WARD:
I really thought we did have a staff 19 member here at your scheduling meetings.
20 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I think they do.
21 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Maybe you do.
22 MR. WARD:
Maybe we don't do anything with the 23 information we get.
24 MR. SIESS:
It is going to be more difficult after 25 we move.
t 47 1
MR. WARD:
Yes.
2 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
They are really putting a 1
3 knife in!
4 (Laughter.)
5 MR. WARD:
We had a lot of discussions about how 6
rapidly we will be able to respond and how frequently we will i
7 be able to meet with you when we are in different counties.
J 8
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It is my impression that that j
9 shouldn't be long.
10 MR. LEWIS:
Some of them are still living in World 11 War II buildings in Washington!
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I guess my concern goes 13 beyond even the timeliness of formal ACRS response.
There are l
14 times -- all of us understand that is not even possible l
15 because you are scattered all over the country and you have 16 certain regularly scheduled meetings.
j 17 What I would say is that I would much prefer to have 18 partial ACRS response in a timely manner than no response at 19 all, no advice, not response.
It is advice.
In TVA, we have 20 Jesse Ebersole here with a reservoir of knowledge and whether 21 or not the ACRS can respond on this whole thing, I would sure 1
22 like to know what Jesse Ebersole thinks and if the ACRS can i
23 trust him with his views --
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Back on TVA!
i 25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
-- we ought to hear those.
1 J
I
i 48 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I turned to talk to Tom Roberts 2
and I found that we were back on TVA.
3 (Laughter.)
4 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I*didn't mean to.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think Glenn Reed had 6
something to say.
7 MR. REED:
I would like to make a point.
I have 8
been very concerned since I came to the ACRS on exactly what 9
you are talking about and suggested that we try to track what 10 I call " fast moving" issues.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Exactly.
12 MR. REED:
And try to get the information to the 13 Commissioners before it can become an embarrassment by late 14 information or late positions that you might take.
I am glad 15 that you mentioned it.
Maybe it will stimulate us more to 16 think about it.
17 MR. WARD:
I think this is an important point.
I 18 think it is one on which there is some disagreement in the 19 Committee.
20 First of all, I think there is a strong -- let me 21 present my view.
I think the most important thing you can get 22 out of the Committee is the collegial positions that we take.
23 I think the Committee has sort of a fairly unique tradition 24 and ability to blend the opinions of 15 people in developing 25 hopefully thoughtful, hopefully wise, at least on occasion,
r 49 1
positions.
2 Obviously, you are always going to be able to get 3
something faster from an individual.
You can hire individuals 4
all over town if that is what you need but the uniqueness of 5
the ACRS is that we have the interest, the inclination and the 6
ability to reach a consensus position.
But that is not going 7
to be very helpful to you in the fire of the week dealing with 4
8 that.
1 9
I really don't think that is an appropriate role for 10 the ACRS.
That is my position.
11 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
To fight the fire of the 4
12 week.
13 MR. WARD:
To fight the fire of the week.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I agree with you one hundred 15 percent.
j 16 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I agree with you in a sense 17 and I understand what you are saying but if you want to 18 influence public policy, the opinions and the advice of the i
i 19 only experts we have around more or less, I guess, needs to be i
20 there when the decision is about to be made.
That is my i
21 concern.
22 It doesn't help to have it when the final decision 23 is over with.
It is nice for the record but it is not going 24 to influence public policy at least not very fast.
It seems 25 to me ultimately that is the objective.
It has to be one of I
-i
I 50 1
the major objectives of the ACRS.
2 MR. LEWIS:
As Dave has emphasized, there is some 3
not disagreement among the Committee members, but there are 4
certainly different perspectives about the degree to which we 5
can serve the Commission in an advisory role as individuals if 6
we happen to know something as Jesse knows about TVA and the 7
extent to which is particularly useful especially for the 8
public record to have it considered collegial letter from the 9
Committee and I don't think that these are questions of 10 absolutes.
These are questions of degree.
11 We are in the midst of trying to unscramble for 12 ourselves the way in which we can serve you in both possible 13 ways.
Obviously, our job is to help the Commission not in any 14 particular form.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Let me just continue a 16 second by analogy here.
There are 15 of you, there are five 17 of us.
You have subcommittees.
I guess we don't have that.
18 Every Commissioner here knows that when he speaks, it 19 represents one-fifth, one-third of a majority, I suppose, and 4
20 everybody out there who listens knows that well maybe you 1
21 listen about ene-third to any individual.
The same applies to 22 any one of you.
23 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
You may be overestimating, 24 but that is all right.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Or if there is a
o 51 1
subcommittee, everyone knows that on Capitol Hill a 2
subcommittee is not the Congress.
It is not even the 3
committee but it means something.
To me, if the subcommittee 4
even would speak in a timely fashion if the full committee 5
cannot, that is tremendously valuable and important.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
There are some legal problems 7
if the subcommittees start to report to the Commission 8
directly.
9 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Then let's fix it.
10 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You won't like the fix!
11 (Laughter.)
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They won't like the fix.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You won't like the fix.
14 MR. LEWIS:
We really are trying to unscramble this i
15 question.
I think we have made light of the difficulties that 16 will be associated with the move but they are very real' 17 difficulties and you should know that.
18 MR. EBERSOLE:
I think I should say something about 19 TVA since I am kind of involved in it.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Oops, we are back on that.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. EBERSOLE:
I don't want you to get the 23 impression that I am being disloyal to TVA.
I think TVA is a 24 great idea and I go back to the 1930's when I say that and I 25 really think it could have been the roots of a development to
o 52 1
really be a model for nuclear development and may if White can 2
ever straighten it out and it be reconstituted into what it 4
l 3
should be might be the point of beginning of a reconstitution 4
of the nuclear effort.
I would like to see that.
Just like 5
it brought the Tennessee Valley out of the hele in the 1930's, 6
perhaps it could have a new mission and I hope that it has i
7 because it is a federal agency and it ought to be a nationally 8
recognized point of endeavor to recoup but it has to be 1
9 straightened out and I mean with a whip or whatever it takes.
10 I don't want you to get the notion I am condemning 11 TVA as a concept.
I am condemning the bad parts of it and I 12 dearly regret that it got itself in such a hell of a mess.
13 CHAIRIGN PALLADINO:
Chet.
14 MR. SIESS:
I would like to go back to Fred's i
15 question or issue about the use of ACRS members as individual 16 experts as opposed to the collegial.
I think we are l
17 available.
Our credentials may seem to be better than some 18 other experts because we have been selected for ACRS and I 19 don't think there is any real bar to a commissioner asking an 20 individual member for advice.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I hope there isn't because I 22 have done it.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
So have I.
]
24 MR. SIESS:
I think as an individual member I have a 25 right to refuse to give you that advice.
l I
i
_.,,____.,_._m-_,__-,,
,_._-..-r_m,y-
.- ~
4 53 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Sure.
2 MR. SIESS:
I don't have the right to refuse with 3
ACRS but I could say that I don't want to talk about that or I 4
don't think I am qualified or something.
5 Now one Commissioner can go to one member and 6
another Commissioner can go to another member and you would 7
each have three or you could select.
That is the problem with I
8 it, I think.
9 I don't know if the Commission as a unit has a way 10 of asking an individual member for advice.
11 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I certainly never hesitate 12 to ask an individual.
13 MR. SIESS:
But can the Commission as a Commission 14 do it?
That is something else.
15 Again, there is a lot of expertise.
There is a lot 16 of wisdom around.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Sure.
18 MR. SIESS:
You can call me up and ask me to come 19 out.
I don't know whether you can ask ACRS to pay for it.
20 MR. LEWIS:
When you integrate it all, there may be 21 some sense there.
22 MR. SIESS:
Maybe they will be able to get to a 23 collegial opinion faster than we can.
24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let me also say though that 25 while that may be one way of getting information or getting a
54 1
particular opinion, I think the value of the ACRS is the fact 2
that it deliberates and exchanges views from a variety of 3
disciplines and then gives us a collegial opinion.
4 MR. SIESS:
You can put it this way, Joe.
You won't 5
always get the best advice out of the collegial opinion but 6
you will very rarely get bad advice.
7 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
One thing I have valued is the 8
fact that the Committee members are not afraid to put their 9
additional remarks and those are often as interesting and as 10 clarifying as the collegial message.
11 MR. SIESS:
My implication was that going to an 12 individual member, you might get bad advice.
It would depend 13 on the member.
14 (Laughter.)
15 CEAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I would hate to see that become 16 the major modus operandi.
17 MR. OKRENT:
I think unfortunately the Committee has la difficulty developing consensus opinion on difficult issues 19 and on many difficult issues, in fact, it never develops 20 consensus opinions.
It puts them off.
I am only making one 21 person's observation.
22 The Committee finds it easier to react to some 23 proposal that the staff has put out, for example, and to say, 24 "Well, I like this."
"I don't like that," than to come up 25 with its proposal as a package, for example.
l 55 l
1 On the Indian Point issue which was referred to 2
earlier, in fact, we had some subcommittee meetings.
We had 3
not been asked for an opinion so the Committee had to face the 4
question should it provide an opinion unasked.
Well, it 5
could.
There is nothing that prevents it.
But it was a very 6
difficult issue and on a very difficult issue there is less 7
incentive if you are not asked obviously to try to force a 8
consensus and so forth.
9 Right now, for example, and we are going to get into 10 this, the Committee has been trying to talk about what might i
11 be appropriate for advanced LWR's and it has not made i
12 substantive progress, I would say.
i 13 It has not been asked to say this.
It has looked at 14 it and again it is a case where it is easier to put it off to 15 the subcommittee.
If the Commission wants advice on some of 16 these difficult issues, I think it should issue a specific 17 request.
18 You might still not get it because so'metimes the 19 Committee will find itself sufficiently divided that it is 20 unable to give you what I will call at least a coherent 21 package but that will provide if it is a Commission request 22 some significant additional pressure on the Committee to give 23 it priority and force itself to come up with a comment.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is a perfect example 25 enough, advanced LWR's, I guess or whatever the term was that i
\\
56 1
you used of an area where now is the time it seems to me and 2
if there is one area among many others where the ACRS really 3
could influence the direction of public policy, that is one.
4 It is terribly important it seems to me that the 5
ACRS speak on issues like that and speak in a timely fashion.
6 It won't do very much good if everybody already has his final 7
design approved.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
I might say something here, that we 9
have zero effort as far as I know on ABWR.
The Japanese are 10 running away with it.
We might buy one from them but that may
)
11 well be, at least I am prejudiced to think that might be the 12 workhorse of the future until we can get one of these exotic 13 new things up.
14 MR. OKRENT:
I would suggest that there be a formal i
15 request from the Commission.
Just watching this difficult 16 issue within the Committee and the meetings are all public, 17 you could watch it with me.
I think if the Committee is going 18 to come up with something, the odds are much greater if there 19 is a formal request.
20 MR. SIESS:
There is a role in between the collegial 21 letter and the individual expert advisors and that is the 22 group of expert advisors that can't agree.
We work on 23 something for three or four months.
We have some 24 disagreements.
We can't got a collegial letter.
We can come 25 up here and tell you what the individuals are thinking and why
=
57 1
we can't agree and you can hear not just one or selected 2
opinions but 15.
I 3
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That is a good idea.
i 4
COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is what we ought to do.
5 MR. SIESS:
I don't think it has been done 6
recently.
It was done under the Atomic Energy Commission in 7
at least a few instances I recall where we met with the
}
8 Commissioners and they sort of went around the table and asked 9
each person for their opinion.
10 I remember one case where we all agreed on that 11 opinion.
It was the only one.
But again, there is a spectrum 12 of opinion.
r 13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Is that a public meeting?
I j
14 MR. SIESS:
Oh, no.
This was the Atomic Energy 15 Commission.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
They used to be closed
(
17 meetings.
18 MR. SIESS:
There were not public meetings in those 19 days.
This is ancient history.
j 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think that is a goo?.
1 21 suggestion, Chet.
I 22 MR. SIESS:
This Committee has not been inhibited by 23 public meetings.
Anybody will say anything any time.
It I
24 doesn't seem to affect us.
25 MR. WARD:
Chet, didn't we have that sort of meeting 4
i
i 58 l
1 two weeks ago?
l 2
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Similar.
3 MR. SIESS:
It was closer to it but there we did 4
have a letter.
I am talking about -- take the future 5
reactors.
6 MR. WARD:
We went well beyond the letter.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The safety goal meeting 8
was pretty close, right.
9 MR. WARD:
I would like to correct one thing.
We 10 talked about the lateness of an Indian Point letter.
That was 11 not a Committee letter.
12 MR. OKRENT:
It was a gang of five.
13 (Laughter.)
14 MR. WARD:
You said it, I didn't.
i 15 MR. LEWIS:
That is a very important factor to 16 recognize.
17 MR. WARD:
The Committee did have a consensus la position on that or I think it could be characterized in that 19 we did not have the concern that was expressed in that letter.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
What?
21 MR. OKRENT:
Excuse me.
The Committee has not taken 22 any position --
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That's right.
24 MR. OKRENT:
-- that I am aware of that is in the 25 minutes of a Committee meeting.
So if there is some Committee
n i
59 1
position --
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Committee position on what?
3 MR. WARD:
We didn't take a position different than 4
what had been expressed in our earlier letter on Indian Point.
5 MR. KERR:
We did discuss it and we did take formal 4
6 action not to send the letter.
7 MR. OKRENT:
Yes, that's right.
8 MR. WARD:
Correct.
9 MR. LEWIS:
We made a decision by vote not to send 10 up the letter.
We didn't send up a letter saying we are not 11 sending up a letter.
12 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
but the principle is the i
i 13 same and I couldn't agree more with I guess with what Chet 14 just said.
We have started to do that now.
Apparently it 15 used to be done all the time.
I don't care if I get a 16 consensus letter.
The hardest thing to get used to, I guess, I
17 is having events being driven by votes but that is the way the 18 place works and if it is time to vote, it is time to get 19 opinions whether or not there is a consensus of opinion.
20 If the consensus comes later, fine.
i 21 MR. LEWIS:
We could add on the rare occasions in 22 which our letters are passed but not passed unanimously, we
}
23 can tell you our vote on it if that would be helpful.
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That would be fine with me.
25 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Let's see.
I think we have at
8 i
60 1
most a half hour if the Commission is willing to go a half 2
hour beyond its allotted time.
3 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Sure.
4 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So maybe you want to touch on 5
another topic.
6 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I have to leave at noon, 7
Mr. Chairman.
8 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
So do I.
9 MR. WARD:
That is generous.
We appreciate the 10 extra 30 minutes.
Why don't we leave the topic of the 11 Effectiveness Report and if you have any future comments or 12 questions, perhaps we can bring it up again later.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I do think if we are not doing it that it would be helpful if at our. agenda planning sessions 14 15 someone from the ACRS staff were here to know what is going 16 on.
17 MR. WARD:
Don't we do that, Ray?
13 MR. FRALEY:
We have had at some but not at all.
19 MR. WARD:
We will become more visible.
20 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
21 MR. WARD:
Let me come to the GESSAR topic second.
22 I would like to give Mr. Reed an opportunity to express his 23 concern about the proposal for a national academy and Glenn, 24 why don't you go ahead.
25 MR. REED:
It seems like we have been having about
)
61 1
almost a three-quarters of an hour lead-in to untimely 2
positions and advice and I guess this will have to be 3
classified as the same.
I will have to a bit put my blinders 4
on in order to talk about this Senator Moynihan National 5
Academy issue because I guess the commission has expressed a 6
position on a three to two vote some time ago.
7 I wished that perhaps I and not certainly as a 8
spokesman could have had an opportunity to say something about 9
this before.
10 However, going back in time with blinders on and not 11 knowing all the other things that have happened, the Senate 12 Bill 16, the National Academy for Power Plant Personnel 13 Training Act of 1985, which was introduced by Senator 14 Moynihan, its purpose was to establish a national academy to 15 provide quote, " comprehensive" and quote, " standard" training 16 for operators of U.S.
nuclear plants.
17 The proposed training seems to be addressed at that 18 point in time at license reactor operators, license senior 19 reactor operators, supervisors, technicians, engineers and 20 other personnel in nuclear plant related positions.
21 The bill proposati contralized and on-site training 22 and that the academy's pe,r w.nel must be hired at nuclear s
23 plants.
24 In my opinion, this national academy approach would 25 be disruptive and non-contributory to a high standard in L
62 1
nuclear power plant performance and in carrying out the 2
nuclear safety mission.
3 Also, in my opinion the efforts of INPO and the 4
indi'ridual utilities spurred on by NRC regulatory requirements 5
from the Three Mile Island incident or lessons learned have 6
created a sound and perhaps even too repetitious leading to 7
some boredom, a sound program for nuclear power plant 8
training.
9 In my opinion, these INPO and utility efforts have 10 been most substantial and I feel that nuclear power plant 11 training of plant personnel is the strongest aspect of the 12 nuclear regulated scene today.
13 In fact, Dr. Kerr in his subcommittee on the state 14 of nuclear pcwer safety asked for people to write down among 15 ACRS people what they thought was the most burning weakest 16 safety issue and also the single most nuclear strength and I 17 as well as I think one or two other members listed nuclear
]
l 18 power plant training as the strongest.
19 The creation of a comprehensive and standard 20 national academy for training is unnecessary and would be 21 mislocated if centralized and would be repetitious of 22 educational institutions already available and in a better I
23 position to serve and be better coupled to the locale, its 24 trainees and the workplace.
25 One must keep in mind that power plant personnel
i 63 1
should get most of their training and development on site with 2
the particular reactor or reactors on which he is going to 3
function.
Most training must be unit and reactor specific 4
right down to the valves and nuts and bolts and even the color 5
schemes and the location of the corridors.
6 Human errors leading to LER's and safety concerns 7
come more from specific aspects of specific in-place 8
machinery, control boards, pumps, valves, et cetera or from 9
such as wrong train or wrong unit and such kind of training 10 cannot be provided at all at centralized facilities.
11 Now I can sympathize that a senator in his 12 Washington office reading TMI-2 reports might conclude that 13 there were some need for a national academy or a West Point or 14 a Great Lakes basic nuclear power training school but that 15 concept is wrong for the nuclear power non-standardized plant 16 situation where every plant is different and little 17 commonality exists for the bulk of training and for people 18 development.
19 Even for an ex-nuclear Navy person who comes to a 20 utility power plant, it requires two to three years on site 21 specific training and development before that person is in any 22 way qualified to be allowed to sit for a license.
23 So sort of to repeat and sum up, it is my firm 24 conviction that the already available institutional training, 25 the INPO guidance and accreditation and the utility on-site h
e 64 1
training schools are such that no additional training schemes 2
for plant personnel are necessary although I do recognize a 3
deficiency in aptitude testing before trainees start down the 4
path.
5 Now as an operator trench worker type I would like 6
to say that there might be a need for a national academy and 7
this is probably not going to be accepted but we had a meeting 8
yesterday in which the reactor operations incidents were 9
reviewed by the ACRS and it was interesting to me that four 10 out of four of the more significant incidents, those that were 11 chosen to be taken up by the ACRS, were all design related.
12 They were not operator errors.
They were design related.
13 I think that there is a trend away from post-TMI era 14 to point the finger more and more and find that the problems 15 are suddenly design related.
16 We might say that perhaps some senator should 17 suggest a national academy to qualify nuclear designers or man 18 space vehicle designers or even a centralized national academy 19 to train top management people in industry and government who 20 are now perhaps solely responsible for some technically 21 complex go or no-go decisions; well, I doubt that that is i
22 really the way to go either.
23 I think there is perhaps a better way than to 24 create national academies to do these kinds of things.
25
? hank you.
i 65 1
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you, Glenn.
Any comments 2
or questions?
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
I think you made some 4
awfully good points.
5 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Any additions?
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Did I detect some support 7
for degree requirements hidden in that statement?
8 MR. REED:
No.
You would not get degree 9
requirements at most of the plant level working positions as 10 far as I am concerned.
It is a long trail growing up in a 11 plant from an 18-year old, let's say, and finally perhaps 12 becoming a shift supervisor or senior operator and these 13 pecple by their in-place, right with the equipment 14 development, are the best qualified to handle emergencies and 15 deal with them.
16 The basic technical knowledge is available out 17 there.
They can be developed for that and they don't have to i
18 have gone through earlier in their lives the degree route to 19 be outstanding.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
You made some cornent about 21 the aptitude testing and I wondered other than giving an IQ 22 test whether a degree would not qualify?
23 MR. REED:
No.
Aptitude does not relate to 24 degrees.
In fact, aptitude is a natural thing, natural 25 ability and if a person has zero mechanical comprehension,
-.-m-
., -... - -.,, - - - ~,,,.,
-y,--
-+,-p...e,n-,,-,,->-w
,m y--
l 66 1
they are not going to be a good mechanic.
2 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Then how are you going to 3
screen?
4 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Fred, when Memphis State 5
University was in the business of training operators, they are
)
6 out now, they have quit, but they maintained that they had i
a j
7 some incredible percentage of people who passed their operator
}
8 exam the first time around and I questioned such a high i
9 percentage and they said that the answer is very simple, the l
10 aptitude sclaening on the people who get into the program.
i 11 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
I guess the question is how 12 they did it.
i 13 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
You mean the details of the 14 test?
I am sorry I don't have that.
15 MR. REMICK:
They are one of a number of tests that i
16 are applied.
Memphis State did de, vise one but EEI has devised i
~
17 some.
There are a variety of tests that are used.
Many 3
1 18 people do use screening tests.
No question about it.
i 19 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On this degree business, i
20 one of the things that I guess, I agree with you Glenn on your j
21 comments about the INPO and utility efforts as probably being l
22 one of the strongest efforts that has been made over the past 23 few years and one of the areas of greatest improvement.
24 But I guess there is one area that still seems to me 25 that is left out of that process.
When you look at the e
i 67 i
1 training programs and you look at the emergency operating 2
procedures for the plants, they all seem to stop when you get i
3 to beyond the design basis, when you get to a degraded core or l
4 inadequate core cooling situation.
5 At that point you are really left with the knowledge 6
and capabilities of the operating staff to deal with the j
j i
7 situation.
So far, I don't think we have done very much on 8
that area.
9 Second, when one looks at some of the recent I
10 experience with operator requalification examinations, we have 1
11 seen some very high failure rates at four or five different 12 plants when the NRC comes in and administers the I
13 requalification exam and at least one sore spot on those exams 14 seems to be the engineering and theory part of the exam.
15 Now granted there may be some questions about the 16 exams and the way they can be improved in asking the question, i
17 but both of those things lead me to conclude that one area 18 where we need some more attention is on upgrading the 19 engineering knowledge, knowledge of theory on the part of the 20 operators so that they understand what is going on in the 21 plant if they get into a severe accident situation because at 22 that point they are one of the last lines of defense in terms 23 of mitigating the consequences.
i 24 Now you can do that a number of ways.
One way is 25 you can impose a degree requirement which I don't happen to f
L
_y
,_ _,-,__..m
s i
i 68 1
think is the best way to do it.
Another way is to figure out 2
some way either through the existing utility training programs 3
or through a combination of measures to upgrade those skills 4
over time both on the part of the operators we now have and on 5
the part of future operator applicants.
6 It strikes me that one possible benefit of an 7
academy arrangement might be to provide an initial training j
ground to give people a grounding in the practical engineering 8
9 knowledge, the practical application of reactor theory that 1
10 they really need to carry out all of the range of 11 responsibilities of an operator.
12 If you built in that grounding to start with and 13 then fed those people into the utility systems that you might 14 have a leg up on dealing with the problem that we have now.
15 MR. REED:
I would like to turn it around.
I sort 16 of dislike the word " mitigation."
I would rather say that we i
17 don't have to mitigate and therefore, as an operator type I 18 say there are design vulnerabilities that lead you down this j
19 trail to back up procedures to back up procedures to all kinds I
j 20 of things because we did not design appropriately to prevent 21 core melt.
22 So if you put -- you could educate people, I think, 23 in basics and in mitigation and all these kinds of things but 24 you have thrown them out into the field and the complexity of 25 the workplace and all the valves and things to twist and you
s 69 1
have a weak design.
They still are not going to prevent core i
2 melt.
3 So as an operator, I would like to turn it back and 4
say make your national academy if you want one or make your 5
national standardization if you want one for systems design or 6
how to lay out a plant so that it doesn't perhaps create a 7
thermal block potential and let's go back to the national 8
academy to make design better in the future and certainly 9
there are some opportunities for backfit.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I would agree with that 11 but the problem is that the direction that the Commission 12 seems to be going is in the opposite direction and that is not 13 to pursue major design changes that would substantially reduce 14 core melt probability either for existing plants or perhaps 15 even for future designs and put more of the burden on the 16 operators.
17 If you are going to do that, it seems to me the only 18 thing you are left with is to try to give those guys every 19 opportunity in terms of their knowledge and skills to at least 20 be able to try to mitigate the consequences if you get into 21 one of those situations.
22 MR. REED:
Yes.
We want to make astronauts super 23 people and operators with all the burdens -- I don't agree 24 with that.
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
The other way is to fix
j i
70 I
1 the design which I agree we should be pursuing as well.
I 2
MR. EBERSOLE:
Our conceptual charter precludes our 3
doing that.
We have to take whatever is before us and we 4
can't even tell them to take this garbage back and give me a 5
new concept.
We have to regulate trash and I don't like to do J
6 that.
7 MR. SIESS:
Oh, come on, Jesse.
8 MR. EBERSOLE:
I am being very cynical when I say 9
that.
I would like to do as he says, go back and address the 10 fundamental issues.
For instance, why is Browns Ferry shut 11 down.
It is because nobody knows how many ways they can get 12 into trouble.
13 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
14 MR. EBERSOLE:
If they had some focused, centralized 15 way of getting heat out in lieu of a trip, we would be in high 16 cotton.
17 MR. KERR:
May I ask a question here?
There have 18 been a couple of statements indicating that we haven't done 19 anything about plant design and that plant designs are lousy.
20 In response to the only core melt that we have had 21 so far, I had thought that we had made a tremendous number of changes in plant design and plant instrumentation and staff 22 1
23 requirements and in training.
24 It was my feeling that those changes many of which 25 were initiated by the Commission and the Commission staff were
, _ _ _.. -. ~,
i s
l 71 I
1 made in an effort to decrease risk.
Now if they have been i
2 totally unsuccessful, then perhaps it makes sense to say that j
t 3
we have done nothing.
l 4
I am not yet prepared to say they have been totally-l 5
unsuccessful but it certainly represents a significant i
f 6
effort.
If that sort of effort prcduces nothing, I guess I 7
would say what is it that we can now do when an effort like 8
that accomplished nothing.
f 9
MR. EBERSOLE:
It did accomplish a lot but it is 10 patchwork.
11 MR. KERR:
It certtiinly was a tremendous effort.
]
l 12 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Jim, on your comment, there
]
l 13 is the allegation floating,around out there and I am not 14 saying whether it is accurate or not that our requal exams i'
15 bear no relevance to the plant specific plant for which the l
16 operator is being tested.
]
17 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
I think there are a j
j 18 lot of valid questions about requal exams.
i 1
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I think there are a lot of 1
1 20 questions.
- i l
21 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
On the walk through part, j
22 quality of some of the examiners, their knowledge of the 1
23 individual plant and on the theory part, there are questions 24 about whether valid questions are being asked.
Is it really 25 important, for example, for someone to be able to recite a 1
i
i i
72 1
particular equation or is it important to be able or is it i
{
2 better to ask them a question in the following set of 3
circumstances, what is happening in the machine.
4 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Or to cite one of the horror l
5 stories that I was told, why should a PWR operator have to 6
know anything about a BWR.
That makes no sense on its face.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I am told there are requal
\\
I 9
exams where that sort of circumstance occurs.
That makes us 10 looks dumb.
I have been told that.
11 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
You can criticize requal exams 12 and in many exams you can find irrelevant questions but I find l
13 that most of the time when people complain about exams it is 14 because they didn't study hard enough to pass them.
15 (Laughter.)
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
It reminds me of the young lady l
17 that went to the professor, she said, "Oh, Professor, I would i
18 do anything to pass this course."
)
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Now wait a minute!
20 (Laughter.)
21 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
He says, "Anything?"
"Oh, yes, 22 anything."
He said, "Then why don't you sit down and study."
23 (Laughter.)
l 24 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
That doesn't mean that we i
j 25 shouldn't look at our exams but I do think that we have to be
i 73 1
careful that we don't throw out all the questions of theory 2
that are important for people to know.
i 3
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I agree with that, Joe.
l 4
COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
I didn't say that, Joe.
I am 5
just saying that the requal exams should suit the plant that 1
6 the person is taking the exam for.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Sure, yes.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
It is so fundamental, it 9
doesn't even have to be said.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think even when you fix 11 those problems, one of the complaints that I hear from a lot 12 of operators including at a couple of plants that have had the 13 big difficulties with the requal exam is we are tested on 14 theory, we don't use that theory in our day-to-day job, sure l
15 we have to know some theory and we particularly have to know t
)
16 some theory in an accident situation, but we don't get 17 day-to-day experience with it and it is like going back and 18 re-learning all of that stuff every time we have to take one 19 of these exams and that seems to be the area where they are 20 falling down.
21 MR. KERR:
Are you sure the theory on these exams i
i 22 has to do with accident situations?
My experience is that 23 much of the theory has to do with reactor physics --
24 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That's right.
25 MR. KERR:
Which is relevant to day-to-day
s 8
74 1
operations.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I think that is right 3
which raises the broader question which is, are they getting 4
any training in terms of the theory that they really need to 5
deal with an accident situation.
I think the answer to that 6
is they are getting very little of that.
7 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
I can assure you that the 8
probability that you are going to study the right line in the 9
book and remember the right equation or even remember "PV=nRT" 10 and know how to use it at TMI is about zero.
I have taught 11 people enough to know that they forget it three days after 12 they walk out of the classroom and most of them never could do 13 a story problem with it to begin with.
14 MR. KERR:
Furthermore, when they tried to do 15 something about TMI-2, there were engineers available to give 16 advice who did presumably have the research background we are 17 talking about.
It wasn't just a question of the operators 18 there not knowing what was going on.
The engineers who were 19 called in didn't know what was going on either.
20 MR. SIESS:
And as a result of TMI, we require 21 a shift technical advisor who is supposed to be a degreed 22 engineer.
I don't know whether he is subject to any 23 requalification exam or not.
24 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
He is not.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Interesting question.
=
i j
i 75 i
1 MR. SIESS:
Certainly by the time you run out of the 2
emergency operating procedures, he is supposed to be there.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
He is supposed to be the i
I 4
brain trust.
That is true.
We probably never do that.
5 MR. SIESS:
They could always call Bethesda.
i j
6 (Laughter.)
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That is what scares me, 4
8 Chet.
9 (Laughter.)
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
That is what really scares i
11 me!
That is why I want them to have the knowledge.
]
12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I think Mr. Remick was given 13 the floor.
I 14 MR. REMICK:
First, I honestly think that when d
15 training truly gets performance based and there are learning 16 objectives and the NRC's examinations use learning objectives, f
i 17 I think some of these problems and there are problems, Jim, I I
f l
18 agree, out there on requalification, I think many of these i
}
19 things will be solved.
I sincerely believe that, i
20 The other point that I want to make, I want to go 1
j 21 back to the comment about training people for handling 22 accidents.
I am a graduate of Oak Ridge School for Reactor l
23 Technology, ORSRT, and as I mentioned to the Committee this j
24 morning, I prize that as much as I do my Ph.D., that 25 certificate.
There are several other people here who are 1
i i
s i
76 1
graduates of that.
2 When I had an opportunity to talk to Senator 3
Moynihan's staff on this thing, I agree with much of what i
4 Glenn said about an academy, but the one thing I threw out was 5
I thought there is a need for real professionalism in reactor j
6 operation.
7 I had not thought this out and it was off the top of 1
8 my head and not fleshed out, one thing that I think could be 9
needed if you have young people coming up through the 10 operations, they get an operators license, they become an SRO, i
11 they have real promise as a professional SRO, and I thought 12 maybe what we need, maybe each utility, nuclear utility, or 13 each plant could identify that young bright guy that they want 14 to keep interested in operations and maybe somewhere there is 15 a need not for an academy, not for an ORSRT, but something 16 that would take a person like that maybe for six months, the 17 certain select people and they would go and they would 18 emphasize some of the things that you are talking about and so 19 forth and truly professionalism in plant operations, and 20 presumably these people will go back to the utilities and then i
21 they would be the teachers and the pace setters and the 22 examples that others would follow.
23 This was something that I threw out just off the top 24 of my head.
It is something that I could see needed.
What do 25 you do once you become an SRO to continue that professional 4
i 1
i 77 1
{
1 development so that you have the pride like I have in being a I
j 2
graduate of ORSRT.
I am very proud of that.
i 3
I think there is something.
I don't think it is the j
4 academy.
I don't think it is another ORSRT but there is an i
5 opportunity here for somebody to do something.
6 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
I 7
MR. WARD:
Dr. Okrent and Dr. Lewis have been 8
waiting patiently to make their comments.
f 9
MR. OKRENT:
I would like to relate it to a prior l
10 subject, managerant and attitude.
As a little story I think i
i 11 one of the best things that happened to my son's attitude
}
12 concerning driving was before he was allowed to drive by i
l 13 himself, he was riding with a friend who had an accident.
He i
l 14 was sitting along side of him and almost broke his nose and l
15 head and so forth.
l 16 That probably had more effect on him being a 1
j 17 cautious driver than an'/ thing I had to say.
18 It is not obvious to me based on my very preliminary l
19 kind of questioning of management that people who are at the j
1 20 top and middle management really understand the question of a
{
21 serious accidents.
22 The principal insights from PRA's and so forth and I
i 23 this is not true of all utilities, but in too many utilities i
j 24 in my opinion the top management and middle management are not i
j 25 cognizant let alone knowledgeable in this area and I think if l
i
. ~ _ _ _ _.
s t
78 1
they were they might, in fact, have different attitudes 2
towards safety and maybe be able to make decisions themselves J
3 as to what is important and what isn't in a variety of things 4
and also on what they want the plant manager and so forth to 5
know of their own volition.
6 I think the Commission might well reflect on whether i
7 they are missing something at the middle management and top 2
8 management level in this regard.
I will just leave it at 9
- that, i
10 MR. WARD:
Hal.
11 MR. LEWIS:
I hate to now go back to training but I 12 felt a compulsion to say something in defense of professors 13 and education, j
14 (Laughter.)
15 MR. LEWIS:
I have probably flunked as many people l
16 in as many courses as most of the people around the table and
{
17 have heard probably not all possible excuses for flunking a 1
l 18 course but certainly a reasonable subcat of all possible l
l 19 excuses for flunking a course.
In general, it is failure to 20 understand, i
21 In particular, being a theoretical physicist by i
training, vocation and avocation the word " theory" when it is 22 j
23 used as a dirty word, I find as disagreeable as the word j
24
" academic" when used as a dirty word which it also is.
?
i 25 In particular, when people complain about theory i
r 79 1
which is really another word for understanding the 2
relationships among the forces at work which you really do 3
want people to have when they describe it as memorizing 4
equations, that means they have missed the boat somewhere 5
because an equation happens to be a mathematical way of 6
expressing a relationship among things which are related and 7
whose relationship is really important to understanding and as 8
has been said several times in one way or another there is an 9
important difference between education and training.
10 You can train a dog to do lots of things but 11 education consists of providing the knowledge to deal with the 12 problem that you haven't. net before in terms of your 13 accumulated body of knowledge and it is extremely important.
14 I think there is another issue which is really not 15 the function of NRC but which I think many of us who teach for 16 a living see and there have been many studies of it and that 17 is that the mathematical capability of the American people has 18 been going downhill for many, many years.
19 There have been lots of studies.
There was a recent 20 editorial in the Los Angeles Times which made one point very 21 nicely.
It said that the Japanese are now so good that they 22 can make cameras that even Americans can operate.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MR. LEWIS:
I thought that was unusually nasty but 25 it reflects if you think of the commercials you have seen
s t
80 1
recently about cameras, it may ring a bell.
2 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
I am glad they succeeded 3
because it is the kind of camera I need.
4 (Laughter.)
5 MR. LEWIS:
Fair enough.
In any case, in terms of i
6 the mathematical capabil'ity which people are losing, there 7
have been as I say lots of studies which show that our kids 8
really don't have it.
So we are going to have to think q
9 through the way in which we are going to provide a pool of 10 people who have the capability to understand the relationships 11 among these things perhaps not in the mathematical terms that
]
12 we have done in the past.
1 13 It is particularly, difficult for reactor operators 14 compared, for example, to pilots because there is a pool of a 15 million licensed pilots in the country from whom the 16 commercial airline pilots are drawn and there is no pool of 17 kids, five year olds, who aspire to become reactor operators 18 as their life objective.
i 19 It is going to be a very difficult problem.
l 20 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
21 MR. REED:
May I make sort of a final statement?
I l
22 am pleased to see that there is not strong support here today l
23 for the national academy for training of people in power i
24 plants and I hope that there isn't.
1 25 But I still would like to say that there is i
s t
81 1
something wrong in management and it relates a little bit to 2
what Dave has just said, there is something wrong in a fast 3
generated new industry that you don't get the competence in 4
management that experience having walked the trenches in 5
management and so we have perhaps a problem in structuring in 6
an industry that is only 30 or 35 years old, a problem in j
7 structuring of how do you get the decision-making process 8
competent when you don't have experienced management and 9
perhaps they don't understand the goals, the problems, the 10 issues and so on and so forth.
That may be TVA's big 11 problem.
12 In my opinion, national academies are not the way to j
13 do that.
I don't think they are going to teach ethics,-
j 14 honestly, objectivity and great talent.
I am reminded that I 15 was asked in about'1956 to write a ten page document for the 1
16 top boss to tell him how to make all judgments and decisions 17 in nuclear which was going to come down the pike so that he 18 could make these final decisions.
19 I think a problem is that in the highly technical i
20 world of today be it NASA or be it nuclear or what no one 21 person at the top or several people at the top who are i
22 somewhat decoupled from the technology.and its detail should l
j 23 be making decisions by themselves or making the final go or 24 no-go statement.
25 Now how do you overcome that where technology has a
s t
82 1
grown up so fast about us in its great complexity?
In my 2
opinion there are the seeds of a structure that can do that 3
and that is in the FAA designated representative system and I 4
think in high tech in the future if this country is going to 5
be a leader we are going to have to look at a designated 6
representative system that gives that wise counsel in a timely 7
fashion to the top man to make the decision be it NASA 8
Challenger "go" without challenges or not.
9 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
Thank you.
Glenn, you made a 10 number of important points and I don't want us to lose 11 something that maybe lost or at least I do not intend to see 12 it lost in my mind and that is that many of our problems are 13 design related and do need attention.
14 I am thinking back to the days when the ACRS helped 15 introduce a number of very important design concepts like ECCS 16 and some of the accumulators that later came into plants.
So 17 I think there is a place where the NRC can do some 18 encouragement in that direction.
I 19 According to that clock, it is just about 12:00 20 o' clock.
I don't think we made GESSAR.
21 MR. WARD:
No.
We don't have time for that and I 22 realize you have to leave but we think it is an important 23 topic.
We wrote a letter on January 14th on the topic and I 24 think we have some significant difference with the position 25 that the staff has taken.
o
(
83 i
1 We would like to have an opportunity to discuss that 2
with you at a future meeting.
We have some concern that maybe 3
the staff position is getting. hardened and might be before we 4
have a chance to discuss the letter and interpret what we 5
meant.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I, unfortunately, whether or 4
i 7
not it was most important, at least some of my staff thought 8
it was very important and I do, too, if we don't do that today i
9 then at least maybe we ought to start with that next time 10 around.
11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
I think that is a 12 good idea.
I agree with you, Fred.
I think that is an I
13 important one as well.
We had a lot of topics to cover 14
- today, 15 I would like to pick up on one idea that was raised 16 earlier and that was, well, the way wo approach these things 17 is to point out problems.
If you want us to do more than what 18 we have covered in our letters, ask us.
19 One of the questions that I have coming out of the 20 ACRS letter for GESSAR is what kind of a system would be a 21 rational system for looking at future designs, whether it is l
22 GESSAR or ones to follow on beyond that if there are problems f
23 with the way the staff is going about this review in terms of 24 having something that would really constitute a final design I
that one would have confidence, wouldn't have to change with 25
t 84 1
the future until all of the issues are resolved, what do you 2
think we ought to be doing and how ought we to approach that 3
kind of an issue?
4 I would be very interested in your comments on that 5
when we take up the GESSAR letter the next time.
1 6
CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
We have a meeting coming up now 1
i 7
in which we are going to discuss safety goals and maybe we i
8 ought to stick to that and put on a separate one or put GESSAR 9
as the first one of another periodic meeting.
j 10 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
To the contrary, they are 11 related in a sense, Joe.
l 12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
They are.
]
13 COMMIFSIONER BERNTHAL:
I think maybe we ought to 14 just start with GESSAR and move right into safety goals 15 because one of the problems in the GESSAR analysis is that we 16 haven't told them our safety goals yet.
i 17 CHAIRMAN NALLADINO:
The relationship is similar to 18 that of many other things, rather tenuous.
If we get into 19 GESSAR, we are looking into the future but I am not sure that 20 is quite the same thing as looking at the safety goals.
21 MR. EBERSOLE:
I may never see a point of 22 convergence of GESJAR and TVA and Browns Ferry again, so I am 23 going to say something.
The horror of starting Browns Ferry, I
)
24 of course, is due to the fact that the people down there don't 25 know how many ways they can get in trouble and how to get i
85 1
out.
There is no back door to run to.
2 There is a back door in GESSAR II.
It is 3
undefined.
We have bitched about it.
4 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Right.
5 MR. EBERSOLE:
That sort of back door could be 6
present in Browns Ferry which would pretty much obviate the 7
present fact that it is shut down at a million dollars per day 8
because they would have a back door to run to and they would 9
need less understanding of their horrendous amount of 10 intricate detail of interdependencies in the systems which are 11 down there now and nobody can understand.
12 I have said enough.
13 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
We will discuss 14 that at Agenda Planning.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Could I make one last 16 request before we do meet to talk about GESSAR which I hope 17 will be soon and that is that the ACRS give some thought to 18 whether there would be any real value in what appears to be a 19 recommendation that the Commission offer some half-baked at 20 best approval of the GESSAR, five year or something like that.
21 It is pretty clear to me at least that you are not 22 going to see any plants built in this country in five years.
23 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Nobody is going to buy 24 one.
25 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Perhaps it is useful for
s 86 1
export purposes.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I doubt it.
3 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
That is something that I 4
would like some thought given to.
It might be better to do 5
nothing.
6 MR. OKRENT:
I am not sure that that was the thrust j
7 of the letter.
I think I would say the thrust of the letter 8
was there are important enough questions on GESSAR that the 9
Commission itself should think about them and not let the 10 staff take its action without at least the Commission having 11 reflected whether it wants to have an input.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes.
13 MR. LEWIS:
Gee, I thought the letter spoke for 14 itself and we didn't have to interpret it.
15 COMMISSIONER BERNTRAL:
It is just a question I had.
16 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO:
All right.
We will schedule a 17 meeting at Agenda Planning.
I 18 Thank you very much.
As usual, it has been a very 19 stimulating meeting and we appreciate your being Pore.
j 20 (Whereupon, at 12:04 o' clock p.m.,
the Commission 21 meeting was adjourned, to reconvene at the call fo the Chair.)
22 23 24 25
s t
1 2
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 3
4 This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING: Periodic Briefing by Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) (Public Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Friday, April 11, 1986 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken 13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
i Maril} n M. Nations 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25
s
?
4/8/86 SCHEDllLING NOTES TITLE:
PERIODIC MEETING WITH ADvlSORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOP SAFEGUAPDS (ACRS)
SCHEDULED:
10:00 A.M., FPIDAY, APRIL 11, 1986 (OPEN)
DURATION:
APPROX l-1/2 HRS TOPICS:
- ANTICIPATED ACRS ACTIVITIES AND RESOURCES IN LIGHT OF BUDGET REDUCTION SCOPE OF ACRS ACTIVITIES REGARDING TVA (LETTER DATED 4/7)
RESPCNSES TO RECCMMENDATIONS OF PANEL ON ACRS EFPECTIVENESS (LETTER DATED 3/20)
- ACRS REVIEW OF GESSAR II REPORT (LETTER DATED 1/14)
- MOYNIHAN PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL TFAINING ACADEMY
Y k ki kG khkk kki khhkktNtNgNg0gQhq(ghgQqQqQgQh &) & &
h 9/35 i
TPREMITTAL To:
/N Doctm2nt (bntrol Desk, 016 Phillips j
'G l
E AD'/ANCE'D CDPY TO: /
/
The Public Documnt Iban g'
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and placcrent in the Public Doctn2nt Pean.
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