ML20154N509

Lists Response to NRC Re Seven Actions to Confirm & Assure Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Operability, Per GDC 19 & Tech Specs.Temp Design Basis Review Will Be Performed by 860701.Addl Info to Be Submitted in 30-day LER

ML20154N509
Person / Time
Site:	Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png
Issue date:	03/04/1986
From:	Withers B PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:	Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
References
NUDOCS 8603170339
Download: ML20154N509 (3)

Text

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Trojan Nuclear Plant Docket 50-344 License NPF-1 Mr. John B. Martin Regional Administrator, Region V U.S. ruclear Regulatory Connission 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek CA 94596

Dear Mr. Martin:

Trojan Nuclear Plant operability of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Your letter of February 28, 1986 outilned seven actions that we have taken or intend to take to confirm and assure that the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System will operate, and !s being tested for operability, in accordance with the Technical Specifications and Concrat Design Criterion 19 of Appendix A to 10 CFR 50 (CDC-19). Our response to each of those items is as follows:

1. Determine the basis for the 110*F control room temperature limit and potential effect on control room equipment (long-term).

Response A review of the control room temperature design basis will be performed by July 1, 1986.

2. The loose /open aluminum / sheet metal formed cover has been replaced and appropriately secured. Determine the effect this opening had on the operability of the system (long-term).

Response: Discussion of the effects of this sheet metal cover will be provided in the Licensee Event Report currently scheduled to be submitted within 30 days, on or before March 26, 1986.

3. Determine the effect the drain line cross-connection had on system performance prior to its being modified on February 27-28, 1986 (long-term).

Response: The ef fect of the dealn line cross-cc,nnection on system performance will be discussed in the LER to be submitted no later than March 26, 1986.

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4. Determine the effect that the manual position of the control reitch for the dampers had on automatic operation of the system, given the lack of speelfic procedures (long-tem). Administrative control now requires this switch (es) to be in " automatic".

Response: These effects will be discussed in the Licensee Event Report to be submitted no later than March 28, 1986. Administra-tive controls are in place to ensure these switches are in

" automatic after open".

5. You believe that the system as now configured and being operated con-forms to the Technical specifications and complies with CDC-19. The potential for inadvertent makeup error to the control room during emergency ventilation system operation will be evaluated (short-tem).

Response The Control Room Emergency Ventilation system is being operated in accordance with Trojan Technteel specifications.

A safety evaluation has been performed for inadvertent leakage into the control room during emergency venttiation i system operation. By the prudent administration of potas- j slum lodido (KI) and the use of respirators, as required by  !

current Trojan Emergency procedures, this evaluation shows I the control room personnel would not exceed CDC-19 doses if either filtered or unfiltered air leakage are substantially l I

above the values assumed in the FSAR analysis. '

During the period Merch 1-2, 1986, th, makeup flow dampers for the "B" train were adjusted to limit makeup flow to 150 cfm. The "A" train air flow was measured on March 3, 1986, and no damper adjustment was required (makeup flow was 123 efs). , j 1

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6. The operating configuration of CB-3 and CS-4 will be justified.

Administrative procedures will be implemented to verify shutdown following control room isolation (short-tors).

Response Immediate corrective action has been to provide in the night orders to all operators the requirement to enrure that, upon automatic actuation of the Control Room Emergency Ventila-tion system, Cs-3 and C3-4 will be verified to be off.

permanent procedure changes will be initiated, and are expected to be completed no later than April 15, 1986. An evaluation of CB-3 and CB-4 will be conducted by July 1, 1986 to determine if any design changes are needed for these systems.

7. T'w operability of the system for toxic gas, including procedural requirements, will be verified (long-term, short-term, if possible).

(- _ _ _ _ .

.a N M MCOIT4MN1y Mr. John B. Martin March 4, 1986 page 3 Response The appropriate off-normal instructions are being revised to provide specific directions for the operation of the ventila-tion systems upon the presence of toxic gas. Additionally, the monthly operating test of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System has been revised to require tha outside air makeup dampers be closed during the test. These procedure changes will be in place today, March 4, 1986.

This coeplates our initial response to those items identified in your February 28 letter. More information will be provided in the 30-day LER.

Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely, r'

Bart . Withers Vice president Nuclear c: Mr. Lynn Frank, Director state of Oregon Department of Energy Mr. Steven A. Varga Director, pWR-A project Directorate No. 3