ML20154L014
| ML20154L014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/08/1988 |
| From: | Sable J Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| To: | Gordon Peterson Federal Emergency Management Agency |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154L009 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8809260075 | |
| Download: ML20154L014 (27) | |
Text
.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region II 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 September 8, 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Grant Peterson Associate Director State and Local Programs and Support FROM:
Jack M. Sable Y/Dv Regional Director SUBJECTS:
(1)
Regional Assista e Comittee (RAC) Review Coments for the LILCO Local Offsite Radiological Emergency
Response
Plan for Shoreham, Revision 10 dated September 6, 1988.
(2)
Post-Exercise Assessment for the June 7-9, 1988 Exercise of the LILC0 Offsi+.e Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station dated September 2, 1988.
In response to your earlier requests, Region !! herewith trancmits three copies of the captioned documents.
As referenced on each page of the plan review, Revision 10 of LILCO's Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan has been reviewed in accordance with the interim use and coment document jointly develosed by FEMA and NRC entitled:
Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Raciological Emerg ncy Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants Utility Offsite Plannin criteria for Supplement 1. November,g and Preparedness):NUREG 0554/ FEMA R P.1 Rev. 1, 1987.
Revision 9 of the LILC0 plan transmitted to you in May 1988.This review up On May 23, 1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission (HRC) requested that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conduct a review of Revision 10 the LILCO offsite plan against the criteria of NUREG 0654/ FEMA. REP 1, Rev.1 Supplement I and the three assumptions stated below.
NRC also requested that Revision 10 changas be incorporated into the exercise play of the upcoming Shoreham exercise.
Since a full RAC review could not be conducted in the short time frame remaining before the exercise, FEM Regio i
review the changes, coordinate with the RAC where necessary, n !! agreed to i
them into the evaluation of the exercise.
and incorporate review and the exercise were based are thatThe assumptions upon which the plan in an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in j
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{DR ADOCK 05000322 PDC
emergency planning will:
l 1)
Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public;
- 2) Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility plan, and i
- 3) Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary, After the exercise, Revision 10 was reviewed in detail by FEM Region !! and the RAC.
Also included in the review were additional materials which NRC formally requested FEM to review on August 31, 1988. A RAC meeting, chaired i
by FEM Region II was held in our offices on September 1,1988, on Revision 10 of the plan.
All of the previous outstanding issues have been reviewed including thosa (1) for which elements were previously rated inadequate and recomendations for improvements of the plan were,made.(2) those for which j
For clarity, the following nomenclature has been carried over from the previous reviews:
A (Adequate)
The element is adequately addressed in the plan.
Recomendations for improvement shown in Italfes are not mandatory, but their consideration would further improve the utility's offsite emergency respor.se plan.
I (Inadequate)
The element is inadequately addressed in the plan for the reason s stated in bold type.
The plcn and/or procedures (mu)st be revised before the element can b considered adequate.
As a means of sumarizing this rather lengthy review and for ease in understanding abbreviations used, an Element Rating Sumary and List of Acronyms are provided at the end of the document.
In accordance with Richard Krim's memorandum of July 27, 1988 to lhor Husar of my staff, elements C.2.b, C.2.c, E.3, and all parts of E.4 have been removed from this review, since they will not appear in the final version of NUREG 0654/ FEM REP 1, Rev.1, Supplement 1.
I As mentioned above, we also transmit a copy of the Shoreham Post Exercise Assessment report dated September 2,1988.
There were no exercise issues classified as deficiencies.
However, there were some areas requiring corrective action.
in response to NRC's request dated February 8,1988. FEM evaluated the fu I
Objectives for the exercise were developed by LILCO and submitted to FEM ano NRC for review.
On May 20, 1988, and May 26, 1982 NRC staff agreed that the proposed objectives submitted by FEM on May 13, 1988, were sufficient to demonstrate j
the capabilities of LIL*.0's Local Emergency Response Organization in a full.
participation exercise.
They also stated their were sufficient to constitute a ' qualifying' position that the objectivos exercise under 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.Section IV.F.1 in t Lt it should test as much of the emergency, plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.
1 i
u Base upon this determination and changes to the plan which were incorporated in Revision 10 in response to the RAC review of Revision 9 Region !!
finalized its plans to evaluate the exercise. The exercise was conducted on June 7-9, 1988 with plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) activities primarily conducted on June 7th, ingestion pathway EPZ activities conducted on June 8th, and recovery / reentry activities conducted on June 9th.
A public meeting was held on June 15, 1988 at the Mediterranean Manor in Patchogue, New York. The public meeting tvas held to acquaint the public with the content of offsite plans and FEMA's preliminary observations on the June exercise.
Representatives from offsite organizations participated with FEMA Region II and NRC Region ! at the public meeting.
LILCO was provided a copy of the draft report dated August 8,1988 and their coments were received by the RAC Chairman at a meeting with representatives of the utility in the Region !! office on August 17, 1988.
Prior to finalizing the Post-Exercise Assessment, the report was reviewed and discussed in detail at the RAC meeting on September 1, 1988.
It should be noted that the plan has been substantially improved by L1LC0 in response to the RAC's previous reviews.
Ninety four plan elements are currently rated adequate. Seven plan elements are currently rated inadequate.
Some of these inadequacies were revealed as shortcomir.gs in the exercise requiring further implementing detail in the plan.
However, the exercise demonstrated adequate overall preparedness on the part of LERO personnel, and therefore, based on the evaluation of the plan and the exercise, Region !!
recomends a finding of reasonable assurance, if you have any questions, please contact Mr. Ihor W.
Husar, Chairman, Regional Assistance Comittee, at FTS 649 8200.
Attachments
Review Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 2.
I Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioleeical Emereeney Resoonse plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 1 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comment (s)
Ratine A.
Assianment of Resoonsibility foreanization contre' )
A.2.a Change (s)lfor connent on Rev. 9 that under the I.ERO plan to the plan could not be located in response A
to an ear (see Ffgure 3.3.7), FEMA is designated as having the primary responsibility for notifying the pubite of the Federal response.
The lead Federal agency for this function is the Cognfzant feders! Agency.
This should be ciariffed in Section 2.2, page 2.2 4s,1inos 1015 and acknowledged in Section 3.3 as appropriate.
C.
Emerenney Resoonse Sueeort and Resources C.1.c As recomended in the review of Rev. 9, the outdated A
designation of USDA responsibility (under FRERP) for the National Radio Fire Cache has been removed from page 2.2 4d of the plan.
C.3 As' noted in the review of Rev. 9, the designation of A
who will transport field samples to the laboratories
...(f.e., Clean Harbors Analytical Servicei located in Massachusetts and Teledyne isotopes in New Jersey) could not be located in Rev. 10.
C.4 Updated executed leases have been included in Rev. 10 A
for the following transfer points:
Expiration DLLt Riverhead (also known as 3/31/89 Warehouse Doctors' Path)
Middle Island 3/31/89 Shirley Mall 3/31/89 Coram 3/31/89 Miller Place 2/28/89 Evidenca of valid leases for the Riverhead and Coram transfer points which were unsigned in Rev. 10 were formally provided to FEMA on 8/31/88.
The expiration date for the executed agreement (lease) for the Expressway Plaza Transfer point was incorrectly reported in the Rev. 9 RAC review.
The correct i
Review Cossents Based On I
NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REPol, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical Emeraency Resnonse Plan for Shereham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 2 of 19 NUREG-0654 El ement.
Review Comment (s)
Ratino expiration date for that agreement was 6/30/88 (see Page App 8 66 Rev. 9).
On June 27, 1988, this lease agreement between LILC0 and Plaza 63 Associates, Inc.
was renewed for the period 7/1/88 through 6/30/89.
A copy cf this updated lease agreement was formally provided to FEMA on 8/31/88.
LILCO's purchase order agreement with Gulf oil Gasoline expired as of 6/30/88. This agreement has been replaced by an agreement with the Rad Oil Company, Inc. of New Rochelle, NY for the period 7/1/88 through 6/30/89. A copy of this lease agreement was formally provided to FEMA on 8/31/88.
A letter of agreement dated 1/30/88 has been executed by LILCO with KLD Associates, Inc. to provide qualified volunteer personnel to fill the LERO Traffic Engineer position.
With regard to the manner in which LILCO responded to FEMA's cossents on letters of agreement with bus companies to obtain "first call" rights, see cossents
for element J.10.g.
Based on the demonstration of a sample of resources (i.e.,
ambulances and ambulettes) to implement an evacuation of mobility impaired persons, this objective was met at the 1988 exercise.
However, FEMA did not have an opportunity to review a copy of the confidential computerized Homebound Evacuation Listing prior to the exercise.
Therefore, a final determination of the overall adequacy of ambulance resources must await comparison of the number of vehicles with the needs of persons 1isted in the computerized Honebound Evacuation Ifsting.
Review Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radiolooical Emeraency Roseense Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 3 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comment (s)
Ratina D.
Emeroency Classification System 0.4 Procedure OPIP 3.1.1; Attachment 1, page 7 of 13, has A
been changed to ensure that the Director of Local Response consults with the Radiation Health Coordinator (if this position is staffed at the EOC) to obtain an assessment of the radiological emergency at the Site Area and General %ergency ECLs before contacting the Suffolk County Executive to obtain approval to initiate notification of the public. Also, telephone nutibers for the Governor of New York and the Suffolk and Nassau County Executives are included in 5,rocedure OPIP 3.1.1.
Attachments 1 and 10.
E.
Notification Methods and Procedures E.5 E85 messages developed at the 1984 exercise generally I
followed prescripted messages contained in OPIP 3.8.2 of Rev.10 of the plan and they were detailed and xj comprehensive. However, new and important information was usually inserted in the middle or at the end of 4
.. information contained in previous musages rather than at the beginning of the message where new information should be carried. Due to the excessive length of EBS messages, listeners say potentially miss critical infor-nation.
Accordingly, the exercise revealed that the format of EIS messages should be revised to make messages more concise and to emphasize important information at the beginning of messages.
The plan and procedures have been revised to specify that in accordance with the New York State Emergency Broadcast System Operational Plan (July 1981), KCBS in New York City will be used as the Coenen Point Control Station (CPCS 1) for disseminating initial and follow-up messages to the public. OPIP 3.8.2, Sections 5.1 and 5.1.4 specify procedures through which the WCBS EBS network would be activated when LER0 is authorized to do so by State officials.
The plan also (see page 3.8-7, lines 34-38) specifies that WPLR, an FM band redio station in Hamden, Connec-ticut has agreed to serve as the CPCS for the Shoreham local EBS network until the issuance of a full power operating license, and, if needed, to rr 3 member EBS station thereafter, i
Review Consnents Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 local Offsite Radiolooical Emercancy Resconse Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional A:Sistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, VJ1 Page 4 of 19 NUREG 0654
. Element Review Comment (s)
Ratina The Shoreham local emergency broadcast network con-sisting of ten (10) radio stations on Long Island and Connecticut provide a backup network for use in issuing EBS messages in the event that a problem or delay is encountered in activating the WCBS-based EBS network.
The Shoreham Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB)
OL-3 proceeding has this plan element under active consideration (EBS litigation).
E.7 As recomended in the review o# Rev. 9, Section 3 A
(item 1) has been revised to include a precautionary statement that EBS need not be activated for an Unusual Event.
F.
Emercancy Comunications F.1.b The plan (Section 3.4 and Figures 3.3.5 an6 3.4.1) and A
procedure OPIP 3.1.1 have been revised to specify that NAWAS'will provide backup to cosinercial telephone for CoOURuhications with New York State and Nassau County.
According to Attachment 7, Section B.12 of OPIP 3.1.1,
' if difficulty is encountered in contacting Nassau County or the State, by commercial telephone, the LERO Lead Comunicator is responsible for recomending that comunications are relayed by either Suffolk County or the U.S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) Security Station via NAWAS.
The Shorehan Control Roon MMAS line specified in the plan (see page 3.4 2, line 25) should be added to Figure 3.3.5.
Also, availability of the N M AS link which can be accessed by the E0C via the SNPS Control Roon or the DOE Brookhaven Area Office (BH0) should be specified in of OP!P 3.1.1 for the Ofrector of local Response in the event that tne lead Communicator is not available to provide this inft
\\ tion.
Telephone nic2ers for the Governor of New York and the Nassau County Executive are now specified in OPIP 3.1.1, Attachments 1 and 10. However, according to the sususary of revisions submitted by LILCO with Rev.1Q of the plan, telephone numbers for New York, Connecticut and Nassau County have been added to the LERO Emergency Telephone Directory, in response to FEMA's cosinent on this element in Rev. 9 of the plan.
This directory
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~
keview Conzents Based On M' REG-0654/FEHA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radiolooical Emercene, Resoor,;f Plan for Shorehan Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Committee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1923 Page 5 of 19
^
NUREG-0654 Element Peview Comment (s) htinc should be submitted to FEMA in orM r to verify that che points of contact to be used for 1.?f tf al comunications include telephone rumbmrs for the New York, Connecticut, Suffolk County and Nassau County wsrning points F.1.d In response to comments on Rcy.
9 of the plan, A.2.1, lines 26 27 have been changed to be consistent with Figure 3.3.5 and OPlP 3.3.5, Section 5.11 which specifies that the Brockhaven Area Office (BHC) is notified by the Hicksville Supervising Service Operator.
Also, page 4.14 of the plan has been revised to clarify that the LERO EOC is linked to the 00E RAP field monitoring teams via BHO radio which is stationed at Brookhaven National Laboratory. If 00E relocater to the LERO EOC, this radio l u k to tha 00E 14P teams will b) direct.
F.1.e In response to Exercise ASLB PIC findings, procedu as A
OPIPs 3.3.3, 3.6.3, 4.2.3, and 4.5.1 have been ruv' sed
- as follows to facilitate the mobilizt. tion /deploysint of emergency workers to the field:
Traffic Guides are dispatched from Staging Areas l e flately aftir their briefing at the Staging Area is cceplete (OPl.'
3,6.3, page 5 of 77):
Road Crews ars mobili.d No Staging Areas at the A.
i.CL rather than the Site Area CCL (OP!P 3.3.3, Atta';.hment ?.. Nge 2 of 3)
Reception Center santgecont personnel are mobilized to the centers at the Alert ECL (0P!P i
3.3.3, Attachment 1, page 1 ef 3 and OPIP 4.2.3, Sectio.- $ 2' The Emergenc/ Preparedness Mviser o.,
.be Radhtion Health Coordinator are now listed in Tigures 3.3.3 and 3.3.4 as affiliated with both LILCO and Other Organ-irations.
This change should be s:de in Fig. 3.3.2, I
l l
Review Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revo 1, Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radiolooical Emeroency Reseense Plan for Shoreham Revie a of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 6 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comment (s)
Ratine which sti11 1ists the Energency Freparedness Advisor only as a LILC0 employee.
F.2 In response to earlier coments on Rev. 9, Figure A
3.3.5 has been revised to show the radio comunication links to hospitals from ambulance dispatch stations and mobile ambulance units.
Figure 3.4.1 has also been revised to show the radio links between hospitals and ambulance dispatch stations.
G.
public Education and Information G.I.a-e In response to coments on Rev. 9, the section of the A
section of the plan on "Media Awareness' (Page 3.8 3) has been revised and now refers to biennial rather than T
annual exercises.
\\
A revised draft of the Shoreham public information brochure was provided to FEMA and its contractor. Based on reconnendations and technical assistance provided by FEMA's contractor, the new draft had a much clearer
', emergency focus and had been reorganized to place emergency instruction sections in the front of the booklet. The information in the brochure was consistent with instructions that may be given to the public via EBS messages and correlated with sample EBS messages contained in the plan.
One important change was the addition of a single, summary instructions page to be placed directly inside the front cover that also serves to index additional information.
Language simplifica-tion and more effective use of graphs and other design elements also greatly enhanced the utility and compre-hensibility of the public information brochure.
Subsequent to the above review, on 7/28/88 FEMA informally obtained LILCO's updated, public information brochure.
FEMA and the RAr. will conduct a detailed review and provide the remRs at a later date.
See comments for elenent L. in this review reganting a
the evalustton of publit mformatton for the agricul-tural community.
See coments for element J.10.g in this review regarding the manner in which the previous discrepancy between the number of nursery schools listed ta the plan and the
Review Coments Based On IXJREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical Emercenev Reseense Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 7 of 19 NUREG 0654 i
Element Review Comment (s)
Ratino i
public information brochure has been adequately ad-dressed by LILCO.
4 I
G.2 Provisions for the public information program and pro-A visions for its dissemination as described in Section 3.8 of the plan are adequate.
The public information j
materials should not be sent out until coments from FEMA's contractor have been incorporated into the brochure (See also coments for element G.1.a-o in this review). It is FEMA's understanding that LILCO intends 4
to distribute the public informat. ion brochure prior to 1
the formal <tennstration of the alert and notification l
siren syst a for telephone survey purposes.
2 G.3 In respease to earlier consents on Rev. 9, the NUREG-A I
0654 r/oss refe ence has been revised to include appr:,priate citations where this element is addressed l
in the plan and procedures.
G.4.a The 1988 exercise revealed that the Energency News A
Center (ENC) staffing chart doas not define a role for radiation health spokespersons, two of which were i
1
" assigned to the LER0 staff to handle briefings related to radiation health issues.
The ENC staffing chart should be accordingly revised le reflect that radiatio health spokespersons will be assigned to this facility.q G.4 b Copying capabilities for the distribution of hard A
i copies of EBS messages to the media were found to be 1
adequate at the ENC during the 1988 exercise.
l G.4.c Procedure OPIP 3.8.1 has been revised see Section A
5.4.3) to specify *, hat the LZRO Spokesperso(n at the ENC will designate a LERO Rumor Control Coordinator from the i
13 Public Infonsation Support Staff (see Figure 2.1.1 and OPIP 2.1.1, Attachment 3 page 1 of 5). This LER0 l
1 Rumor Control Coordinator will be assigned to the LILC0 i
I rumor control room in the ENC at the LILCO Trainin Center, Hauppauge, NY where offsite related rumors wil be routed to him/her by the LILCO Rumor Control Ad-ministrative Staff.
l l
I 1Although this exercise issue is not sufficient to rate the element
]
inadequate, this issue should be corrected.
l 4
l Review Consents Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical Emeroency Resoonse Plan '9r Shoreham i
Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 j
Page 8 of 19 4
NUREG 0654 Element Review Cey ent(s)
Ratina i
In response to Rev. 9 review consents, detailed rumor control procedures are provided in onsite procedure EP!P 4 4 which has been provided for information only behind of OP!P 3.8.1. When the LERO Rumor Control j
Coordinator arrives at the CNC, he/she will be respon-sible for ensuring that offsite rumor control responses are transmitted to the District Offices and Callboards via TSO computer (see EP!P 4-4, Section 2.4)ller (see ar.d that responses are fonvarded back to the initial ca
]
OPIP 3.8.1, Section 5.6.4).
LILC0 Rumor Control staff at the District Offices and Callboards are accordingly available for use by LERO in the control of offsite l
rumors. The effectiveness of the system for controlling offsite related rumors was evaluated during the 1988 j
exercise and found to be adequate as discussed in the i
PostExerciseAssessment(PEA). Nevertheless, informa-tion regarding the number of rumor control staff and the i
nuake" of telephone lines allocated for this function should he provided to FEMA.
i G.5 Section 3.8 (Page 3.8-4) of the plan has been revised A
to specify in accordance with NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, i
i Rev. 1, Supp. 1, that the ' role of offsite response l
~..
~
organizations vs. the State and local organizations
~
j during an emergency' will be reinforced during the annual oriintation program for members of the news media.
1 H.
Emercancy Facilities and Eauinment H.4 The LER0 Energency Telephone ofrectory should be sub.
A 2
sitted to FEMA in order to verify that the point of contact to be used for initial communications with New York State includes the telephone number for the State l
Warning Point (see also comment for element F.1.b in this review),
a 1
H.7 In response to otr11er comments on Rev. 9, the NUREG-A a
0454 cross reference has been revised to indicate that the field monitorin i
for the offsite Radio-of the plan. y (0RS)g equ pment logical Surve teams is listed in Attachment 2.2.1 3
i 4
I 1
1 i
4 Review Coments 8ased On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 i
local Offsite Radiolooical Emeroency Resoonse Plan for Shott 10 h
Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 9 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comentfsi Etti, g q
Accident Assessment
!.7 In response to earlier coments on Rev. 9, reference A
to OP!P 3.5.1, "Downwind Surveying
- which has been i
i deleted from the plan, has been removed as c reference j
Prom Section 6 of OPIP 3.5.2.
l.9 Provisions for transporting field samples to laborato-A
!l ries located in New Jersey (f.e., Teledyne laboratories) and Massachusetts (f.e., CleGr Harbors) could not be found in the plan.
J.
Protective Resoonse J.10.a figure 3, which is referenced on page !!-5 of Appendix A
A as outlining the 19 Energency Response Planning Areas (ERPAs) that comprise the plune exposure EPZ needs to be added to Appendix A.
r l
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A list of the preselected radiological sampling locations is given in Table 3.5.1 of the plan. However,
~~ as sentioned in the earlier comments for Rev. 9, a asp showing these locations was not contained in the plan l
submitted for this review of Rev. 10.
i 4
l r
l J.10.e
'In response to earlier cossments on Rev g, the Lead I
Traffic Guide briefing form (0 PIP 3.3.4, Attachment 8 Page 16c of 16) has been revised to clarify that AnlX Route Alert Drivers are to be instructed to ingest KI prior to leaving the Staging Area or when a General Emergency is announced via Ei!S. Although K! administra-tion procedures are now consistent for Route Alert Drivers, the use of KI by any emergency workers is i
unacceptable without a dose projection of thyroid exposure first being made by a responsible health official (i.e., LERO Radiological Health Coordinator).
i see additional coments for element J.10.f in th9s
]
review.
Procedures OPIP 3.6.2 (Section 5.2.2.d) and OPIP 3.6.5 6
(Attachment 14, Section 5, page 64 of 75) are inconsis-tent with regard to when all school bus drivers will i
take their KI tablet. OPIP 3.6.2 states that school bus-i drivers will take a K! tablet upon hearing of a j
declaration of a General Emergency on E55 radio or when j
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j
Review Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical Emercency Reseense Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 10 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comment (s)
Ratinc actually implementing a schcol evacuation.
OP!P 3.6.5 states that school bus drivers will gnly take K! upon hearing of a General Emergency (via E85).
Regardless of the inconsistency of these procedures, the use of K!
by any emergency workers is unacceptable without a dose projection of thyroid exposure first being made by a responsible health official (i.e., LERO Radiological Health Coor(inator).
See additional comments for l
element J.10.f in this review.
KI has been added to the equipment inventories in OP d 5.3.1 for all of the companies slated to supply buses for school evacuation.
I OPIP 3.6.5 also specifies that two (2) K! tablets have j
been added to the LERO School Bus Driver Assignment l
Packets (Attachment 14, p. 1 of 3).
1 Copies of the LILCO letters that offer' training to non-1 LILCO organizations that to not receive training have i
been provided to FEMA.
i I
J.10.f
' Procedure OPIP 3.6.2 specifies the means by which I
emergency workers will be instructed to ingest KI after iodine dose equivalent has been detenstned by the LERO Radiation Health Coordinator.
As provided in Section j
5.2.2.a of this procedure, the Dosimetry Coordinator is 1
responsible for comunicating K! instructions to the i
Traffic Control Coordinator who is in turn responsible i
for contacting Trtffic Guides if they have already been deployed to the field from the Staging Areas.
This a
means of administering K! has been clarified in OPIP 3.3.4, Attachment 8 which now delineates instructions given by Lead Traffic Guides to Route Alert Drivers as distinguished from other emergency workers at the Staging Areas.
The directive for specified emergency workers (e.g.,
school bus drivers and route alert drivers) to take KI at the declaration of a General Emergency ECL is not in accordance with Federal guidance which states that the use of K! is appropriate at nrojected doses of 25 Ram s
thyroid. Although the more conservative 10 rem trigger level contained in the LILCO plan is acceptable, the use of KI without a dose projection of thyroid exposure i
i 1
i
NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 8, Suppo 1 Local Offsite Radioleaical Emercency Reseense Plan for Sh.gnha Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 11 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Cementfs)
EE.Lg first being made by a responsible health official is not acceptable.
During the 1984 exercise there was misunderstanding among school bus drivers about the use of KI. The LERO controller information was unclear as to the status of the emergency at the start of the school evacuation which was out of sequence with the plume portion of the exercise.
In addition, some school bus drivers were unaware of the use of the K! record form for recording their use of K!.
This result reinforces the need for K! use to be based upon a dose projection of thyroid exposure first poing made by a responsible health official.
J.10.g Nursery schools have been added to OPIP 3.6.5 Attach.
A ments 3,3a and 19 and have had buses allotted for their evacuation.
The plan and the public information brochure are now consistent except that the oublic information brochure also lists the Maryhaven 7hera-peutic Pre-school / day Residential School and the St.
Charles Exceptional and Therapeutic Center as nursery schools.
The plan in OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 2, lists
~ Maryhaven and St. Charles as handicapped facilities.
LILC0 clarified in an informal transmittal to FEMA dated 7/25/88 that for planning purposes, several schools have been listed as Health Care Facilities in OPIP 3.6.5, because of their special transportation needs for evacuation.
However, since parents send children to these facilities for educational purposes, they are listed as schools in the public information brochure. The facilities treated in this manner are as follows:
Little Flower U.F.S.0, and Children's Services Maryhaven Therapeutic Preschool Day Residential School Preschooler's Place for Learning 4
I Review Comments Based On NUREG-0454/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 Supp. 1 i
local Offsite Radioloaical Emercenev Reseense P1tn for Shoreham
)
Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC) i J
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 12 of 19 i
NUREG 0654 El ement Review Commentfs) 8.dinq
)
St. Charles Educational and Therapeutic Center t
Learning Center of BOCES !!
i (See also coments on element G.I.a e regarding nursery schools).
)
Results of the confirmatory letters sent to bus companies citing the number of first call buses available from each were provided to FEMA in LILCO's i
inforsal transmittal of 7/25/88 and these confim a a
number of 200 spare buses (i.e., not used by school
)
i districts on a daily basis) which is 47 in excess of the 153 first call buses required by the plan.
It is understood that the bus yard contracts in question are i
going to be renegotiated.
When these contracts are fina ized by 12/31/88, they will specify first call buses to be supplied by each yard.
At that time all contracts with bus yards providing first-call buses will specify the number of these vehicles.
I
- It has been determined in view of the fact that OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 3 and 0P!P 3.6.5, 4 contain a list of the bus companies where buses for school evacuation are obtained, that it is not necessary to include this information in Table I!!!C of Appendix A as requested in the Rev. g review cessents. However, 1
if this information is not to be included in that table, i
the statement en page IV-180 of Appendix A that ' Table
)
XI!!C presents... (the thirst bullet) Bus companies where vehicles are obtained* should be removed.
i Section 2.1, page 2.1 1 of the plan has been revised to specify that 'LER0 School Bus Drivers will provide a
{
1005 backup of the Regular School Bus Drivers that 4
i normally transport EPZ school children.
At bus yards that do not normally support eft transportation LER0 will assign 1505 of the complement required." This is consistent with the previous statement in the Plan that it is LER0's goal to have approximately 1505 of the j
personnel available to respond to an emergency.
i i
However, the enveeration of school bus drivers assigned to bus yards should be provided to FEMA. A summary of assignaents free the LER0 Scheel Bus Driver call-out i
sheets specified in Attachment 14 (iten p. 1 of 3, 01)
{
of 0!!! 3.6.5 could satisfy this request.
~
RevieJ Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioleoical Emeroency Reseense Plan for Shorehan Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 13 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review ComentIsi Ratina The plan has been revised (see OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 1, Section 10; and OPIP 4.1.1) to provide direct radio comunications from the Transfer Point Coordinators at their Transfer Points to the Bus Coordinator at the LERO EOC.
The comprehensive needs vs. resources charts for the vehicles intended for relocation have not been provided to FEMA. Also, inconsistencies previously noted in the number of buses available for Suburbia, Bruno, Coram, WE Transport and Towne bus companies have not been addressed.
J.10.h No change of the plan could be located in response to A
an earlier comment on Rev. 9, regartfing inclusion in the 1
plan of.a list of potential reception hospitals.
J.10.j The 1988 exercise revealed that Rev. 10 of the plan I
does not contain preplanned access control points to restrict access to evacuated ERPAs when a sheltering
- advisory is rescinded.
Such an access control plan should be developed for any subset of ERPAs where an evacuation advisory is in effect.
In addition, the 1988 exercise revealed that during the reentry phase, traffic guides at access control points were not fully knowledgeable about W should be allowed access and what areas were specifically restricted. The i
plan should be revised to include instructions for traffic guides regarding how they are be informed of l
restricted areas and how they are to handle allowing l
access to restricted areas.
The plan has been revised (see OPIP 3.6.3, Sec. 5.2.7) to provide Traffic Guides with direct radio cossounica-tions to the Evacuation Support Comununicators at the LER0 EOC.
Per conments on Rev. 9, revision of Procedure cpl! 3.6.3 1
regarding directions for the Evacuation Coontinator to contact FM as called for by the plan (see figure 3.4.1)
\\
could not be located in Rev. 10.
J.10.k Procedure OPIP 3.6.3 has been revised to include proc-A
]
edures for the Traffic Engineer (Section 5.11).
l l
-__.--,.--,-_,_a e.
,e.,
-c m
-, - ~ -
-e
Review Coassents Based on NUA!6 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1
,j Local offsite Radieleeical E-erennev Reneense oltn for Sherehan Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (AAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 14 of 19 l
NUREG-0654 Element Review coerentfd Qatine The Towns of Brookhaven and Riverhead have been added to the list of local snow removal organizations to be notified per OPIP 3.6.3, Section 5.1.8.
This addresses one of the areas for improvement suggested in the Rev.
9 review.
The 1988 exercise r6vealed a discrepancy between the desc.'iption of route spotter route H004 in Attachment 6 of CPIP 3.6.3 and the' route nep provided to the route napshouldberevisedsotheyagree.fcedureand/orthe spotter during the exercise.
The pr J.10.a The current LERO plan is not in accordance with A'
}
current FEMA 001tcy regarding PARS for severe core nelt sequences. FEMA, and the NRC, have concluded that for the populatten within 2 3 miles, in severe core neit i
accident sequences, the PA should be evacuation, unless external condittens absolutely prehtbit evacuation. The LERO plan, CPip 3.6.1 (Attachment 5 and 6), does not use this PA philosophy.
The plan should be revised to
.. reflect this position.
J.11 Procedure OPIP 3.6.6 (section 5.1.3 has been revised A
to specify that pas for milk or any)other food should not be taken until response levels are actually exceeded in sanpled foodstuffs.
i The Ian specifies in Section 2.2 and 3.8 and in OPIP 3.1., Ingestion Pathway) that LERO will rely u(pon the States of New York and Connecticut to dit. tribute wMtten instructions to the agricultural i
cotuunity within 50 miles of the plant in an emergency.
According to Section 3.8, p. 3.81 of the plan, LILC0 1
will assure that a brochure of ingestion pathway information is distributed to all farmers, distributors i
i and food processing facilities within 10 miles of j
Shoreham on an annual basis.
To comply with FEMA i
Guidance Memorandus (GM) IN 1, the final version of the 2Although this exercise issue is not sufficient to rate the element inadequate, this issue should be corrected.
8The plan must be revised to address this issue in order to conform with FEMA policy prior to the next plan review.
4
Review Coments Based On NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1. Rev.1 Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioleoteal Nmency Reseense plan fer Shoreha9 Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 page 15 of 19 NUREG-0654 Element atyi.ty Cearent(s)
Ratine brochure should be ready by Cecember 31, 1988.
In attempting to finalize its written materials, for FEMA evaluation and for distribution, LILCO should consider the following:
USDA's coments, FEMA's and its contrac-tor's coments, and The Guidance of GM IN 1.
It should also be noted that USDA is developing a "generic' agricultural brochure which will be applicable to the entire 50 mile ingestion zone and could be used to satisfy the GM IN 1 public information requirements.
LILCO should submit its agricultural brochure within 60 days after the final publication of the USDA generic agricultural brochure.
During the 1988 exercise, an actual nilk aample was taken at the Poole residence in sharehan. This location is shown as a sanpling site in the LiLC0 on site plan, but is not shown in Rev.10 of the LER0 off sits plan (see CPIP 3.6.6).
During the esercise, it was learned that two dairy locations in an eastern direction, identified in CPIP 3.6.6, Attachnent 9, page 1 of 3, are no longer allk producing locations. The plan should be reviewed and revised to include accurate, up to date infornstlen for Nog York and Connecticut concerning the ingestfon pathway.
Section 2.2 pages 2.2 6 and 2.2 6a list respon-sibilities in the ingestion pathway that are to be
- arried out (1) by the State of New York under the 'best efforts" assumption of the NRC regulations and (2) by the State of Connecticut under letters of agreement or 1
the 'best efforts' assumption depending on the status j
of agreements between LILCO and Connecticut.
IAlthough this exercise issue is not sufficient to rate the element inadequata, this issue should be corrected.
l
Review Coments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical E?ercency Reseense Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 Page 16 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Comment (s)
Ratina In response to coments on Rev. 9., OP!P 3.6.6 has been revised and Section 2.5 of that procedure now contains reference to the Connecticut Radiological Emergency Response Plan that would be used by the Connecticut Department of Health to implement PARS for the ingestion l
pathway.
In response to coments on Rev. 9. reference to OP!P 3.5.3, which does not exist in the LERO plan, has been L
removed as a reference in Section 6 of OPIP 3.6.6.
J.12 Procedure OPIP 3.6.5 (Section 5.2.2.d) has been revised in response to the earlier RAC coment regarding i
l provisions for school evacuations in the event there has been a release of radioactivity.
If populations in
)
4 particular zones are directed to report to reception centers for monitoring, the School Relocation Super-visors are instructed by the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator to direct buses arriving from schools in these designated zones to report to the Micksville reception center for monitoring.
This adequately addresses the problem of unnecessarily i
risking additional exposure to school children in affected zones while they await being renited with
-l their parents at the School Relocation Centers.
I However, procedures for the receipt, tracking and handling of school children forwarded to the Hicksville Reception Center could not be located in the plan, During the 1944 exercise, there was no demonstration of how school children and other bus passengers (e.g..
j teachers and administrative personnel) would be directed after disembarking their buses at the School Relocation i
Center (s). A school bus driver was unaware of the need to give school officials a school children log out form i
or relocation center location assignment diagrams and I
charts from his packet. Procedures should be developed fer the receipt, tracking and handling of school i
children at the School Relocation Centers.
No change in cpl? 3.9.2 could be located which responds i
to the Rev. 9 connent that decontamination efforts l
should be halted if the skin becoees abraded or broken.
l l
l 4
-,-.n--y
--n.,..,,-,--,--~-e.
.--e.--_,.--.
Review Consents lased On NUREG-0654/FEMAoREPol, Rev.1.
Suppa 1 Local Offsite Radioleaical Emercenev Resoonse Plan for Shoreham l
Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Comittee (RAC)
Dated September 6, 1988 1
Page 17 of 19 j
NUREG 0654 Element Review ComentIs) 3419q LILCO does not have written agreements for a sufficient number of buildings beyond the 10 mile EPZ for shelter-ing and feeding relocatees.
Also, as noted under element J.10.h (page 58 of 90) of the Rev. 9 review, it is not clear that the facilities to be utilized for congregate care of relocatees by the American Red Cross (ARC) are known to LERO. Nevertheless, this issue has been resolved based on NRC interpretation (see CLI 87-
- 05) of the level of cooperation required to be demon-strated by ARC with LERO in the planning effort. Based upon these decisions which interpret ARC policy to adequately provide assistance in a radiological emerg-ency, planning for the availability of ARC resources (i.e., buildings for the sheltering and feeding of l
relocatees) is considered adequate.
K.
Radioloaical Excesure Control K.3.a In response to Rev. 9 comments, OPIP 2.1.1, page 14 of A
79, paragraph C has been revised by deleting the
. reference to Record Keepers calibrating dosimeters.
Copies of the LILCO letters that offer training to non LILCO organizations that do not receive training have been provided to FEMA (see also comments for J.10.e in thisreview).
.4 j
K.3 b Emergency worker radiological exposure control proc.
edures have been specified in greater detsil in OPIP 3.6.5 for school bus drivers.
Section 7 of Attachment i
14 of procedure OPIP 3.6.5 instructs school bus drivers 1
to read their DRD: at 15 minute intervals. However, as recommended in the Rev. 9 review comments, the Emergency Worker Dose Record Fors (Attachment 2 of OPIP 3.9.1) has not been revised to specifically instruct emergency workers to read their DADS at 15 minute intervals.
.l i
l l
i
.-., ~~_,..____-..
l Review Consnents Based On NUREG-0654/FEMAoREP-1, Rev.1.
Supp. 1 local Offsite Radioloaical Emercency Reseense Plan for Shoreha9 Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Consnittee (RAC)
Dated September 6. 1988 Page 18 of 19 NUREG 0654 Element Review Cemeentis)
Ratina During the 1988 exercise, at least four school bus drivers believed that they could stop reading their DRDs when they had left the 10 afia EPZ, which is not stated in the LERO procedures.
Revision of the Energency Worker Dose Record Forn is needed to reinforce training that will be given to LER0 school bus drivers as well
\\
as those regular school bus drivers that are to be sentit)fbyLEROpersonnel(perCPIP3.6.5, Attach.
accompanf i
K.4 School Bus Drivers are now included in the drill in i
the drill matrix (OPIP 5.1.1. Attachment 2) for LERO Integrated Facility Orills (DR 1) and training continues
{
to be offered to non LERO personnel with energency responsibilities envisioned by the plan.
In addition, where real school bus drivers are to be utilized for school evacuation, these drivers will be accompanied by LERO personnel trained in emergency worker exposure control procedures (OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14).
{
During the school evacuation demonstration for the 1984
.. exerc< se, a bus driver who was approximately four and one half months pregnant and accompanied by a LERO back-up driver was allowed to drive the route without questfon. Upon FEMA's review of training rosters, the driver was found to have attended LERO training at which I
the dangers of radiation exposure to an unborn child had been covered. However, the driver was not reminded of the subject at the time of the simulated evacuation.
MRC Regulatory Guide 8.13 and the Appendix thereto were not listed among the materials included in the assign-j ment packet (LER0 School Bus Driver Procedure OP!P 3.8.5. Attachment 14).
Regulatory Guide 8.13 and the Appendix thereto should be listed in the LERO school bus l
driver assignment packet.
Materials issued to female bus drivers should include a specific query and/or i
l consent fors to assure that they are aware of this information.
No change (s) to pages 3.9 2 and 3 of the plan could be located which respond to the previous Rev. 9 coament l
that the plan should be revised to renove the impression t
IAlthough this exercise issue is not sufficient to rate the element inadequate, this issue should be corrected.
l
Review Conments Based On NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. Rev.1.
Supp. 1 Local Offsite Radioloaical Emeraency Reseense Plan for Shoreham Review of Revision 10 by Regional Assistance Committee (RAC)-
Dated September 6. 1988 Page 19 of 19 NvREG 0654 l
Element Review Comment (s1 Ratinc that an energency worker could be authorized by an fanediate supervisor to remain in the EPZ with an off-scale 0 SR dosineter.
K.S.b No change (s) to OPl? 3.9.2 could be located which A
responds to the previous Rev. 9 connent that no instructions are given for what to do with an essential vehicle which is contaninated above the 1inits after three (3) decontanination attempts.
L.
Medical and Public Health Suceert L1 Section 2.2 (page 2.2 8) of the plan has been revised A
to specify that Mid !sland Hospital has been added as i
the backup hospital for the evaluation and treatment of contaminated injured persons. #owever, the linguage in Section 3.7 (page 3.71) concerning which hospital is i
primary or backup needs to be clarified.
P.
Reseensibility for the Plannina Effort P.5
... The Table of Contents section of Rev. 10 has been A
updated to include documentation of the pages changed for this revision.
Page vili specifies that Rev.10 became effective 5/16/88.
P.8 The NUREG 0654 cross reference has been revised as A
recommended in the review cossents for Rev. 9.
l n
i 5
Element Rating Summary page 1 of 3 NUREG 0645 Element Rating Rev. 10 A.1.a A
A.1.b A
A.I.c A
A.1.d A
A.1.e A
A.2.a A
A.2.b A
A.3 A
A.4 A
Col.a A
C.1.b A
C.1.c A
C.2.4 A
C.3 A
C4 A
C.5 A
D.3 A
D.4 A
E.1 A
E.2 A
E.5 l'
E.6 A
E.7 A
E.8 A
F.1.a A
F.1.b A
F.1.c A
F.1.d A
F.1.e A
F.2 A
F.3 A
4.1.4 e A
G.2 A
G.3 A
G.4.a A
G.4 b A
G.4.c A
G.5 A
l Elseent Rating Summary page 2 of 3 hCREG 0645 Element Rating Rev. 10 H.3 A
H.4 A
H.7 A
H.10 A
H.11 A
H.12 A
!.7 A
!.8 A
!.9 A
!.10 A
!.11 A
J.2 A
J.9 A
J.10.a A
J.10 b A
J.10.c A
J.10.d
,A J.10.e J.10.f I
J 10.g A
J.10.h A
J.10.1 A
J.10.j J.10.k A
J.10.)
A J.10.a A
J.11 A
J.12 I
K.3.a A
K.3 b I
K.4 I
K.5.4 A
K.5.b A
L.1 A
L.3 A
L.4 A
M.1 A
M.3 A
M.4 A
4
\\
Element Rating Sunnary page 3 of 3 NUREG 0645 Element Rating Rev. 10 M.1 A
M.3 A
M.4 A
N.1.a A
N.1.b A
N.2.a A
N.2.c A
N.2.d A
N 2.e
'A N.3.a f A
N.4 A
N.5 A
N.6 A
0.1 A
0.4 A
0.5 A
0.6 A
P.1 A
P.2 A
P.3-A P.4 A
P.5 A
P4 A
P.7 A
P.8 A
P.10 A
P.11 A
LIST OF ACRONYh3 page 1 of 2 i
.A-I ARC American Red Cross ASLB Atomic Safety and Licensing Board B-l BHO DOE's Brookhaven Area Office
-C-CPI Coordinator of Public Information CPM counts per minute i
0 i
DOC U.S. Department of Cosmerce 000 U.S. Department of Defense
}
00E U.S. Department of Energy 1
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation ORD Direct Reading Dosimeter
.E-l EBS Emergency Broadcast Systes ENC Emergency News Center i
EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility i
EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency EPC Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
)
EPIP Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPZ Emergency Planning Zone j
ERPA Emergency Response Planning Area EWOF Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility
.F-FAA Federal Aviation Administration i
FCC Federal Communications Commission i,
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FRERP Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan FRMAP Federal Radiation Monitor <ng Assistance Program
-H-1 HHS U.S. Department of Health,,and Human Services,
.K.
K!
Potasstue lodine 1
1
o I
. LIST OF ACRONYNS.
page 2 of 2 i
.L.
LERO LocalEmergene)ResponseOrganization LILCO Long Island Lighting Company LIRR Long Island Railroad
.N.
NCS National Comunications System NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team NRC Nuclear Regulatory Comission 0
OPIP Offsite Plan Implementing Procedure ORS Offsite Radiological Survey
.p.
i
]
PA Protective Action PAG Protective Action Guide PAR Protective Action Recossendation i
.R.
RAC Regional Assistance Committee 1
RAP Radiological Assistance Program
-l RECS Radiological Emergency Cosaunications System REMP Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program 9
]
SNPS Shoreham Nuclear Power Station
)
.T.
TLD Thersoluminescent Oosimeter TSC Technical Support Center TSO TimeSharingOption(computer)
]
.U.
j USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture
.V.
VA U.S. Veterans Administration i
4 i
b i
I
4+
d
%W o
o POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT June 7 9,1988, Exercise of the Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO),
as specified in the LILCO Local Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for e**
SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION Shoreham, New York September 2,1988
\\.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Region il 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y.10278
!!! "288# sis L F
4 1
\\
POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT June 7-9,1988 Exercise of the Wal Emergency Response Organization (LERO),
as speelfled in the LILCO Local Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION at Shoreham, Now York i
September 2,1988 i
Tederal Emergency Management Agency l
Region 11 24 Tederal Plaza New York, New York 10278 i
i CONTEN'!15 t
GOVERNMENTAL AND ORG ANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION..................
vil A B B R E VIA T I O N S.........................................................
vill
SUMMARY
......6.......................................................
xi 1 I NT R O D U C TI O N.......................................................
I 1.1 Ex erc ise Backgro und................................................
1 l
- 1. 2 Fede ral E v alua t ors.................................................
2 1
1.3 T E M A C on trolle rs..................................................
8 j
- 1. 4 E v alua t i on C ri t eri a.................................................
10 1
- 1. 5 Ex e rc ise Obj ec t iv es................................................
10 j
- 1. 8 Ev ere ise Sc enario..................................................
23 1
1.8.1 Major Sequence of EventJ on Sits...............................
23 l
J 1.6.2 On-Si t e Sc e nario Ov e rvi e w....................................
26 1.8.3 Description of Local Emergency Response Organlaation
)
R e so urc e s...................................................
32 l
1.8.4 Actual and Simulated Off-Site Events Summary..................
37 l
)
1.8.5 Ez ere tse Ti m elin e............................................
38 J
2 E X E R CISE E VA LU ATION.............................................. -
41 i-i 2.1 Local Emergency Response Orfanization EmerTency Operations l
j Center...........................................................
41 2.1.1 Plu m e Exposure Pa thway Ac tivities.............................
41 l
2.1.2 Ingestion Pathway and Recovery / Reentry Activities..............
59 1
2.2 E m e rg enc y Ope ra t io ns F a c ili ty.......................................
57 l
2.2.1 Plume Exposure Pathway Activities.............................
57 2.2.2 Inges t!on Pathway Activities...................................
2.3 Broo k hav e n Are a Of flee.............................................
40 1
2.3.1 Plume Exposure Pa thway Activities.............................
80 2.3.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities...................................
83 i
2.3.3 Emerteney Worker Radiological Exposure Control................
84
- 2. 4 Co n trac t Labora tory................................................
48 l
l 2.4.1 Plume Exposure Pathway Activities.............................
88 i
l 2.4.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities...................................
44 l
2.5 E me rge ncy Ne ws Cen t er............................................
48 1
2.5.1 Plume Exoosure Pathway Activities.............................
48 l
2.5.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities...................................
70 1
2.8 Port Je f f erson Staging Area.........................................
72
))
1 2.8.1 Staging Are a Opera tions......................................
72 2.8.2 Implementation of Field Activities.............................
74 2.8.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Contro!................
77 l
- 2. 7 P a t c hogue S taging Are a.............................................
79 J
2.7.1 Staging Are a Ope ra tions......................................
79 l
2.7.2 Imple mentation of Field Activities.............................
Il 2.7.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................
83 3
1
- 2. 8 Riv e r h e a d S t agi ng Ar e a.............................................
85 j
2.8.1 S t agi ng-Ar e a Expos ure........................................
85 L
2.8.2 Imple mentation of Fle!d Activities.............................
87 J
2.8.3 Emergency Worker Radiological Exposure Control................
90 l
i
!!k a
1 CONTEN'11 (Cont'd) 2.9 Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility.........................
92 2.9.1 E W D F Op e r a t i o ns..........................................
92 l
2.9.2 Emergency Worker Radlological Exposure Control..............
93 R e c e p t i o n C e n t e rs................................................
95 2.10, M e d i c al Drills....................................................
2.11 98 2.12 Sc hool In t e rv i e w.................................................. 102 2.13 Transit Dependent Evacuation Operations............................ 104 2.13.1 Imple mentation of Transf er Points............................ 104 2.13.2 Vehicle / Driver Mobil! stion and Activation.................... 105 2.13.3 Emergency Worker Radlological Exposure Control..............
106 2.13.4 Implementation of Evacuee Transportation.................... 110 2.13.5 R eloc a ti o n C e n t e rs......................................... 112 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION.............................................................
115 4 STAT U S O F O BJ E CTIVES...............................................
144 FIGURE 1.1 Organization of Shoreham Exercise Evaluators...........................
3 TABLES 1.1 Number of Transit-Depende nt Evacuation Routes.......................
34 1.2 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline for the Shoreham Ex e re t s e..........................................................
39 1.3 Plume Pathway Protective Action Timeline.........,..................
40 3.1.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defieleneles - LERO EOC..............................................................
117 3.1.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Correc t i v e A c tion - L E R O E O C.....................................
118 3.2.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defielencies -
E m erTency Opera tions Facility....................................... 123 3.2.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Emergency Operations Facility.................... 124 J
3.3.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defielencies -
Broo kha v e n Are a O f fic e.............................................
125 l
17
TABLES (Cont'd) 3.3.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Brookhaven Area Of fice..........................
126 3.4.1 shoreham Nuclear Power Station summary of Defielencies -
E m e rg e n c y Ne w s C e n t e r............................................
127 3.4.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Ac tion - Emergency News Center..........................
128 3.5.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station summary of Deficiencies -
Port Je f f e rson S t aging Are a.........................................
129 3.5.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Port Jefferson Staging Area.......................
130 3.6.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defieleneles -
P a t c hogu e S t agi ng Are a.............................................
131 3.6.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Patehogue Staging Area..........................
132 3.7.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defielencies -
Riverhe ad S t aging Are a.............................................
134 3.7.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Ac tion - Riverhead Staging Are a..........................
135 3.8.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defielencies -
Emergency Worker Decontamination Faci!!ty..........................
136 3.8.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - EmerTency Worker Decontamination Facility........
137 3.9.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defieleneles -
R ec ep t i o n C e n t e r..................................................
138 3.9.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power station Summary of Areas Requiring Corrective Action - Reception Center................................
139 3.10.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Deficioneles -
Congr eg a t e C are C e n t e r............................................
140 3.10.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Rayulting Corrective Action - Congregate Care Center..........................
141 3.11.1 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Defielencies -
M e d i c al D r ill......................................................
142 3.11.2 Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Summary of Areas Requiring C o rr e c t i v e A c t i o n - M e di c al D el11....................................
143 1
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TABLES (Cont'd) 4 Status of Objectives - Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.....................
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,00VERNMENTAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PARTICIPATION PARTICIPATING:
Local Emergency Response Organization Long Island L!ghting Company Shoreham-Wading River School District U.S. Department of Energy, Brookhaven Area Offlee U.S. Cout Guard Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory Mid Ialand Hospital Brunswick Hospital NONPARTICIPATING:
New York State Nassau County Suffolk County i American Red Cross State of Connecticut t
vil
ABBREVIAT!2NS ANL Argonne Natiotial Laboratory AVS automatic verlfloation system BHO Brookhaven Area Office j
BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory DOC U.S. Department of Commerce DOE U.L Reportment of Energy DOH Department of Health (New York State)
DO!
U.S. Department of the Interior DOT U.S. Department of Transportation l
DRD direct-reading dosimeter EAL emergency action level EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECCS emergency core cooling system ECL emergency classification level EMS emergency medleal service ENC emergency news center EOC emergoney operations center EOF emergency operations facility EPA U.S. Environmenu; Protect!on Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ERPA emergency response planning area EWDF emergency worker decontamination f acility FAA Federal Aviation Administration vill t
I FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Manadement Agency FSAR f!nal safety ar.alysis report GM guidance memorandum i
HMS U.S. Department of Health and Human Servlees t
!!iEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory E!.
potassium lodide LERO Local 3mergene-) Response Organlaatton LILCO Long taland Lighting Company LIRR Long Island Railroad LOCA loss-of-coolant accident i
MOU memorandum of understanding NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'mlon NUE notification of unusuu event OGC Office of General Counsel OSC operations support center PAG protective setton guideltne PAR proteettve action recommt idation PIO public Infornation offlect RAC Regional Assistance Committee RAF radiological assessment plan RBSV5 resetor building stand-by ventilatten systam REA radiation emergency pea RECS Radiological Emer$o ey camelestions System e
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REPP radiclogical emergens; pr: par;dncss plan RERP radlological emergency response plan l
l
'RO radiation officer l
RSC radiation support center l
RSO radiation safety officer SNPS Shoreha:n Nuclear Power Station SSO supervising service operator TCP traffic control point TLD thermoluminescent dosimeter l
TP transfer point TSC technical support center TSO time sharing option (computer)
USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture e
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SUMMARY
On February 8,1988, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) asked FEMA, under the terms of the FEMA /NRC Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of April 1985, to conduct an exercise to test off-site preparedness at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS).
From June 7-9, 1988, a team of 68 Federal evaluators evaluated an exercise of the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) Local Off-Site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), which is located in the Town of Brookhaven, New York. Included was an evaluation of the level of preparedness of the LILCO Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO).
The exercise was conducted over three days to accommodate demonstrations of plume exposure pathway, ingestion pathway, and recovery / reentry activities.
Following the exercise, an evaluation was conducted by the Federal evaluator team, and a preliminary briefing for exercise participants was held at the LILCO Training Center in Hauppauge, New York. After the preliminary briefings, thedetailed evaluations were compiled and presented in this report.
The Federal evaluators evaluated the following:
- LERO Em
,ncy Operations Center Emerf my Operations Facility
'e Brookhaven Area Office Contract Laboratory (Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory)
Emergency News Center Port Jefferson staging area Patchogue staging ares e
Riverhead staging area Transfer Points Emergency Worker Decontaminatiott Facility Reception centers Medical drills x1
e Bus evacuation of school children and members of the general population Evacuation of institutional! zed and noninstitutionalized mobility-Impaired people Traffic control points Route alerting for the deLf Impediments to evacuation e
Radiological field monitoring (plume exposure psthway) and sampling (Ingestion pathway)
- School interviews Recovery / Reentry Warning Point (SSO)
EBS station (WPLR)
- Rumor Control Estimation of total populatten exposure.
e A public meeting for the general public on the plans anu the exercise took place at 1700 nours on June 15, 1988, at the Mediterranean Manor in Patchogue, New York.
I 1
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m-1 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACEGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emettency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response. FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear faellities include the following:
Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in reviewing and evduating radiological em irgency response plans developed by state and local governments.
Determining whether such plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans conducted by state and local governments.
Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Con' mission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding [MOU) between NRC and FEMA Relating to Radiological Eme.gency Planning and Preparedness (50 Fed. Reg.,15485, April 18,1985).
Coordinating the activities of the following Federal agencies with responsibil';les Sr radiological emergency planning:
- U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC)
- if'S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
- U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
- U.S. Department of Transportatfor. (DOT)
- U.S. Departtaent of Agriculture (USDA)
- U.S. Department of the Inteetor (DO!).
l These agencies are represented on the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is l
chaired by FEMA.
1 Radiological emergency preparedness plans for the SNPS, which is located in the l
l Town of Isrookhaven, New York, have not beeri submitted to FEMA either by the State or by affected local jurisdletions. Instead, the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO), the applicant for an NRC license to operate SNPS, establishod its own Local Emergency Responsa Organization (LERO), relying on LILCO employees, contractors, private crganlaations, ana DOL On May 28,1983, LILCO lIled a series of five m.! ternate plans with the NRC, each embodying a somewhat different approach to emergency planning.
On June 10,1983, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearing the LILCO application ruled that only the plan entitled "LILCO Transition Plan" would be considered.
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3 J
At the request of NRC, pursuant to ths FEMA /NRC MOU, the FEMA Region !!
RAC reviewed the LILCO Transition Plan (Rev. 9) against the standards and evaluative criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Interim Supp.1, dated November 1987.
Inherent in the latter document are three basic assumptions, which were factored into the FEMA ~ evaluation. In an actual radiological emergency, state and local officlajs that have declined to participate in emergency planning will:
1.
Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public.
2.
Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility's plan.
3.
Have suffielent resources to implement those portions of the utility off-site plan that necessitate state and local responses.
FEMA Region !! RAC found that 17 of the 135 planning elements evaluated were inadequate and recommended a negative finding on Rev. 9 of the LERO plan, stating that l
the plan did not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures could be j
taken in the event of a radiological emergency at SNPS. This recommendation was l
cdopted by FEMA Headquarters and on May 31, 1988, FEMA. transmitted a negative findings to NRC.
Planning for the exercise was allowed to proceed for the following reasons, f
LILCO provided FEMA and the RAC with proposed changes to the plan that addressed l
the inadequacies. These changes were incorporated into Rev.10 of the plan prior to the exercise. Of the 17 inadequacies,11 required relatively minor changes to the plan, while the remaining 6 required substantial revisions. For the six Inadequate elements requiring more substantive revision, FEMA determined that five of these would not affect the conduct of the exercise. FEMA Region II provided technical assistance to the utility to expedite the resolution of the remaining inadequacy requiring substantial revision, concerning the monitoring and decontamination of school children (J.12).
The NRC requested that the Revision 10 changes be incorporated into the exercise play of tlie Shoreham exercise. Based on a cursory review by FEMA Region II, FEMA Headquarters
]
concurred with the regional conclusion that the inadequacy had been addressed in a manner suffielent to permit an adequate demonstration of the monitoring and decontamination function in the exerelse.
The exercise was conducted on June 7-9, 1988, with plume exposure pathway i
emergency plannit.g zone (EPZ) activities conducted on June 7th, Ingestion pathway EPZ cetivities conducted on June 8-9, and recovery /raentry activities conducted on June 9th.
l 1J FEDERAL EVALUATORS 1
The 68 Federal evaluators who evaluated off-site emergency response funettons l
were organized us shown In Fig.1.1. The names of these Individuals, along with their j
affiliations and their exercise assignments, are given below.
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fy O 5 Evaluator Agency Exercise Location (Function (s}) !. Huatr FEMA. (Region II RAC Chairman, oversight evaluation) /1. Selder feld FEMA (oversight evaluation) G. Connolly FEMA LERO Emergency Operations Center (EOC) (team leader) T. BRdwin ANL LERO EOC (operatiens) D. Schweller ANL LERO EOC (operations; Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory) H. Fish DOE LERO EOC (evacuation) P. Lutz DOT LERO EOC (evacuation) P. Kler ANL LERO EOC (warning point communications) S. Wasserman DOC LERO EOC (health services); Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF): school relocation M. Jackson FEMA LERO EOC (pub!!c Information officer (P!O]) J. Keller INEL LERO EOC (accident assessment) E. Fox NRC Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) C. Mallna USDA EOF; LERO EOC (Ingestion pathway decisions) M. Brooks FEMA EmerTency News Center (ENC) (team leader) P. Cogan FEMA (ENC P!O) J. Gentile FEMA WPLR Radio (Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) activation) \\ J. Sutch ANL (rumor control) i B. Salmonson INEL Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) (team leader) i N. Chipman INEL (plume fleid monitoring, Ingestion pathway field sampling) W. Serrano INEL (plume field monitoring, Ingestion pathway field sampling) \\ O
~ O l Evaluator Agency . Exercise Location (Funetton(s}) S. Googins EPA Reception center; EWDF; (Ingestion pathway field sampling) M. Pensak EPA Reception center; decontamination trailer 1 R. Bernacki FDA (medical drills) M. Wordsman FEMA Port Jefferson (team leader; route alerting for the deaf) B. Gasper ANL Port Jefferson (staging area; transfer point (TP]; school evacuations school Interviews) E. Hakala ANL Port Jefferson U.taging area; traffic control points (TCPs}; school evacuation)
- 5. Maleski
,ANL Port Jefferson (TCPs school evacuation) K. Bertram ANL Port Jefferson (impodiments; school evacuation) P. Weberg FEMA Patchogue (team leader; route alerting for the deaf) N. Smith ANL Patchogue (staging area TP schcol evacuation) A. Teotia ANL Patchogue (staging area; TCPs school evacuation) C. McCoy FEMA Patchogue (TCPs school evacuation) M. M'llar ANL Patchogue (Impediments; school evacuation) { P. McIntosh FEMA Riverhead (team leader; route alerting for the deaf)
- 5. Nelson ANL Riverhead (staging areal TP; school evacuation) l M. Madore ANL Riverhead (staging area; TCPs; school evacuation)
N. DITullo ANL Riverhead (TCPs; school evacuation) W. Vinikour ANL Riverhead (Impediments; school evacuation) J. Pleclano FEMA (bus operations; team leader) D. Newsom ANL (bus operations; assistant team leader; general evacustion bus route) 4
7 Evaluatcr Agency Ex rcise Location (Funsti:n(si) J. Lamb FEMA Port Jefferson (TP; school evacuations reentry bus) A. Lookabaugh ANL Patchogue (TP schoci evacuations reentry bus) G. Jones FEMA Patchogue (TP school evacuations reentry bus) L. Payton FEMA Patchogue (TP: school evacuation) R. Acorno FEMA Riverhead (TP school evacuation) E. Robinson ANL Riverhead (TP: school evacuations reentry bus) J. Bravo FEMA Riverhead (TP school evacuation)
- 5. Rizzo FEMA Riverhead (TP school evacuation)
- 5. ' Gray PEMA (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus)
M. Farrell FEMA (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) L. Testa FEMA (general evacua'tlon bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) D. Anderson FEMA (general evacuation bus router school evacuations reentry bus) R. Shapiro FEMA (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) J. Muzzarelli ANL (general evacuation bus routes school evacuation reentry bus) L. Conley ANL (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) R. Izzo ANL (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) J. Ellas ANL (general evacuattor, bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) R. Nelsius ANL (general evacuation bus routes school evacuations reentry bus) 4 4 0
8 Evaluator Agency Ex:relse Ideati:n (Funstign(sD D. Cessna FEMA (general evacuation bus routes school evacuation reentry bus) . Karvelas ANL (mobility impaired (home]; school evacuation) i i M. Post FEMA (mobility Imptired (home]; school evacuation) W. Lueders ANL (mobility impaired [home]: school evacuation) T. Carroll ANL (mobility impaired (special facilities]; school I evacuation) l F. Wilson ANL (mobility impaired (home] school evacuation) i H. Rhude ANL (mobility impaired (home]; school evacuation) l r J. Wang ANL (mobility impaired (home]; school evacuation) E.* Sears ANL (mobility impaired (special fac!!!tles]; school evaewtlon) f I C. Hunckler ANL (mobility impaired (special f acilltles]; school evacuation) l l 1.3 FEMA CONTROLLERS To assist in its evaluation of the exercise objectives, FEMA Region II executed certain control functions through controllers. Their responsibilities included injecting t exercise. messages and exercise data to specified exercise participants. Controllers were f specifically prohibited from providing exercise information to the exercise participants regarding scenario development or specific advice on the resolution'of problem areas encountered. As stated in the FEMA Guidaace Memorandum (GM) EX-3 Amendment dated March 7,1988, "FEMA will evaluate. Interfaces between utility off-site response orfanisation personnel through Interactive communications and exchanges with controllers and evaluators. While the controllers will not function as stand-Ins, they will provide appropriate opportunities for the players to demonstrate the knowledge and Interface capabilities of utility off-site response organization personnel." FEMA used information obtained by both exercise controllers and evaluators to assess the utility off-site response organisation's Interface and liaison capabilities. - Controllers were not used as evaluators since the control cell function was primarily to request Information from LERO liaisons !n order to demonstrate the knowledge and sk!11s of LERO. Ten Individuals served as FEMA controllers. Their names, aff!!!ations, and assignments during the exercise follow. I .~-.--...-,,__._.-___,m_ m ..,_., -..-_ _ _,,,.~,. _.,.,.,.,,,.
9 Throughout this PEA document, wherever references are made regarding requests for information from the Federal, State, and local response organizations, it is to be recognized that the organization's role is being performed via the FEMA control cell. Controller Agency Assignment R. Donovan FEMA Senior FEMA controller M. Hapler FEMA Local Government Controller M. Russo FEMA Local Government Controller-R. Screen FEMA Local Government Controller O R. Jaske FEMA State Government Controller Local Government Controller V. Wingert FEMA State Government Controller W. McNutt FEMA State Government Controller V. Adler FEMA Federal Government Controller State Government Controller Local Government Controller ~ L Angelo FEMA Federal Government Controller State Government Controller Local Government Controller American Red Cross W. Cumming FEMA /OGC' Legal advisor to senior FEMA controller 'OGC = Office of General Counsel. { t
1.4 EVALUATION CRITERIA The exercise evaluations presented in Sec. 2 of this report are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-l REP-1, Rev.1, Interim Supp.1, November 1987. For the purpose of exercise assessment, FEMA uses evaluation method to apply the NUREG-0654 criteria. FEMA classifies exercise inadequacies as Defielencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Actions. Deficiencies are demenstrated and observed inadequacles that would cause a finding that off-site emergeen geparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the public !!ving in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of Defielencies on emergency preparedness, they must be corrected promptly through appropriate remedial actions, including remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) are demonstrated and observed inadequacies of performance, and although their correction is required, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety. An ARCA which is not corrected in future exercises may be reclassified as a deficiency. In addition to these inadequacles, FEMA identifies Areas Recommended for Improvement (ARFIs), which are problem areas observed during an exercise that are not considered to adversely impact public health and safety. While not required, correctio 1 of these would enhance an organization's level of emergency preparedness. 1.5 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES Objectives for the exercise were developed by LILCO and submitted to FEMA for review by the RAC. Following the review process, FEMA requested LILCO to revise the proposed objectives based on review comments. Upon FEMA's approval of the revised objectives, thef were sent to NRC for review. NRC stated in a memorandum to FEMA dated May 20,1988, that "... these objectives are sufficient to constitute a ' qualifying' exerelse under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1....". This NRC staff position was again confirmed in a memorandum of May 26,1988. The objectives of this exercise included the demonstration of LERO's ability to mobilize needed personnel and equipment and LERO's famillarity with procedures required to manage an emergency at SNPS. The exercise was to involve activation and i participation of staff and response facilities at SNPS, as well as at LERO and its facilities. Federal agencies were to be notified during the exercise according to existing protocols. Federal agencies with radiological emergency preparedness responsibility l were not to participate actively in the play of the exercise, except.'or commitments under the plan by DOE for radiological field monitoring and ingestion pathway sampling snd by the U.S. Coast Guard for notification of waterborne traffic inside the 10-mile EPZ. The exercise was to endeavor to demonstrate by actual performance a number of primary emergency preparedness functions. At no time wu the exercise to interfere with actual operation of SNPS or with normal State or County activities. The scope of the exercise was defined by the objectives listed below. These objectives are grouped according to the location responsible for their demonstration and identified as being part
11 of the plume exposure pathway or the ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry phases of the exercise. Thirty-four of the 36 FEMA objectives from Guidance Memorandum (GM) EX-3 were tested during the exercise. As provided for in the March 7,1988, amendment to GM EX-3, an additional objective (#37) was added to test other items identified in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1. Rev. 1, Supp. 1. The three objectives that were not demonstrated are: 1. Objective 17: Use of Potassium lodide (K!) for the General Public. This was consistent with the New York Public Health Law, New York State r3diological emergency preparedness practices, and the Shoreham REPP, that the distribution and administration of K! to the general public la not an acceptable protective action. 2. Objective 22: Congregate Care Center Operations. This objective was not demonstrated because the American Red Cross did not participate in the Shoreham exercise.* 3. Objective 36: Unannounced and Off-Hours Exercises. This omission is consistent with GM EX-3, which states that an off-hours, unannomeed exercise is not a requirement for a qualifying i exercise. The text of the object!.er evaluated during the exercise are taken directly from FEMA CM EX-3, which is entitled Managing Pre-Exercise Activities and Post-Exercise Meetings, and, was dated February 26, 1988. The objectives below are identified by number as they appear in GM EX-3. Because these objectives were evaluated at various facilitics and locations (e.g., EOC, BHO, and ENC), and on different days during the plume exposure pathway, ingestion pathway, and recovery / reentry phases of the exercise, the results of these evaluations are keyed in this report to the location at which each was evaluated and to the GM EX-3 objective number (e.g., EOC 1). The following list incorporates all objectives for demonstration in the exercise sgreed upon by LILCO, as confirmed in the June 2,1988 memorandum from FEMA Region 11 to LILCO. l L Plume Exposure Pathway LERO Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and { use emergency classification levels (ECLs), through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding j
- An NRC memorandum to FEMA, dated May 11,1988, stated that "the Commission in Long Island Lightine Co.... recognized that the American Red Cross charter from Congress and its national policy require that the American Red Cross provide aid in 'any radiological or natural disaster,' whether or not there are letters of agreement...."
12 So ECLs as required by the scenarlo. The four ECLs are notification' of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. Objective 2: Demonstrate the ab!!!ty to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility- ~ and field-based emergency functions. i Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Objective 5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. Objective 10: Demonstrate the ability, witN!n the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. Objective 11: Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage, EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors. Objective 12: Demonstrate the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropelate state and/or local offlcials. ? Objective 13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formula-e I tion and dissem! nation of accurate Information and Instructions to the pub!!c in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. 4 Objective 18: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of El for emergency workers and institution-alized peraons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the dectston is made, if necessitated by radiolodine releues. Objective 18: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including
13 transit-dependent persons, special needs population, handicapped persons, and institutionalized persons). Objective 19: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school ch!!dren within the plume EPZ. Objective 20: Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Objective 26: Demonstrate the ability to Identify the need for assistance and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies for that assistance. Objective 34: Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous,24-hour basis by an actual shif t change. Objective 35: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the evacuation of on-site personnel. Objective 37:* Demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillze, and activate personnel for both faellity-and field-based emergency functions. Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all e appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel.
- FEMA HQ memorandum:
Guidelines for Regions to Use In Implementing NUREG 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp.1, with Qualifying Exercises, March 7,1988, GM EX-3 Amendment.
t% \\ Obj:ctive 5: Damenstrato the ad:qu cy cf fcs!!!ttes, equipment. o displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. ' Objective 10: Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. Objective 34: Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shif t change. Objective 35: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the evacuation of on-site personnel. Brookhaven Area Offlee (BHO) Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility and field-based emergency functions. ' Objective 3: Demonstrste the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 41 Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. I Objective 5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipmsnt, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. Objective 7: Demonstrate the approorlate equipment and procedures for determining fleid radiat!on measurements. Objective 8:* Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and proced-ures fgr measurement of altborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10' microcurie per em in the presence of noble gases, t t
- This objective is applicable only to the plume-exposure-pathway phua of the exercise, although it was originally ident! fled as an Ingestion-pathway objective, based on the June 2,1988 letter from FEMA Region !! to LILCO.
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V 15 Objective 9: Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly evaluate data. Objective los Demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data. Objective 11:* Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant data and field measurements, and to recommend appropriate protective measures to LERO, based on PAGs, and effectively communicate them to the LERO EOC. LERO, with permission from state and local officials, is responsible for final deelslon on protective action recommenda-tions (PARS). Contract Imboratory (LAB) Objective ha* Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and e procedures for determining field radiation measurements. Emergency News Center (ENC) Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobl!!ze, and activate personnel for both facility-and fleid-based emergency functions. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriats locations, orTanizations, and fleid personnel. Object!'ve 5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. Objective 13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formula-tion and dissemination of accurate Information and Instructions to the public in a timely fuhton after the Initial alert and notification has occurred.
- This objective replaces GM EX-3, objective 11 to accommodate the DOE-RAP Brookhaven Area Offlee (BHO), which provides technical support to LERO.
- This objective was demonstrated and evaluated at the Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory as agreed upon by LILCO and FEMA.
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36 Objective 14: Demonstrate the ability to brief the media In an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner. Objective 15: Demonstrate -the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. Objective 34: Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shif t change. Objective 37: Demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. Staging Areas (SA) Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and . use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emergency. Objective 2 Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions. '~ Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, ceardinate, and control emettency activities. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Objective 5: Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. Objective 16: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of El for emergency worken and Institutional-1:ed persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if I necessitated by radiolodine releases. Objective 18: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessar e to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted d l
17 permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persona, special needs population, hand! capped persods, and institut!onalized persons.) Objective 20: Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Objective 34: Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous,24-hour basis by an actual shift change. Emerteney Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF) Objective 2: Demonstrate the ab!!!ty to fully alert, mobilize, and setivate personnel for both fac!!!ty-and field-based emergency functions. Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. Objective 25: Demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal. Objective 34: Demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous,24-hour basis by an actual shift change. Fleid Activities (FA) 1 Objective 2: Demonstrate the ab!!!ty to fully alert,' mobilize, and activate personnel for both feallity-and field-based emergency' funetions. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all I appropriate locations, orfanizations, and field personnel. Objective 6: Demonstrate the abt!!ty to continuously monitor and. control emergency worker exposure. Objective 7: Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and proced-ures for determining making field radiation measurements. Objective 8: Demonstrate the appropriate equipment and proced-ures fgr measurement of girborne radiolodine concentrations as low l as 10' microcurie per em in the presence of noble gases. l 6 _.t..
18 Objective 9: Demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly perform laboratory analyses. Objective 16: Demonstrate the ability to make the decision to e recommend the use of EI for emergency workers and institutional-Ized persons, based on predetermined criteria, as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision la made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, Objective 18: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to e implement appropriate protective actions for the Imnacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (Including transit-dependent persons, special needs population, handicapped persons,. and lastitutionalized persons). Objective 19: Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ. Objective 20: Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas. Objective 21: Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees. Obj'ective 23: Demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals. [ Objective 24: Demonstrate the adequacy of medical facility equipment, procedures, and personnel for handling contaminated, injured, or exposed Individuals. Objective 37: Demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response orfanization personnel to Interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mob!!!zation and provision of advice and assistance. District Offlees (DO) Objective 15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. 4 S l l
19 II. Ingestion Pathway and Recovery / Reentry Objectives Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizat!ons, and field personnel. Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. Objective 13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formula-tion and dissemination of accurate Information and Instructions to the publ!,e in a timely fashion af ter the initial alert and notification has occurred. Objective 25:* Demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipment, supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of amerTency workers, equipment, and vehleles, and for waste disposal. Objective 26: Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for assistance and call upon Federal and other outside support agencies for that assistance. 8 Objective 28: Demonstrate the appropriate laboratory operatiom and procedures for measur!ng and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water, and animal feeds (Indigengus to the area and stored). l l Objective 29: Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dose to l the public via the Ingestion pathway and to determine appropriate protective measures, based on fiv!d data, FDA PAGs, and other { relevant factors. Objective 30: Demonstrate the ability to implement both preventive and emergency protective actions for Ingestion pathway hazards. Objective 31: Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population exposure. ( 'Objeettve 25 was demonstrated at the EWDF, not at the LERO EOC.
- Objective 28 was demonstrated at Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory, not at the LERO.MOC.
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20 Objective 32: Demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery based on estimated total population exposure, available EPA PAGs and other relevant factors. Objective 33: Demonstrate the. ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery. Objective 37: Demonstrate the capab!11ty of utility off-site response organization personnel to Interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. Emergency Operations Faellity (EOF) Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and e use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario. The four ECLs are notification of unusual event, alert, site area emergency, and general emerTency. Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions. Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 4: De$onstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations,.and field personnel. Objective 5: Demonstrate the adequacy of faellities, equipment, f displays, and other materials to support emergency operations. I Objective 29: Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dose to e the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appro-l priate protective measures based on fleid data FDA PAGs, and other relevant factors, i Objective 31: Demonstrate the ability to estimate total population e exposure. Objective 32: Demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate f i e measures for controlled reentry and recovery based on estimated total population exposure, available EPA PAGs, and other relevant factors.
21 4 DOE-RAP Brookhaven Area Office (BHO) Objective 2: Demonstrate the ab!!!ty to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions. Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Objective 27: Demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collection and transport of samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water, and animal feeds (Indigenous to the area and stored). Objective 29:' Demonstrate the ability to project radiation dose to the public via the ingestion pathway, based upon laboratory analysis results and field measurements, and to recornmund appropriate pro-tective measures to LERO, based on FDA PAGs, and effectively communicate them to the LERO EOC. LERO, with permission from state and local officlais, is responsible for the final decision on PARS (except for the Connecticut portion of the 50-mile EPZ). Contragt Laboratory (LAB) Objective 28:8 Demonstrate the appropriate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, meat, poultry, water, and animal feeds (Indigenous to the area and stored). Emergency News Center (ENC) Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Objective 13: Demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formula-tion and dissemination of accurate information and instructions to 'This objective replaces GM EX-3, objective 29, to accommodate the DOE-RAP Brookhaven Area Offlee (BHO), which provides technical support to LERO.
- This objective was transferred from the LERO EOC to the Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory where it was demonstrated.
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22 ' the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred. I Objective 14: Demonstrate the abt!!ty to brief the media in an e accurate, coordinated, and timely manner. Objective 15: Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion. i Objective 37: Demonstrate the capability of utility off-stte response organization personnel to Interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance. Staging Areas (SA) Objective 33: Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate e measures for controlled reentry and recovery. l Flaid Activities (FA) Objective 33: Demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery. a I 1 I l j . ~.. -
M 23 1.8 EXERCISE SCENARIO 1.8.1 Mejor Sequence of Events on Site Given below is a listing of exercise events, and the approximate times that they were projected to occur by the scenarios Drill Day 1 - June 7,1988 Projected by Scenario (hours) Event 0355 Predrill briefing 0405 Initial conditions: - SNPS Is operating at 100% power near the end of core !!fe - Residual heet removal pump 1E11*P-014D is out of service - Reserve station service transformer is out of service - Carbon dicxide fire protection system B header is out of service - Control rod drive pump 1C11-P-17A is out of service - Hydrogen recombiner test - Wind direction is 85* at 12-14 mph 0425 Unidentitled leak in drywell begins 0435 Drywell leak exceeds 5 gym 0450 Notification of unusual event, because of a primary system leak j rate in excess of technleal speelf! cations j l 0455 Identify failure of hydrogen recombiner valve 1T; *MOV-032A 0535 Fire in uninterruptible power supply #2 thenfort lose: - Process computer - Rod position indication system 9
24 Projected by Scenario (hours). Event - Safety parameter display system 0600 Alert, because of a fire condition that "potentially" affects a safety system 0610 Fire extinguished 0630 Uninterruptible power supply #2 power restored 0655 Normal station service transformer lockout loss of off-site powers scram 0659 Drywell pressure hight emergency core coollng system (ZCCS) Initiates 0701 High-pressure coolant injection and reactor core isolation cooling trip on high level 0702 Suppression poolspray valve IE11
- MOV-40A falls 0720 Emergency mobile diesels fall 0725 Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) in A reactor recirculation loop Loop A reeltculation valves fall l
Site area emergency, because of high drywell pressure combined with reactor vessel water level below top of active fuel 0730 Core spray pump A falls 0735 Drywell spray valves falls residual heat removal loop cross-tle l valve falls 0925 Lose bus 102 loss of ECCSs General emergency, because of loss of two out of three fissbn product barriers, with a potential to lose the third 1055 Primary containment recombiner valve 1T48
- MOV-037A opens Downstream pipe rupture Ground level release beglu e
25 Projected by Scenario (hours) Event 1125 Normal power and bus 102 reste.,rsd (elavated release) Hydrogen recombiner valve IT48
- MOV-32A closed 1125-1155 Wind shif ts iam west to east
( 1700 Day 1 ends Drill Day 2.!ano 3,1388 0800 Wind direction is 230' Release below technfeally speefilad limits reactor building star.ds by ventilation system (RBSYS) ar.d statim exhaust booster fans in operation HEPA filter on "A" RBSYS failed: "B" train in service A. circulation pump A suction and dise:wge valvas are c!cted Containment is isolated Plant conditions are stcle 1600 Day 2 ends Drill Day 3 - June 9,1988 f 0800 Assume tiniestep to June 10,1988 Wind direction to northeast RBSYS in service Release below technical spec!fications ~ Footprint data available Stable p; ant conditions e 'l k
l 26 Review by operations committee revised emergency action 17 vel (EAL) Cat.15, GE 4 1200 Time advance to June 27,1988 1300 Normal station service transarmer repaired and ln service ~ l EDG 102 repaired l All four EMDs and EMD bus have been repaired i I 1600 Exerelse is terminated 1.6.2 On-Site Scenario Overview The exarcise scenario begins at 0405 hours with SNPS operating at 100% power with a reactor core approaching its end of life. The ple.n' has been at.100% power for the last five months. All systems are operating normally, with the following exceptions: Residual heat removai pump IE11'P-014D !s out of service because an electrical fault in the motor breaker tripped on overload during a surveillance test and a megger showed a phase-to-ground fault. The pump wu declared inoperable 48 hours ago and is isolated mechanically and electrically. Motor replacement has commNeed by a simulated maintenance crew azid L. arpected to be completed within 48 hours. Technical specification LCO 3.5.1 allows continued operation for a total of seven days with this pump out of service. The reserve station service transformer is out of service because of j a cracked bushing on the A-phase primary winding. The transformer is lactated from the 69KV System, with MOD 623 tagged open. All seven breakers from the transfcrmer to the 4KV switchgear are l tagged open and racked out. The transformer was declared } ) Inopirable as of 0800 hours psterday. Maintenance is in progress f by a simulated crew and is expected to be completed within eight l hours. With the transformer declared inoperable, technical specification LCO 3.4.1.1 applies. Action statement "a." allows operation for a total of 72 hours, providing surveillances have t:sen completed on schedule and are due again at 0800 hours today. The carbon dioxide fire protection system feeding the B carbon dioxide header is out of service because of damage to the B discharge line. The line is tagged out while the header is being cut 4 out for replacement. The line had been broken while Colt tie-in work was in progress in the area. This header supplies the relay root and control room. A simulated, continuous fire wate.; has been established in the relay and computer rooms in accordance l l l 1 1
..-~ 27 with technical specification LCO 3.7.7.3 action statement "a." Maintenance is in progress on the broken !!ne by a simulated crew, and repairs are expected to be completed witbn three hours. The control rod drive pump 1C11-P-1?A is out of service because of a fa!!ed pump bearing. The bearing overheated and seized yesterday at 1342 hours. A simulated raalntenance crew 16 working to repair the pump, and it is expected to be returned to service in 12 hours. The previous operating shift perform 6d a functional test of the B los2-of-coolant post-LOCA hydrogen recombiner IT48*RC-002B, in accordance with the recombiner functional test procedure SP24.402.01. The operations shift on the day watch is responsible ~ for verifying the valve positions In the recombiner system as a condition for completing the functional test. Weather conditions are expected to be fair and seasonable, with the wind out of the east at 12-14 mph. l 1 The scenario begins when the nuclear station operator recognizes an increase in drywell pressure, temperature, and humidity, as alarms and Indications show that the drywell unidentified leakage is beginning to trand upward. The unidentifled leakage has been steady at 1 gym for the past two months within 10 minutes, it increases to above 5 gym. Technical speelfication LCO 3.4.3.2 requires a controlled shutdown to hot shutdown within 12 hours. This shutdown is assumed to begin at this time. If a primary system leak rate is exceeded, the technical speciflestion requires notification of an unu.1ual uent (Cat.1. UE No. 5) per EPIP 1-0. The watch engineer will then assume the duties of emeifency director and implement the SNPS emergency plan. Meanwhile, the operator assigned to complete the valve lineup verification for the post-LOCA hydrogen recombiner fune'.lonal test identifles that containment isolation l valve 1T48*MOV-032A failed to close. The series isolation valve IT48'MOV-037 A, did close. Several electrical problems are postulated as preventing the 1748*MOV-032A valve from closing. These problems are incestigated and eventually the valve is closed, but not until the release has occurred. Because the valve is inside the drywell, it is inaccessible for manual closure. Technleal' specification LCO 3.8.3 requires the valve to be fixed within four hours, or 1T48'MOV-037A must be deactivated and secured in the isolated position. Approximately one hour into the drill, a fire breaks out in uninterruptible power l supply 1R36-!NV-02 located in the relay room. As System B of the carbon diox!Je system is out of service because of the damaged line, the carbon dioxide system will not ] automatically inject into the room. The simulated fire watch in the area notes smoke and flames coming fram the panel and reports it to the control room. The fire is in bay 5 i on the east and of the pe d and threatens to endanger safety-related panels [' 1H21*P101C and D. The SNPS t te brigade is setivated to manually extinguish the fire. The fire continues for approximately 30 minutes from its initial discovery until it is extinguished. Deenergized 1R36-INV-02 will be reenergized, thcreby restoring its loads. I i I
88 This fire condition that "potentially" affects a safety system requires an alert (Cat. 8, Alert No.13) to be declared per EP!P 1-0. The Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), EOF, ENC, and LERO EOC are activated at this time. At approximately two-and-one-half hours into the scenario, a loss of off site power occurs when the normal station service transformer trips.because of a ground on one of the secondary windings. This transformer electrical fault causes the main generator output breakers 1310 and 1330 to open, as well u the opening of grid Isolation breakers 1350 and 1360. Thase events lead to a generator load reject, turbine trip, and reactor scram. Of sipificant importance with the loss of 'tormal power is the simultaneous loss of the condensate /feedwater system. 2 On the loss of power to the emergency buses, emergency diesel generators 101, 102, and 103 autostart normally and reenergize all emergency switchgear. The loss of voltage to 4EV bus 11 causes the emergency mobile diesei generators to automatically start and begin to autosynchronize to one another while the emergency mobile diesel bus feeder breaker to bus 11, ACB11-1B, trips open in response to the undervoltage signal. As the second emergency mobile diesel generator attempts to synchronize, its cutput breaker closes when its generator is 180' out of phase' with the emergency diesel generator mobile bus, causing extreme damage to the bus and the two breakers involved. The two emergency mobile diesels trip, and the bus is rendered unusable. In addition, power is lost to the drive mechanisms for the SRMs and IRMs and power-level indication is lost within 13 minutes following the scram. Following significant core damage later in the drill, it is postulated that even after power is restored, the detectors cannot be inserted because the in-core instrument tubes have collapsed, resulting in a complete loss-of-power-level indication for the remainder of the drill. Following the reactor scram, the main system isolation valves isolate because of loss of power to the RPS buses, which feed NS4, the nuclear steam supply shut-off system. With the valves closed, the reactor pressure is limited by opening the SRVs and initiating RCIC. Because of the loss of normal AC po'wer to the emergency buses, power is lost to the drywell cooler fans via the shunt tr'ps. With the small primary system leak continuing, drywell pressure and temperature quickly rise. When the drywell pressure reaches 1.69 ps g, ABCLCW is automatically isolated to the drywell coolers, precluding restoration of drywell cooling. Also, at the drywell high-pretsure setpoint, all ECCSs are initiated. The HPCI pump quickly raises the vessel levels both HPC! and RCIC then trip on a high-vessel-level sipal. The core spray pumps run, with flow through their minimum flow valves. One loop of RHR is expected to be allped in the suppression pool spray mode per EOP DW/P, while the other is aliped for low-pressure coolant injection, with flow through the minimum flow line. If an attempt is made to initiate suppression poci spray, suppression pool cooling / spray valve 1E11*MOV-040A will % found to have a cracked stem. The shaft has cracked inside the body, and a part of the fractured piece hu jammed into the packing. In this way, control of suppression pool pressure and temperature with RHR system A is lost. The B loop of RHR in suppression pool spray mode operates as designed. Because of the drywell conditions of high temperature and low pressure, procedures do not permit the use of drywell sprays at this time.
29 At three hours into the drlU, a double-en'ded shear of the A reactor recirculatton loop occurs. The break is postulate.d to be between the recirculation pump and the pump discharge valve. This LOCA will rapidly drop the reactor vessel water level and pressure wh!!e the drywell pressure and temperature increase. The conditions of high drywell pressure, combined with a reactor vessel uter level below top of active fuel, necessitates a site area emergency (Cat.1, SAE No.1) to be declared per EP!P 1-0. A restricted area evaluation la called for at tais time, and personnel accountability is called for. Personnel accountability begins. It la postulated that the reelreulation !!ne i>reak produces a jet of steam arid water directed at the A rectreulat!on loop discharge valve.1831*MOV-031A falls to close if attempted because of a thermal overload. The break is essentially between the reeleculation pump A suction and discharge valves and cannot be Isolated at this time. The LOCA reduces reactor pressure, allowing low-pressure coolant injection and core spray injection into the vessel. Low-pressure coolant injection with RHR pump B !s successful, but the discharge of RHR pumps A and C is directed into the broken recirculation loop and flows directly cut the break. Core spray pur"ps A and B Inject into the core as designed. Five minutes after the accident, however, core spray pump A falls because of a falled upper motor bearing that has no oil present for lubrication. As the upper bearing seizes, the pump motor trips on overloid. FoUowing the LOCA, drywell conditions change greatly, but procedures still prevent the use of drywell spray. The owators should not attempt f o initiate drywell spray 1 If they do, however, drywell spray valve 1E11*MOV-038A stifers a mechanical failure, preventing its successful operation. A failure of the motor torque switch causes i the valve to be jammed in its seat so that it cannot be opened. In this way, control of I drywou pressure with RHR system A is lost. Similarly, the B RHR loop drywou spray valve 1E11*MOV-038B also falls to open because of mechanical binding, if attempts are made ts.open it. With these tallures, all drywell spray espability is lost. At this time, the reactor vessel coolant level has recovered to twythirds core height with RHR pump 5 and core spray pump 5 and is gradually increasing. RHR pumps A and C are only injecting into the leak. RHR loop eross-tie valve 1E11*MOV-050 fa!!s to open, if the attempt is mede, as does the ultimate cooling water connection valve IP41'20V-0020. Supplemental sources of injection water, such as condensate transfer and fire boses aligned to the feedwater system, are delayed because of malfunctions as At approximately five hours into the driu, emerTency bus 102 power is lost because of a failed exelter on EDG 102. This event causes the diesel te trip on an overspeed condition. As the RHR pump B's are powered from emergency bus 102, these pumps lose power and stop their injection into the reactor vessel. At this point, the plant is essentially without ECCS capability. All drywen and suppression pool spray capability is lost at this time as well. With the loss of core cooling, the core begins to boll dry, leading to failure of the feel cladding. Primary containment temperature and pressure will continuously increase, leading to the potential for a primary containment failure. With the reactor coolant t
30 i pressure boundary and fuel cladding already breached, a general emergency (Cat., GE No. 2) is declared per EP!P 1-0. A GE No. 6C and/or GE No. 68 are also applicable and may be declared as well. At this time, appropriate PARS are made to off-site agencies. One and one-half hours af ter the loss of emergency bus 102, the post-accident hydrogen recombiner outboard Isolation valve 1T48'MOV-037A opens because of a malfunction in the control switch on the primary containment atmosphere control panel. Because the series isolation valve 1T48'MOV-032A had previously failed to close, the steam atmosphere of the drywell rushes through these valves and ruptures the piping downstream, carrying fission products into the reactor building. The increased activity levels in the reactor building are detected by the refuel floor exhaust radiation monitor i and RBSYS. The secondary containment atmosphere is exhausted to the atmosphere via i that system. This action is initiated on the loss of power to 4KV bus 11. One-half hour after the primary containment failure, station power is restored by completion of the RSST bushing replacement. The station's normal and emergency buses are reenerfized, restoring power to RHR pump B, core spray pump B, and the condensate i and condensate booster pumps. RHR and core spray pumps are restarted, reflooding the reactor vessel. At the same time, repairs are completed to the failed post-LOCA hydrogen recombiner valve 1T48'MOV-032A. The valve is closed, and the primary containment is isolated. The restoration of power to the normal buses also allows the operators to rastart the station exhaust booster fans, changing the release from a ground-level one to an elevated one. Following reflooding of the core, core conditions are estab!!shed, and the radiological releue and in-plant radiation levels begin to decrease. The information presented to the players at this time indicates that plant conditions are improving and that radiological nazt.rds are under control. Shift ' changes for both on-site and LERO groups are planned and demonstrated. After the shift change, the second shift continues with exercise play until the end of the fi st day's activities. Following suspension of play, key management, operations, and dose aAmessment staffs discuss the activities they expect to carry out during the night. Plans to repair equipment and for environmental samp!!ng are discuased. On the basis of these plans, the controllers are to develop the information twuested by the players. When the exercise resumes on the second day,it is assumed that the accident has protrassed in real time and that 0800 hours on drill day 2 is in fact 0800 hours on June 8,1988. Plant conditions are stable, with the leak isolated and all containment isolation valves closed. However, for purposes of this exercise and to meet the objectives stated in Sec.1 of this report, it is assumed that the ventilation rate from the reactor building is much greater than ths Mrmal RBSYS flow rate. This artificiality allows the stack release rate to be reduced below technical specification values by P.pproximately u400 hours on the morning of June 8,1988. Players are briefed on this j exercise artifice the evening before, so that Msumption of play la not delayed the next day. For purposes of deposition calculations caly, the norwal release rate and duration are used in making ingestion pathway calculations. The following two assumptions assure that there would be high lodines and particulat.s in the environment to ensure eat objectives in the ingestion pathway phase are met
31 1. Rain showers occur overnight en castern Long Island Sound and in southeastern Connecticut. 2. H!gh differential pressure across the RBSYS filter train causes 'tasket fa!!ure and filter blow-by. Due to L!LCO controller intervention, approved by the RAC Chairman, at the beginning of day 2 play ?!me was picked up from the end of day one play. The time jump discuased above commenced at approximately 1030 hours. When play resumes on June 8,1988, players brief their management on the data collected overnight and the recommendations made, based upon the program developed on the previous night. Initial ground deposition rec. dings (uR) are provided to establish a preliminary footprint of the plume. Based upon these preliminary data, specific survey missions are ~ assigned. Teams are dispatched to collect samples of vegetation, sol!, food stuffs, and other consumables. These samples are prepared for shipment to an outside contract laboratory for analysts. The sample results are evaluated, and the results are compared with EPA guidance and Ingestion pathway PAGs. On the basis of this evaluation and comparison, the initial PARS (plume exposure) may be lifted and PARS for the ingestion pathway formulated. Additional sampling and survey planning occur to better define the extent of the ingestion pathway radlological ha:ard. Following collection and transport of the samples to the laboratory, activities are suspended for drill day 2. A briefing for drill day 3 activities is conducted, including development and presentation of the. data collected in response to the players' sampling program. At the start of exercise activities on drill day 3, it is postulated that time has advanced another 40 hours (i.e., that the time is 0800 hours on the fourth day of the accident, or June 10, 1988). The sample data collected during the time jump are made available to the player:. The scenarlo provided for the deescaiation to an Alert ECL for recovery and reentry purposes. The sample results are evaluated and the results compared with EPA ruldance and Ingestion pathway PAGs. On the basis of this evaluation, the PARS may be lif ted. By noon on day 3 of the exercise, another time warp occurs that advances the time 17 days to three weeks after the release, or June 27,1988, i Again, sample results are given to the players for refining their PARS. The purpose of these time jumps is to demonstrate reentry planning espabilities. Due to controller Intervention and the completed demonstration of reentry planning activities the last time warp was not played. 1 When it is determined that the exercise objectives have been achieved, the exercise is terminated.
1 32 ~ 1.6.3 Description of Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) Resources LERO was to be responsible for ensuring that its resources were deployed in adequate numbers to reasonably test its notification, mobilization, command, coordination, accident assessment, and government Interface capabilities during a three-day exercise of both the plume exposure pathway and ingestion pathway and reentry / recovery seenarios. In orde.' to demonstrate the government Interface espabilities, ut!!!ty off-site response organization personnel in facilities were to maxe telephone calls and forward Information to control cells. For utility off-site response organization personnel in the field, evaluators were to use directed questions to determine their ability to carry out their Interface capabilities. LERO was to obtain permission from the control cell to implement the portions of its plan for which it required legal authority. The control cell was to give authorization in accordance with the LERO plan. This approach was to ensure the requisite demonstration of LERO resources, In accordance with the three assumptions mentioned under Exercise Background. The personnel and resources to be deployed by LERO to demonstrate the capabilities of its emergency resources are described in the following sections. Public Alert and Notifleation During the exercise, the alert and notification system was to be demonstrated by the deelslon to activate bimulate) the siren system and telephonic transmission of an EBS mes, age to the desig.iated radio station for broadcast (simulate) within the 15-minute guideline. All but the actual broadcast of an EBS message was to be evaluated. Because the LILCO Transition Plan provides a system for notification of the deaf, Federal evaluators also evaluated this system. The system consists of preplanned routes driven by LERO route alert drivers who stop at pre-identified addresses to notify deaf persons of an emergency at SNPS. During the exercise, a Federal evaluator was assigned to follow from each staging area, the route alerting vehicles required for deaf notifications and to interview the drivers regarding their knowledge of their responsibilities and procedures. Radiological F1 eld Monitoring Teams In addition to the off-site radiological field monitoring teams dispatched by SNPS, BHO-Radiological Assistanes Plan (RAP) field monitoring teams were to be demonstrated, as provided for in the LERO plan. Three BHO-RAP teams were to be demonstrated (two evaluated) during the plume exposure pathway portion of the exercise and five teams were to be demonstrated (three evaluated) during the ingestion pathway portion of the exercise. The BHO-RAP teams were accompanied in the field by a LILCO controller and a Federal hvaluator. The controllers were given simulated field data, I which they provided to the teams to determine local dose rate readings consistent with I the scenario. 1
33 BHO-RAP teams were to demonstrate the equipment necessary to determine gamma dose rates, airbor ' radiolodine concentrations, and ingestion pathway sample collection for laboratcry analysis. The monitoring teams were not to be suited up in ant! contamination clothing. Emphasis was to be on rapid deployment of teams, rapid gathering of data, communication of data to BHO and proper handling of sample media. Radiological W_ e Control All emergency workers in the 10-mile EPZ were to have thermoluminescent (TLDs) and direct-reading dosimeters (DRPs), access to thyroid blocking agents (i.e., KI), and radiological exposure record cards. They were to be famillar with procedures for rad!ological exposure control (i.<r., at what exposure levels to contact the EOC and with procedures for obtaining clearance for excess exposures). Transportation for Transit-Dependent Evacuees Each of the locations designated in the LILCO Transition Plan as p!?ying a part in evacuation of the 10-mile EP' was to activate all of th0 routes and vehicles it would use in an actual aceldent with FEMA avaluating a selected number of these routes. Resources to complete all evacuations were to be activated out of sequence with the scenario, based on fre2-play messages inserted at the EWDF (for ambulances and ambulettes), staging areas, and TPs (for general population evacuation buses). Bus routes were not to be preassigned. The Federal evaluators, '.n concert with the LILCO controllers, were to ensure that the selected routes did not affect normal public transportation-The drivers were to assemble at their normal dispatch locations and be assigned routes, but they were not to pick up any evacuees. The drivers selected by FEMA at the LERO facilities were to actually plek up the vehicles to be used for route demonstrations. Upen completion of the routes, selected drivers war to report to the i neeption centers to drop off the simulated evacuess, and thence to the EWDF for econitoring and decontamination of the drivers and vehicles. There were to be no tim'. constraints on running the routes, other than those in the L!LCO Transition Plan. In addition, routes were to be demonstrated for simulated transportation of evacuees during reentry. The number of transit-dependent evaeustion route 0 to be evaluated by FEMA is i s speelfled in Table 1.1. School Evacuation Demonstration The LERO primary / auxiliary school evacuation bus drivers were to be exercised out of sequence on day 2 of the exercise. To be inelt. sed were the activation and mobilization of all LERO school evacuation bus drivers, as well as five drivers from the Seaman Bus Company, which were to be assigned to the Shoreham-Wading River School District. Upon notification, bus drivers were to report to their assigned bus yards and receive a school evacuation roee assignment. Forty of these assignments were to be
34 TARI.E I.1 Nasenber of ML-Dependent Evee=setion Routes Transit-Dependent Population Institutiorislized -g Originating Ceneral Moninstitutionalized Mobility Impaired School Location Population Mobility Impaired (special facilities) Children Reentry Poi: lefferson 10 0 0 0 0 staging area Patchogue 11 6 2 0 10 I staging area Riverhead 15 0 0 0 0 staging ares EWDF (co-located 0 3 ambulance, 2 ambulsace. 0 0 with 1.ERO EOC) 3 mobulette I embulette Peconic Ambulance 0 0 1 ambulance 0 0 Company I.ERO primary and 0 0 0 35 0 + backup bus J drivers l Seaman Rue Co. 0 0 0 5 0 drivers (shoreham- ] Wading River ] schools) Total 36 12 6 40 10 e e 9 e W 6
35 free-play inputs from FEMA evaluators. Drivers were not to stop at either their assigned schools or school relocation centers, but were to drive by the facilities. After driving by the Reception Centers, but before reporting to the EWDF, all bus drivers were to first stop at LILCO's Garden City facility where they were to receive the instructions they would have received at the school relocation centers had those facilities been activated for the exercise. A number of bus drivers were to be directed to report to the Hicksville Reception Center from Garden City, simulating that the school children they were carrying came from areas that were potentially contaminated by the passing plume. The number of school evacuation routes to be evaluated by FEMA is specified in Table 1.1. Traffle Guides LERO was to deploy traffic guides from all three staging areu to simulate activation of a suitable sample of TCPs within the 10-mile EPZ. The TCPs were not to be preassigned, nor were the traffic guides to be prepositioned. To avoid interfering with the normal flow of traffic, FEMA was not to request that traffic guides demonstrate the functions they would implement during an actual incident at SNPS. Instead, the traffic ruldes were to retaaln in their legally parked vehicles upon arriving at each TCP and to submit to an incerview' by the Federal evaluator concerning their responsibilities, procedures, and equipment. FEMA evaluated 30 traffic guides deployed from Staging Areas to TCPs as follows: Number of Staging Area TC2s l Port Jefferson 10 l Patchogue 10 1 Riverbead 10 Total 30 In addition to the above chart,10 TCPs were to be evaluated during the reentry portion of the exercise. Impediments to Evacuation Federal evaluators were to introduce free-play messages to test appropriate procedures for removing Impediments from evacuation routes and/or rerouting evacuation traffic around Impediments. The free-play messages to be given to a.LERO field worker were to state that a simulated impediment had been discovered at a given location. These demonstrations were to include, where appropriate, the actual dispatch I 1 l_
36 of appropriate emergency vehicle (s) to the scene, as specified in the LILCO Transition Plan. Emergeny Worker Decontaminatlod The LERO EWDF, located in the basement of the LERO EOC, was to set up and demonstrate the monitoring and decontamination of LERO workers and emergeacy vehicles. The processing of emergency workers who had completed their participation in the exercise was to be demonstrated during the exercise. Decontamination actions were to be simulated, although all necessas > equipment was to be assembled at the EWDF and all procedures were to be explained to the Federal evaluators. 1 Reception Centers The LILCO facilities in Hicksville, Roslyn, and Bellmore, designsted in the LILCO Transition Plan as reception centers for all evacuees, were to be opened and 1 staffed in accordance with the plan and in sequence with the exercise. The LERO I personnel were to obtain estimates on how many evacuees would be arriving had the j exerelse been a real emergency. They were then to estimate the supplies required for the potential evacuees. Some volunteers were to be processed through the Initial procedure. Procedures and equipment for monitoring evacuees and their vehicles were to be demonstrated. The capabilities of all four trailer teams were to be evaluated on day 2 l l of the exercise. Decontamination was to be simulated at the storage location of one of the trailers (i.e., on the SNPS site). l l Medical Drills l l Two medical drills were to be conducted - one on June 7 and one on June 8 - to evaluate the emergency medical response of the LERO ambulance medical technicians as well u that of Mid Island and Brunswick hospitals. A separate scenario was to be developed for each drill, in which a simulated victim suffered a simulated contamination 5 injury. The patient was to be trested by ambulance personnel, transported to either hospital, and treated at the hospital. A Federal evaluator evaluated each drill. h Volunteer organisations Response organizations identitled in the LILCO Transition Plan were to participate in the exercise. Because members of volunteer organizations have other responsibilities, including earning a livelihood, that take precedence over their participation in an exercise, the staffing of these volunteer organizations for exercise purposes was to be on an as-available basis.
37 Contract Laboratory Demonstration Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory, LILCO's contracted. laboratory, wu to be exercised during both the plume exposure pathway and Ingestion pathway portions of the exercise. On day 1 of the exercise, a FEMA evaluator was to observe the transportation, handling, and analysis of air samples taken in the simulated radloactive plume. On day 2, a FEMA evaluater was to observe Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory's capabilities for hand!!ng and analyzing various samples from the Ingestion pathway. 1.8.4 Actual and Simulated Off-Site Events Summary The following list summarizes all of the activities that were actually demonstrated or simulated during the June 7-9, 1988, exercise.
- Simulated All plant parameter data All rad!ological cata All meteorological data Station evacuation Actual Declaration of emergencies Activation of warning point, EOF, TSC, OSC, ENC, and LERO (including staging areas)
Radiological fleid monitoring teams - ingestion-pathway sample collection and analysis Accident assessment PAR decisions Formulation of EBS messages t Issuance of EBS message (timeliness to be coordinated with stren activation) Issuance of press releassa Conduct of press conferences Demonstration of a shif t change Emertency medical response to a contaminated injured man (on s site) Operation of LERO reception centers LERO reception center decontamination traller operation (at SNPS) LERO school evacuation bus driver program demonstration (using LERO and regular bus drivers) Transportation for transit-dependent evacuees Impediments to evacuation EWDF TCPs
Response
to cff-site contaminated injured man (MS-1 demonstration) Reentry TCPs and bus routes
O i 38 i 1.8.5 Exercise Timeline Tabies 1.2 and 1.3 provide detailed timelines of events during the June 7-9,1988, exercise. Table 1.2 detalls the escalation of the ECLs, times when emergency response personnel were notified, and times when notification was received of radiological release information by various facilities. Table 1.3 details protective action decisions and the time at which these decisions were issued to the public via EBS. I .W 4 l l 4 I
.~ 39 TABLE 1.2 Emergency Classification and Event Timeline for the Shoreham Exercise (hours) Emergency Classification LILCO LERO DOE-KAP Notification Declared EDT Eoc (BHO) Unusual event 0429 0436a Alert 0540 0549b 0606 racility declared operational N/AC 0716 0709 0750 site area amargency N/A
- 0731, 0733 0734 Ceneral amergency N/A 0928 0934 0934 telease started 1100 1100 1100 1101 telease terminated N/0d N/0 N/0 N/0 Downgraded to Alert' (day 4) 0930 0930 0930 N/A
' Observed at Supervising Service Operator (550), j LILCO Micksville facility, via activation of I peger system. bobserved at 550, LILC0 Micksville facility, via activation of Radiological Emergency Communica-tions System (REC 5) and pager systems.
- W/A = not available.
dW/0 = not observed. 'For scenario purposes. e
TAltIE IJ Pleone Patinsey Protective Action Timeline EOF I.ERO EOC DOE-RAP (SHO) Recommendetion Recommendetion Siren Es3 Recommendetion Made Received Decision Nede Activation Activation Received Time Time Time 7 me Time Time 8 s Event (hours) ERPAs (hours) ERPAs * (hours) ERPAs (hours) (hours) (hours) ERPAs g Protective action #1 b b School OM9 Early 0613 0613 closing school J closing Protective action #2 b Shelter for 0800 A,5,C, 0810 0810 animals DE Protective action #3 Shelter 0934 K,8. N. 0937 K, l., N, 1920 K,L,N, 1930 K.L ~d, N,Q,E N,Q.R N,Q.R N,Q,R f b Evacuate 0934 A-J. 0937 A-J, 1020 A-J. 1023 IO26 1930 A-J 0,P.S O,P.S 0,P.S 0,P,5
- ERPA = emergency response planning area.
bSimulated. e e i J
41 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 5.1 LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGA.NIZATION EMERGENCY OPERAT!ONS CEFTER (LERO EOC) The LERO EOC is located at the LILCO Brentwood operations facility. This factllty Is involved 24 hours per day with LILCO business activities. A portion of this faellity is dedicated to emergency response activities during radiological emergencies. 5.1.1 Flume 'm e Fathway Activitles There were eighteen objectives demonstrated by LERO EOC Operations during the plume exposure pathway exercise, with sixteen objectives being fully met, and two objective being partially met. EOC 1. The objective of demonstrating the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate Implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs was met. Initial notification of unusual event (NUE) ECL was received by the Supervising Service Operator (550) at LILCO's Hicksville fac!!!ty by pager at 0436 hours. At approximately 0442 hours, the NUE was received by the SSO via the RECS line. Notification of the alert was received by the SSO at Hicksville at approximately 0549 hours. After the RECS function was transferred to the LERO EOC in Brentwood at approximately 0701 hours, the RECS communicator there received and recorded notifleation of the site area emergency and general emergency ECLs at 0733 and 0934 hours, respectively. Because notification of ECL changes was received via the RECS line, verification was not required. ECLs were prominently displayed and kept current at the LERO EOC. EOC 1. The objective. of demonstrating the ability to fully alert, mobil!ze, and activate personnel for both facility-and fieldebased emerfency functions was met. The computerized Automatic Verifleation System (AVS) was used to alert and mobillae LERO EOC personnel and to verify receipt of such notice. Seven key LERO EOC staff members were alerted at the NUE ECL and verifled receipt of their pager notification within three minutes. Other LERO EOC personnel were alerted and mo' llized at the o alert and site area emergency ECLs. An AVS computer printout indleated that nearly all LERO EOC personnel called AVS to verify receipt of notice of ECLs. Those not calling AVS were contacted by SSos at three L!LCO district offices. The LERO EOC was staffed,by 102 persons having 32 titles. LERO EOC staff first began to lot in at approximately 0810 houn, with most staff members hr.ving arrived by 0700 hours.. The LERO EOC wu fully staffed by 0800 hours. All first-shift staff members were on the roster, which was last revised on May 31,1988. EOC 3. The objective of demonstrating the ability to direct. coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. Overall management of the LERO EOC was very
/ 42 good. The staff mobilized expeditiously and demonstrated adequate knowledge and capability to respond to scenarlo events. The Director of Local Response was in command and coordinated the decision-making process, including making protective action recommendations (PAR). Protective action decisions were coordinated with LERO EOC personnel. The ability to coordinate with state and local authorities was demonstrated. Periodic briefings were conducted. LERO EOC officials followed the plan i and demonstrated the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities. l The Bus Coordinator clearly demonstrated the ability to muster, direct, coordinate, and control emergency bus operations. 1 Messages neelved from traffic guides and route spotters in the field were properly legged and followed up. Directions and instructions to these field personnel, as required to implement the evacuation and to respond to the free-play Impediment l messages introduced in the f!Old, were properly coordinated, following the LERO EOC's i estmblished procedures, through the Traffic Control Coordinator. EOC 4. The objective of demonstrating the ab!!!ty' to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was partially met. Use of a t number of communications systems wu demonstrated. These systems, along with the locations communicated with, included (1) the RECS line for receiving ECLt and for communicating with the EOF (2) short-wave radlos for communicating with transfer points (TP), traffic guides, route spotters, road crews, helicopters, and the U.S. Cout Guardt (3) dedicated telephones for communicating with staging areas, the ENC, EBS station (WPLR), and BHO (4) telecopters for receiving hard copies of RECS messages and for communicating with the ENC and the FEMA control celli (5) a personal computer for communicating _.with the ENC (6) a time-sharing option (TSO) computer for communi-cating with LILCO district offices and the ENC for rumor controll and (7) cosmerclal telephone for communicating with various locations. These communleations systems functioned well, ucept as fouows. Direct radio communications with field workers in the vicinity of the Port Jefferson staging area was lost between approximately 1100 and 1120 hours. The Evacuation Support Communicator for staging areas indicated that the secondary system of dedicated telephones to the staging area and of radio to the field workers was being implemented. For some time i themafter, significant static caused a delay of 10-15 minutes in the aceipt of the first free-play evacuation impediment message and verification of that message to the satisfaction of the Traffic Control Coordinator. During activation of the LERO EOC, a few telephones did not functions this problem was promptly corrected by New York Telephone personnel. An early problem with a telecopier wu corrected by facility staff. There wu some delay in using the Director of Local Response's speaker telephone, which provided a primary conferencing capability. Between 1300 and 1400 hours, when all thne evacuation impediments were active, traffic on the radio of the Evacuation Support Communicator for road crews, road spotters, and helleopters was vey heavy. The involved staff responded appropriately by giving prlority to communications concerning the evacuation Impediments. Additional Impediments might have resulted in delays in some priority messages. In extreme situations, route spotters could l communicate with the LERO EOC via commercial telephone. l l _____,.____-___________________._____._______.____.__._m_ ____m.
43 Generally, message handling was excellent. Message forms were completed by coordinators, or their administrative assistants, and by communicators. T*v were distributed promptly to the addressee or to those on the distribution !!st and t..e Lead Com municator. In addition to completing RECS and message forms, administrative assistants kept logs of messages fer key coordinators. Messages between the LERO EOC and field workers were generally transcribed accurately. Prompt dissemination of accurate messages helped the LERO EOC respond appropriately to free-play evacuation impediments in a timely manner. Although message protocols were generally followed, one evacuation support communicator recorded additional messages concernin' :vacuation Impediments on his copy of the standard message form after the other copies had been distributed to the addressee and the Lead Communicator. EOC 5. The objective of demonstrating the adequacy of facilltles, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. The LERO EOC was controlled for security with access limited to authorized individuals, who logged in as they entered the facility. Security personnel were posted at appropriate locations. The facility was appropriately equipped with status boards, maps, key-event logs, PAR logs, and resource allocation boards. Lightlag, sound control, and ventilation were exce!! ant. The facility la capable of continuous, around-the-clock operation and Is equipped with back-up power and accommodations to lodge emergency management persennel. Operational equipment (e.g., telephones, and duplicating arid telecopying machines) was available in sufficient quantity to meet needs. Display. boards were present in the command and control room but were not hung on the walls whleh inhibited their prompt utilization, especially in the case of the sector map showing the ERPAs and the plume. All relevant status boards should be hung. Actions t. ave been taken to modify and enlarTn the dose assessment s*,atus board to accommodate separate data from the BHO-RAP and LILCO field monitoring teams: reducing the crowding in the command and control rooms and employing a key-event status board. A previous ARCA (LERO EOC 3) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 has been corrected and verifled. EOC 4. The objectiv'e of demonstrating the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. The exposure control staff established contact with the dosimetry record keepers at the str,ging areas to ensure that suff!clent staff and equipment were avs!!able. Records of eme.Tency worker doses were reviewed at the conclusion of each oay's activities to ensure that no worker exceeded preset dose !!mits. When an emergency worker reported that one of his two DRDs was reading off scale, instructions were issued to obtain a reading of that worker's TLD.
44 EOC 10. The objective of demonstrating the abi!!ty, within the plume-exposure pathway, to project dosage to the pub!!c via plume exposure, based on plant and field data was met. The dose assessment staff, including the BHO-RAP team liaison, made several hypothetical dose projections based on a gap release and design-buis LOCA prior to any releue of radioactivity. Current and projected wind direction data were used throughout the dose projection process, and new geographic areas of concern were ident! fled as conditions changed. The projected doses were compared with those made by the EOF and BHO Radiat!on Support Center (RSC) staffs. The coordination between the BHO-RAP team liaison and the EOF staff in positioning the available fleid monitoring ] teams wu excellent. After the releue of radloactivity began, the field monitoring teams effectively defined the plume. Field measurements were compared with projected values. The field data were plotted and displayed in the accident assessment room. All projected doses were clearly shown as project!ons, and all actual measurements were clearly designated as measurements. A single system for distances was used to correctly log all fleid data on the status board. Two previous ARCAs (LERO EOC 4,5) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 have been corrected and verifled. a EOC 11. The objective of demonstrating the ability to make appropriate protective action decisions, based on projected or actual dosage EPA PAGs, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors was met. The PARS were made by the Director of Local Response, after consultation with the accident assessment staff. Projected dose calculations, PAGs, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant information were considered. The Director of Local Response included PAR deelslons in appropriate EBS messages. The LERO EOC recommended evacuation 4 of most zonet (Table 1.3), and the governor / county-executive concurred, therefore reducing the need for further PARS. The only school district with which there was an agreement to participate in the exercise was the Shoreham-Wading River District. EOC 12. The objective of demonstrating the ability to initially alert the public within the 10-mile EPZ and begin dissemination of an instructional message within 15 minutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local offielais was m e t. Dissemination of instructional messages was effectively coordinated and timely. The 15-minute guideline for stren activation and broadcut of simulated EBS messages wu met (Table 1.3). The EBS station (WPLR) was prepared and equlpped to carry out all phases of EBS message broadcast. The public information team had excellent liaison with all LERO EOC components. The Coordinator of Public Information displayed outstanding judgment and management expertise throughout the day. He used his staff efficiently, delegating responsibilities to his deputy and other members of his staff, u appropriate. The ability of a private firm, Mar'teting Evaluations, Inc., to verify stren operation was demcastrated, based on actual siren failures that occurred when the system wu activated. However, the 15 minute design objective wu met and the issue of the actual stren failure will be dealt with through the maintenance and operability requirements of FEMA REP-10. Therefore, a previous ARCA (LERO EOC 7) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 has been corrected and verifled. l i
45 j EOC 13. The objective of demonstrating the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate information and Instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification has occurred was pr.rtially met. In general, EBS messages were processed effectively and efficiently, and no problems were observed in issuance of EBS messages within the 15-minute guideline. EBS messages were generally detalled and comprehensive however, new and important Information was usually inserted in the middle or at the end of previous announcements rather than at the beginning where new Information she,uld be carried. Due to the excessive length of EBS messages listeners might not stay tuned to the entire EBS message thereby potentially mluing pertinent Information. This planning inadequacy will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiological Emergency Response '.'lan for Shoreham, by the RAC. EBS message #3 was sent to the ENC by TSO computer at 1035 hours, and according to LILCO documentation, received at the ENC at 1037 hours. The content of this message was also communicated to the ENC by telephone. Due to a controller inject designed to stimulate certain school evacuation procedures, EBS messsge 43 Indicated that Rocky Point School v.4 remaining open, although the ERPA in which the school is located wu to be evacuated. This EBS message was broadcast at 1026 hours. At 1032 hours, it was reported that evacuation discussions were initiated for the Rocky Point School. EBS message #4 which was recommended at 1130 hours, and approved at 1206 hours after concurrence of county officials stated that the Rocky Pcint School District has implemented the evacuation of all students by bus. Once approved. EBS menage #4 was processed in a t!mely fashion. EBS menage 8.7, which did not result in a change of PARS. was issued after lengthy conversations with county and state officials in which concurrence with the menage was discuued in detall over a three hour period. EBS messages #4, #5, #6. and #7 contained Incorrect Information that.' based upon* radiation measurements, small doses of radiation were projected at the site boundary. At the time these messages were broadcast, projected doses based on measurements beyond the site boundary were in excess of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) guidelines requiring protective actions. The fact that emergency Information Is contained in telephone books was not referenced until the second half of EBS messages. Because experience has shown that many people do not retain emergency booklets, telephone books may be the only source of such information at some homes and offices. EBS messages should explain u close to their beginning as possible that emergency information is provided in their telephone book.
4. EOC 14. The objective of demonstrating the ability to make the decision to rec,ommend use of El for emergency workers and Institutionalized persons *, based on predetermined criteria, was met. The dose assessment staff had performed hypothetical dose projections that Indicated a potential need for El use. When actual fle!d data became available, staff members calculated thyroid dose rates and made dose projections based on a default exposure time. This projected emergency worker dose was in excess of the trigger level in the plan (10 REM) for use of El for emergency workers. The j Radiological Health Coordinator passed this does projection through the system, and the i decision was ultimately made to administer El to emergency workers. The Radiological Health Coordinator and the Health Servlees Coordinator were both aware of the EPA PAG for use of E! by emergency workers and members of the j public who could not be evacuated. They were also aware that the LILCO plan uses a more conservative PAG. A previous ARCA (LERO EOC 8) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 have been corrected and verifled. EOC 18. The objective of demonstrat!ng the ability and resources necessary to ] Implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population (including transit-dependent persons, speelal needs populations, handleapped persons, and Institutionalized persons) wu met. The Bus Coordinator demonstrated the ability to implement protective actions for transit-dependent persons and for special needs populations. The status of resources was centinually monitored and ] managed. Close and effective coordination was maintained with the traffle section to ensure proper routing. j t ] The Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator expertly identifled special needs I populations (i.e., the homebound, the deaf, and those in nursing homes, hospitals and l d other health facilities, and schools). He determined the resources required to assist in l the evacuation of these groups and deployed the resources in a timely enanner. The coordination' of response to the three free-play evacuation impediment j problems that were Introduced in the field after the evacuation began was very good. [ Staff at the LET% LOC demonstrated outstanding ability in dealing with impediments to j evacuation. The traffle control section included a Traffle Engineer whose expertise wu i well ured. Communleations personnel made persistent and successful efforts to get all i ] the information needed to deal with an trapediment. Situations were carefully analyzed, and information was continually passed laterally as' well as vertleally to ensure coordination. Finally, the situation on Impediments was announced at intervals to the { entire LERO EOC. The bus evacuation route affected by the Impediment on Center J Moriches Wading ' River Road was promptly ordered to be rerouted by the l l Transportation Coordinator as warranted by the problem presented. } ) i i l 'As described in the plan, there is no institutional! zed population within the EPZ which L 1 requires demonstration of this portion of the objective. I i i
47 EOC 19. The objective of demonstrating the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was m e t. When the implementation of school evacuation was simulated on day 1 of the exercise, the Special Fac!!!ttes Evacuation Coordinator promptly initiated evacuation discussions at 1032 I.ours, employing 47 buses to move 2366 students from Rocky Point schools to the Nassau Coliseum School Relocation Center. The Hicksville center had earlier been put on alert and had established necessary controls to receive the student evacuees. However, it was later determined that these students were coming from a possibly contaminated area and would therefore need to be redirected from the Collseum to the Hicksville Reception Center for monitoring. It was confirmed that four monitors per bus could complete the monitoring task in two and one-half hours. After monitoring, the students were returned to the Coliseum to await pickup by family members. This activity was completed at 1845 hours. EOC 20. The objective of demonstrating the organizatlonal ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. The traffle control group at the LERO EOC did an outstanding job in analyzing evacuation problems and coordinating the evacuation decisions made during the exercise. The Traffic Control Coordinator, assisted by the Traffic Engineer and Traffle Control Polnt Coordinator, thoroughly assessed traffle flow and demonstrated famillarity with the evacuatlon routes and the traffle control plan. Prior to the deelslon to evacuate, the Traffic Control Coordinator requested Information from county police offletals. This Information was used to assess the effect of normal construction and highway repair work on evacuation time estimates. After the evacuation deelston was made, the progress of the evacuation wu carefully monitored, based on information communicated by route spotters to the Evacuation Route Coordinator. At approximately 1535 hours, the access control plan was comploted, and information about the details of the plan was discussed with the county police commluloner. The access control plan was telefazed to the county po!!ce commissioner at approximately 1546 hours. Receipt of the plan was acknowledged at about 1602 hours. Pending further discussion and coordination with the county regarding relaxation of sheltering in those zones, this initial accou control plan was only for the perimeter of the 10 mile EPZ and did not include the locations where traffic guides would be stationed to !!mit access to the evacuated zones. There was extensive discussion, in conference calls conducted between 1840 and 1710 hours, between LERO officials at the IOC and county officials regarding unabeltering the affected senes as a condition for implementing access control points that would restrict entry into the evacuated zones which constituted the Interior portion of the access control plan. The exercise revealed that Revision 10 of the plan does not contain preplanned access control points to restrict access to evacuated ERPAs when a sheltering advisory is rescinded. Such an access control plan should be developed for any subset of ERPAs where an tvacuation advisory is in effect. This -lanning issue will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC.
48 i The second-sh!ft traffle control group actively participated in coordinating the proposed access control plan with county officials until the exercise was suspended at approximately 1800 hours on day 1. At the time the exercise was suspended, concurrence i on the plan to cordon off the western boundary cf the evacuated portion of the EPZ had not been received from county officials. When the exercise resumed on day 2, the LERO EOC recommended unsheltering the sheltered zones. County concurrence was obtained to implement ecrdoning off the Interior zones, with police resources being provided to assist LERO in this effort. Internal communication, as demonstrated by lateral information flow and vertical flow to and from the Evacuation Coordinator and the Manager of Local Response, was also very good. Throughout the evacuation, the I Evacuation Coordinator and the Traffic Control Coordinator contacted county officials, either to provide information or to request assistance. Verification by route spotters of free-play evacuation Impediments introduced in the field through traffle guides following vertical and lateral coordination at the LERO j EOC wu timely. A previous Def!clency (LERO EOC 1) and a previous ARCA (LERO EOC 8) from a SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 have been corrected and verified. i EOC 28. T!te objective of demonstrating the ability to identify the need for assistance and to call upon Federal and other outside support agencies for that assistance was met. The U.S. Coast Guard was notified of the Alert ECL at 0720 hours., A safety voice broadcast (simulated) was initiated after the Site Area Emergency ECL at 0837 l hours, and a safety zone was established at 0913 hours, prohibiting traffle In a zone of l i 10-mile radius from the mouth of the Wading River. The dispatch of three cutters to j i enforce the sadety zone was simulated. Two Coast Guard liaisons arrived at the LERO EOC at 0915 hours to coordinate Coast Guard involvament. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the LIRR were contacted at 0957 [ hours. The FAA agreed to restrict air traffic within a 10-mile radius; the LIRR agreed to stop traffic between Yaphank and Alverhead. 1 Two previous ARCAs (LERO EOC 1 and 2) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 1 were corrected and verified. i d EOC 34. The objective of demonstrating the ability to maintain staffing on a i continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met. The LERO EOC demonstrated this ability excellently. The shift change occurred in various phases, starting approximately at 1450 hours and ending at 1830 hours. The first phase was a i briefing of the Manager of Local Response by first-shif t coordinators on major issues still eurtent. The second-shift personnel assembled and were kept in a holding area to reduce ) noise and prevent overcrowding. While the second-shift personnel were assembling, key i second-shift coordinators were individually briefed by their first-shift counterparts. The ] turnover briefing by the primary Radiation Health Coordinator wu very detailed (e.g.,it covered log books and written Information) and far too long. Between 1537 and 1800 hours, the incoming Manager of Local Response briefed the incoming coordinators l j / i i i i
49 on major pending actions. At 1610 hours, first-shift personnel were uked to go to a holding area in the cafeterla until officially released from the building. At 1720 hours, first-shif t management personnel were released to go home. The shift change for the traffic control group was staggered from that of other LERO EOC staff. At approximately 1505 hours, the traffic control group wu developing an access control plan for the 10-mile perimeter and for cordoning off the sheltered portion of the EPZ. At this time, the group was directed by the Director of Local Response to postpone its shif t change until the access control plan was completed. The shift change of the Evacuatlon Coordinator and Traff!c Control Coordinator, and their respective staffs, was then Initiated at approximately 1600 hours. Second-shift personnel were properly briefed, and the shift change was completed at approximately 1630 hours. Both first-and second-shift traffic and evacuation personnel adequately demonstrated their knowledge of the plan and their ability to coord!nate Irnplementation of recommended protective activities. EOC 35. The objectr.'e of demonstrating the abl!!ty to coordinate the evacuation. of on-site personnel was n.et. On-site personnel contacted the Traffic Control Coordinator during the site area emergency ECL at approximately 0840 hours to ascertain whether there were any cond!ttons that would affect evacuation of on-site personnel. The Traffic Control Coordinator reported that there were such condit!ons in the form of construction on Sunrise Highway. The avecuation of nonessential on-site personnel wu announced in a briefing at the LERO EOC at approximately 0915 hours. EOC 3Y. The objective of demonstrating the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance was met. LERO EOC personnel discuased all operations on a continual basis with offielais of New York, Connecticut, Suffolk County, and Nassau County. Conversations took place several times each hour. The Director of Local Response assumed a leadership role in suggesting policies, procedures, and recommendations associated with emerTency status and off-site activities. All information received at the LERO EOC (e.g., from the EOT) was promptly shared with the nonparticipating state and local governments. The Traffic Co'ntrol Coordinator and the Evacuation Coordinator made many telephone calls to Suffolk County and Nassau County offielais. In addition to informing these offletals of evacuation-related events, they requested Information on road construction and repair work to assess the effect of such work on evacuation time estimates. They also requested assistance to augment their traffic guides and route spotters. 4
50 1.1.2 Ingestloc Pathway and Recovery / Reentry Activities There were eleven objectives to be demonstrated at the LERO EOC during the Ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry exercise, with ten objectives being met, and one vbjective being partially met. ROC 3. The objective of demonstrating the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activltles was met. Overall management of the LERO EOC was very good, as it had been during the plume exposure pathway phase of the exercise. On day 3 of the exercise LERO EOC management successfully demonstrated its ability to coordinate responsive Ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry decision making. EOC 4. The objective of demonstrating the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met, Suring the Ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry phases of the exercise, there were considerably fewer field workers deployed who communicated with the LERO EOC thu during the plume exposure pathway phase. Nevertheless, there was attil considerable communications traffic between the accident assessment group and the BHO-RAP field monitoring teams, and between the public information group and the ENC. Among the other locations contacted from the LERO EOC were bus yards to confirm the arrival of LCRO EOC bus drivers and traffic guldes deployed to access control points during reentry. The communications systems operated without breakdown, and the excellent message handling demonstrated during the plume exposure pathway phase was sustained during these phases of the exercise. EOC 8. The objective of demonstrating the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. The exposure control staff at the LERO EOC continued their contacts with the dostmetry record keepers at the staging areas to ensure that sufficient staff and equipment were ava!!able. Records of emergency worker doses were reviewed at the conclusion of each day's activity to ensure that no worker l exceeded preset dose limits. EOC.13. The objective of demonstrating the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate Information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion was met. in general, eoordination between the LERO EOC and the ENC wu good during the Ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry phases of the exercise. All LERO EOC managers displayed excellent leadership, especially the Manager of Local Response, in their actions to keep the public informed. In addition to EBS messages, the LERO EOC staff produced summary sheets of l most EBS messages that were sent to the ENC, district offlees, and staging areas via the l TSO computer. They also produced "LERO Updates" that provided EBS message l Information as well as additional information obtained in response to press Inquiries. l
J 51 l EOC 28. Tl i objective of demonstrating the abulty to identify the need for assistance and to call upon Federal and other outside support agencies for that assistance I was met. The Director of Local Response discussed Federal us! stance with the FEMA Coordinator during the ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry pbues of the exerelse. l FEMA and other Federal agencies were requested to participate in the Recovery Action Committee, and the Director of Local Response agreed to brief the other Federal agencies. The American Red Cross representative was requested to manage the congregate care facilitiet. In addition to the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard, wh.lch is discussed in EOC 33, the LERO EOC received simulated assistance from USDA, EPA (for radiolog! cal r monitoring), and the NRC. i EOC 29 and BHO 29. The objective of demonstrating the ab!!!ty to prCact radiation dose to the public via the Ingestion pathway and to de' ermine appropite l protective meuures was partially met. The BHO-RAP dose assesstient team relocated i to the LERO EOC for the ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry ghases. Overall, the dose assessment staff assessed Ingestion pathway doses and projected recoveryhcentry i doses excellently. All fan a of ingestion dose projection were exa mined in more than adequate detall. The Ingestion dose assessment function was impacted by errors In the scenario data. Resolution of these errors required considerable time during day 2 of the exercise, which slowed the overall progress of the intestion path'vay phase. l The ingestion pathway PARS were well thought out and were based on appro-priate PAGal however, they were very slow to be developed. The apparent reason for this slow development was the management decision to have the dose assessment staff focus on reentfy and relocation issues. Sufficient scenario information was available the morning of day 2 of the exercise to provide the basis for low-tmpact, Ingestion pathway j PARS u suggested in Sec. 5.2.2 of OP!P 3.8.8. However, it was not until mid morning of day 3 that actual PARS were developed for the 10-to 50-mile area in New York State., i i EOC 30. The objeettve of demonstrating the ability to implement both I preventive and emergency protective actions for ingestion pathway hazards was rnet. i Following completion of radiological field monitoring for the plume pathway, the ) Radiological Health Coordinator, his s'aff, and BHO-RAP response personnel on day 2 of l the exe*else began to focus on the following ingestion pathway activities: i i 1. At 0908 hours EBS message it was issued by the LERO EOC. It i addressed several food safety issues, including the lastruction not { to est locally grown fruits and vegetables until further analysis could be performed. The ebb message also stated that all milk-producing animals in the 10-mile EPZ should be moved into sheltars and placed on stored feed. This step was initially accomplished on day 1 of the exercise. The same advisory was issued again at 1135 hours. l l i I
52 i 2. A priority sampling plan was developed, based on field team meuurements and rad!ation readings from a "fly-over" contour map developed by DOE. 3. Ingest!on/ pathway teams were sent out to gather samples of grass, water, allk, vegetables, and soll from areas within the 80-mue EPZ in New York State. 4. Beef, fruit, vegetable, and duck farmers, as well ' dairy processors and muk suppliers, in the affected ana were notdled of I the sample collection activities, f However, no ingestion pathway FARs were made during day 2 for New York State. Additionally, an EBS message was lasued at the end of day 2, recommending that l all muk-producing ar.!mais within a 10-mile radius of Old Lyme, Connecticut, should be moved into shelters and placed on stored feed. In the areas recommended for protective actions in Connecticut, muk should be held until sampled by State of Connecticut local health departments. The Radiological Health Coordinator, his staff, and BHO-RA responso personnel i continued to focus on food safety issues involving the Ingestion pathway during day 3 of i the exercise. The following actions were taken } 1. Assessment priorities were developed, using laboratory results and ' j "fly-over" and field monitoring data. i 1 2. Not!!! cotton of ingestion pathway PARS waa cattled out as 1 follows. Muk suppliers in areas where samp!!ng nsults had showed j eontamination levels that exceeded emergency PAGs were j directed to place animals on stored feed and water and not to ship their muk. Samples were to be pleked up'by a survey team. Milk 1 { ruppliers were asked to provide the LERO EOC with a !!st of distribution points for the muk and the amcut and location of any I that had been shipped. Farm-stand operators, fruit farmers, and l vegetable farmers outside the 10-mile EPZ were advised the.t *M locally stown fresh produce ar.d leafy vegetables stored la the rea i i should be washed, serubbed, or peeled to remove a:urtt.co i contaminatlou. Farm-stand operators in areas within the 10-mile i EPZ where contamination levels exceeded preventive PAGs were I advised that thelt products were not safe for consumption and that l l they would be collected for reimbursement by LILCO. i { 3. Other PARS were tasued as follows. Several EBS messages advised i j that locally grown fruits and vegetables may not' be safe for j consumption, pending further sampilng and analysis. They also j advisu, as a wautionary measure, that all fruits and vegetables i stored outsm e at to the incident should be washed and peeled i 1
53 ) tnfore consumption. Local top water supplies ' wa-o being continually sampled and analyred. Tap waMr was safe to ceruume,. Instructions were given to place all liv 6 stock withh e. 50 rn!!e rad!us on stored feed and water. Resid1nts and factrers with milk from loesi farms within the affected area were cautioned in EBS message #19.to consurre only dry o* ennned milk in closed containers or fresh tr!1k on hand prior to the it.cident and stored in closed containers. 4. Seafood and beef animals were declared safe lor consumption because samples showed less-than-detectable levels of radiation. in addition to these actions, LILCO purchased stored feed for ysa by farmos in the affected area. The Radiological Health Coord setor and his staff had infermation on tne food produc'J and water Indigenous to the a' n. During the exercise an actual milk sample was taken at the Poole residence in Shoreham. This location Is r.hown as a sampl' rig site in the LILCO on 9ite plan, but not in Revision 10 of the LERO off-site plan (see OP!P 3.8.8). Durhg the exercise, it was lestned that two dairy locations In an easterly direction. Identitled in OP!P 3.6.f., page 1 of 3, are no Mger allk-producing locations. The plan should be reviewed and revised to include accurate, up te date informatica concern!rg the higestion pathway. This planning issue will be addr./ d in the evt.luation of Revision 10 of LERO off-stte Radiologica! Emerger:cy Response P!ar, for Shornham, by the RAC. EOC 3), Evaluation of the objective of denonstrating the t.b!!:ty to estimate total population exposure was met. LILCO submitted a detalled report document!ng the results of a task force assigned to perform its totte, population dose (stimate. This t report was prepared and submitted In accordance with the guidelines established by the RAC chairman. The followlag dose psthways were considered plume exporure, ground shirie including resuspension, ant! Ingestion. While there ar9 minor concers with a few calculational assumptions, the report demonstrates the abt!!ty to p$rform total poculation do6e estitaation. EOC 31. The objective of demorn.ratity the ability to determine appropriate n!sisu es for controlled reentry and recovery, basad on estimsted total population exposare, avkllable Parts and other relevant fact:rs was met. The svacuation and traffic cohtrol g*oups su<tcewMly demonstrat*d implementation and montwring of recovery /ferntry activities, After de-ees!s.tlon of the emergency to an alert ECL, the Traffic Engineer, upon direction frua the Tr,affle Control Coorelnstor, developed a preliminary reestry contMI plu to dipet ',he r* entry of residents into the evacuated zones. This preliminary plan was coord!cated i:lth the county, both by telephone and by hard copy. Plan approval ar.d polics assistama to implament the plan were subsequently obtained In a conference ca),t trivolving key LERO EOU coordinaw and coWy offleisJs at approximately 1035 howt on day 3 si the ca.>relse. The reintry traffic control plan, the analysis of tran portation requiro/.*ents. sed the allocatio:: of necessary percoanel s e .ma ____.____________m-
54 and resources for directing traffic and transporting the transportation-dependent evacuated population were very well coordinated by the Evacuation Cocedinator and his support staff. Discussion and consideration of resettlement pol cies were not demonstrated because the recovery /r: entry phase of the exercise was terminated with final approval of the reentry plan. I EOC 33. The objective of demonstrating the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery was met. When the exercise resumed on June 8th (day 2 of the exercise), the Evacuation Coordinator and his staff were mainly planning actions lead!ng to recovery. Plans were made both for evacuating the remeining persons la the evacuation areas and for retti ning 9ersons previously excluded from l entering the sheltered area. l l ( Fifteen additional access control points were established along the westerly perimeter of tlie evacuated area in coordination with county officials. The county police commissioner agreed to providt police officers for each post, and the LERO EOC provided dosimetry to the police. Traffic guides were reassigned as necessary, and relief of firstdhlft traffic guides was a-ranged. Two helleopters kept the EPZ under l survallisnee. At 0930 hours, sheltering of the western part of the EPZ was lifted, and the access control points were lifted on the perimeter of the area previously sheltered. At 0950 hours, the unsheltering wu considered complete. No one was permitted to onter the evacuated areas without permisslan of the Saffolk County Commissioner of Health. I 'At 1236 hours, the U.S. Coast Guard was requested to reduce the perimeter of the excluded area to the shore but to retain boat patrols for security of the evacua areas. This request was relayed by the Coast Guard liaison at the LERO F.OC to thc. Coast Guard Rommand at New Haven, Connecticut, who reduced the exclusion area to one mile snd commenced simulated patrolling one mile off shore from 10 miles east of SNPS to 10 miles west of SNPS. 1 Actual implementation of the plan for controlled reentry was demoitstrated out of sequence (day 3 of the exercise), for pizposes of field evaluation. Twelve traffic 1 guides were actually deployed from the Patchogue staging area. All but one, who was delayed by an actual traffic impediment, arrived at their posts within 40 minutes of deployment. An evacuation support communicator established radio communication with these trattle guides, and they were effectively managed by the Traffic Control Coordinator and the Traffic Control Point Coordinator. The Bus Coordinator, Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator, and Ambulance Coord'nator demonstrated the ability to prepare for teentry 4 persons needing transportation. LILCO's district sffice in Hicksville was chosen the location for persons from scattered locaticas to congregate because of its proxto :v o a major LIRR station. Buses wcre allocated for persons at eight congregat..are centers and Hicksville. Ambulances were allocated for persons at rebcated hospitals and other special care facilities.
6 55 I ROC 3?. The objective of demonstrating the capab!!!ty of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments was met. LERO EOC personnel continued to discuss all operations with and seek assistance and necessary approvals from officials of New York and Connectleut and Suffolk and Nassau counties at the FEMA control cell during the Ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry phases. Deflelencias No Deficiencies were observed at the LERO EOC during the exercise. Areas kequiring Corrective Action 1.
== Description:== An evacuation support communleator recorded additional messages on his copy of the standard LERO EOC message form after the other copies had been forwarded to the l addressee and the Lead Communicator. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1, U, l L1) Recommendation: EOC personnel should be tralned that the recording of additional messages requires a new message form rather than being added to previous message forms. 2.
== Description:== EBS messages #4, #5, #6, and #7 contained incorrect information that, based upon radiation measurements, small doses to_.radiatlon were projected at ths site boundary. At the time these messages were broadcast, projected doses based on measurements beyond the sit s boundary were in excess of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) guidelines requiring protective actions. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1, H, L5, !.A). Recommendation: All EBS messages should be sueened to ensure that eumulative information is appropriate to the changed conditions (projected doses). i 3. Description PARS for the ingestion pathway in New York State i t,eyond the 10-mile EPZ were slow to be developed due to management decision to have dose assessment staff focus on reentry and relocation issues. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1 U, J.11) Recommendation: Priorities in the overall dose assessment- - function should be reviewed. There are more than an adequate number of competent dose assessment staff members. e l
56 l Areas Recommended for Improtement 1.
== Description:== There was arc.e delay in using the Director of Local Response's speaker telephone, which provided a primary conferencing espab!!!ty. I l Recommendation: Ongoing training should include techniques l required for effective telephone conferencing. Speaker telephone equipment should be Msted to ensure its operat!onal capab!!!ty. 2. Description Display boards present in the command and control l room were not hung on the walls and wera therefore of limited I utility. l Recommendatlods Relevant display boards should be hung on the walls. 3.
== Description:== The fact that emergency information is contained in I telephone books is not explained until the secund half of EBS messages. Experience has shown that many people do not retain eme:Jency booklets, telephone books may be the only. source of such information at some homes and offices. Recommendation: EBS messages should explain as close to the beginning as possible that telephone books contain emergency information. 1 4. Descriptio,n: The briefing given at the shift change by the primary Radiation Health Coordinator was far too long. Recommendation: All necessary Inforroation should be included in the turnover briefing at a shift change; however, log books and written information should not be reviewed hem by item. i k e S
l $7 2.f EMERGENCT' OPERATIONS FACILITY (EOF) l The EOs 3 located at the LILCO Training Center, just west of Veterans Mamorial Highway off the Long Island Expressway. The EOF is 18.5 miles from the SNPS site. 1.2.1 Plume W=e Pathway Activities All elght objectiv:.1 to be demonstrated by the EOF during the plume exposure pathway exercise were fu.'/ met. EOF 1. The ot,jective to demonstrate the ability to ruonitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs was met. The Response Manager and his key staff at the EOF developed appropriate ECLs in response to actions dictated by plant status and exercise scenario events. Notification of each ECL was promptly communicated to all of the appropriate organizations. The ECLs were prominently d! splayed in the command center, and frequent briefings were held by the Response Manager to keep the EOF staff aware of the current ECLs. EOF 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and I activate personnel for both fasility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Notification of EOF emergency personnel was accomplished in a timely manner. Initial calls to alert the staff were made by the Control Room Communicator using radio pagers. StaffTere nottfled at the alert ECL, beginning at Ob45 hours. The fr.dlity was declared operational at 0716 hours when all key emergency response personnel were in place. EOF 3. The objective of demonstrating the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. Although an internal tracking system was not used for all incoming or outgoing messages, the various sections logged messages with respect to various staff functions. The RECS forms were logged in and distributed, as were the field monitoring forms. Section members maintained logs of deelstons and completed procedures forms. EO F 4. The objective of demonstrating tha ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. Fleid monitoring teams were in contact with the dispatcher at the EOF, and ample commercial telephone lines were available for all elements at the EOF, including FEMA and NRC. Telephones were also available for both New York State and Suffolk County should their representatives arrive. A real-time loss of commercial telephone service from the site occurred; however, back-up telephones (tie lines and direct lines) were used. If these had ,___,_--,_,,,,_r ,y ,,--__.------_.,,_.,,_.,_.-7
58 been lost, adlos were available. Back-up systems had already been checked and their operation verified at the start of the exercise. l l \\ l j EOF 5. The objective of demonstrating the adequacy of facilities, equipment, l displays, and other materials to support emergency operations was met. Eleven rooms in j the LILCO Training Center were identified for EOF operations, including separate work I areas for FEMA, NRC, New York State, and Suffolk County. Access control and security were maintained at the EOF throughout the exercise. Photo identification was required for all personnel requesting entrance to the Trahing Center and again upon entering the EOF area. The required display maps and status boards were posted in the Command Center and were continually updated with current emergency data. EOF 10. The objective to demonstrate the ability within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data was met. Utility teams were deployed in advance of releases. Projected doses were compared to simulated actual readings once the releases began. Teams were maneuvered before wind shif ts to protect the teams from being in the plume. EOF 34. The. objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hcur basis by an actual shift change was met. The shift change at 1500 hours was followed by the emergency response managers and major staff members briefing each other, with the exception of the LILCO Emergency Preparedness Advisor. ( After the briefing, the new Emergency Response Manager briefed all new members of his staff. Another br!*fing was then conducted with the new manager and his key staff and the old manager and his staff. The dose assessment staff staggered their shif t change to maintain continuity du-ing analysis of the plume data. Field monitoring teams bere replaced when they returned with samples and were decontamirated, including their vehicles. Completion of the shift change was announced at 1500 hours, and the new Emergency Response Manager assumed command. The LILCO Emergency Preparedness Advisor demonstrated Jhift-change capability via a roster. Those trained for this position could not be used in the exercise because they were knowledgeable about the scenario. EOF 35. The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the evacuation of on-site personnel was met. The on-site personn61 were evacuated following the } appropriate procedure. The LILCO Emergency Preparedness Advisor contacted the LERO EOC to advise of the on-site evacuation. There was no radiological releue, and nonessential personnel were evacuated through normal exits. Monitoring and decontamination, if needed, is to be performed on site as they leave. l
59 2.2.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities There were eight objectives to be de:nonstrated by the EOF during the ingestion pathway exercise with seven objectives being met, and a determination being made that one objective was not applicable for the EOF. EOF 1-5. These objectives are covered in Sec. 2.2.1 (Plume Exposure Pathway Activities). EOF 29. The objective to demonstrate the ab!!!ty to project r.-Olation dose to the public for ingestion pathway exposure and determine appropriate protective measures based on field data, FDA PAGs, and other relevant factors was met. During the ingestion pathway phase of the exercise, the EOF dose assessment staff evaluated projected and actual dose measurements to fac!!! tate LERO EOC efforts and to control the collection of data by the environmental teams through the dispatcher. ROF 31. Evaluation of the objective of demonstrating the ability to estimate total population 4xposure was met. (See Section 2.1.2 Ingestion Pathway and Recovery /Rentry Activities, EOC 31) EOF 32. The objective' to demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery is not applicable for the EOF. The EOF is not directly in,yolved in the recovery / reentry phase, but does provida support to the LERO EOC in obtaining necessary data for decision making. Defielencies No Deficiencies were observed at the EOF during the exercise. i Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Arou Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the EOF during tha exarcise. Areas Recommended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed at the EOF 1 during the exercise. 1 ll l 4
60 2.3 BROOKHAVEN AREA OFFICE (BHO) The BHO is located at Brookhaven National Laboratory G3NL) in Upton, New York. 2.3.1 Plume Exposure Pathway Activities All 10 objectives to be demonstrated by the BHO during the plume exposure pathway exercise were fully met, i 8801. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs was met by the BNL police and BHO staff. BNL police promptly contacted the appropriate BHO-RAP responders when notified of the alert ECL at 0606 hours. BHO2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for,both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Notification of the BHO-RAP Team Captain was completed by 0615 hours, and the Team Captain arrived at the BHO RSC at 0648 hours. By this time, the Team Captain had I already contacted key responders. Other team members were notifled, beginning at 0705 hours; the call-out was completed by 0720 hours. The last fleid team members arrived by 0800 hours. By 0815 hours, the two field monitoring teams were ready to be deployed to the field, having completed their equipment checkout procedures and loaded their l equipment into vehicles. During the exercise, Individuals were contacted by telephone to identify which BNL staff members were available to fill second-shif t positions for the RSC and the field teams. Two field teams hsving two members each were used during the first shift.
- Three additional teams were identitled for use during the first shift, if needed. A full complement of five teams (10 members) were identified for the s1cond shif t.
l BHO 3. The objective of demonstrating the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. The Team Captain was effectively in charge of the BHO response. Accident assessment staff were kept well Informed of changes in j plant status and protective actions in effect. Incoming messages were copied and j distributed by the administrative support person. Outgoing messages were relayed by J telephone, with a hard-copy telefax follow-up to the LERO EOC. Protective action recommendations were discussed with the BHO-RAP llatson at the LERO EOC. BHO 4. The objective of demonstrating the ability to communicate with all i appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was m e t. The primary I communications link between the RSC and other off-site facilities was commercial 4
61 telephone. At least one telephone had a dedicated "hot line" 6.e., no need to dial) direct to the BHO-RAP liaison at the LERO EOC. Communicaticn between the RSC and the LERO EOC via facsimile machine hard copy was demonstrated. The BHO-RAP field monitoring team demonstrated its ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. The communications system used was the Motorola Model MX-360 with encoding capabilltles and the clear-channel option. Teams 1 and 2 were issued portable, hand-hald radlos, along with spare batteries. The equipment was encoded and tested by contacting the dispatcher at the RSC before the teams left the dispatch area. The rad!os worked quite well in the field, with no communleation delays being reported. Spre rad!os and batteries, which could be delivered to the field teams from the dispatch area, were available for back up. There was also the option for communicating over the clear channel; this option was demonstrated because one of the radios lost its encryption code. BHO 5. The objective of demonstrating the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergency operations wu met. The BHO-RAP RSC is located on the site of BNL, which is a major national research centar with all the resources that such facilltles offer. The RSC has adequate fccllities, equipment, and displays necessary to carry out emergency radiological response functions over an extended period of time. It is located in the BNL Meteo clogy Building Library. Minimal time is required to convert the !!brary into an operational RSC All emergency response support equipment is stored in an adjacent building, the Instrument Maintenance and Calibration Facility. BHO 7-and FA 7. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures for making field radiation measurements was met by the BHO-RAP field monitoring teams. The hand-held radiation monitoring equipment consisted of a Ludlum Model 12S micro-R meter (low level), a high-range Victoreen 471A lon chamber (hlgh-level), and a Ludlum Model 3 GM beta-gamma detector (pancake). Spare equipment in operating condition was available at the dispatch location for transport to the field teams via courier. All equipment was battery and source checked before the teams left the dispatch site. All equipment had valid calibration stickers. Fleid measurements ware made at the 4-foot and 4-inch height, in both window-open and window-closed conditions. T1.s instruments were not enclosed in plastic bags before team members entered the tapected areas of the plume. All data were lvgged on BNL standard sample log forms having places for location, time, and date entries. In general, the monitoring locations were found in a reasonable amount of time. However, legible maps showing street names should be available to the fleld teams to reduce the amount of time required to find specific locations. The teams were well trained in field radiation monitoring and equipment use. This exercise was an application of their normal job description and duties at BNL. The field measurement data were reported carefully and correctly, with special emphasis on measurement location. ._-.n ..,--,,--..____.,._.-,.-.,...,,-,,,--_.-..-,,-.n
63 BHO 8 and FA 8. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and progedures for measurement of airborne radiofodine concentrations as low as 10' uCi/cm3 in the presence of noble gases was met by the DHO-RAP field monitoring teams. The sr.mpling equipment consisted of a BNL air pump, powered from the vehicle's ) 12-V system, a particulate filter, and a charcoal cartridge. .*!!ver-based sample cartridges were also available in the kits, but were not used during the exercise. All 1 pieces of equipment had calibration stickers and were callbrated within the lut year. 3 Air samples (25 ft ) were taken using the required air flow rate and time duration. The samples were taken within the plume and then bagged and sealed before transporting them to an area of low background radiation outside the plume area for count!ng. The samples were counted in a fixed geometry with a CDV 700 with a #6308 probe. The samples were rebagged after counting. All samples were properly identitled and the results of the counting transmitted to the RSC. Some samples were transported to a "runner," who transported the samples via helicopter to Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory for additional analysis. Team members demonstrated proper techniques for avoiding contamination of the sample media and erons contamination of other samples. BHO 9 and FA 9. The objective to demonstrate the ability to obtain samples of particulate activity in the airborne plume and promptly transport the samples to a "runner" was met by the BHO-RAP field monitoring teams. These samples, along with the radiolodine samples discussed above, wc.re transported by air to Teledyne Isotopes i Laboratory in Westwood, New Jersey. Aoout 55 minutes elapsed from the time the i airborne plume sample was taken until it was delivered to the "runner." During this time period, the team moved to a low-background-radiation area to make initial field measurements,of the samples. One of the air samples was delivered to BNL for demonstration purposes. The sample was received one hour after the field team gave the samples to the courier. This transport time is not totally realistic because the same 1 courier stopped en route to deliver other air samples to the "runner" for air transport to Teledyne. At BNL a !!ve-minute sample count was used to qualitatively determine the ratios of specific radionuclides to total activity. With such a short counting time, only radiolodines were detected. The counting procedure involved a quick count of the whole sample cartridge - both the silver silica gel canister and the particulate filter. Proper contamination control procedures were used, both for initial sample screening and for preparing the samples for counting on laboratory instrumentation. BHO 10. The objective to demonstrate the ability, within the plume exposure pathway, to project dosage to the public via the plume exposure pathway based on plant and field data was met by the BHP-RAP REC accident assessment group. Timely dose projections were made. These projections were initially based on changing plant conditions and considered both filtered and unfiltered release pathways. While the release was in progress, dose projections were revised, based on field measurements. As field monitoring data became available, they were plotted on an area map to provide an indication of the current plume location. Meteorological data and weather forecasts were continually reviewed to estimate the areas that could be affected because of changes in the direction of plume travel. Field team controller errors caused much of I m.
63 ~ the team 2 field data to be lost. Although the loss created some player concern and confusion, no major problems were observed with respect to dose assessment. BHO 11. The objective to demonstrate the ability to project radiation dosage to the public via plume exposure, based on. plant data and field measurements, and to recommend appropriate protective measures to LERO, based on PAGs, and effectively communicate them to the LERO EOC wu met. The Team Captain discussed with the BHO-RAP !!alson at the LERO EOC the conditions leading up to the PAR. The Team Captain used information provided by the RSC group nuclear engineer regarding plant status information and trend analysis. "What if"-type dose projections were performed by the dose assessment group to help determine what type of protective actions should be implemented and how far the protective action should extend. When PARS were issued by the LERO EOC, the Team Captain closely questioned why certain ERPAs were omitted. 2.3.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities There were five objectives demonstrated by BHO during the ingestion pathway exercise, with four objectives being fully met,and one objectives being partially met. BHO 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. At the start of day 2 of the exercise, the BHO dose assessment team relocated to the LERO EOC for the Ingestion pathway phase of the exercise. Team members brought their own reference matirial and calculators. All other resources were available at the LERO EOC. Although day-2 exercise play was delayed until completion of cany-over day-1 activities, no problems were encountered in this relocation. The day-2 Ingestion pathway dose assessment function activated as smoothly as scenario constraints would permit. BH O 3. This objective is covered in Sec. 2.3.1 (Plume Exposure Pathway Activities). 1 BHO 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all ) appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met by the BHO-RAP field sampling teams. The communications system was a cellular telephone in the vehicles, which was issued to each field team, along with portable, hand-held radlos for communications while near the BNL dispatch office. While in the fleid, the cellular telephones worked well, with no significant delays in communication. The back up for the cellular telephone system was commercial, land-line telephones. BHO 27. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate use of equipment and procedures for collecting and transpo ting samples of soll, vegetation, water,' and milk 9 e
i 64 was met by the three BHO-RAP field sampling teams. Each team was issued the appropriate sampling equipment. Team members were well trained in the use of the l equipment and in proper procedures. They were familiar with the area and arrived at sampling locations promptly, using appropriate maps. During the exercise, standard operating procedures were followed to obtain the field samples of soll, vegetation, water, and milk. A preservative was added to the milk sample. The collected samples were handled and packaged to prevent cross contamination. They were properly identitled and labeled, and the data were logged on a BNL standard form. Each team member was capable of taking any of the samples. The samples were field monitored, with the results being reported to the LERO EOC. The ( samples were delivered to a sample collection center for subsequent transport to a radiation measurement laboratory for analysis. The teams defined the deposition area with little direction from the LERO EOC field team communicator. BHO 29. This objective is covered in Sec. 2.1.1 (LERO EOC). 2.3.3 Emergency Worker Radlolegical Exposure Control BHO6. While this objective wu not negotiated for evaluation during the l exercise, evaluators assigned to field monitoring teams made the following observations. The BHO-RAP field monitoring teams demonstrated the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure. Team members were each issued a TLD and two DRDs, which they wore throughout the exercise. The DRDs had ranges of 0-200'mR and 0-5 R. Dos! meter chargers were available, and each DRD was zerced before being issued. The DRDs were read at approximately 15 minute Intervals, and the individual exposure received (simulated) for each team member was recorded on a standard form and reported to the RSC. Team members were knowledgeable about exposure limits and who could authorize additional exposure. Also, team members knevi the proper procedures should they receive an exposure higher than previously authorized.. All team members were well tralned in and had an excellent knowledge of the use of personal dosimetry. l The BHO demonstrated its ab!!!ty to distribute and administer E!. Each field monitoring kit contained an adequate supply of K1 for the team members. Each sealed j bottle of K! tablets was within its expiration date. Team members knew who could I authorize the administration of El and the factors upon which such a decision would be based. Team members knew of the possible, but highly unlikely, allergie eenettons to El and the symptoms of this reaction. The Team Captain and RSC dose assessment group l l routinely evaluated the need to administer K! to their emergency worker field teams. l The projected dose estimates based on field att sample measurements Indleated that l emergency worker thyroid exposures would not exceed 25 rem. Therefore, use of E! was not recommended for BHO-RAP field teams. This decision was consistent with RAP emergency r2sponse procedures.
65 Deficiencies No-Deficiencies were observed in the BHO activities during the exercise. Area Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in the BHO activities during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement 1.
== Description:== Field monitorin; equipment was not always adequately protected from contamination when BHO-RAP field teams were in the plume. Recommendation When the team is in the plume, equipment shouJd be protected from contamination by plastic bags, or the equipment should remain in closed kits. 2. Descriptions Legible maps clearly showing street names should be available to each tsam to reduce the amount of time driving in the plume to find specific locations. Recommendation: Packets of legible maps should be available to ehch team. 8 e
66 2.4 CONTRACT LABORATORY The Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory, located I'n Westwood, New Jersey, approximately 65 air miles from the SNPS, is the prime off-site laboratory for this facility. 2.4.1 Plume Exposure Pathway Activities f LAB 7. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate equipment and procedures l for determining fleid radiation measurements was met. Samples of particulate activity in I the airborne plume were obtained and laboratory analyses promptly performed. The sample pick-up team (runner) was fully briefed, equipped, and informed of all aspects of i this operation prior to leaving the EOF. Coordination was arranged with Teledyne and Island Helicopter, which was stationed at BNL. Radio checks were made prior to departure from the EOF area, and alternate telephone communication was provided. Actual and projected meteorological data were provided before the team left the EOF. Five field monitoring teams (thrse LILCO and two BHO-RAP) were monitoring the plume area. The pick-up of lodine and particulate filters from four of these teams wu coordinated through the EOF and accomplished. Contamination control was excellents good records were maintained. Transfer from the teams and transport to the helicopter was expeditious. Samples taken shortly after 1100 hours were en route to New Jersey by 1303 hours and being counted at Teledyne by 1410 hours. Teledyne demonstrated excellent contamination control procedures and rapidly readled sample 3 or the counting process. The professional capability to properly handle f and process these samples was demonst sted. Correct procedures were followed. Although no data were available from these simulation samples at Teledyne, discussions with Teledyne personnel indicated that data from thele samples would be sent via telephone and telecopler to the LERO EOC and EOF as appropriate. Teledyne can trace its standards to the National Bureau of Standards. It also' complies with NRC standards for laboratories of this type. Teledyne is regularly audited by the nuclear utilities it services. 2.4.2 Ingestion Pathway Activittee l l LAB 28. The objective to demonstrate the appropriate laboratory operations and procedures for measuring and analyzing samples of vegetation, food crops, milk, water, and soll was met at the Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory. Teledyne demonstrated excellent radiation-protection, contamination-control, and record-keeping practices. Procedures were followed, and samples were expeditiously put into the counting procev. Within one hour of arrival at Teledyne, one sample of each type was being counted. The Teledyne facility is a full-scale iadioanalysis laboratory, with the capability of measuring all types of samples to high precision, with known geometries. It performs this service for 21 nuclear utilities. It is regularly audited by these utilities and the State of New Jersey. It 9
67 ) conducts its own vigorous internal audit program. On average, an audit of Teledyne operations is performed every three weeks. Standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards are used to calibrate the various instruments. Defielencies No Deficiencies were observed in the laboratory operations at Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in the laboratory operations at Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory during the exercise. 2 Areas Recommended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in the laboratory operations at Teledyne Isotopes Laboratory during the I exercise. e 4 o
68 l \\ 2.5 EMERGENCY NEWS CENTER (ENC) The ENC is located in the LILCO Training Center in Hauppauge, New York. 2.5.1' Plume Exposure Pathway Activities A11 elght objectives demonstrated at the ENC during the plume exposure pathway exeretse were fully met. ENC 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for bcth facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Activation of the ENC occurred in a timely fashion at 0714 hours, and. emergency personnel were in their required positions, as described in LERO procedures. L ENC 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. The office equipment and facilities to electronically receive, reproduce, and distribute information to the press were excellent. Everything was in good working condition, and adequate back-up systems for hard-copy transmittal were available. ENC staff had three hard-copy communications systems in operations a telef.at machine, a perscnal computer software system (PC-NET), and a Teletype 387 computer. Copying capabilities for the distribution of information to rumor-control personnel and EBS messages to media personnel were timely. Receipt of EBS messages from the LERO EOC via a telefax machine resulted in a clean hard copy that could be reproduced and distributed. A previous Deficiency (ENC 1) and previous ARCA (ENC 2) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 have been corrected And verified. ENC 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of the facility, equipment, displays, and other materials to support emergocy operations was met. Security measures and screening controls were in place and met the necessary objectives. The EBS messages were written, authorized, and sent to the ENC from the LERO EOC. The three hard-copy systems were used for sending EBS messages and other communications to the LERO EOC, EOF, and ENC. The availability of hard-copy press releases and EBS messages was accomplished by posting each item, In the order of their release, on a bulletin board, and by putting numerous copies Ina distribution bins that were available to media personnel. The ENC had maps and status boards in app'ropriate locations for use by media personnel, but th current weather conditions were not always updated. Meteorological conditions, including wind speed and direction, were not posted initially. When such information was posted in the briefing area, it was not updated regularly. The l \\
69 ~ meteorological conditions pested in the government working area were not updated, and no one was apparently assigned to do so until the second shif t. Maps posted Identitled the various zones and.other critical information. There was an aerial photograph that included the 10-mile EPZ; Maps displaying the plume EPZ and ERPAs and status boards giving the ECLs and times of declaration were available fcr the media. Pres's releases and other hard-copy documents were posted for easy reading and review. Delays occurred in the writing, producing, and distribution of hard-copy releues to the medla from the verbal press briefings, given at the ENC. A previous ARCA (ENC
- 1) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 has been corrected and verifled.
ENC 13. The objective to demonstrate the ability to coordinate the formulation and dissemination of accurate Information and instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the initial alert and notification wu met (Table 1.3). The ENC operations were executed as planned. The necessary ENC functions, including communications, were carried out. The first EBS message was broadcast (simulated) to the public via radio at 0613 hours. This message described the current Alert ECL, which had been activated through the EBS. Subsequent EBS messages were formulated and issued for radio broadcast, although some of these messages were too lengthy to be effective. 4. ENC 14. The objective.to demonstrate the ability to brief the media in an accurate, coordinated, and timely manner was m e t. The timely activation and mobilization of ENC staff allowed for adequate communications with the media. Eight press briefings vere conducted on the flest day, and six on each of tne next two days. LERO also provided a spokesperson for follow-up Interviews after each press briefing. The ENC staff also conducted sessions before the press briefings to prepare media representatives for the upcoming briefing. LERO provided a esdlation htalth spokesparson who was not included in the plan. This planning Issue will be addressed in the evaluatlon of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. The press briefings by the ENC staff were transmitted through the ENC facility by closed-circuit television. The audio portion of press belefings wu transmitted to the LERO EOC in Brentwood. A L2RO spokesperson wu ava!!able to the media during each shift. ENC 15 and DO 15. The objectives of demonstrating the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated and timely fashion were met.. Rumor-control functions include (1) prompt handling of incoming calls from the district offlees and call boards, (2) reviewing media calls and Inquiries about plant conditions, and (3) consta'.t monitoring of radio and television programs to respond to or correct inaccurate 4 information. The rumor-control staff referred media calls to media staff at the ENC. Af ter checking the response, rumor-control staff called back district off!ces of rumor , ~ - -. - .,cn-- -,m.-,n-,-------. -v,,---mm -,<-m---m-----v~-~-, , -, - ~,
- - - - ~ 70 control to couplete the loop. The rumor-control staff members received individual copies of both EBS messages and press releases, so that their responses were correct and timely. Communications with district offices of rumor control were performed through the computer networks. The rumor-control staff of nine had eight public rumor-control telephone lines, nine medla information telephone lines, and a single insurance inquiries telephone line. LILCO staffs and operates 11 district offices, which are equipped to function as rumor-control centers. Four of these offices include LILCO call boards that provide response assistance to customers for normal electrical service problems or repairs. These four cr.11 boards are available to support the 11 rumor-control operations at the district offices. During the exercise, four of the rumor-control operations were evaluated: Port Jefferson, Riverhead, and two at Brentwood (one call board and one district office). Each of these operations has four to eight operators who are normally involved with customer service and have been trained in rumor-control procedures. Using hard copies of press releases, speeches, and other applicable information, the rumor-control operators answered telephone questions concerning the emergency situation. If these ' operators were unable to provide sufficient Information, then the ENC's rumor-control staff were contacted and requested to provide clarification. More than 900 telephone calls were received by the district offices and call boards. Approximately 215 of these had to be referred to the ENC for additional information. Timely and accurate responses were raade by rumor-control personnel. ENC 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing cn a contlhous, 24' hour basis was mot by an actual shif t change. During the exercise, the rumor-control staff and the other staff functions at the ENC executed a successful shift change at about 1400 hours. The first shift spokesperson conducted a detailed debriefing session with second shift personnel. Additional assistance was provided to the second shift spokesperson in preparation of their Initial press briefing, who In turn did an excellent job. Furthermore, the first shift rpokesperson asked staff to remain an j additional 15 minutes to assist their counterparts to assure a smooth transition. Third shift ENC personnel were available if needed. i ENC 37. The objective to demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organization personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments was met. At the ENC, LERO personnel maintained continual contact and Interacted well with nonparticipating governmental organizations. LERO ENC stafi' verified information with these organizations and when clarification wu necessary, referred to their plan. 2.5.2 Ingestion Pathway Activities All five objectives to be demonstrated at the ENC during the ingestion pathway exercise were fully met. I
,,,-r-
---~w -,--------w----
7A 1 ENC 4,13,14,15, and 37. These objectives are covered in Sec. 2.5.2 (Plume Exposure Pathway Activities). Defielency No Defielencies were observed at the ENC during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action ) No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the ENC c aring the exere!se. j .iress Recommended for Improvement j l 1. Descript!om Meteorological conditions, including wind speed and direction, were not posted initially. When such information was posted in the beleting area, it was not updated regularly. The I meteorological conditions posted in the government working area were not updated, and no one was apparently assigned to do so until the second shift. Recommendatiom The procedures should be reviewed and revised, as required. Appropriate training should be conducted. Position descriptions should t,e revised to identify the position (s) responsible for this function. 2. Descriptforu Hard-copy releases coverin'g ENC verbal press briefings were not written, reproduced, and distributed to the media in a timely enough manner. 1 Recommendattom Releases covering ENC verbal press briefings l should be produced faster at d distributed to the media within 20 minutes of the end of each briefing. e
72 1 2.8 PORT JEFFERSON frrAGING AREA l The Port Jefferson staging area is located at the LILCO fossil fuel plant in Port Jefferson. The main part of the staging area is the turbine deck for one of the generator units. Briefing areas were set up in two rooms that open onto the turbine deck. Another briefing area, the Staging Area Coordinator's office, and a communications room were i j set tp in an adjacent office area. 1 l 2.8.1 Staging-Area Operations Plume Wre Fethway Activittee All eight objectives to be demonstrated by the Port Jefferson staging erea during the plume exposure pathway exercise were fully met. SA 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emergency functions and activities corresponding to ECLa as required by the scenario was met. The staging area was promptly notifled of each ECL as it occurred during the exercise. Appropriate emergency functions 'were implemented by the staging-area staff for each ECL. The lead staff were equipped with pyers activated ~oy LERO for each ECL. A public-address system at the staging area wu used to brief the staff on pertinent Information.and to announce any changes in the ECL. The public-address sptem worked well, and each change in ECL wu broadcast promptly; however, on several occasions, staging-area personnel did n,ot know the current ECL. The staff appeared to ignore the Information broadcast over the public-address system, waiting instead for hard-copy notification. Also, the ECLs were displayed on a status board in the coordinator's office and in the dosimeuy briefing room. SA 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Activatloi. of the staging area was initiated at the alert ECL and was accomplished in a timely manner. Radio pagers were used to notify by personnel of the alert. The Staging-Area Coordinator, Bus Dispatcher, lead traffic guides, dosimetry record keepers, and support staff arrived promptly and set up the physical arrangements and equipment necessary for the facility's emergency functions. At 0658 hours, the LERO EOC was notifled thet the Por t Jefferson staging area was activated, with all key personnel present and prepared for emergency operations. Following receipt of the site area emergency ECL, notification procedures were initiated' to alert and mob!!!ze the remaining emergency staff. Computerized roster lists with telephone numbers were used j to call the staff and later, upon arrival, to m!gn them in. 1 l I 1 i i
73 !!A 3. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met. The emergency response at the Port Jefferson staging area was effectively administered and managed by the Staging-Area Coordinator and his assistant, who were kept informed of all staging-area activities. They ensured that written procedures were used and followed. Periodic briefings were conducted to update the staff on the current situation. SA 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communleate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel was met. Communication with the LERO EOC was generally good. Dedicated telephones (primary), commercial telephones, and LILCO radio were used to communicate with the LERO EOC throughout the exercise. Internal message handling and distribution also were good. Incoming messages were recorded on message forms, reproduced, and distributed to appropriate staff. SA 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipm'ent, displays, and supplies were adequate to support emergency operations was met. The main part of the staging area is the turbine deck. This area provided ample space for fleid personnel awaiting assignments. Three separate briefing rooms were used for briefing personnel prior to dispatch: one for dosimetry distribution, one for briefing bus drivers, and one for briefing route alert drivers, route spotters, traffic guides, and road crews. Command, control, and communications were conducted in a separate room. The status board in the coordinator's office was kept up to date with appropriate information. SA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population was met through actions taken et the staging area. Personnel were dispatched from the staging area to perform their field assignments in support of this objective. These personnel were prepared to provide the necessary assistance. - SA 20. The objective to dtmonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met by the staff at the Port Jefferson staging area by establishment of TCPs. Fifty-eight TCPs were established and were staffed by 72 traffic guides froJ. the staging area shortly after their dispatch into the field from the staging area, beginning at 0314 ho.urs. SA 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staff!ng on a continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met at the Port Jefferson staging area at 1530 hours. Second-sh!ft staff were appropriately briefed by the outgoing staff and by the second-shif t coordinator. The transition from the first t) the second shift occurred smoothly and effectively, with the staff moving quickly to..telr positions and carrying out their. emergency response functions, consistent with current plans and procedures. 0 g
74 Ingestion Pathway and Recovery / Reentry Activities SA 33 and FA 33. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery were met. The Port Jefferson staging area wu activated and remained operational during the ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry phases of the exercise. The primary function of the staging area was to provide assistance to its personnti in the fleid and to other staging areas. The Port Jefferson staging area was requested to aasist the Patchogue staging area by supplying three traffic guides, some dosimetry equipment, and bus drivers. Deficiencies No Def!clencies were observed at the Port Jefferson staging area during the exercise. Areas nequiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the Port Jefferson staging area during the exercise. Area Recommended for Improvement 1.
== Description:== Although each change in ECL was broadcast over the public-address system, staff members on several occasions were not aware of the changes until they were notifled of them by hard copy. Recommendation: Personnel should be trained to pay attention to the public-address-system broadcasts. A whistle or loud noise, to draw attention, could precede each broadcast. 2.8.2 Implementation of Fle d Activities All five objectives to be demonstrated through field activities originating at the l Port Jefferson staging area, were fully met. These field activities were generally well organized and Implemented according to the plan. FA 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, snd activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Personnel with field assignments from the Port Jefferson staging area were notified to report by either the pager system or telephone. Mobilization of emergency workers to the staging area occurred promptly, and each worker was briefed prior to dispatch into + m,
75 the field. These briefings consisted of information on dosimetry use and deta!!ed Instructions on specific assignments. Preparing personnel prior to dispatching them into the field was accomplished quickly and efficiently. Personnel assigned as route spotters were ready for deployment about two hours following receipt of notification to report to the staging area, well within the allotted time. FA 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all appropriate locations, orTanizations, and field personnel was met. Communications with personnel in the field were effectively demonstrated by the equipment provided and its operation. Personnel were able to use the portable radios in their vehicles to communicate with the LERO EOC. Appropriate radio protocol was used, and the equipment operated without failure. FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate proted. actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ populations was met. Personnel were dispatched from the staging area to perform their field assignments in support of this objective. These personnel were prepared to provide the necessary assistance. Route alert drivers were dispatched (out of sequence) to notify (simulated) all deaf residents in the affected area. Routes were actually run, and "pass-bys" of their residences were made. There were some minor problems observed with identification of ~ houses and routes. The address numbers on several of the houses could not be located, and one of the drivers had difficuuy in locating the area in which the route was to be run. The Atomic Safety and Liceastnr 5,ard has concluded (Long Island Lighting Company (Shofeham Nuclear Power Station Lnit 1), LBP-85-12, April 17,1985, 21 NRC 853-854 (1985)] that "... a 4 hour notif! cation period does not subject the deaf to any special hazard to their health and safety since they can still be evacuated in about the same time frame as the general public." FA 20. 'The objective to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffle flow and to control access to evacuated and i sheltered areas was met. Personnel and resources from the Port Jefferson staging aren were used to demonstrate TCPs and the ability to deal with a traffic ltopediment. The staging area established 58 TCPs, using 72 traff!c guides: 10 of these TCPs (1, 4, 5, 6, 38, 42, 56, 57, 81, and 86) were evaluated. Conelse briefings were given prior to dispatching the traffic guides, and all were issued an information packet concerning protective actions and evaeustion. Generally, the traffic guides had a complete and adequate understanding of the functions and responsibilities of their assignments. However, the traffic guide at TCP 38 was not famillar with evacuation routes peripheral to that location. Overall, traffic control was well executed. A free-play message - Interjected TCP 47 at 1125 hours - Identifled a simulated Impeciment to evacuation in the form of a blockage of a bridge near to TCP'47
76 en an evacuati:n route. T'cre were threo elements to the imp:diment (1) a partially collapsed bridges (2) a dump truck with its wheel through the bridge deck; and (3) a stalled, out-of-gas car at one end of the bridge. Initially, the personnel at the TCP had difficulty in communicating the details of the Impediment to the LERO EOC because of ' n apparent dead spot in the radio coverage. After the vehicle equipped with the rad!o was relocated (a short distance away, but still at the site of the impediment), the message was transmitted to the LERO EOC. Instructions were received, and communication was completed without any further difficulties. The appropriate resources were dispatched to the site of the Impediment, and applicable procedures were used to remove the vehicles and route the traffic accordingly. The Impediment was l removed at 1245 hours and the bridge remained closed to traffic. l FA 37. The objective to demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response l organfzation personnel to interface with nonparticipating state and local governments i through their mobilizat!on and provision of advice and assistance was met based on the traffle guides knowledge of procedures. Traffic control personnel were aware of the possibility of interfacing with area pollee and were prepared to rellnquish the TCPs to l !aw enforcement officers, but would offer to remain and assist as speelfled in the traffic I guides procedure. l Defielencies l No Deficiencies were observed in the field activities of personnel dispatched from the Port Jefferson staging area during the exeretse. Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in the field activities of personnel dispatched from the Port Jefferson staging ares during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement 1. Descriptions The traffic guide TCP 38, out of the Port Jefferson staging area, was not f amillar with evacuation routes peripheral to that location. Recommendation The traffle guNes should be Informed at the { briefing given prior to dispatch into the field that they should review the Information on evacuation routes provided in their packets. 2.
== Description:== Two problems were observed during the demonstration of notification of the deaf. The address numbers on
77 several of the houses could not be located, and one of the drivers had difficulty in locating the area in which the route was to be run. Recommendation: Drivers should receive Instruct!ons from staging area personnal on how to locate their route areas. 2.6.3 Emergeoey Worker Radiological Tyre Control SA 8 and FA 8. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to centinuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure were met by the emergency workers i with field assignments from the Port Jefferson staging area. All field personnel were issued dosimetry kits and were thoroughly briefed on their use prior to being dispatched. The briefings were detailed, Informative, and structured to cover all appropriate aspects of exposure control. The kits issued to each worker contained a low-range (0-200 mR) DRD, a mid-range (0-5 R) DRD, a TLD, and assorted instructional, consent, and. record-keeping forms. All personnel evaluated in the field were knowledgeable in exposure control equipment and practice. SA 18 and FA 16. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to distribute and administer K! were met. All fleid personnel were given a brief!ng on K! use at the staging area prior to being dispatched, including why it would be administered, authorization procedures for use, and the danger posed to lodine-allergic Individuals. Emergency workers were supplied with.K! (simulated) along with their dosimetry kits. The deelslon tp. recommend the use of El for all emergency workers was received at the staging area at approximately 1106 hours. Except for the route alert staff, most of the other field personnel had been dispatched prior to the K! recommendation. Stagir.g-area staff took the appropriate actions to notify the workers !c the field to ingest KI, and the route alert staff were informed at the staging area. i Def!clencies No Deficiencies were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers assigned to the Port Jefferson staging area during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers assigned to the Port Jefferson staging area during the exercise. S t 8 .___-_---_-m, .--,,..,___,,,--__,.___,-._v__,---.-,,,_._,,,,p----------,--vr...,--.__.-_r-,-
78 Areas Reco:2cended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for improver 6ent were cbserved in radiological exposure control for emergency. workers assigned to the Port Jefferson staging area during the exercise. l l l l ) e 1 1 l 1 l l l l l E
~ 79 2.7 PATCHOGUE !rrAGING AREA The Patchogue staging area is at a LILCO district office in Patchogue, situated at 460 East Main Street at the Intersection with Clinton Avenue. The entire first floor of the two-story building is used as the staging area. An equipment storage building located across Conklin Avenue is where such ltems as dosimetry, protective clothing, radios, and mobue loudspeakers are stored. 2.7.1 8taging-Area Operstlons Flume R-c_e Pathway Activities All eight objectives to be demonstrated by the Patehogue staging area during the plume exposure pathway exercise were fully met. SA 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriate implementation of emargency functions and activities corresponding to ECLs as required by the scenario was met. The Staging-Area Coordinator informed the
- staff as each ECL'was declared. The ECLs were prominently displayed. All response activities were implemented in a manner consistent with LERO's emergency plan.
SA 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate persofthel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. The staging area was activated, and emergency personnel were briefed and dispatched to their tasigned locations. By 0635 hours, security was established and the reception room for incoming emergency workers was organized. There was a delay of about 30 minutes in pm'hg a guard at the equipment storage building where the lead traffic guides were temporarily obtalning supplies. Security arrangements and a procedural change had all staff entering via the north entrance. The staging area was declared activated at 0850 hours, and the first brieflrr 'n key staff was conducted at 0658 hours. Fleid deployments commenced 25 minutes afu the site area emergency ECL notification at 0735 Purs and were completed by 0950 hours. A previous Def!clency (Patchogue 2) and three previous ARCAs (Patchogue 1,3 and 9) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1988 have been corrected and verifled. SA 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities was met by the Staging-Area Coordinator. Periodic briefings were held to update staff on the emergency. Message logs were kept for all incoming and outgoing messages and transmissions. The lead traffic guides and bus dispatchers were clearly in charge of their respective activities. Emergency workers were briefed by the lead traffic ruldes and bus dispatchers on dosimetry and its use, and were given instructional packsts.
80 SA 4. The cbjective to demonstrate the ability to comm.unicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel wu met. Personnel at the Pr.tchogue staging area communicated with various locations and field personnel. A dedlented telephone line with the LERO EOC, comme:clal telephone !!nes, and a two-way radio were the three means of communication. Communications were established with the LERO EOC, othsr staging areas, traffic guldes, and TP coordinators. The dedicated telephone line with the LERO r.OC handled communications without undue delays. I SA 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials, to support emergency operations was met. Sufficient telephones were available on the main floor to perform emergency functions. Parking for emergency workers was ava!!able, and the equipment storage building was adequate for the warehousing of emergency supplies and equipment. A security guard was posted l at the south door. Two previous ARCAs (Patchogue 2 and 4) from SNPS PEA dated l April 17,1986 have been corrected and ver! fled. SA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted perm.anent and transient plume EPP. population was met. Bus drivers, traffic guldes, route spotters, and road crowt from the general population were deployed to their respective locations. Route alert cri.ars for the deaf and the transporting of the mobility tapaired were evaluated l out c.' sequence. All field emergency workers were thoroughly briefed and squipped for their assigned functions. A previous ARCA (Patchogue 8) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986, was corrected and verifled. l SA 20. The objective to demonstrate the orgt.ntzational ability and resources n?cessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. Twenty-eight i TCPs were established and staffed by 41 traffic guides dispatched from the Patchogue staging area. Prior to deployment, the traffic guides werk briefed on their assignments and Instructed on the measur lery to control access to designated areas. Dispatching began at 0815 ho' ~ ** a y arrived at their posts 35-55 minutes af ter dispatch. l SA 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met. The shif t change began at 1500 hours. Approximately 35 second-shift personnel replaced 43 first-shift personnel. The transition went very smoothly, with all staff being phased in within one hour of the time announced for the shift change. Each incoming person was briefed on the present situation and the status of their particular tasignment. The first-shif t Staging-Area Coordinator personally briefed his relief for 30 minuts: on the status of the exercise. J i
G1 Ingestion-Pathway and Recovery / Reentry Activ!4cs SA 33 and FA 73. The object!ves to detsonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recuvery were met. Twelve traffic guides were briefed and dispate ed by approximately 1130 hours. They arr!ved at their sts approximately 40-45 m' v6es later. la several ca.e:, the traffic ruldu did not appear to fully understand theb duties as to w.'o should be allowed access and what areu were specifically restricted. This ;,isnning Inue will be addressed in the evaluation of Rey!sion 10 of LERO off-site %diological Emergency Rasponse Plan for Shorch.2m, by the RAC. 5 Defielenclu No Deficiencles wt -Merved at tne Patchogue staging arse, during the exercise. Area Requiring Corrective Action t No Areu Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the Patchogue staging area during the exercise. t Area Recommended for Improvement 1. bptiom A delay of about 30 minutes occu.tred in posting a security guard at the equ!pment storage building. Recommesidatlom This post should oe established at tne same time the other security posts are established, that is, upon activatlou of the staging are.a. 2.7.2 Implemes+.atlon of Field Activities All five objectives to be demonstrated thaugh field e.ctivities originating at the Patchogue staging ares were fully met. FA 1. The o'sjective to demonstrate the acility to fully alerting, mobilizing, and s.ctivste personnel was met, with emergency workert with fleid responsibilities being blefed prior to belc>i $lspatched into the field. FA 4. The objective to deronstrate the ability to communleate with all eppropriate locations, organizations, and field personrel wu met. Traff!c guides and l
82 route spotters were Issued portable radios that plugged into vehicle cigarette lighters. Communication between emergency workers in the field and the LERO EOC was reliable. FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to 'mplement appropriate protective actions for the Impacted permanent and translent plume EPZ population was met. The traffic guldes at the TCPs were knowledgeable about their assignments, including the Information they should provide to the general population. Also, the route alurt driven for n9tification of the deaf knew their routes, how to locate the routes, and the correct procedures for their ass 4nment. A previous ARCA (Patehcque 5) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 was corrected and verifled. I FA 20. The objective ta demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas was met. The TCPs established in preparation for an evacuation l functioned smoothly. The personnel involved were fully knowledgeable about and aware { of their datles. An impediment was located approximately one quarter mile west of a TCP 68 on Granny Road at the Intersection with Blue Ridge Drive, which was outside of the 10-mile EPZ. When the free-play message for the traffic impediment was inserted at 1200 hours it took 8 minutes to read a less-than-30-word message twice to the LERO EOC and then rece!ve confirmation. At about 1245 hours, two road crews responded to TCP 68, where they were advised by the L2RO EOC to stand by to assist Suffolk County pollce and fire rescue personnel. The rsad crews proceeded to the impediment when instructed to do so by the EOC at 1315 hours The road crews reported to the EOC that the Impediment could be removed by 1430 hours. The road crews were knowledgeable about the capabilities of the. required equipment and exercised appropriate judgement. The exercise revealed a discrepancy between the description of spotter route 1004 in Attachment 6 of OPIP 3.6.3 and the route map provided to the route spotter. The procedure and/or the map should be revised so they agree. This planning issue will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radlological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. The mino-discrepancy did not have an i adverse effect on the public health and safety. A prev ous ARCA (Patehogue 6) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 was corrected and verifled. FA 37. The ohjte.tive to demonstrate the capability of utility off-site response organlaation personnel o laf.erface with nonparticipating state and local governments through their mobilizatten and provision cf advice and assistance was met. Because representatives of nonparticipating state and local governments were not pretent, this objective was avsluated by questioning LERO emergency workers In the field on what they would do if governmental personnel had been directed to assume the functions they were performing. Those most affected would be the traffin guides at TCPs where police could be directed to assume their functions. Thi traffic buldes understood how to deal l with such situations. They indicated they would (1) brief the police officers, (2) provide l l I u
83 them with El tablets (with appropriatm instructions), (3) provide them with dosimetry, and (4) turn over the responsibility for traffic control to them. Deficiencies No Defic leneles were observed in the. field activities of personnel dispatched from the Patchogue staging area during the exercise. Area Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in the field activities of personnel dispatched from the Patchogue staging area during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement 1. DNerlptiem It took eight minutes for a traff!c guide to transmit to the LERO EOC and confirm a relatively short message about a traffic accident that wu blocking traffic. Recommendation: Training should be provided in transmitting and receiving radio messages. l l 1.7.3 EmerTency Worker Radic!r.gical Exposure Control j SA 8 and FA 6. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control kmergency worker exposure were met. The briefings on these subjects were thorough and well ? resented. The dosimetry issued to each emergency worker was checked. The potential exposure of all workers was continuously monitored through frequent dor! meter read!ngs. The use of protective clothing on Instructions from the LERO EOC ato. demonstrated a means of contro0ing worker exposure. The emergency workers depleyed knew how to monitor their Individual exposures and what to do if tb4 prescribed !!mits of 200 mR, 3.5 R, and d.3 R were exceeded. Three previous ARCAs (Patchogue 10,12 and 14) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1988 have been corrected and vertfled. SA 18 and FA 18. The objectives to de nonstrats the ability to make the decision to recommend the use of K! for emergeacy workers and institutional! zed persons, based on predetarn:Ined erlteria, as well as to distribute sad ad:n!nister it once the decision is i made, if necessitated by radiolodine releases, were ::let. During the dosimetry briefings for all emergency workers at the staging area, K! and its use were described, and the circumstances under which it should be ingested were explained. T*ie traffic guides simulated ingestion of El after the order to ingest had been issued. Th(y also indicated l.
that they knsw that a ree:rd was to be kept of th:!r individual doses. A previsus ARCA (Patehogue 13) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1988 was c rrected and verificd. l l Dettelencies l No Deftelencies were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers mas!gned to the Patchogue staging ares during the exeretse. Areas Requiring Corrnetive Action f No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers ass!gned to the Patchogue staging arms during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in radlological exposure control for emerTency workers assigned to the Patchogue staging area during the exercise. I 1 O r l l l l L
4 85 5.8 RJVERHEAD frrAGING AREA The Riverhead staging area is located in the basement of a LILCO fac!!!ty on Doctors Path in Riverhead, New York. A large work space is divided into an office for the Staging-Area Coordinator and sections for the administrative support staff and communications staff. Several other rooms are specified for fleid personnel and related staff.
- S.1 Staging-Area Operations Plume 'gl=e-Pathway Activitles All eight objectives to be demonstrated by the Riverhead staging area during the plume exposure pathway exercise were fully met.
5A 1. The ob.fective to demonstrate the ability to monitor, understand, and use ECLs through appropriately implementing smergency functions and activities at each ECL was met. Staging-area staff were knowledgeable moout ECLs. They knew what the ECLs meant and what to do when notifled of a change by the LERO EOC. SA 7, The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Staging-area staff were mobill ed after notifloation of the alert ECL. Suffielent staff to operate arrives promptly and activated the staging area at 0700 hours. Staffing was completed at 0800 hours. Upon notification of a site area emergency at 0731 hours, bus drivers, traffle guides, route spotters, and route alert drivers were called in. As soon as they arrived, they were issued their equipment and dispatched in accordance with their functions. Mobil!:stion was completed by about 0945 hours. 8A 3. The objective to demonstrate the ahility to direct, eoordinate, and control emerteney activities was m e t. The Staging-Area Coordinator and the Deputy Coordinator (a new position) were in charge of the faellity's emergency response role. The Staging-Area Coordinator exercised effective control, initially assigning staff to several functions until enough staff had arrived. All responsibilities were quickly covered. The Deputy Coordinator traveled around the staging area to facilitate operations and locate problems, while the Staging-Area Coordinator stayed in the operations area where he could be easily reached if a decisloa needed to be made or if he needed to be informed of events elsewhere. Briefings were held for key staff, who in turn beleted their staff (e.g., traffic guides), as appropriate. A copy of the plan was available. All Incoming and outgoing messages were logged. The entire operation was handled competently and professionally. 6
86 SA 4. The oefective to demonstrate the ability te communicate with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field 9ersonnel was met. Telephones and radios, respectively, were the primary and secondary communication systems. In addition, the Staging-Area Coordinatcr had access to a telefax machine. All communication systems functioned properly throughout the exercise. I SA 5. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment, displays, and other materials, to support emergency operations was met. The !!ghting wu good, the ventilation was adequate, space and furnishings were suff!clent, back-up power wu available, and parking wu provided. Office equipment and supplies were sufficient for the limited paperwork requirements of this operation. Access to the facility was controlled, with at least one security person at each door. Maps with the i plume EPZ, evacuation routes, relocation centers, TPs, and TCPs were displayed and l were appropriately controlled. The status board was prominantly displayed and updated promptly whenever new information was provided. A staffing board was updated every I half hour until the full complement of staff had arrived. A previous ARCA (Riverhead 1) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 has been corrected and verifled. SA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability.nd resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population wu met. The staging area was responsible for deploying traffic l guides and route spotters to the field, bus drivers to their buses and to the assigned TPs, I TP coordinators, and route alert drivers for the deaf. These workers were at the staging area only long enough to pick up their assignment, dosimetry, receive briefings, and in some cases pick up traffic control equipment. Staging-area personnel began notifying these workers at 0731 hours by 0945 hours, the last field worker had been processed and l dispatched. The handling, briefing, and dispatching of personnel were promptly and j professionally performed by an.propriate staff. SA 20. The objente to demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control e. cess to evacuated and sheltered areu wu met. Staging-area staff called up the traffic guides and route spotters, outfitted them, briefed them, and dispatched them in a timely manner. Staff members provided information on evacuation routes, relocation centers, and access control point Icentions, and briefings on sheltering, l evacuation, and special facilities. These efforts were in addition to prior training. This l outfitting and briefing constitute the entire function of the staging area for traffic guldes. Most traffic guides were in place before the general emergency ECL. A previous Deficiency (Riverhead 1) from SNPS PEA %) April 11,1986 has been corrected and rifled. SA 34. The objective to demonstrate the ab!!!ty to maintain staffing on a continuous 24-hour buis by an actual shif t change was met. The notification of the need for second-shift staffing came at 1320 hours, and call-out of staff began within a mir. ate or two. Second-shift personnel began to arrive at 1420 hours. By 1452 hours, the
87 Staging-Area Coord'inator and his assistant began a thorough briefing of their second-shif t counterparts. The former then conducted a general briefing for administrative support staff. The lead traffic guide, dosimetry record keeper, e.nd bus driver coordinator then conducted detailed briefings of thstr second-shift counterparts. The entire staff change, including signing In, briefings, and personnel excha.nge, was completed by 1540 hours. Interviews conducted with second-shift staff members indicated that they had been well beleted and were aware of their appropriate duties and responsibilities. All releTant functions and activities were implemented consistent with the LERO plan. Ingestion-Fathway and Recovery / Reentry Activities SA 33 and FA 33. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery by simulating the dispatch of workers to access control points were met. No other activities were required of this staging area. Defielencies No Deficiencies were observe'd at the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Adu Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement t t No Areas Reecmmended for Improvement were observed at the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. 1.8.2 Implementation of Field Activities s There were five objectives to be demonstrated through field activities j originating at the Riverhead staging area, with three objectives being fully met, one objectivs being partially met, and one objective was not observed. 4 FA 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobillze, and i activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency funettons workers was ) met, with emergency workers with field responsibilities being briefed prior to being dispawhed into the field. I j
88 FA 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate w!th all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel wu met. The traffic guides communicated with all appropriate locations, organizations, and field personnel. Mobile emergency radles provided communication links among the traffic guides, the LERO ( EOC, the Riverhead staging area, and the transfer points. The radios were new, lightweight, and easily transportable. They plugged into vehicle cigarette lighters. The ~ redloc generally functioned well, with the radios at eight TCPs operating without problems. Two radios failed. One failed immediately after the traffic guide contacted the LERO EOC for a radio test. Within minutes of the failure, the LERO EOC, the f Riverhead staging area, and two nearby TCPs were unable to contact the traffic guide, I and the staging ares arranged for a replacement radio to be delivered. Meanwhile, the l traffic guide proceeded to the nearest TCP and reestablished contact. After its prompt delivery, the replacement radio worked well. A second radio failed to function properly. In this instance, the traffic guide went to an adjacent TCP r.nd nccified the l LERO EOC. The staging area again delivered a replacement radio, which reso'ved the l problem in a timely manner. All traff!c guides evaluated displayed good radio technique and demonstrated knowledge of radio operations procedures. I FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources neewssary to implement appropriate protective actions fo.' the impacted permanent and transient I plume EPZ population was met. Evacuation was the only protective action for the ( affected area in the Riverhead staging area's jurisdiction. The traffle guides were issued sufficient traffic control equipment, traffic cones and lights, traffle direction gear, and emergency fiares, along with detailed instructions to control evacuation at the TCPs observed in the field. The traffic guides also demonstrated a working knowledge of TCP l setup and traffic direction. They implemented activities and functiorc for evacuation consistent with the LERO plan. They were aware of the proper information to furnish { motorists regarding relocation centers. When questioned, they answered that they would { instruct motorists to tune in to the appropriate EBS radio station for information on the reception centers to which evacuees were being directed. The route alert drivers for the deaf were able to locate all of the addresses provided. They also were able to provide written instructions on the appropriate protective actions. The routes were all run in a timely manner. l l FA20. The objective to demonstra* ..c organizational ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flu and to control access to evacuated and sheltered areu was partially met. The traffic guides were equipped, briefed, and deployed to the field from the staging area in about 40 minutes. Deployment time was l less than 30 minutes. Most guides arrived at thelt posts before the general emergency ECL was caelated (0934 hours), and all were there well in advance of evacuation I (1026 hours). The traffic guides had the resources necessary to control traffle at the TCPs and were able to establish and maintain contact with the LERO EOC. The route spotter being observed notifled the LERO EOC once, upon his arrivaj at his route. He then proceeded to run his route, driving within the normal traffic speed limit. He failed to cover e portion of his assigned route, missing a triangular segment 9 -A.
89 southeast on North County Road and west on 25A back to Wading R!ver Road. At 1259 hours, the route spotter arrived at the scene of an Impediment. He immediately tried to notify the LERO EOC by radio, calling it three times with no response. Leaving the scene, he went one-half mile south to an intersection. From that location, he was able to contact the LERO EOC. He described the Impediment twice, ending the communication at 1307 hours and proceeding back to the impediment. He called the LERO EOC at 1314 hours and was informed that two road crews were in route. The first road crew arrived at the Impediment at 1322 hours. They Immediately notified the LERO EOC of their arrival. A second crew called the EOC at 1322 hours to say they were at the road intersection one-half mile south of the Impediment. Adequate discussion was held on the procedures and the time it would take to clear the j impediment. The EOC was Informed that about 30 minutes would be needed to clear ths j impediment at 1333 hours. At 1337 hours, the road crews notifled the EOC how the people involved in the accident would be esacuated. One lane was reopened at 1343 hours. At 1400 hours, the imp *:diment was cleared; at 1405 hours, the EOC 2 instructed the road crews to return to their station. During later questioning, the route spotter described the very reasonable method he would have used to handle traffic backed up by the Impediment. a l In response to a simulated impediment, a traffic guide wu relocated to an Intersection closer to the Impediment, from which he directed traffic down an alternate route, that is, Wadtng River - Manorville Road rather than Schultz Road. The alternate route is at a fork in the road. The traff!c guide thought the right fork was Schultz Road i and that Wad!ng River - Manorville Road went straight and mistakenly directed traffic directly toward the impediment. 1 FA 37. The objective to demonstrate the capability af ut!!!ty off-site response l orfants.atlon personnel to Interface with nonparticipating state and local governments i through their mobilization and provision of advice and assistance was not observed in the I field for activities related to the Riverhead Staging Area. l 1 Defieleneles l No Defielencies were ebeerved in the field activities of personnel dispatched from the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. I Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1. Descriptiot.: A route spotter failed to cover a portion of his a.ulgned route. (NUREG-0454, Supp.1. II J.10.k). t j Recommendation: The route spotters should study their route i maps more thoroughly to ensure that they are completely familiar with their routes. As a check, the route spotters could to over the l route m:.ps with the supervisor during the route briefing. l l 4
) 90 2.
== Description:== Because of a misinterpretation of road names, a l traffic guide directed traffle directly toward an impediment., (NUREG-0654, Supp.1. II, J.10.k) Recommendation: The traffic guides should consult road maps so i that they are aware of the Impediment location and can more t readily determine how traffic should be routed. i Areas Recommended for laprovement i i' No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in the field j activities of personnel dispatched from the Riverhead staging area ] during the exercise. l 4 i 1.8.3 Emergency Worker Radiologleal Exposure Control l } ] SA 4 and FA 4. .The objectives to demonstrate the ability to continuously j monitor and control emergency worker exposure were met. The hedling of. dosimetry distribution and the knowledge of the fleid workers demonstrated Gie ability of the staging-area staff to brief field personnel and disseminate exposttre control ) information. All field emergency workers were issued a dostmetry packet, which censisted of a TLD, 0-200 mR and 0-5 R DRDs, an exposure record, and E!. They were then briefed on proper dostmetry procedures, and written Instructions were handed out before they 1 were dispatched. All DRDs were zeroed, read, and readings recorded before j distribution. I The emergency workers were aware of proper dostmet.'y procedures. They could i I explain the difference between low-and mid-range DRDs. They' knew the maximum l authorized dose and who to contact for authorisation for exposures in excess of the l authorized dose. Finally, they understood what to do when an excessive dose has been j received. i l l Additional doelmetry was availsW for the staging-are2 staff should it have been i ) necessary for any of them to be deple' id to the field or for doelmetry to be delivered to r i emergency workers already in the field. l l A previous ARCA (Riverhead 4) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 has been eorrected and verifled. l BA 16 and FA 14. The objectives to demonstrate the ability to make the deelslon l l t) recommend the use of El for emergency workers and institutional! zed persons, based l l on predetermin'ed criteria, as well as to distribute-and administer it once the decision is l made, if necess!tated i ..~4olodine releases, were met. E! was distributed as part of l l i l
l 91 the dosimetry package. Workers were beleted on E! use during the dosimetry briefing. They were Instructed to take El either when told to do so by their supervisor or when they were informed of a general emergency CCL. The traffic guldes also carried extra El for policemen. All the field workers interviewed krew when to take E!. The field workers who were observed simulated taking E!.when told to do so by the appropriate person. Defieleneles No Deflelueles were observed in radiological exposure control for emetteney workers assigned to the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. Areas Requi.-Ing Corrective Aetion No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in.adlological exposure control for emergency workers assigned to the Riverhead staging area during the exercise. Armas Recommended for leprovement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed in rad!ological exposure control for emergency workers assigned to the Riverhead stagintarea during the exercise. O
92 2.9 EMERGENCY WORKER DECONTAMINATION FACILITY 1.9.1 EWDF Operations The EWDF is located in the basement of the LERO EOC,1650 Is!!p Avenue, Brentwooc, New York. All three objectives to be demonstrated at the EWDF were fully met. EWDF 2. The objective to demonstrate the abt!!ty to fully alert, mobillze, and activate 7WDF staff wu met. Mob!!! ration of the EWDF staff was not observed by the evaluators however, the times of call-out and full staffing were obtained from the sign-in log and the lors of the EWDF controllers. The slgn-in logs Indicated that the EWDF I supervisors arrived at 0650 hours, that two dostmeter clerks arrived at 0650 hcurs, and that radiation / decontamination personnel arrived between 0415 and 0900 hours. Tr.e I controller logs showed that the facility was fully activated at 0939 hours. \\ EWDF 15. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, equipment. l supplies, procedures, and personnel for decontamination of emergency workers, l equipment, and vehicles, and for waste disposal, was met. EWDF workers wore adequate protective clothing and were dware of the limits regarding contamination of personnel and vehicles. Decontamination procedures were actually demonstrated on automobiles and personnel. Proper handling of injured / contaminated and contaminated personnel was de monstrated. A simulated injured person was directed to a hospital for further care. The decontamination leader had been a military medic and was well qualified for this assignment. Adequate parking for contaminated vehicles wu available in the facility lot. RM-14s with HP-210, 240, and 270 probes were available in suff!clent numbers, as were back-up units. l During the observation time on day 1 of the exercise, the EWDF processed in excess of 200 emergency workers. To demonstrate procedures, simulated contaminated workers and vehicles were provided by the controllers at a rate of approximately 10 per hour. Contaminated workers and vehicles were separated and decontaminated according to procedures that were also posted in the personnel decontamination area. While this objective was not negotiated for evaluation during day 2 of the exercise, an evaluator was present at the EWDF and made the following observations. Approximately 400 LERO school bus drivers were processed durlag this out of sequence portion of the exercise. The monitoring of 40 school bus drivers by 15 monitors were observed. Monitoring of eight emergency workers took approximately 150 seconds each to pedorm, while the monitoring average of the other emergency workers was approximately 90 seconds. At 15-minute Intervals, the personnel monitors read their dosimeters and surveyed the grounds surrounding the mon.toring stations for contamination.
93 EWDF 34. The objective to demonstrate the ability to maintain staff!ng on a continuous. 24-hour basis by an actual shift change was met. A sh!ft change was observed at 1500 hours. A supervisory personnel overlap of one and one-halt hoc s assured that everyone was fully informed of ongoing issues, the status of contaminated personnel, and the status of the accident. The transition occurred smoothly and without incident. Defielencies No Deficioneles were observed in the operation of the EWDF during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in the operation of the EWDF during the exercise. Area Recommended for improvement No Arou Recommended for Improvement were observed in the operatton of the.EWDF during the exercise. 19.2 Emertengy Worker Radiologleal Exposure Control EWDF 8. The objective to demonstrate the abtllty to continuously monitor and ~ . control emergency worker exposure was mer. All EWDF emergency workers were fully cognizant of ext.osure limits (200 mR, 3.5 R, and 5 R) and knew to call In to their supervisors. All workers Indicated that they were briefed and provided dostmetry (i.e., a TLD and two DRDs) prior to deployment. The dostmetry staff recorded the exposures of returning emergency workers. They followed proper procedures and instrveted those workers who had taken El that they must return each day to the EWDF to receive subsequent El doses. Defieleneles No Defielencies were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers at the EWDF during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action j No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed in rad!ological l exposure control for emergency workers at the EWDF during the exercise. l
l 1 9' l Areas Recommended for leprovement No Areas Recommended for improvement were observed in radiological exposure control for emergency workers at the EWDF during the exercise. l O e ed 1
-- c. o 7 95 2.10 RECEPTION CENTERS Of the three objectives to be demonstrated through Reception Center Operat.'ons two were fully met, and one objective was partially met. Reception center activities were conducted in sequence with the plume portion of the exercise at centers established on LILCO properties in Roslyn, Hicksyllle, and Bellmore. On day 1 of the exercise, decontamination teams from Bellmore, H!cksville, and Roslyn initially reported to their assigned reception centers; following demonstration of their mobilization, they were released. The same teams reported to the decontamination trailer on day 2 of the exercise. Evacues decontamination capabilities were evaluated out of sequence on day 2 of the exercise at a trailer located on the SNPS site. FA 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobill:e, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emergency functions was met. Key staff responsible for operation of the reception centers were notifled by personal pagers activated by SNPS. They then notified dosimetry coordinators and other personnel through a fan-out not!fication system. The reception centers were fully activated by 0955 hours. Dosimetry coordinators and other staff arrived early to begin setting up the dosimetry room. FA 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency we' r exposure was met. Emergency workers received a TLD and two DRDs (0-200 mR and 0-5 R). Dosimetry coordinators instructed personnel in the proper use and.are of personal dosimetry and reviewed record-keeping requirements. Fema?e workm were questioned regarding the possibility of being pregnant and were given NRC Reiffulatory Guide 8.13 for review. Pregnant workers were advised that they would be assigned to work locations outside areas having a potential for radiation contamination. Emergency workers were knowledgeable about personal monitoring techniques, contamination control procedures, and personal exposure !!mits. FA21. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of procedurcs, fac!!!tles, equipment, and personnel for the registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees was partially met. Monitoring teams, along with traffic guides, directed cars and buses through monitoring lanes. Once monitored, vehicles and occupants were sent to their respective clean or contaminated areas for further processing. Generally, individuals were monitored within the 90-second timeframe anc. vehicles were monitored as specified in the LERO plan. LILCO has documentation which assures the availability of a suffielent number of trained radiologleal monitors to adequately conduct monitoring at a 90 second timeframe for til arriving general population at reception centers. At the Roslyn Reception Center a monitor placed a pen on a potentially contaminated vehicle and then picked it up. A potentially contaminated emergency worker drove a clean vehicle away from the decontaminatian center without first having himself monitored. Finally, survey probes occasionally touched evacuees. 9 9
.a Denntamination teams from reception centers at Beumore, H!cksville (2 teams), and Roslyn each had 12-13 members. Overau, tL teams performed satisfactorily in the areas of evacute monitoring, contamination control procedures, and decontamination procedures. 1 i All the decontamination leaders were weU trained. Each coordinated his team's activities, reminding team members to regularly check dosimetry and background readings and generaUy making himself available to arrange the transport of Individuals who were injured or who could not be decontaminated. Each team was given one hour to set up the trailer, and each completed the taak within the time aUotted. Fouowing a demonstration of various decontaminat!on scenarlos, each team dismantled the traller, paying attentloh to basically sound contamination control ' procedures. However, some problems were noted during observation of decontamination activities and are !!sted below. Bellmore Decontamination Team 1. A contarvinated person was sent into the showers without being instructed in proper decontamination procedures. 2. During the breakcown of the trailer, workers removed their cotton gloves before removing their boots. Gloves sheuld be the last item of clothing removed. Roslyn Decontamination Team ~ 1. A tag wu remcVed from a bag of contaminated clothing and handed to a person in the clean area. 2. Women going through the decontamination showers had numerous questions for the decontamination leader. The presence of a d female decontamination leader would have been useful. 3. Most of the team members improperly recorded a "clean" thyrold scan as having been 20 cym, which is the background reading, j Hickwille Decontamination Team #1 i 1. Workers were observed monitoring an Individual in the men's clean ) area with the meter probe closed. l I 2. A worker, after having been told that a woman had a reading of 63 ) epm, following the woman's second attempt at decontamination, j sent her back into the shower for a third attempt. According to OP!P 3.9.2, such a reading is considered "clean." l i - - - -. - ~ - -
n,
97 3. A team member did not remove his gloves last, when removing protective clothing. R!cksville Decontamination Team #2 - 1. An evacuee was told to put a clean foot down on a contaminated step-off pad. 2. Sur'ly readings from a shoe were improperly recorded under a het.ing for "unclothed," rather than under the heading for "clothed" on the decontamination record form. 3. A monitor's initials were not recorded in the appropriate place on the decontamination monitoring sheet. A previous ARCA (Reception Center 1) from SNPS PEA dated Apr!! 17,1986 has been corrected anc verifled. Defieleneles No Def!clencias were observed at reception centers during the exercise. Area Regulring Corrective Action 1.
== Description:== Monitoring and decontamination workers were inconsistent in their use of contamination control procedures. Speelfic examples are efted in Section 2.10 of this report, Objective FA 21. (NUREG-0454, Supp.1. U, J 12) Rooommendation: Workers should receive ongoing traini.; in contamlnttion control procedures prior to the next exercise. Areas Recommanded for leprovement No Areas Recommended for leprovement were observed at reception centers during the exercise.
l l 98 I 2.11 MEDICAL DRILLS Of the four objectives being demonstrated through Msdical dellis, two were fully met, one was partially met, and one was determined to be not applicable. Medical drills were conducted on days 1 and 2 of the exercise in crder to evaluate the emergency medical response of personnel from LERO, Brunswick Hospital, Mid Island Hospital, and participating ambulance companies. The drills required responses to two different medical / radiological emergency situations, each occurring on a different day. Activity on day 1 of the exercise..nvolved injury of a member of a LERO emergency worker's fam!!y. The injuries sustained (sim'tlated) included an open compound fracture of the left forearm, a lacerated right forearm, and radiation contamination. Activity on day 2 of the exeretse invc...d transport of an injured, contaminated person from the Hicksville reception center to the Brunswick Hospital emergency room. I FA 8. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker erposure was met. All emergency workers observed were provided with a TLD and two DRDs (0-500 mR and 0-5 R). Dosimeters were read at regular 15-minute Intervals, and the readings were recorded on appropriate forms. Authorization to receive exposures in excess of EPA PAGs wu not applicable, since both hospitals are located outside the 10 mile plume EPZ. FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ab!!!ty to make the decision to recommend the use of K! for emergency workers and institutional! zed persons was not applicable. Radiolodine was not a factor during the medical drills because both hospitals were located otitside the plume exposure pathway. ( FA 23. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of vehicles, equipment, procedures, and personnel for transporting contaminated, injured, or exposed individuals w *s m e t. In the first drill (day 1) following simulation of the injury, the victim was immediately treated to stop bleeding and was monitored. The patient's status was then communicated to the LERO decontaminat!on leader, who re.luested an ambulance at 1222 hourr. The ambulance arrived at 12%5 hours, and the victim wu received at Mid I Island Hospital by 1347 hours. During the madleal-assessment and patient-transport periods LERO personnel provided monitoring support to the ambulance crew. Data concerning contt6mination levels and patinnt vital signs were reported te the hospital by radio. The seecnd medical drill revolved around an unconscious, contaminated person found in a vehicle at the Hicksville reception car.ter monitoring station. On cay 1, the victim wu assessed as to medleal condition and monitored to determine contamination level. On the next day, the activity resumed with the arrival of an ambulance and crew at the reception center. A victim was not actually transported, so the ambulance crew wu not evaluated. Data concerning tne simulated victim's vital signs and contamination 1
.. = _ d level were transmitted to Brunswick Hospital. The ambulance arrived at the hospital at I 4 l 1052 hours, but the driver had difficulty in locating the radiation emergency area (REA). Once the propee entrance was found, no hospital staff were present to remove an access barricade. The total delay experienced was approximately 15 minutes. After ambulance staff contacted emergency room staff, a simulated victim was made available for simulated treatment / decontamination. M 24. The objective to demonstrate the adequacy of medleal fac!!!ty i equipment, procedures, and personnel for hand!!ng contaminated, injured, or exposed Individ' als was part! ally met. In the first drill, the victim arrived at the hospital at 1347 ho/rs and was taket. Into the emerTency room for treatment and decontamination. A properly calibrated Ludlum 3-8 survey meter was used for patient monitoring. l Samples were taken, properly labeled, and sent to the laboratory. Procedures were 1 Improperly followed by the Mid laland Hospital radiation safety officer (RSO), as some surveys were conducted too rapidly, with the probe positioned too far away from the victim. Reading: taken under the previously described conditions would not have provided an accurate assessment of radiation exposure. Additionally, only one Individual wu prese,nt to monitor the patient, hospital staff, ambulance and crew, as well as to conduct staff exit procedures. Procedures for contamination control were weak j windows lef t open for ventilation purposes could hava produced draf ts tnat would have i contributed to the spread of contamination. During patient decontamination, a plastic sheet caught potentially nntaminated water that should have drained off into a waste barrel. Containment of contaminated water could have recontaminated the victim. The j patient was transferred onto a clean gurney from the original stretcher without first checking the patient's back and the stretcher for contamination. The hospital RSO l l conducted exit monitoring of all staff leaving the treatment / decontamination area. As with the victim monitoring, the RSO used rapid monitoring times, with some as brief as i 5-10 seconds. Tor the second drill, the patient was received into the REA and was promptly I examined for medleal problems and surveyed for radiation contamination., Excellent cor.t.mination control procedures were exhibited by REA staff as they decontaminated i l the ytetim and properly took samples, labeling them for referral to the laboratory. The patient exit processing was done well, except that the patient gurney was removed from the area prior to being monitored. The use of a single.RSO erested some diffleulty during the staff exit processing. The physician and nurse were properly monitored by the RSO. When the RSO was ready to exit the REA, another Individual monitored him but failed to check the 1 RSO's legs and feet. 1 Defielencies i No Def!clencies were observed during the medical drills. 1 I \\ 4 1 I l
100 Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1.
== Description:== Procedures were improperly followed by the Mid Island Hospital RSO: survey scans were conducted too rapidly, and th6 pr:be was held too far from the subject being monitored. (NUREG-0654. Supp.1, !!, L.1) Recommendation Hospital monitoring staff should receive ongoing training in prop 9r monitoring procedures. 2. Daseription: A sufficient number of tralned monitoring personnel were not available, at each hospital, to perform all monitoring functions for victim, ambulance and crew, and hospital staff. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1. !!, L.1) Recommendation: At least one additional tralned monitoring person should be available to assist in performing monitoring l functions at each hospital. I 3.
== Description:== At the Mid Island Hospital, open windows in the decontamination area could have produced drafts that would have l contributed to the spread of contamination. In addition, the containment of potentially decontaminated water beneath the victim, and the failure to monitor the victim's back prior to placing the victim on a clean gurney could have resulted in recontamination of the victim or cross-contamination of hospitsj ogipment. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1. II, L.1) Recommendation: Hospital staff should receive ongoing training in contamination control procedures. Areas Recommended for leprovement I 1.
== Description:== An ambulance crew was unfamillar with the location of the REA. Reeommendation Ambulance personnel should receive ongoing tralning regarding the location of radiation treatment areas at local hospitals. 2.
== Description:== Hospital staff were not at the entrance to remove an access barricade for the ambulance. Recommendation: Security guards should be ava'lable to direct the ambulance to the appropriate entrance and remove access barricades. l 1 1
101 o 3. Description A potentially contaminated patient turney was removed from the REA prior to being monitored. Rooommendation Hospital staff should receive ongoing training regarding proper contamination control procedures. a n e# e t o 4
2.12 SCHOOL INTERVIEW FA 19. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was met. Briarelltf Elementary School was visited during the execcise, and the principal was interviewed. The Interview focused on the availability and the degree of knowledge of emergency response plans for implementation by the school staff in the event of a radiological incident at SNPS. The Briarelltf School is located in the town of Shoreham and is part of the Shoreham-Wading River School District. A copy of the plan for the Briarcliff Elementary School was available at the school, and the principal was familiar with its purpose and content. She indicated that the school can implement three options: early dismissal, evacuation, and sheltering. She was famillar with the procedures for each option. In the event of a PAR that affected the students at Briarcliff, the principal would be notifled by the superintendent of the school district as to which action to take. The school is equipped with several communication capabilities: three commercial telephone lines, a private telephone line for use by the principal during emergencies, and a tone alert radio, which is supplied, maintained, and tested by LILCO. Upon receipt of instructions to provide emergency care for the students, the principal would authorize the staff to begin notifying parents of the children, using the established fan-out notification scheme as indicated in the plan. Parents of all children would be notified and informed of the actions being taken by the school. Teachers at the school have received information ecneerning their responsibilities and roles in the event that a protective action were implemented for the school. Each teacher would be responsible for the students in his or her class and are to remain with them during the incident. Emergency information containing details on school protective action procedures have been distributed to all familles with school children in the district. Several staff members have received training so that they could assist the principal or assume her position, if required. during an event. Knowledge of t?.e plan and confidence in the ability to implement it were displayed by the principal. The issue of non-participation of other school districts, the subject of a previous ARCA (LERO EOC 9) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1988 has been addressed by the NRC letter to FEMA dated May 11, 1988, and three (3) assumptions addressed by NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp 1. Defieleneles No Deficiencies were observed during the school Interview.
103 Areas Requiring Correctiv,e Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed during the school Interview. Areas Recommended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed during the school interview. O e 8 a
2.13 TRANSIT DEPENDENT EVACUATION OPERATIONS 2.13.1 Implementation of Transfer Points Plume Exposure Pathway Activities FA 4. The objective to demonstrate the ability to communicate with all ) appropriate locations, orTanizations, and field personnel was met during observed operations at all Transfer Points (TPs). The single-channel TP LERO radio communications system performed flawlessly during the exercise. A communications l link between the TP coordinators and the LERO EOC wa; established and maintained without failure. TP coordinators demonstrated good working knowledge of proper radio protocol. FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and' transient plume EPZ population was met during observed operations at all TPs. Buses were allocated to TPs by 0805 hours, and LERO bus drivers were dispatched from the staging arou by about 0444 hours. All bus drivers were able to follow assigned routes from the staging areas to bus garages, and from there to their respective TPs. TP coordinators verifled that the drivers were at the correct TPs. Full operations were observed at 11 TP locations, although the evacuation order affected only six TPs All TP coordinators in areas requiring protective action were notified between 1040 and 1043 hours by the f LERO EOC dispatcher. A previous DefMiency (Patchogue 2) and a previous ARCA (Riverhead 2) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 have been corrected and verified. l Recovery / Reentry Activities FA 33. The objective to demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery was m et. For the purposes of I demonstration, a limited number of buses were dispatched from the Patchogue staging area to two TPs. These TPs were promptly set up according to plan wnen reentry deelston making began. A minimum of two bus routes were run out of each TP, with no observed problems. Defieleocles No Defielencies were observed at the TPs during the exercise.
105 Areas Requiring Corrective Action No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed at the TPs during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement No Areas Recommended for Improvement were observed at W TPs during the exercise. 1 1.13.2 Yehlale/ Driver Mobilization and Activation General Fopulation FA 1. The ability to fully alert, mob!!!ze, and activate personnel for both l facIllty-and field-based emergency functions wu met, based upon exercise activity observed during simulated evacuation of the gendral population on day 1. General population evacuation bus drivers received notification to report to their respective garages between 0730 and 0858 hours. Thc last bus driver arrived at 0949 hours and was deployad to a TP by 0950 hours. Overall, drivers for the general population evacuntion were nottfled, mobilized, and activated in a prompt and efficient manner. i Mobility lupaired FA 2. The ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emerge 6y functions was met, based upon exercise activity observed during simulated evacuation of the mobility-Impaired population on day 1. Drivers for evacuation of the mob!!!ty impaired were notifled between 0730 anit 0745 hours, ne drivers promptly arrived at their designated staging areas, with the latest arrival occurring at 0830 hours. The demonstration of mobility-impaired i evacuation occurred out of sequence on day 1. Suffielent numbers of drivers were available at all staging areas to implement the evacuation procedure. l i ] School Evacuation i FA 2. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobill:e, and activate personnel for both facility-and field-based emerfency functions was met, based t l ._ ~ L.
106 upon exercise activity cbs:rved during the simuisted evacu3ti:n cf schools which were evaluated out of sequence on day 2 of the exercise. School evacuation bus drivers were notified to report to their appropriate bus garages between 0900 and 0910 hours. The last bus drivers arrived at the garages by 1030 hours and were deployed to the appropriate school by 1115 hours. The length of time from arrival to deployment is largely attributable to an extensive safety inspection conducted by LERO drivers prior to driving the assigned buses. Defieleneles l No Defielencies were observed related to vehicle / driver mobilization and activation during the exercise. Area Requiring Corrective Action l No Areas Requiring Corrective Action were observed related to vehicle / driver mobilization and activation during the exercise. Areas Recommended for Improvement l No Arou Recommended for Improvement were obsermd related to ( vehicle / driver mobilization and activation during the mise. 2.13.3 Eme2Tency Worker Radiological Exposure Control General Population FA 8 and PA 18. The objective to demonstrate the abt!!ty to eontinuously monitor and control emerTency worker exposure was partially met. The objective to demonstrate the ability to distribute and administer El once the deelslon has been made was met during observed activities at all TPs and general evacuation bus routes. l All TP eoordinators and general evacuation bus drivers were equipped with the proper doelmetry (0-200 mR and 0-5 R DRDs and TLDs) and briefed on correct procedures for their use. All personnel showed familiarity with dosimetry procedures. Most personnel read their dosimeters every 15 minutes, pausing in their routes. If necessary, to do so. However, two drivers from the Riverhead staging area did not read their dostmeters every 15 mir.utes while driving their routes, although they were aware of correct procedures. Perstnnel were equipped with dose record forms. All personnel knew the exposure limits for reporting to thalt supervisor and knew what to do if exposure limits were met or exceeded. a
107 All TP coordinators and general evacuation bus drivers were issued simulated KI and knew that they were to take It only upon Instruction from their supervisor. The announcement to take KI, made at about 1045 bours at the LERO EOC, was communi-cated to all TP coordinator dispatch locationt by 1100 hours. TP coordinators conveyed instructions to drivers immediately or as soon as drivers esturned to the TPs from bus routes in progress. All personnel promptly took their simulated E!. Some drivers were unaware of the use of the KI record form for recording the use of E!. i Three previous ARCAs (Patchogue 11, Port Jefferson 1, and Riverhead 5) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1966 have been corrected and vertfled. However, ARCA (Riverhead 3) remains uncorrected. Mobility impaired FA 8 and FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ab!!!ty to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure was met. The objective to demonstrate the ability to distribute and aBminister El cnce the decision has been made was partially m et. All mobility-impaired transportation drivers were equipped with the proper dostmetry and used it correctly. Thorough briefings about the use of dostmetry we e held i for the drivers before dispatch. All personnel knew the exposure limits and what to do if the limits we e met or exceeded. All mobility-impaired transportation drivers were issued simulated El and knew that they were to take it only upon Instruction from their supervisor. Thorough briefings about the use of E! were held for the drivers before dispatch. The announcement to take E! was communicated to all mobility-Impaired transportation dispatch locations by 1110 hours. Mobility-impaired transportation dispatchers conveyed Instructions to drivers Imniediately. Most personnel promptly took their simulated KI. However, In one instance, the Peconic ambulance crew was instructed to take El if they entered the 10-mile EPZ. The crew judged that they never entered the EPZ. So, they never took E!, even though one of their destinctions was the Riverhead Nursing Home, which is listed in OP!P 3.6.5 as being in Zone P. In another instance, bus drivers assigned out of the Patchogue staging area to Our Lady of Perpetual Hope and to Ridge SOICF said that they would take E! only if instructed to do so by their own bua dispatcher. A previous ARCA (LERO EOC 13) from SNPS PEA dated April 17,1986 has been l corrected and verifled. However, ARCA (LERO EOC 11) remains uncorrected. 1 School Evacuation FA 4 and FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability to continuously l monitor and control emergency worker exposure was partially met during observed i activities for all schcol evacuation bus routes. The objective to demonstrate the ability a l j
108 to distribute and administer E! once the dscislen has been made was met for school evacuation bus routes. LERO school bus drivers thoroughly understcod dosimetry and its use. LERO drivers were equipped with 0-200 mR and 0-5 R DRDs and TLDs, with additional TLDs for regi.lar school bus drivers. However, out of the 40 drivers evaluated, two did not read their dosimetry every 15 minutes. Four other drivers believed they could stop reading their tos! meters when they had left the EPZ. This planning issue will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiologleal Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. Of the 40 school bus drivers evaluated, most knew the exposure limits and what to do if the limits were met or exceeded. However, one br!efing held for drivers prior to dispatch did not fully explain such information. Upon questioning, two other drivers showed limited kaswledge about the authorized exposure limits, and one did not know who to contact for authorization to incur excess exposure. There was a clear misunderstand!ng among schoo*4 bus drivers about the use of E!. i in general, the LERO drivers had adequate knowledge relating to the purpose and use of { E!. The simulated supply of KI was adequate for LERO drivers and any regular drivers that they would accompany. However, because the LERO controller information was l unclear as to the status of the event at the start of the out-of-sequence school evacuation, LEAO drivers made different assumptions about administering E!. Upon questioning, some assumed that a general emergency had already occurred, so they would r have already taken E!. Others would take El automatically upon initiation of a route. l Most would await notification of a general emerTency ECL or the implementation of a school evacuation. At least two drivers Indicated that E! was to be taken only at the direction of their supervisors. Although the school bus driver proceduza claarly states that E! ts to her taken at the general emergency ECL, some drivers simulated taking El l Immediately upon Initiating their routes. This action may have resulted from lack of j information about the status of the event from LERO controllers, or from driver unfamiliarity with procedures on El ingestion. One evaluator noted that because his i observed bus was not equipped with a radio, the driver would not be able to hear any l notifloation of general emergency while en route. This planning lasue will be addressed In the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiologleal Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. Previous ARCA (LERO EOC 12) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 has been reclassifted as a planning inadequacy rather than a performance AACA. In one instance, a school bus driver who was four and one-half months pregnant and secompanied by a LERO back-up driver was allowed 'o drive the bus without question. Upon FEMA's review of training rosters, the driver was found to have attended LERO training at which the dangers of radiation exposure to as unborn child had been covered. However, the driver was not reminded of the subject at the time of the simulated evacuation. NRC Regulatory Guide 8.13 and the Appendix thereto were not listed among the materials included in the assignment packet (LERO School Bus Driver Procedure, OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 14). Materials lasued to female bus drivers should inelade a specifle query and/or consent form to assure that they are aware of this t ...-,,--r.mw. ..e.e.x .em.,m. ww---,srw w e
109 Information. This planning Issue will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LERO off-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. A previous ARCA (LERO EOC 10) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1986 has been corrected and verifled. However, a, previous ARCA (LERO EOC 14) has not been corrected. Defieleneles No Deficiencies concerning radiological exposure control for bus operations were observed during the exercise. Areas Requiring Corrective Action 1. Desertptioiu During the' exercise two school bus drivers and two general population bas drivers did not read their dosimetry every 15 minutes.(NUREG-0654, Supp.1, II, E.3.b) Recommendation: In the ongoing tralning in dostmetry usage, an added emphasis should be provided for school bus drivers to reed 1 dosimetry every 15 minutes. 2.
== Description:== A pregnant school bus driver was allowed to drive a j bus without question. The driver was not reminded of the dangers ) of, radiation orposure to an unborn child at the time of the simulated evacuation. NRC Regulatory Guide 3.13 and Appendix were not listed among the materials included in the assignment packet. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1, II, E.4) l I Recommendattom Briefings upon arrival at l'us yards should Include reminders to women school bus drivers regarding the [ dangers of radiation exposure to an unborn child. i 3.
== Description:== Some general population bus drivers were unaware of 4 the use of the El re:ord form for recording the use of El. q (NUREG-0054, Supp.1, II, J.10 e) Recommendation: Ongoing training should continue to be provida) to general population bus drivers regarding the use of the El form. l 4. Desertption: Some ambulance and ambulette crews are not aware of miten to take KL In one Instance, the Peconic ambulance crew l was Instructed to take E! If they entered the 10-mile EPZ. The i crew failed to take El prior to departure for the R!verhead Nursing I Home, which is listed in the 10-mile EPZ. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1 II J.10.e)
LLO Recommendation Ongoing training should be provided to ambulance and ambulate crews regarding procedures for the administering of K!. Area Recommended for Improvement No Areas 'decommended for Improvement concerning radiological j exposure control for bus operations were observed during the i sxercise. 2.13.4 Implementation of Evacuee Trusportation General Population FA 18. The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population was partially met during the simulated evacuation of the general population. ~- Generally, evacuation routes were run without difficulty. Of the 38 routes evaluated, there was one bus route in which the driver missed a portion of his assigned route. Mobility impaired FA 18. The objsetive to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population was met during the simulated evacuation of the mobil'ty Impaired. Drivers and attendants completed their assigned routes and tasks with a high degree of competence. Two previous ARCAs (Patchegue 7 and 8) from SNPS PEA dated April 17, 1988 have oeen corrected and verlfled. School Erneustion FA It.- The objective to demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for the impacted permanent and transient plume EPZ population wu partially met during the demonstration of evacuation for schools. This activity wu conducted ont of sequence on day 2 of the exercise. i 1 s l
All In general, the running of routes went well. No drivers were lost because of unfam!!!arity with designated routes. Of the 40 routes and drivers evaluated, seven drivers took routes other than those assigned. Some of those seven took other routes they considered more efficient in evacuating the school ch!!dren. However, other } pertinent planning factors, such as traceability of routes, traffic volumes during evacuation, and relationships of school bus routes to other traffic evacuation routes, were nt,t considered in these decisions. A discrepancy was noted between the marking of Long Island Expressway exit signs and exit notations on driver route maps. No exit sign was observed on the Long 3 !aland Expressway marked "William Floyd Parkway," as Indicated on the drivers map. I Recovery / Reentry FA 33. The objective to demonstrate the ability to implement appropriate measures for controlled reentry and recovery was met during implementation of evacuee transportation. Exercise play occurred on day 3. With one exception noted bele,w, bus i drivers and TP coordinators demonstrated knowledge of plan procedures for reentry. 1 ]. Bus drivers received dosimetry and route ' briefings prior to being assigned l routes. Upon receipt of their instruction packets, drivers proceeded to their designated l bas yards and on to the appropriate reception centers and TPs. Generally, the simulated j return of trsnsit-dependent evacuees to their homes went according to plan. However, one driver failed to follow his assigned route from the staging area to the bus company and was not provided with maps to his Assigned reception center and TP therefore, he could not complete his reentry route as stipulated in the plan. l l Defielencies No Defielencies were observed during exerelse activities involving the evacuation of the general population, the mobility impaired, and the j school population, or during the sinaulated reentry of evacuees, i l Areas Requiring Correet!ve Action 1. Descriptions A general evacuation bus driver missed a portion of his assigned route. (NUREG-0454. Supp.1. !!, J.10.g) i j Recommendation Drivers should receive specific, briefing information with regard to the need to complete the route they are 1 1 i assigned, following the route as Indicated on the maps issued with their bus assignments. i i 1 1
112 2. Description Seven school bus drivers faued to follow their assiped routes, making one or more deviations during the course of the simulated evacuation. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1. II, J.10.g) Recommendation: School bus drivers should be trained not to deviate from their assigned routes. If exceptions are permissible, those exceptions should be Identifled in the plan. 3. Description During the school evacuation, a discrepancy was noted between the marking of Long Island Expressway exit signs and exit notations on driver route maps.(NUREG-0654, Supp.1, II, J.10.a) Roccamendation: Driver route maps should be reviewed to assure that exit and street markings are comparable to those on actual signs. Area Recommended for Improvement 1. Descriptions One reentry bus driver failed te fouow his assigned route from the Patchogue staging area to the bus company and wu not provided with maps Indicating the routes to be taken from the bus company to his assigned reception center and from the reception center to the assigned TP. Recommendatlom Drivers sho'uld receive ongoing tralning stressing the need to follow essigned routes. Prior to their distribution, -?!ver packets should be checked to assure that all relevant materials are included. 1.13.5 Relocation Centers Mobility Impaired l i F A 1. The objective to demonstrate procedures, facillties, equipment, and personnel for registration, monitoring, and decontamination of evacuees was met, based on observed setivities at relocation centers for mobility-Impaired evacuees. As a conuttlon of the exercise, transporters of mobility-impaired evacuees only drove by the relocation centers. Routes to these locations were followed accurately and i in a timely manner. Monitoring of vehicles and passengers was demonstrated at the ) l Riverhead and Patchogue staging areas monitoring and decontamination of emergency j workers were demonstrated at the EWDF. (See Sec. 2.9 for the evaluation of the EWDF.) l l
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113 School Evacuation FA 1. The objective to demonstrate the ability to fully alert, mobilize, and activate the staff was met for the school relocation centers. School relocation center staff were paged at 0905 hours to report to Garden City. Staff bagan to report immediately, because some of them were normally located in the building. Staff signed in on a register preprinted with their names. A supervisor gave the staff who had reported a status update at 0940 hours. Other staff were given an update as they reported. Staff who had reported left for the relocation centers at 0943 hours, taking needed materials with them. Staff lng was completed by 1015 hours. The total staff was
- 33. The school relocation centers at Nassau Community College and Veterans Memorial Collseum were simulated to have been activated at 1015 hours.
FA 19. The objective to demonstrata the abi!!ty and resources necessary to implement appropriate protective actions for school children within the plume EPZ was partially met at the school relocation centers. The first bus arrived at 1045 hours. As buses sirrived, they were asked to identify themselves and what school they were from. Checkers who greeted the buses had a list of possibly contaminated buses, and those were directed to go to the Hicksville reception center for monitoring and decontamination. Those buses that were later found to be clean at Hicksyttle were returned to the relocation center with a tag verifying them as clean. After admission to the relocation center, bus drivers signed in and were then directed to a briefing area where they were assigned jobs at the relocation center, primarily controlling traffic flow. Initially, the total number of contaminated buses expected was not posted, nor was a prearranged procedure in place for totaling the number of contaminated buses sent to Hicksville from the entrance to each school relocation center. These problems were corrected later in the exercise. One school bus driver had the standard packet of forms for school officials accompanying the bus, however, he was 'iriware of the need to give school officials a school children log out form or relocation center location assignment diagrams and charts. There was no demonstration during the exercise of how school children and other bus passengers would tie directed af ter they left the buses. Thlp planning issue will be addressed in the evaluation of Revision 10 of LIRO off-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham, by the RAC. Defleleoclee No Deficiencies were observed during exercise activities at the relocation centers. 6
n Area Requiring Correctiva Attlon 1. Descriptions A bus driver was unaware of the need to give school officials a school children log out form or relocation center location assignment diagrams and charts from his packet. (NUREG-0654, Supp.1, II, J.12) Recommendation Ongoing trsining is necessary for school evacuation bus delvers In submitting school ch!!dren log out forms to officials at the school relocation center. Area Recommended for Improvement 1. Descriptions initially, the total number of contaminated buses expected was not posted, nor was a prearranged pmcedure in place for totaling the number of contaminated buses sent to Hicksville from each entrance to the school relocation center. These problems were corrected later in the exercise. Recommendations The ad hoc proci.dures developed during the exercise should be Incorporated into the planned procedures for accounting for the total numbee of potentially contaminated buses arriving at the school relocation centers. 4M e t l
115 4 3
SUMMARY
OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIOli Section 3 of this report provides a listing of Areas Requiring Corrective Action noted during the June 7-9, 1988 exercise. Tables 3.1.1 through 3.11.1 summarize recommendations to correct those Areas Requirit.g Corrective Action during the exercise. These tables also include Deficiencies and ARCAs identitled in the previous exercises which remain unresolved or have been rectified during this exercise. FEMA requests that LILCO submit a schedule of actions they have taken or intend to take to correct these inadequacles. e 6 e& 4 .I [ t g b i { .i
TAalJ 3.1.1 ananmenu guCtNJ Pondu STAT 10sl StpetAAT OF DEFICIDC18S 1 JWE 7-9,1988 L430 80C l Page 1 of 1 l l WVREC+0656 Ese'reise. ste FEXA*REPal tsv. 1 Supp. I FtxA June 7-9 Previews Present a Wo. Receanended Carrettive Action Reference Objective gggg g,,,,g,, .gg,g,, 1. Delays in responding to the two (2) ovacwa* J.10.h 20 X C tien impediment fret-play messages inserted at the LIA0 COC were saweed by the f allwre to infore the tvacuation Caerdinator in a timely manner. In addition there was a lack of internal seenwnication in response to these impediment prettees. Pertinent information was not included en the 1945 and !!06 1.tRO nessage Ferne free the tvecuation Bewte Coeregnator to the tvecuation Support Coe* municator for towte Spotters / Read Crews regarding the slowleted impetteent involviss the gravel truth and f uel trvsk prettees. As a result of this lack of information, the a spediment problems were not analysed in a timelF fashton and instepleve equipment was dispatched to handle the gravel truck impedia ment in LAe field. Int e rnal te m nisations precedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that i n f ersa t i on en aspeciments is proeptly passed uth up the thaan of t eauma nd to the tvatwation Coordia mater and d owriwa r d ens laterally to all lead teorennators under the tvatwatten Coordinator and their stofts. Ad di t t enal training is needed to ensure that the procefwres, whether new At terrent, are properly implemented. All seerdanators at the ECK, and these who instaate messages, owet be traaned to inc!wde all pertament inf ormatten en the LIRO mensage teres and to analyse the equipment require
- ments he clear topeliments.
O i i 1
TAALE 3. 2 secarxAm sucuAs pouca star 10m SUDOiARY OF A&EAS REQUltlleC COSAECTIVE ACT10sf JUWE 7-9. 1988 LEB0 80C Page 1 of $ ennitC 063A tiertise h te FEMA-REP-1 pov. 1. Supp. I FEMA June 7-9 Previews Present s 19 g' Eastasse Statws No. geteenendet Carrective Attien hetetente Objective 1. An eveswation support so w nicator roterded E.1 4 I I additional messages en his copy of the standard LERO COC message lere after the other toples had be en forwarded to the addresses one the Lead Ceanvaitater. ECC pe r s onnel shewld be traineG that t:le recording et aseitional messages reguires a new eessage fare rather than seing added to pre
- lows message forms.
2. Eg5 messages #4 fl. f6 and #7 contained sl. S. 13 I insettest information
- that, based wpen 1.5 tadiation seasurements, small deses to radiation were projetted at the site boundary.
At the time these messages were broadcast, projected deses based en esaswreeents beyond the site boundary were in estess of the U.S. Envi tenment al Protettien Agenty's (IPA's) guidelines retviring protettive actions. All tal messages should be streened to ensate that sumulative information is appropHett to the changed tenditions (projettes de'ses). 3.. PARS fet the ingestion pathway in New York J.ll 29 I 1 State beyond the 10-elle tr: were slow to se soveltpos due to management estisten to have i este assessment staff fetus en reentry s'd i relegation asswes. Priertties in the everall ease assessment.- fwnstion shewld be revieves. There are more than en asetwate n+aser of taapetent sese assessment staff e osers. v Dwring the esertise two scheel bus drivers K.3.b 6 I 1 general population but drivers did see twa not test their desteetry every !$ sinwtes. in the ongoing training in desiastry usage, an adsed esonesis shewld be provided for scheel tws drivere to read desiastry every l$ minutes. 3. A pregnant scheel bw a d e: ve r was all+wed to E.6 6 I 1 i drive a two withewt tucation. The driver was I not teenneed of the dangers of radiation espesure to en unborn snild at the time of the sa mlated evatwation. mac segulatory Cuise 4.13 ane Appendia were not listed emeng the materials inclwded in the assignment pathet. gesefings upon arrival at bwe yards' enowle incl de reenneers to women otheel bws drivers regardine the dangers of radiation espeswee t o en untern child. 6. Some general popwlation bus drivers were J.10.a 16 I waaware of t%e use c2 the El reser6 f ers f or retorting the use of (f. Ongoing training i I shew!4 tentinue to be provices to general ) popwletion bws 4tivers regareing the woe of the El fere. 1
TAeLE 3.1.2 SIIOS236Asi upCtJAA p0WS STAfloal SpetARY Of AAAAa REQUIRIIIC 00812CTIVE ACTIOu JUIst 7-9.1988 LE30 gDC Page 2 of 5 WUREC-06)4 Esertise iate FEMA-stP-L gev. 1. Supp. 1 FCNA June 7-9 previswa Present c3. geteesended Corrective Action gefertece Objective
- 1984 tsortise Stat.s 7
Some satulante and ambwlette crews are aet 2.13.3 6 I I I aware of when to take Kl. In one instance, the potents embelance crew was Instrus.ed to take El if they entered the 10-elle 171. The crew f ailed to take El prior to departura for the giverhead Nursing Wees, which is list u in the 10-mile EP2. Ongoing training shewld be prevised to senviante and estvlete crews regarding precedures for the seeinisteri a of si. A. '4 geestal evatwation tus driver missee a J.10.g 18 I pettien of his assigned rewte. Ortvers s r.e wl 4 tegenve spett!!c briefing information with regare Le 'Se need to complete the rewte they are assigt d. following the rtete as indicated on the maps isswed with their two a s s i g'ae n t. 9. Seven school bvs drivers failed to follow J.10 8 19 I I their assigned rewtes, naming one er more seviations during the tourse of the sisvlated e.acuation.. fehool bus drivers should be trained not to deviate free their assigned to.tes. !! estoptions are permissible, those estoptions showtd be iden.ified 6n the plan. 10. Dwrang the school evatwation, a discrepancy 2.13.4 18 1 .as notes cetween the merking of Long Island Espressway esat signs and ennt notattens en artver towte sass. Denver route esos shevle e. revieves to e s Cre that esit end street earaints are toeparable to these on attwat essas. A e.s denu was weaware of the need to give J,12 19 I 1 cneel efficials and school childreri les out ..res or relatatten tenter location assign
- eent disgrees aH tharts free his pa c k e t.
Onseing training is necessary for school eva c ua t t en bus drivers in swheitting scheel chaleren les owt foros to effittels at the schael reletation senter. 12. There was some teater in regarding the method F.1.s 2.4 I C ler notifying the Fe. oral Aviation Aenimie-t rat t en (FAA). (1) The Lig0 preeedores showld be reviewed and revised as necessary 16 enswee that a point of contact with the FAA has been designated. (2) 'he LigG COC staf f should be trained in the appropriate prestaures se that the FAA tan be notified in a timely nestner. i 3 S
TAnu 3.1.2 SuostMAM uuCLEAR POWER STATION SL8etARY Of ARIAS R20 Ult!!sc CDeitcTIVE ACTION JUWE 7 9. 1984 La30 80C rage 3 et s WWttC-0654 tsereise este FEMA-stp=1 Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA Jurie 7-9. previews Pressat s he. 'toteamended Corrective Action Reference Cejective g,gg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, l 13. Since there are ne preceduret for notifise-E.1 2.4 C tien of the Lens Island Callread (LIRA) in F.1.s the plan, the Litt was not notified during the esertise. I (1) The Ltto procedures shewld be revised to eneelish a point of tentatt and a oesns j for notifying the Lllt. (2) The Ltto (OC staff shewld be trained in the revised precedures se that the LIRR san be notified in a timely eenner. 14. The dose assessment statwo beard in the 1.10 10 I C accident assessment area had t o es c oeuneda t e i teth Dot lap and LILCO field monitoring dats. Theve were not enewsh solumns en the' teard to keep the two (2) sewetes of data l separates. Ltto should enlarge the dose j assessment status board to acstenedste a clear separation be t we en the data reports free the Dot RAF and LILC0 field monitoring teams. 15. The downwind distante of the seetle was 1.10 10 X C tesorrectly reported as 7000 meters it.s t e a d F.1.4 ef 700 meters for one of the thyroid deses i reported ey a Dot rap field monstering tese. This e r r or"wa s towsed by a deciaal pe6nt sisplaced during the se1 version of the distante waits and meant that the initial calculation of thyreis dose based on this seasweeeent was 90C0 maee/hr at 4.3 eines downwind instead of 9000 eses /hr et apowt 0.3 miles downwind. Amews five (3) stawtes elapsed before this errer was fewnd and terrested. All downwind destantes free the field shewld be re po rt ed tensistently in either etles er meters. 16. During the reperting of the initial Dot ED 1.10 10 3 C thyroid deses. only one field measurement, the 1400 edeelhe esaswroment nede et atewt 1204 at two (2) elles free the plant, was l availaele. This velve was weed at the L180 E0C to estrepelete volves at other distantes. TPese e s t ra pel e t ed data were reported as attwal asasweements at other distentes rather then as projected data en the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.3) hours to identify and terrett this error. LIA0 reperting precedures shewld be reviewed to ensure pro pe r coordination and prope r i r e po r t in g.
TAa'J 3.1.2 MNm WWC1. TAP. POWER STATICII 'luMART OF AREAd REQUIRllac 00talCT!'it ACTICII JWE 7-9.1944 LEGO BOC Page 4 of S WUREC-0654 tseesise Cate FEMA REPal Rev. 1. Swpp. 1 flu June 7*9 Previews Present 8 ww. Recomeceded Certestive Action Beforence Objective 1988 Esersise Stat.s 17 Althewsh he later tweted the PAC cortectly 1.10 10 I C when asked to de se by a Federal evaluater, dweing a triefing held at the LERO COC at abewt 1110 the realth Services Coordinator ensstates the EPA PAC as being mandatory evaswation when the projected thyroid dose was inve O) Ben. The Wealth Services Coordinator shewld review the EPA PAC dwisance in order to avoid any possible senfweien that sewld result due to essinteression given deties triefings. 18. Prior to the esersise. LILC0 management made E.6 12 I C the assision that the siten systee wowls not te estivates as part of the Feerwary 13. 1986 eseranse. Activatten of the siren systes shewld be ast' wally tested in the future. 19. Teere was a telay af abewt forty-five (45) 2.2 20 I C sin tes between the Ltto toc's first attempt to have Route Spotter $1003 verify the fuel trust impediment end the diepesch of than spotter free the part Jefferson Staatsg area. This delayed timely veriffsation of sne seposioemt. Personnel need to be trainee in the sovelopment of alternative appesaches veen delays are reasonaoly anticipates in the field verificassen of sepediment s to evaswa* tien. Development of etternatives shewld instwee sensultatige between, at a siniewa. 18, tvecwatten Caeregneter one the Eveswat,en to Coerannater. 20. Or.l y the Shorehae-eeding River School J.10.g 19 I C* District participates in the Febrwary 13. 1946 voortase. Priet to the esortise. LILCO senessment neee the desisten that other sensel sisteists were not to be includes in the esersise. In the fvtute all scheels m et be instweed in all Federally evelvatec eseresses one drills. 24. Desiastry and training have set been provided E.3. 6 I C to the Bus Drivets used let otheel evenwe= t.).s $6en. (!! 5.s Drivers weed for scheel eveswation showie be trainee na the woe of desi-esters. (2) Adeswate swpplies of desiastry shewld be prewneed f or Sws Otavers weed f or scheel evatwation. e m
121 TA48.2 3.1.2 SuDREntAlt puCLEAR POWER STATION SL404A47 0F ARIAF REQUlBIIIC 000AECTIVE ACT10sl JUNE 7-9. 1948 1J30 80C Page ) of 5 WUREC 06$4 teereise Date FEMA
- REP 1 Rev. 1. Swpp. I FEMA Jwne 7-9 Previews Present he.
Beteaunensee Correttive Action Reference 0 ejective
- 1988 Eserstee Statwo Some of the Amewlette Drivers were not evere J.10.e 16 I
I C8 ef when to tame their E!. Trainina en K! proceswees shewld be given to the Antvlette Drivers. 23. les Drivers weed for scheel evetwation have J.10.e 16 I I C8 met been t rained in K! policy and the wee of El. Swificient swpplies of El are not availante ter school evatwation two Drivers. (1) See Drivers weed for scheel evatwatten snowle be traines in El pe'.ity and the use of Kl. (*) A4eesate supplies of El should be provised ter les Drivers weed for scheel evatwation. u bwlette Drivers were not all traines r.4 6 1 C regarstes wee tan autherise deses in estess si ame what to se in the event of espesure aeove the general twelis PACS. Amewletto ';t i v e r s sh:wle be trained on estessive esbwswre avthertaatsen and a t:eli s sel e trates.res.
- 5.
t.. Drivers weed for otheel evatwation have K.4 6 1 I I a.t seen traines taearsing wne tan authertse es6wswee in estess of the general pwnlit v AC s.- two henvers wees for scheel evatwatten s *.a wl 4 tetelve training regarding wne tan a a:tnerise espesvre to estess of the general 6.bint pacs. m ) l l l l ) e 4 \\
TA4&E 3.2.1 Oueamam suCLEAa POWER STATles SeeiAar er BEF1CI BCIBS e Aalt F-9,1944 BERCENCY OPERAT1958 FACILITY Fase 1 of 1 o muttC 0614 taettise Date FEMA-REP 1 Rev. 1, Suppe 1 FEMA Joas 7 9, Previews Present 4 a l me. Beteenended Cettestive Attien Referente Objective gggg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, I i i I No atcommtWDAT10ml j 1 J ) I } y 1, i k I l l l r I l l { 1 1 i 1 i e 1 l 4 J t i i 1 f I i 1 t I i F I i l } I l i b
- j r
q f i a
- i. m suchmAss suctaat Pet e STAT 195 948enARY Of AasAs taquillut IDetSCTIVE ACT10el JL98 7-9, 1948 SusactbCT OPetAflout FACILITY Page ! of 1 i
l [ WUttC 0614 (9ereise Cate i FEMA
- REP *1 Bev. 1, supp. 1 FEMA June 1*9, previews PreseAt l
s co. Betemnended Corrective Astlen Referense Ctjestive gggg g,,,g,3 gg,g,, i ho AEC M LNDAt10ml ( [ I b i { ] 1 l 1 l v \\ I r a i f i I L \\ I I l I i ] a l 'I f 1 e [ l r l 1 l l i ) ) 4 1 1 l i i i i i 1 1 .-_.--_,1
) TAME 3.3.1 suessess mechada paust ST*TIce SWetaaf er 98FICIENCIO 7AIE f-9. 1944 i i tese mAve Aa8A 0FFICE Page 1 el 1 I l WUttc. Cele tsereise Sete FtnA+REPal Bew. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June f*t, Previeve Present hv. Receentedes Cettettive Action Befstence Otjettive* 1*44 teettise Stat.s u0 ttComptrDATIONS t e eW e b m e 8 e
Ta8LE 3.3.2 amann WWCLAAA fewtB STAT!05 94petARY OF A&aA4 taguttless taatSCTIVE ACT!0s JUWE 7-9. 1944 RetsimAVEN AasA 0FFICE Page 1 ef 1 mustC-0634 tsereise Date FRAA-AtP-1 7 Previews Present Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA Jwas,gg*9 s g g.,,,g ig,gy, me. secesmonded Corrective Action Referenec objective 4 20 AttemmthDA?!Oa5 e W e eW e e e S i e
TAalJ 3141 I SesotaaWe uuCLEAR Pots 93 STAfl0W l StastAsf 0F BEFICIDICIRS Jnast f*9. 1944 i Page I of 1 Ir' REC *C 6 54 tiettise Sete w FEMA
- REP *1 Sev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June ?-9 Previeve Preseet s
av. Bete== ended Carrettive AJtion soferente Objective 1984 (ser 6se Stat.sf 1. Insuffielent sapping espetilities et the Enc C.e.b. aA E C resulted in delays in the di s t ri but l er of C.4.s I information. These delays effected the following two ( H eteest
- Mard seples of tes messeses were not provided to the media in a L6mely menner.
r
- Sweer tentrol personnel were not able le answer toestions retelved free the public beteuse they were not given escurate up*
t e*det e stat wo re port '. LIRO shewld name previsions for tellette and rapid equipment to reproduce, in hard espy. 411 oppropriate messages for distribution to the EWC staff. I L eW e e 4 )
127 TABLE 3:4s2 """ WWCLEAR PouRE STAT 10m SWetAAT OF AREAR tagulttuC CatalCTIVE ACTica JtAE 7-9. 4944 msERCBBCT DEWS Carrta page 1 of 1 NkaltC+C616 taerstee Date FDtAattpal Rev. 1,Supp. ! FEMA June fat, previews present 4 me. Resoamended Cartestive Action Referente Ctjestive 1988 taettise Statwo 1. nape and displays in the media briefing reee J.10.6 5 I C were insellistent. The following elsplays shewld be posted in en area 44sily visible to reporters e An Ep! met which treams protettive estions and plume pathway.
- A statwo teerd which provices ICLs and their times of desleration.
2. Some hard seples of Els messages that were C.3.a 14 I C stevidea to the press senteined estraneous informatten (stearly method for deletiin) that should have been esitted to avoid possible sentweien. isa rd seples of tel messages posted in the IWC for wet tp th6 press she=14 sentain enty that information which was treassant to the puttis. ) j I f
t- - - ~ _ - - TABLE 3.3.1 888885H uuCLEAR poust WTafles ElsetAar or esFICleeclas Just 7-9. IMS FORT JEFFemaam gTagguC AAAA Tage ! of 1 muttC-0456 (sereise Cate FDLA-R EP-1 Pev. 1. Supp. I FEMA Jwne 7-f, Previews Present s No. P iceausendet Correttive Attien Reference Objective gggg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, l 8e9 RtC0*ENDAtlows e e g90 0 0 4 4 0 t B e e
. s.. - 129 TAALE 3.3.2 smessawt uuct.FC Poeta ffAflom SWesAAY OF AAAAS ASQWilluC 008ASCTIVE ACT10sl JUtsc F-9. 1944 Pot? JErft180s STActuG AMA Page 1 of I f WUREC-0614 tsortise Date Ft.a atPal J Rev. 1. SvPp. I FEMA June 7-9 Previews Present 8 1948 Laersise Sletus No. Reseamended Correstive Action Beforente Otjettive 1. One (1) b s delver meglected to read his DtD r.3.e. 6 I C i et any ties auring the seventy-five (75) E.3.b etnutes he was in the EPI. All bwe delvers should be troised to read l their DeDe eveer fifteen (15) einutes es aestribes in Ltto Procedures.
- l i
I i a e# I l l 1 1 I l l 1 4 I l i i l l \\
TaalJ 3i4 d Segnalah WJCLEAR PeuSE STAM0s Bl80sA4f 0F BSPICIEWCIES JUut 14. 1948 PATCWQGUE STACluC AAAA Pete ! el 1 putte*0654 tsereise cate FtAA*ttP-1 8ev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA Jwne 7 9 Previews Present s he. Secommended Carrettive Action Reference Objective 1988 Esertise Status 1. Sus drivers were het disparthed watil two (2) J.t. 18 I C' howre after roteipt of the site trea Emer. J.10 3 gency ECL dettatation. (1) An edditional ecos shew!d be established for the distribwtlon of desiastry to tedete Swd Dr'iver processtag time. (2) add 6tional trained Staff should be prev 6ded to the Sus Dispetsber to assist him in deploying ever three hundred (300) drivers and Transfer Pelat Coefdineters vne are deployed free the Patsheg e Staging Area, J. a two driver test two (2) howes sad ten (10) J.9 18 I C cinutes to pressed f ree the staging eres to J.10 3 t.ie transfer point. Amether driver went to the vroeg transfer point, end his sistete was not resegnised ty the Transfer Point Ceerdan* ator. Tot another detwer missee a segment of cm assigned evaswation toute. (1) les drivers fet general population ovat. .etion rew'es shovie rossive training to asswee LAest senlity to follow difet* tiens gives to thee se they can (a) l follow toutes free the stating area to hun gerates and then to transfer seints. ene (e) letlow an essigned hws rewte. (;) CPIP 3.6.4 atTosPeent 2 (Peges 13 14) are attachment 1 (Pages 10-12) should be revised to tedware. respostively. the 8.s Driver to presente end the Transfer Psant Coordinator te ve ri f y, eeth Sws Driver's sepy of the las/Ven Dietetektes Fore (0p!7 3.6.4. Attachment 7. Page 62) te seswee that the Sus briver has arrives at the proper Treasier Point. e i 9
131 .e TAALA 3.6.2 SapotanAm WWCLAAa possa STAT 10e StactAaf of AttAs asoultinac CotA4CTIVE ACT10el JUWE 7-9, 1934 PAfQe0CVS STAC!b4 AAAA Page 1 of 3 NUtti+C6)6 (sereise Cate FEMA +ttP ! Rev. I, supp. ! FtmA June f+9, Previews Present s No. Besoamended Cetrostive Astlen Befevense Objective gggg g,,,4,, g,,g,, 3. OPIP 6.7.1 spelflee that the entP personnel uit 3 I C enteense is to be the main Ent ranssi en the Centlin Avenue side of the bwilding. The entranse estwally weed for this wepose was the one en the merth side of the building (main Street). Aiase the systee
- twelly weed seems to be sweetter to the Plan awe to tes.see sensestion. 071P 4.7.4 showho be tevises to teensate that personnel are to enter the P4. sheave lit 3ies Area threwth the main liteet entrante to the twilding.
2. Lt*0 personnel entered the uppe floor min I C repeatedly to wee telepaenes for emergency as iftsatief. This stestive is espliently prehabited by CP!P 4.7.1 (page 3 8.* itea
- 3).
Either CP!P 4.7.8 showie be revisee 'a reflest the estwel practise of ustra telephones en the sesond fleer of the Patshogwe Staging Area twileing, er eere tele popes shewle be peevices an t4e first tiest let L!to personnel to pesfere their e erpesy notifications. m J. The seeth seer was not leases f or 'seserit y as ath I C s po s t l i e s i n O PI P 4.1.1. All eeers reewares to se lessee by the Plan shewld ta verifies as act.elly tested oy the Stegang Area C.orcinator er e designes. . e= 4 .r.e e t he t i s e d entranse to the stagleg stes att l I C seule be asnieves throwan the open fire ess:se en the sesene fleer of the east este et see twilenos. The fire escape en the sessne floot el the east side of the bwileing enov6 e De sosignated as a 6.ard pest in the plan one en inesviewet snowld be essigned to stelf this guere post, l. frsffie Cwases de met have semplete et J.9. 20 I C sortest 4miereenien on the optrepriate J.40 3 eastination for eveswees. All Traffic Cuides shewld be stalmed to oevise esterests.ath t toestnens to tone to the its station (WALA) i for the lotest informatie* en all metters l re <,tes to the emergoesy, insivaing the location of the sesepston Center. 6. Appropriate personnel one etwipment were not J.10.6 20 I C dispenthee to sleet the mentiple veAnste assisent sim.leted as en so,esseems to oveswalten. fte appropriate personnel et the j i petsmeswe Statist 4ree showle be treined to reevest more information free the L140 ECC =*en impediment s to eseswation are indicated.
L913 1 TAALE 356.2 1 Stot Safe WuctAAR POWER STATION e* BL80nAAT OF AnaAB taQultimC coaASCTlvt ACT10se J JUset f*f. 1944 P&TCuoCut STAC!nc AAAA ...e , e,, WVRsc 0614 taereise Case FEMA *tCPal lev. 1. Supp. I FEMA Jwne f*t, Previews Preseen me. Resoamenses Cettestive Action tolerence Otjest6ve' 1988 Esertise States 7 Instrwssions for the driver of the me== J.10.4 la a C institutionalised es tili t y-L ope t t ed bus to preteed to the Beseption Center were met properly transeitted to the two Driver at the treetaeven ustional Le be ra t ory Transfer Pe6nt. Transfer Potat Coordinatore shewld be trained to follow instructions letthseenna tree the staging sees regereing diresttens that are to te given to special popwletion evaswation toute les Drivers. einse they are trainee to telwen to the transf et peint for instrust6 ens as specifies in the LEA 0 Flen. 4. Ieeseenses of eaee moniastitutionalises J.10.4 II I C estility*ispea res persons were difficult to Isme. Drivers designated to pist vp een* imet 6 tutiomalnses seeility*ispaited evasvees et theft testeentes shevie te prevised with eere detalles seps and clearet desstiptions el pisawp points. 9. It seem letty (40) einutes free rosespt of a J.9, 19 E C LIA0 tet est to enspatch a les Delvet to J.10 4 siewlete the eveswetten of forty (60) sensel shaleton. The les Dispatsher at the Penshes.e Staates Aree should be prevised witn t*tises staff sweport se that two Drivers tan te 46spatched na a este timely eenner. 40. Tne Patsmes,e Staging Atee los Dietetsher f.3. 6 I C a.a s e repeates statements with a bullbern E.4 .u s h eephas6 sed taly that general popwletion evaswation toute two Denvers were to sail in is a reasing el 3.) was tenshed on thett D808 he end met give the units assestated with the 3.5 aweser set mention the wee of the 0 300 es e. dad watch 6s swppeces to trisset the favet sallena at a toestos es et eteve 300 eAee. The verbal instemessess given to the temeret po pul e t t en evosvenie* t*wle bue Drivets by the polskogee tus Dispetsber ever the twithorn showie be este presies to empaessee the prope r wee of heth desiasters one the satelvl teeding of espeswee seateel lastevelsens ter emergency weteers. 18. One general repulettee eveawegion rowte two E.3.a. 6 I C Denvet rose Dage saly twise et the instems* 5.3.t tiens of the Transfer Poemt Cooreaneter end emettet toes has DaDe only des it wa s soavvaient. Ceneral popvlatica oveswelion towte Bus Drivere shovid be trained to reed their desiasters appresteetely eve ry fifteen (ll) einwtes den they are instes t>e ID-elle Ep!. stepping the two to de se if assessery. m_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. - _______________________..____._..________________._____.__________.____..,___._____.._____-._m
m 133 TAstA 3.6,2 M"a IUCLAAA POWER STA?!Oss l SWetAtt OF 448A4 taQultluc' 00aAACT!vt Ac710e l JVtt fat. 1944 PAtOWOCUE STAG!aC AAAA Page i of 3 WUttC N616 faere,ise Cate FLMA*ttP ! Rev. 1, Supp. 1 FEMA June f*f. Previews Presses ca. Rossemeaded Cartestive Action Befotence Objective
- 8944 taattise Stat s j
Tref fle Colees at two (2) TCPs did set uov K.3.a. 6 I C dose authetisation lients. Train the Treffle E.3.t Cvices es that they pew the esse authet6se. 4 1 tien 16eite. t i 13. Ylie towne elettimt Denver etserved believed J.10.e. 16 I C
- . we.le receive El authetasetten in on tel J.40.f aetetse.
This is insens6 stems with OPIP -.. attesheent 4 4tes it. Beute Alert .<te sne.le be troises to uow thtt El 4 .. etisation is to te issued to thee by l i.t : 6 e e.perviset as specified in the L180 j Plea. 14 Trasfia C.nees et two (2) TCPs did set fully K.6 6 I C wneerstone that nne shain of seamane (et essess espeswee evthet6astion gives the Lead Traffis C.ies aethetity to s. .'se essess Guides i espeswee ey taeto, and sees I amassates that they eight 1 - m the l l authority et Lee Lead Traffit t,$ e isewe the authetisation for essess espesota. All Tratfic Cuises snente be testood to u ow that tr.e Lees traffas C.6es can authetise esposwee essess of the genetal populat6en FACs by i Pasie. I i l 1 1 l l I + n
TAalt 3.F.1 34sotuLue acCLEAR poWt2 STA?!Otf SteenAAY OF DifICIDCIIS Just ?-9. 1988 Ett7EastAS STAC! lac AAS.A Pete 1 el 1 v'.'I t s -0 61 A toeweise Sete FLMA=ttP*l ~ tov. 1. swer. I flu June fat. Prevneve presem Oe. Beteepenses Corteetive Aatten Referente Obje: Live' 1984 Laeresse Stat e 4. The 16ee between deploy 4 t of fraffic Cwides J.10.) 2 I C free the essiini eres one their eersist si TCPe was esseselve, taking betwen fif ty (10) and seventy (70) siew.est appessinetely thirty (30) esavsee was spen; la Line et the staging sees ressiving fiele bite and pre
- eeswees.
A more esteettieve scene of d6epotshing the Treffas C sees free the ste: Lap sees to the field shewle be sovelopee. .W l !{ f { {,, ' : * ' ZA '. h e,
135 TASI.E 3.7.2 SW0tEMAN WUCLEAR POWER STAT!0el StDetARY OF AREAS ESQu!11DC 0041ECTIVE ACT10sl JVWE 7-9, 1988 41VERMEAD STACINC AAEA Page 1 of a NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Supp. I FEMA June 7-9 Previows Present 5to. Recommended Corrective Action Reference objective
- 1988 Emercise Statas 1.
A route spotter f ailed to cover a porticn of J.10.k 20 I 1 his assigned route. The route spotters should study their route maps more thoroughly to ensure that they are completely familiar with their rowtes. As a check, the route spotters could go over the rowte maps with the supervisor Juring the route briefing. 2. Because of a misinterpretation f road names. J.10.k 20 X a traffic swide directed traffic directly toward an impediment. Yhe traffic swides should consult road maps so that they are aware of the impediment location and can more readily determine how traffic should be routed. 3. While the statwo board was updat ed pe ri oJi-N/A 5 x C* cally, the time was not always included when new ir. formation was posted. Personnel should bv trained to receed the time that updated inf ormation is posted on the statwo board. 4 The assess road at the trookhaven Substation H 18 X C Transfer Point was narrow and curving and ev.ld be impassable in inclement weather. Consideration should be biven to relocatant t%e grookhaven Swbstation Transfer Point to a datterent location. 5. One (1) of the .6 fivers foi the general E.J.o 6 X X population evacuation bus toutes dispatched tree the Riverhead Staging Area did not read his DRDs every fifteen (15) sinwtes as stated in CPIP 3.9.1. Sus drivers for the general population bws towtes should be given additional training to
- read their low = end mid* range DADS every fifteen (15) einutes.
6. Two (2) of the eight (8) traffic guides die K.2.b 6 I C not fully understand the difference between low = and sid* range DSDs. Traffic swides should be given additional training in the use af low = and mid-range DRDs. 7 One (1) bus driver simleted the ingestion of J.10.e 16 x C his K! tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuatten recte. two Drivers snowld be given additional training in procedures for ingesting El. I i e -y.-- w, m
TABLE 3.8.1 350ttuAle WWCLEAR POWER STATION StBetAtf 0F DEFICIENCIES Juut 7-9, 1984 DtERCENCY WOEJ33 DECONTAfl!NA*.'10W FAC11J7Y Page 1 of 1 wuREC-004 Esereise Date FEMA-REP Rev. 1. Supp. i FEMA June 7-9 Previous Present s tse. Recommended Corrective Action Reference Objective 3933 g,,,,g,, g g, g,,, 100 AECOMMENDATIONS i e O 5 oW I i 6 i i t 3 f a- -_,,,.__.__,-.---_r,-_----_.m-- --_g,-
o o-137 =. TaaLE 3.8.2 ennam u WUC114A POWEB STAT 1001 S N Y OF AAEAS REQUltlNC CDSAECTIVE ACTION e AWE 7-9,1988 DIERCI31CT Waf 3 DEccerfAMINATIcel FACILITY Page 1 of I WUREC-0454 tsereise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previous Present us. secommended corrective Action Reference objective
- 1988 fiercise Statwa 180 RECOM."ENDAfl0NS a
e G e o ed o e e e 4 1 e 4 4 e --,,.,.,,e --,,,,--g, - - -,.. - - - -. ~...
TASL2 3.9.1 SuetSAM WC1 JAR POWER STATION RBetARY OF DEFid!ENCIES Juut 7-9, 1948 kECEPTION CENTdSS Page 1 of 1 NUREC-06 $ 4 Faercise Date FEMA-REP-1 tev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June 7 9, Previous Present Ko.' tecommended Corrective Action Reference Objective'- 1948 Esercise Status No REcomENDATIONS t [ 3 Y 9 e L i dO e e 1 l 6 9 9 .i . - - ~.
&]v tat u 3.9.2 ennaruan WUCMAS POWE1 STAT 10sl SwetAAT OF A&EAS REQUltlasc 004ASCTIVE ACTION JUst 7-9, 1988 RECEFfl05 CENTERS Page 1 of I WUREC-0654 teereise Daee FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previous Present s Wo. Recommended corrective Action Eeference objective g,gg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, I. Monitoring and decontamination workers were J.12 21 I 1 inconsistent in their use of contamination control procedures. Specific esemples are cited in Section 2.10 of this report. Objective FA 21. Workers should receive additional training in contamination control procedures prior to the nest esercise. 2. On several occasions. personnel radiological J.12 21 X C sonstering took approsimately four (4) to five (5) einutes per individual, wnich is considerably longer then the ninety (90) seconds specified in the LEto Procedures. All monitoring pe r sonnel assigned to the Reception Center should be trained to monitor indiviewals within ninety (90) seconds as prescribed in the lit 0 Procedures. e e# e e 4 0 e-y g + ,-em- -~--r >---r
>--o ww
-wmm
g TABLE 3.10.1 880SalAM IAICLEAR POWER STATION SWe4ARY OF DEFICIDICIES JUIst 7-9, 1984 00escasCATE CARE CarrERS Pese ! of 1 WUREC-0654 tsereise Date FEMA REPat Rev. 1, Supp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previous Present me. Recomended Corrective Action Reference Objective" 1988 Esercise ' Status NO RECOMMENDATIONS O + 9 s e ed e B e G l
85E TAalJ 3.10.2 emnanma MUCLEAR POWER. STATION Sl80 TART Of AREAS 18QUltllac COERECTIVE ACTION JUNE 7-9, 1948 CDesCEECATE CASE CDrTERS Page 1 of I f NUREC-0654 Esercise Date FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previews Present No. ,Cecommended Corrective Actson Reference Objective g9gg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, i a b 1. Weither of the two (2) congregate care J.10.h 22 4 C sacilities activated for the February 13, 1986 esercise are identifled in the latest submission of the LEAD Plan. The Plan should be revised to include all f acilities intended for use as shelter facilities during a radiological emergency at SNPS. These facilities should be included in the list attached to LERO's letter of agreement witn the American Red Cross. O e l I I e i _..--c.
TASIA 3.11.1 , --- 1 SuoRMAfE IRICIAAR F0WER STAT 10s SIsotARY OF BEFICIENCIES Juut 7-9, 1984 IEDICAL Dt!!.L Page 1 of 1 NUREC-0654 Esereise este FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1, S'wpp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previous Present s Recommended Corrective Action Reference objective g9gg g,,,,g,, gg,g,, 480 RCCor/AENDA710NS I I t t 4 i i s t e e s I l f t k I r I t I \\ i 3 4 i .l 1 l + 4 - - -a w--- ---v,-n-e--,-,,,--- --,-,-ww--e~ ~ - - - - - - --,-wmg-- -r- -,n ,e --e- --w--m--mm m av we - e----,,w---,-------m-wc,w - - - - -,v-
85 TAaLa 3.11.2 suonntAM uucuAA Pcerta STAT!0sl SWOLARY OF AREAS REQUlt!Isc COGAECTIVE ACTION JUNE 7-9, 1984 MEDICAL DRILI. Page 1 of I WUREC-0634 Enereise Cate FEMA-REP-1 Rev. 1. Supp. 1 FEMA June 7-9 Previews Present 8 No. Recossended Cerrective Action Referente Objettive 1988 Estetise Status 1. Procedures were imprope rl y followed by the L.1 24 I 1 Mid Island Hospital gSO4 survey scans were conducted too rapidly, and the probe was held too far from the subject being monitored. Nespital monitoring staff shewld retelve ongoing training in pro pe r monitoring procederes. 2. A sul'icient number of trained monitoring L.1 24 X personnel were not available, at each h6 spital, to perform all monitoring functions f or vistie, ambwlande and c rew, and hospital state. At least one edditional trained monitoring person shawld be available to assist in performing monitoring fu stions at each hospital.
- ).
At the Mie Island Wespital, open windows in L.1 26 x the decentamination area sound have prodweed drafts that would have contributed to the spread of contamination. In addition, the containment of potentially decontaminated water beneath the victim, and the f ailure to monitor the vittie's back prior to placing the victim on a clean gw rne y could have resulted in recentaa4 nation of the victim or tesse contamination of hospital etwipsent. n..,atal statt should receive ongoing training in contamination control procedures. 06..c.sve numoer is from CM-LX3 (d'ated February 26, 1983). 8 Mr.s s iss.e was addre? sed by the stC letter to FEMA dated May ll,1984 and three (3) assumptions upon which u;Mt:-Qe W FEMA REP-1, Bew. 1. $wpp. 1 is based. 8 thi s AA CA ha s be e n in t e rpo r a t e d in t o AA CA 1.Z50 EOC 7. 8this previewsly identified performance AACA has been reclassified as a planning leadetwacy well&h is being asaressed in Revision 10 of L180's off-site Radiological Emergency Response Plan for sharehaa. ' Withdrawn as a deficiency wpen rev6ew of LILCO taergency Respinse Plan evtsegwent to SWPS PEA dated April 17, 1986. A i
l 144 4 frTATUS OF OBJECTTYES The objectives for radiological emergency preparedness exercise
- are developed to correspond to the observable elements of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Supp.1. FEMA has defined thirty-seven (37) core objectives to test major portions of emergency response capabilities. Table 4 lists the status of these objectives for the LETLO and locil jurisdictions by exercise date.
i e** __...__,,,,_.,_,___,..-__,._y.-____,____._.,_._.m, .r_,..-__,_,_.,._,_
7 St.E 4 STAWS OF 08 JECT 1YT3 - SWORDLAM WWC12AR POWER STATION e, Page 1 af 6 ) o Esercise Lero contract Staging Field l FEMA objectives Date EOC EOF SHC La b Ei-Areas EVDF Activities 1. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 monitor. understand and use emergency classifica. 6/7-9/88 M M M M tion levels (ECL) throwth the appropriate implemen* tation of emergency functions and activitias corresponding to ECL's as required by the scenario. The four ECL's are notill-cation of unwswat event. alert, site area energency and general emergency. 2. Demonstrate the apility to 2/13/86 M M M M M M j fully alert mobilise and activate personnel for 4/7*9/88 M M M M M M M both facility and field
- based esergrney activities.
Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/46 P M M M P direct. coordinate and control emergency activi. 6/7 9/f8 M M M M ties. 4^ Demwnstrate the aallity to 2/13/86 P M M cceswnicate.ith all a;p.opriata locations. 6/7-9/88 P M M M M M srgantaations and field verseenen. t. 9.sonstrate the adequacy 2/13/86 M M M N/M N of t ac i li t i e s, etwi pment, sisblays and other 6/7 9/84 M M M M M R4terials to tupport e*ergency operettons. De onstrate the ability to 2/13/46 P M P M P e. m car.t.nwowsly monitor and control emergency worner 6/7*9/48 M M M P essesure. 7 Demonstrate the appro* 2/13/86 priat e etwi pment and procedures for deter. 6/7-9/88 M M M sining field radiation measurements. t. Demonstrate the appro-2/13/t6 M praete etwipment and s prosesvres for the e/fa9/88 M M measurement of airborne rasseiodine content tiensaslowas10*ge= eicrocurie per es in the presense of notte gases. 1 i 1
TABLE 4 STATUS OP OSJECTIVES. emnew inacLgas pong gy;ygong Page 2 of 6 s' Esercise Le ro Contract Staging Field I FEMA Objectives Date EOC EOF BHO La b [NC Areas CVDF ..etivities 9. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 obtain samples of partitu-late activity in the air-6/7-9/88 M M borne plume and promptly perf ore laboratory analyses.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability, 2/13/86 M
M wi;hin the plume espesure pathway, to project dessee 6/7-9/88 M M M to the public via plume fsposure, based on plant and field data.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 P
M nake appropriate protes-tive actions decisions. 6/7-9/88 M M based on projected or actual dosage. EPA PAC's availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estinates and other relevant factors.
- 12. Demonstrate the stility to 2/13/86 P
P in i t i a l l y.41 e r t the public within the 10-elle EP2 and 6/7-9/88 M begin dissemination of an iestructional message within il sinutes of a decision by appropriate state and/or local offissals. 13. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 M M coorsinate the f orowFvtion and dissemination of 6/7-9/88 P M accurate information ano instructions to the public in a timely fashion after the.nitial alert and notification has occurred. 14. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 P brief the media in en ecsurate, coordinated and 6/7-9/88 M timel y manner. al. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/06 N/M establish and operate rumor 2 c:ntrol in a esordinated 6/7-9/48 M (ad timely fashion. 1 l i 4 j
_ - - - - g TAat.E 4 STATUS OP OSJECTIVES = '"*"" WUCLEAR POWER STAT!0sf s. Page 3 of 6 e Esercise Le ro Contract Staging Fleid FEMA objectives,I Date E0C EOF gM0 La p ENC Areas EWOF Activities 16. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 make the decision to recommend the use of K! 6/7*9/88 M M P for emergency workers and institutionalised persons. based on predetermined criteria as well as to distribute and administer it once the decision is made, if necessitated by radieiodine releases. 17 Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 N/M M P M P maae the decision. if the State plan so specifies. 6/7-9/88 to recommend the use of K! for the general public. based on prede'*rsined criteria, as we"$ as to distribute and ateinister it once the decision is made. if necessitated by ra6solodine releases.
- 13. Demonstrate the ability 2/13/86 M
P P and resowrces necessary t o implement appropriate 6/7 9/88 M M P protective actions for the impacted permanent and transtant plume 172 pspelation (inclwding transit-dependent persons. special needs population. nanetcapped persons, god institution 41: sed persons). 19. De*onstrate the ability 2/13/86 P and es.owrces necessary te implement appropriate 6/7-9/88 M M protective actions for schsel children within I the plume 172.
- 20. Demonstrate the organisa=
2/13/.. W/M P taenal sellity and resewrces notessary to 6/7-9/88 M M P tentrol access to evacuated and sheltered i areas. ) .21. Demonstrate the sleewacy 2/13/86 P of trecerwres. f,cilities, etus poent sad pe rsonnel 6/7 9/88 P for the rest.*rstion. radielegical monitoring and decentoaination of evacuees. 0 e
148 TA8LE 4 STATUS OF OSJECTIVES - SII0tEMAN 1RACLEAR POWER STAT 10W page 4 of 6 Esercise La ro contract Staging Field i i FEMA objectives Date 20C tof gM0 La b [NC Areas EWDF Activi,tes
- 22. Demonstrate the adequacy 2/13/86 M
of f acilities, egalpeent cnd personnel f or congre-6/7-9/48 gate care of evacuees. 23. Demonstrate the adequacy 2/13/86 M of vehicles, equipment, procedures and personnel 6/7*9/88 M for transporting contae= insted. injured or esposed individuals. 24. Desonstrate the adegwacy 2/13/06 si sacalitaes equipment. supplies, precedures and 6/7-9/88 p personnel f or handling contaminated, injured er esposed indiviewals.
- 23. Demonst rate the adequacy 2/13/46 M
el f acilities, equipment, supplies, procedures and 6/7-9/88 M personnel for decentamina ation of eeersency workers, e q ui pmen t and wenicles for waste disposal. Jt. Demonstrate the ability to 2/13/86 M adentify the need for and cail woon Federal and 6/7-9/48 M } other avtside support adencies' assistance. 27 D.monstrate the approa 2/13/86 setate wie of equipeent and procedures for *~' 6/7-9/88 M collectnen and transport of samples of vegetatien. Ioed crops. milk. meat. poultry. water and animal feeds (indigenews to the area and stored).
- 28. Demonstrate the appre-2/13/86 priate let operations and prece6eres for 6/7*9/88 M
measuring and analysing samples of r*setation, food crops, ellh. meat. peeltry, water and animal feeds (indigenews to the. area and storedi. 1 i 4 l 1 I 9 .c
_,___,___m
- - - - ~. r
rv v ~ { 149 [ TASt.E 4 STATUS OF 04JECTfYt3 - ' " N a MUC1. EAR POWtt STAT 10sl a P:ss S sf 6 9 Esercise Lere Centract Staging Field I FEMA Objectives Date E0C ECF SHO La b ENC Areas EWDF Attivities
- 29. Denenstrate the stility to 2/13/86 project dosage to the public for ingestion 6/7-9/88 P
M P pathway espesure and d etermine appropriate protective measwees based on field dets. FDA PAC's and other relevant fatters. 30. Deeenstrate the ability to 2/13/86 laplement both preventive and energency protective 4/7-9/88 M actions for ingestion pathway hasards.
- 33. Deisenstrate the ability to 2/13/86 estieste total population espesvre.
6/7-9/88 M I I JJ. Deeenstrate the ability to 2/13/86 determine appropriate neasures for controlled 6/7-9/88 M N/A ) reenir, and re.ove,y tened en estimated total J i population espesure, ) availante EPA PAC's and ) other relevant fasters.
- 33. Denenstrate the aattity to 2/13/86 septement appropriate esaswres for controlled 6/7-9/88 M
M = reentry and recovery. 34 Desenstrate the attitty to 2/13/86 M M N/0 M M M maintain staffing on a continwows 24-heut tesis 6/7-9/48 M M M M M I by an astwat shift change. J5. Deeenstrate the stility to 2/13/,86 teerdinate the evasvation of on-site personnel. 6/7 9/88 M M 36. Seteestrate the ability to 2/13/86
- t. cry owi emergen.y response f unctions (i.e.,
6/7-9/88 attivate EOC's, metilise staf f that report to the EDC's, establish esmouni-i sations tint 4ges and te== elete telephone salt down) during an unnannevnsed effaheers still er esercise. t 0 7
Page 6 of 6 1 4 4 1 s Esercise Laro Contract Staging Field FEMA Objectives! Date EOC EOF BHC Lab ENC Areas EWDF Activities 37. Demonstrate the capoeility 2713/86 I of utility off* site response organisatiot. 6/7-9/48 M M M M personnel to interface with nonparticipating State ese lccal governments threvsh their mobstiaation and provision of advice and eseistence. LE 0:ht Alank
- Not an esertise objective M
- Objective ;et P
- Objective partially set M/p e Objective not set N10
- Not esservet by FEMA l
N/A
- Not ar/ icaele 1
FOOTWOTE: Note 18 Objectives are from CM EX*3 (dated February 26, 1948). Note 2 Objective !$ was also desenstrated at klLCQ district ef fices. t i I b 4 3 I j 1 I I I, 1 I i l I i, { 1 i ? i i a 1 l 1 ) 1 t t _}}