ML20155B111
| ML20155B111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1998 |
| From: | Imbro E NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Bowling M NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20155B115 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-336-98-213, NUDOCS 9810300063 | |
| Download: ML20155B111 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000336/1998213
Text
,
.
_-
._
.
-
-
-
1
.
.
I
e
fa n:%
\\
p
UNITED STATES
l
-
s
j
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
4
WASHINGTON, D.C. 3066H001
%
October 23, 1998
.
Mr. Martin L. Bowling
Recovery Officer - Millstone Unit 2
clo Ms. Patricia A. Loftus
Director - Regulatory Affairs
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P.O. Box 128
Waterford, CT 06385
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND INDEPENDENT CORRECTIVE ACTION
VERIFICATION PROGRAM TIER 2 SPECIAL INSPECTION OF MILLSTONE
UNIT 2 (NRC INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-336/98-213)
Dear Mr. Bowling:
From August 10,1998, through September 3,1998, a team from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's (NRC's) Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, in accordance with guidelines
outlined in SECY-97-003, " Millstone Restart Review Process," performed a Tier 2 special
inspection of your Millstone Unit 2 facility. This inspection was part of an ongoing, multifaceted
NRC effort to evaluate Parsons Power Group inc.'s (Parsons) conduct of the Independent
'
Corrective Action Verification Progam (ICAVP) and the effectiveness of your Configuration
Management Plan (CMP). The results of the ICAVP will provide insights that will be used by
the NRC in assessing the effectiveness of your CMP and your readiness to restart Millstone
Unit 2.
Selected accident mitigation systems were reviewed to assess Parsons' Tier 2 review, to verify
the ability of these systems to perform their intended safety functions during postulated
accidents described in Chapter 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and to
determine whether the accident analysis assumptions were properly translated into instructions,
procedures, and drawings. The NRC determined that Parsons successfully implemented the
Tier 2 verification of critic 11 design characteristics controlling plant configuration aspects of its
NRC approved ICAVP AL.dit Plan in accordance with the applicable project procedures and
instructions.
The inspection findings were presented to you and your staff during a public exit meeting on
October 6,1998. The issue cited as a violation in the enclosed Notice of Violation, is described
in detailin the enclosed report. The number of examples identified in this violation, as well as
issues recently identified in the Tier 1 In-Scope inspection and discussed with you at the public
exit meeting held on October 6,1998 appear to be indicative of a configuration control process
weakness in the translation or reconci' ation of the accident analyses inputs and results v ith
station procedures and other supporting engineering analyses that form the bases for the
system design. Please note that you are required to respond to the Notice of Violation and
should follow the instructions specified in it when preparing your respense. We request that
your response address the team's observations regarding configuration controlindicated above
.
'
D' f D l
9810300063 981v23
I
ADOCK 05000336
bb b bEb hY
l
l
.
.
l
.
1
2
-
in addition to the specific technicalissues identified in the violation. The NRC will use your
response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure
compliance with regulatory requirements,
l
The violation described in this report has been categorized as equivalent to ICAVP Significance
'
Level 3 findings. ICAVP Level 3 findings have been defined by the NRC to occur if a system is
outside its licensing and design bases while still able to perform its intended function. In a
January 30,1998, letter to you, the Director of the Special Projects Office described the NRC's
criteria for determining whether to expand the scope of the ICAVP An important factor in
making this determination is the NRC's assessment of the effectiveness of the corrective
actions taken to address the findings. The NRC will assess the corrective actions taken in
response to these findings as part of its review of the implementation of ICAVP-related
I
corrective actions.
As noted earlier, this inspection was part of the NRC's ongoing assessment of the effectiveness
of your CMP and Parsons' ICAVP. The findings of this inspection will be combined with the
results of other NRC inspections to make an overall determination of the restart readiness of
Unit 2 and your configuration management practices. However, the results from this inspection
provide a measure of confidence that the Unit 2 accident mitigation systems are adequately
designed and tested and will perform as assumed in accident analyses as described in
Chapter 14 of the FSAR.
In accordance with Section 2.790(a) of Title 10 of the Code of Federa/ Regulations (10 CFR 2.790(a)), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document
Room.
If you have any questions concerning the enclosed inspection report, please contact the project
manager, Mr. Daniel Mcdonald, at (301) 415-1408 or Mr. Peter Koltay at (301) 415-2957.
Sincerely,
m
Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Millstone Independent Corrective Action
Verification Program Inspections
l
Associate Director for Technical Review
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-336
License No. DPR-65
Enclosures:
,
2. Inspection Report 50-336/98-213
cc w/ enclosures: See next page
___
_ _ - - _
.
,
2
.
in addition to the specific technical issues identified in the violation. The NRC will use your
response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure
,
compliance with regulatory requirements.
The vioistions described in this report have been categorized as equivalent to ICAVP
Significance Level 3 findings. ICAVP Level 3 findings have been defined by the NRC to occur if
a system is outside its licensing and design bases while still able to perform its intended
function. In a January 30,1998, letter to you, the Director of the Special Projects Office
described the NRC's criteria for determining whether to expand the scope of the ICAVP. An
important factor in making this determination is the NRC's assessment of the effectiveness of
the corrective actions taken to address the findings. The NRC will assess the corrective actions
taken in response to these findings as part of its review of the implementation of ICAVP-related
corrective actions.
As noted earlier, this inspection was part of the NRC's ongoing assessrnent of the effectiveness
of your CMP and Parsons'ICAVP. The findings of this inspection will be combined with the
results of other NRC inspections to make an overall determination of the restart readiness of
Unit 2 and your configuration me.nar,ement practices. However, the results from this inspection
provide a measure of confidence that the Unit 2 accident mitigation systems are adequately
designed and tested and will perform as assumed in accident analyses as described in
Chapter 14 of the FSAR.
In accordance with Section 2.790(a) of Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations (10 CFR 2.790(a)), a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document
Room.
If you have any questions concerning the enclosed inspection report, please contact the project
manager, Mr. Daniel Mcdonald, at (301) 415-1408 or Mr. Peter Koltay at (301) 415-2957.
Sincerely,
g stgne W
o
Eugene V. Imbro, Director
Millstone Independent Corrective Action
Verification Program inspections
Associate Director for Technical Review
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-336
License No. DPR-65
Enclosures:
2. Inspection Report 50-336/98-213
cc w/ enclosures: See next page
Distribution: See next page
DOCUMENT NAME: TIER 2.RPT
(*see previous concurrence) Review completed by Technical Editor on 10/21/98
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate in the box "C" copy w/o attach / encl "E" copy w/ attach /enci"N" no copy
_
OFFICE
ADT:lCAVP
E TechED. lN ADT:lCAVP l
C:lCAVP
D:lCAVP
NAME
RMcIntyre*
JNakoski
PKoltay
Elmb[
DATF
10D1 /4R
10/71 /QR
10/??/QR*
10/
/9R
10/
/98
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
_
_
. _ . . . - .
_ _ _-_
- _. .
__ .
__
. _ . .__ .
_ _ _ _
.
.
.
i
Letter to Mr. M. L. Bowlino dated: October
,1998
'
,
Distribution w/ enclosures:
.
FILE CENTER, NRR (with original concurrences)
PUBLIC
Region i Docket Room (with copy of concurrences)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
ICAVP R/F
DOCDESK
NRC Resident inspector, Millstone Unit 2
W. Axelson, DRS -
S. Collins
W. Lanning, RI
M. Callahan, OCA
W. Dean, NRR
E. Imbro, NRR
R. McIntyre, NRR
P. Narbut, NRR
J. Nakoski, NRR .
B. Hughes, NRR
J. Houghton, NRR
D. Mcdonald, NRR
S. Dembek, NRR
P. Koltay, NRR
'
J. Andersen, NRR
D. Screnci, RI, PAO (e-mail)
Inspection Program Branch NRR, IPAS
S. Castro NRR, PIMB/ DISP
T. Walker, RI
-.
.
..
-
-- -
.
.
_
'
e
~
\\
Letter to Mr. M.L. Bowling dated:
,
cc w/encis:
J. Streeter, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight
J.K. Thayer, Fecovery Officer, Nuclear Engineering and Support
D. Amerine, Vice President, Engineering and Support Services
J.A. Price, IJnit Director, Unit 2
P.D. Hinnennamp, Director, Unit Operations
F.C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services
J. Stankiewicz, Training Recovery Manager
J. Cantrell, Direchr, Nuclear Training
S.J. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
L.M. Cuoco, Esquire
J.R. Egan, Esquira
V. Juliano, Waterferd Library
J. Buckingham, Depr.rtment of Public Utility Control
S.B. Comley, We Tt.o Pecple
State of Connecticut Ocsignee
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
R. Bassilakis, CAN
J.M. Block, Esquire, CAN
S.P. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
Representative T. Concannon
E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, Nuclear Energy Advisory Council
_ _ _ .