ML20154H121
| ML20154H121 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/28/1998 |
| From: | Rathbun D NRC OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS (OCA) |
| To: | Bartlett R HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154H125 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 9810140082 | |
| Download: ML20154H121 (3) | |
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i p 4 UNITED STATES j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 2008H001 4,..... .
September 28, 1998 1
The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett
. U.S. House of Representatives 322 Cannon Building Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Bartlett:
This is in reference to your letter of August 6,1998, forwarding correspondence from a constituent regarding the Juragua nuclear power facility in Cuba.
Enclosed please find information on the design, attributes, and status of the two-unit Juragua Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has compiled over the last ten years.
If you have any further questions on this subject, please feel free to contact Dr. Karen Henderson, Senior International Policy Analyst, in the Office of International Programs of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, at (301) 415-1771.
Sincerely, y p r 'LL Dennis K. Rathbun, Director Office of Congressional Affairs
Enclosure:
As stated j
i PDR ORG NRCC
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' l ENCLOSURE I b
- Over the last ten years, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has compiled the following information on the design, attributes, and status of the two-unit Juragua Nuclear Power Plant '
(NPP).
The two Russian-designed pressurized water WER-440 model V-213 reactors with bubbler / condensers are to be housed in reinforced concrete domed containments with carbon i steel liners, not unlike U.S. structures. This containment, which the Chemobyl reactor lacked,
- as well as differences in design between the two plants, would significantly reduce the likelihood of any large offsite radiation release in case of an accident. When the Juragua NPP was
, mothballed in 1992, the civil construction of Unit I was variously estimated to be from 75 to 90 percent complete, while only about 37 percent of the reactor equipment (e.g., pipes, pumps,
- and motors) have been installed. The civil construction on the second reactor has been
- estimated to be about 20 to 30 percent complete, with no information available about the status of equipment for Unit II. Neither reactor contains fuel. There have been periodic reports of faulty construction and poor workmanship in some parts of the reactor plant. Misgivings have
- also been voiced that existing construction has not been properly maintained since construction was halted in 1992, and that Cuba lacks the necessary economic and technical infrastructure 4
and scientific personnel to meet stringent nuclear safety requirements. Cuba is a member of
. safeguards, including regular inspections, since the beginning of construction and continuing through this mothballed period.
. Further, in March 1995, the Cuban govemment signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco, committing itself
- to placing all its present and future civil nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Even when, or if, Cuba (a) ratifies and implements the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and (b) finds financing and 1 i
assistance from nuclear supplier states, it will be a minimum of 3-5 years before the plant could !
be operational.
l As was reported in The Baltimore Sun story, on January 17,1997, Cuban President Fidel l Castro announced the indefinite postponement of the Juragua Nuclear Power Plant. As quoted l- in the Cuban daily newspaper Granma. President Castro said "[t]here was no hope" in 1992 when the work on the plant came to a stop due to lack of resources, "and there is no hope for now." He referred to a recent feasibility study which indicated that in order to complete the first ,
i reactor, nearly $750 million would be required, of which Cuba would contribute $208 million, '
Russia $349 million, and the remaining $193 million would be provided by a third partner or consortium of partners. (Unofficial U.S. estimates show that completion of both reactors would
- cost far in excess of $1 billion.) The article goes on to note that "the likelihood of finding a third
{ partner failed, among other reasons due to the reservations and concems expressed by
. Washington with respect to safety measures at the plant." Although there have been occasional press reports that Russia and Cuba still intend to finish construction and operate the plant, no third partner (s) has been willing to accept the high risk of default associated with the j
project. In the meanwhile, the Cuban press reports that President Castro may use the i irivestments meant for the Juragua facility for modernizing the Cuban thermoelectrical plants,
- whose crude oil requirements are considerably less.
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The U.S. Government has repeatedly made its long-standing concerns about the facility known l to Cuba, Russia, and to all potential third-country suppliers of nuclear equipment and financing for the Juragua project. Due to legal and policy constraints, the U.S. is not providing any financial resources, directly or through aid to Russia, to complete the Cuban plant. According )
to press reports, U.S. Govemment opposition played a significant role in' discouraging foreign l companies from contributing to the Juragua NPP's completion. In 1993, Russia extended a $30 i million credit line to assist Cuba in mothballing, not completing, the plant. Russia reportedly l extended that credit through 1997. The Clinton Administration supports Russian assistance that leads to the shutdown of Juragua. On the other hand, the Administration continues to vigorously oppose nuclear assistance from any source that is aimed at completing the plant.
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