ML20154R016
| ML20154R016 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 10/20/1998 |
| From: | Gaskin C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Galloway M, Pierson R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9810260139 | |
| Download: ML20154R016 (6) | |
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20066 0001 October 20, 1998 g&
l MEMORANDUM TO: Robert C. Pierson, Chief Special Projects Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Melanie A. Galloway, Chief Enrichment Section Special Projects Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS THRU:
Charles W. Emeigh, Acting Chief e. b
,5 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS Mary T. Adams, Chief Licensing Section 1 k-Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS FROM:
Charles E. Gaskin
($ 6 Senior Safeguards Project Manager Licensing Section 1 Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, NMSS
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT - USEC PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION FACILITY SEPTEMBER 29 THROUGH OCTOBER 1,1998 (TAC NO. L32088)
During the period of September 29 through October 1,1998, I met with members of USEC and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Facility to discuss Amendment 4 to their physical security plan at Piketon, Ohio. The primary purpose of the trip was to obtain site familiarization, to discuss the application of the regu!ations, and to observe the application of the physical protection plan at the site.
Attached is the list of attendees at the various meetings held during this period.
< 7 7.' u O Site Familiarization The tour of the site was conducted by the Portsmouth physical protection technical staff. The site tour was significant because the sheer scope of the site is greater than any other i
Category 111 facility licensed or certified by the NRC. Such size would imply that unique
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9810260139 981020 PDR ADOCK 07007001 7
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Robert C. Pierson 2
i measures may need to be taken in order to meet the intent of 10 CFR 73.67. During the tour, I was particularly interested in the survey that had been conducted to determine the location and amount of HEU in the form of holdup or residue.
Amendment 4 USEC had provided Amendment 4 specifically to account for the handling of high enriched uranium (HEU) not covered by their certification. Such HEU would be in the form of holdup or other residue from previous operations. In reviewing Amendment 4, I was struck by the amount of procedural detail provided. My previous recommendation was to merely reference by procedure nurr ber the appropriate procedures that would obtain the Department of Energy involvement and the handling of any equipment dismantlement or the discovery of material not covered by the USEC certificate.
USEC instead chose to place the detail into the physical protection plan. This poses a dilemma for the NRC. First, the material, that may or may not be discovered, is not covered by the certificate but by another government agency. Second, the procedures are USEC/ DOE procedures and not USEC/NRC procedures. Third, such proceduralinformation should only be referenced in the physical protection plan. This would keep detailed operational information, particularly USEC/ DOE operations, out of the physical protection plan.
During the tour it became apparent that the amount of HEU available for diversion was minuscule in any given area, and that it would require considerable long term efforts to obtain sufficient material fcr diversion. Further I was also struck with the fact that there are considerable USEC/ DOE activity areas located around the plant. These USEC/ DOE activity areas would be the recipients of any material found whenever the equipment is dismantled or opened.
The Amendment 4 procedures were to be invoked prior to the dismantling of equipment or the opening of any area identified through the survey. Thus any specific area that is to be opened becomes, through procedure, a USEC/ DOE activity area until the project is complete.
Therefore, it is puzzling as to why NRC is interested in the holdup issue when the problem is truly a DOE problem.
Physical Protection Plan in preparation for the site visit, I performed a brief review of the physical protection plan and conferred with the Regional inspector (Rlli). While my review of the physical protection plan was not in-depth, I was surpnsed with commitments made by USEC to measures that concerned only USEC/ DOE interactions. It was also quite obvious that there was an apparent lack of authority on the part of the NRC in inspecting these commitments.
The physical protection plan is overly detailed, much more than that required for a Category lli facility, and contains measures that have little to do with the proter %n of SNM. There are some unique qualities about the Portsmouth site, such as the si;, of the site and the potential for uncovering HEU, that would impact the development of a physical protection plan for a Category til facility. These could be addressed specifically in a separate classified addendum in order to accommc,date the relationship arnong USEC, DOE, NRC, and the handling of HEU.
l Robert C. Pierson 3
In conferring with Rlli, it was apparent that the Region was uncomfortable with the commitments and indeed recognized that some commitments could not be enforced. In conferring with USEC, it was apparent that the physical protection plan was developed in the haste of obtaining a certificate to operate, and little attention was given to the focused aspects l
of NRC regulations in the protection of SNM. Thus the physical protection plan became overly l
broad and included areas that should be covered by other agreements.
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The use of armed guards and the commitments of having armed guards in the physical protection plan were noted. This far exceeds NRC regulations.10 CFR 73.67 was not written in anticipation of having such a security force. The inspection of the capabilities of these g Jards is questionable because NRC has no regulatory basis for the performance of guards at l
a Category til facility.
l Conclusions /C_oncerns Amendment 4 contains adequate measures to handle those areas and activities associated with the dismantlement or opening of equipment. However since such measures are directly associated with the USEC/ DOE relationship it is questionable why they should be in either the physical protection or the MC&A plans. Indeed, the concerns raised regarding HEU appear to be unwarranted.
The physical protection plan includes areas that fall outside the purview of the NRC.
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The USEC/ DOE areas should not be included in the physical protection plan.
The concern about diversion of HEU appears to be unwarranted based upon the l
detailed survey and the amount of material which may be uncovered whenever equipment is dismantled or opened.
1 The physical protection plan contains procedural material that should be referenced i
only. Such procedures should be operationally related and provide the certificate holder with some flexibility. Placing them in the physical protection plan reduces operational flexibility.
The use of armed guards at a Category lli facility is unwarranted under 10 CFR Part 73.
If the site uses armed guards based upon other requirements, those guards should l
meet those other requirements without the involvement of the NRC. NRC staff time is too precious to be spent on another agency's requirements. (I note that the regional staff has only been allocated 8 staff hours to inspect physical protection measures at this facility.)
l References to DOE orders and memoranda of agreement have no place in an NRC physical protection plan.
1 Robert C. Pierson 4
4 The evoking of Appendices B and C of 10 CFR Part 73 is a contrivance to 4
accommodate the use of non-NRC required armed guards. Typically we would not use these requirements at a Category lil facility, The inspection of USEC/ DOE areas is unwarranted and should be ceased. It is noted that some NRC inspectors do not care for the methods used by DOE. That should be the concem of the USEC/ DOE interface and not of the NRC or, in other words, render unto DOE that which is DOE's and unto the NRC that which is NRC's.
Recommendations Immediately initiate a dialogue with USEC for the purposes of refocusing the physical protection plan and addressing the above concerns.
l Confer with OGC on the legality of NRC inspecting DOE controlled areas.
Confer with OGC on the legality of NRC incorporating into a license or certificate
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measures that far exceed regulatory requirements, such as the arming of the security force at USEC.
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PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION FACILITY VISIT ATTENDEE LIST l
SEPTEMBER 29 THROUGH OCTOBER 1,1998 Charles E. Gaskin (NRC)
(301) 415-8116 CEG1@NRC. GOV Mark Lombard (USEC)
(301) 564-3248 LombardM@usec.com Emery Smith (LMUS)
(740) 897-2659 Dan Hupp (LMUS)
(740) 897-5843 i
Jim Snodgrass (LMUS)
(740) 897-2370 Rick Coriel (740) 897-2212 Bern Stapleton (USEC)
(301) 546-3492 STAPLETONB@usec.com ATTACHMENT 1
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e Robert C. Pierson 4
l The evoking of Appendices B and C of 10 CFR Part 73 is a contrivance to accommodate the use of non-NRC required armed guards. Typically we would not use these requirements at a Category lli facility.
l The inspection of USEC/ DOE areas is unwarranted and should be ceased, it is noted that some NRC inspectors do not care for the methods used by DOE. That should be the concern of the USEC/ DOE interface and not of the NRC or, in other words, render unto DOE that which is DOE's and unto the NRC that which is NRC's.
I Recommendations l
Immediately initiate a dialogue with USEC for the purposes of refocusing the physical l
protection plan and addressing the above concerns.
Confer with OGC on the legality of NRC inspecting DOE controlled areas.
Confer with OGC on the legality of NRC incorporating into a license or certificate measures that far exceed regulatory requirements, such as the arming of the security force at USEC.
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Distribution (Control No.707002370S/212AM/L32088 Closed )
Docket PUBLIC' NRC File Center NMSS R/F FCLB R/F FCSS R/F Region JKnicely, Rllli RCastaneira AHoadley
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l OFC FCLB FCLB FCLB C-FCLB y,g NAME CGaskin
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CEdih 3
DATE 10/19/98 10/19/98 10R/98 10/ /98 4
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