ML20155D345

Responds to NRC 880506 Request for Addl Info Re Simulator Certification.Rev 3 to Procedure 18-340-1, Maine Yankee Simulator Work Order, Also Encl

ML20155D345
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	06/07/1988
From:	Whittier G Maine Yankee
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20155D350	List: ML20155D345 ML20155D380
References
GDW-88-134, MN-88-58, NUDOCS 8806150121
Download: ML20155D345 (201)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:MaineYankee RELIABLE ELECTRCTY FOR MAINE SNCE 1972 EDISON oRIVE. AUGUSTA. MAINE 04330. (207) 622 4868 June 7, 1988 HN-88-58 GDH-88-134 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Attention: Document Control Desk Hashington,l'. C. 20555

References:

(a) License No. DPR-36 (Docket No. 50-309) (b) USNRC Letter to HYAPC0 dated May 6, 1988 Gentlemen:

Subject:

Maine Yankee Simulator Certification contains our responses to your request for additional information concerning the certification of the Haine Yankee Simulator, Reference (b). He trust our responses are satisfactory; however, if you have any additional questions, please contact me. Please feel free to contact Mr. Michael Swartz, Simulhtor Supervisor, at (207) 882-6321 directly, regarding your on-site inspection of the simulator the week of August 29, 1988. Very truly yours, HAINE YANKEE bA%k G. D. Whittier, Manager Nuclear Engineering and Licensing GDH/bjp Enclosures cc: Mr. Richard H. Hessman Mr. Hilliam T. Russell Mr. Patrick H. Sears Mr. Cornelius F. Holden @e06150121 880607 ( f ADOCK0500g9 \\ DR 0083L-SDE

+ -{: MN-88-58 ENCLOSURE 1 l MAINE YANKEE RESPONSE.T0 NRC REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING l. MAINE YANKEE SIMULATOR CERTIFICATION l D e I 0083L-SDE l

Page 1 of 11 GENERAL Q1. Did you conduct 100% of your malfunction performance tests prior to this certification? A1. Yes, all of our malfunctions were completely tested during the accaptance testing phase of simulator procurement. Q2. If so, please provide the test abstracts for-these performance tests. A2. See Attachment A.

03. Please provide specific information which identifies which performance tests are to be conducted for each of the systems listed in the schedule..

A3. This is included in Attachment A. Q4. Please provide a list of acronyms and their meanings as used in your certification and supporting documentation. A4. See Attachment B EXCEPTION 1 Ql. Does.your use of the term "remotely operated equipment"-mean that both the equipment and the controls are outside of the Control Room? Al. Yes A2 If not, are any aspects of the operations simulated? For example, are the controls replicated on the control boards so as to maintain physical fidelity? A2. N/A Q3. How many and what kinds of functions does tuis include? For example, are the manually operated isolation valves for safety systems such as auxiliary feedwater and containment isolation not simulated? A3. The exception deals with valves used during the conduct of surveillance testing and are operated outside the Control Room. Maine Yankee reviewed all pertinent normal and abnormal operating procedures, emergency procedures and safety relateo surveillance procedures to determine which-specific valves must be simulated to support licensed operator training. The Simulator Review Board consisting of Training, Simulator and Operations Department representatives decided that values operated outside of the control room and used solely for surveillance procedures conducted on a frequency longer than month;y (i.e. set.i-annually, annually, etc.) did not have sufficient training value to simulete. In summary, we can conduct the pertinent normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures as well as safety related surveillance procedures conducted in the plant on a monthly or shorter frequency. '0058L-ARS-SOE

Page 2 of 11 EXCEPTION 2 Ql. Please defina your use of the term "all available." A1. For the dropped rod, stuck rod and rod ejection malfunctions "All available" means that we have the capability to perform these malfunctions on all trippable control rods, not just a selected few. ) fE EPTION 3 Ql. Please explain why you have taken this exception. A1. During Acceptance Testing, the procedure used did not specifically perform surveillance testing as required by this section and a report was not generated. Since we cannot backfit the initial acceptance testing, we took an exception to this requirement by deleting "Completion of Initial Construction." EXCEPTION 4 Q1. Why shouldn't the scheduling of these modifications conform to the = schedule given in Section 5.3 of the Standard? A1. Required modifications, such as those required in response to plant design changes, will be scheduled to conform with Section 5.3 of the standard. Enhancements, such as an increase in the scope of simulation beyond that required by the standard, will be scheduled as specified in the proposed Section 5.5. Q2. Why do you document only that feedback which results in simulator modifications? A2. The documentation discussed is a "Simulator Work Order." This is part of our Simulator Configuration Management System. In our system all changes to the hardware or software are controlled with a Simulator Work Order. He believe the cost of documenting all feedback throughout the life of the simulator significantly exceeds any anticipated benefit. However, the disposition of design changes are documented whether or not they are implemented in the simulator. Q3. Why do you use the term "influences the use of the simulator as a training and testing device" as opposed to the t.?rm "detract from training" or testing as used in Section 5.2 of the Standard. A3. The words "detract from training" are used in Section 3.2.1 of the Standard in the context of deviations of dimensions and arrangements of panels. In this context any deviation detracts to some degree from reality. The words "influence the use of the simulator as a training and testing device" are more appropriata for performance issues because they encompass both positive and negative factors when evalutting whether or not a change should be made to the simulator. l 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 3 of 11 THE TEST PLAN SECTION 3.1 Q1. Does this refer to the certification test plan and not the performance test plan? A1. This refers to the Certification Test Plan.and its implementing procedure, "Simulator Operability Test Procedure.No. 18-343-1. This statement allows us to make changes to our general approach and specific procedure without notifying the NRC as long as the change does not decrease either the scope or frequency of testing. An example might be adding a section to the procedure that increases the frequency of testing for a particular system. SECTION 5.0 Q1. Are you aware of the requirement to submit a report of your performance testing every four years in accordance with 10CFR55.45b(5)(ii)? A1. Yes. 1985 ANNUAL REPORT PAGE 1. SECTION III, ITEM 1 Q1. Please identify NORTH on the Control Room drawing. A1 NORTH is on the right hand side of the control room drawing. Ql. Here any passages or access to any panels or instrumentation altered or obstructed? A1. No ITEM 3 Q1. Please explain why these modifications are being deferred until after the human factors evaluation, and when they are expected to occur? A1. Based on the Detailed Control Room Design Review, Maine Yankee decided to. i replace the plant's turbine supervisory recorders. Installation of the l simulator recorders was deferred for economic reasons until a replacement for the plant was selected. The replacement recorders are scheduied to be installed in the plant by 8/88 and in the simulator by 10/88. I 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 4 of 11 PAGE 1, SECTION IV, INSTRUCTOR INTERFACE Q1. Can the instructor perform the functions of an auxiliary operator as required by the Standard? A1. Yes, the instructor from the instructors station can operate local valves and equipment that an auxiliary operator would operate. The instructor also has the required communication equipment to perform this function. Q2. Do you have administrative controls or other means in place which alert the simulator operator when the simulations go outside known reference plant behavior or model design limits? A2. Yes, we have a flashing amber light on the instructor station which flashes when specific parameters exceed preset limits. The parameters and limits are posted in the instructor station. PAGE 3, SECTION V, SIMULATOR OPERADILITY TESTING Ql. He have interpreted your statement that "all systems and processes are checked at least every four (4) years" to mean that the operability testing as defined by the Standard will be conducted annually and that the performance tests will be conducted at a rate of 25% per year. If this interpretation is not correct, please clarify. A1.'Your intrepretation is correct, assuming that your definition of performance tests are what we call malfunction tests as defined in Reg Guide 1.149. PAGE 3 SECTION VIII Q1. If other than your 1985 ATP, please identify the specific testing that you conducted to satisfy the requirement for the conduct of 100% performance testing prior to certification. A1. The ATP was completed in 1984 and tested all malfunctions installed at delivery. Subsequent to the acceptance, we have added additional malfunctions. These were throughly tested prior to use as required by our Simulator Work Order procedure. Altnough it appears reasonable that 100% of the malfunctions should be tested prior to certification, we can find no requirement for this in 10CFR55 Reg Guide 1.149 or NRC Form 474. Q2. Did the testing you performed in 1985 encompass all 10 of the items discussed in Section 4.0 of the test plan? A2. No, the test plan describes the testing requirements at the time we certified the simulator. The specific tests performed in 1985 are described in the 1985 Annual Report. 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 5 of 11 PAGE 4, STEADY STATE HEAT BALANCE Ql. Please provide the rationale for your acceptability criteria. Why did you not compare this to plant data? A1. Data obtained from the simulator during steady state operations was compared to plant data obtained by computer using our plant's Performance Evaluation of Power Systems Efficiencies (PEPSE) code. This code records actual plant data where available and calculates the remaining heat balance information. Heat balance data obtained from plant design calculations was also compared to confirm the PEPSE calculations. For evaluation of the actual plant data, the criteria from Section 4.1 of the standard was used. For calculated values, the simulator data was compared to the window between the PEPSE data and the design calculations. If the simulator value fell outside of the window then the criteria from Section 4.1 of the standard was used. In all cases, the Simulator Review Board made the final training value judgement as to whether or not a discrepancy was allowed. APPENDIX D. H0DIFICATION REQUEST

SUMMARY

Q1. Please explain the criteria which you use to determine whether an item is-an enhancement or a discrepancy. A1. An enhancement is defined as an increase in scope of simulation that is not a result of a design change. An example would be a malfunction added due to a training requirement or need. A discrepancy is a problem noted with the existing software or hardware. Q2. Please outline the mechanism used for your coding and tracking systems. A2. The following is a brief explanation of the various fields on the report: HR# - Self generated tracking number. EDCR # - Plant generated number developed as a result of a design change (i.e., E81-010 is the 10th Engineering Design Change Request generated in 1981). The designation that begins with "P" or "A" are Plant Alterations. Those that are designated xxx are enhancements. SYSTEH Two letter designation for which system is affected by the change. HDH ENG - Initials of the individual or company (if contracted) who is responsbile for the hardware change. SFH ENG - Initials of the individual or company who is responsible for the software change. NOTE: If work is beyond the scope of the Simulator Group and must be contracted, but the contract has not been awarded yet, a "?' is used. 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 6 of 11 APPENDIX 0, MODIFICATION REQUEST

SUMMARY

(cont'd) DESCRIPTION - Brief description of the change. OPEN DATE - The date the Modification Request was generated (for simulator work). ~INCORP DATE - The date the change was installed and tested "Ready for Training" in the simulator. The tracking system has been changed since 1985, Attachment C is the Simulator Hork Order procedure. This explains our tracking system as it now exists. Q3. What criteria do you use to determine whether an item should be rejected or deferred. A3. Rejected means no change will be made to the simulator hardware or software. The Simulator Review Board is the only body that can reject a design change. There are two (2) basic criteria for rejecting a design change: insufficient training value or the change is temporary and will be replaced by a permanant modification at some later date. Deferred means that we intend to install the change, but due-to some constraint we cannot do it at this particular time. This decision is also made by the Simulator Review Board. 1986 ANNUAL REPORT PAGE 2 SECTION VI, TOP OF PAGE, MR

SUMMARY

TABLE Q1. Please break this table out by year. A1. This table displays a summation of data for 1986. The Appendices (A&B) include the computer log of modification and discrepancy reports for 1985 and 1986. PAGE 2, SECTION VII, INTEGRATED TEST, LINE 3 Q1. Please define RE procedures. A1. RE procedures are developed by the Maine Yankee Reactor Engineering (RE) Section to control our plants core physics testing. The Simulator Group uses these procedures as a basis for simulator core physics testing. PAGE 3, SURVEILLANCES l

01. Do these surveillances address all of the safety related systems?

A1. No. Since the completion of the 1986 testing, the scope of testing has l been expanded based on the criteria developed by the Simulator Review Board (see Exception #1, Q3). f i 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 7 of 11 PAGE 4, SIMULATOR OPERATION TESTING Q1. What is included in these tests and how are they evaluated? A1.~The details of the Simulator Operation Testing are described in Appendix C of the 1986 Annual Report page 16 of 29. PAGE 4, BASELINE TRANSIENTS Q1. Why didn't you take the elimination of. Appendix B, Test 7, as an exception? A1. He do not consider Appendix B, Test 7 to be a requirement. Although Appendix B is an integral part of the Standard, the specific tests along with the parameters to be checked are offered as examples according to "B. Purpose" of Appendix B. Test 7 was deleted because it is not applicable to Maine Yankee as described on page 4 of the 1986 Annual Report. APPENDIX C, SIMULATOR OPERABILITY TEST PAGE 2-5, SECTION 5.0, INTEGRATED TEST Q1.-What are the units and ranges for the values.in.the tables? A1. See Attachment D of this response. Q2. How did you decide what was a DR? A2. The criteria i 10% for non-critical parameters and i 2% for critical parameters is our basis for deciding what is a DR. This does not apply to items that have logarithmic scales. For these items Subject Matter Expert (SHE) judgement was used.

03. Please submit plant data for start-up.

If unavailable, please explain. A3. Not all data was available for the specific conditions required. Where available data was taken from plant logs. Otherwise, SHE judgement was used to assess the relative appropriateness of the simulator performance. Q4. If this data is not available, can you estimate values based on SHE judgement or other available data? A4. Yes, we have done that (see response to Q3 above). QS. Some of the values appear to be discrepant but are not written up. E.g., Items RI-3401 and RI-1701 in the Section 5.1.2 Table. Please explain. AS. The discrepancy reports listed in the Section 5.1.2 Table were written in response to the particular event rather than the value observed. i 005L. - ARS-SDE

Page 8 of 11 PAGE 9, SECTION 6.0, MALFUNCTIONS Q1. Please provide the abstracts for the performance tests conducted this year. A1. I assume "this year" refers to 1986. Attachment A includes the performance test abstracts (cause and effect documents) and lists the tests performed and plans for future testing. PAGES 10 - 15, SECTION 7.0, SURVEILLANCES Q1. What criteria are you using to evaluate those? Al. He used SHE judgement to assets acceptability. The acceptance criteria from the surveillance procedures was used for the 1987 testing and this practice will continue in future years. PAGES 18 - 20, SECTION 10, BASELINE TRANSIENTS, AND ASSOCIATED GRAPHS Q1. How do you know if the annunicators actuated correctly? A1. That is not the purpose of these test, annunicatorsmare checked during the malfunction tests. Q2. What was used as baseline data for these transients? A2. These transients were analyzed (Table Top Analysis) by a licensed SRO. The results of the analysis were reviewed by the Maine Yarkee Nuclear Safety Engineering Group and the Transient Analysis Group from Yankee Atomic Electric Co. Framingham, Mass. The analysis and results of the review are documented in the 1987 Annual Report. GRAPHS - ALL FH PUMPS TRIP - SG LEVELS I Ql. Why is this in inches instead of percent like the rest of the SG 1evel graphs? l A1. Hide range level is recorded in inches while narrow range level is l recorded in %. This transient caused SG 1evel to go below 01.. In order to obtain meaningful results we graphed the wide range readings to record the dynamic response. l l GRAPHS - ALL SG LEVELS l Q1. Is this a narrow range or a wide range reading? A1. If the graph is in "%" it is narrow range, if it is in "inches" it is wide range. I l 0058L-ARS-SDE t

Page 9 of 11 GRAPHS - MAIN TURBINE TRIP Q1. Is 15% the maximum power as required-by the Appendix 8.2.2(6) of the Standard? A1. Yes, if power is greater than 15% and the turbine trips, we experience a reactor trip. Q2. Why does feed flow drop after the turbine trips? A2.~ A turbine trip causes the Hain Feed Reg Vcives to close and the Bypass Valves to open to supply approximately 2% feed flow. This is all automatic upon receipt of a turbine trip. GRAPHS - LOCA AND HSL BREAK Q1. Why is there no graph of narrow range pressurizer pressure as required by i Appendix B of the Standard? A1. He used wide range pressurizer pressure-because the narrow range would have bottomed out during the LOCA. The scale of_the. narrow range is:_. 1500-2500 psi. The wide range pressurizer level was also used for the HSLB and other transients where-we plotted pressurizer pressure vs. time._ As previously discussed, we do nat feel that the specific parameters or the specific transients listed in Appendix B to the Standard are required. GRAPHS - STUCK PORV Q1. Based on the TMI experience in which the pressurizer indication reflected that the pressurizer went solid, isn't it possible that the pressurizer level indicated could be different from the actual level? Do you reflect this. A1. As we understand the THI experience, the pressurizer went solid because a bubble formed under the head. At this time, our RCS model does not accurately model the head bubble phenomenon. He are currently studying our RCS model to determine the best way to resolve this issue. Your question asks if our simulator reflects a difference between actual and indicated level, the answer is yet. He have density compensated level-instruments in the reference plant and the simulator to reflect this. l Q2. Is reactor level indication installed in the reference plant? If so, why isn't.it included in the graphs as required by Appendix B of the Standard? i l i A2. Yes, reactor level indicators based on differential pressure i instrumentation are installed in the reference plant. However, during l this transient the level indications are meaningless because the pressure instrumentation indicates maximum differential pressure when over the reactor coolant pumps are on. During this transient the pumps remained on. l l 0058L-ARS-SDE L

Page 10 of 11 PAGE 28, CEA WORTH MEASUREMENTS Q1. How do you account for the apparent violations of the criteria for Groups 1 and B and for the total? A1. Although some of the CEA worth measurements were outside of the acceptance criteria as defined by the simulator operability test procedure, we did not fine tune the core model for the following reasons: The simulator's measured values were only marginally outside the -acceptance criteria as defined by the simulator operability test. The simulator's measured values were within the acceptance criteria used by the plant as defined in the Low Power Physics Test procedure (11-2). The operators were still able to use the current plant procedures on the simulator. The operators could detect the difference on the simulator. The difference would not detract from training or the examination process. APPENDIX D Q1. How does this core physics test relate to the test reported on pages 6-7, and 28-29 of the 1986 report? A1. The core physics test comparison was performed at the completion of the core model upgrade. This test was more comprehensive than the annual operability test. Much of the data collected during the physics test comparison was also used as data for the annual operability test.

02. Why wasn't this change in the core model reported in the "Changes Since Last Report" section?

A2. The change was reported in Appendix A as HR-054 Core Update, completed 9/25/B6. APPENDIX E Q1. Is the simulator performance reflected in the "reperformed" graphs of this Appendix the same as that reflected in the graphs at the end of the 1986 report? A1. Yes, they are the same. 0058L-ARS-SDE

Page 11 of 11 .-Q2. Please describe why you chose not to rerun the ATHS tests to determine if you were correct about the differences seen in the first run? A2 Because the differences were relatively minor and both the ATHS and MSLB transients are performed annually to check model integrity, we made a value judgement not to rerun the transient. However, the MSLB had a major difference in pressurizer response and was reperformed. d I 1 0058L-ARS-SDE

ATTACHMCv7 A Enclosed are the Cause and Effects Documents for the malfunctions available on t' e Maine Yankee simulator. These documents list the cause of each malfunction and the corresponding effect the simulator should display. In addition to their use during the simulator design, these. documents have a significart influence in the simulator malfunction testing Maine Yankee has and will pe form. All the maltut..onc listed on the Cause and Effects Documents were tested prior to accept 1n, sne simulator as ready for training. In addition, portions of'the acceptance testing listed below were repeated during 1986 and 1987. Our four year malfunction test plan by system is also listed below. (NOTE 1) (NOTE 2) (NOTE 3) (NOTE 3) (NOTE 3) (HOTE 3) 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 AN FH RC RP AN EG CC IA RD RX CC FH CV HS RH SG CV IA ED NI RH TC ED HS EG PC SH TV NI CR PC CH NOTE (1) Testing prior to certification NOTE (2) Testing in progress at certification and completed in 1987. NOTE (3) Post certification schedule Year 1 systems to be tested in 1988, Year 2 - 1989, Year 3 - 1990 and Year 4 - 1991 0058L-ARS-SDE

MAINE YANKEE SIMULATCR FALFUNCTIONS_ TABLE OF CONTENTS Ah01 LOSS OF AhNUNCIATOR(S) CC01 LOSS OF FFIFARY COMPCNENT C0 CLING WATER CCO2 LOSS OF SECCADARY CCF00NENT CCOLING kATER CCO3 LOSS OF CCMPCNENT CCCLING TC LPSI PUFP(S) CC04 COMFCNENT CCCLING WATER FEAT EXCHANGER EYPASS FAILURE CC05 COMFCNEAT CCCLING PUFP LCW CAPACITY CC06 LOSS OF CCMPCNENT C0 CLING TO DIESEL (S) CC07 COMFCNEAT CCCLING SURGE TANK LEVEL FAILLnE CC08 COMPCNEhT CCCLING 2-INCH SUPPLY HEADER LEAK CC09 LOSS OF CCMP C0 CLING TO LETOCWN HEAT EXCHANGER CC10 SEAL OIL S Y S T E.M F AIL.L RE CRO1 FUEL CLADDING FAILURt CV00 LETCCWN PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE LO-F-15 FAILLRE CV01 PAS LETCChN CONTROLLER L Y 101 P ( 3 ) CV02 CSARGING ISCLATICN CV03 VCLLFE CChT ACL T ANK LEVEL FAILURE CV04 CHAAGING LIhE LEAK l CVOS PRIFARY WATER PUMP FAILURE l CV06 EORIC ACIO PUMP FAILURE CV07 LSTOCWN ISCLATION VALVE LEA < AGE CV08 CHARGING FLCW INDICATION LCST CV09 LETDCWN ISCLATICN LD-T-5 FAILURE l cv10 A FIGH PRESSURE LETDOWN LEAK S LCW FRESSURE LETDCWN LEAK l l

w. MAINE YANKEE SIMULATCR VALFUNCTICNS TABLE OF CONTENTS CV11 UNCCNTRCLLED DILUTIch CV12 CH ARGING PUFP FAILURE CV13 INACVERTENT DILUTION /30RATIOh CV14 RCP - LCWER SEAL FAILURE CV15 RCP - MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE UPPER SEAL FAILURE CV16 R CP CV17 RCP - LCW PP!SSURE VAPOR SEAL FAILUAE CV1B RCP - LCSS CF SEAL WATER CV19 LETCCWN Flok CONTROLLER FAILLRE Ch01 LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUFP(S) Ch02 CONDENSER TUBE LEAK (S) i Ch03 LOSS OF VACLUM PRIVIA-3 ED01 TOTAL LCSS CF OFF SITE PCdER E002 LOSS OF STATION SERVICE TRANSFORFER(S) E003 LOSS OF STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFCRv!R(S) E004 SUS TIE 2REAKER(S) FAILURE ECOS LOSS OF DC EUS l l E006 LOSS OF VITAL Af SUS i E007 RING BUS FAILURE EDOS FAILURE TC AUTO-SHIFT FRCM STATION TO RESERVE PChER E009 LOSS OF OP/ PAC l EG01 AUTC VCLTAGE REGLLATCR FAILURE l EG02 LOSS OF PAIN TRANSFORMER (S)

MAINE YANKEE SIMULATCR M. A L F U N C T I O N S TABLE CF CONTENTS EG03 DIESEL GEhERATOR FAILS TC START EG04 DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP EGOS GENERATCR BREAKER FAILS TO OPEN AFTER TQIP EG06 FAILLRE CF CG-2 Fh01 LOSS OF CCNDENSATE PUMP (S) Fh02 LOSS OF FAIN ELECTRIC FEEDWATER PUMP (S) Fh03 LOSS OF ALXILIARY FEE 0 WATER ELECTRIC PUPP(S) Fh04 LOSS OF TLREINE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMF Fh05 P-2C TUREINE FEEDWATER PUMP LOSS OF CIL Fh06 FAILURE CF THE P-2C AECIRC CCNTRCLLER CASCACE MCOE Fh07 ELECTRIC FEEChATER PLMP FIGH TEMPERATURE Fh08 HEATER CRAIA TAhK LEVEL CONTROLLER FAILLGE Fh09 SPILL VALVE FAILURE Fh10 HOTh ELL L EVEL CChTRCL FAILURE Fh11 FEEChATER HEADER LEAK FW12 LOSS OF HEATER ORAIN PUMP (S) l FW13 LOSS OF FEE 0 WATER TO STEAM GENERATOR i Fh14 LOSS OF CCNCENSER VACUUM l FW15 AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER FAILURE Fh16 P-2C FEE 0 HATER PUMP LOW CAPACITY FW17 P-2C TUREINE FEECWATER PLMP SPEED CCNTRCL FAILURE FW18 FEED REG CABINFT POWER SLPPLY FAILURE Fh19 F AILURE O F P-2A & P-29 ALTO START DRESSLRE ShITCb l l 1 1 l

6 ~ MAINE YANKEE SIMULATCR MALFUNCTIONS TABLE OF CONTENTS IA01 LOSS OF CCNTROL AIR IA02 LOSS OF CCNTAINFENT CONTFOL AIR MS01 STEAF LEAK INSIDE COhTAIAMENT MS02 STEAM LEAK CUTSIDE CCNTAINMEAT DCWNSTREAP EFCV MS03 STEAP LEAK CUTSIDE CCNTA!NY.ENT U# STREAM EFCV MSO4 EFCV CLCSLRE PSOS STEAF GEhERATOR SAFETY VALVE FAILURE M206 DECAY HEAT RELEASE VALVE FAILURE M507 DECAY HEAT RELEASE ISOLATION MOV FAILURE MS08 AUXILIARY STEAM CONTROLLER FAILURE MSO9 GLAND STEAM REGULATOR FAILURE MS10 STEAP DLPP/iLR3INE 9YPASS VALVE FAILURE NIO1 HIDE RANGE h1 FAILURE, CHANNELS 1-4 NIO2 POWER RANGE FAILURE CHANhELS 5-8 PC01 LOSS OF PLANT CorPUTER RC01 HOT LEG LCSS OF COOLANT RCO2 HOT LEG CCCLANT LEAK RCO3 COLC LEG LOSS OF COCLANT RC04 COLD LEG COCLANT LEAK RCOS LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT FUMP(S) LCCKED ROTCR RC06 RCP EXCESSIVE VIBRATICh RC07 RCP RCOS RCP - HIGF EEARING TEMPERATURE

.) MAINE YANKEE l SIFLLATCR MALFUNCTICNS TABLE OF CONTENTS J \\ RC09 PRESSURIZER PORV FAILURE RC10 P RES $URIZ E R PORV ISCLATICN VALVE FAILURE RC11 REACTOR HEAD VENT LEA < RC12 SURGE LINE SAMPLE LIhE LEAK RC13 RCP FAILS TC START RC14 LTOP CONTROLLER FAILLRE RC15 FAILLRE CF PIR SAFETY RELIEF VALVE RC01 DROFFE0 RC0(S) R002 STUCK RCD R003 R00(S) hITHCRAWAL FAILURE R004 ROO(S) INSERTION FAILURE RDOS R00 EJECTION R006 CEDF LOSS OF COOLING l R007 LOS$ OF PGCS) FOR CECM R003 CEOF(S) FAILURE T0 TRIP RC09 LNCChTRCLLEC WITHORAkAL/INSERTICN OF CEDF(S) t l RD10 LOSS OF CEA F0VEFENT RH01 RESICUAL HEAT REF0 VAL LOSS OF CCCLING RH02 LOSS OF RHR PUMP (S) Rh03 RHR FLOh CONTROLLER FAILURE Rh04 RHR CISCHARGE DIFING FAILURE RF01 AREA RACIATICN FCNITCR FAILUPE(S) RF02 PROCESS RADIATION MohITOR FAILURE (S) l

~~_ MAINE YAN<EE SIMULATCR MALFUhCTICNS TABLE CF CohTENTS RF03 FRIP ARY VENT STACK GAS FCNITCR FAILURE, RI-3902Y RF04 LETCCWN MONITOR FAILLRE RP01 REACTOR TRIP FAILURE RP02 SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP RP03 Ih ACVERT ENT SAFETY INJECTION RPO4 SAFETY INJECTION FAILURE RPOS INACVERTENT PAS RP06 CONTAINFEST ISOLATION FAILURE RP07 IN ACV ERT ENT CCNTAINFENT ISOLATICA SIGNAL RP08 RECIRCULATICN ACTIVATION FAILURE RP09 LOW TEMPEPATLRE/ LOW PRESSURE PRCTECTION FAILURE RP10 DELTA-TEFPERATURE INSTRUFINT(S) FAILS RP11 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE TRID CHAhNEL(S) FAIL r RP12 COLD LEG TEMPERATURE TRIP CHANNEL (S) FAIL RP13 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE TRIP CHANNEL (S) FAILURE RP14 ECCS 86 DEVICE FAILURE RXOi PRESSURIZER PRESSURE C0h1 ROLLER PIC101 FAILS Rx02 PRESSURIZER SPRAY CCNTRCL FAILURE Rx03 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROLLER DC1C1 FAILS Rx04 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CCATRCL FAILURE Ax05 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE REGULATIh3 CHANNEL (S) FAILURE RXO6 CCLC LEG REGULATING CHANNEL ($) FAIL RXO7 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE

it i MAINE YAN<!E SINULATCR MALFUhCTIONS TASLE CF CCATENTS RX08 1ST STAGE TLR8INE PRESSURE INSTRUMENT FAILURE RXO9 TAVE INSTRUMENT FAILURE RX10 STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CChTROL FAILURE RX11 STEAP DLFP/ TURBINE SYPASS SYSTEX FAILURE RX12 FEEC REGULATING VALVE FAILURE SG01 STEAF GENERATOR TUSE(S) LEA < Sh01 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PUFP(S) Sh02 SERVICE HATER HEADER RUPTURE Sh03 LOSS OF RAW HATER Sh04 TRANELIhG SCREEh HIGH DELTA FRESSURE SkOS LOSS OF SCREEN WASH PUMD Sh06 LOSS OF FIRE WATER HEADER PRESSURE Sh07 SERNICE h4TER PUPP DISCHARGE RUPTURE TC01 TUREINE/ GENERATOR TRIP FAILURE TCO2 TUREINE/ GENERATOR SPURIOLS TRIP TCO3 TUREINE CCNTROL VALVE (S) FAILURE TC04 INTERCEFTCR VALVE CLOSURE TCOS LOSS OF TUREINE AUTC SPEED CCNT9CL TC06 LOSS OF AUTC LOAD CONTROL TC07 LOSS OF EH FLMP(S) TUO1 TUREINE VIBRATION

m, - FAINE-YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4A,9GE/CALSE % EFFECTS ..................................,.e...u............,.......... Ah01 LOSS OF ANNLACIATOR(S) TYPE:150 - GENERIC YP:XMFTB (682 - 694) CAUSE: SWITCH FAILURE TC SELECTED DANEL(S) PLT STA:AT SChER ANNUNCIATOR FANEL D S - S '. I L L L O S E ITS P0hER SUPPLY DUE EFFECTS:AN01A TO THE Sh!TCF FAILING Ih THE PChER CIRCLIT. ANY ANNUNCIATORS THAT WERE LIT KILL G0 CFF AhD PANEL WILL SE DARK. NO ALARMS ASSOCIATED hITH THE PANEL WILL ANNUNCIATE CR ACTUATE. REMCVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE PANEL TO NORMAL CFERATION. AN019 - SAME AS AN01A EXCEoT PS-W. PS-G. AN01C SS-T. Ah010 PS-FI AN01E AN01F - oS-R PS-P AN010 PS-C AN01H PS-L AN01J PS-RH AN01K DS-HU+R AN01L as-SS AN01P PS-F0 AN01h

e FAINE YANKEE WALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLI/ RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CC01 LOSS OF PRIFARY COMPCNENT C0 CLING WATER 15eCCO GAM TYPE:C78 - VARIASLE: 100% = YPXSVRTY-(1) CAUSE:20" HEADER 3REAK ON COMMON SUPPLY TC HEAT EXCHANGERS PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIOh WILL SIMULATE A 9REAK IN THE PCC CCMM0h 20" HEADER SUPPLY TO THI C0FFONENT COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS. THE LEAK CAN 9E VARIED TC 15,000 GDP WHICH IS GREATER THAN THE CCMEINED CAPACITY OF THE SUPPLY PUMPS. AT FAXIMUM SEVERITY C0 CLING h00LO GE LOST TO ALL CCFPONENTS SUPPLIED BY THE PCC. PUMPS WCULO RUN CUT AND EVENTUALLY TRIP DUE TO FECH ANIC AL FAILURE. SURGE TANK LEVEL HILL OROP ACCCRDING TC THE MALFUNCTI0h SEVERITY. ASSOCIATEC ALARMSe INSTRLFENTATICNi AND AUTO PUMP START WILL EE SEEN AS THE EVENT PROGRESSES. TEPPERATURES ON EQUIPPENT SUPPLIED 3Y THE PCC WILL AISE ACCCRDING TO THEIR USE. THE SIFULATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-IhITIALIZED AFTER FALFLACTION IS REMOVED. l l l l l l

T-FA!NE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE t EFFECTS I CCO2 LOSS OF SECCh0ARY CCFDONENT CCOLING_WAT55 TYPE: C79 - VARIABLE: 100.1 = 15,003 GPM YFXSV Y (2) CAUSE:16" HEADER BREAK 00khSTREAM CF SCC-A-46C FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: SIFILAR TO CC01. Ih ADDITION LCW SCC PRESS WILL CAUSE ISCLAION OF LEAK DOE TO ACTUATION OF SCC-A-460 AND SCC-A-461. AFTER ISCLATION PRESS WILL RETURN TC NORMAL CN SCC. COOLING WILL SE LOST TO EXCITERr HYO90 GENS GENERATOR SEAL OILi CCNDEASATE FUMP, AIR CCFPRESSORr TURB!hE LU9E CIL, EHC, FEED PUFPr AND HEATER DRAIN PUMP CCCLERS. TEMPS WILL RISE IN CCMPCNENTS THAT LOST SCC. ASSOCIATEC ALARMS WILL ACTUATE. REF0 VAL OF THE VALFUNCTION WILL RESTORE THE SYSTEM'S INTEGRITY ANC ALL0k FEFILL.

FAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE S EFFECTS CC03 LOSS OF CCMPCNENT C0 CLING TO LPSI DUMD(S) TYPE:CBC - GENERIC YF:XMFTB (3 - 4) CAUSE:SUPFLY LINE 9REAKS CFF AT PLFP CCNNECTIch PLT STA:CN SHR EFFECTS:CCO3A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A LCSS OF CCFPONENT COOLING TO THE LFSI PUMP P-12A CLE TC THE SUPPLY LINE-EREAKING AT FUwP. LOSS CF THE CCOLIhG HILL CAUSE THE STUFFING E0X TEMP TO INCREASER RESULTING IN EVENTUAL FAILURE OF THE SEALS AhD POSSIELY THE PUMP, IF THE PUMP IS IN USE. ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS HILL REFLECT THE CONDITICh. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTION HILL RESTORE COMPCNENT CCCLING FLCW. SAME AS CC03A EXCEPT P-123. CC032

'l FAINE YANKEE-FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CC04 COMFCNENT CCCLIhG WATER FEAT EXCbANGER EYPASS FAILURE GENERICJ VARIASLE: 0% = SHUT; 10CX = FULL OPEN TYPE: C31 YF)SVRTY (146 - 147) CAUSE: TEMPERATURE CONTROL FOR EYPASS VALVE FAILS FLT STA:CN RHR THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF TEMPERATURE EFFECTS:CC04A CONTROL CN THE PCC HEAT EXCHANGER, OUE TC THE TEMPERATURE CONTROL FOR THE EYPASS VALVE FAILING. THE AMOUNT AhD DIRECTION OF THE FAILLRE IS VARIAELE. THE NOMINAL TEMPERATURE OF THE SYSTEM IS 75 DEG F. FAILURE CF TFE TEMoEGATLRE CCNTSCL TC THE L0h END aILL RESULT IN A SIGNAL TO CLOSE THE BYFASS VALVE AND CPEN THE COOLERS INLET %ALVE. THIS KILL RESLLT IN MORE HATER THROUGH THE HEAT EXCHAhGERSr RESULTING IN COOLER CCFPONENT COOLING KATEP. FAILURE IN THE HIGH OIRECTICN HILL CPEN THE BYFASS AND CLOSE DChN Ch THE COOLERS INLET. THIS WILL ALLOW FORE WATER TC EYPASS TbE CCOLERS AND CCMPCNENT CCCLING TEFPERATURE WILL RISE. EGUIPMEhT CCCLEC RY THE PCC HILL SEE THESE TEMPERATURE VARIATIONS ON THEIR RESPECTIVE FETERS AND RECORDERS. ALL ALARFS ANC ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION HILL REFLECT THIS CCNDITION. REMOVAL CF THE VALFUNCTICN HILL RESTCRE FROPER OPERATIch 0F THE TEMPERATURE CONTROL. SAti AS CC04A EXCEPT THE SCC ANC CCFFONENTS WILL CC042 EE AiFECTED.

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGS/CALSE ! EFFECTS CC05 COMFCNEhT CCCLING PUFP LCW CAPACITY TYPE: CS2 - GENERIC, VARIAiLE: 1CC% COPPLETE FAILURE YPXSVRTY (3 - 6) CAUSE: IMPELLER WORN PLT STA:AT FCbER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIFULATE TFE CAPACITY OF THE EFFECTS:CCOSA COMPCNENT CCCLIhG PUFP P-9A F ALLING C F F CUE TO IMPELLER WEAR. THE HIGHER THE SEVERITY SELECTED, THE LOWER CAPACITY THE PUMP WILL HAVE. kHEN THE PUMP'S CAPACITY REACHES A PCINT THAT IT CANNOT XEEP UP hITH THE SYSTEM FL0k AND PRESSURE REGUIREMENT, THE ASSOCIATED CCMPONENT C0 CLING PUFP, P-99, WILL AUTC START. APPROPRIATE ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTATION WILL ALERT THE OPERATOR TO TbE FROBLEM. FLCW AND PRESSURE INTERLOCKS k!LL PERFORF THEIR FLNCTIONS. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION HILL RESTCRE FULL CAPACITY OF Thi PUMP. SAME AS CC05A EXCEPT D-99. CC0!B SAME AS CCCSA EXCEPT P-1CA. CC05C SAME AS CCOSA EXCEPT P-103. CC050 l l l [ l I [

f i PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE S EFFECTS CC06 LOSS OF CCMPCNENT C0 CLING TO DIESEL (S) = DG-1A B = DG-10 TYPE:CS3 - A CALSE: PCC-493 VALVE DISC FALLS CFF PLT STA: LOSS CF ALL POWER IN PROGRESS THIS FALFUhCTICN HILL SIMLLATE A FLOW ELOCKAGE EFFECTS: CCC6A OF COMPONEAT CCOLING TC THE DIESEL GEhERATCR DUE TO THE VALVE DISC FALLING CFF THE ELOCXED OoEN TEMPEPATURE CCNTRCL %ALVE (PCC-T-493). AS A RESULTi THE DIESEL CCCLIhG WATER TEMPERATLRE WILL INCREASE RAPIDLY. WFEN THE DIESEL WATER GETS TO 19C DEGREES, TS-27C1A h1LL TRIP THE ALTERNATE COOLING VALVES OPEh 3UT WILL NCT FPOVIDE ALTERNATE COOLING UNTIL THE PAhuAL ISCLATIONS ARE OPENED (REMOTE FUNCTICN EG-109). IF THE OPEFATCRS 00 NOT RE-ALIGN THE FANUAL VALVES (FS-37e DCC-492, CCC-494), DIESEL GENERATOR WATER AND OIL TEFPERATURES WILL CONTINUE TO INCREASE. CCNTINUED CPERATICS WILL CAUSE A SPOKE DETECTOR ALARM IN TFE AFFECTED AREA TO ALARFr DUE TO THE HIGH AF9!ENT TEMPERATUREr FCLLCWED SHCRTLY BY A CATASTROPHIC FAILUDE CF TFE DIESEL GENERATCR. SAFE AS CCC6A EXCEPT DG-15 h!LL SE AFFECTED. CCC66 NCTE: DIESEL TEMDERATURE RESFCNSE IS DEPENDENT UPON DIESEL GENERATOR KW LCAD AhD, TFEREFORE, THE TIPE FRAME FCR PLANT RESPONSES HILL VARY WITH DG KW LOAD. T = 1.0 MIN PAhEL TROL 9LE ANNLNCIATOR 3.0 MIN SMCKE DETECTOR PAhEL T = T = 4.0 MIN DIESEL 3ENER ATCR FAILS

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS FALF .MA'LFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS h0...................................................................... CC07 COMFCNEhT CCCLING SURGE TANK LEVEL FAILLRE TYPE:CS4 - GEhERIC YF:XMFT3 (13 - 16) CAUSE: LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE PLT STA:AT POWER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE PCC SURGE TANK EFFECTS:CC07A LEVEL TO FAIL HIGH. A HIGH ALARP WILL AhNUNCIATE CN THE CCNTRCL 3 CARD. IF TFERE IS NC HIGH RADIATICh ALARM CN THE PCC ALONG WITF THE HIGH LEVili IT CAN SE ASSUMED THAT NC RADI0 ACTIVE WATER IS LEAKING INTC THE SYSTEP AND EITFER THE ALARF FAILED OR A NON-RADI0 ACTIVE SCURCE OF WATER HAS GOTTEN INTO THE SYSTEM. LOCAL LEVEL VERIFICATI0h HILL 3E REQUIRED TC DETERMINE TFE PRCBLEP. REMOVAL CF TFE FALFUhCTION HILL RESTCRE THE LEVEL INDICATICN. CC07E - T HIS MAL FUNCT!0h WILL CAUSE THE PCC SURGE TANX TO FAIL LOW. Moh1TORING PUPF PFESSUREs SYSTEM FLOWS AND TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS WILL VERIFY THAT SYSTEM IS IhTACT AND TFE IASTRUFENT FAILED. REMOVAL CF TFE VALFUACTICN KILL RESTCRE THE LEVEL INDICATION TO NORMAL. SAME AS CC07A EXCEPT SCC TAhK. CC07C CC070 - SAME AS CC07E EXCEPT SCC TAhK. l

4 FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /FANGE/CALSE s EFFECTS I CC03 COMPCNENT CCCLING 2-INCH SUPPLY HEADER LEAK TYPE:C36 - GENERICe VARIAELE: 1CC% = 15C GPF YPXSVRTY (9 - 10) CAUSE:PCC - SUPPLY TO SAMPLE HEAT EXCHANGERS AT TAP OFF S-INCH HEADER SCC - SUPPLY TO SAFE-GUARDS SUPPS SEAL LEAK-CFF COOLER AT SCC-16e 'LT STA:AT POWER EFFECTS:CCOEA - THIS MALFUNCTION wILL CALSE A LEAK CF UP TO 150 GPM CN THE 2-INCH SUPPLY LINE TC THE SAFPLE HEAT EXCHANGERS. SYSTEv PRESSURE HILL NOT SHCW ANY DECREASE AS A 15C GPM LEAK IS EASILY HAhCLED BY THE SYSTEM. OCC TANK LEVEL HILL SLChLY-CECREASE CUE TO THE LCSS CF WATER. IF LEFT UhCHECKED, A LOW LEVEL ALARM HILL ANNUNCIATE. TAhK HILL EVENTUALLY EMPTY IF LEAK IS NOT ISCLATED. CPERATOR WILL BE ABLE TO PAKE UP TO THE TANK. SAFPLE HEAT EXCHANGERS .ILL NOT RECEIVE SUFFICIENT kATER TC PRCPERLY C0CL SAMPLES. REMOVAL CF THIS MALFUNCTION KILL STCP THE LEAK AND ENA9LE NCRMAL SYSTEP. ODEPATICN. CC059 - SAME AS CC09A EXCEPT SCC WILL BE AFFECTED AND SAFE GUARDS PUMPS SEAL LEAK CFF C00LER HILL NOT COOL LEAK CFF WATEP.

P FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CC09 LOSS OF CCMP C0 CLING TO LETDCWN HEAT EXCHANGER TYPE:C66 YP:XMFTS (19) CALSE:COMF C0 CLING VALVE PCC-T-155 F/C PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIch DILL CAUSS A LOSS CF CCOLING kATER TC THE LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGEk RESLLTIhG Ih A FIGH LETDOWN TEMPERATURE AFTER THE FEAT EXCHANGER. kHEh TEMPERATURE REACHES 14C DEG Fr THE LF.TDCWN FLOW KILL SE DIVEPTED BY EYPASSING THE ICA EXCHANGERS. A FIGF LETDOWN TE*PERATURE ALARM h1LL ANNLhCIATE AT 135 DEG F. REMOVAL OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESTORE CCCLIhG HATER FLOW AND, AS TEMPERATURE FALLS SELCW 140 DEG Fr FLOk KILL AGAIN GO TFROUGH THE DE-MIhERALIZERS. w

F l FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS YALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS CC10 SEAL OIL SYSTEM FAILLRE TYPE:136 - VARIABLE 0-100% 100% = 10 PSIG/ FIN YPXSVRTY (28) CAUSE: LOSS CF SEAL OIL PACKAGE PLT STA:AT P0hER EFFECTS: COMPLETE LOSS OF SEAL OIL SYSTEF INCLUDIhG BACK UP IS SIMLLATED. THIS ALLCWS FYDRCGEh TO ESCAPE ALONG SHAFT TC ATMCSPHERE AT A VALUE GREATER THAN FYDRCGEN PAKELP CAN HANDLE. FYDROGEh PRESSURE IN GENERATCR WILL SL0klY FALL. LOAD REDUCTICN HILL !! REQUIRED WITF EVENTUAL SHUT CChh IF PROELEM IS NCT CORRECTED. APPRCPRIATE ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTATICN WILL FONITOR THE EVENT AND ALERT THE CPERATCR. REMOVAL CF Tb5 MALFUNCTICN HILL ALL0h NCRMAL SEAL OIL SYSTEF CPERATION AND STOP HYDROGEN LEAKAGE.

F f FAINE YANXEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS FALF FALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS h0. CRO1 FUEL CLADDING FAILURE TYPE:C01 - VARIABLE: 100% = 1% FUEL FAILLRE YFXSVRTY (11) CAUSE: RUPTURED FUEL ROD (S) FLT STA:AT FCWER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL REFLECT A RUFTURE OF CNE CR FCRE FUEL RODS RESULTING IN A RELEASE OF FUEL INTC THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. INDICATIONS OF THIS FALFUNCTI0h WILL SE A AISE IN LETDCWN ACTIVITY, CCNTAINMEhT AREA RADIATION FONITCRSr AND AREA MCNITCRS WHERE THE HIGH ACTIVITY WATEP IS IN TRANSIT. IF TkIS F ALFUNCTION IS LSED IN CCNJUNCTICN hITh CTHER *ALFUNCTICNS WHICH COULO RESULT Ih A LEAKAGE CF F RIt' ARY COOLANT INTC OTHER SY STEF $ r THOSE SYSTEFS WILL SF0W AN INCREASE IN ACTIVITY ALSC. FAXIPLM ACTIVITY HILL BE 100 CURIES /CC. THE SI'UL ATCR WILL H AVE TO BE RE-Ih1TIALIZE0 TO RECCVER F00M THIS MALFUNCTION. l l i

/ V \\ FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CV00 LETOCWN P RESSURE CONT ROL V ALV E LO-F-16 FAILLRE TYPE: SPECIFIC YP:XFFie (326 - 327) CAUSE:CONTRCLLER PIC-2C1 AtTO FUNCTIch FAILURE PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:CVCCA - THIS MALFUNCTION W!LL CAUSE LD-F-16 TO FAIL SHUT IN AUTC. LETOCWN PRESSURE WILL RISE LPSTREAM CF THE VALVE. AT 6CC FS!G THE LETCOWN RELIEF WILL CPEh TC THE VCT. LETOChN FLOW WILL 3E GOVERNED 9Y THE RELIEF. A b1GH LETCOWN PRESS ALARF WILL ALERT THE CPERATCR TC THE FAILURE. FANUAL CONTROL h!LL 3E LNAFFECTED. THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE LETOCWN FRESSURE CONTRCL' CVCCE VALVEr LD-F-16, TO FAIL ODEh. LETDChN EACK PRES $URE WILL DROP ALLOWING THE HOT LET30kh UFSTREAM CF THE LET00Wh HEAT EXCHANGER TO FLASH. LET00kh FLCW WILL EE ERRATIC DUE TO ST E AM/W ATER FLOW MIXTURE. LCh LETDOWN PRESSURE ALARM WILL ALERT THE CPERATCR TC THE PRCELEP. THE t ( MANUAL CCNTRCL OPERATION OF THE CONTPOLLER WILL NOT EE l AFFECTED. TFE TEMP 00WhSTREAM CF THE LETDOWN HEAT l EXCHANGER WILL RISE SLIGHTLY DUE TO THE INEFFICIENCY OF HEAT EXCHANGE.

PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUS'E AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS CV31 PAB LETCChN CCNTRCLLER L Y 101 F ( C) TYPE:C64 - VARIA?LE C-100% C% = NO CUTFUT 100% = FULL CUTPUT Y:)SVRTY (13 - 14) CAUSE:SWITChE0 FRCM AUTC TC MAh0AL PLT STA:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIMULATE THE SkITCFING OF THE LOCAL EFFECTS:CV01A CONTROL IN TrE PA3 FROM AUTC TO FANUAL. THIS C0hTRCLLER KILL CVE4 RIDE THE SIGNAL FRCF HIC 101 IA THE CONTROL RCCF. WHEN CONTROL'.ER LY101P IS 'LT Ih MAhUAL LD-A-9 WILL POSITION ITSELF TO THE VARIAELE DEMAND SIGNAL. IF SIGNAL IS CALLING FCR NC CUTPUT, LC-A-9 WILL CLCSE TO 4C GPP LETOCWN. FULL CLTPUT WILL CAUSE V ALVE TC FULLY CPENs ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARMS k!LL REFLECT THE CONDITIOh. RE*0 VAL OF THE MALFUNCTION KILL RESTCRE CONTROL TO HIC 101. SAME EXCEPT CCNTRCLLER LY1010 Ahc LO-A-1C WILL BE CV01E AFFECTED.

w-PAINE YANKE! PALFUNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS CV02 CHARGING ISCLATICN TYPE:C65 YF:XMFT3 (26) CAUSE: LOSS CF AIR SUPPLY TC CHARGING VALVE CH-F-38 FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIOh WILL CAUSE A LCSS CF THE AIR SUPPLY TO CH-F-38. SINCE THIS VALVE !$ A FAIL CLOSE VALVEi THE VALVE WILL CLOSE AND ALL CHARGING WILT. EE LCST. THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL START TO DECREASE AND THE LETOChN VALVE WILL START CLCSING TO 950LCE LETOChN. LETCChN TEMPERATURE HILL INCREASE DLE TC THE LACK OF COOLING FROVIDED SY THE CHARGING FLCW VIA THE REGEN FEAT EXCHANGER. WHEN TEFPERATURE REACHES 46C DEG F THE LETCCWN WILL BE' ISOLATED ALSC. APPRCPRIATE INSTRUMEATATION AND ALARPS WILL REFLECT THIS CONDITION. REF0 VAL OF THE PALFLNCTION HILL REETORE CChTRCL OF CH-F-35 AND ALL RESTCRATION CF NCRMAL ChARGIhG AhD LETCChN. l l [ l L

+ FAINE YANKEE WALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE t EFFECTS CV03 VOLUFE-CONTACL TANK LEVEL FAILURE TYPE:C67 - VARIA9LE: 0% = 0% LEVEL; 1002 = 100% LEVEL YFXSVRTY (15) CAUSE:LIC 2C5 ERRATIC FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICA WILL CAUSE THE SICNAL FROF LIC 205 TO APPEAR ERRATIC. THE AUTO FUNCTICNS CF THE LEVEL CONTRCLLER WILL RESPCND TO THE INDICATED LEVEL SET IN SY THE INSTRUCTOR. THE AUTC FUNCTICNS ARE: HI LEVEL ALARM 94% INCREASING HI LEVEL ALARM CLEARS 7 0 ?. DECREASING AUTC FAKE-UP STOPS AUTC MAKE-UP STARTS 50% INCREASING LCW LEVEL ALARM 40% DECREASING NOTE: CPERATION OF LD-A-51, CH-M-1, CH-F-87/ HSI-M-50, HSI-F-51, AND THE LC-LC LEVEL ALARY ARE CONTROLLED EY LC-204 AND HILL NOT BE AFFECTED SY THIS kALFUNCTION. (REF. CF FRINTS 4467-414-352, 362, 376, 8 406. ESK - 10AAA & FE - 1U) REF0 VAL OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESTORE LIC 205 TO FRCPER OPERATION.

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSi & EFFECTS NC. CV04 CHARCING LIhE LEAK TYp5:C68 - VAPIABLF: 10C% = 500 GPM YFXSVRT) (145) CAUSE:3/4" NEAT VALVE CH-39 BCCY TC 3CNNE1 LEAK PLT STA:AT FCWER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL CAUSE A \\ARIAELE LEAK IN THE CHARGING LINE DUE TO A SCDY TO 2CNNET LEAK Ch VEhi VALVE CH-39. THE RESFCNSE OF THE CVCS WILL DEFEND ON THE PAGAITUDE OF THE LEAK. A SMALL LEAK WOLLD SE CChTROLLED BY THE REPOSITICNING OF THE LETDCWN VALVES AND REDUCED LETCChN FLOW WILL BE OSSERVED. PRESSURIIER LEVEL WILL FEMAIA CCNSTANT. MAKE UP TO THE VCT WILL aE MCRE FRECUENT. AS THE MAGNITUDE OF THE LEAK INCREASES, THE CHARGING FLCh WCULD ALSC INCREASE. hHEh PRESSURIZER LEVEL DRCPS TO 11% SELOW THE SETPOIhTe A SECCND CHARGING DUFP WILL START. WHEN THE LEAK EXCEEDS 200 GPMi IT IS AECVE THE CAPACITY OF THE CHARGING SYSTEM TO FANCLE. IF THE LEAK IS ACT TERFINATED, A REACTCR TRIP HILL CCCUR CN THERMAL-MARGIN /LO PRES $URE. IF ALLOWED 10 FRCCEEDr AN EkENTUAL SIAS WILL OCCUR. REF0 VAL OF THE FALFLNCTICN WILL ALLCW TFE RECOVERY CF THE PRES 3URIIER LEVEL AND CVCS OPERATION IF SIAS HAS NOT CCCLRED. i r i 7 r --...~. -.,._y.,

r PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS CVOS PRIPARY WATER PUFP FAILUFE TYPE:C69 - GENERIC YF:XMFTB (29 - 30) CALSE:FUMF TRIFS THERF RELAY 49 TRIP PLT STA:AT P C 'a E R EFFECTS:CVOSA - THIS MALFUN TION WILL CAUSE THE c-24A PRIMARY kATER PUFP TC TRIP 0U5 TO A THERFAL CVERLOAD. THE FLOW FRCF THE DUMD aCULD SE LOST AND MAKE-UP 'nATER TC THE ELEADER WOULO BE LOST. ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS hCULD ALERT THE CPERATOR TO THE CCNDITICN. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION hCULO ENAELE A RESTART CF Tb! PLFP. CVOSS - SAME AS CVOSA EXCEPT 8-243. P r i

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CV06 SORIC ACIO PUMP FAILURE TYPE:C70 - GENERIC 33) YP:XMFTS (31 CALSE:COUFLING FAILURE PLT STA:AT P0hER EFFECTS:CV06A - THIS FALFUNCTION WILL CAUSS AN APPARENT COUPLING FAILURE ON TF' P-6A SORIC ACID PLMP. Ih0ICATIONS CN THE CCNTRCL SCARD WILL INDICATE THE PLMP IS RUNNING CUE TO THE RED IN0!CATIhG LIGHT CN AhD NC TRIP INDICATICNS. HOWEVERf THERE WILL EE NO BORIC ACID FLCh. ALARFS AND INSTRUMEhTATICN HILL REFLECT THIS LOSS OF 309IC ACIO FLCh. REMCVAL OF THIS FALFUNCTION KILL RESTORE CPERASILITY CF Tb! PUMP. SAME AS CV06A EXCEPT P-62. CYO69 CV06C - SAME AS CV06A EXCEPT 8-6C. t I

PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE ANO EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCT;# TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS CV07 LETOCWN ISCLATION VALVE LEAKAGE TYPE: C71 - VARIABLE: 10C2 = 200 GPM YP)SVRTY (16 - 17) CAUSE: CHARGING ISOLATICN VALVE LEAKS SY SEAT FLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:CV07A - THIS MAL'JN7 TION WILL SIPULATE LEAKAGE SY LD-A-9 .is WHEN LO-A-10 IS SEING LSEC FOR LETCOWN LETOCWN CONTROL <. il LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM h1LL REFLEC1 THIS ADDITIO'; .iTDOWN FLOW AND HILL ADJLST LD-A-10 AND CHARGIN( AcCCRDINGLY, AT YAXIFUP SEVERITY OF 100 GPP, i LD-A-10 %ILL SE CLOSED TC IT'S FINIPUM PCSITION CF 4C l GPM. LETD0hh FLCW h!LL INDICATE APRCX 140 GAM. l CHARGING FLOh WILL INDICATE APPFCX 125 GPM. SINCE THIS IS WITHIN THE CHA0GING Sv"TEMS CAPACITY, THE CVCS S Y S T itt HILL CONTINUE TC dt,' ATE PRCFE#LY. RE?CVAL CF TbIS PALFUNCTION hits sTCP THE LEAKAGE AND ALLCh NCRMAL OPERATICN CF TFE CVCS. I CVO?9 - CAME AS CV07A EXCEPT LO-A-1C. I

FAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS _.. _________........______..__. ~..._____........._________._____ CV08 CHAPGING FLCh INDICATION LOST TYPE:C72 YF:XMFTS (36 - 37) CAUSE:FT 212 FAILS HI/LO PLT STA:AT PChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE FIC 212 TO READ EFFECTS:CVO!A CHARGING FLC4 AT THE TCP C. THE FETERS SCALE DUE TO F T 212 TR AN SMITTER FAILING HIGH. THE AUTO FUNCTICh CF FIC 212 WOULO hCT BE AFFECTED A S TH E PRESSLRIZ ER LEVEL PRCGRAP WOULO STILL CONTROL CHARGING AND LETDOWh VALVE PCSITIONS. IF THE CCNTRCLLEE WA3 IN MAhtAL, ACTLAL RECOP'E0 P RES SURIZER L EVEL WOULO HAVE T O B E U S YJ FOR wiVEL INDICATICN AND CCNTRCL, AS THE CPERATOR h0VLD NOT BE ABLE TO 9ALANCE CHARGING AND LETOCWN FLOhS LSING THE FLOW METERS. A HIGH CHARGING RATE ALARP WOLLD SOUND WHEN ITS SETPCINT hAS FEACHED. REMOVAL CF THIS PALFLNCTION LCULO RESTORE FT212. SIMILAR TO CV38A EXCEPT PT212 WCULO FAIL LOWS CVOSS CAUSING LOSS OF ALL FLOh INCICATION. l l l l I l i {

FAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF _h9: _________________fehfugg];gy IIIg3tg3NgEzg395e 3_31! EGIS CV09 LETCCWN ISOLATION LC-T-5 FAILURE TY?E: C73 - VARIA9LE 0-100% C% = SHLT 1CC% = FULL OPEN YPXSVRTY (20) CAUSE: TIC 2C1 FAILORE PLT STA: AT PCkER EFFECTS: DUE TO A FAILURE CF THE LETDOWS TEPP CCATRCLLER LD-T-5 HILL FAIL TO ODERATE PRODERLY. FAILURE TC TFE LCh VARIABLE WILL CAUSE THE VALVE TO SHUT AND ALL LETD0hN WILL EE LCST. CHARGING VALVES WILL CLCSE DCWN TO 65 GPP FLOW. A TOTAL CF 80 GPM WILL CONTINUE TO E E SENT TC THE RC SYSTEF BECAUSE CF THE 15 GFF TO RC PUMP SEALS. PER LEVEL WILL RISE AND CONTINUE TO RISE UNTIL AN ALTER-HATE LETCOWN IS ESTAELIShED. F A I L I N'G TCWARD THE HIGH END WOLLD CPEh THE VALVE FULLY. NC VISA 9LE EFFECTS WOULD EE SEEN DUE TO LD-A-9 CR 1C CONTROLLING LETDOWN. APPRCPRIATE IhSTRUMENTATICN AND ALARPS WILL REFLECT THE CONDITICN. REF0 VAL OF THE PALFLNCTION WILL ALLCW RECOVERY CF NCRMAL LETDChN. l l l l l l

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS ?ALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CV10 A hIGH PRESSURE LETCOWN LEAX E LCW FRESSURE LETOCWN LEAX TYPE: FIXE 0 cv10A 110 GPM YD: XVFT3 (834) CV109 BC GPM YP:XMFTB (835) CAUSE: CV1CA FAILURE OF INLET WELD CN LC-S-14 (600 PSI RELIEF) CV1CO FAILURE OF INLET WELD ON LO-S-34 (PURIFICATION RELIEF) PLT STA: AT FChER EFFECTS: CV1CA THIS MALFUNTION WILL CAUSE A FIXE 0 LEAK IN THE LETOCWh LINE DCkNSTREAM OF THE LETOCWN HEAT EXCHANGER AhD UPSTREAF CF THE PRESSURE CChTRCL VALVE LO-F-16. THIS LEAK WILL RESULT IN AN INCREASE OF BOTH PVS AND PA3 FADIATICN LEVELS AND A POSSIBLE HELE ACTUATION. PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL REMAIN CONSTANT, MAKE-UP TO THE VCT WILL BE MORE FREGUENT. UDCN INITIATION THE INDICATED LETOOWN FLCh RAT E WILL DROF TO IERO, LO-F-16 WILL CLOSE, CHARGING TEMPERATURE WILL INCREASE, AND VCT LEVEL WILL DECREASE. kHEN VCT LEVEL FALLS TO EELCW 1%, CHARGIAG PUMP SUCTION WILL SHIFT TO THE RWST CAUSING EMERGENCY BORATICh 0F THE RCS. IF ALLCWED TC CChTINUEr A REACTOR TRIP DUE TC LOW SG PRESSURE WILL FCLLOh. REFCVAL OF THIS MALFUNCTIOh WILL ALLOW AECCVERY OF h0RFAL CVCS OPERATION. CV1C9 THIS 9ALFUNCTIOh WILL CAUSE A FIXE 0 LEAX IN THE LETOCWN LINE DCWNSTREAM OF THE PURIFICATIch PRE-FILTER AND UPSTREAF OF THE ICN EXCHANGER TRAIN. VCT LEVEL WILL v! CREASE. IN OTHER ASPECTSi CV108 SAME AS CV10A.

I l FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MA " h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE % EFFECTS CV11 UNCChTRCLLEC DILLTICN 75 GPY TYPE:C75 - VARIA3LE: 100% = YFXSVRTY (23) CAUSE:PRIFARY WATER SATCH SWITCH FAILS PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL ACTIVATE CURING A DILLTICN ANC KILL CALSE THE BATCH' SWITCH TO FAIL IN A C0hCITICN THfT HILL CONTINUE TO DILLTE EVEN THCUGH THE SETTER GALLONS WERE EXCEEDED. IF ALLO 4E0 TC CCNTIhtE, FEACTOR POWER n0VLD START TO INCREASE AND TEMPERATURE h0VLC INCREASE. APPRCFRIATE ALAR?S AhD INSTRUMENTATICN kCULO ALERT THE CPERATOR TO THE CONDITION. REF0 VAL OF THE FALFLNCTION h0VLD STCP THE LNCONTROLLED CILLTIOh.

I FAINE YANKEE WALFUNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS YALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /GANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS CV12 CH ARGING FUFP FAILURE TYPE:C76 - GENERIC YP:XMFT9 (42 - 44) C AUS E :IN ADV ERT ENT EREAKER TRIP, SUCTION PS-224X FAILS PLT STA:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SUPPLY EFEAKER EFFECTS:CV12A TO P-14A CHARGING PLFP TC OPEN, TRIPPING THE PUFF IF PUMP IS OPERATING. CHARGING FLOW WILL DROP OFF. IF THE "E" PUMP IS IN THE AlTC PCDEe IT HILL START ON THE LOW CHARGING FLOW SIGNAL. AT 2400 PSIG THE PUFP WILL TRIP CFF. AS FLCk AhD PRESSURE FALL IT WILL RESTART. IF IT IS NOT IN AUTO CR IS CUT CF SERVICE, CHARGING FLCh WILL SE LCST AND LETOCWN KILL 3E FINIFUP. SEAL HATER FOR THE RCP'S KILL EE SUPPLIED FACF THE RCS AAST THE TFERFAL EARRIER. THE P-14S P tJ F P WILL HAVE TC PLT IN SERVICE TO RESTORE NCRNAL CFARGING AND LETOOWN. APPRCPRIATE INSTRUP.ENTAT!ON AND ALARFS WILL ALERT THE CPERATOR T O T.tl E CONDITICN. REMCVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN 'aILL PERFIT FUMP START AND NORMAL OPERATION. CV123 - SAME AS CV12A EXCEPT P-149 SAME AS CV12A EXCEPT P-14S CV12C

e PAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTICN C'USE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CV13 INACVERTENT DILUTION /30RATI0h TYPE:C77 YP:XMFT3 (45 - 46) CAUSE: FAILURE TO EQUALIZE OEMIhERALIZER WITH FCS PRIOR TO USE PLT STA:AT PChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIPULATE THE POTTING CN EFFECTS:CV13A LINE OF THE CEMIhERALIZER WITH A 90RCN CCNCENTRATION CF C PPM AT THE ECL. THIS HILL CAUSE A CILUTION OF THE RCS kHICH WILL EE ABOUT 650 PPM. SINCE THE CUTLET CF THE DEMINERALIZERS G0ES TC THE VCTi THE VCT WILL BE CILUTED AND THE DILLTED SOLUTION WILL EE 400E0 TO THE RCS THRCUGH NORPAL CFARGING. AFTER A PERIOD OF TIMER THE DEVINERALIZER HILL EQUALIZE AND THE CILUTION WILL SLOWLY STCP. THE CPERATOR WILL HAVE TO FOLLOW THE DILLTICh AND SUESEGUENT EQUALIZATION WITH MANUAL OPERATICNS. APPROPRIATE ALARMS AND IhSTRUMEhTATICN KILL RESPCND TO THE FALFUNCTION. REMCVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTION HILL EQUALIZE THE DEMINERALIZER AND ALLOW THE VCT TO ECUALIZE AFTER A PERICD OF TIME. SAME AS CV13A EXCEpT AT EOL AND THE CONCENTRATION CV135 IN THE DEMINERALIZER WILL BE 16CC GPP. l i l -r .-.-.n

FAINE YAAKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS f ) MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS LChER SEAL FAILURE CV14 RCP TYPE: C12 - G Eh E RIC 49) YP:XMFT0 (47 CAUSE: EXCESSIVE WEAR PLT STA:AT F C 'a E R THIS PALFUNCTION WILL SIFULATE THE CCMPLETE EFFECTS:CV14A FAILURE CF THE RCP LCWER SEAL. THIS WOULD RESULT IN AN INCREASE IN PRESSURE IN THE MIDDLE SEAL CAVITY A30VE THE ALARM SETFCINT. PRESS IN THE UFFER SEAL CAVITY WOULD ALSO INCREASE TO ABOUT 1100 PSIG. THESE PRESSURE INCREASES WOULD EE SEEN CN THE TEREE PEN RECCRDER PR150. THIS MALFUNCTION CAN BE REMCVED AND RESTCRATION CF NCRMAL SEAL CFERATION WILL 9E POSSIBLE. SAME AS CV14A EXCEPT "#2" PLFP AND ASSOCIATED CV149 INSTRUMEhTATION. SAME AS CV14A EXCEPT "#3" PLFP AND ASSOCIATED CV14C INSTRUMENTATION.

n 9 e FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. M AL FUNCT ION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE i EFFECTS CV15 RCP - MIDDLE SEAL FAILURE TYPE:C13 - GEhERIC YP:XMFTB (50 - 52) CALSE: EXCESSIVE WEAR PLT STA:AT P0hER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A CCFPLETE FAILURE EFFECTS:CV15A CF THE VIODLE SEAL. THE TOTAL FRESSURE DROP WILL BE ACROSS THE ECTTCP AND TCP SEALS. THE FIDDLE CAVITY PRESSUDE WILL RISE AND WILL 3E APPRCXIMATELY THE SAFE AS TFE UFPER SEAL CAVITY. THESE PRESSURE INCREASES WILL BE SEEN ON PR150. REMOVAL CF TFIS PALFUNCTION HILL RESULT IN NORMAL SEAL CPERATION. SAME AS CV15A EXCEPT FOR #2 RCP CV156 SAME AS CV15A EXCEPT FOR 33 RCP CV15C l l l l l 1

r-FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AA0 EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE.! EFFECTS CV16 RCP - UFPER SEAL FAILURE GENERIC TYPE:C14 YF:X1FT3 (53 - 55) CAUSE: EXCESSIVE WEAR P L T S T A : A T F C 'a E R THIS ?.ALFUNCTION WILL CALSE A CCFPLETE FAILURE EFFECTS:CV16A CF THE UPPER SEAL. THE UPPER SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE WILL INCREASE ALONC WITH THE FICOLE SEAL CAVITY. THE MIDDLE ANC UPPER SEAL CAVITIES WILL READ APFROXIMATELY THE SAME. APPROPRIATE INSTRUMEhTATION HILL REFLECT THE SEAL LEA < AGE. REMOVAL CF THIS FALFUNCTION HILL RESTORE NORMAL SEAL OPERATICN. SAME AS CV16A EXCEPT #2 RCP. CV165 SAME AS CV16A EXCEPT #3 RCP. CV16C h0TE: INSERTICA CF CV14, CV15, ANC CV16 WILL RESULT IN AN INCIPIENT SEAL FAILURE. TbE LCW PRESSURE VAPOR SEAL WILL kITHSTAND THE FLLL SYSTEF PRESSURE. ALL SEAL CAVITIES WILL REFLECT FULL SE/L PRESSURE. ALL INSTRUMENTATION WILL REFLECT THIS CChDITION. CPERATOR ACTION IS REQUIRED PER PLANT OPERATING PROCEDURES.

r PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE ! EFFECTS CV17 RCP - LCW PRESSURE VAPOR SEAL FAILURE TYPE:C15 - GENERIC YF:XMFT9 (56 - 58) CAUSE: SEAL WEAR PLT STA:AT PCkER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A FAILURE OF THE P-1-1 EFFECTS:CV17A VAPOR SEAL. IF THE CTHER SEALS ARE INTACT, THE CNLY LEAKAGE SEEN WILL BE THE FLCh 91 THE SEALS. THE SEAL WATER RETURN PRESSURE PAY READ LOWER THAN NORMAL IF THE LEAK IS OF A PAGNITUDE THAT THE PRESSURE REGLLATING VALVE CANNOT KEEP UP WITH. CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE WILL SEE THE LEAK IN HUMIDITY AND RADIATICN FONITCRIhG. THE RATE OF INCREASE OF THE READINGS ON THE RMS WILL DEPEND CN THE SIZE CF ThE LEAK. TFE FAXIMUF LEAKAGE SY THE SEAL KILL SE 500 GPM WITH ALL SEALS FAILED. IF THE ThREE NORFAL SEALS AFE NCT FAILECr SEAL SUPPLY FLOW WILL RISE ABCUT 1.5 GPM. BACK PRESSURE VALVE ON SEAL RETURN LINE WILL CLOSE 00hh TO MAINTAIN 75-100 PSIG. IF THE SEALS AFE ALL FAILECr THE NCTE CN THE ECTTOF 0F CV16 WILL APPLY WITHOUT THE LOW PRESSURE VAPCR SEAL INTACT. APPROXIFATELY 500 GPM WILL BE LOST. THIS IS ABOVE THE CHARGING NORMAL FLOh AND WILL ACT SIMILAR TC RCC2 AT 500 GPM. THE SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TO E! RE-INITIALIIED TO CLEAR THIS MALFUNCTION. SAME AS CV17A EXCEPT P-1-2. CV173 SAME AS CV17A EXCEPT P-1-3. CV17C l l l 1 l l I

T FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /PANGE/CALSE 3 EFFECTS CV18 RCP - LCSS CF SEAL HATER TYPE: C16 - GENERIC YF:XMFTS (59 - 61) CAUSE: FAULTY SIGNAL TC SEAL ISCLATION VALVE FRCM FIC218 (225, 233). PLT STA:AT F0hER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN ERRATIC SIGNAL TO EFFECTS:CV18A SE 3ENERATED FROF FIC213 CALSING THE SEAL SUPPLY VALVE TO SHUT AND REFAIN SHLT. APPRCPRIATE ALARPS h0VLD ANNUNCIATE AND SEAL FLCW kCULD INDICATE O GPM. THE LOSS OF THE SEAL INJECTICN FRESSLRE h0VLD ALLOW RC TO FLCW PAST THE THERFAL SARRIER AND LP THE RCP SHAFT TO PROVIDE SEAL SUPPLY FRCF THE RC SYSTkM. THE AMOUNT OF FLOW WILL 9E DEPENDENT ON THE SEAL CONDITICN. h0RFAL FLOW KILL 3E 1-1.5 GFF. TEMPERATLRES WILL RISE SLIGHTLYr BUT PUFP OPERATIOh MAY CONTINUE. IF PUMP IS NCT RUNNIhG AND RCS IS AT FULL PRESSUREr TEMPERATURES WILL RISE HIGHER AS THE SEAL WATER IFPELLER IS NCT CPERATING. FROPER OPERATING PRCCEDURES FUST BE FOLLOWED IN THIS CONDITIch. REMOVAL CF THIS FALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN SEAL WATER SUPPLY 9EING RESTORED. SAME AS CV1BA EXCEPT PIC228 KILL FAILi AFFECTING CV1EE THE 82 PUMP. SAME AS CV1SA EXCEPT PIC238 KILL FAIL, AFFECTING CV1EC THE #3 PUMP. b

e FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS CV19 LETDCWN FLOW CONTROLLER FAILURE TYPE:126 - V ARI ABLE: 0% = VALVES SHUT = VALVES FULL CPEN Y PX SVRT Y (15 3) 100% CAUSE: ELECTRONIC FAILURE Ih FLCW CCNTRCLLER FIC-1C1 PLT STA:AT PChER CCNTRCLLER FIC-101 (YEW SERIES SC) OUTPUT INSTANTLY EFFECTS:CV19 JUMP 3 TO THE PALFUNCTION SEVERITY VALLE. THE RED "FAIL" LIGHT IN THE CCNTRCLLER FRCNT PANEL WILL LIGHT AND THE CCNTRCLLER WILL TRANSFER TO THE "FAIL-MANUAL" F0DE. THE CCATROLLER OUTPUT KILL RESPOND TO THE FANUAL CPERATION LEVERe EUT WILL DRIFT TCWARD 0% IN THE ASSEhCE CF ACTUATION CF ThE FANUAL OPERATION LEVER DUE TC DISCHARGE CF THE CCNTRCLLER'S INTERNAL HCLDING CAPACITOR. THE DRIFT RATE IS APPRCXIMATELY 10C% Ih 10 FINUTES. (NOTE THAT THE MANUAL MOCE DURING FAILURE DIRECTLY ACTUATES THE ANALOG OUTPUT AMPLIFIER OF TFE CCNTRCLLERJ THE DIGITAL LOGIC IS EYPASSED.) THE CCNTRCLLER FAILURE WILL CIRECTLY IMPACT THE PCSITION CF TFE LETDChN FLOW CONTROL VALVES LD-A-9 AND LD-A-10. IF THE CONTROLLER IS FAILED TO C%e THE SELECTED LETDCWN VALVE WILL SHUTi RESULTING IN A LOSS OF LETDOWN FLOW AND INCREASING FRESSURIZER LEVEL. THE PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTRCLLER HILL REDUCE CHARGING FLCh TC CCNTRCL PRESSLRIZE LEVEL AT THE CLRRENT SETPOINT. IF THE CCNTRCLLER IS FAILED TO 100%r THE SELECTED LETDOWh VALVE KILL CPEN FULLY, RESULTING Ih AN INCREASE IN THE LETDCWh FLOW. PRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL TEhD TC DECREASE AND THE PRESSLRIZE LEV EL CONTROLLER KILL INC9 EASE CHARGING FLCW TC CONTROL DRESSURIZER LEVEL AT THE CURRENT SETPOINT. THE LETDChN TEMPERATURE CONTRCLLER ( TIC-201 ) MAY REDUCE LETDChN FLOW DURING THIS TRANSIEhT DUE TO INCREASED LETDChN TEMPERATURE AT THE OUTLET OF THE REGENERATIVE HEAT EXCHANGER. TFE OPERATOR MAY TAKE ACTION TO MITIGATE THIS EVENT THRCUGH MANUAL CPERATICh 0F THE LETDOWN CONTROLLER l AS NOTED PREVIOUSLY. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN CLEARING OF THE "FAIL" LIGHT CN FIC-101. THE CONTROLLER WILL NOW l EE IN THE "DIGITAL" FANUAL *CCE. THE OPERATOR MAY STA3ALIZE LETDOWN FLCh AT THE DESIRED VALLE AND RETURh l THE CCNTRCLLER TO THE AUTOMATIC FCDE. l E

7- .u- .FAINE YAhKE! FALFLNCT20N CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF ho. WALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Ch01 LOSS OF C I R C U L A T I N G 'a A T E A PUFP(S) TYPE:C91 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (62 - 65) CAUSE: INADVERTENT TRIP DUE TO 86 HFA RELAY FAILURE PLT STA:AT FCkEA THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE F-26A TC TRIP DUE EFFECTS:Ch01A TO A LOCKOUT RELAY FAILURE. PUPP AFPS LILL FALL TO ZERO AND THE AM3ER INDICATING LIGHT WILL COME CN. CONDENSER DELTA PRESSURE WILL INCREASE. IF ALL0hEO TO CCNTINUE INCREASING, THE REACTOR AND TUREINE hCULC HANE TC 9E TRIPPEC AT 2-1/2". REDUCTICA CF LOAD TO 35% ANC PRCPER VALVE LINE-UP KILL PERFIT CONTINUED OPERATION AT THE REDUCEO POWER LEVEL. FEMOVAL CF THE FALFUNCTICN KILL ALLCh TFE PUFP TO 3E RE-STARTED. CWO15 - F-262 P-26C CWO1C P-260 CWO10

r-- s FAINE YAhKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CAUSE S EFFECTS Ch02-CONCENSER TLEE LEAK (S) TYPE: C92 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 1CC% = 50 GPM YPXSVRTY (103 - 1C6) Ct.SE:CORACSIch 0F TUEES PLT STA:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CASE LEAXAGE CF CIRCULATING EFFECTS:CWC2A %ATER INTO TFE E10A NORTH CCNDEhSER CUE TO A TU9E LEAK. CCN00CTIVITY WILL RISE IN THE ENTIRE FEE 0 HATER AND STEAP SYSTEM. A MAXIMUF SE%ERITY WILL CAUSE THE CHLCRIDES TC RISE TO 3CC PPF ABCVE NCRPAL IN 15 FIN. THE RECCRDER WILL REFLECT TFIS RISE. APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES WILL BE FCLLCkED TC FCNITCR AND REACT TO THE PROBLEM. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN KILL STCP THE LEAK AND ALLOW THE SYSTEM TO BE CLEANED LP AND RETURNED TC NORMAL IN A 2 HR PERIOD. E10A SCUTH CWO2B E103 NORTH CWO2C E102 SOUTH CWO20 l l l 1 l l 1

(--- a FAINE'YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & IFFECTS Ch03 LOSS OF VACUUM PRIMIhG TYPE:C93 - GENERIC YF: XMFT3 (70 -71) CAUSE:VACUUF PRIMING PUMD TRIDS DUE TC THERMAL OVERLOAD FLT STA:AT FCkER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE F-28A VACUUM EFFECTS:CWO3A FRIMING PUMP TO TRIP DUE TO A TFERMAL OVERLCAD. AS VACUVF FALLS CFFr A CONDEASER WATER SCX LEVEL LOW ALARF WILL AANUNCIATE. AS VACUUF REACHES 25" >Ge THE STANC3Y PUMP WILL START AND V ACULM WILL E! RESTCRED TO 27" hG. ASSCCIATED INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS WILL ALERT THE OPERATOR TC THE CONDITION. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION KILL RESTCRE THE PUMP TO CPERATIONAL STATLS. P-282 CWO35 h0TE: INITIATICN CF GCTH Ch03A &E WILL CAUSE THE VACUUM TC CONTINUE TC FALLi AESLLTING IN LOSS OF LEVEL IN WATER SCXESe LCSS CF AIR REF0 VAL FROM CIRCULATING FIPINGr LOSS OF AIR REMOVAL FROM PCC AND SCC C00LERSr AND REDUCED HEAT TRANSFER OF THE CONDENSER DUE TO SCFE OF THE TUEES EEING BLOCKED WITH AIR. AS THE HEAT REMOVAL IS REDUCEDr CONDEhSER 'I E M P E R A T t, R E HILL RISE AND VACUUF WILL START TO FALL. i l I l 1

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / A A JGE /C ALSE & EFFECTS E001. TOTAL LCSS CF OFF SITE DCWER TYPE:138 YP:XMFTS (72) CAUSE: ELECTRICAL STORP FLT STA: FULL 70kER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A TCTAL LOSS OF ALL CFF-SITE EFFECTS:iD01A POWER. UNIT WILL TRIP AND ALL EUSES WILL BE DEAD. EMERGENCY LIGETING WILL CCFE CA. DIESELS BILL START AND ENERGIZE SAFEGUARD EUSES TC ENABLE PLACING THE REACTOR IN A SAFE CChDITION AND C.C. LOACS WILL PICK UP AS PEGUIRED. PLANT ECP'S WILL BE USED TO FCLLCh LP THE EVENT. ALL ALARMS ANC INSTRUPENTS WILL MChITCR THE EVEAT AS REGLIREC. NATURAL RECIRCULATIOh WILL BE EVIDENT AND WILL 9E A9LE TO EE XCNITCRED. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN HILL RESTCRE STATION RESERVE F0WER FRCM X-14 AND X-16. SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TC SE RE-INITIALIZED TC FULLY RECCVER FROF THIS MALFUNCTION.

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS MALF h0. M AL FUNCT ION TITLE /FANGE/CALSE 8 EFFECTS E002 LOSS OF STATION SERVICE T R ANS FORM E9 (S) TYPE:140 - GEhERIC 7S) YP:XMFT3 (74 CAUSE:FHASE DIFFERENTIAL TRIP 87J RELAY FAILS PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:ED02A - TRANSFORFER X-24 TRIPS CFF CLE TC AN 87L RELAY FAILURE. SINCE ALL BUSES ARE FED FROP X-24 WHEN AT POWER, EXCEPT THE 6.9 KVi LOS! 0F THE TRAhSFORPER KILL CAUSE A FAST EUS TRANSFER OF THE EUS SUPLY FFCM X-24 TO X-14. ASSOCIATED A L A R M. S AND INSTRLMENT ATIOh WILL MONITCR TFE EVENT. GENEFATOR 'n I L L T R I P AND, IF A80NE REGUIRED PCWER LEVEL, REACTCR 'a I L L T R I P. d.9 KV WILL AUTO TRANSFER TO X-16. REMOVAL CF TF E MALFUNCTION HILL RESTCRE THE ABILITY TO 4ESTCRE THE SYSTEM TC NCRMAL. TRANSFORMER X-26 TRIPS CFF CUE TO AN 87U RELAY FAILURE. E0029 SIMILAR TO ECO3A EXCEPT 6.9 KV EUS WILL LOSE POWER FIRST. UNIT WILL TRIP AhD ALL ELECTRICAL EUSES HILL TRANSFER TO X-14 AND y-16. l l i i ( t m.-

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS YALF AO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE $ EFFECTS E003 LOSS OF STATION AUXILIARY TRANSFORvER(S) TYPE:141 GENERIC YP:XMFTS (76 - 77) CAUSE: FIGF PRESSURE TRIP 63 RELAY FAILS PLT STA:FOT STANDBY TRANSFORMER X-14 TRIPS DUE TC A 63 RELAY FAILURE. ALL EFFECTS:5003A STATION F0WEA IS LOST EXCEPT TO THE 6.9 XV 9USES. UNIT WILL T9IP AND DIESELS WILL START AND LOAD ON THE SAFE-GUARDS EUSES. ACTICN IS SIPILAR TO A STATION BLACK-CUT. ADPRCPRIATE ALARMS AND INSTRUM!hTATICN h1LL REFLECT THE LOSS OF POWER. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN k!LL RESTCRE THE TRANSFORPER AND PERPIT RECOVERY AND NORPAL FCWER LIh! UP. TRANSFORVER X-16 TRIPS DUE TC A 63 RELAY FAILURE. TFE ED039 6.9 KV ELSES WILL 9E LCST. RC FLMPS AND FEEDWATER PUMPS WILL TRIP IF RUNNING. ALL OTFER ELSES WILL REFAIN ENERGIZED IF BEING FED FROM X-14. Ih THE EVENT X-14 IS FEEDING EUSES 4 AND 6 AND ASSOCIATED BUSES AND X-16 IS FEEDING EUSES 5 AND 3 AND ASSOCIATED BUSESr THE EUSES EEING FED FRCM X-16 WILL LOSE PChER. Ih THAT EVENT, CG-1A WILL START AND LOAD ONTO THE AS SAFEGUARDS 8US AND ASSCCIATED StSES. ALARPS AhD IhSTRUPENTATION WILL REFLECT THE EVENT. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTION KILL ALLCh RESTORATICh 0F NORMAL PCWER LINE UP. 1

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. F.A L F U N C T I O N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS E004 EUS TIE EREAKER(S) FAILUPE TYPE:145 - GENERIC YF:XMFTB (78 - C7) CAUSE:EREAKER T R I P ') DUE TC 86 RELAY FAILURE FLT STA:AT FChER EUS 3+5 TIE EREAKER CPENS. ALL EUSES AND LCADS FE0 EFFECTS:E004A FROW BUS #5 ARE LOST. ALARFS AhD INSTRLFENTATION WILL REFLECT THE LOSS OF VOLTAGE. DIESEL GENERATCR 1A WILL START AND CLCSE CNTO SUS #5 AND ENERGIZE SAFEGUARDS TRAIA "A" 3USES. REMOVAL OF ThE MALFUNCTION h!LL RESTCRE CPERA3ILIlv Cr TIE EREAKER AND ALLCh CLCSING OF EREAKER AND SECURING CF OIESEL. EUS 4T6 TIE. SAFE AS EDC3A EXCEPT DG-1E WILL START. E0045 EUS 3T9 TIE. EUS 49 LOSES VCLTAGE Aho ECUIPPENT. E0040 EUS 3T13 TIE.

1. 13 E0040 E004E - EUS 3T11 TIE.

• 11 E004F - EUS ST7 TIE.

EUS #7 AND BUSES FE0 FROM IT WILL LOSE VCLTAGE AND ECLIPPENT. E0084 - EUS 6TB TIE. BUS 48 AND SUSES FED FROM IT KILL LOSE VOLTAGE AhD EGLIPPENT. EUS 4T1C TIE. ELS #10 KILL LCSE VOLTAGE AND EQUIPMENT. E004H EUS 4T14 TIE.

• 14 E004J E304K - EUS 4 T12 TIE.

212 l I l

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS -VALF NO. VALFUACTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS EDOS LOSS OF DC SUS TYPE:146 - GENERIC -(8 : XMFT3 (38 - 91, 84C) CAUSE:EATTERY CHARGER FAILS SHCRTING CUT ELS PLT STA:AT POWER DC 3US #1 AND ASSOCIATE SUSES ARE LCST DLE TC BATTERY EFFECTS:EDO5A CHARGER FROBLEM. ALL ECUIPPENT kHICP IS FED OFF THE BUS WILL SE INOPERABLE DUE TC TFE LCSS CF DC CONTROL POWER. APP 4CPRIATE ALARFS AND INSTRFENTATICh WILL REFLECT THE LOSS OF DC DLE TC THE SMCRT. REFCVAL CF TF E M ALFUNCTICN HILL RESTCRE THE SUS TO AORMAL CPERATION. SAME AS EDOSA EXCEPT SUS 82. ED059 EDOSC -

1. 3.

14. 50050 E005E -

1. 5.

l i l l l

E-o PAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. M AL FUNCT ION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE $ EFFECTS E006 LOSS OF VITAL AC SUS TYPE:147 - GEhERIC YP:XMFT3 (100 - 1C 2r 73) CAUSE: INVERTER FAILURE PLT STA:AT FChER INVERTER #1 EURNS UP AND TRIPS CFF. THIS CAUSES A LCSS EFFECTS:E006A CF VCLTAGE ON VITAL SUS #1. ALL EQUIPMENT AND INSTRU-FENTATICN FEC OFF THE ELS WILL FAIL. THE TRIP STATUS LIGHTS FROM RPS KILL INDICATE THAT 1 0F 4 REQUIRED TC TRIP IS PADE UP. ALARMS ANC INSTRUPENTATION WILL REFLECT THE LOSS OF EUS VOLTAGE. REMOVAL CF THE FALFUNCTICN BILL RESTCRE THE 9US TO NCRFAL CR SHIFTING IT TC ITS ALTERhATE SUPPLY hlLL RESTCRE THE VOLTAGE.- INVERTER 82 - S AF E AS INVE4TER 41 ALCNG KITH TURBINE ED065 SHIFTING TO PANUAL. E006C - INVERTER #3 - SAFE AS INVERTER 41. SAVE AS INVERTER 41. INVERTER #4 E0060

FAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUhCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS ED07 RING BUS FAILURE TYPE:148 - GENERIC YF:XMFT3 (103 - 1C7) CAUSE:INACVERTENT EREAKER TRI8 PLT STA: AT FCWER 24EAKER K375-1 WILL T9IP DUE TO A MECHANICAL PROELEM IN EFFECTS:ED07A THE EREAKER. BREAKER INDICATIOh WILL SFCW 9REAKER IS CPEN AND ASSCCIATED ALARMS WILL ANNUhCIATE. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTION h!LL ALLCh RECLOSURE CF TbE EREAKER. EREAKER KG1 E00?E K378/392 E007C KG1/375 E0070 K392-1 E007E ANY COMEINATION CF TWO CR VCRE EREAKERS CPENING, WITh THE EXCEPTIOh 0F KG1 AND KG1/385, WILL CAUSE A LCAD SHIFT DUE TO LOSS OF THAT SUESTATIchS LCAD. MEGA-WATT AND MEGA-VAR METERS WILL REFLECT THIS LCAD SHIFT. IF EOTH KG1 AND KG1/385 ARE OPENED, THE UNIT WILL TRIP IF F0WiR LEVEL IS A50VE THE PLANT'S OPERATING REQUIREMEhTS CR IF PLANT IS OPERATING WITH RESERVE TRANSFCRMERS RATHER TEAN STATION SERVICE TRAhSFORFERS. TUR9IhE SPEED l KILL INCREASE TO AN CVER-SPEED CCNDITION IF BOTH OUTPUT I EREAKERS ARE OPEhED AT FULL LCAC.

FAINE YAAKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE ANC EFFECTS MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /RANGF/CALSE & EFFECTS E008 FAILLRE TC AUTO-SHIFT FRCM STATICN TO RESERVE PCWER TYPE: YF:XMFTa (102) CAU36:56P RELAY FAILURE PLT STA:TRIF FRCF POWER EFFECTS: FLANT TRIPS FRCM PO'aER. DUE TO THE E6P RELAY FAILUREr THE CLTFLT 3REAKERS CO NCT CPEN AND AUTC SHIFT FROM STATION TO RESERVE DOWER DOES NCT OCCUR. FOR AFPRCXIMATELY 1.5 MINUTES. A MANLAL TRIP OF THE OUTFUT EKRS (KG-1 8 KG-1/375) WILL RESULT IN A LOSS OF AC AND AUTC START OF DG-1A & 19 AND NO AUTO TRAASFER TO RESERVE F0WER (SEE E001 FCR EFFECTS.) 4 l i

FAINE YANXEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS E009 LOSS OF DF/FAC 835) TYPE: YF:XMFTB (884 CALSE: FAILURE IN FANUAL THROW 0VER SWITCH FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:ED09A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIFULATE AN OPEN CIRCUIT FROM THE OP/ PAC TbROWCVER SWITCH TO CP/ PAC. SWITCHING TO THE ALTERNATE P0nER SUPPLY KILL NOT RESTCRE CP/ PAC. ASSOCIATED INDICATIONS AND CCNTRCL FEATLRES ON THE MCB KILL BE LOST. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE OP/ PAC. SAME AS F^39A EXCEPT DP/IAC KILL BE EFFECTED. E0095 t l

o PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS EG01 AUTC VOLTAGE REGULATCR FAILURE TYPE:132 YFXSVRTY (27) CAUSE:ELOhN PChER SUPPLY FUSE FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: AUTC VOLTAGE REGLLATION WILL 9E LOST. ASSOCIATEC ALARMS AND IASTSUMENTATION b!LL REFLECT THE CONDITICN. OPERATOR WILL HAVE TO TURN VOLTAGE REGULATCR ShITCH TC 0FF TO GAIN MANUAL CONTRCL. IF NULL METER kAS 9ALANCEC, TFERE KILL BE A BUFPLESS TRAhSFER. IF NULL YETER IS NOT SALANCECr VCLTAGE WILL EITHER OROF CR RISE ACCCRDING TC THE DIRECTICN AND AMothT CF ERROR. CDERATOR WILL BE ASLE TO MAINTAIN MANUAL VOLTAGE CONTRCL USING THE dASE ADJUST SWITCW. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN WILL RESTCRE AUTC VOLTAGE REGLLATING CAPA91LITIES.

1 FAINE YANKE! FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF NO. ?, A L F U N C T I O N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS EG02 LOSS OF MAIN TRANSFCRMER(S) TYPE:139 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (323 -329) C AUSE: G ROL ACED INSULATCA CAUSING LCCK CUT PLT STA:AT FCh!A EFFECTS:EG02A - TRANSFORFER 1A TQIPS DUE TO A LCCK CUT. THIS RESULTS IN A TUREINE TRIFr GENERATOP TRIP, Ah0 ISCLATION OF THE TRANSFORPER FROM THE RING BLS. EUS SUPFLIES WILL AUTO-TRANSFER TO )-14 AND X-16. ACRPAL FCLLCh UP AFTER TRIP KILL 3E R E ^ U I D. E D. REMCVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN HILL PESTCRE THE CAPAEILITY TO RETURh THE UNIT TO SERVICE. SAME AS EG02A EXCEPT TRANSFCRSER 19. EG025 1 ---n vre,, - - e w--,.

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS ECO3 DIESEL GEhERATOR FAILS TC START TYPE:142 - G!hERIC Y :XMFT3 (113 - 114) CAUSE:ZSR-1 SPEED RELAY FAILURE PLT STA:LCSS CF AC DG-1A WILL START EUT WILL TRIP CFF EECALSE CF THE SPEED EFFECTS:EG03A 3ELAY FAILING. ENGINE KILL TRIP AT ABOLT 40 RPF. TFE ENTIRE "A" TRAIN OF SAFEGUARCS HILL EE Ih0 PERATIVE. ALARFS AAD IhSTRUMENTATICN HILL REFLECT THE DIESEL START AND TRIP. ASSOCIATED BUS WILL REFLECT THE LACK CF VOLTAGE. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTION HILL PERMIT NCRMAL OPERATION CF DIESEL. SAME AS EG034 EXCEPT 0G-13. EG032

i FAINE.YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS l EGC4 DIESEL GEh!RATOR TRI: j. TYPE:143 - GENERIC YF:XMFT3 (115 - 116) 4 CAUSE:CVER SPEED RELAY FAILURE .l PLT STA: LOSS CF AC IN PRCGRESS EFFECTS:EG04A - OG-1A WILL T8:P CUE TO CVERSPEED SWITCH FAILURE. THE ASSCCIATED SAFEGLAROS 9LSES HILL LCSE P0kER AND ALL EOUID*ENT FEC FRCM THE EUS. THE ENTIRE "A" TRAIN OF SAFEGUARDS WILL EE LCST. ALAR *S AND INSTRUMENTATION WILL REFLECT THE LOSS OF THE DIESEL AND ASSOCIATED 9LSES AND EQUIPMENT. REMCVAL Cr ThE MALFUNCTION KILL ENA9LE RE-STARTING OF THE DIESEL AhD SLBSEOUENT LCADIhG. ALL EGUIPMENT WILL GE AELE TO 3E RE-STARTED. OVERSFEED TRIP MUST BE RESET WITH REFCTE FUNCTION EG101. SAv,E AS EGC4A EXCEPT DG-19. EG04E (EG1C2 FCR RESET OF CF TRIP) ,,-,-,--.,-,,,,-y .s- - - -.... - ~ _,

' PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTi MA'.F ts 0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EF8ECTS EGOS GENERATCR BREAKER FAILS TC'CPEN AFTER TEID TYPE:144 YP:XMFT3 (117) CAUSE:fAILUGE CF 3CTH E6P AND $65U TO FIRE PLT STA:TRIF FRCP PCWER EFFECTS:2F A Flahi TRIP CCCURS, THE FAIN GENERATCR CUTPUT BREAKERS WILL FAIL TO AUTOMATICALLY CPEN DUE TO A FAILURE CF ECTH 56P AND 6690. THE GENERATCR WILL ATTEMPT TO PCTORIIE CUE TC TFE TIE BETWEEh IT AND TkE 345KV TRANSPISSICN SYSTEM. BREAKEPS WILL OPEN MANUALLY. APPFCFRIATE GENERATOR INSTRUMENTATICh CLTPUT AND ALARMS HILL REFLECT THE PROBLEM. FEMCVAL CF T H E " 4L F UN C TI C N 'a ILL R E S TC R E T H E 66 DEVICES TC NORMAL. 4 i i 1 l l l l l l 1 l

s FA!NE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS. EG06 FAILLRE CF DG-2 TYPE: YF: XMFT3 (336) CAUSE: OIL LEAK Ch DG-2 PLT STA: AhY EFFECTS: 06-2 h!LL TRIP DUE TO A LCW LLEE CIL PRESSURE CONDITION. DG-2 TROUSLE LIGHT AND ANNUhCIATOR WILL E! RECEIVED. IF DG-2 WAS SLPFLYING EUS 931 AT THE TIXE CF 1hE FAILUREr THEN THE 991 BUS WILL EE DE-ENERGIZED. REFCVAL OF THE MALFUNCTICN WILL EhA9LE RESTARTING THE DIESEL GENERATOR. I ,,.._,--n n

PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. MALFUNCTI3N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Fh01 LOSS OF CCNCENSATE PLMP(S) TYPE:100 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (113 - 120) CALSE:INACVERTENT TRIP. 3REAKER FAILLRE PLT STA: AT PChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE P-27A C0h0ENSATE PUPP EFFECTS:FWO1A TO TRIP DUE TO A MECHANICAL FAULT IN THE BREAKER, CAUSING EREAKER TO TRIP. DISCHARGE PRESSURE FROF THE PUMP WILL FALL OFF AND CURRENT h!LL GO TC ZERO. AN AAUNCIATCR WILL SIGNAL TFE PLFP TRIP. IF THIS IS THE ChLY OPERATING PUMP, THE PUMP THAT IS IN AUTO WILL START AND RESTORE SYSTEM PRESSLRE. IF AT GREATER TFAN 40% FCWER, Tk0 CLMPS WILL BE RUNNING AND THE THIRC ONE WILL PICK UP Ch THE TRIP OUE TC LOW SUCTION FRESSURE TO THE FAIN FEECWATER PUMP (S). ASSCCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRLFENTATIOh WILL REFLECT THE CONDITION ANC ALERT THE CoERATOR. REMOkAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN KILL ALLCh RECLOSURE CF THE EREAKER AND ALLOW NCRMAL PUNP OPERATION. SAME AS FWO1A EXCEPT P-273 FWO15 l SAME AS FWC1A EXCEPT P-27C l FWO1C l I 1 l l l l l 1 l

r FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTICN TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS Fh02 LOSS OF MA!N ELECTRIC FEEDWATER PUPP(S) GEhE4IC TYPE:101 122) YP:XMFT3 (121 86 RELAY FAILUPE CAUSE:EREA<ER TRIP PLT STA: 50% PCWER P-2A FEE 0 WATER PLMP WILL TRIF. IF TFIS IS THE ChlY EFFECTS:FWO2A PUMP RUhhINGr FEEDWATER FL0h WILL ORCP TC ZERO. PUMP TR!P ALARM AhD AFBER INDICATING LIGHT WILL ALERT THE CPEAATOR TO THE RUMD TRIP. STEAP GEhERATOR LEVELS WILL ALL STACT DROPSING OUE TO THE LCSS CF FEEDWATER. AS PRESSLRE OR005 TO 925 PSIGr THE CTHER FEEDWATER PUMP WILL AUTO START. LEVEL IN STEAP GEhERATOR HILL STA9ILIZE AFi!R A SERIOD OF TIME. IF AE0VE 50% POWE1 AND ECTH PUMPS ARE INITIALLY RUNNINGr A FAST RAMP-CCWN OF POWER WILL EE REGUIRED TC WITHIN THE LIMITS OF ONE FEEDWATER PUMP IN CRDER TO PREVENT A *LANT T*IP. REMOVAL CF TbE MALFUNCTION AhD PESETTING ITS 86 CEVICE (YP-101) WILL RESTORE THE PLFP TC SERVICE AND Alt 0W RESTART. SAME AS FWC2A EXCEST 8-23. FWO25 i

t PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS F403 LOSS OF ALXILIARY FEEDWATER ELECTRIC PUPF(S) TYPE:102 - GENERIC YF:XMFTa (123 - 124) CAUSE:EREAKER TRIP. Uh0ERVOLTAGE RELAY 27Y6 CONTACT FAILURE FLT STA:h0T STANDBY EFFECTS:FWO3A - THE PLANT IS AT HOT STAND 3Y WITF STEAM GENERATOR MAKEUP FROW AUXILIAFY FEEDWATER. SECONDARY SIDE OF PLANT SHUTDOWN VACLUM CUT. P-2EA AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FUMP TRIPS DUE TO A RELAY FAILURE. FLOW, PRESSURE, AND CURRENT FOR THE FUMP WILL DSCP CFF TC ZERO. STEAM GENERATCR LEVELS WILL SLOWLY DRCP DUE TC THE LOSS OR CECREASE IN FLOW IF TWO PUvPS hERE CFERATING. ALL INSTRUVENTATION AND ALARFS ASSOCIATED WITH THE EVENT W!LL CPERATE AS REGUIRED, REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION HILL ENAELE RESTART CF ThE PUMP. SAME AS FWO3A EXCEPT P-2SC F4036 V: l

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF go, vALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS FkO4 L0SS OF TUREINE AUXILIARY FEE 0kATER PUMF ~ TYPE:103 YF:XMFT9 (125) CALSE:SOV-1106Y FAILS CAUSING FS-P-168 TO SHUT PLT STA: HOT STAN0BY EFFECTS: THI5 MALFUNCTION WILL 9E SIFILAR TO FWO3 EXCEPT THE TLREINE AUXILIARY FEE 0 WATER PUMF KILL SE AFFECTED ALONG WITH ITS INSTRLMENTATICN AND ALARPS. 1 l l l l l

t PAINE YANKEE-FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS ' YALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Fh05 P-2C TUREINE FEED.ATER PLMP LOSS OF CIL TYPE:104 YF:XMFTB (126) CAUSE:CIL LINE RUPTURE ON !UPPLY HEADER FLT STA: FULL F 0 ~n ! R EFFECTS: CLE TC AN OIL LINE 0.UATURE Oh THE OIL SUFFLY HEACE9e ALL OIL FRESSURE IS LOST TC ECTb THE LUEFICATION AND TFE CCNTRCL SYSTEM CF F-2Cr CAU$ING TH! FUMP TO 1 RIP. FEEchATER FLOW WILL CECREASE AND THE UNIT WILL TRIP CN LOW STEAF GENERATOR LEV!L. INSTRUMEhTS AND ALARFS ASSCCIATED WITH THE CUMP, AS WELL AS THE PLAATi HILL REFLECT THIS CONDITICN. REMOVAL OF THE MALFUNCTION WILL FESTCRE TFE OIL S Y ST E M TC OPERATION. 1

r FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS FALF No. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS .00E 4 FWO6 FAILLRE CF THE P-2C RECIRC CCNTRCLLER CASCADE TYPE: VARIA3LE C - 100% YP)SVRTY (152) CALSi: FAILURE OF TRANSMITTER FT-13C3 FLT STA: AT FULL PChER LSING T)FP EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION h!LL RESULT IN THE FAILURE CF THE P-2C SUCTICN FLOW TRANSMITTER, FT-1303. THIS TRANSMITTER IS LSED TC GENERATE THf FROCESS VARIABLE SIGNAL FOR THE F-2C RECIRC CChTRCLLER. hCTE: A SPEEC SIGNAL FROM 99T5X AND A FLCW SISNAL FRCM FT-13C3 ARE USED EY ThE RECIRC CCNTROLLER kHEN IN THE CASCADE VCCE TC SET TFE CCNTRCLLER OUTPUT SIGNAL. FT-1303 IS USED FCR OISPLAY OF SUCTIOh FLOW ON THE CCNTRCLLER ONLY WHEN FLOW IS LESS THAh 9,000 GFM. THE SUCTIch FLCW INDICATICN IS DERIVED FROM A SEPARATE TRANSVITTER, FT-1305. FAILING TC 1CC% WILL CAUSE A MININUM TRANSMITTER SIGNAL FROM FT-13C3 TC BE SENT TO THE P-2C RECIRC C0hTRCLLER. IF THE CCNTRCLLER IS IN 1HE CASCADE VODE ANC THE AUTC UNELCCK CChDITION (<72% PCWER) IS SATISFIED, THE FECIRC VALVE WILL FULLY CPEh. INDICATED SUCTICN FLCW CN THE CChTRCLLER WILL 8ESPChD ACCORCINGLY OEPENDING ON THE RECIRC VALVE POSITICh. FAILING TC 0% WILL CALSE A MAXIMLF TRANSPITTER (FT-13C3) SIGNAL OF 789C GPP TC 3E SENT TO THE P-2C RECISC CONTROLLER. IF THE RECIRC CONTRCLLER IS IN TFE CASCADE PCCE, THE RECIRC VALVE WILL CLOSE. IF THE CONTROLLER IS SWITCHED TO THE FAhuAL MODE, ASILITY TO CCNTRCL RECIRC FLCW HILL GE REGAIAED. REF0 VAL OF THE MALFUNCTION WILL RESTCRE THE TRANSPITTER SIGNAL AND ALLOW CASCA0E CCNTROL. l t l l l l l l }

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE S EFFECTS FWO7 ELECTRIC FEE 0 WATER CLMc FIGH TEMPERATURE TYPE:106 - GENERIC YP:XMFTB (12C - 130) CAUSE:RECIRCULATICN VALVE FAILS SHUT CUE TC FAULTY SIGhAL FR0P FIC 13C 2 9. PLT STA:FOT STANC3Y EFFECTS:FWO7A - PLANT IS AT HOT STAND 3Y WITF SECCNOARY SYSTEFS ALL CPERATING. STEAP GENERATOR LEVEL IS B E I h' G .v A I N T A I N E D SY FEE 0 WATER SYSTEM. THE RECIRCULATIhG VALVE CN P-2A FAIL 3 SHUTE ALLCWIAG Tb! PUMP TO HEAT UP OLE TC INSUFFICIENT FLOW. OVER A 10 FIN PERICD THE TEMD WILL RISE 200 DEG F A9CVE NCRMAL. AS TFE DUMP HEATS UF, ThE LUSE CIL KILL ALSC HEAT UP CALSING A HIGH LLBE CIL TE!voERATV'E ALARM. AS HEAT-UP CONTINVES, PUF8 HILL VAPCR EIND AND CAVITATE AND EVENTUALLY TRIP. ADDROPRIATE IhSTRUPENTATION AND ALARFS WILL ALERT THE CPERATCR TC THE EVENT. REMCVAL CF TFE FALFUNCTION AND RESETTING ITS 86 OEVICE (Y?-1C1) KILL ALLCW ACRMAL OPERATION OF ThE VALVE. SAME AS FWC7A EXCEPT PC29 FWO75 l l l t f i

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE ANO EFFECTS MALF NO. Y. A L F U N C T ! 0 N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS Fh08 HEATER ORAIN TANK LEVEL CONT 40LLER FAILLRE TYPE:107 - VAFIAELi: YPX$VRTY (31) 0% = HD-A-130 CLOSE0 100% = FO-A-18C FULL OPEN CAUSE:FAILLRE OF LEVEL CONTROL TRANSMITTER (LIC-1414) PLT STA:AT P0kER T R Ahs. ITT ER KILL FAIL TC EFFECTS: THE HEATER DEAIN TAAK LEVEL A VARIAELE PCSITION, AS SET EY THE INSTRUCTCR. AS THE TRAhSPITTER FAILS TC THE HIGH END, Ih0ICATED LEVEL CN THE CONTRCLLER KILL RISE, CALSING MO-A-13C TC OPEN. FAILING THE TRANSMITTER TOWARDS THE LOW END HILL CAUSE THE Ih01CATED LiVEL CN THE CONTROLLER TC DECREASE, CAUSING FO-A-13C TO CLOSE. THE CPERATOR MAY REGAIN CONTACL CF ThE HEATER ORAIN TAbk LEVEL SY SHIFTIhG TC VANUAL C0hTRCL CN THE CONTROLLER. PEMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE AUTOFATIC CONTRCL CADAEILITY. (

l PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Fh09 SPILL VALVE FAILLRE TYPE: VARIA3LE C%= SHU1 100% = CPEN YPXSVRTY (143) CALSE:LIC 1305 FAILURE PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: DLE TO THE FAILLRE OF LIC 13C5, AN ERRCNEOUS SIGNAL KILL CAUSE THE SPILL VALVE TO FAIL TC 0 FEN TC A S E's E C T E D POSITIONr CR FAIL TO CPEN CN A HOTkELL HIGH LEVEL. FAILING OPEN WILL CAVSE FOThELL LEVEL TO START DROSPING, AS HATER WILL EE REJECTED TC CWST. FAKE-LP VALVE WILL CPEN TC FILL TFE HCTWELL. AS A RESULT CONCENSATE HDR PRiSSLRE FAY FALL CALSING THE THIRD CCNDENSATE PUMP TO START. hDR PRESS WILL RISE AND HOThELL HILL FILL. FAKE-LP VALVES WILL CYCLE AS NECESSASY TC MAINTAIN HCTWELL LEVEL. IF VALVE IS FALEC SHLT, IT WILL NOT CDEN TO REJECT WATER ON A HIGE FCTWELL LEVEL. APPRCPRIATE I N S T F UP.E N T AT I ON AND ALARFS KILL FONITOR THE EVENT. REMCVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN WILL RESTCRE THE SPILL TO NORFAL CPERATICN. l l l l l t_

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSS ANC EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Fh10 HOTkELL LEVEL CONTROL FAILURE TYPE:109 - YP:XMFT3 (133) C AUSE:L C 13C6 FIGH CAPACITY MAKE-LP FAILS PLT STA:AT P0hER EFFECTS: CUE TO A FAILURE OF LC 1306 THE HIGH CAFACITY MAKE-LP WILL FAIL OPEN. THIS WILL ALLCh WATER TC FLCW FFOM THE DWST TO THE CCNDENSEP. WFEN THE HIGH LENEL SETPOINT FOR THE FEJECT kALVE IS REACHED, IT WILL CPEN AND SPILL CONCENSATE EACK TO THE OWST. hHEN LEVEL HAS DRCPPED TO SETPOIhT LEVELe THE SPILL %ALVE WILL SHUT. THIS PP.0 CESS HILL KEEF REPEATING UNTIL MAL-FUNCTION IC REMCVED Ca CD-A-95 IS ISCLATED. APPROPRIATE IN-STAC,v5NTATION AND ALARMS WILL MONITCR TFE EVENT. IF LEVEL REACHES THE TCMFP HIGH HCTWELL LEVEL SETPOINT TFE PUFP HILL TRIP CAUSIhG THE UNIT TO TRIP ON LOW STEAP GENERAT09 LEVEL. REMOVAL CF TbE MALFUNCTION HILL RESTCRE THE V ALVE TO NORFAL CPEPATION. i 4 l l I i l

p FAINE YAh(EE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Fh11~FEECWATER HEADER LE4K TYPE:110 - Van!A9LE: 1002 = 30,CC0 GPM YPXSVRTY (32) CAUSE:18-INCH HEADER EREAK BY SAMPLE VALVE FW52 PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE 18-INCH SUPPLY HEADER CN THE FEEDhATER PIPING TO OFEAK UP TC A MAGhITLDE CF 30rCCC GPM. THE EFFECTS WILL GREATLY DEPEND ON THE SEVERITY. A SPALL LEAK WILL 0NLY 3E SEEN EY TFE APCUNT OF FAKE UP AEGUIRE0 TO XEEP THE HOThELL AT ITS ACRFAL LEVEL. AS THE LEAK INCREASES, LESS FLOh W!LL EE AVAILABLE TO THE STEAM GENERATCRS. THE MAIA FEED REGULATING VALVES WILL GC TO FULL CPEN IN ORDER TC TRY AND MAINTAIN LEVEL. FURTHER FROGRESSION HILL RESLLT IN STEAM GENERATCR LEVELS AND FRESSLRE FALLING. A TUREINE ANO REACTCF TRIF WILL CCCUR CUE TC LCW STEAM 3Eh!RATCR LEVEL. THIS WILL CAUSE THE FAIN FEED VALVES TO SHUT AND THE 3YFASS %ALVES TC REPCSITICN Th!MSELVES TO THE 4% FL0k POSITION (AEOUT 32% CPEN). HOTwELL LEVEL WILL DECREASE AND HIGH AND LOW FLOh FAKE LP VALVES ' NILL CPEN. CLOSING Tk! EYPASS VALVES WILL ALLCh STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL RECCVERY USING THE ALXILIARY FEEDWATER PUFPS. APPRCPRIATE INSTRL'ENTATICh AND ALARMS HILL FONITCR AND FOLLOW THE EVENT. THE SIFULATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED AFTER THIS FALFUNCTICN. l l l l l I f

FAINE YAAKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE ! EFFECTS Fh12 LOSS OF HEATER DRAIN PUMD(S) TYPE:111 - YP:XMFT9 (135) CELSE: FEAIEE CRAIN TANK PRESSURE SWITCH FAILS LOW PS14C1 PLT STA:AT PChER CUE TO Tk! DRESSLRE SWITCH (PSX-1401) FAILUREe P-62A EFFECTS:FW12 WILL TR!P. AN AUTC TRID ALARM HILL ALERT THE OPERATCR TO THE PROELEM. P-629 WILL ACT EE AELE TO 9E STARTED CUE TO TFi DRESSLRE SWITCH FAILLRE. LENEL IN THE TAAK h!LL RISE. AT 89% THE HEATER ORAIN TAAK DRAIN VALVE FD-A-188 WILL CPEN, C#AINING THE TAhk TC THE CONCENSER. IF LEVEL STILL RISESi A TUREINE TRIP WILL OCCUR AT 92% LEVEL IN THE TANK. IF P-622 IS RUNhING AT TIME CF PAL-FUNCTION P-62A h!LL NOT STAFT UFCN P-629 TRIP. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN HILL RESULT IN THE RESTORATION CF TFE PDESSLRE SWITCHi ALLCkING NCRFAL CPERATICh. l t t

FAINE YAAKEE PALFLNCf!CN CAUSS AhD EFFECTS FALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS FW13 LOSS OF FEECWATER TC STEAM GENERATCR TYPE:112 - GENERIC: 8X1C(6) LS/HR YF:XMFT3 (136 - 133) CAUSE:FEECWATER LINE 9AEAKS AT STEAM GENEPATOR N0ZZLE FLT STA:AT FChER STEAP GENERATOR E-1-1 FEEDWATER LINE SHEARS OFF AT EFFECTS:FW13A STEAP GENERATOR INLET NCZILE. STEAP GENERATOR *RESSURE AND LEVEL WILL FALL. AS LE%EL FALLS, HEAT REMOVAL CF STEAM GENERATOR k!LL 3E LOST. ELOWDCWN CF THE STEAM GENERATCR WILL EPPTY IT. REVERSE STEAM FLOW FROP THE CTHE: STEAM GENIGATCR WILL EE PFEVENTED EY THE CLOSURE CF THE NCN-RETURh CHECK VALVE. AT 4C0 DSIG ALL EFCV'S AhD TFE ASSOCIATEC S/G AFh ISOLATION VALVES WILL CLOSE. ALXILIARY FEED PUMPS WILL START AT THE LOW LEVEL SETOCINT. CCNTAIhMENT CONDITI0h5 KILL REFLECT A RISE IN TEMPEPATLRE, FUMICITY, ANC PRES $URE. AT 5 PSIG SIAS AND CIS WILL ACTUATE. A SIAS COINCIDENT WITH A LCW S/G PRESSLRE HILL CAUSE ALL MAIN FEEDe HEATER DRAIN, AND CONCENSATE PUMPS TO TRIP. REACTOR TRIP WILL BE DUE TO LOW STEAP GEhERATOR LEVEL. AFTER TRIP, FEEDWATER REGUL AT CR V ALVES HILL SHUT. SY-FASSES KILL CPEN TO 4% FLOW POSITION ON UNAFFECTED STEAF-l GENERATOGS ChlY. THIS WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE FEEDWATER LOSS AND ALLCW CCNTRCL AND CCCLCCWN CN IhTAcT STEAM GENERATORS. AFTER EYPASS VALVE IS SHUT AND FEEDhATER REGULATIh3 VALVE IS ISOLATEC ON AFFECTEC STF-GEN, LCSS CF FEEDWATER WILL TER*INATE. ASSOCIATEC ALARMS AND INSTRU-l FENTATICN WILL MCNITCR THE !V ENT AND FCLLOW RECCVERY. THE SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED l AFTED THIS FALFJhCTICN. FW138 - SAME AS FW13A EXCEPT STEAM GENERATOR E-1-2. E-1-3. FW13C l l l l

PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION T!TLE/ RANGE /CALSE % EFFECTS Fh14 LOSS OF CCNDENSER VACUUF 15" H3/ PIN TYPE:113 - VARIASLE: 1002 = YPXSVRTY (144) CAUSE:VACLUF EREAKER AR-92 LEAKING PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A CCNTRCLLED LOSS OF VACUUF, DEPENDING ON SEVERITY, DLE TC THE VACVUP BREAKER AR-92 LEAKIhG. VACLLP 'n I L L DROP ON THE INSTRUPENTATION IN THE CCNTRCL RCOM. AS TH EIR SETPOINTS ARE REACHED, ALARFS HILL ALERT THE OPERATCR CF THE CCNDITION. AT THE L0h VACUUP TRIP SETPOIhTi THE TUR9INE WILL TRIP. IF PCWER LEVEL IS SUCH THAT A DEACTCR TRIP IS IS RECUIRED, THE REACTOR WILL ALSO TRIP. THE BALANCE OF THE PALFUNCTION WILL FCLLOW THE NORFAL 1 RIP PROCEDURE. REMOVAL CF THE FALFUNCTICN FRIOR TO TRIPPING WILL ENABLE VACLUF RECOVERY. IF UNIT HAS TRIPDED, NORMAL START UP CAN BE INITIATED.

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE S EFFECTS Fh15 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER FAILLRE TYPE:115 YP: XMFTB (14C) CALSE:6" FEADER RUATURE UP STREAM VALVE AFh-1CC PLT STA:FOT SMUTDC.N EFFECTS: THIS VALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A HEADER RUPTURE OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM WhILE AT FOT SHUTDOWh WITH FEED COMING FROM THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. SECCNDARY SIDE CF FLANT WILL BE SHUTDOWN WITA VACULF OLT. THIS WILL RESULT IN A TOTAL LCSS CF ALXILIARY FEEDW AT ER TC ALL THREE STEAF GENERATCRS. LEVEL AND ?RESSURE IN THE STEAM GENERATORS KILL DROF SLChlY DUE TO TFE LCSS OF WATER. FRIMARY SYSTEP TEPPERATURE KILL RISE DUE TC THE LOSS CF CCCLING. AS RC SYSTEM TEMPERATLRE RISES, PRESSURE WILL ALSC RISE. ASSCCIATED INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARvS KILL ALERT THE OPERATCR AND HILL FONITOR THE EVENT. LNLESS AN ALTERNATE SUPPLY CF AXILIARY FEED IS STARTEDr THE STEAM GENERATCRS WILL EVENTUALLY 3CIL CRY AND THERE WILL GE NO COCLIhG CF Rt SYSTEF BY STEAM GENERATOR. INITIATION OF SAFETY IhJECTION HILL EE THE ONLY METF00 CF CCOLING A\\AILABLE AND PRCPER EMERGENCY ACTICN KILL SE REQUIRED. REMCVAL CF TFE FALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE AUXILIARY FEECkATER AND ALLOW RECOVERY OF FEEckATER CChTRCL. l l i i l l

FAINE YAhKEE NALFLNCTION CAUSC ANC EFFECTS

• ALF h0.

MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS Fh16 P-2C FEEChATER PLMP Lok CAPACITY TYPE:116.- VARIABLE: 10C% = 100% CAFACI1Y LCES YPXSVRTY (33) CALSE: IMPELLER WEAR FLT STA: FULL F06ER EFFECTS: DEPENDING ON THE FAGAITUDE OF SEVERITY SELECTEDs THE CAPACITY OF P-2C WILL DECREASir FEECWATER FLCW WILL CECREASE, WHILE TUR9INE SPEED WILL REFAIh C0hSTANT AT GOVERhEC Roy. WITHOLT ACDITIONAL FEEDWATER, AN EVENTUAL PLANT TRIP WILL CCCU ON STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL. REMOVAL CF Tb! YALFUNCTICN WILL RESTCRE FLMP'S CAPACITY TO NORMAL. l i i

C PAINE YAhK!! FALFLNCT2CN CAUSE ALD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /RatJGE/CALSE E EFFECTS FW17 P-2C TURBINE FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED CCNTRCL FAILURE TYPE:117 - VARIASLE: 0% = !OCO A 8V; 100% = 510C APM YFXSVRTY (34) CAUSE: SPEED REFERENCE SIGNAL ERRATIC PLT STA:'ULL 80hER EFFECTS: TFE SPEED REFERENCE SIGNAL WILL FAIL TO A VARIABLE SET Ih EY THE INSTRUCTOR. AS THE *CDULE F. AILS TCWARD THE LOW EADe TUREINE SPEED WILL DRCP OFF ANC PUFP OLTPUT WILL DECREASE. THIS WILL CAUSE A LOW FEEDWATER FLLW TO THE STEAM GENERATCRS TC SE EVIDENT. DEoENDING ON THE SEVERITYr All ELECTRIC PUFP VAY 3E STARTED TO HELF REGAIN FEEDh4TER FLCW. IF SEVERITY IS FLLL FAIL LOke 7HE Uh1T KILL TRIF ON LOW STEAP GENERATCR LEVEL. FAILING TCWARD THE HIGH END KILL RESULT Ih FEEDWATER FLOh INCREASING WITH So!!D.

• EED rig VALVES WILL CLOSE DOWN TO REFLECT INCREASED Floh.

REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICA WILL FE-STCRE THE SPEED REFERENCE S!GNAL.

A PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. v&LFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS Fh18 FEEC REG CAEINET POWER StPPLY FAILURE TYPE: .YP:XVFTS (396 - 393) CAUSE: POWER SUPDLY FAILURE PLT STA: FULL POWER EFFECTS:F.16A - 21 FEE 0 REG CASINET WILL LOSE PChER AND F0WER IS LOST TC THE FCLLCWING INSTRUMENTATICh: F#-1C11/1211

1. 1 SG FEEC/ STEAM FLCW EECCROER LI-1214 di $3 WIDE RANGE LEVEL INCICATCR LIA-1211
2. 1 3G NARRCW FANGE LEVEL Ih01CATOR FIC-1212 41 $3 FEED REG BYFASS CCNTROLLER b!C-1211 81 SG VAIN FEED DEG CCNTPCLLER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSS A LCSS OF MAIN FEED TO TkE s1 STEAM GENERATCR.

RCS TEhPERATURE ANC PRESSURE WILL RADIDLY RISE, GENERATOR PEGAWATTS WILL RAPIDLY RISE TO APPRCXIMATELY 90C V.WE, AND ThE FL ANT WILL TRIP Ih APPRCXIV.ATELY 30 SECCNDS OUE TO A LCh LEVEL CONDITIch IN 21 STEA? GENERATCR. FCR ACCITIChAL INFCRMATION, REFEREhCE PLANT UNLSUAL OCCURRENCE REACRT a78+E6. FW185 - SAME AS FW18A EXCEPT FOR 82 STEAM GENERATOR FW1EC - SAME AS FW13A EXCEPT FOR #3 STEAF GENERATOR l f l ._= m.- y

O PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE E EFFECTS Fh19 FAILURE OF F-2A & P-29 AtTO START PRESSLQE SWITCF TYPE: YP:XMFT3 (92) CAUSE: FAILURE OF PRESSURE SWITCb 85-1204 PLT STA: ANY EFFECTS: Fh19A-THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIFULATE A FAILURE OF THE P-2A LOW FEEDhATEF HEADER PRES $USE SkITCH (PS-1206) Ih THE CLOSE POSITICN. THIS WILL CAUSE AN AUTC START OF P-2A TO OCCUR IF THE FOLLCWING CCNDITIONS EXIST: A. SLCTICN *RESS SATISFACTORY (PS-13C4) 3. SEAL kATER DRESS SATISFACTORY (PS-2402) C. LU3E CIL P8ESS SATISFACTCRY (FS-2406) D. SG LE%il LESS THAN 91% (LIA-SGX 1 S 2) E. NC ELEC FAULTS (S6-92A) F. P-2A SWITCH Ih NAC 0F NAT POSITICh (1/P-2A) (FOR ADDITIchAL INFCRMATION REFERENCE ESK SC & 6BC) Fh199-SAME AS FW19A, EXCEPT FOR p-22 Fh19 C-T HIS M AL FUNCT ION WILL SIFULATE A FAILURE OF THE P-2A l LOW FEEDhATEE HEADER DRESSURE Sh!TCH (PS-12C6) Ih THE t CPEN POSITIch. THIS WILL PREVENT AN AUTC START CF P-2A (PON Lok FEEC HEADER PRESSUEE. (FOR ADDITICAAL INFCRMATION REFE9ENCE ESK SC & 69C) Fh190-SAME AS FW19Ce EXCEPT FCR P-29 .,n

o 4 FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS YALF NO. .MALFUNCT!ON TITLE /9ANGE/CALSE ! EFFECTS IA01 LOSS OF CCNTRCL AIR VAAIA5LE: 10CX = 1CCC CFF TYPE:151 YFXSVRTY (35 - 36) CAUSE EODY TO SONNET LEA < CN 2" SUDPLY HEADER VALVE IA-1(2) PLT STA:AT F0kER EFFECTS:IA01A -A BCCY-TC-SCNNET LEA < WILL CAUSE A LOSS CF AIR ARESSURE TO THE "A" CCNTRCL AIR HEADER. THE FAGh!TUDE OF THE LEAK KILL GOVERN F0W FAST THE HEACER DRESSURE OECREASES. AT SS PSIG THE STANC3Y COWPRESSCR HILL START. AT 7C PSIG THE LOW FEADER PRES $URE ALAFy WILL ANNUNCIATE AS PRESSURE CONTINUES TO FALL, AIR CPERATED VALVES HILL GO TC THEIR FAIL POSITICh. IF CROSS-C0hhECT 3EThEEN THE "A" AND "S" IS CLOSECs ChlY THE "A" HEACER KILL LOSE PRESSURE ANC VALVE OPERATION WILL NOT SE AFFECTED DUE TO THE DUAL IA FEADER AF R AhG EMENT. THE SEFVICE AIR PORTION OF THE SYSTEM KILL ISCLATE AT 75 05IG. ALARMS, INSTRUMENTATION AND EFFECTS CF ASSOCIATED SYSTEFS ANO VALVES WILL BE CBSERVED AS THE AIR CPERATEC VALVES FAIL. REMOVAL CF THE PALFUNCTION HILL RESTCRE HEADER PRESSURE TO NCRMAL. IA012 - SAME AS I A 01 A EXCEPT IA-2 Ch THE "B" HEACER WILL LEAK. h0TE: FALFUNCTICN TEST HILL SE RUN WITF THE CRCSS-CCNNECT VALVES CFEN. INDIVICUAL HEADER LOSS WILL ALSO EE VERIFIED. i i

o FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MAL'F A0. "ALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS IA02 LOSS OF CCNTAINFENT CCNTROL AIR TYPE:152 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 100% = 35CFF YPXSVRTY (37 - 33) CAUSE:50Di-TO-SONNET LEAK CN ISCLATION V ALV E FLT STA:AT FCkER A SODY-TC-SONNET LEAK CF VAFYING DEGREE CN VALVE CCA-36 EFFECTS:IA02A HILL CAUSE CCNTAINMENT CONTROL AIR PRESSLRE TO DROP. AT 90 PSI, IF CCMDRESSOR SA IS IN RUN, COMPRESSCR WILL LOA 0 AND TRY TO HOLD HEADER PRESSURE. IF COPPRESSOR IS IN AUTC, IT HILL START AT 8C PSI. AS PRESSURE CCNTINUES TO FALL, A LCW CCNTAINMENT CCNTRCL AIR HEADER PRESSURE ALARP WILL AhNUNCIATE AT 70 PSI. AS MAGNITUDE OF LEAK INCREASES, HEADER PRESSURE HILL CONTINUE TO FALL. CPERATICh 0F VALtES WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY A SINGLE HEADER F AILUR E OLE TC THE OL AL FE ADER CChSTRUCTICN. REMCVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN h!LL STOP THE LEAK ANC RESTCRE SYSTEM TC NCR9AL OPERATICN. SAME AS IA02A EXCEPT CCA-37 CN "E" HEADER. IA025 h0TE: INITIATICN CF SOTH IA02A ANC S HILL CAUSE A TOTAL AIR LOSS AND ALL AIR OPEPATED VALVES WILL FAIL AS DESIGNE0. ALARFS, INSTRUMEATSr AND VALVE INDICATIchs h!LL REFLECT THIS AND ALL SYSTEMS WILL P. ESP 0hD TC THEIR VALVE FAILURES.

FAINE YAAKE! ~FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE $ EFFECTS MS01 STEAF LEAX INSIDE CCATAINMENT TYPE:118 - GEhERIC; VARIAELE: 1CC% = 4X1C(6) L9/hR YFXSVRTY (39 - 41) CAUSE:hiLC FAILURE AT STEAF GENERATCR STEAF NCZZLE FLT STA:AT FCWER EFFECTS: PS01A - h0ZILE ON STEAM GENERATOR E-1-1 hELO FAILS CAUSIhG STEAF TC LEAK INTO THE CCNTAINFENT. THE AMCUNT CF EFFECTS SEEN AND THE TIME PERIOC WILL DEPEND ON THE SEVERITY. Ih THE POST SEVERE CASir A RAPIO CCCLOChN WILL OCCUR IN THE PRIVARY SYSTEM, KITH THE DOSSIBILITY OF RETURN TC P0hER DUE TO MTC. IF THE CCOLDOWh IS SEVERE Eh00GH, SIAS FAY ACTUATE CUE TO PRESSLRIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE DRCPPIhGs SEACTOR h I L '. TRIP DUE TC HIGH PChER. FEED VALVES FCR THE STEAF GEhERATOR WILL CLCSE AND ASSOCIATED PUFPS HILL TRIP WITH SIAS AND LOW STEAF GENERATOR PRESSURE. ASSOCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRLFENTATICN WILL MONITCR THE EVENT. CONTAINVENT ATMCSPHERIC CONDITICNS WILL FOLLOW THE STEAM ADDITICNr RESULTING IN HUMIDITY, TEMPERATLRE, SUMF LEVELS, AhD PRESSURE ALL RISING. AT 5 PSIG CIS WILL ACTUATE. IF FRESSURE GETS TO 20 FSIGs CSAS WILL ACTUATE. RELATED SYSTEPS WILL REFLECT THESE CChDITIONS. SIMULATCS WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED TO RECOVER FROM THIS MALFUNCTICN. SAME AS FS01A EXCEoT STEAM GENERATOR E-1-2. FS01E E-1-3. FS01C w

FAINE YANXEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE ! EFFECTS MSO2 STEAP LEAK CUTSIDE CCNTAINMENT DCWNSTREAF EFCV TYPE:119 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 10C%

• BX1C(6) L9/HR YPXSVRTY (42 - 44)

CAUSE:30" b!ADER BREAK PLT STA:AT FChER IC" b!ADER DCWNSTREAP EFCV FS-11 BEThEEN FLOW ELE 0W EFFSCTS:FSO2A AND 42" FEADER Oh STEAP GENERATCR E-1-1 KILL DEVELOP A LEAK. SEVERITY WILL BE DETECFIhED BY THE INSTRUCTOR. DUE TO THE EXCESS STEAM DEMAND, PRESSURE AND LEVEL Ih THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR WILL ST ART 10 F ALL. FEEDWATER TO THE STEAM GENERATCR NILL INCREASE. TbE OTHER TWO STEAM GENERATOR $ WILL ALSC SEE THE LOSS CF STEAM PRESSURE CN THE 42" FANIFCLD AND WILL TRY TC PAKE UP FOR THE STEAM LCSS. REACTOR POWER WILL ATTEFPT TC FCLLOh THE STEAM LCAD AND PAINTAIN POWER. RC TEFFERATLRE HILL DRCF DUE TC THE EXCESSIVE STEAM CEMAND. ASSCCIATED FRIFARY INSTRU-PENTATIch WILL FCLLCh THE EVENT. WHEN Th0 CF THE FOUR CHAhhELS FRCF ANY STEA GENERATOR DRCF TC 400 PSIGr ALL THE EFCV'S KILL CLOSER STOPPING THE STEAM LEAK. TUREINE AND REACTOR KILL TRIP. CONTGCL CF TEPPEPATURE WILL FAVE TO 3E DChE WITH THE DECAY HEAT RELEASE VALVE. ALL ASSOCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRL*ENTATI0h WILL FOLL0h THE EVENT. PS023 - SAME AS FSO2A EXCEPT MS-22 CN STEAM CENERATOR E-1-2. FS02C - MS-33 E-1-3. {

FAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AAC EFFECTS MALF h0. FALFUNCTICh TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS MS03 STEAF LEAK CUTSIDE CCNTAIhMENT UPST954F EFCV TYPE:120 - SEAERICJ V A RI AE LE: 1CC% = 4X1C(6) L3/bR YFXSVRTY (45 - 47) CALSE:FUPTLRE IN 3C" HEADEF UPSTREAM EFCV AND ARV PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: FSC3A - STEAN GihERATOR E-1-1 h!LL CEVI.CP A STEAM LEAK IN ThE 30" HE AD ER CL TSIDE THE CCNT AINMENT. RESULTS OF THIS FALFLNCTION KILL SE SIMILAR TO FS01A WITF THE EXCEPTION CONTA!NFENT CCNDITIONS HILL NOT CHANGE. SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TO SE RE-INITIALIZEC TO RECCVER FROM THIS MALFUNCTICN. PS039 - SAME AS FSO3A EXCEPT STEAM GENEFATOR E-1-2. E-1-3. PS03C A

1 FAINE YAN<EE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF hO.

SALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS MSO4 EFCV CLCSURE GEh!RIC TYPE:121 YF:XMFTS (156 - 153) CALSE: AR ECLENCID FAILS TC 3LEED PCSITION PLT STA: FULL F0hER EFFECTS: PSO4A - EFCV MS-11 CLOSES DUE TC AIR SOLEN 0!D FAILURE. STEAF GENERATO9 E-1-1 HILL INCREASE IN P9 ESSURE ANC RELIEFS LILL OPEA. EFCV WILL IhCICATE SHUT. SECONDARY LOAD WILL DROP DUE TO THE LOSS OF STEAM VCLUPE. PRIMARY HILL RESPCND TO THE SLDDEh CHANGE IN STEAF LCAD. THE RCS DELTA-T WILL INCREASE Ch THE OTFER Th0 thEFFECTED LCCPS. A PLANT TRIP WILL OCCUR DUE TO FIGN DELTA-T P 0'lE R. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN HILL ALLCh NCRMAL OPERATICN CF THE VALVE. SAME AS PSC4A EXCEPT EFCV MS-22. PSO46 FSO4C -

• !-33.

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS YALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /PANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS MSOS STEAP GENERATOR SAFETY VALVE FAILURE TYPE:122 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 1CC% = 7X1C(5) L3/hR YPX$VRTY (48 - 50) CAUSE: SAFETY NALVE SPRING FAILURE PLT STA:NOT STAND 3Y SAFETY VALVE MS-5-14 FAILS TC A PRE-SELECTED OPEN POSITICN EFFECTS:FS05A CUE TO A SDRING FAILOREr 04 FAILS TC RESEAT AFTER USE. MAXIFUM SEVERITY STEAM OEMAho WILL CAUSE A RAPID COCLOCWN CF PRIMARY SYSTEF. STEAP GENERATOR E-1-1 LEVEL k!LL DRCP RESULTING IN A REACTOR TRID. RC SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL FALL CFF QUE TO TFE CCCLOCWN RESLLTIhG IN AN SIAS. ISOLATIch CF THE STEAM SENER ATOR AND AFFSCTED PRIFARY LOOP WILL STCP THE CCCLOOWN. A S S O C I A T:! D ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTATION WILL FONITOR THE EVENT. '!LL RESTCRE THE VALVE TO REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN h0RFAL CPERATION. SAME As PSO5A EXCEPT SAFETY VALk! MS-$-24. FS05E MS-S-34. FS05C

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhC EFFECTS YALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS MS06 DECAY NEAT RELEASE VALVE FAILURE TYPE:123 - GEhERIC YP:XMFT3 (162) CAUSE: FAULTY SIGNAL TC SOV 1001 FLT STA: FULL F0kER EFFECTS: MS-A-162 DECAY HEAT RELEASE VAL \\E WILL FAIL CPEN. IF FS-M-161 IS CFENs RC 1EMPERATURE KILL ORCF SLIGHTLY. IF RODS ARE WIThDRAkN TC MATCH TAVE TO TREF, REACTCP POWER KILL INDICATE 2.5% HIGHER DOWER THAN SECCNDARY PChER LEVEL. ASSCCIATED ALARMS ANC INSTRUMENTS WILL PCNITCR THE EVENT. IF ISCLATION VALVE IS SHLTe THERE WILL EE NO EFFECT SECN. CEMCVAL CF TFE FALFLhCTICN KILL RES1CRE CPERA9ILITY CF THE VALVE. l l L_

PAINE YAAKEE MALFLNCTION CAUSE AAC EFFECTS 4 MALF AO. MALFUNCTION TITL E / R A*lG E / C AL S E B EFFECTS MS07 DECAY HEAT RELEASE ISCLATION MCV FAILURE TYPE:124 YP:XMFT3 (163) CAUSE:THERFAL CVERLOAD TRIPPED PLT STA: START-UP EFFECTS: DUE TO A THERMAL TRIPS VALVE PS-P-161 IS INCPERATIVE. VALVE WILL FAIL kHEN ATTEMPT TO CPERATE IS TRIED. IF SHUT, IT HILL STAY SHLT; AND IF CPENr IT WILL STAY OPEN. REMOVAL CF TFE VALFUACTICN HILL RESTCRE 1HE VALVE TO CPERAEILITY. i l-i l l I 1 1

FAINE YAN<EE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF hC. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALS! $ EFFECTS FS03 AUXILIARY $ TEAM CONTROLLER FAILURf VALVES SHUT TYPE:126 - VARIAELE: CX = VALVES FULL CPEN YPXSVRTY (51) 100% = CAUSE:ELECTR0 HIC FAILUPE Ih FLCW CCNTROLLER PIO-11C1 PLT STA:AT FChER CCNTRCLLER PIC-11C1 (YEW SEDIES EC) CUTPLT INSTANTLY EFFECTS:FSOS JLMPS TO THE PALFUNCTION SEVERITY VALUE. THE RED "FAIL" LIGHT IN Tk! CONT 90LLER FFCNT PANEL WILL LIGHT AND TF CCNTRCLLEF WILL TRANSFER TO THE "FAIL-MANLAL" FCDE. THE CCNTROLLER OUTPUT BILL RESPOND TO THE FANUAL CPERATION LEViR, EUT b1LL DRIFT TCWARD 0% IN THE ABSENCE CF ACTUATION OF T H E M A N U A '. OPERATION LEVER DUE TO DISCHARGE CF THE CCNTROLLER'S INTERNAL HOLDING CAPACITOR. THE DRIFT RATE IS APPRC)IFATELY 1CC% Ih 1C FINUTES. (NCTE THAT THE FANUAL MCDE DLRING FAILURE DIRECTLY ACTUATES THE ANALOG OUTPUT AMPLIFIER CF TFE CChTOCLLER; THE DIGITAL LCGIC IS EYPASSED.) TFE CCNTRCLLEF FAILUPE WILL CIRECTLY IMPACT THE FCSITION CF TF E ALXILI A RY STEAM PR'dSSURE FEGULATIhG VALVES AS-P-3 AND iS-F-653. IF THE CONTRCLLER IS FAILED TO C%, ECTH CF T H E S E V A!.V F S W '_ L L ShlTi FESULTING IN A RAFID LCSS CF AUXILIAPY 3TEAP PRESSURE. THIS LCSS CF PRESSURE WILL RESULT IN A LCSS CF THE STEAP JET AIR EJECTORSr THUS RESULTING IN A GRAGUAL LOSS C9 FAIN CCNDEhSCR VACLUM. THE CPERATOR FAY TAKE ACTION TO PITIGATE THIS EVEAT THROUGP MANUAL OPERATION OF TbE (CNTFCLLE9 AS NOTED l AE0VE TO CONTFOL AUXILIARY STEAM PRESSURE. IF NO ACTION . AI A CCNDEhSOR VACULM KILL RESULT Ih l IS TAKEN, LOSS UF EVENTUAL FAIN TUREINE TRIP. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN WILL RESULT Ih CLEARING OF THE "FAIL" LIGHT CN PIC-1101. TFE C0hTRCLLER WILL N0h EE IN THE "DIGITAL" FANUAL MCDE. THE OPERATOR MAY STABALIZE AUXILIARY STEAP PRESSUPE AT THE DESIRED VALLE AND RETURN THE CONTRCLLER TO THE AUTCF ATIC MODE. l

PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CAUSE 8 EFFECTS MSO9 GLANC STEAM REGULATCR FAILURE TYPE:127 - YF:XMFTB (165) CAUSE:GS-F-1 FAILS SHUT PLT STA:FHASING CN LINE EFFECTS: WHILE PHASING ON LINER GS-P-1 FAILS SHUTi THEREBY SECLRING ALL GLAAD SEALING STEAM TO THE TURGINE. WITH SEALIhG STEAM LCST, STEAM WILL ESCAPE ALCNG SHAFT ANC VACUUM WILL BE LCST IN THE CCNDENSOR. ASSOCIATED ALAR *S AND INSTRUVENTATION WILL PCNITCR THE EVENT. IF THE PLANT IS GREATER THAh 20% POWER, THIS M AL FUNC T ICh-KILL FAVE NC EFFECT SINCE TH! GLAND STEAF IS NOT SUPPLIED BY GS-F-1. FEMCVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION WILL RESTORE NORMAL GLAND SEAL CPERATICN. l I l l L..

PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS MS10 STEAF DUMP / TURBINE EYPASS VALVE FAILURE TYPE:C56 - GENERIC YF:XMFT9 (166 - 176) CAUSE: FAILURE OF SELECTED SOLEhCID TC ENEFGIZE0 PCSITICN PLT STA:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WOULO.CAUSE THE SCLENCIC VALVE EFFECTS:NS1CA FOR FS-P-142 AND 143 TO FAIL TC THE ENERGIZED POSITION, ALLOWING THE VALVES TC GO FULLY OPEN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN SECCNDARY FCWER 'EING HIGHER THAN PRIMARY POWER DUE TC TFE INCREASED STEAM LOAD. A TCV NOT SHUT WCULD PRIhT OUT Ch THE CCMPLTER. 450VT A 5% LCAO FISFATCH h0VLC BE SEEN. OPERATOR ACTICN hCULC GE REOUIRED TO MATCH THE PRIMARY AND SECCNDARY DChER. REMOVAL CF TFIS PALFUNCTION %0ULO CAUSE THE SOLEh0ID TO CE-EAERGIZE ANb fHE VALVES TC SMUT. SAME AS FS10A EXCEPT FOR MS-T-144. FS1CE MS-T-145. PS1CC MS-T-146. FS1CC l MS-T-147. FS1CE i MS-T-148. FS1CF FS1CG - MS-T-149. MS-T-15C. FS1CH MS-T-151. FS1CJ MS-T-152. FS1CX MS T-153. FS1CL NOTE: PS-T-144 THRCLGH FS-T-153 HAVE A 4.5% RATED l CAPACITY EACH. ?S-P-142 AND 143 HAVE A RATED CAPACITY OF 2.5% EACH. l [

FAINi YANAEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhC EFFECTS FALF AO. MAL 8 UNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE 3 EFFECTS NIO1 h!DE RANGE hI FAILUEEe CHANNELS 1-4 GENdRIC TYIE: C33 Y::XMFTB (176 - 161) C ALSE:P RE-AFP FAILURE PLT STA:AT :ChER THIS PALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE NICC1 TC FAIL LCh EFFECTS: HIC 1A AS Tri SI3NAL FRCY THE FAILEO DFE-ASP hCLLD SE LCST. IF Tr! SALFUNCTICN IS INSERTE0 DLFING A STARTUS, ALL INDICATION FROF THE CHAhNEL WOULO EE LCST. IF THIS CHANNEL WAS SELECTED FCR AUDIC COUNTr TrE ALDIC WCULO EE LCST. OURING F0WER CPERATI;he TFE PCWER METERS h00LO ORCP TC 0%, ANC THE SIGNAL F R O.9 THE CHANNEL TC TkE CEA CCNTCL ANC REACTOR PROTECTICN SYSTEF WCULO EE LCST. REMCVAL CF TFIS VALFUNCTION h0VLD RE-STCRE THE CHANNEL TO ITS NORM.AL OPERATICN. SAME AS NIC1A EXCEPT CHANNEL NICC2 NIQ1E NICC3 HIC 1C NICC4 NIO10 i-l l l l

I ?A*NE YANrEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS l NALF L AC. VALFUNCTION TITLE /CANGE/CALSE i EFFECTS NIO2 POWER RANGE FAILL3E CdANhiLS 5-3 TYPE: GENERIC Y::XMFT9 (760 - 775) CALSE: FAILED CETECTOR (HI C1 LCa) FLT STA:AT PC.ER THIS MALFUNCTION a!LL CAUSE THE LPPER DETECTCR EFFECTS:h!02A IN CHAN 5 TC-FAIL HIGH. THE P a' 4 MTR FOR THE LPSEE P C '. E R k!LL READ 1CC%. PWR RECCRDER WILL RECCR0 A: PROX 15C% Pha rCR CHAN 5. CVEAPOWER

9. E - T R I P AND TRIF ALARPS FOR CHAANEL WILL BE ACTUATED.

SYMMETRIC CFFSET PRE-TRIP AND TRIPS KILL SE ACTUATED FOR CHANNEL. AFPRCX +33% CFFSET WILL 3E REFLECTE0. REMOVAL CF NALF. WILL DEST 0FE DETECTCR. THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE LPPER DETECTOR N!029 IN CFAN 5 TC FAIL LCW. THE PkR FTR HILL READ 0%. j L THE PWR RECCROER WILL READ AP*RCX 50%. SYMPETRIC CFFSET WILL CEAD PAX NEGATISE. ASSCCIATED ALARMS l KILL REFLECT TH5 FAILURE. l REMCVAL CF VALFUNCTICN WILL EESTCRE CETECT09. THIS MALF. WILL CAUSE Tk! LCkE8 CETECTOR IN CHAN hIO2C 5 TC FAIL HIGH. L 0 k E D. 7%R FTP w!LL CEAD 100%. PWR RECCROER WILL REA) APPPCX 15C%. APPROX -33% CFFSET 4ILL 9F REFLECTE0. ASSCCIATED ALARMS WILL REFLECT THE FAILURE. 9EMCVAL CF MALF. WILL RESTOFE 05TECTCR. THIS MALF. WILL CAUSE THE LChER DETECTOR TO FAIL NIO20 LOW CN CFAN 5. FWR VTR WILL REA0 C%. PkR RECCROER WILL READ APDRCX SC%. SYY.FETRIC OFFSET WILL REAC MAX POSITIVE. ASSCCIATED ALARFS WILL REFLECT THE FAILLRE. REMOVAL CF THE MALF WILL RESTORE THE DETECTOR.

04/07/83 11:25:37 TAS< s'1FCC0039 GCOLO CSC P P h - 3 2 - 1 '. 5 0 hIO2! - CHAN 6 LCPER DETECTOR FAILS HIGF h!02F'- CHAN 6 UPDER DETECTCR F A I L S L O '. AIO2G - CWAN 6 LCWER DETECTCE FAILS'HIGF CHAN 6 LOWER DETECTCR FAILS LCW h!026 CHAN 7 ufo!R DETECTC4 FAILS FIGP h!O2; CHAN-7 LPPER DETECTCR FAILS LCh AIC2) AIC2< - CHAN 7 LCWER DETECTCR FAILS kIGE CHAN 7 LCVER DETECTCR FAILS LCW AIO2L CHAN 3 LCPER DETECTCR FAILS FIGb NIC2P CHAN 3 USPER DETECTCE FAILS LOW AIO2N CHAN 3 LCWER DETECTCR FAILS LIGF AIO2C CHAN 8 LCaER DETECTCR FAILS LCh h!O2P l-i l l l l l l

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS PC01 LOSS OF PLAhi CCFPUTER TYPE:149 -- YF:XMFTB '(1Sc) CAUSE: COMPUTER FAILiD PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THE COMPUTER WILL FAIL DUE TC AN INTERNAL PRC8LEF. THE CCMPUTER WILL FAIL TC UPD ATE ANY DATA PCINT AND FANUAL SE3LEATIAL RCD WITH0AAWAL WILL SE IhCPERATIVE. 4 " * ~ ' m-'ww,, -,, - -,., _..,., _ _, _ _ _ _ _ _

a FAINE YAAKEE MALFLNCTICN CAUSE ANO EFFECTS MALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RC01 HOT LEG LCSS OF COOLANT TYPE:CC4 GENERIC YP:XMFTB (187 - 189) CAUSE:00VELE-EADED RUPTURE OF BOT LEG AT STEAF GENERATCR INLET NCZZLE PLT STA:AT FCkER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A RAPID LOSS OF EFFECTS:RCC1A REACTOR COOLANT INTC THE CONTAIhPENT ATVCSPHEREi RESULTING IN A RAPID DECREASE OF RC SYSTEM PRESSLRE. A LOW PRESSURE TRIP h!LL OCCLRi FOLLCWED BY SAFETY INJECTICA ACTUATICN. WITHIb APFROXIFATELY 12 SECONDSr A900T 3C,000 GALLCNS OF COOLANT KILL 9E RELEASED FROM THE RC SYSTEM. THE HIGH HEAD SAFETY INJECTIONr THE LOW FEAD SAFETY INJECTICNr AND THE LCW PRESSURE SAFETY IAJECTION TANKS ALL kCULC DISCHARGE INTO THE RC SYSTEF. THE RESULTAAT LCSS CF WATER HILL LNCCVER THE CORE SEFORE SAFETY IhJECTION FLCh WILL AGAIN CCVER THE CORE. IhCORE THERMC-COLPLES WILL REFLECT THIS CONCITION. THER E WILL E E A RISE IN CONTAINMENT PRESSUR!i TEMPEGATUREr HUMIDITYr AND ACTIVITY. TFE RvS IN 'HE CCNTAIhMEhT WILL SHOW A RISE IN EOTH GASECUS AND PARTICLLATE ACTIVITY. THE CONTAIN*ENT SPRAY SYSTEF WILL ACTUATE DUE TO THE HIGh PREGGURE IN THE CONTAIN?ENT. CChTAIhMENT ISCLATION WILL ALSC OCCUP. THi.S 4ALFLNCTICN HILL CONTINUE INTC RECIRCULATION PHAbE. THE SECONCARY SYSTEMS WILL REFLECT THE RC C C N D I T ION S., ISOLATIch 0F THIS LE/K MAY BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CLOSING THE AFFECTED LOCP'S ISCLATICh VALVES. ALL lNSTRUMENTATI0h WILL RES?0hc TO THE FALFUNCTION AND SUBSEOUSNT ACTICNS. THE SIMULATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED TO RECOVER FROM THIS MALFUNCTICN. SAME AS RC01Ai EXCEPT "82" LCCP RC018 SAME AS RC01A, EXCEPT "33" LCCP RC01C

i FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS VALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 1 EFFECTS RCO2 HOT LEG CCOLANT LEAK TYPE:C05 - GENER!Ce VARIAELE: 1CC% = 20CC GFF YPXSVRTY (56 - SS) CAUSE: HELD FAILURE ON BOT LEG AT VESSEL PLT STA:AT PChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL RESULT IN A SPILLAGE OF EFFECTS:RCO2A COOLANT TO THE CCNTAINVENT ATMOSPHERE. THE SEVERITY OF THE LEAK CAA BE CCNTSCLLED EY THE INSTRUCTCR OVER A RANGE CF 2C-2CCO GPM. THE A9ILITY CF TFE CVCS TO <EEP LP KITH THE LEAK WILL DEPEND UPON ITS SEVEPITY. A LEAK OF LESS THAN CVCS CA?ACITY WILL ENABLE THE C0hTRCLLED RAMF DOWN OF THE PLANT AND SUESEGLENT CCCLOokh AhD DEFRESSURIZATICN TC A CCLD SHUT COWN CONDITION. A LARGER LEAK WILL SH0h A LCSS CF PRESSLRIZER LEVEL AND PRESSURE. IN ALL CASESr TFERE WILL BE AN APPARENT CHAhGE IN THE CONTA!NPENT ATMCSPHEPIC CONCITICNS. PRESSUREr TEMPERATURE, AND HUMIDITY ACTIVITY WILL ALL RISE. THE CONTAINMENT SUMP WILL Al50 AISE AND NEED TO BE PUMFED. IF LEA < IS EEYCND CVCS CAPACITYr AN EVENTUAL REACTOR TRIP WILL RESULT DUE TO THE LOW PRES $URE TRIP-POINT 3EING EXCEEDED. AS PRESSLRE CCNTINVES TO FALL, AT 1585 OSI SAFETY INJECTI0h WILL OCCUR WILL ALL ITS FUNCTIONS. EVENTS kCULD C0hTINLE AS IN RC01 EXCEPT hITH A LCNGER TIPE FRAME. THE SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TO EE 9.E INITIALIZ50 TO CLEAR THIS M.tLFUNCTICN. SAME AS 9C02), EXCEPT THE "42" LCCP FCO2E SAME AS RCO2Ar EXCEPT THE "43" LCOP RCO2C

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. M. A L F U N C T I O N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RC03 CCLD LEG LOSS OF COOLANT TYPE:CC6 - GENERIC YF:XMFTe (193 - 195) CAUSE:00VELE-ENDED RUSTUDE OF COLD LEG AT VESSEL NCZZLE PLT STA:AT PChEF SIMILAR TO RC01 EXCEPT CNE SAFETY INJECTION TANK EFFECTS:RCO3A SPILLS ITS CCNTEATS CUT CF TFE !REAK. Ih ADDITICN A90VT OhE-THIRD CF THE SAFETY IhJECTION PUMPS' FLOW WILL SE LOST THRCUGH THE BREAK. THE CORE WILL REMAIh LNCIVEREC FCR A PERICD CF TIFE FRICR TO REFLC00. THE INSTRUCTCR WILL HAVE TO GE-lhITIALIZE THE SIMULATCR TC RECCVER FPCP TFIS PALFUNCTICN. SAME AS ACO3A EXCEPT "#2" LCCP FC039 SAME AS RCO3A EXCEPT "#3" LCCP ACO3C

FAINE. YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS YALF. h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS RC04 COLD LEG COCLANT LEAK TYPE:C07 - GENERICe VARIAELE: 10C% = 2CC Go.* YCXSVRTY (62 - 64) CAUSE: FAULTY kELO AT STEAM GENERATOR CUTLET NCZZLE FLT STA:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL BE S! PILAR TO RCO2 WITH THE EFFECTS:RC04A EXCEPTICN THAT THE LEAK WILL 9E ABLE TO EE ISCLATED EY OPERATION OF THE PRCPER LCCP ISCLATICh VALVES. SECCNDADY PLANT RESPCNSES WILL REFLECT THE ISOLATED LOOP'S LACK CF HEAT REFCVAL AND RC SYSTEP'S INTEGRITY RE-ESTABLISHE0 WITH LOCP ISCLATION. THE SIMULATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZE 0 TO CLEAR THIS PALFUNCTICN. SAME AS RC04A EXCEPT "#2" LCCP RC049 SAME AS RC04A EXCEoi "#3" LCCP RC04C NOTE: IN RC04Ar LET004N TEPPS WILL 9E HOTTERe AS FLOW WILL DE IN DEVERSE AhD WILL CCPE DIRECTLY FRCM i THE VESSEL AFTER LCCF ISCLATICN. LETDChh LINE I TEMP AND HEAT EXCHAN3ER WILL REFLECT THIS CONDITICN. 1 l l \\ l

FA2NE YAhKEE FALFLNCT20N CAUSE AhC EFFECTS 'MALF NO. FALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RC05 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT PUMP (S) TYPE:COS - GENERIC 2C1) YP:XMFTa (199 CAUSE:LS-4 SWITCH FAILLRE CAUSING EREAKER TRIF PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:FCOSA - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL INITIATE A BREAKER TRIPr DL E TC A FAILURE OF HCV-121 POSITICN Sh FOR THE P-1-1 RACTOR COOLANT FUMP. THE APPRCPRIATE ALARMS WILL ALERT THE CPERATOR TO THE PUMP TRIP. AS FLOW CECREASES, A REACTCR TRIP WILL OCCUR AT 93% TOTAL FLCWe IF NCT BELOW 2% PCWER AND FLOW TRIP BLCCKET., LNIT WILL 9E ORCLGHT TO A HCT SHUTDOWN CONCITICN BY THE STEAM DUMP SYSTEM USING THE CPERATING LCCPS' STEAM GENEFATORS FCF HEAT REMOVAL. REVERSE FLOW IN THE INACTIVE LOCP WILL EE EVIDENT. TEPP-ERATURE %ILL ALSC REFLECT TFE LCSS CF FLCW. THE AFFECTED LOCP'S STEAP GENERATOR PRESSURE WILL DECR." (E AS HEAT TRANSFER DECREASES. APPROPRIATE ALARFS AND INSTRUMENTATICN WILL 9EFLECT THE CONDITIOh. REMOVAL CF THIS PALFUNCTION WILL ALLCW A NORFAL RESTART CF THE PLMP AFTE2 CChDITIONS HATE STA9ILIIED. RC059 - SAME AS RC05A EXCEPT P-1-2. p I. RC05C ACTE: INITIATICN OF RCOSA, 3r Ci HILL SIMULATE A TCTAL LOSS CF FLOW. PUFP CCASTDOWN WILL BE EVIDENT AND ALL FLCh INDICATICN WILL DECREASE. AATURAL RECIRCULATION WILL SE ESTABLISH 8D WITH THE STEAP GENERATORS TO REMOVE THE l HEAT. RC TE),1ERATURES HILL INDICATE RECIRCULATICN FLOh AND DELTA TEPPERATURES. I 1 l l 1 l

i FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS VALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS RC06 RCP - LCCKED ROTCR TYPE:C09 - GEAERIC YP:XMFT3 (202 - 2C4) CALSE: LOWER BEARING SEIZURE PLT STA: 100% F0WER EFFECTS:RC06A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL ENA3LE THE INSTRUCTOR TO TOTALLY STOP " Wi " RCP UNDED LCAD. THIS HILL RESULT IN THE PUFP'S CURRENT METER TC PEG HIGH AND A SUBSEDUENT OVERLOAD TRIP. THE FLCh IN THE AFFECTED LOCP WCLLD DRCP OFF TO C FLCW IN ABCUT 5-6 SECCNDS. A REACTOR TRIP WILL RESULT DUE TO LOW FLOW, WITH A CORRESPONDING TURBINE TRIP. THE REACTOR kOULD GO TO THE HOT SHUT DCWN CCNDITION USING THE STEAM DUMP /9YPASS SYSTEM AND THE UNAFFECTED LOOPS FCR C C C L D 0 'n N. THE AFFECTED LCCP KILL REMOVE HEAT ONLY TC THE EXTENT CF THE LCW PEVERSE FLOW. ASSCCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRLFENTS WILL REFLECT THIS C C N D I T I C li. ISOLATICN CF THE LCCF WILL EhABLE CCCLDChN TO SE CONTRCLLED 3Y THE CPERATICN OF THE REMAINING INTACT LOOPS. A DNER OF <1.5 HILL EE SEEN IN 3-8% CF THE C095. CCNTAINMENT R F S '* I L L R E F L E C T TVE fab!ATION FIELDS. R EMCV AL CF Tb E M AL *LNCTICN HILL P ERFIT A RESTART CF THE FLMP LSING AFFRCFEIATE PRCCEDUREG. SAME AS PC06A EXCEPT "#2" LCCP 6C062 SAME AS AC06A EXCEDT "#3" LCCP AND NC LCSS OF HC06C PRESSURIZER SPRAY.

PAINE YANXEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF 60. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS RC07 RCP - EXCESSIVE VISRATICA TYPE:C10 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 1C0% = SC MILS ABCVE NORMAL 67) YFXSVRTY (65 CAUSE:FLYhMEEL INEALANCE FLT STA:AT FChEF EFFECTS:RC07A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN INDICATED VIBRATICN CN TWE 1 PCF OF VARIABLE AFCUNTS. THE AMOUNT OF VISRATIch w!LL DETERMINE THE ACTION TO EE TAKEN EY THE OPERATCR. APPRCPRIATE ALAR.vS ANC INSTRUMENTATI0h WILL REFLECT THIS CCNDITION. REMCVAL CF THIS FALFUNCTION HILL REMOVE THE VISRATIOh SIGNAL AND RESTOPE NCRFAL VIERATICNS. FC079 - SAME AS RC07A EXCEPT "#2" PUFP SAME AS RC07A EXCEPT "#3" PLFP RC07C l i l 1

1 PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS HIGH EEARING TEMPERATUEE RCOS RCP GENERICJ VARIAELE: 10C% = SCC CEG F ABCNE NCRMAL TYPE: C11 YPXSVRTY (6S - 70) CAUSE: LOSS CF COOLING HATER TO LOWER EEARIAG CIL CCCLER DUE TO CHECK VALVE FAILURE PLT STA:100% POWER EFFECTS:PCOSA - THIS MALFUNCTION '4ILL SIMULATE THE LCSS CF CCOLING WATER TC THE LCAER EEARING CIL CCOLER DUE TO THE FAILURE CF THE CHECK VALVE IN TFE INLET LINE. A SLOh RISE IN SEARING TEMPERATURE WILL Of EVIDENT IN TFE IhSTRLMENTATION CN TFE CCNTRCL BCARD. ADDROPRIATE ALARPS WILL ANNUNCIATE AS TFEIR SETPCINTS ARE REACHED. REMCVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION WILL RESTCRE COOLING WATER FLOWS ALLOWIAG ThE SEARING TEMPERATURE TC RETURN T0 NORFAL CVER A PERIOD OF TIME. SAME AS RCOSA EXCEPT "#2" PLVP RCOEE RC06C - SAME AS RCCSA EXCEPT "*3" PLFP

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS RC09 PRESSURIZER FORV FAILURE TYPE: C18 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = SWUT; 10C% = FULL OPEh 72) YPXSVRTY (71 CAUSE: PILCT VALVE MECHANICAL FAILURE CALSING PORV TC FAIL OPEN PLT STA: 1CC% FCWER EFFECTS: RCC9A-THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE PORV PR-S-14 PILCT ACTUATING VALVE TO FAILi RESULTING Ih THE PORV CPEAING TO A PREDETERMINED FCSITION SET IN 9Y THE INSTRUCTCo. THE RESULTS WILL BE SEEh Ih THE RCS SY A FALLING PRESSU2Er A FALLING PRESSURIZER LEVELi A RISING PORV HEADER TEFFERATURE, AA INCREASE IN CUENCH TANK LEVEL, AND THE EVENTUAL RUPTLRE OF THE CUENCH TANK PUPTLRE DISC. IF ACTION IS h0T TAKEh IN TIMEi WITHOUT PROPER ACTICNr THE REACTOR WILL TRIP ON LOW FRESSURE FOLLOWE0 OY SIAS. CLOSING CF THE AFFECTED FORV BLCCK NALVE WILL TERMINATE THE ELOWOOWN OF THE RCS. REMOVAL CF THE VALFUNCTION KILL ALLCW NCRMAL OPEPATICN PROVIDING SIAS HASN'T TAKEN FLACE. IF $1AS WAS ACTLATED, THE SIFULATOR WILL HAVE TC BE RE-INITIALIZE 0. RCC90-SAME AS RC09A EXCEPT PR-5-15 WILL 3E THE AFFECTED VALVE. LCTE: PILOT VALVE WILL REMAIN DE-EhERGIZd0 AND MCS VALVE POSITION LIGFTS KILL IN0ICATE TFE VALJI IS CLOSEC. i l l l i l l l l l l

PAINE YAhKEE PALFUNCTION CAUSE AAC EFFECTS MALF .NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RC10 PRESSURIZER PORV ISCLATICN VALVE FAILURE TYPE:C19 - GihERIC YP:XMFT9 (213 - 214) CAUSE:THERFAL CVERLOAD 49 TRIPFE0 FLT STA: 100% F0hER THIS M.ALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE THERFO-CVERLOAD EFFECTS:RC1CA TO TRIA CN PR-M-16, MAKING THE VALVE INCPERABLE. UNDER NCRMAL CONDITICNS THIS WILL HAVE NC AFFECT CN PLANT OPERATICN. DURING A PCRV FAILUPEr THIS PALFUNCTION kOULD PREVENT TFE ISCLATION CF THE FORV. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION kCULD PERFIT h0RMAL CPERATICh 0F THE VALVE. SAME AS RC10A EXCEPT OR-M-17 WOLLD SE TFE AFFECTED FC1CB VALVE.

PAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. 'ALFUNCTION TITLE /RANGi/CALSE % EFFECTS RC11 REACTOR HEAC VENT LEAX TYPE:C35 - VARIABLE: 1CC% = 200 GPM YFXSVRTY (73) CAUSE: PINHCLE LEAK ON HELD FLT STA:100% PohER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIch WOLLO SIMULATE A PINHCLE LEAK CN THE VESSEL FEAD VENT LINE OF VARY!NG SEVERITY. THE LEAX FAGAITUDE WCULO SE %ITHIN THE CHARGING PUMPS CAPACITY. AS THE SEVERITY INCPEASES, LETOChh WCULO EE THROTTLED UNTIL A SALANCE SETWEEA CHARGING, LETOCWN AND THE LEAK WAS ACHIEVED. VCT MAKE UP h0VLD BE INCREASE 0 TC MAKE UP FOR THE LCSS CF WATER IAVENTORY. CCNTAINFENT CCNDITICAS.CULO SEE THE LEAK IN HUPIDITY AISE, SUPP LEVEL, G A S ECU S AND PARTICULATE ACTIVITY AND A PCSSIELE TEMPERATURE RISE. REF0 VAL OF THE FALFLNCTION WILL STCP THE LEAKAGE AND ALLCh CCATAIAMENT CCh0ITIONS TO FETLRN TC NCFMAL AFTER A PERICO CF TIME.

FAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSS AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. v.ALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE 8 EFFECTS RC12 SURGE LINE SAMPLE LINE LEAK 25.C GPV VARIAELE: 10C% TYPE: C36 = YPXSVRTY (74) CAUSE: 3/3" LINE LEAKING BETWEEh PS-A-4 ANC CChTAINFENT PENETRATION. FLT STA: 100% F0kER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICN WILL CAUSE A LEAK CF VARYING SEVERITY THAT WILL SE WELL WITHIN THE CHARGING SYSTEFS CAPACITYr EUT TO A DEGREE THAT ACTION KILL 9E REGLIREC. VCT LEVEL KILL FAIL SLChlY AND LETCCWN WILL THRCTTLE TC MAXE UF FOR THE LOSS CF INVENTORY. ACTIVITY RISES KILL BE SEEN IN BOTH THE GASECUS AND FARTICULATE SAMPLES CF THE CCNTAINMENT. THIS MALFUNCTICA CAN BE TERMINATED ?Y THE CPERATOR EY CLCSIhG :S-A-4. REF0 VAL OF THE FALFUNCTION WOULC STOP THE LEAK AND ALLCW CINTAIhMENT CCh0ITICNS TO RETLRN TC NCRMAL. l I i

FAINE YAhKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS PALF AO. SALFUNCTION TITLs/ RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RC13 RCP FAILS TC START TYPE:C37 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (217 - 219) CAUSE:CIL LIFT PUFP LCGIC FAILLRE PLT STA:SHUTDCWh EFFECTS:RC13A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL DISA9LE TFE CIs LIFT PUMP LOGIC SIGNAL TO THE RCP START LCGIC. TFE LIFT P ;?,? WILL BE RUNNING BUT THE PRESSURE SkITCH WILL NOT MAKE UPr THEREEY NOT SATISFYING THE RCP START LCGIC. IF AN ATTEMPT IS PADE TO START RCP P-1-1r TH E PUMP KILL NOT START. REMCVAL CF TFIS PALFUNCTION %ILL ENAELE THE FRES$URE SWITCH TO CCMPLETE ITS CIRCLIT CF THE PUMP START LOGIC AND THE PUPP WILL START IF ALL CTHER CONDITICNS ARE FET. SAME AS RC13A EXCEPT RCP P-1-2 RC133 SAME AS RC13A EXCEPT RCP P-1-3 RC13C p w'*----. ---r ---~v-.v.-~_ m

FAINE YANKEE PALFUNCT:CN CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF .ALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS NO. RC14 LTOP C0hTROLLER FAILLRE TYPE: VARIA3LE% C-10CF. 150) YFXSVETY (149 CAUSE: ERRATIC TRANSMITTER SIGNAL FLT STA:AT FChEE EFFECTS:RC14A WITH PLANT AT POWER, FAILING THE CCNTROLLER TC 10C% KILL RESULT IN ThE SIGNAL TC THE C0hTRCLLER CRIVING THE INDICATCR TO FULL SCALE. THE PCRV FCR CHANNEL "A" OPEN CUE TC IT'S SENSING A HIGH PRESSURE. FAILING IT TO 0% HILL RESLLT IN A LCSS OF PCRV AUTO ACTUATICN. REMOVAL CF THE PALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE TRAhSMITTER SIGNAL. RC149 SAF.E AS RC14A FOR "B" CHANNEL ANC ASSCCIATED EQUICFENT.

r FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /RANGi/ CAL!E & EFFECTS RC15 FAILURE CF PZR SAFETY RELIEF VALVE TYPE: VARIAELE: 10C% = 200eC00 L3M/HR YPtXMFTE (837) CAUSE: SAFETY VALVE SPRING FAILURE PLT STA: FULL PCWE9 EFFECTS: PZR SAFETY VALVE PR-S-11 FAILS TO A PRE-SELECTED CPEN POGITICN OLE TC A SPRING FAILURE. SETTING THIS MALFUNCTION AT THE MAXIMLF SEVERITY h!LL CAUSE THE FCLL0hING PAJCR EVENTS: SRV ACCOUSTIC MONITOR ALARM TE-1C? TEMPERATURE TC PAPIDLY RISE TC APPROXIMATELY 330 F RCS TO RAPIDLY DEPRESSURIZE GUENCH TANK PRESSURE & TEMPERATLRE TC RAPIDLY RISE UNTIL' ITS RUPTLRE CISK FAIL $ REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TMLP ASSCCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTATION KILL M0h! TOR THE EVEhT. REFCVAL OF THE MALFUNCTIch WILL RESTORE THE VALVE TO NOPMAL OPERATION. 1

4 PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS R001 OROPPED RC0(S) TYPE:C40 - GEAERIC YF:XMFTs (693 - 754) CAUSE: LOSS CF VOLTAGE TO GRIPPER CCIL PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS: THIS VALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF VOLTAGE TO ANY ChE CF THE EIGHT SHUT 00WN ROOS Ih GROUP A. ENTERING THE R00 NUMEER IN TFE SEVERITY FOSITION WILL DETERMINE WHICH ROD (S) WILL OROF. hI INSTRUPENTS WILL SEE THE PCWER CHANGE Ih THE AFFECTED QUADRANT AND SYMPETRIC OFFSET WILL RESP 0hD TC IT. THE AMOUNT CF EFFECT WILL DEPEND CN CORE LIFER PCWER LEVEL, WCRTh 0F R00, AND LOCATICh IN CORE. CPERATOR WILL HAVE THE ABILITY TC RECOVER THE CROPPED RCD ANO RESTCRE IT TC ITS NCRMAL POSITIChi hITH THE CORE MODEL REACTINC TO THE hITFORAWAL AND RETURN. INSTRUPENTATIOh WILL REACT AS NECESSARY. REMOVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION KILL ALLOW RECOVERY CF TEE DROPPE0 9CD AND CCRE PARJPETERS TC RETURN TO NCRMAL OVER A PE9IOD CF TIME. 3 RODS RCD 45 38,39,40,41,42,43 44,45 SHUT 00Wh G ROL P A 4 RCD 4S 6e7,8r9 S S RCD AS 46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53 C 8 RCOS FC0 45 55,56,58 59,61,62,64,65 CONTROL GRCUF 1 2-8 RCD AS 18,19,20,21 22,23 24,25 3-3 RCD AS 26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33 4 FC0 4S 2,3,4,5 4 5A-9 RCD AS 1e34,35,36,37i54,57,60, 63 ~

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AAC EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS RD02 STUCX RCD GENERIC TYPE: C41 293) YF:XMFT3 (237 CAUSE: ROD FAILE0 TC DRCD CA TRIP FLT STA:1RIF FRCF PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SELECTED ONE CF EIGHT R005 IN SHUTOChh GRCUP A TC REPAIN IN THE WITHORAWN POSITION. THE CORE WILL SEE THE LACK OF THE ROD'S WCRTH IN ITS TCTAL REACTIVITY WCRTH. ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS HILL FUNCTION AS REQUIRED. PEMCVAL CF THIS FALFUNCTION WILL ALLCW TFE R00 TO OROP. 8 RCOS F00 45 38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45 SHUTOOWN GROLP A 4 RCO 45 6,7,8,9 3 S FC0 AS 46,47,48/49i50r$1,52,53 C S RCOS FC0 AS 55,56,53,59,61,62,64,65 CONT 2CL GRCUF 1 8 FC0 AS 15,19,20,21,22,23,24,25 2 3-S RCD e s 2 6,2 7,2 8,2 9,3 0,31,3 2,3 3 4 FC0 AS 2,3,4,5 4 5A-9 500 AS 1,34,35,36,37,54,57,60, 63

PAINE YANKEE F ALFLNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /9ANGE/CALSE ! EFFECTS R003 ROD (S) kITHDRAWAL FAILURE TYDE: C42 ~ GENERIC YF:XMFT3 (296 352) CAUSE: INDIVIDUAL CEA F0DULE FAILURE FLT STA:AT FCkER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL PREVENT TFE SELECTED RCDCS) FROF WITnDF.AmING WHEN CALLED ON TO DC SC, DUE TO A FAILLRE CF TFE RCD'S VCDULE. ALL OTFER RODS IN SHUTDOWN GROLP A WILL OPERATE AS NORFAL. IF ROD IS ALLOWED TC GET FIVE ETEPS CUT OF SEQLENCE, A HIGH ALARP wILL ANNUNCIATE ANC A HI-HI ALARM AT TEN STEPS. REED S 'a I T C H ALARF WILL SCLND AT SIX STEPS. 200 INDICATICNS KILL SHCh THE RCD OUT CF STEP. THE OPERATOR KILL FAVE THE CAPABILITY CF TRYING TO GET THE RCD BACK IN ITS PROFER STEP. REMOVAL CF TFIS PALFUNCTION KILL ALLCV TkE SELECTED ROD (S) TC POV E NCRM ALLY. 3 RCDS CCD 45 38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45 SHUTDCWN GRCLP A 2 -4 dCD AS 6,7,8s9 S SCD AS 46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53 C ! 900S ECD AS 5 5,5 6,5 8,5 9,51,6 2,6 4 r 6 5 CCNTACL GROLF 1 2-E ACD 45 19,19,20,21,22,23,24,25 3-E 500 as 26,27,28,29,30,31,!2 13 4 5CD AS 2,3,4,5 4 5A-9 FCD AS 1,34,35,36,37,54,5?i6Ce 63

PAINE YAN4dE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE $ EFFECTS RD04 ROD (S) INSERTION FAILURE TYPE:C43 - GENERIC YP:XMFTe (355 - 411) CALSE:INDIVIDLAL CEA FCDULE FA! LURE PLT STA:AT C C 'n E R EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICN IS SIMILAR TC R003 kith THE EXCEPTION THAT THE SELECTED RCD (S) WILL hITHDRAW EUT WILL NOT INSERT. 3 RODS RCD AS 33,39,40,41,42,43,44,45 SHUTDOWN GRCLP A 3 -4 500 4S 6s?,8e9 C -S 500 A S 46,4 7,4 8,4 9,5 0,51 e 5 2,5 3 8 RCDS C00 4S 55,56,58,59,61,62,64,65 CONTROL GROUF 1 2-8 500 45 15,19,20<21,22,23,24,25 33-8 8CD 4S 2 6 i 2 ? r 2 3,2 9,3 0, 31,3 2,3 3 4 -4 SCD AS 2,3,4,5 5A-9 FCD 45 1,34,35,36,37,54,57,60, 63

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS M/LF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 5 EFFECTS RDOS ROD EJECTIch TYPE:C44 - GEhERIC 470) YP:XMFTa (414 CAUSE:hELC FAILURE ON CEDP NO ZLE fC h!AD PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIMULATE THE TCTAL EJECTICN CF A CE?? ANC ITS CEA DUE TC A CCMPLETE SEVERENCE CF TFE WELD AT TFE VESSEL HEAD. A REACTCR TRIP WILL RESULT CUE TO LCW PRESSURE. RODS WILL ALL DROP AND THE F0 WEB TRANSIENT 'a I L L TERMINATE. IF THE LNIT WAS AT FULL F0WEA, SCME NEGLIGIELE FUEL CAMAGE WILL CCCUR. THE REMAINDER OF THE MALFUNCTIOh WILL SE SIMILAR TO TFE LCCA ACCICENT, WITH CCNTAINMENT CCN-DITIONS, SECCNDARY CONDIT!0hSi AND SAFEGUARDS ACTING IN THE SAME FANNER. THIS MALFUhCTIch CAh BE INI-TIATED Ch ANY RCD IN Sh0TD0hN GRCUP A. THIS SIFLLATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-lhITIALIZED TO RECCV2R FROM THIS MALFUNCTICh. S RODS FCD 45 38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45 SHUTDOWN GROLP A 4 RCD 45 6,7,8,9 3 6 Ft0 4S 46,47,48i49,50,51,52,53 C 3 RODS RCD 45 55,56,53,59,61,62,64,65 CONTROL GROUF 1 2-5 FCD AS 18,19.20,21,22,23,24,25 3-8 FCD AS 26,27,23,29,30,31,32,33 4-4 F00 85 2,3,4,5 5A-9 900 4S 1,34,35,36,37,54,57,6Ce 63 i l l I l 1

b. FAINE,YAhKEE MALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. FAliVNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS RD06 CEDF LOSS OF C0 CLING TYPE:C45 - VARIABLE < SC% Fh43-3 TRIPS, < 100% FN43-1+3 TRIP, 1002 ALL FANS TRIP YFXSVRTY (18) CAUSE: FAN FCTCR CVERLCAD TRIP $6 4ELAY FLT STA:AT FCkER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL SIPULATE THE LOSS OF CEDM FAN (S). AT A SEVERITY CF < 50% FN43-3 KILL TRIF GIVING AN ALARM. FROM 50% 10 99% FN43-1 WILL TRIP IN ADDITION TO FN43-3. AT THIS TIME ANY F0D WCVEFENT WILL RESULT IN A DRCPPEC RCc FRCM 1C-30 FIN AFTER POVEFENT. AT 1CC% SEVERITY A RCD WILL CFOP 10 FIN AFTER THE F0VEMENT. AS FAh5 TRIP EACH WILL ACTUATE IT'S ASSOCIATEC TRIP ALAFF. REF0 VAL OF THE FALFUNCTION WILL ENABLE THE FANS TO BE RESTARTED USING THEIR cEPOTE FUNCTICA ACTUATION.

+ I F.AINE'YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. WALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS RD07 LOSS OF MG(S) FOR CEDM TYPE:C46 - GENERIC 475) YF:xMFT3 (474 CAUSE:PG CUTPUT BREA<!A TRIP PLT STA:AT PChEP THIS MALFUNCTION WOULO CAUSE THE OUTPUT EREAKER EFFECTS:FD07A CF MG 1A TO CPEN RESULTING Ih REACTCS TRIP 9REAKER 1A CPENING. APDROPRIATE ALARMS AN) INSTRUMENTATION WILL INDICATE THE PRC3LEP. THE REACTOR HILL NOT TRIO AS LONG AS THE CTHER NG SET IS CPERABLE. REMCVAL CF TFIS PALFLNCTION kCULD ALLOW EECLOSURE CF 3REAXER. RD073 - SAME AS.AD07A EXCEPT FOR MG 19. t i l l l f 1 1 l I

j PAINE YANKE6 FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF No. VALFUNCTION TITLE /AANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS RDOS CEDP(S) FAILURE TO TAIP TYPE:C47 - GENERIC YF:XMFTS (476 - 47?) CAUSE: LOGIC FA! LURE PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:500!A - THIS SALFUNCTICN WILL DISABLE TFE AUTO-TRIP FUNCTION CF THE RFS. A TRIP INITIATING EVENT CAN OCCURr EUT ho ACTIOh WILL Si TAKEN EY THE RFS. THE UNIT WILL CONTIhUE TC CPERATE IN THE CEGRACEO CONDITION. CEACTOR CAN EE TRIPPED FANUALLY h!TH THIS MALFUNCTI0h' INITIATEC. RE.1CVAL CF THIS VALFLNCTION HILL ENAELE THE AUTO-TRIP TC CPERATE. THIS MALFUNCTION WILL DISABLE TFE MAhUAL TRIP & P.G. TRIP 50083 SUTTCN INITIATION OF SCTH RCCSA AND R002E WCULD BEQUIRE THE CPERATOR TO CPEN THE P0hER SUPPLY TC THE FG SETS. l i 1 l I

MAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE ANC EFFECTS MALF h0. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CAUSE 8 EFFECTS RD09 UNCChTRCLLED WITHDRAkAL/INSERTIch CF CEDF(S) TYPE: C48 - GENERIC YF:XMFTS (478 - 479) CAUSE:IN/ CUT SWITCH FAILURE IN LAST OPERATING POSITION. PLT STA:AT FChER THIS PALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN LACCNTROLLED CEA EFFECTS:FD09A hITFDRAWAL, DUE TO A FAILURE CF THE IN/CLT SWITCH. RODS WILL CChTINLE TC WITHDFAW LNTIL THE UPPER LIMIT INNIEIT Sh!TCH IS REACHED CR UNTIL THE OFF FUSHSUTTCN IS DEFRCSSED. DEACTCR PChEk KILL RESPOND TO TFE WITHDRAWAL AND AFFRCFRIATE ALARMS WILL ANNUhCIATE AS THEIR SETPCINTS ARE REACHED. INSTRUMEhTS AND RECCRDERS WILL FEAD AND RECCRD THE EVENT. A M OV ER-RID E WILL BE ABLE TC BE INSERTED ON THE CFF BUTTCN CISAELING IT. REMCVAL CF FFIS FALFUNCTION HILL STCP THE WITHDRAWAL AhD PERMIT RECOVERY FROM THE EVENT. 50092 - SIMILAR TO RD09A EXCEPT THE FALFLNCTION KILL BE AN INSERTICA 0F CEA'S. REACT 0F PChER KILL DECREASE AND SECONDARY P0hER WILL HAVE TC BE DECREASED TO TRY AND FOLLCW PRIMARY POWEF. INSTRUMENTATICN AND ALARFS WILL RECCRD THE EVENT AS FEQLIRED. REMCV AL CF TF E F ALFUNCTICN HILL PERFIT ACRMAL CPERATICA AND RECCVERY.

e PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS

MALF h0.

M4LFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE I EFFECTS w R010 LOSS OF CEA POVEFENT TYPE: C49 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (430 - 431) CAUSE:IN/ CUT SkITCF FAILURE PLT-STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:501CA THIS SA(FUNCTICN w!LL CALSE CEA kITHCRAhAL TC TO LCST. INSERTION WILL STILL EE CPERATIVE. THE LCSS OF h1THORAkAL PCWER h!LL HAVE TC PE FATCFED EY SECCNCARY D0h!R CCNTRCL. REMCVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION HILL ENAELE CEA WITHORAhAL. 301CE - SAME AS RDiCA EXCEPT INSERTICN HILL E E A F FECTED. h0TE: INSERTION OF E0Th RD1C A AND F0105 WILL PREVENT RCD.0VEMENT. 4 ANY

r FAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSS AhD EFFECTS YALF NO. MALFUNCTION. TITLE / RANGE /CALS! 3 EFFECTS RH01 RESICUAL FEAT RiF0 VAL LCSS OF CCCLING TYPE:C87 - YF:XMFT3 (432 - 453) CAUSE: SUPPLY VALVE (S) FROF 22 LOOP FAILS CLOSED (585 PSI CONTACT CLCSED FAILURE) PLT STA: CN RHR THIS MALFUNCTION KILL CAUSE RH-h-1 TC FAIL TC THE . EFFECTS: GHO1A CLOSE0 POSITION OUE TO THE 585 PSI INTERLOCK FAILING TO THE I S OL AT E P C SITICl4 (REF. DCR 1C3-4 CF ESK 7G). CLOSING THE VALVE W!LL SECURE ALL RHP SLPPLY FL0k. CISCHARGE PR!SSURE wILL FALL CFF AND Lok FLCW ALARMS' KILL ANNLNCIATE. THE PLYPS KILL CAVITATE AN0r IF NOT SECUEEDr PU'P DAMAGE WILL RESULT. THE CCMP0hENT COOLING AATER TEPPERATURES KILL START TC FALL DLE TO THE LOSS CF' THE RHD HEAT LCAC. AC SYSTEP TEFPERATURES WILL SLOWLY START TC R!SE ANCr IF SYSTEF INTEGRITY FAS NOT BEEN ERCKENs A PRESSURE RISE KILL ALSC 9E SEEN. THE AMOUhT 4 CF T E Y,P E R A T U R E AND PRESSURE.4ILL SE DEPEhDENT ON CORE HEAT. IF ENCUGH DECAY HEAT REMAIN $r THE PRESSURE MAY REACH THE SETPOINT CF THE LCW TEFPERATURE OVER PRESSUR-IZATION SYSTEM AND THE PCRV'S WILL ACTUATE. ALL INSTRUMEATATICN AND ALARFS KILL REFLECT THE PROBLEM. I REMCVAL CF ThE MALFUNCTICN KILL ENAELE RE-CPENING OF l RH-F-1 AND RE-ESTABLISHVENT CF :HR. l SA*.E AS RHC1A EXCEPT RH-M-2 k ILL BE AFFECTED. pH015 (REF. PCG 1C5-4 CF ESK 7C) l l

o FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AAD EFFECTS FALF NO. FALFUNCTION TITLE /9ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS Rh02 LOSS OF RHR PUMP (S) TYPE: C38 - GEhERIC 4d5) YP:XMFTS (454 CAUSE:EREAKER TRIP! DUE TC UNDER-VCLTAGE 27Y FAILURE FLT STA: CN RHR THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE RHR PUMP P-12A TC TRIP EFFECTS: EH02A CUE TO AN UNCER VCLTAGE RELAY FAILURF. PRESSURE, FLCW AND CURRENT A SSCCI AT ED KITH THE PUFP WILL FALL TC "C". ASSOCIATED ALARXS AND INSTRLFENTATION WILL REFLECT THE TRIP. IF THE AFFECTED FLFP IS THE ChlY TRAIN CF RHR'CCERATIN3r HEAT CEM AL FROM THE FCS HILL SE LOST ANO RCS TEFFERATURES WILL START TC RISE. STARTING THE OTHER RHR TRAIN WILL RESTORE CCCLING. IF SCTH TRA!h5 WERE IN CPERATION, THE TRAIN NOT TRIPPED KILL REFLECT THE AOCITICNAL FEAT REFCVAL LOAD. REMOVAL CF TFE FALFUNCTICN KILL PERPIT hCRMAL OPERATION CF THE PUMP AND RHR TRAIN. SAME AS RH02A EXCEPT P-129. PH025 h0TE: TRIPPING 3CTH DUFPS KILL CALSE SIMILAR EFFECTS TO RH01.

FAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. M A L F U'i C T I O N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE % EFFECTS Rh03 RHR FL0k CONTROLLER FAILLRE LS!-F-59 CLCSEO TYPE:C39 - VAPIABLE:

37. :

.Y' F X S V R T Y (51) 1CC% : LSI-F-59 FULL OPEN CAUSE:ELECTP0 HIC FAILURE I'h FLCW CCNTRCLLER FIC-3C6 FLT STA: CN FHR EFFECTS: CONTROLLER FI;-3C6 (YEW $5 RIES SC) CLTPUT INSTANTLY JUMPS TC THE MALFUNCTION SEVERITY VALUE. THE RED "FAIL" LIGHT IN THE CONTROLLEP FRONT PAhEL WILL LIGHT AND THE CONTFOLLER WILL TRAhSFEF TO THE "FAIL-MAhUAL" PCDE. TFE CCNTRCLLER CLTDUT n!LL RESP 0hD TO THE MANLAL CPERATICh LEVER, 3UT WILL DFIFT TOWARD C% IN THE ABSENCE CF ACTUATION CF THE FANLAL CPERATION LEVER DUE TC DISCHADGE OF THE CONTROLLER'S IhTERNAL HCLDING CAPACITCR. THE DRIFT RATE IS APPROXIMATELY 100% IN 10 FINUTES. (NOTE TWAT TFE M.ANUAL MCDE DURIhG FAILURE DIRECTLY ACTUATES THE ANALOG CUTPUT APPLIFIER OF THE CONTROLLER; THE DIGITAL LOGIC IS 3YPASSED.) THE CONTRCLLER FAILURE KILL DIRECTLY IMPACT THE POSITION OF THE RHR FLCh CohTRCL VALVE LSI-F-59. IF THE CONTROLLER IS FAILED TO C%, LSI-F-59 WILL SHLTi RESULTING IN LOW RhR FLCh. IF THE CCNTRCLLER IS r FAILED TC 1CCT, LSI-F-59 WILL FULLY CPENs rESULTING l IN HIGH FHR FLOW AND THE RHF PUFP BEING IN AN OVER-I LOADED CCNDITION. THE CPERATOR FAY TAKE ACTION TO MITIGATE THE EVENT TERCUGH PANUAL CPERATION CF THE CONTROLLER AS NOTED ABOVE. l REMCVAL CF THE MALFUACTICN KILL RESLLT Ih CLEARING OF T HE " F AIL" LIGHT CN FIC-336. TFE CONTRCLLER WILL N0h SE Ih THE "DIGITAL" MANUAL PCDE. THE OPERATCR FAY l STAEILIIE RHF FLCW AT THE DESIRED VALLE AND RETURN THE l CCNTROLLER TC THE,.UTOMATIC MODE. l l l l l l l l

~ a FAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFFCTS 4 MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECT9 RH04 RHR OISCHARGE PIPING FAILURE TYPE:C90 - GENERIC YP: XMFT3 (4S7 - 489) CAUSE:CI5 CHARGE PIFING CRACK AT CChTAINM!hT PENETRATICh ESVELCFE FLT STA:CN RHR THIS MALFUNCTION HILL CAUSE A LEAK Ch ThE RHR EFFECTS:RH04A DISCFARGE LIhE TC LCCP NO. 1 IN THE FAGh1TUDE OF SCO GoM. SINCE THE LEAK IS CUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT, CONTAINFENT ATMOS 2HERE KILL NQT EE AFFECTED. FLCW INDICATION WILL IN. CREASE 3Y 500 GPS CN THE AFFECTED LOOD. SINCE ONE RHR DUPP HAS SLFFICIENT CAPACITY TO CPERATE THE Rh4 SYSTE*'S NCRFAL CFERATION, THE SYSTEM HILL CONTINUE TC CPEFATE hITH THE INCREASED 't 0h. HCWEVER, THE PRIFARY SYSTEM WILL PEFLECT THE LOSS OF 500 GPM IN PRESSURIIER FRESSURE AND LEVEL OR REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL. ADDITIONAL WATER HILL HAVE TO EE A00E0 FRCF THE RWST TC AVCID THE LOSS OF ENOUGH HATER TC LOSE RHR PUPS SUCTICN AND LOSS CF SYSTEF. THE LiAK HAS THE CAPABILITY CF EEING ISCLATED. APPROPRIATE INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS KILL ALERT TWE CPERATOR TO THE CONDITICh AND REFLECT PRCPER l DARAFETERS. I REMCVAL CF TFIS FALFLNCTION KILL STCP THE LEAK AhD ALLOW RECOVERY OF NORMAL LEVEL AND CPERATION. l l RH045 - SAME AS GH04A EXCEPT #2 LOOF. SAME AS Rh04A EXCEPT 83 LOOP. RH04C l t l l w

r FAINE YAhKEE FALFLACTICN CAUSE ANC EFFECTS MALF NC. MALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Ry01 AREA RACIATICN VCNITCR FAILURE (S) TYPE:155 - GENERIC YF:XMFTB (49C - 519, 472 - 473) CAUSE:CETECTOR FAILS HIGH/ LOW PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIMULATE A DETECTCP FAILURE IN AN AREA RADIATICN MCAITCF. EACF MohITOR WILL HAVE THE CAPABILI1Y TO FAIL HIGH OR LOW. CONTAINVENT PARTICULATE HIGH, RF61C2X PM01A1 RM01A2 - LOhr RF6102X CONTAINFENT GAS HIGHi RF-61C2Y RM0151 FF0152 - Low, RM-6102Y CONTAINFENT HIGH GAMMA HIGh, RF-6113A RM01C1 RM01C2 - LOW, RM-6113A MANI?ULATOR CRAh! HIGHi R"-6104 RM0101 PM0102 - LCW, RM-6104 RM01E1 - REACTOR CONTAINyENT HIGH, RF-61CS AM01E2 - Lok, RP-61CS DE-CONTAMINATIch AREA HIGH, RM-6106 RMC1F1 RM01F2 - LCW, RF-(106 l SPENT FLEL FIT FCBILE PLATFCRM FIGhr RF-61C7 l FN01G1 LOW, RM-6107 RM01G2 - l SAFPLE F 0 0.V HIGHi RF-61C3 FMGibi RM01H2 - LOWi R F - 61 C S PRIFARY AUXILIARY SLILDING HIGhr RM-61C9 RM01J1 RM01J2 - LOW, R*-6109 SPRAY PLMP AREA HIGHi RF-6110 RM01K1 A M 0'a X 2 - LOWS RF-611C STEAM LINE FEADER s1 HIGH, RM-PSH1 FP01L1 RM01L2 - LCW, Fy-MSH1 STEAM LINE FEADER #2 HIGHi RM-F$H2 FM01F1 RM01M2 - LChi RF-MSH2 STEAM LINE FEADER 83 HIGHi FF-?SH3 RM01N1 AM01h2 - LCW, FF-MSH3 i

04/07/88 11:25:37 TASK # 1FOC0039 GCULO CSC MPX-32 1.50 PRIFARY V ! '. T STACK HI RANGE HIGHe RM-16 RM01P1 RM01F2 - LChi RF-16 FM0101 - LET00WN LO RANGE RP6111 HIGH L C '. RYC1G2 C O NT A IN?.E NT HIGH GAMVA 6113E HIGH AM01R1

M01R2 -

LOW i i ) i i

s FAIN! YANK *E FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE t EFFECTS RF02 PROCESS RADIATICh MChITOR FAILURE (S) TYPE:156 - YP: XMFT3 (52C -543) CAUSE:CETECTOR FAIL $ HIGH/ LOW PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:RM02A1 - VENT STACX PARTICULATE HIi ' RS-3902X ALARMC AT 2X1C(5)CFM FMC2A2 - LOW DCC aATER FI. PV-3401 Shul $ StRGE T ANK VENT VALVE ROUTES AM02E1 PUFP ORAINS TO 8A9 SUMP ANC ALARMS AT 1C(5) CPM. RM02E2 - PCC WATER LCW. SCC WATER HIGH. RV-17C1 SAFE AS RFC391. RM02C1 AM02C2 - L C a'. SERVICE WATER HIGHi RM-1601 ALARMS AT 5X10(2) CPM FM0201 FM0202 - LCW. LISUID HASTE DISPOSAL h!, FN-3!C1 ALARFS AND STCPS CISCH FF02E1 AT 3X1C(4) CPM. FM02E2 - LIOUID.ASTE DISPOSAL LOW. ALARMS AND STOPS DISCHARGE. CONCENSER AIR EJECTCR HIGH, RM-1801 ALAAMS AT 1C(3) CPP. RM02F1 SM02F2 - LO4. E-1-1 STEAM GEN B L O W D C'a h hie RP-26C1 ALARMS AT 5X1C(3)CFM PM02G1 RM02G2 - L C 'a. E-1-2 HIr RP-26C2 ALARMS AT SX10(3)CP* FM02H1 L C 'a. FM02H2 E-1-3 HI, RF-2603 ALARMS AT 5X1C(3)CP* RM02J1 FM02J2 - LCh. WASTE CAS VENT WIGH, RV-30C1 ALARMS AND STCPS DISCH AT RM02X1 1.5X1C(4) Cov. AM02K2 - LOW. BORCN 'aASTE LIGUID FIGH, RP-37C1 ALARMS AT 5X10(5) CPF. AM02L1 FMC2L2 - LOW. SERVICE BUILDING EXHAUST HIGH, RM-6101 ALARPS AT 1C(3)CFM PM02M1 FM02F2 - LCW. ALL OETECTORS SHARE A CCMM0h HIGH RADIATION ALARF. EACH l CRAhEF FAS I T S C 'a N O!TECTOR FAILLo! INDICATICN. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN HILL RESTCRE THE DETECTOR TC NORPAL. L_

a FAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSI 1 EFFECTS RF03 PRIFARY VENT STACX GAS MCNITCR FAILUREr RI-3902Y TYPE:157 - VARIA3LI: 0-1C0% = 1C-10(6) CPS YPXSVRTY (75) CAUSE:0ETECTOR ERRATIC FLT STA: PURGING CONTAINVENT EFFECTS: FAILING THE MONITOR TOWARD THE FIGH END KILL RESULT IN AN ALARN AND THE AUTC SECURING CF TFE PLRGE. RECORDERS AND INSTRUMENTS KILL FOLLOW Th! VARIABLE FAILURE. REACVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN BILL ALLCL NCRMAL OPEFATICN CF THE FONITOR AND RESTCRE OF THE PLRGE,

FAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. FALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RF34 LETCCWN PCNITOR FAILLRE TYPE: 158 - VARIAELE RANGE OF INSTRUMENT C-1CC% 25) YFXSVRTY (24 RACIATICN FONITOR 6111 = 1C 1C' RCENTGENS/HR. 3102 = 1C-1C(6) CPM CAUSE:CETECTOR FAILS FLT STA:AT F0kER EFFECTS:RM04A - LOW RANGE LETD0dh *CNITCR FAILS. IF ALARM FAILS TOWARD HI3H ENDr AN A L A R Y. h!LL ANNLhCIATE ALERTING THE CDERATCR TO Tb! DROELEM. THE OPERATCR HILL HAVE TO VERIFY THE. FAILURE AGAIhST THE FIGH RAhGE PCNITCR. REMC%AL CF TH E MALFLNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE FONITOR 10 NORMAL CPERATION. FIGH RANGE LET00kN McNITCR. SAPE AS RMC4A. PM045 l l I l

~ FAINE Y A.N K E E

• LLFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS NALF NO.

VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS + RP01 REAC10R TRIP FAILURE 1YPE:C50 - GEAERIC YF:XMFT3 (543 - 557, 759) CAUSE: LOGIC FAILURE RESULTING IN NC TRID SIGNAL FLT STA:AT FChER EF'ECTS:RP01A - THIS M4LFUNCTION WILL ALLOW THE EXCEEDING OF THE RCS LOW FLOW TRIP PCINT, WITH NO RESULTING REACTOR TRIP, DUE TO THE LOG!C FAILURE. TRIP AILL HAVE TO BE FANUAL CR SY EXCEEDING SCME CTHER TRIP SETPCINT. INSTRLFENTATICh Aho ALARFS h!LL R EFLECT THE CONDITICN AS SETPOINTS ARE EXJEECEO. R!MOVAL CF THE FALFUNCTION KILL ENASLE THE TRIP TC CDER8TE FRCPERLY. SAME AS RP01A EXCEDT LC% STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE kP018 SP01C - HI RATE CF CHANGE CF POWER HIGH PC L E R RP010 RP01E - L0h STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL RP01F - HIGH PRESSLRIZER PRESSURE RP01G - THERMO-F ARGIN/LC PZR PRESSURE SYMETRIC FLUX CFFS!T RP01H LCSS OF LOAC Rp01I HIGH CCATAINMENT PRESSURE RP01J MAAUAL TRIF RP01K Ap01A'S EQU NO = 2.04 DPC1a's EGU NC = 2.04 RP01C'S EGU NO = 2.C4 RPC10'S EGU NC = 2.04 2.04 R P 01 E ' S E G U A C = 2.04 R*C1F'S ECL NC = RP01G's 500 NO = 2.04 RDC1H'S ECU NC = 2.04 2.06 RPC1I'S EGU A0 = 2.C4 RPC1J'S EGL NC = RP01K'S E00 NO = 2.04 i l I

PAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RP02 SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP GENERIC TYPE:C51 YF:XMFT3 (777 - 787) CAUSE:TRIF FOINT EXCEE020 PLT STA:AS REGUIRED SY AFS EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL CAUSE A REACTCR TRIP ANDr IF FEGUISED, A TUR3INE TRIP. CEA'S KILL INSERT, STEAM CUMP/EYPASS WILL CONTRCL TEVPERATURE, AhD RELATED SYSTEMS AND INSTRUMENTATION KILL ACT TO SRING TFE PRIMARY SYSTEM TO A FOT SHUT 00hh-CCh0ITION. ALL SYSTEFS WILL REACT AS REQLIREC,UNLESS ANOTFER FALFUNCTION HAS BEEN INSERTED TO CISAELE SCME INTERFACING SYSTEM. REF0 VAL OF THIS MALFUNCTION WILL EhABLE START-UP CF THE AEACTCR AND PLANT. A0TE: FCLLCWING IS A LIST CF TRIPS AND SETPOINTS: RPC2A ACS Lok FLOW 93% RPC29 LOW SG PRESS 485 PSIG RPC2C HI RATE CF CHANGE CF PCWER > 2.d DPF (1C)-4% TO 15%) EpC20 FIGH DOWER 2C%-1C6.5% RPC2E LOW SG LEVEL 35% RPC2F FIGH PIR PRESS 2325 PSIG RPC2G LOSS OF LOAD < 45 PSIG AS CIL CR 4 0F 4 STOP VALVES RPC2H HIGH CONTAINFENT PRESS 4.25 PSIG RDC2I TM/LF NARIAELE POC2J SYMPETRIC OFFSET VARIAELE APC2K FA.NALAL APC2A'S EQU NO = 3.C3 RPC23'S ECU NC = 6.02 3.C2 RPC20'S ECU NC = 3.01 RPC2C'S EQU NO = FPC2E'S EQU NO = 4.C1 Rc02F'S EGU NC = 4.03 5.03 5.C2 APC2H'S ECU NC = RPC2G'S EGU NO = RPC2I'S EQU NO = 5.C1 RP.C2J'S ECU NC = 5.03 2.C7 RPC2K's Eau NO = s

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AND EFFECTS YALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS RF03 INADVERTEhT SAFETY INJECTION TYPE:C57 - GENERIC YP: XMFT3 (559 - 560) CAUSE:56 RELAY FAILURE PLT STA:AT F0kER EFFECTS:PP03A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A LCGIC FAILURE IN TFE RPS CAUSIhG A SAFETY INJECTICh SIGNAL TO SE SENERATED TO TRAIN #1 krTFCUT A SAFETY INJECTION CCh0ITICN. ALL REL~ATED TRAIN 81 SAFETY'IhJECTION EQUIPMENT kCULC ACTUATE AND CPERATE AS TFROUGH AN ACTUAL SAFETY INJECTION CONDITICN HAD EXISTED. CHAFGING, LETD0khr AND $5AL SUFFLY KILL ISCLATE. THE STANDEY CFARGING PUMP WILL START AND 9OTH "A" ANC THE STAh03Y PUMP KILL TAKE A SUCTION FRCP THE RhST. VCT KILL ISCLATE. IF "3" CHARGING PLFP IS RUhNIhGr IT WILL LOSE ITS SUCTION. MPSI AND LPSI LOCP VALVES WILL CPEh AND FLCh TC RC SYSTEM KILL EE EVIDEAT. A REACTOR TRIP WILL CCCUR CN FIGH PRESSURIIER PRESSURE. TUR3INE KILL TRIPE UNLES HPSI PLFPS ARE SECURED. PCRV'S KILL OPEA AT 2335 AND DUPP TC CCATAIhMEhT VIA QUENCH TANK AFTER RLDTURE DISC IS RLPTLRED. ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTATION KILL PCh!TOF ANC FCLLOW THE EVENT. THE SIMULATCR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INIT I ALIZ ED TO RECCVER FRCM THIS PALFUACT!Ch. SAME AS PP03A EXCEPT FCR 82 TRAIN. RP032 l l l

FAINE'YAhxEE FALFLNCTTCN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS FALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RPO4 SAFETY INJECTION FAILU95 TYPE: CSS - GENERIC YF:XMFTe (561 - 563) CAUSE: LOGIC FAILU4E - NO CLTPUT FLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:RPO4A - THIS PALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A LCSS CF A SIAS CUE TO A LOGIC F4ILURE IN TFE MANUAL C0hCITION. kHEN MANUAL SIAS IS INITIATED, ACTHIhG KILL FAPPEN TC ANY OF THE SAFEGUARDS COMPCNENTS. TO ACCOMPLISH SAFETY INJECTION, A MAhuAL VALVE LINE-UP AND A MAhUAL STARTING OF PUFFS WILL BE REQUIRED. ASSOCIATED INSTRLFENTATION AND ALARMS HILL ALERT TFE CPERATOR TO 1HE LACK CF SAFETY INJECTION. PLANT RESPOhSE KILL CONTINUE IN THE CONDITICN IT WAS IN PRICR TC THE MANUAL SAFETY INJECTICh ALARM 3IGNAL ATTEPPT. THE SIMULATOR WILL HAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED TO CLEAR THIS MALFUNCTION. SIMILAR TO AF044 EXCEPT THE SIA! SIGhAL FROM RPO4B LO-LO PRESSUGIZF.R PRESSURE HILL 3E LCST. FANUAL SAFETY INJECTION WILL 9E AVAILAELE. SAME AS RPO4E EXCEPT THE HI CONTAINMENT RPO4C PRESSURE S!GhAL WILL SE LOST. A0TE: INSERTION OF FALFLNCTIONS RPC4Ar Er AAD C WILL FAIL ALL SIAS SIGNALS. SI WILL REQUIRE A TOTAL FANUAL CPERATION. l l On l l t

r FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS MALF AO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RP05 INACVERTENT RAS TYaE:C59 - GENERIC 565) YP: XMFT3 (564 CAUSE: LOGIC FAILURE PLT STA:AT PCiER EFFECTS:RPOSA - T HIS MAL FUNCT ION WILL ACTIVATE TRAIN 81 nAS DUE TO A FALLTY SIGNAL FRCM THE LOGIC PROGRAM. ALL VALVES HILL STRCXE A S REQUIRED EY EAS SIGNAL.. FCC WILL REFLECT AN INC9 EASE IN FLCW DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL LOAD OF E-3A RHR FEAT EXCHANGE 2 LiTOCWA HEAT EXCHANGER TEMPERATLRE WILL RISE DUE TO THE ?CC ISCLATICN. ALA9FS AND INSTRL-FENTATICN WILL MCNITCR THE EkENT. REMCVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN kLL EN'A9LE THE RESTORATICh CF NCRMAL LIh5 UP. RP053 - SAME AS RPOSA EXCEST #2 RAS TRAIN. l I k l 1

c FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4AN05/CALSE ! EFFECTS RP06 CONTAINFENT ISOLATICA FAILURE TYPE:C60 - 3EhERIC YP: XMFTB (573 - 576) CALSE: LOGIC FAILURE - NO CLTPUT FLT STA:LOCA IN FPCGGESS THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ASILITY EFFECTS:RP06A TO VANUALLY INITIATE CIS FOR "A" TRAIN. bHEN THE CIS EUTTCNS IS ACTUA.TED, NOTFING WILL HAPPEN. CIS KILL ACTLATE WITk A HI-CONTAINMEhT PPES$URE SIGNAL FROF THE *RESSURI SWITCHES IF CALLED FOR. IF HIGH PRESSURE SIGNAL IS NOT CALLED FCR CR IS IN00ERATIVE, THE OPERATCR WILL FAVE TO CC A FANUAL ISOLATION 3Y CLCSING ALL VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH CIS WANUALLY. REMCVAL CF THIS PALFUNCTION KILL r.ESTORE THE FANUAL CIS CF "A" TRAIN. SAME AS RP06A EXCEPT THE "B" TQAIN SIGNAL WILL RP063 EE LCST. SAME AS FoC6A EXCE?T THE HI-CONTAINFENT PRES $URE P90dC PRESSURE SIGAAL WILL BE LOST T O T H E " A" TRAIN. 9P060 - SAME AS R*06C EXCEPT "0" TRAIN. ACTE: INSERTI0h 0F ALL 4 MALFUNCTICNS b!LL REQLIRE A TOTAL FANUAL CIS LINE-UP. I

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTTON CAUSE AND EFFECTS PALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE ! EFFECTS RF07 INACVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISCLATICN SIGNAL TYPE: C61 - GENES.IC YF:XMFT3 (56? - 569) CAUSE: LOGIC FAILURE FLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: RP07A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN INADVERTEhi CIS FOR THE "A" TRAIN DUE TO A FAILLRE IN THE LOGIC FR03 RAM. THE ISCLATION VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH TRAIN "A" 'aILL CLCSE DUE TO THE CIS $1GhAL. ALARFS AND INSTRUMENTATIONr AS HELL AS THE CIS STATLS LIGHT PANELr HILL INCICATE Tb! PRCELEF. COMPCNENT CCCLING TO CONTAINFENT, RCF SEAL WATER, STEAP GENERATOR ELOWDOWNr SAFPLE VALVESr CHARGING AND LETDCWN h!LL BE THE SYSTEMS ISCLATING. REMOVAL CF THE V.ALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE LOGIC PROGRAM TO ITS NCRFAL FLNCTICN. SAME AS RDC7A EXCEPT FOR "9" TRAIN. EPC7c

7 FA2NE YANKEE FALFLNC72CN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS YALI h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RP08 RECIRCULATICA ACTIVATION FAILURE TYPE: C62 - GENERIC Y::XMFT3 (570 - 571) CAUSE: LOGIC FAILURE - NO CUTPUT PLT STA:LOCA IN PRO 3RESS THIS MALFUNCTICN WOLLD CAUSE THE LCGIC CF THE EFFECTS:FPOEA RAS TO FAIL, RESULTING IS NC ACTIVATION CF RAS FOR THE "A" TRAIN. AS A RE!LLT, THE "A" TRAIN WOULD CCNTINCE TC TAKE A SUCTION ON THE RWST AFTER IT HAD REACHED ITS RAS LENEL OF 1CC,000 GALLCNS. THE "3" TRAIN h0VLC SFIFT FROF THE RWST TO THE CONTAINVENT SUMF FOR ITS SUCTION AND ITS ASSOCIATED LPSI PU"F WCLLD TFIPs ALLCWING THE $? RAY PUPP TC SUPALY SOTb TFE SPRAY bEADER AND THE kPSI ? UMP. ASSOCIATED ALARPS AhD INSTRUMENTATION hDULD INDICATE THE PROBLEM. IF PROPER ACTION WERE NOT TAKEN, THe "A" TRAIN WOULD EVENTUALLY EMPTY THE PkST AND THE FUMPS h0VLD CAVITATE AND EVENTUALLY TRIP. REMCVAL CF TFE VALFUNCTICN hCULC RESTORE THE PAS SIGNAL. SAME AS RPCSA EXCEPT THE "3" TRAIN. RPOE9 NOTE: IhSERTION OF RPOSA AND E WOULD DISABLE BCTH TRAINS AND WCULD REGLIRE A FANUAL OPERATION CF RAS.

' PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCT20N CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF hC. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RP09 LOW 1EMFEFATLRE/ LOW FRES!URE PRCTECTION FAILURE TYPE: C63 - YF:XMFTe (572) CALSE: LOGIC FAILURE FLT STA: CN FHR EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTICh WOULD CAUSE A FAILbRE IN THE LPRS LOGIC ALLOWING PRESSLRE TO INCREASE ABCNE 6CC PSIG WIThCUT RELTEF VALVE ACTUATICN CR. ASSOC!ATED ALARMS hITh LPGS TC ANNUNCIATE. WITHOUT OPERATCR ACTIChi A ' ITHCLT RELIEVING CAPAEILITY. FIGE FRESSURE COLLD EXIST IN ADDITICN, SYSTEM FRESSUPE COULD EE INCREASED CURING FEAT-LP h!TMCUT THE hARNING ALARP TC SHIFT FROM LPRS TO FPRS. FEPCVAL OF THIS MALFUN-ITICN WCLLD ALLCh N0; PAL LOGIC OPERATION. l l l l

PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. FALFUNCTION T!TLE/ RANG!/CALSE & EFFECTS RF10 DELTA-TEFFERATURE INSTRUPENT(S) FAILS TYPE: C24 - GENERIC YF:XMFTO (79C - 513) CAUS!:ERICGS FAILURE FLT STA:100% Poh!R THIS FALFUhCTICN WILL CAUSE TFE INCICATED CELTA-T E F F E C T S : R P 1 C.\\ 1 A CHAN "A" CN THE di LOCP TC FAIL HIGH. THIS HIGH SIGNAL WILL CALSE A PRE-T:!P ALARF AND A TRIP STATUS ON FOR THE THERMO-MARGIN /LC4 FRESSURE TRIP. IF A SECCND CHAhNEL IS !N TESTi A TRIP KILL RESULT CUE TO THE 2 0F 4 LO3IC E!!NG VADE UP. IF NO CTHEC CCNDITION EXISTS, THEEE h!LL EE NC FURTHER EV! HTS. REF0 VAL OF THIS MALFUNCTICN WILL RESTCRE THE DELTA-TEMPERATLRE TO ACRF.AL. THIS 'ALFUhCTICN h!LL CAUSE THE INCICATED DELTA-T RP1CA2A CHAN "A" Ch THE *1 LOOP TC FAIL LCh. CTHER THAN THE METER FAILING L0we NO FURTbER EVEhTS HILL SE SEEN AS THE RPS WILL SELECT TFE AUCTIChEERED HIGH DELTA-T FOR PRCTECTIOh. REFCVAL OF THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL RETURh THE METER TC ITS NCRFAL SETTING. RP1CA13 SAFE EXCEPT CHAh 3 HI RP1CA23 SAME EXCEPT CHAh S LO RP1CA1C SAFE EXCEPT CHAh C HI RP1CA2C SAFE EXCE*T CHAh C L3 RP1CA10 SAME EXCEPT CHAN D HI RP1CA20 SAVE EXCEPT CHAN 3 LO RP1CS1A LOCP 2 CHAN A HI RP1CB2A LOCP 2 CHAN A LC RP1CE18 LOCP 2 CHAN 3 HI RP1CS2B LOOP 2 CHAN S LC AP1Ce1C LOCP 2 CHAN C NI l-RP1CE2C LOCP 2 CHAN C LC RP1CB10 LOCP 2 CHAN O HI l RP1CG20 LOOP 2 CHAN O LC kP1CC1A LOOP 3 CHAN A HI RP1CC2A LOCP 3 CHA.h A LC RP1CC19 LOOP 1 GHAN 3 HI RP1CC26 LOO' 3 CHAN 3 LC RP1CC1C L7CP 3 CHAN C HI RP1CC2C L /CP 3 CHAN C LC RP1CC1D L33P 3 CHAN D HI RP1CC2D L iC P 3 CWAN O LC L

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION ;AUSE ANC EFFECTS vALF NO. M A L F 'J N C T I O N TITLE /SANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS RF11 HOT LEG TEMPERATURE TRIP CH ANNEL ($) FAIL TYPE:C25 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = 515 CE3 F; 1CC% = 665 DEG F YF)$VRTY (77 - 33) CAUSE:RTD FAILED PLT STA: 100% F06ER THIS MALFUNCTICA WILL CAUSE THE HCT LEG INDICATION EFFECTS:FP11A1 FOR 112FA TC FAIL AS DETERFINEC SY THE INSTRUCTCR. F AILING TC'a A RD T HE HIGH ENC h0LLD IhCREASE THE AMCLNT CF DELTA-T SEEN EY ikE THERFC-PARGIN/LC ORESSURE TRID SETDCINT. AFPROF9IATE ALARMS WILL INCICATE THE CChDITICN. FAILURE TC THE LOW END WOULD 35 AN INDICATION PROELEF CNLY. REV0 VAL OF TH!S MALFUNCTIch WOLLO RESTCAE THE NORFAL INDICATICN. RP11A2 - SAFE AS RXC6 A1 EXCEPT FCR 112HE RP11A3 - 112HC 112HC AP11A4 122HA RP1131 122HE RP1132 - RP1133 - 122HC 122HC RP11E4 132HA RP11C1 - PP11C2 - 132HE l RP11C3 - 132HC l 132HC AP11C4

~ l PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTICh CAUSE Ah0 EFFECT! MALF A0. VALFUNC1ICN TITLE /EANGE/CALS! 8 EFFECTS RF12 COLO LEG TEPPERATURE Ta!F CHANNEL (S) FAIL TYPE:C23 - GiNERICJ VARIAELE: 0% = 465 O!G FJ 10C% = (15 DEG F YFXSV2TY (39 - 1CC) CAUSE:FTD FAILED PLT STA: 1003 F0kER THIS MALFUNCTICA WILL C USE. THE COLC LEG EFFECTS:FP12A1 TE*pERATURE INDICATION FOR TI112A.TC FAIL AS DETERMIAE0 EY THE INSTRUCTCR. T-CCLD FAILING 70kARD THE FIGH ENO WCULO CAUSE

1. LOW DELTA-T AND w0VLD REFLECT THIS CN TFE PROPER INSTRUMENTS.

IN ADDIT!0N, TAVE FCR THIS CHAhhEL kOULO APPROACH T-kCT AND E\\ENTLALLY PASS IT. TOTAL-FAILURE HIGN WOLLO RESULT IN A TAVE READING OF A300T 607 DEG F, APPRCPRIATE ALARFS h!LL EE AhNUNCIATED.. AS T-CCLD IS FAILED LOW, TFE DELTA-T IS INCFEASED TO A MAXIMUF PCINT OF ABOUT 135 DEG F. THIS DELTA-T WOULO 3E SEEN EY TFE TFERFC-MARGIN / LOW PRESSURE TRIP SETPCINT. AFPROPRIATE ALARMS WOULO INDICATE THE PR03LEM. REMCVAL OF THE FALFUNCTION kCULD RETURA THE INSTRUFENT TO ITS NCRMAL READING. FP12A2 - SAFE AS RXCEA1 EXCEPT FCR 1129 112C ppj;43 1120 FP12A4 122A ppj;gj 1229 FP1252 - RP1283 - 122C 1220 FP1234 FP12C1 - 132A RD12C2 - 1328 RP12C3 - 132C 1320 RP12C4 t

7 PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE i EFFECTS RF13 PRES $URIZER P RES 3UR E TRIP CH ANNEL($) FAILUR t TYPE:C31 - GENERIC YPXSVRTY (603 - 610) CAUSE:TRAhSNITTER FAILLRE P 'A: 1002 P0kER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE PT1C2A TO FAIL FIGH. EFFECIS: RP13A1 MIGH PRE-T91P ALARF AND WIGH PRESSUCE ALARM WILL ANALNCIATE AND THE APPRCDRIATE TRIP MATRIX KILL BE FADE UP FOR A HIGH SRESSURE RE ACTOR TRIP IN THIE CHANNEL. THIS CONDITICN h!LL RESULT IN A 10F 3 REMAINING CHANNELS TC CALSE A TRIP. RENCVAL OF THIS PALFUNCTIch WILL RESTORE THE TRANSVITTER TO NORMAL. FP13A2 - THIS MALFUNCTICh WILL CAUSE PT1C2A TO FAIL LOW. LO PRiSSURE ALARM WILL ANNLhCIATE AhD ThE TRIP P. A I P I X FOR THERFAL-FARGIN/LCW FRESSURE HILL BE MADE UP FOR THIS CHANNEL. THIS C0ADITICN WILL RESULT IN A 1 0F 3 REMAINING CFANNELS TC CAUSE A TRIP. SAFE AS RP13 A1 EXCEPT FT1025 RP1351 EP1392 - RP13A2 PT1025 RP13A1 P T102 C RP13C1 RP13C2 - RP13A2 PT102C RP13 A1 PT1020 EP1301 RP1302 - RD13A2 PT1020

4 1 6 FAfNE YAhKEE FALFUNCT20h CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS OP14 ECCS 86 DEVICE FaILLRE TYPE: YF:XMFT3 (696 - 697, 386 - 895) CALSE: 56 CEVICE FAILS TO TRIP PLT STA: AT F0hER THIS VALFUNCTION WILL DREVENT S6-CIS-A1 FROM TRIPPING. ^ EFFECTS:RP14A 86-CIS-A1 DEkICE WILL ACT TFIP kFEN TRAIh "A" SIAS CR CIS SIGNAL IS GENERATED. IF 86-CIS-A2 IS ALLOWED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY, THE ASSOCIATED GREEN ECCS STATUS LIGFT WILL EEGIN TC FLASH. AUTCFATIC PCSITIONING OF VALVES AND STARTS OF PUMDS ASSOCIATED WITH 86-CIS-A1 WILL NOT FUNCTION. TO ACC0FPLISH PACPER ECCS A L I G'lF E N T i FANUAL PCSITIONING CF VALVES ANC PUVFS, ASSOCIATED WITH $6-CIS-Air WILL E! REQUIRED. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN WILL ALLCh THE oj DEVICE TO FUNCTION. TFE 66 DEVICE WILL TRIP IF "A" SIAS 09 CIS SIGNAL IS PRESENT. SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 56-CIS-A2 RP145 RP14C - SIMILAR TO RP14A EXCEPT FOR 66-CIS-83 SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 86-CIS-54 RP140 SIMILAR TO RP14A EXCEPT FOR 86-RAS-A1 l RP14E 1 SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 86-RAS-A2 GP14F l l RD14G SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 36-RAS-21 SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 86-RAS-E2 FP14F SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 56-SIAS-A1 RP14J SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR 86-SIAS-A2 RP14K RD14L - SIMILAR TO RF14A EXCEPT FOR S6-SIAS-E1 SIMILAR TO RP14A EXCEPT FOR 86-SIAS-E2 RP14F

PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RX01 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTRCLLER PIC1C1 FAILS TYPE:C20 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = PINIMLF OUTPUT; 1CC% = FULL OUTPUT 1FXSVRTY (109 - 110) CAUSE: CONTROLLER PIC 1C1X(Y) ERRATIC CUTDLT FLT STA:AT FCkER EFFECTS:RX01A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SIGhAL FROM CCNTRCLLER DIC 1C1X TO FAIL TO A VARIABLE AFCUNT AS SELECTED SY ThE INSTRUCTCR. FAILING FIGH WILL CAUSE 9AC(-LF' HEATERS TC SHLT OFF IF ON, A HIGH PRESSURE ALAFM TC CCME IN, AND AN ERROR SIGNAL TC S!C1C1Xi PRCVIDING TFAT PIC101 IS THE SELECTED CHANNEL. SPFAY VALVES kOULC START CPENING AND PROPCRTICNAL HEATERS WOULO SHUT CFF. IF FAILURE kAS LOW, ALL HEATERS WOULO CCME CN AND RAISE PRESSURE REGAROLESS CF ACTUAL SYSTEP PRESSURE. IF PR-V-16 AhD 17 WERE SHUTE THEY WCULO RECEIVE A0 SIGNAL TC OPEN, h0R kOULO SFRAY VALVES CFEN. EVENTUAL DRES$URE RELIEF WOLLO EE VIA THE SAFETIES IF NC ACTION WERE TAKEN. REMCVAL CF TFE PALFUNCTICN kCULC RESTORE THE CONTROLLER TC N00 MAL OPERATICN. SAME AS RXO1A EXCEPT FCR CONTRCLLER FIC1C1Y. RXO1E

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS .MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS RX02 FRESSURIZER SPRAY CCNTRCL FAILURE ~ TYPE:C21 - VARIA3LE: 0% v!hIMUM CUTPUTJ 1CC% = FULL OUTPUT YPXSVRTY (111) CAUSE: SPRAY CCATRCLLER HIC 101-1-ERRATIC CLTPLT PLT STA:AT F C 'n E R EFFECTS:RXO2A - THI3 VALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER TC FAIL IN A PRESET CCN01 TION DETERMIhED EY THE IhSTRLCTOA RECAROLESS CF ACTUAL PRESSURE. FULL CUTDLT WILL CFEN SPRAY VALVES. MINIMUM CUTPUT WILL NOT ALLOW SFRAY VALVES TC OPEN. DEPENDING CA CCNDITION DESIRE 0i PRESCURE WOULO EITHER RISE TC TFE RELIEF POINT OR FALL TO TFE TRIP POINT AND ENENTUAL SIASr kITHOUT CPERATOR ACT!CN. MAhUAL CONTROL OF THE SPRAY VALVE CONTROLLER WILL NOT BE AFFECTED. AE"", VAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION hCULO RESTORE NORMAL CPERATIch 0F THE CONTRCLLIP, l l l I l

E PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS MALF h0. F. A L F U N C T I O N TITLE / RANGE /CALSE % EFFECTS RXO3 PRESSURIZER FRESSURE CONTROLLER PC1C1 FAILS TYPE: C22 - GEhERIC YF:XMFTs (614 - 615) CALSE:CONTRCLLER PC101X(Y) FAILS INTERNALLY PLT STA:AT PCWER THIS FALFUNCTICN 'a0LLD CAUSE THE LCSS OF OUTPUT EFFECTS:5XO3A F R Ol' C O N T 2.0 L L E R FC101X. LOSS OF OUTPUT kOULO CAUSE THE PRCDCRTIONAL HEATECS TC SHLT CFFr THE SPRAY VALVES WOULO BE INCPE:ATIVE, AND PRESSURE WOULO START FALLING. THE 9AC(-LP HiATER CIRCUIT WCULO NCT BE AFFECTED. THIS W C U. 0 AFFECT BOTH THE AUTC AND M Ahl AL CIRCUITRY. REMOVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION h0VLD RESTORE THE CONTROLLER TC NORMAL OPERATICN. SAME AS RXO3A EXCEPT FCR CChTRCLLER FC1C1Y. RX038

(. NAINE YANKEE VALFUNCTION CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS RXO4 PRESSURIZER LEVEL CCNTRCL FAILURE TYPE:C23 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = -5% ERROR; 100% = 5% ERROR 1C2) YP)SVRTY (101 CAUSE:CONTRCLLER LIC101X(Y) ERRATIC CUTPUT PLT STA:AT P C 'a E R l 1 THIS MALFUNCTION WCULO CAUSE THE OUTPUT CF LIC101X E F F E C T S :.* X O 4 A f TO FAIL IN A PRESET CONDITICh DETERFINED BY THE INSTRUCTCR. THE SIGNAL CUT CF 1HE CCNTRCLLER j n0VLD CAL 3E THE LETOCWN AND CHARGING VALVES TO TRY l AND POSITION THEPSELVES TO A AOSITICh TC SATISFY THE APPARENT LEVEL CF THE PRESSLRIZER AS SIGNALEC. L CEPiSDING ON SIGNAL GENERATE 0, PRESSLRIZER LEVEL l WOULO EITHER RISE OR FALL. ALL ASSOCIATED ALARMS h0VLC ANhuhCIATE AS SETPCINTS WERE REACHED. SWITCHING THE CONTRCLLER TO PANLAL hCULD HAVE NO AFFECT CN THE CCNTQCLLER. REMOVAL CF THIS MALFUNCTION kCULD RESTORE PRCDER CPERATICN OF THE CONTRCLLEP. SAME AS RXC4A EXCEPT FOR C0hTROLLER LIC1C1Y. RXO4E l 1

E FAINE YANKEE P A L F L N C T I Cli CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS MALF NO. YALFUNCT!CN TITLE /9ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS RXOS BOT LEG TEF.FERATLRE REGULATING CHANNEL (!) FAILURE TYPE: C27 - GEAERIC; VARIAELE: C% = 515 CEG F; 1CC% = 665 DEG F YFXSVRTY (112 - 114) CAUSE:FAILEC RTD PLT STA: 100% F0hER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE FCT LEG TEMPERATURE EFFECTS:RX0!A TO FAIL TO A PRECETERMINEO NALUE SET IN EY THE INSTRUCTCR. WITH A HIGH FAILURE APPROPRIATE INSTRUVENT ATION KILL DEAD HIGH. IF THE SEVERITY IS 100%e DIVIATICN ALARM TREF /TAVE HILL ANNUNCIATE. IF THE 81 LCCP IS SELECTED FCR RECORCING ON THE TAVE/ TREF RECORDERr TAVE WILL READ HIGHER THAN TREF. A SIMILAR RESPONSE WILL EE ENCOUNTERED kHEN FAILING THE INSTRUMENT LCW. REMOVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION KILL RESTORE THE INSTRUMEhT TC NORMAL. SAME AS RXO7A EXCEPT FOR TI121X RX058 RX05C - SAME AS 4XO7A EXCEPT FOR TI131X l i

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCT20N CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF. h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS RXO6 COLO LEG REGLLATING CHANhEL(5) FAIL TYPE: C29 - GENERIC;-VARIAELE: 0% = 465 CEG F; 1CC% = 615 DEG YFXSVRTY (115 - 117) CAUSE:FAILEC RTO FLT STA: 100% F0kER EFFECTS:RXO6A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE COLD LEG TEFPERATURE INDICATICN Oh TI111Y TO FAIL AS DETERMINED BY THE INSTRUCTCR. FAILING THE INSTRUFENT TOWARD THE HIGH END WILL RESULT IN INDICATED TAVE RISING. IF THIS CHAhhEL IS SELECTED CN THE TAVE PECORDERi IT WILL REFLECT THIS. A TAVE/TCEF DIVIATION ALARF WILL ALSO ANNUNCIATE. FAILING IT TOWARD THE LOW END k!LL RESULT IN TAVE OROPPING ANC SIMILAR ALARMS AhD INDICATICNS WILL EE EVIDENT, REMCVAL CF TFIS FALFLNCTION KILL RESLLT IN THE RESTORATION CF THE INSTRUMEhT TC ITS NORFAL RANGE. SAME AS RXO6A EXCEPT T I121 Y RXO68 RXO6C - SAME AS EXC6A EXCEPT T I131 Y

FAINE. YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 8 EFFECTS ..............n.---..........------............................. RXO7 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL CHANNEL FAILURE TYPE: C32 - GENERIC / VARIABLE: 0% = 2C50 FSIG1 1CC2 = 2450 PSIG YFXSVRTY (118 - 119) CAUSE:TRAhSFITTER FAILLRE FLT STA:100% P0hER THIS VALFUNCTION WILL ALLOW A VAFIABLE FAILURE OF EFFECTS:FXO7A PT101X. AS THE CHANNEL FAILS LChe IF IT IS THE SELECTED CONTROL CHANNEL, LCh PEESSUFE ALARFS WILL ANNLNCIATE AhD THE PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM WILL ACT AS THOUGH THE PRESSURE hAS LCW. THE PRCPORTIONAL PEATERS HILL 3E FULL CN AND THE EACK-UP FEATERS WILL CCFE CN AT THEIR SETPOIhT. PRESSURE WILL START TO RISE ON THE OThER INJTRUMENTS. WITHOUT ACTICNi THE FRESSURE WILL CCNTINUE TC RISE, AS THi SPRAY VALVES WILL NCT OFiNe LNTIL A REACTOR TRIP IS INITIATED CN HIGh DFESSLRE. FAILING THE TRANSMITTER TOWARD THE HIGH ENO WILL RESULT IA THE PRCPORTIOhAL FEATERS SECURING AND THE SPRAY VALVES OPENING. THE SPRAY WILL CAUSE PRESSURE TO FALLe SUT DUE TO THE FAILURE CF PT101), THE HEATERS WILL NOT ENERSI!E. IF CPERATOR ACTION IS NOT TAKENr I AN EVENTUAL LOW FRESSURE TRIP WILL CCCURi FOLLOWE0 BY l SAFETY IbJECTION AT ITS SETFCINT. TAKING MANUAL CONTRCL CF THE SPRAY VALVES KILL ALLCW THEM TO BE CLOSED. SWITCHING TO CHANNEL "Y" WILL RE-ENAELE AUTC CONTROL. REMCVAL CF THIS FALFUNCTION h1LL RESTORE PROPER CPERATIch 0F THE TRANSFITTEP. SAME AS RXO7A EXCEPT PT1C1Y. FXO7E i l l l

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF h0.

• ALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS RXO8 1ST STAGE TLRSINE PRESSURE INSTRUMENT FAILUPE TYPE:C33 - GENERIC; VARIAELE:

C% = 532 CEG F; 1CC% = 574 DEG YFXSVRTY (120 - 121) CAUSE: ERRATIC SIGNAL FROM TRANSMITTER FLT STA:50% PCWER T H IS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE AN ERRATIC VARIASLE EFFECTS:RX05A SIGNAL TC 35 GENERATED FROM THE 1ST STAGE PRESSURE' TRANSMITTER FT5C4. THIS WILL RESULT IN AN INCORRECT TREF INDICATION CN RECCRDER TR111. THE HI/LC TAVE/ TREF ALARM KILL ANNUNCIATE ANor DEFENDING Ch FAILURE, EITbER THE HI CR LCk TREF ALARF WILL ANNUNCIATE. REMCVAL CF TFIS PALFLNCTION KILL RETLRN THE TRANSMITER TC NORMAL CPERATICN. SAME AS RXOSA EXCEPT PTSC5 KILL BE AFFECTED. FX085 l l l 1 l l l e

s = 0 FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE / CAL $5 & EFFECTS RX39 TAVE INSTRUPENT FAILURE TYPE:C34 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = 515 CEG F; 1CC% = 615 DEG YFXSVRTY (122 - 123) CAUSE:TAVE SUFFER FAILLRE PLT STA: 50% PCWER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE TAVE SIGNAL TO EFFECTS:AXO9A FAIL AS CIRECTED EY THE INSTRUCTCR. TR-111, TAVE RECORDER WOULD INDICATE THE TEMPERATURE FAILED. TAVE/ TREF DIV I AT ICN ALARP WCLLD ANNLACIATE AS ITC SETPCINT WAS REACHED AND A FIGH CR LCW TAVE ALARF HILL ANhtNCIATE. IF TAVE IS FAILED TOWARD THE HIGH SIDER A SIGNAL WILL 25 GENERATEC TO THE STEAF DUFP SYSTEM. AMCLNT CF SIGNAL WCULD DEPEND Ch THE SEVERITY OF THE FALFUNCTION. IF THE SEVERITY WAS AT ITS.vAXIFLM MIGH AND A TLRBIh! TRIP CCCURED AT TFAT TIMEi THE STEAF CUMFS WCLLD ALL CPEN FULLY AND STAY THERE UNTIL OPERATCR ACTION WAS TAKEN. KITH NO ACTICNr THE PLANT WCULD LNDERGO A RAPID CCCLDOWN AND SAFETY INJECTICN ACTUATION AT 1535 PSI. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION kCULD RESTORE TAVE TO ITS PROPER READING. SAME AS RXO9A EXCEST TR-121 WCULC SE THE FXO99 AFFECTED RECCRDER.

PAINE YANKE! FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS FALF h0. YALFUNCTION TITLE / A ANG!/ C ALSE & EFFECTS RX10 STEAP GENERATOR LEVEL CCNTR3L FAILURE TYPE:C54 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = NC CLTDU1; 1CC% = FULL OUTPUT 126) YPXSVRTY (124 CAUSE:SETFCINT GENERATCR FAILED PLT STA: AT PChER EFFECTS:RX1CA - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE THE SIGNAL FROM THE STEAF GENERATOR LEVEL SETPOINT CENERATOR TO FAIL VARIABLY FRCM PINIMUM CUTPLT TC MAXIMUM CUTPUT WITH NO REGARD TC THE ACTUAL STE1P GENERATCR LEV EL IN STEAF GEhERATCR E-1-1 THE FEED REGULATCR VALVEr Fh-r-iC7, KILL RESPONO TO THi CONTROLLER'S ERPATIC CUTPUT AhD WILL CPEh OR CLOSE AFFECTING FEECWATER FLCW TC The GENERATOR. LEVELS AND PRESSURES WOULO CHANGE IN THE AFFECTED STEAF GENERATCRi AS KELL AS PRIMARY INDICATICNS IN THAT RC SYSTEP LCCP. THIS MALFUNCTION WILL NCT AFFECT MANUAL CONTROL CF THE FEED REGULATCR VALVE!. SHRIhK AND SWELL WILL BE EVIDENT WITH VARYING FEEC. REMCVAL CF THIS PALFUNCTION KILL RESTORE AUTC CPERATION OF THE LEVEL GENERATOR ALLCWIhG RECCVERY OF h0RMAL CPERATIOh. SAME AS RX10A EXCEST FOR STEAM GENERATOR E-1-2. FX1CS SAME AS RX10A EXCEPT FOR STEAM GENERATOR E 3. RX1CC

r s Q l FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF A0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Rx11 STEAP DLMP/ TURBINE SYPASS SYSTEF FAILURE l = FULL OUTPUT TY.aE:C55 - VARIA9LE: 0% = NO CUTPUT; 1CC% Y?XSVRTY (127) CALSE STEAP OLFP CCNTRCLLEF FAILURE PLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIch WILL CAUSE THE AVE /TAVE CCATRCLLER TO FAIL IN A PRE-DETERMINED FASbION. IF PLANT IS AT POWER WITH NC T9IP SIGNAli ALARPS WILL ALERT THE OPERATOR TO Thi CCNDITION. IF FAILED DURING A TGIP CCNDITIONs CONTRCLLER WILL NOT CPERATE AS PER NCRMAli EUT WILL GO TO PRE-SET CCNDITION. OLMP VALVES hCULC OPEFATE AS RE2 LIRE 0, 3UT WCULO FAIL TO SEGUENTIALLY OPEN OR CLOSE. THEY kOLLO REMAIN AT THE SETPOINT TFE CCNTRCLLER WAS CALLING FOR. MAAUAL OPERATICN WCULC NOT BE AFFECTE0. IF CPERATOR ACTICN NERE NOT TAKEhr A CCClockh 0F THE FEACTCR WOULD TAKE PLACE AND WOULO CCNTINUE LNTIL PRCPER ACTION kERE TAKEN. ALL INSTRUMENTATION AND ALARFS kOULD FLhCTICN AS NECESSARY % HEN RECLIRED. REY 0 VAL OF THIS MALFUNCTION WOLLO ALLOW NORPAL AUTC CPERATICN CF THE SYSTEM. l l l l l l l ~

e l FAINE YAhKEE NALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS NALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS j Rx12 F EED REGULATING VALVE FAILURE GENERIC; VARIAELE: C% = NC STF FLCW; 100% = > 4X1C(6) L9/HR I TYPE:114 YPXSVRTY (126 - 130) CAUSE:STM FLOh COMPUTER FY-1011X(Y) FAILS FLT STA: AT FChER THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A VAOIASLE FAILURE Ih THE EFFECTS:RX12A STEAP FLCW CCMPUTER FOR THE E-1-1 STEAM GENERATOR FEED REGULATING SYSTEF. IF THE FAILLRE IS TChARDS THE 0% POSITIch, FEE 0 WATER FLCh TO THE STEAP GENERATOR KILL OROP INITIALLYi STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL OROP AND PRESSURE IN THE STEAF GENERATOR WILL DECREASE. IF ALLChED TO GC UNCHECKE0e FEECWATER FLOW KILL INCREASE EACK TO ITS CRIGINAL VALUE CLE TC THE STEAM GENERATCR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM EEING LEVEL DCMINANT. IF THE FAILURE IS TCWARD THE 1CC% FOSITION, STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL WILL RISE, PDESSURE WILL RISEe FLCh WILL RISE, AND RC TEMPERATURE WILL OROP SLIGHTYLY 00E TO THE EXCESSIVE CCCLING CAUSED BY THE A00ITIch AL W ATER. FEE 0 HATER FLCW WILL EVENTUALLY CECREASE EACK TO ITS CRIGINAL VALLE, CUE TO THE STEAP GENERATCR WATER ' LEVEL CONTRCL SYSTEF 9EING LEVEL 00FINAhT. IN SCTH CASESr THE MANUAL CCNTRCL CF THE FEE 0 WATER AEGULATING VALVE KILL SE UNAFFECTED, ALLCkING M AhU AL CONTROL CF TF E V ALVE. REMCVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN HILL ALLCh NCRMAL OPERATICN. SAME AS RX12A EXCEPT STEAM GENERATOR E-1-2. RX128 E-1-3. FX12C -

PAINE YANKEE 'ALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS 4 MALF ho. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 1 EFFECTS SG01 STEAP GEhERATOR TUBE (S) LEAX .1 GFF; 100% = 1CCO GPM TYPE: C17 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = YFXSVRTY (131 - 133) CAUSE: RUPTURED TU3E(S) FLT STA:AT FCkER THIS MALFUNCTION h!LL SIFULATE THE RLPTURE OF EFFECTS:SG01A STEAM GEhERATOR TUEES IN THE E-1-1 GENERATOR OVER A VARIAELE RANGE OF 1CCC 39*. THIS KILL ALLCW CONDITIOh5 SCTH KITHIN AND CUT CF THE RAhGE OF THE CHARGING SYSTEM 10 HANDLE. FOR LEAKS WITHIN THE CHARGING CAPACITYi NC REACTCR TRIP WCULD OCUR, EUT ALL CTHEF PARAMTERS kOULD INCICATE TFE LCSS CF RC INVENTCRY. LETD0kN FLCW KILL DECREASE AND CHARGING FLOW WILL INCREASE. VCT LEVEL KILL DEC3IASE REDLIRING FREGUENT PAKE-UP TO PAINTAIN LEVEL. RADIATIGh ALARMS IN THE ELChDOWh SYSTEM, STEAM LINErAND AIR EJECTOR KILL INDICATE TFE LEAKAGE OF RC TO THE SECONDARY SYSTEM. LEAKS GREATER THAh CHARGING PUMP CAPACITY WILL RESULT IN AN EVENTUAL FEACTOR TRIP ON LOh PRESSURE. RCS PRESSURE KILL DROPr FRESSURIZER LEVEL WILL FALL AND A RISING LENEL Ih TbE AFFECTED STEAF GEhERATOR kOULD SE NOTED, AS WELL AS PARAMETERS DISCLSSED IN A LEAK OF CHARGING FUMP CAPACITY. AFTER THE TRIP RCS TEMPERATURE WILL SE LOWERED BY THE STEAV DUP?/9YPASS SYSTEF. LFON REACFING THE LOW FRESSURE SEPCINT $!AS WCULD ACTLATE. IDENTIFICATION AND ISCLATIch 0F THE AFFECTED STEAM GENERATCR WOULD ALLCh THE ASSOCIATED LCCF'S ISCLATICh VALVES TO BE CLOSED AND ALLOW RCS DRESSURE AND INVENTCRY TO BE REGAINED FOR AN CRDERLY COOLDCWh. THE SIMULATOR WILL MAVE TO EE RE-INITIALIZED FOLLOWIhG THIS MALFUNCTION. SG013 - SAME AS SG01A EXCEPT AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR kOULD BE E-1-2. SAME AS SG01A EXCEST AFFECTED STEAM GENERATOR SG01C hCULC 35 E-1-3. I ( 1

PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AAD EFFECTS MALF h0. FALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE B EFFECTS SkO1 LOSS OF SERVICE WATER PUFP(S) TYPE: C96 - GENER!C YF:XMFT3 (640 - 643) CALSE: IMPELLER FAILURE PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:SWO1A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIMULATE THE LCSS CF CAPACITY CF F-29A SERVICE WATER LMA CUE TO Ah IFFELLER FAILURE. INDICATING LIGHTS WCULD INDICATE THE PUFF WAS STILL RUNNING. FLCW AND 0; ESSURE IN 1FE SYSTEP WCULD DROP AND AMPS ON F-29A WOULD DECREASE DUE TO THE LOSS OF LOAD. APPRCPQIATE ALARFS ANO INSTRLMENTATICN WCULD REFLECT THE FRCELEM AND ALEFT THE OPERATCR. THE REDUCED FLCh h0VLD ALSO RESULT IN LESS CCCLIAG OF THE PCC AND SCC AND THEIR TEP PER ATUC E S kCULC INCREASE. REMCVAL CF TFIS PALFUNCTION kCULD RESULT IN THE CAPACITY OF THE FUMP BEING ACRMAL. SAME AS S401A EXCEPT P-298. SWO15 SAME AS SWO1A EXCEPT P-29C. SWC1C SAME AS SwC1A EXCEPT P-29D. SWO10 1

L i ) FAINE YAhKEE. FALFLNCTICN CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS 1 MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS Sh02 SERVICE kATER HEADER RUPTURE TYPE: C97 - VARIAELE: 0% = 20C GPF; 100* = 2CeCCC GPP YPXSVRTY (134 - 135) CALSE:24-INCH FEADER EREAX FLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS:SWC2A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL SIMULATE A 3REAK IN THE 24" HEADER AT SW-31 MAKING THE CLCSING CF Sh-31 IMPCSSISLE. MOST SERVICE kATER FLCW WILL EE LCST THRCLGH THE EREAX ANC CCCLING WILL EE LOST TO EOTH DCC AND SCC HEAT EXCHAhGERS AND THEIR RELATED CCOLING LOACS. TEMPS WILL RISE ApoRCPRIATELY Ch ALL C0 CLING LOACS. ISC-LATICh CF THE LEAK EY CLCSING SW-32 WILL ENAELE RE-ESTABLISHFENT CF LCADS COCLED EY THE SCC CCOLERS. PCC WILL BE OUT OF SERVICE.- APPACFRIATE INSTRUMENTATICN AND ALAFFS HILL FONITOR AND REFLECT THE CCNCITICN. SAME AS SWC2A EXCEPT AT VALVE Sk-30s ISCLATION WILL AFFECT SWO2E THE SCC SYSTEM. l l l

FAINE YAAKEE FALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF AO. VALFUNCTION TITLE /AANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS Sh03 LOSS OF RAW HATER TYPE:C98 - GENERIC YG: XMFTB (646 - 647) 42 RELAY FAILURE CAUSE: PUMP TRIPS PLT STA:AT PChER THIS PALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE :-6CA rah WATER PUMP EFFECTS:SWO3A TO TRIP. THE RESULTING LOW PRESSURE WILL CAUSE THE STANCSY FUMP, P-603r TO START AT 6C FSIG. ASSOCIATED ALAR'S AND INSTRLFENTATION WILL ALERT THE CDERATOR TO THE EVENT. REMCVAL CF Tb! MALFUNCTION KILL ENASLE TFE PUMP TO EE RESTAR1EO. SAME AS SWC3A EXCEPT o-608. SWO39 h0TE: INITIATING SCTH SWO3A AND 9 KILL CAUSE A COMPLETE LOSS OF RAW WATER. A WATER TREATMENT PLANT ALARF HILL CCPE IN DUE TO THE LOW FEACER PRESSLRE. IN ADDITION TO SUPPLYING WATER TO HATER TREATMENTi TFS RAW WATER PUXP SUPPLIES LU9CICATING HATER TO THE CIRCULATION PUM?S AND SERVICE WATER PUMPS, SEAL HATER FOR VACULM PRIMIAG PUMPSi AhD ALTERNATE COOLING TO S E R ', : C E AIR C O M.P R E S S C R S. LCSS CF 9CTH PUMPS WILL RESULT IN ThE LOSS CF THE PLANT UNLESS AN ALTERNATE SUPPLY OF WATE9 IS CONNECTED TO THE SYSTEM. SERVICE WATER PUMDS B AND C CAN SUPPLY THEIR ChN HATER FROF THEIR OISCHARGE.

PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTICh CAUSE Ahc EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE B EFFECTS Sh04 TRAVELING SCREEN HIGh DELTA PRESSURE G!hERIC TYPE:C94 YF:XMFT3 (645 - 651) CAUSE: TRASH Oh SCREEN. SHEAR FIN 9ROKEN PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:SWO4A - THIS MALFUNCTION WILL CAUSE A PIN TO SHEAR ON THE SR1A TRAVELING SCFEEN WITH A RESULTANT TRASH EUILD UP CN THE SCREEh OVER A 30 FIN. PERIOD. IhDICATION ON THE CONTROL 20 ARC WILL INDICATE THE SCREEN IS RUANING. THE TRASk 3UILD UP WILL RESULT IN A FIGH DIFFERENTIAL ALARPr ALERTING THE CPERATOF. EVENTUALLY THE LEVEL IN THE SLCTICN EAY FOR P-26A WILL DRCPr PESULTING IN LOSS OF SUCTION TO THE PUMD. APPROPRIATE ALARMS AND INSTRUMENTS KILL RECCRD THE EVEhT. POWEP WILL HAVE TO EE REDUCED AND THE CIRCULATING PLMP SECURED. FEMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN h* ENABL E hCRMAL SCREEN CPERATION. SR19 SWO45 SWO4C - SR1C SR1D SWO4D

PAINE YANXEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS SWOS LOSS OF SCREEN kASH PUMP TYPE:C95 - GEAERIC YF:XMFTB (652 - 653) CALSE:EREA<ER TRIP PS1'13A(3) FAILURE PLT STA:AT PCWER THIS MALFUNCTICN WILL CAUSE THE C-63A SCREEN EFFECTS:SWOSA WASH PUFP TC TRIP OUE TC A LCW SUCTICN PRESSURE SWITCH P S1613 A FAILURE. THERE ARE hC ALARMS ASSCCIATED WITH THE TRIP. THE CNLY INDICATION CF THE TRIP KILL SE THE AM95R LIGHT CN ThE CCNTROL SWITCH. AEMCVAL CF TFIS FALFUNCTION KILL ENAELE RESTART CF THE PCMP. SWOSS P-539 I

PAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTION CAUSE AND EFFECTS FALF NO. VALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE E EFFECTS SWO6 LOSS OF FIRE WATER HEADER PRESSURE TYPE:153 - YC: X*.FTa (654) CALSE:FOST INCICATCR VALVE FS-45 EREAKS OFF FLT STA:AT PChER EFFECTS: FIRE WATER HEADIE PRESSURE KILL OROP OFF. AT 90 PSIG THE ELECTFIC FI;E PUF8 h1LL START. AT SC PSIG TFE DIESEL FIFE PLMP KILL START. THE COM3INED OUT2VT OF THE PUMPS WILL NCT SE AELE TC KEEP LP WITH THE LEAK. ISOLATICN CF THE A9EA AFFECTED WILL ALLCh LOOP FRESSURE TC 9E FEGAINED IN THE LNAFFECTED SCRTION OF THE LOOF. ASSOCIATES ALARMS AND !NDICATIONS WILL MChITOR THE EVENT AND ALERT THE OPEDATCR. REMOVAL CF TFE VALFUACTICN 1ILL RESTCRE THE HEADER TC h0RFAL CPERATION OF THE FIRE WATER SYSTEM. l i l

FAINE'YAAKEE FALFLNCT?CN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /AaNGE/CALSE B EFFECTS SWO7 SERVICE WATER PUPP CISCHARGE RUPTURE TYPE: YF:XMCT3 (33C - 533) CAUSE: PLPP CISCHARGE LINE 3REA<S PLT STA: AT F0hER THIS MALFUNCTICN WILL SIPULATE A 10,000 GPP EFFECTS: SWC7A EREAK IN THE DISCWARGE HEADER UPSTREAM CF Sk - 16 CHECK VALVE. CUE TC THE 34EAK LCCATICNr THE ASSOCIATED HEADER CHECK VALVE HILL CLCSE AhD ALL CCOLING '*ATER WILL BE SUPPLIED 9Y THE INTACT FEADER. ADPRCPRIATE INSTQUMEhTATION AND ALARFS WILL FONITCR AND REFLECT THE CCAOITICN. SAME AS SWC7A EXCEPT ON THE "3" FEADER SWO73 17 (HECK VALVE. LPSTREAN CF S a' l^ l-

FAINE YANKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS YALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE E EFFECTS TC07 LOSS OF Eb PUMP (S) TYPE:135 - GENERIC YP:XMFT9 (673 - 679) CAUSE:EREAKER TRIP DUE TO 49 DEVICE FAILING CFEN PLT STA:AT FCkER EH PLMP F-55A TRIPS. PRESSLRE IN EH SYSTEM WILL START EFFECTS:TC07A TO FALL. AT 135C PSIGr THE P-559 WILL ALTO START AND PICK UD FRESSURE. IN THE EkENT THAT 90Tb PUFPS ARE LOST THE PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TC FALL. STCP AND GOVERNCR NALVES WILL START DRIFTING SFLT ALONG WITH THE REHEAT AND INTERCEPTOR VALVES. AS V ALVES shute SECONDARY PCWER KILL DECREASE. STEAP DLFP KILL TRY TO FAINTAIN PRIMARY AND SECCNDARY PohER EALANCE. A FAST RAFF DOWN OF PRIMARY 70WER TO MATCH SECCNDARY PohER PAY SAVE A REACTOR TRIP. IF UhABLE TC FOLLOWs REACTOR WILL TRIP Ch HIGH PRESSURE. ALL ALARMS AND IhSTRUMENTATICN HILL FOLLCW THE EVENT. PEMCVAL CF TFE MALFLhCTICN KILL ALLCh RESTART OF THE PUMP. TCO?e - SAME AS TCC7A EXCEPT P-553. l I

FAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTICN TITLE / RANGE /CALSE 3 EFFECTS TC01 TUREINE/GENERATCR TRIP FAILURE TYPE:C52 - GEhERIC YF:XMFT3 (655 - 665) CALSE: LOGIC FAILURE RESULT!NG IN AC TRIP SIGNAL PLT STA:AT P0hER THIS PALFUNCTION WILL ALLOW THE EXCEEDING OF EFFECTS:TC01A THE CVERSPEE0 TRID SETDCINT kITFCUT A TUR3INE/ GENERATOR TRID. TRIP WILL HAVE TO SE CONE MANLALLY OR SY THE EXCEEDIhG OF SCFE CTniR TRIO SETPOINT. APPROPAIATE INSTRUPENTATION AND ALARNS 'n I L L EEFLECT THE CONDITICN. REMOVAL CF TFE SALFUNCTICN KILL ALL0k TFE TRIP SETPCIhT TO CPERATE PROPERLY. SAME AS TC01A EXCEPT L O 'n BEARING OIL PRESSURE TC015 L C 'a C0hCENSER VACULF 1C01C MANUAL TRIP BUTTONS TC010 HAND TRIP LEVER TC01E STEAM GENEFATCP HIGH LEVEL IC01F TC01G - LC$S OF LCAD LCSS OF EH CCNTROL F0WER TC01H 36P RELAY TC01I 86 SU RELAY TC01J HEATER ORAIN TAhK LEVEL HI TC01K l l l l

FAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS PALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS TCO2 TUREINE/ GENERATOR SPURIOLS TRIP TYPE: C53 - GENERIC YP:XMFT3 (315 - 325) CALSE:SPURICUS TRIP SIGNAL PLT STA:AT FCWER EFFECTS: THIS MALFUNCTIch HILL CAUSE A TLRBINE/ GENERATOR TRIP. IF REGUIRE3e A REACTOR TRIP WILL ALSC OCCUR DUE TO THE LOSS OF LOAD. ALL SY ST EF 3 'a ILL CP ER AT E AS REQUIRED FOR A TURBINE /3EhERATOR TR!Pr UNLESS ANCTHER MALFUNCTION HAS SEEh INSERTEC TC DISA3LE SCPE I\\TERFACING SYSTEY. REF0 VAL OF THIS SALFJNCTION WILL EhABLE NORFAL RECCVERY FROF THE TRIP AND SU3SECUEhT LCADING OF THE TUREIhE/ GENERATOR. NOTE: F C L L O 'a I N G IS A LIST CF TRIPS AND SETPCINTS TCO2A CVERSFEED 198C RPM TC029 LCW 3RG CIL PRESS 6 FSIG TCO2C LCW CCNDENSER VACUUM 20.5" HG TCO2D STEAN GEN HIGH LEVEL 91% TCO2E HCT #1 LEVEL 92% TCO2F LCSS CF Eh CCNTRCL oCWER 45 PSIG { TCO2G 36P TCO2H 86 9U TCO2I LCSS CF LCAD TCO2J MANLAL TRIP EUTTCNS l TCO2K HAND TRIP LEVEL l l l i l

FAINE YANKEE FALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS i TC03 TUREINE CCNTROL VALVE (S) FAILURE TYPE:125 - G ENERIC; VARIAELE: 0% = SHUT; 100% FULL CPEN = YPXSVRTY (136 - 139) CAUSE: FAULTY EF SIGNAL PLT STA: FULL F0kER CONTRCL VALVE MS-193 WILL FAIL TC A PRE-SELECTED EFFECTS:TC03A FCSITION. VALVE WILL FAIL CVER A CCPPLETE CPERATIONAL SPAN IN A PERIOD OF SELECTED TIFE. IF V ALVE IS FAILED CLOSED AT FULL PCWER, A SECCADAFY LCAD REOUCTION OF ABOUT 3C% WILL CCCUR DUE TO CPERATIch Ih IMP OUT MODE. SINCE ThIS IS A TIVE RELATEC MALFUNCTION, AMPLE TIME IS AVAILABLE FCR THE CPERATCR TC TAKE ACTICh AND FCLLOW THE-LOAD LOSS SY ADJUSTING PRIMARY CCNDITIOh5 TO MATCH SECCNOARY. KITH NC ACTICNr REACTOR F0kER WITH STAY AT FULL POWER AhD AN EVENTUAL TOIP KILL OCCUR DUE TC OVER PCWER. SINCE MS-193 IS FULL CPEA AT FULL PChER, NO EFFECT WILL SE SEEN 3Y FAILING IT CDEN. IF C0h0ITIONS WERE SUCh THAT THE VALVE WAS PARTIALLY

• PENS FAILIhG IT OPEN WCULO FESULT IA AN INCREASE IN TUFEINE SPEEDi CR PCWER, CEPENDENT UPCN THE SITUATI0h.

THIS KILL CAUSE PRIMARY TEMPERATURES TO CDCP. ASSOCIATED ALARPS AND INSTRUPEN-T ATICN WILL FONITOR THE EVEhi. SAME AS TCO3A EXCEPT MS-199 TCO3E MS-200 TCO3C MS-201. SINCE FS-2C1 IS NOT FULL TC030 CPEN AT FULL PC.ER, FLILING IT TC FLLL CPEN WILL CAUSE FRIFARY TEMPERATURES TO SL0kLY FALL AS VALVE OPENS. A REOUCTIch IN TUREINE PCWER TC MATCH FRIPARY POWER WILL EE h!CESSARY. IF NC ACTIch IS TAKEh, FAIN STEAN PRESSURE KILL SLCLLY FALL. AN EVENTLAL TRIA kOULC OCCUR CUE TO CVERPOWER DELTA TEMPERATURE SIGAAL TC CVERPOWER TRIP. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTICN KILL ALLCk NCRMAL OPERATICN CF CCNTRCL VALVES. e

PAINE YAhKEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE Ah0 EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS TC04 INTEACEFTCR VALVE CLCSURE TYPE:128 - G!hERIC YD: XMFTB (672 - 675) CAUSE: FAULTY SIGNAL TC VALVE PLT STA: FULL F0hER INTERCEPTOR VALVE MS202 FAILS SSUT. THE RESULTING LCSS EFFECTS:TC04A CF SECONDARY LCAC DUE TC VALVE'S CLCSING WILL CALSE A SUDDEN. RISE IN PRIMARY TEMPERATLRE. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE KILL RISE TC THE HIGH PRESSLRE TRIP SETFCINT AND REACTOR / TUREINE TRIP WILL OCCUP. ASSOCIATED ALARMS AND INSTRU-PENTATICh WILL MONITCR THE EVENT. REMOVAL CF THE MALFUNCTION KILL RESTCRE THE VALVE TO AORMAL. SAME AS TCC4A EXCEST MS2C3 TC048 MS2C4 TC04C MS2C5 TC04D ,.,.c.

PAINE YAhKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE Aho EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /PANGE/CALSE & EFFECTS TC35 LOSS OF TLREINE AUTC SPEED CCNTRCL TYPE:130.- GENERIC;VARIAELE: 0%=C RF.; 1CC%=2CCC RPM YFXSVRTY (142) CAUSE:AGVC C0hTROL FAILS PLT STA: ROLLING TUR3INE TO 1200 RPM. EFFECTS: CURING TLR3IhE RCLL, THE AGVC CChTRCLLER WILL FAIL RESLLTING IN AN ERRCR SIGNAL BETkEEh THE AGVC ANC ACTUAL TUREINE $ PEE 0s khEN ER00R REACHES TWE ECLIVILANT VALLE CF 60C RPF THE TLREINE WILL SHIFT TC MAAUAL ANC THE SPEED IACREASE KILL STOP. THE REFERENCE FEDER WILL DISPLAY THE ACTUAL SPEEO. CONTRCL IN FAhUAL WILL BE CPERA3LE. REMOVAL CF THE VALFUNCTICN KILL RESTCRE THE ATVC CON-TRCLLER ALL0 KING A SWITCF EAC< TC ALTC CFERATIch. I i [

FAINE YAhKEE PALFUNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE /4ANGE/CALSE 3 EFFECTS TC06 LOSS OF ALTC LCAO CChTRCL SENERIC TYPE:131 YF:XMFT3 (677) CAUSE: AGVC FAILS TC 1 C C.*4 PLT STA: STOP VALYE TEST KITH IMP IN EFFECTS: TUR3INE CONTRCL KILL SHIFT TC MAhUAL. IF AN AUTC RAPP .kAS 3E!NG USE0r TUR3 NE PGWER KILL STOP INCREASIhG OR DECREASING' AND REMAIN AT TWAT PCWER LEVEL. OPERATCR WILL HAVE TO MANUALLY FOLLCW THE LCAO SWING WITH GOVERNOR VALVE OPERATION. ASSOCIATED ALAEFS AND INSTRUMEhT ATICN WILL MONITOR THE EVEhT. REMCVAL CF THE MALFUACTICN HILL ALLCh A SHIFT BACK TC SUTCYATIC. I l l l l l

o FAINE YAhXEE PALFLNCTICN CAUSE AhD EFFECTS FALF NO. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE & EFFECTS .T C 07 '.0S 5 0F Eh PUMP (S) TYPE:13 5 - G ENE 0IC YF:XMFTS (673 - 679) CAUSE:EREAXER TRIP DUE TO 4 9 OEVICE FAILING CFEN PLT STA:AT FChER EH PLMP F-SSA TRIPS. PRESSLRE IN EH SYSTEM KILL START EFFECTS:TC07A TO FALL. AT 135C PSIG, THE P-559 WILL ALTO START AND PICX UD PRESSURE. IN THE ELENT THAT 90TF PUFPS ARE LOST THE PRESSURE WILL CONTINUE TC F STCP AND GOVERNCR VALVES MILL START ORIFTING SFL .C', WITH THE REHEAT AND INTERCEPT 0R VALVES. 45V,.ES SFUTr SECCNDARY PCWER KILL DEC4 EASE. ST3AP DLFP BILL TRY TO FAINTAIN FRIFARY AND SECCNDARY poker sALANCE. A FAST RAFF DOWN OF PRIMARY POWER TC MATCH SECCND;RY poker FAY SAVE A REACTOR TRIP. IF UNABLE TC FOLLOhr 4EACTOR WILL TRIP Ch HIGH PRESSURE. ALL ALARMS AND INSTRUMEhTATICN HILL FOLLCW THE EVENT. PEMCVAL CF TFE FALFUNCTICN KILL ALLCh RESTART OF THE FUMP. SAME AS TC07A EXCEPT P-555. TC072 l l l l

i PAINE YANKEE FALFLNCTION CAUSE AhD EFFECTS MALF h0. MALFUNCTION TITLE / RANGE /CALSE t EFFECTS TLO1 TURBINE VISRATION TYPE:129 - GENERIC; VARIAELE: 100% = 25 FILS ABCVE hCRMAL. YPXSVRTY (140 - 141) CAUSE:ROTCR IMEALANCE PLT STA:AT FChER EFFECTS:TUO1A - THE H.P. ROTCR WILL START A SL0h VIERATICN RISE CVER A 10-FINUTE DERICD DUE TC LOOSE 9 LADING. THE L.P. BEARIhG VISRATI0h3 WILL ALSO INCREASE, EUT AT A LESSER DEGREE. RECCROEAS ANC INSTRUMENTATICN WILL FCNITCR THE VISRATIch. AMOUNT OF VIERATION IS DE?Eh0ENT ON THE SEVERITY OF THE FALFLNCTION. REMOVAL CF TFE MALFUNCTICN KILL RETURN RCTOR TO NORFAL STATUS. TUO18 - SAME AS TUC1A EXCEPT FCR L. F. RCTCR #1. i 1 1

ATTACHMENT B Acronym Descriotion AFH Auxiliary Feedwater System ATP Acceptance Test Procedure ARO All Rods Out BN Boron BOC Beginning of Cycle CEA Control Element Assembly CEDM Control Element Drive Mechanism CIS Containment Isolation Signal CRDNBR Value for Reactivity in Units of % dk/k CVCS Chemical & Volume Control System DR Discrepancy Report ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDCR Engineering Design Change Request EDG Emergency Diesel Generator EFCV Excess Flow Check Valves EOC End of Cycle FDS Final Design Specifications FTC Fuel Temperature Coefficient HFP Hot Full Power HZP Hot Zero Power IBH Inverse Boron Horth IC Initial Condition ITC Isothermh1 Temperature Coefficient LD Letdown LPSI Low Pressure Safety Injection MCB Hain Control Board MR Hodification Report MSH Hain Steam Header MSLB Hain Steam Line Break MTC Moderator Temperature Coefficient l MWE Megawatts Electric-MHTH Hegawatts Thermal PAB Primary Auxiliary Building PCC Primary Component Cooling PTL Pull-to-lock RAS Recirculation Actuation Signal RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System SCC Secondary Component Cooling SI Safety Injection SIAS Safety Injection Acutation Signal TDF Terminal Debug Facility THLP Thermal Margin / Low Pressure l l YAEC Yankee Atomic Electric Company 0058L-ARS-SDE 1

ATTACHMENT B (cont'd) J Acronym Descriotion AN Annunciator CC Component Cooling CH Containment CR Core CS Containment Spray CV Chemical and Volume Control CH Circulating Water ED Electrical Distribution EG Electrical Generation FH Feedwater IA Instrument Air MI Miscellaneous MS Main Steam NI Nuclear Instrumentation PC Plant Computer RC Reactor Coolant RD Rod Drive RH Residual Heat Removal RH Radiation Monitoring RP Reactor Protective System RX Reactor Control SG Steam Generator SH Service Hater and Fire Protection TC Turbine Control TU Main Turbine YP Instructors Station & Computer Equipment 1 l l 1 0058L-ARS-SDE}}