ML20155E025
| ML20155E025 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 10/28/1998 |
| From: | Beasley J SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GL-96-06, GL-96-6, LCV-0897-D, LCV-897-D, NUDOCS 9811040138 | |
| Download: ML20155E025 (17) | |
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Y-L J.Bernie Beasley,Jr.,P.E., Southors Nuclear L'
Vice President Operating Company,Inc.
r-Vogtle Project 40 invemess Center Parkway
- Tel 205.992.7110 Fax 205 992.0403 SOUTHERN COMPANY Energy to Sertro bur World" October 28, l'98 LCV-0897-D 9
Docket Nos.: 50-424-50-425 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
ATTN: Document Control Desk
. Washington D. Cc 20555-0001 Ladies and Gentlemen:
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP) RESPONSE TO REQUEST -
FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING GL 96-06, ASSURANCE OF EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY AND CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY DURING DESIGN-BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITIONS By letter dated January 27,1997, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC)
- provided a response to GL 96-06 for VEGP Units 1 and 2.- On August 10,1998 the NRC requested additional information relating to the VEGP response.- Attached are specific answers to some of the questions asked by the NRC; however, resolution of several questions are pending the completion of the EPRI technical basis report for this issue which is currently scheduled for July 31,1999. Therefore, additional information in response to the NRC's request will be submitted following receipt of the EPRI report.
Please contact this office if you have any questions.
- incerely, 0SJm J.
. Beas y, Jr.
.' JBB/BHW/gmb xc: (See next page) 9811040138 981028T""
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Mr. J. T. Gasser Mr. M. Sheibani l
SNC Document Management U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional-Administrator i
j Mr. D. H. Jaffe, Senior Project Manager, NRR Mr. J.. Zeller, Senior Resident Inspector, Vogtle 1
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9 Response to GL 96-06 RAI Introductory Note 4
Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC), along with other utilities, is participating in an EPRI managed project to develop a common technical basis report (TBR) that can be used to support resolution of GL 96-06 RAls. SNC expects that the TBR will address many of the assumptions, judgments and/or methodologies that are useful to the VEGP understanding and resolution of GL 96-06 issues. Therefore, the responses to various RAI items for VEGP are deferred pending completion of the EPRI TBR and subsequent review of this report by SNC.
1.
NRC Request Provide a detailed description of the " worst case " scenariosfor waterhammer and two-phaseflme, taking into consideration the complete range ofeventpossibilities, system configurations, andparameters. For example, all waterhammer types and water slug scenarios should be considered, as well as temperatures, pressures, pow rates, load combinations, andpotentialcomponentfailures. To the extent that the possibilityfor waterhammer and two-phaseflow to occur is eliminated, describe the minimum margin to boiling that will exist.
SNC Response The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 RAls.
2.
tLRC Request Ifa methodology other than that discussed in NUREG CR-5220, " Diagnosis of Condensation-Induced Waterhammer, " was used in evaluating the effects of waterhammer, describe this ahernate methodology in detail. Also, explain why this methock> logy is applicable andgives conservative results (typically accomplished through rigorousplant-specific modeling, testing, andanalysis).
SNC Response The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 RAls.
1
I 3.
NRC Request 1
1 Identify any comjmter codes that were used in the waterhammer and two-phaseflow analyses and describe the methods used to validate and hench mark the codesfor the specific application and loading conditions involved SNC Response The computer program HSTA (Hydraulic Systems Transient Analysis) was used for the water hammer analysis of the Containment Air Cooler System at Vogtle. This program is a generalized finite difference code developed by Bechtel Corporation and used extensively over the last 20 years for water hammer design and diagnostic purposes in nuclear and non-nuclear piping systems. The method of characteristics is used to solve the hyperbolic partial differential equations (of continuity and momentum) to obtain the liquid velocity and pressure head at a known grid location. These flow variables are then utilized to generate the dynamic forcing functions on specified pipe run segments.
HSTA can model a complex piping system containing one or more of the several different types of flow devices (boundary conditions) present in the system. Examples of these boundary conditions are: time dependent pressure / flow reservoirs, valves, branches, pumps, surge and air tanks. vacuum breakers, etc.
The code allows for modeling ofliquid (water) column separation when the pressure falls to the vapor pressure of the liquid. Two computational schemes are available:
A conventional scheme of generating a vapor pocket at each computational node and tracking its size. The vapor pocket is attached to the node and does not move along the system. This commonly used methodology works well if the vapor pocket size is less than the distance between two adjacent node (" nodal distance" or " reach length"). For larger vapor pocket sizes, the accuracy of results by this scheme is questionable.
A special "line filling" scheme that treats the vapor pocket as bounded by two vapor / liquid interfaces. These liquid interfaces are tracked independently thus allowing for accurate representation of these pockets and their growth / collapse irrespective of the pocket size relative to the nodal distance. This method also allows the entire vapor pocket to efTectively move along the piping system due to the motion of both the upstream and downstream interfaces. This method allows for starting a transient with a pre-existing steam bubble or multiple bubbles present and is well suited for GL 96-06 type water hammer applications.
Since the vapor pocket sizes in the specific application were large compared to nodal distance in the Vogtle Units I and 2 models, the second computational scheme was used.
For the validation of the HSTA code, emphasis was placed on comparison with experimental or test data. This was supplemented by comparisons against independent numerically predicted results available. When comparing time-history predictions of I
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l pressure, velocity, etc. in a piping system, both the magnitude and frequency of the v' riable compared could be important depending on the piping response. For this a
reason the comparisons are given by directly superimposing the HSTA predicted on the measured (or calculated) variable time-histories and not just by defining the percentage agreement or disagreement between them.
j The formal HSTA program documentation includes the validation of the following HSTA capabilities:
- 1. Validation of valve actuation transient and pressure wave reflection / transmission at branches / area changes in complex piping networks is against data given in the standard text books by Wylie and Streeter, and Parmakian.
- 2. Validation ofcentrifugal and reciprocating pump actuation, surge sessels and air tank mitigation devices is against various test data (available in open literature and in other Bechtel proprietary data).
- 3. Validation ofwater column separation and rejoining calculation schemes includes the validation of both conventional and line filing schemes described above.
The conventional scheme is validated against test data from several careful laboratory experiments in Europe for two different piping geometries. Further validation is against laboratory tests done for water hammer predictions in a piping system at a nuclear power plant in U.S.
For the line filling calculational scheme, the HSTA validation was performed as follows:
a) Comparisons against laboratory test data from Europe.
b) Comparisons against in-plant test data from a nuclear power plant in U.S.
c) Comparisons against predictions from a totally different computer program that used a simpler calculational scheme and not the Method of Characteristics that are used by HSTA.
d) Comparisons against predictions from the conventional calculational scheme in HSTA for vapor pockets smaller than a nodal distance in length.
Besides the validation in the formal code documentation discussed above, the HSTA code participated in the EPRI water hammer computer code evaluation program during the 1987-1992 EPRI sponsored research effort into water hammer. In this program, the results from HSTA were compared against those from several other participating codes for a set of six varied water hammer simulation problems. In the problems for which data (test and analytical) was available, HSTA results compared very well against such data.
The HSTA program methodology and its application has been published widely (six papers) both in national and international conferences.
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'4.
NRC RtquE Describe andjustify all assumptions and input parameters (including those used in any comjmter codes) that were used in the waterhammer and two-phaseflow analyses, andprovidejustipcationfor omitting any epcts that may be relevant to the analyses (e.g.,puid structure interaction, pow induced vibration, er osion). Conprm that these assumptions and input parameters are consistent with the existing design and licensing basis of the plant. Any exceptions should be explained andjustified.
SNC Response The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 RAls.
5.
NRC Requm Explain why voiding in the CA Cs is limited to the 2 top coils (i.e., is this an assumption or is it based on heat tran.sfer considerations).
SNC Response The waterhammer evaluation performed for the VEGP containment cooling units includes a case in which the top two coils of the containment air coolers (CACs) are assumed to completely drain. This assumption was made based on a drain down analysis of these coolers which indicated that the actual drain down would be less than the assumption of the top two coils. The drain down analysis is a hydraulic analysis (not based on heat transfer characteristics) that assumes thermal conditions which maximize the calculated drain down. Specifically, water in the tubes of the coolers is assumed to reach the containment steam / air temperature instantaneously. Thus, the steam pressure inside the tubes is assumed to be the same as the saturation pressure corresponding to the containment temperature. Utilizing the steam pressure in the tubes along with elevation differences as the driving potential, drain down flow rates were calculated for specific time intervals (quasi steady-state analysis) based on modeled system hydraulic resistance. The cumulative drain down volume was then calculated over the time frame of the drain down period. For purposes of the waterhammer evaluation, drainage of the top two coils was assumed which bounds the results of the drain down analysis.
6.
NRC Request The January 27, I997, response indicated that additional analyses would be completed to determine if modifications or. system operational changes would be required to reduce waterhammer stresses. Describe the additional analyses that were completed and conclusions that were reached.
4
SNC Response Additional engineering analyses were completed and concluded that modifications would be required to the NSCW piping supports to reduce piping and support stresses to meet VEOP design requirements. As prt of the efTort, an analysis of the Unit 2 train B (28) NSCW system was performed similar to the previous analysis performed for Unit I train A (I A). The hydraulic transient (waterhammer) portion of the analysis was performed using Bechtel's flydraulic System Transient Analysis (IISTA) computer program. Results of the 2B transient analysis are similar to the results of the 1 A analysis. The calculated forcing functions from the 2B transient analysis were used as inputs in the dynamic piping stress models to detennine piping stresses and support loads due to the waterhammer event. Again, the results from the 2B pipe stress and suppon evaluation are similar to the l A results. The 2B piping and supports will remain intact and capable of performing their safety related function. However, modifications such as addition of tie back type pipe supports at various locations are needed to meet VEGP design requirements. As described in the response to item 16, design change packages have been prepared to accomplish these modifications.
7.
NRC Reqqqs1 Explain andjustify all uses of "engineeringjudgement " that were credited in the j
waterhannner and two-phaseflow analyses.
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SNC Respon g The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis repon for GL 96-06 RAls.
8.
NRC Re_ quest Discuss spec?fic system operatingparameters and 0:her operating restrictions that must be maintained to assure that the waterhammer and two-phaseflow analyses remain valid, and explain why it would not be appropriate to establish Technical Specipcation requirements to acknowledge the importance of these parameters and operating restrictions. Also, describe andjus:th use ofany non-safety related instrumentation and controlsfor maintaining these parameters.
SNC Response There are no specific operating parameters or restrictions that must be maintained to assure the validity of the analyses, other than those that are already established to maintain the operation of the system within its design limitations. Current VEGP Technical Specification surveillance requirements include verification of basin water level and temperature, and verification of flow paths for safety related equipment serviced by NSCW. The waterhammer analyses performed in response to GL 96-06 are based on system operating parameters that currently exist. Design changes made 5
to the system as a result of GL 96-06 are described in the response to item 16 and are aimed at improving the structural capability of the system in withstanding loads that result from the postulated waterhammer scenarios. These design changes do not change system operating parameters or the functional operation of the system. Non-safety related instrumentation and controls are not required to maintain parameters that are important to the validity of the waterhammer or two-phase flow analyses.
9.
NRC Reauest implementing measures to minimi:e or elitninate waterhanuner and two-phasepow conditions may be a viable approachfor addressing these issues. However, all l
scenarios must be considered to assure that the vulnerability to waterhammer and two-phaseflow has been eliminated. Confirm that allscenarios have been considered, including those where the a((ected containment penetrations are not isolated (if this is a possibility), such that the measures that have been established (or will be established) are adequate to address the waterhammer and two-phaseflow concerns during (andfollowing) all applicable accident scenarios.
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SNC Responsq The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 R.Als.
10.
NRC Request t
Confirm that the waterhammer and two-phaseflow analyses included a complete l
failure modes and effects analysis (l%1EA)for all components (including electrical andpneumaticfaihires) that could impact performance of the cooling water system and confirm that the 1%1EA is documented and availablefor review, or explain why a complete andfidly documented 1%ff&t was not performed.
SNC Response Existing design documentation for the VEGP NSCW system includes a failure modes and efTects analysis (FMEA) that evaluates failures of active components. The results of the FMEA are presented in FSAR Table 9.2.1-2. The evaluated failures include components utilized in the waterhammer mitigation (slow fill) feature of the existing design. Design changes made to the system as a result of GL 96-06 are described in the response to item 16 and are aimed at improving the structural capability of the t
system in withstanding loads that result from the postulated waterhammer scenarios.
These design changes do not change the functional operation of the system and do not l
involve changes to active components. Therefore, no revision is required to the existing FMEA. The FMEA documentation is available for review upon request.
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11.
NRC Request Describe the smcertainties that exist in the waterhammer and two-phaseflow analyses, j
' including uncertainties and shortcomings associated with the use of any computer codes, and explain how these uncertainties were accountedfor in the analyses to assure conservative results.
SNC Response The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 RAls.
12.
NRC Request 1
The waterham' er and two-phaseflow analyses assume that there is no backflow m
through the containment supply check vah es. Describe measures that exist that assure that these valves will remain leak-tight over the hfe of the plant.
SNC Response Considering the volume of water that is expected to drain from the outlets of the containment coolers or conteinment auxiliary coolers during the postulated scenarios, a relatively small amount ofleakage through the containment cooler / auxiliary cooler check valves is not important to the outcome of the analyses. It is only important that the check valves function to prevent gross backflow of water which could significantly increase the drain down volume. Conservative assumptions regarding drain down :
volume were made in the waterhammer and two-phase flow analyses that bound the effects of minor leakage through the check valves. Therefore, assurance ofleak-tightness is not required to maintain the validity of the waterhammer and two-phase flow analyses. The check valves in the NSCW supply lines to the containment cooling units will be periodically disassembled for cleaning and inspection at an appropriate frequency to be determined. This maintenance is performed to provide assurance that i
the check valves can accomplish their design function.
13.
NRC Reauest 7he response seems to indicate that two phaseflow due tofluid conditions in concert with the pressure drop associated with various system components was not considered. Confirm that the potentialfor two-phaseflow throughout the affected system was evaluot and that two-phaseflow conditions do not existfor any ofthe applicable accident scenarios. Ifit is determined that two-phaseflow does exist, then heat transfer, structural, andsystem integrity concerns must be addressed. For example thefollowhrg two-phaseflow effects would be relevant:
the effects of voidfraction onflow balance and heat transfer; e
the consequences ofsteamformation, transport, andaccumulation:
e 7
cavitation, resonance, andfatigue effects; and e
- ' erosion considerationi Licensees mayfind NUREGlCR-6031, " Cavitation Guidefor Control Valves, " helpfad in addressing some aspects of the two-phasepow analyses.
SNC Response The response to this item is deferred pending completion and review of the EPRI technical basis report for GL 96-06 RAls.
14.
NRC Request The waterhammer analysis was based on analyses of the NSCIVsystem associated with Unit 1, Train A. Confirm that the analyses that were completedare boundingfor the other NSCIV trainsfor both of the Vogtle units.
SNC Response As described in the response to item 6, a waterhammer analysis of the Unit 2 train B (2B) NSCW system was performed similar to the analysis performed for Unit 1 train A (I A). This analysis included the calculation of peak pressures and forcing functions on piping segments inside the containment. The results of the 2B analysis are similar to the results of the l A analysis. As is the case for the l A analysis, the 2B analysis concludes that the NSCW system piping and supports are capable of sustaining waterhammer loads without failure and performing their intended safety function.
Also like the l A analysis, the 2B analysis concludes that modiGcations to piping supports are required at various locations to meet VEGP design requirements. Upon completion of the 2B analysis, a decision was made to implement physical modi 6 cations to the piping supports for all four NSCW trains (i.e. I A, IB,2A and 28). Subsequently, specific waterhammer hydraulic transient analyses were performed for the remaining two NSCW trains (i.e.18 and 2A) similar to the previous analyses in order to develop the speciGc forcing functions to be applied to these trains.
The results of the IB and 2A transient analyses are similar to the previous analyses and were used as inputs in the dynamic stress models to verify that these trains, after modiGcation, would meet VEGP design requirements. In summary, all four NSCW trains have now been speciGcally analyzed and the appropriate forcing functions have been developed for use in implementing physical modi 6 cations to the piping and/or supports. See the response to item 16 for a description of the modi 0 cations that have been or are planned to be implemented.
15.
NRC Requcs1 1
Provide a simphfied diagram of the afected system, showing major components, active components, relative elevations, lengths ofpiping runs, and the location of any onfices andflow restrictions.
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SNC Response A simplined diagram of the Unit 1, train A NSCW system is attached. There is close similarity between all trains / units of the VEGP NSCW system, although there are l
some differences. As can be seen by review of the NSCW P&lDs, difTerences include l
the use of manual valves for throttling in the vicinity of the CCW and ACCW heat exchangers, the location /use of certain orinces, and the contiguration of branch locations. The simplified diagram provides approximate lengths of the major piping runs between the indicated junction / interface points. The diagram also provides approximate elevations of major equipment. Unless otherwise indicated, the elevations shown represent the elevation of the piping at the inlet connection to the equipment. Please note that a partial system isometric sketch was previously provided l
with the VECP response to GL 96-06.
16.
NRC Request l
Describe in detail any plant modifications or procedure changes that have been made I
or are planned to be made to resch e the waterhammer and two-phaseflow issues, inchiding schedulesfor completion.
SNC Resoonss For Unit 2, design changes in response to GL 96-06 were implemented during the sixth refueling outage during the Spring of 1998. The changes improve the capability of NSCW piping and supports to withstand potential waterhammer loads. The changes are associated with safety related NSCW supply and return piping to and from the containment coolers, containment auxiliary coolers and/or reactor cavity coolers.
The nature of the changes include the following: addition of new tie-back type suppons at various root, vent, drain, test and relief valve locations; modi 0 cation to replace various existing snubbers with rigid struts; deletion of various existing snubbers; deletion of an existing spring support; and modincation to improve the dynamic capability of various existing supports.
For Unit 1, a design change package in response to GL 96-06 has been issued t.nd the changes are scheduled to be implemented during the eighth refueling outage during the Spring of 1999. The changes will improve the capability of NSCW piping and supports to withstand potential waterhammer loads. The changes are associated with safety related NSCW supply and return piping to and from the containment coolers, containment auxiliary coolers and/or reactor cavity coolers. The nature of the changes planned include the following: addition of new tie-back type supports at various root, vent, drain, test and relief valve locations; modi 6 cation to replace various existing l
snubbers with rigid struts; deletion of an existing snubber and an existing pipe l
support; modiGcation to various existing supports to improve their dynamic capability or to accommodate the new tie-back suppons; and deletion of the outboard valve in a double valve arrangement at various locations of vent, drain and test valves.
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SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER CES SHOWN AT VARIOUS PIPING LOCATIONS siGNATED AS EITHER "FE" FOR FLOW SYSTEM - UNIT 1 TRAIN A NfmG SEiCES REF: RE A 98-VAA085 / GL 96-06 RAI R "FO" FOR FLOW I AL VALVES AT THE ACCW HEAT EXCHANGER ORAWING NO.
pEV ND OUTLET ARE LOCKED IN A THROTTLED SCALE:
N.
JOB NO.10604 SHEET 3 OF 3
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