ML20154D408

Licensee Contractor and Vendor Inspection Status Report. Quarterly Report,April-June 1988.(White Book)

ML20154D408
Person / Time
Issue date:	08/31/1988
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
NUREG-0040, NUREG-0040-V12-N02, NUREG-40, NUREG-40-V12-N2, NUDOCS 8809150268
Download: ML20154D408 (67)

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NUREG 0040 l

Vol.12, No. 2

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UCENSEE CONTRACTOR ANDTEND0R INSPECTION

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1 STATUS REPORT l

QUARTERi.7 REPORT i

april 1988 JUNE 1988 i

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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91 02 800821 0040 R PDR i

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Available from 1

Superintendent of Documents i

U.S. Government Printing Office Post Office Box 37082 Washington, D.C. 20013-7082 i

A year's subscription consists of 4 issues for i

this publication.

i Single copies of this publication are available from National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 i

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NUREG 0040 Vol.12, No. 2 i

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LICENSEE CONTRACTOR AND VENDOR INSPECTION STATUS REPORT QUARTERLY REPORT april 1988 JUNE 1988 Manuscnpt completed July 1988 Cate Published August 1988 Division of Reactor Inspection and Safeguards Office of Nuclear Resctor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

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Preface.......................................................

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Reporting Format.............................................

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Inspection Reports...........................................

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Selected Information Notices.................................

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Inds:........................................................

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Table of Vendor Inspection Reporta Related to Reactor Plants..................................

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PREFACE i

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A fundamental premise of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's (NRC) nuclear l

facility licensing and inspection program is that licensees are responsible i

for the proper construction and safe operation of their nuclear power plants.

l The total government-industry system for the inspection of nuclear facilities

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has been Jesigned to provide for multipleglevels of inspection,and verification.

Licenv as, contractors, and vendors each participate in a quality verification process in accordance with requirenents prescribed by, or consistent with, NRC rules and regulations. The NRC inspects to determine whether its requirements dre being tret by a licensee and his contractors, while the great bulk of the inspection activity is perfumed by the industry within the framework of ongoing quality verificaticn programs, in implementing this multilayered opproach, a licensed is responsible for developing a detailed quality assurance (QA) plan. This plan includes the QA l

t progra'ns of the licensee's contracto?s and vendors.

The NRC reviews the i

licensee's and contractor's QA plans to determine that implementation of the proposed QA program would be satisfactory and responsive to NRC regulations.

In the case of the principal licensee contractors, such as nuclear steam supply system designers and architect engineering fims, the NRC encourages submittal of a description of corporate-wide QA programs for review and acceptance by the NRC. Once accepted by hRC, a corporate QA program of a licensee's contractor will be acceptable for all license applications that l

incorporate the program by reference in a Safety Analysis Report (SAR).

In I

such cases, a contractors's QA program will not be reviewed by the NRC as part of the licensing review process, provided that the incorporation in the SAR is without change or nodification. However, new or revised regulations, Regulatory Guides, or Standard Review Plans affecting QA program contruls may be applied by the NRC to previously accepted QA programs.

j When design and construction activities were high, fims designing nuclear I

steam supply systems, architect engineering firms designing nuclear power plants, and certain selected major equipment vendors were inspected on a I

regular basis by NRC to ascertain through direct observation ci.alected activities whether these design firms and vendors were satisfactorily implementing the accepted QA program.

However, with the substantial decline I

of new plant design activities, the inspection of QA program implementation has been deemphasized.

Instead, the NRC vendor inspection focus has been shifted to vendor activities associated with nuclear plant operation, maintenance, and modifications.

Inspection errphasis in now placed on the quality of the vendor products including hardware fabrication, licensee-I l

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vendor interfaces, environmental qualification of equipment, and equipment problems found ouring operation and corrective action.

If nonconformances with NRC recuirements and regulations are found, the inspected organization is requestet to take appropriate corrective action and to institute preventive j

measures to preclude recurrence.

If generic implications are identified, NRC assures that af fected licensees are expeditiously informed.

In addition to the above, the Vendor Program Branch has begun inspections,at licensee facilities covering the areas of procurement of replacement par i

for use in safety-related systems and licensee / vendor interface programs,ts as i

requested in Generic Letter 83-28.

This edition of the White Book,contains i

copies of the inspection reports of inspections complete'd to date Sub' sequent l

l issues will contain those reports that are issued in the quarterly report period covered by that White Book.

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i in the 'past, NRC issued confirming letters to the principal contractors to indicate that NRC inspections have confirmed satisfactory implementation of the accepteo QA programs.

Licensees and applicants could, at their option, i

use the letters to fulfill their obligation under 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII, that requires them to perform initial source evaluation audits and subsequent periodic audits to verify QA program implementation.

However, ba'.ad on the above described change in nuclear plant design and construction activities, NRC will no longer issue confirming letters to principal contractors since future NRC vendor program inspections will focus on selected areas rather than addressing the implementation of their respective QA programs. Therefore, 4

j confiming letters that have already exceeded their three year effective period j

will not be renewed.

Confirming letters isseed less than three years ago will remain in effect until the stated effective period expires.

Therefore, as the i

confirming letters expire, licensees and applicants will no longer be allowed to take credit for the NRC acceptance cf the implementation of a principal contractor's QA program.

Licensees continue to be responsible for the conduct of initial source evaluation audits and subsequent periodic audits to verify QA j

program implementation, j

l The White Book will continue to be published and will contain copies of all vendor inspections issued during the calendar quarter specified.

The vendor inspection reports list the nuclear facilities to which the results are

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applicable thereby informing licensees and vendors of potential problems.

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l addition, the affected hRC Regional Offices are notified of any significant j

problem areas that may require special attention.

The White Book also con-(

tains copies of 1&E Information Notices, concerning vendor issues released

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during the calendar quarter.

The White Book contains information normally ubed to establish a "qualified 2

l suppliers" list; however, the information contained in this document is not i

adequate nor is it intended to stand by itself as a basis for qualification of suppliers.

l Correspondence with contractors and vendors relative to the inspection data contained in the White Book is placed in the USNRC public Document Room, i

located in Washington, D.C.

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ORGANIZATION:

COMPANY, DIVISION CITY, STATE

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I REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION NO.: Docket / Year / Sequence DATE:

OH-SITE HOURS:

CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS:

Corporate Name Division ATTN:

Name/ Title Address City, State Zip Code' ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT:

Name/ Title

,TELEPHO"E NUMBER:

Telephone Number r

O NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY:

Description of type of components, eggipment, or o

r services sdppli,ed.

ASSIGNED INSPECTOR:

Name/ Vendor Program Branch Section Date OTHERINSPECTOR(S): Name/ Vendor Program Branch Section APPROVED BY:

Nare/ Chief - Section/ Vendor Program Branch Date

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INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE:

A.

BASES:

Pertain to the inspection criteria that are applicable to th*

activity being inspected; i.e., 10 CFR Part 21, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and Safety Analysis Report or Topical Report conrnitments, i

B.

SCOPE:

Sunnarizes the specific areas that were reviewed, and/or identi-i Ties plant systems, equipment or specific components that were inspected, i

For reactive (identified problem) inspections, the scope summarizes the prcblem that caused the inspection to be performed.

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PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY:

List plant name and docket numbers of licensed i

facilities for which equipment, services, or records were examined during the inspection.

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ORGANIZATION: ORGAN!ZAl!0N CITY, STAiE REPORT INSPECTION NO.:

RESULTS:

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A.

VIOLATIONS:

Shown here are any inspection results determined to be in violation of Federal Regulations (such as 10 CFR Part 21) that are applicable to the organization being inspected, i

B.

NONCONFORMANCES:

Shown here are any inspection results determined to be in nonconformance with applicable commitrtents to NRC requirements.

In addition to identifying the applicable NRC requirements, the specific i

industry codes and standards, company QA manual sections, or operating procedures which are used to implement these coninf tments may be referenced, t

C.

UNRESOLVED ITEMS:

Shown here are inspection results about which more information is required in order to determine whether they are acceptable items or whether a violation or nonct.nformance may exist.

Such items will be resolved during subsequent inspections.

D.

STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS:

This section is used to identify l

4 the status of previously icentified violations, items of nonconformance.

l and/or unresolved items until they are closed by appropriate action.

l For all such items, and if closed, include a brief statement concerning j

action which closed ths item.

If this section is omitted, all previous j

inspection findings have been closed.

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E.

INSPECTION Flh0!NGS AND OTHER_ COMMENTS:

This section is used to provide

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significant information concerning the inspection areas identified under "Inspection Scope."

Included are tuch items as mitigating circumstances i

i concerning a violation or nonconformance, or statements concerning the i

i limitations or depth of inspection (sample size, type of review performed i

and special circumstances or concerns identified for possible followup).

j For reactive inspections, this section will be used to surrrnarize the i

i disposition or status of the condition of event which caused thr 2

inspection to be performed.

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F.

PERSONS CONTACTED:

Typed. Name, Title i

• present during exit meeting c

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j (EXPLANATION OF FORMAT AND TERMINOLOGY) l viii

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ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORAT10N TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TK0Y. t19r0NtfN REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION l NO.: 99902008/88-01 DATES: 02/16-19/88 ON-SITE HOURS-23 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Mr. John Tverberg, Vice President Technology l Crucible Materials Corporation Tre t Tube Division 2188 Church Street East Troy, Wisc9nsin 53120 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: H. D. Xurtz, Chief Metallurgist TELEPHONE NUMBER: (416) 642-7321 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Tubing for heat excht.n9ers and condensers. / k \\@M bO 88 ASSIGNED INSPECTOR: ( T 3 onway, Pro Mam Developd at cnd Reactive Date ( Inspection Sect 1@ (PDRIS) OTHER INSPECTOR: T. Tinkle (consultant) APPROVEDBy: . bM O? . A Baker, ActEng ef, PDRIS, vendor Inspet. tion Branch Date ] I ~ INSPECTION BASES AND SCOPE: A. BASES: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B and 10 CFR Part 21. B. SCOPE: The inspection was conducted to perfonn a programmatic evaluation of the implementation of frent Tube's (TT) QA program as it relates to the fabrication of tubing for nuclear facilities. l PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: "Sea-Cure" tubing - Beaver Valley 2 (50-412) and Point Beach 1/2(50-266/301). i 1

ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVIS10N EAST TRGY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION tic. : 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 2 of 12 A. VIOLATIONS: Contrary to Section 21.31 of 10 CFR Part 21, a review of purchase orders (PO) to vendors revealed that while 10 CFR Part 21 was imposed upon TT, TT did nct impose 10 CFR Part 21 requirements on P0s 54133 (December 30, 1 1985) to Anderson Laboratories, 50005 (February 21,1985) to Conam, and 58684 (January 22,1987) to Instrumatics (January 22,1987). (88-01-01) B. NONCONFORMANCES: 1. Contrary to Criterien IV of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, subsection NCA 3856.3 of.Section III of the ASME Cnde, and Section 5 of Af4SI N45.2, the reqtrirement for a vendor to have an approved QA program was no't stated on P0s 54113 (December 30,1985) to Anderson Labora-tories, 50005 (February 27,1985) to Conam, 58684 (January 22,1987) to Instrumatics, 59715 (April 30,1987) to Page Wilson, and 57224 (September 2,1986) to Magnetic Analytical Corporation (MAC). (88-01-02) 1 1. Contrary to Subsection NCA-3867.4(a) of Section III of the ASME Code and Sections 8.9.5 and 19.5 of the Quality Systems Manual (QSM) TT did not include the chemical product analyses which had been perforced by steel manufacturers and/or a laboratory on the following CMTRs for nuclear orders: (88-01-03) i

• Two to Joseph Oat Corporation (J0C) for heat Nos. 360090 and 360314 on mill order No. NE-85027-6.
• Three to JOC for heat Nos. 230183, 340467 and 340911 on rnill order No. NS-80173-4

'Two to Wisconsin Electric Power Company (WEPC) for heat No. 94164 on mill order Nos. 4N5-10364-7 and 3N5-10365-7.

• 0ne to Duquesne Light Company (DLC) for heat No.1G4094 on mill order No. N5-70005-5.

3. Contrary v Section 7.3 of Procedure No QCS-134 and Section 9.6.1 of SNT-TC A. a review of qualification records for 13 nondestructive examination (NDE) personnel revealed that the records for all the examiners did not contain a statement indicating satisfactory completion of training in accordance with TT's written practice l fio. QCS-134. (88-01-04) i 2

l ORGAMZ/. TION: CRUC;BLE MATERIALS CORPORiTION l TRENT TUBE DIVISION l EAST TROY, WISCONSIN i l REPORT INSPECTION i NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 3 of 12 4. Contrary to Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, Section II of ANSI N45.2, and Sections 4.1 and 4.4 of the QSM, a review of training records and training schedules for 1986 and 1987 indicated that TT failed to indoctrinate and train personnel perfortning activities affecting quality in the requirementsnof the QSM. l (88-01-05) 5. Contrary to Subsection NCA-3867.4(e) of Section III of the ASME Code and Section 8.9 of the QSM, IT failed to upgrade stock material used for safety-related tubing on two orders from DLC (P0 No. 28559 dated February 4, 1985) and WEPC (P0 No. C397325 dated November 11,1987). (88-01-06) 6. Contrary to Criterion XII of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, Subsection NCA-3868, and Section 17.5.1 of the QSM, a review of calibration records indicated that calibration cards for three pressure gauges (S/Ns 8325-4, 8247-7, and 1286) had not been updated to reflect current calibration stetus. (88-01-07) 7. Contrary to Criterion II of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, Section 2 of ANSI N45.2, and Section 6 of the QSM, documented evidence was not available to show that a "Nuclear Review" form was generated for two nuclear orders from DLC (P0 No. 28559 dated February 4, 1985) and UEPC (P0 No. C307325 dated November 11,1987). (88-01-08) t C. UNRESOLVED ITEMS: None. D. STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS: None. This was the first inspection of this facility. E. OTHER FINDINGS AND COMMENTS: 1. TrentTube(TTl TT is one of six divisions of Crucible Materials Corporation which is an employee owned company with corporate headquarters located in Syracuse, New York. TT produces stainless steel and alloy pipe and tubing at three manufacturing plants. At East Troy Wisconsin, the CWA (cold work annealed) Plant produces tubint (1/2" to 11/2" diameter) to 150 feet in length, and piping (1/8" to 4" diameter) to 3

ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 4 of 12 50 feet in length is produced at the Trentweld Plant. The TT East Troy facilities have an ASME Quality System Certificate (QCS-289 expiration date May 20,1989) for a Material Manufacturer of ferrous and nonferrous seamless and welded without filler metal tubular products. The plant in Carrollton, Georgia has a QSC (Materials) and certific.3tions for NPT and U stamps, and it produces welded pipe 1 andtubingfrom27/8"-72"outsidediametersf00). 2. E-Brite 26-1 qo E-Brite 26-1 is 6.high purity ferritic stainless s' teel alloy developed and fabricated by Airco Vacuum Metals (AVM) until 1977 when the patent rights were purchased by Allegheny Ludlum (AL). The inspector was interested in knvaing if TT had pechased E-Brite 26-1 from either AVM or AL and subse tuently fabricated the alloy into a product that % used in a nuclear power plant. In discussions with the Vice-President Technology, Chief Metallurgist, and Director of Marketing on this subject, the following infortnation was obtained. TT has not fabricated any E-Brite orders since AL has been producing the Registered Trademark alloy. However, from 1974 through 1978. TT did a number of conv usion orde s (approximately 25) for AVM. To the best Of their recollections, TT management indicated that the orders. All for tubing, did not contain quality or nuclear requirements, e.no the tubing was shipped to suppliers or to.'.VM. They state,d that Ti did not supply any E-Brite tubing to any US comercial nuclear facility. TT was able to retrieve QA records pertaining to only two C-Brite orders. The records for both orders in 1977 were procurement documsnt change orders and Returned Material Reperts for tubing returned to TT due to suspected weld defects. TT performed ultrasonic tests (UT) on the tubing, which was identified only as ASTM A268 Grade XM-27, and shipped the tested tubes which passed UT back to AYM and Southwest Alloys in Houston, Texas. 3. Plant Tour the inspector toured the CWA manufat:uring facility in the presence Of the Manager, Technical Services. Due to the nature of this inspec-tion and the time available, activities at the Trentweld Plant were not reviewed during this inspection. Approximately 80 percent of the raw material from vendors is slit to size at TT's processing plant in Chicago, Illinois and sent to TT's CWA Plant in East Troy Wisconsin. The strip is roll fonned into a 4

R ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERfALS CORPORATION l TRENT TURE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 5 of 12 l circular shape and welded using the Tungsten Inert Gas (TIG) Process with argon-helium or hydrogen shielding on 10 weld mills. The weld bead is cold worked to produce a smooth surface on the 00 and ID. The tubing goes through in-line induction annealing followed by final straighter,ing and sizing on rolls. In-line eddy current testing (ET) and destructive tests (mechanical and hardness) are performed four times a shift assure the' integrity of the weld. An off-line two-zone annealirg furnace with an oxidizing atmosphere is also available. Stretch or rotary straightening assures straight tube lengths. A pneumatic (250 psi air) test is performed on all straight tubes. The tubes e cut to length and samples are taken for the laboratory tests. The laboratory performs tensile, hardness, f13nge, flatten, and reverse bend tests and also corrosion tests if required by the specification or the customer. Finishing includes deburring and pickling (nitric /hydroflouric bath) followed by a dual rinse (treated plus denineralized water). A calibrated ring gauge is used on the tube, the OD and wall thickness are checked with a calibrated tricro-meter, and a visual inspection of the weld's inside diameter (1D) and 00 is undertaken at final inspection. All the tubes are ET, and ultrasonic testing (UT) can be done if required by the custoner. MAC and Conam calibrate the ET and UT equipeent, respectively. The tubes are U-bent using a rotary die method with no lubricant, followed by stress relieving using an electric resistence heated unit which is calibrated by Instrumatics. The bent er straight tubing is hydro l tested at 1000 psi using demineralized water followed by purging with Argon. The radius of the bent tubes are checked on a template table, final cut to length, and deburred. A felt plug is blown through the ID of all tubes. Each tube is marked (type, heat number, row number for installation in vessel, and mill order number) and packaged for shipment. 4. Documentation Packages (DP)_ Four DPs for nuclear orders were reviewed in detail. Two J0C orders (P0 17265 dated September 19, 1984 and Revision 6 dated February 18, 1986) were for approximately 2400 U-bend, SA 249, 304L tubes. The P0s invoked Section III, Clast,1 of the ASME Code but did not reference 10 CFR Part 21 requirements. Each DP consisted of a number of documents. 1T assigned mill order Hus. NS-80173-4 (October 26, 1984) and NS-85027-6 (June 19, 1986) to these orders. Each mill order (i.e., traveler) identifiec manu-facturing operatiuns and witness / hold points for the work. Nuclear i Review Sheets ider.tified procedure numbers for the manufacturing 5-

ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE >%TERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 6 of 12 operations. Procedures relating to stress relieving, UT, ET, tube cleaning, and hydrostatic testing were sent to J0C for their l approval prior to use by TT. For these orders, TT purchased Type 304L stainless steel from Armco Specialty Steels on P0s 47941 (September 20, 1984) and 1257 (February 26,1986). Armco CMTRs certified the chemical analysis and mechanical aroperties for heat Nos. 230183, 340911, and 340467 (P0 17265) and 1 eat Nos. 360090 and 360314 (P0 17265 Revision 6) Anderson Laboratories performed spectrographic metallurgical analyses on samples from the five heats on TT P0s 54113 (December.30, 1985) and 43358 (no date since TT could not locate a copy). TT failed to impose quality or 10 CFR Part 21 requirements upon Anderson Laboratories (see Violation 88-01-01 and Nonconformance 88-01-02). Two TT Laboratury Reports gave the chemical analysis (same as Armco CMTRs) and mechanical properties (yield an'd tensile strength, elonga-tion, and hardness) for tie five heats. The flatten, flare, and reverse bend tests were also satisfactory. Five TT CMTRs, one for each heat, documented the chemical analysis and mechanical test results. Each CMTR stated that the tubing conforced to the require-4 ments of SA 249 and Section III, Class 1 of the ASME Code; gave the l results from the pneumatic, hydrostatic, ET, and UT tests; and indicated that the results of the flange, flatten, and reverse bend I tests were satisfactory. It was noted that the five TT CMTRs failed to document the product chemical analysis l Laboratories (seeNonconformance 88-01-03) performed by Anderson Other focuments in these packages included CWA row sheets, raw material release / disbursement, Weld Production Reports, Pressure Test Reports (both pneumatic and hydrostatic) Inspection Tally Sheets (ITS), Solution Annealing Reports, ET charts, calibration check-off shtets U-bend-process inspection sheets, and Shipping Notices. The CWA row sheet identifies various parameters (e.g., bend radius, tangent length, etc.) for each row of tubing, and the j ITS documents the results of visual, dimensional and ET test results. Two ops for "Sea-Cure" tubing for DLC and WEPC for use in safety-related component coolin DLC's PO j 28559 (February 4, 1985)g heat exchangers were reviewed. was for 2400 3/4" tubes, and 5080 5/8" tubes were crdered by WEPC on P0 C397325 (November 11,1987) for 4 units at Beaver Valley and Point Beach nuclear plants, respectively. Both P0s invoked the requiren.ents of 10 CFR Part 21 and Appendix B 6

ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY. WISCONSIN l" REPORT INSPECTION NO : 99902008/88-01 RESULTS:

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l to 10 CFR Part 50. TT purchased strip material from Universal Cyclops (UC) for the DLC order and from Jones & Laughlin Specialty Products (JLSP) for the WEPC order. The CMTRs from UC (heat No. 1G4894) and JLSP (heat No. 94164) gave chemicals and mechanical values but did not certify that the material was produced in accordance with a QA program that met the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 or ANSI N45.2 (i.e., this indicates that "stock material" was sent to TT). 1 TT performed mechanical testing and documented the results in labora-3 tory reports dated January 28, 1985 and November 12, 1987. These results along with the results of the flange and reverse flat tests were identifiec' in TT CMTRs to the customers. Chemical analysis was not performed by an independent 17.boratory. TT did not report the product chemical analysis which had been performed by UC and JLSP (see Nonconformance 88-01-03). The results of the pneumatic and ET were reported on the CMTRs, but there was no evidence that hydro-testing had been performed, and the CMTRs did not certify that the tubes were manufactured to a QA program meeting the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 or ANSI N45.2. Based upon a review of l l all the documents made available to the inspector for these two orders, it appears that TT failed to upgrade stock material for these nuclear orders (see Nonconformance 88-01 06). In addition, a Nuclear Review Sheet was not in the DP for the DLC order. This matter was brought to the attention of the Manager Technical Services CWA Plant, who reviewed the situation with the Chief Metallurgist and concluded that the order had been processed i as a standard (non-nuclear) order rather than a non-standard (nuclear) order. He further stated that a standard order was probably used because the P0 did not invoke the requirements of Section 111 of the 3 ASME Code. (see Nonconformance 88-01-08) l The remaining documents (e.g., Weld Product Report, inspection Tally Report, etc.) were similar to those in the DPs for the J0C orders. DL PO 26314 (September 20,1984) was for tubing for a refrigerant condenser at Beaver Valley Unit No. 1. The PO invoked 10 CFR Part 21, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, and DL specification NDS-0082. The DP on this order was not reviewed by the inspector. 5. Calibration of Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) The inspector reviewed Section 17. "Calibration of the QSh records to assure that M&TE is properly controlled and calibrated. It was 7 j

ORGANIZATIONt CRUCfBLE MATERJALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY. WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 8 of 12 noted that the QA Coordinator is responsible for preparing and main-taining a calibration card for each device. The card identifies the calibrator (personnel or subcontractor), the calibration procedure, and the results of the calibration. The calibeation card file was reviewed to ascertain the calibration status (or selected test equipment. The equipment included three pressure gauges, two UT transducers, two UT testers MK!!, three micrometers, one ring sauge, one digital panel, one Tinius Olsen tester, one ET unit, one optical pyrometer, and two sets of gauge blocks. For the three micrometers, j it was noted that the earliest calibration date on the current card was June 1986, but the equipment was used in November 1984 (S/N 248-A) and May 1986 (S/Ns 154-A and 709-A). The calibration cards i for the three pressure gauges (S/Ns 8325-4,8247-7,and12P6)had not been updated following the last calibration. (SeeNoncun-l fomance 88-01-07) 6. Control of Purchased Material and Services l The inspector reviewed Section 8. "Purchasing" and Section 9 "Vendor Qualification" of the QSM, procurement documents Approved Supplier List (ASL), and external audits to assure that iter.s and services confom to the precurement documents and are purchased from approved j vendors. Procurement documents to five vendors of services were selected to detemine if technical and quality reouirements were included in P0s. PO 54113 (December 30,1985) to Anderson Laboratories cove. red spectro-graphic metallurgical analysis of steel alloys for calendar year 1986. Page Wilson calibrated the Tinius Olsen 60,000 lb. tensile 4 tester under PO 59715 (April 30,1987). Although the PO to Page J Wilson did not invoke quality or 10 CFR Part 21 reautrenants, the Chief Metallurgist stated that the calibration service was performed on-site under the superv hion of TT and in accordance with TT proce-r dures. The pressure gauges were calibrated off-site by Instrumatics ) under FO 58684 (January 22,(February 1987), and Conam calibrated the Sonic instruments under PO 50005 27,1985) alse'off-site. PO 57224 (September 2,1986) to MAC was for calibration of equipment. It was noted that QA program requirecents were not included in P0s 54113, 50005, 58604, 59715, and 57224 In addition, F0s 54113, 50005, and 58684 did not reference 10 CFR Part 21 requirements. (see Violation 88-01-01 and Nonconfomance 88-01-02) TT receives raw material (i.e., strip, sheet, and plate) from a nuber of 'donestic vendors which include Allegheny Ludlum (AL), JLSP, UC, Artrco, Jessop Lukens, and International Nickel. A review l 1. 8 [

I ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN P REPORT INSPECTION l NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 9 of 12 of TT P0s (e.g., 36285 dated September 24, 1982 to UC; 1207 dated February 4, 1986 to LSP; 1257 dated February 26, 1986 and 47941 dated September 20, 1984 both to Armco) indicated that TT purchased stock material which would have to be upgr3ded to meet the require-ments of a nuclear order. l Three QA audit reports of AL, Anderson Laboratories and Armco were reviewed. Two of the audits were conducted by the Manager QC - l Trentweld Plant, and the audit of AL was by an individual from the Carrollton Plant. A review of the qualification records for the auditors indicated that the most recent data for the Carrollton employee was August 1986. This matter was brought to the attentiei of the QA Coordinator who had a copy of the individual's current record telecopied from the Carrollton Plant. 1 l 7. Nondestructive Examination (NDE) j The inspector reviewed Section 14,

• Nondestructive Testing" of the QSM, TT's written practice QCS-134, Revision 6 "General Require-i ments for NDT Training and Certification " qualification records for 1

13 NDE personnel, and two NDE procedures. A memo from the President dated November 19, 1967 on the subject of Non-Destructive Training and Grading delegated the authority to administer the training of Level I and Level II NDE personnel to the Chief Inspectors of the I Trentweld and CWA Plants. TT performs both ET and UT during fabrica-j tion. Procedures QCS-110. Revision 5 "Ultrasonic Inspection of i Tubing and Pipe" and QCS-109. Pevision 13 "Eddy Current Testing were reviewed. For both procedures, there was no indication who wrote, reviewed, and/or approved the documents. In general, the type of information found in the record files for the [ 13 NDE personnel (four - Level !!! and nine - Level II) included educational background, training record, record of qualification, { certification staterrents, copies of examinations (general, specific, i j andpractical),andeyeexams. With one exception, the qualifica-l 1 tion records appear to satisfy the requirements SNT-TC-1A. The exception is that the qualification records for each examiner did not contain a statecent showing satisfactory completion of training ) in acenrdance with Procedure No. QCS-134 (see Nonconformance 88-01-04). l 1 I ) 8. Indoctrination and Training 1 I The inspector reviewed Section 4 "Training of the QSM and training l records for both the CWA and Trentweld Plants. The CWA Training i l l I I 9 l

4 ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPOP" INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 10 of 12 Schedule for 1986 was a matrix showing the subject, instructor, and j the month in which the training was given. The Training / Meeting i sign up sheets for each session were reviewed. The sessions were titled DuPont Specification, Nuclear Training, Nuclear Orders. Auditor Training, Manager Technical Service Traihing Welder Quality Training, Multicathode, Inspector Training, and Level !!! Training. A nuc1&ar training outline for "Welding and Furntshing" was reviewed. This session was given in November 1986, and a session on "Funda-I mentals of Ultrasonics" was given by the Chief Inspector in October 1986. The CWA Training Schedule for 1987 indicated 10 areas were covered. These sessions included Nuclear Training Welding, Level Ill Training. l 1 Practical Nuclear Order, Mill Inspection Training Management Produc-l tion & Inspection Training, Advanced Training for Final Inspector, j Forester Training New Product Lines. Training for Welders, and UT i Training. 4 A reviw of the Trentweld Training Schedule for 1986 indicated that t only three subjects out of 32 identified on the matrix were given. [ ] The schedule for 1987 included nine subject areas. Training / Meeting sign up sheets for these sessions were reviewed. There was no indication that a Training Schedule for 1986 for either plant had been prepared. In addition, documentation was not made available to the inspector to show that training had been perfortred prior to 1987. Following the review of all the training records presented to the inspector, it was noted that personnel performing quality affecting activities ).ad not been trained or injoctrinated J with applicable requirements of the QSM (see Nonconformance 88 01-05). t 9, 10 CFR Part 21 The inspector reviewed TT Procedure No. QCS.147 which addresses the I j evaluation and reporting of deviations. The procedure along with Section 206 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 and 10 CFR Part 21 were posted on the employee's bulletin board in the CWA l Plant. There was no documented evidence presented to the inspector that TT has a cedication program in effect to upgrade "commercial l grade" material as defined in Section of 10 CFR Part 21 in the event i that the material is used as a safety-related basic component in a j nuclear facility. i l i l l l 4 10 l

ORGANISTION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION l l EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902008/B0-01 RESULTS: PAGE 11 of 12 l 10. Ferritic Stainless Steel l Two other ferritic stainless steel alloys have been fabricated by TT for heat exchanger ap)11 cations in nuclear power plants. The two alloys are Type 439 witch is a stabilized material (17-191 Cr) that has been used in condensers, feedwater heaters, lube oil coolers, and component cooling heat exchangerst and SEA-CURE, a Registered Trade-mark stsbilir.ed material (approximately 27.51 Cr) that has been used in condensers and other plant cooler tubing applications. Based on discussions with TT management personnel, the following list is a summary of the ferritic materials produced by TT for balance of plant installations. TT stated that none of the orders were for Section !!! tubing, s Licensee Plant Application Date Shipped Wisconsin Public Kewaunee Service (WPS) Northeast Utilities Conn. Yankee Condenser 08/81 - 11/85 Niagara Mohawk Nine Mile Point Condenser 02/84 t DLC Beaver Valley Condenser 09/84 - 02/85 Coroonent Cooling i Exc'ianger Refrigerat.on Condensing Unit l WEPC Point Beach Cornponent Cooling 11/87 l Exchanger Lube & Seal Oil Coolers i Southern California San Onofre Low Pressure Blow 11/87 Edison Down i The order from WPS was for Type 439 stainless steel, and Sea-Cure was the alloy for the remaining orders. F. PERSONNEL CONTACTED: 1 B. Grant, President i

• J. Tverberg, Vice President Technology
• H. Kurtz, Chief Metallurgist 11

ORGANIZATION: CRUCIBLE MATERIALS CORPORATION TRENT TUBE DIVISION EAST TROY, WISCONSIN REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99902005/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 12 of 12

• D. Janikowski, Manager Technical Services - CWA
• R.

Billiat, Sales

• H. Hubbell, Production Manager Sales
• I Matuszak, Production Manager Sales
• D. Burt, QA Coordinator
• J. DeClark, Manager QC - Trentweld
• J. Stam, Plant Manager - Trentweld
• D. Greeley, Plant Manager - CWA L. Lundwall, Chief Inspector - CWA J. Thackray, Director Marketing l
• Attended exit meeting, i

i i ( i i 12

ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA l REPCRT INSPECTION INSPECTICN NO.: 99900871/88-01 DATES: 01/25-28/88 ON-SITE FONDt. U CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Elgar Corporation ATTN: Mr. P. A. Zecos Fresident and Chief Executive Of ficer i 9250 Brown Deer. Road San Diego, California 92121 CRGANIZAT!0hAL CONTACT: Mr. Clyde B. i'.cVicker, CA Manager l i TELEPHONE NUMBER: (6191 450-0085 1 jl NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Elgar manufactures electrical inverters. uninterruptible power supplies and associated products. l l i o [^h M88 ASSIGNED INSPECTOR: w, J./J./etrosino, Program Development anu Reactive Date Inspection Section (PDRIS) OTHERINSPECTOR(S): W. E. Gunther, Brookhaven National Laboratory / f-/ f APPROVED BY: (. QE84 / E T. Baker, Ac y . PDRIS, Vendor Inspection Branch ate INSPECTION BASES ANO SCOPE: A. BASES: 10 CFR Part 21 and Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. B. SCOPE: This inspection m s nade as a result of re:urring problems experierced with Elgar's 25 KVA electrical inverters by the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) units 11 and !!!. The inspection was limited to the Elgar 25 and 7.5 KVA inverter design change activities. I l PLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Clinton (50-461); Comanche Feak (50-445/446); Crystal River (50-302); Dresden (50-237/249); Fitzpatrick(50333); Hatch (50-321/366); IndianPoint(50-286); Millstone (50-245/336/423);(continuwd) l 13 l

ORGiN!ZAT!0N: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN O! EGO, CALIFORN!A REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 999008:1/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 2 of 11 j PLANT SITE APPLICAB:LITY: Menticello (50-263); Nine Mile Point (f0-220/410); Oconee(50-269/270/287); Palo Verde (50 528/529/530); Perry 50-440); Point Beach (50-266/301); Rancno Seco (50 312); River Bend (50 458 ; han Cnofre (50-206/361/362); Seabrook (50-443); South Texas (50 498/499 i St. Lucie (50-335/389); Vermont Yankee (50-271); Vogtle (50 424/425); WPASS (50-392); Waterford (50 382); and Yankee Rowe (50 029). A. V!0LAT!0NS: Contrary to Section 21.21, "Notification," of 10 CFR Part 21, several deviations were revealed where Elgar neither i.erformed its required evaluation of potentially repcrtable 10 CFR 21 issues nor informed the end user so they could cause an evaluation to be performed. A number of the deviations are likely to constitute defects and would have been reportable if evaluated (88 01-01). This is a Severity Level 111 violation (Supplement VII). B. NONCONFORMANCES: 1. Cor.trary to Criterion I, "Organization," Criterion !!, "Quality Assurance Program " Criterion V. "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings," of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. Elgar has failed to clear 13 establish the duti +, snd authorities of its engineering personnel to assure its sa.4,' related design and ang..eering activities are sattsfactorily accomplished (88 01 02). 2. Cuntrary to Criterien !!!, "Dest;n Control." of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 and El ar's quality assurance manual (QAN), it was noted that (68 01-03 : a. Elgar has ftiled to ensure that its design control measures provide for an independent verification of the tethnical adeqts:scy of its design changes for at least its 7 ! and 25 KVA inverters. A review of approxtinately 55 Elgar engineering de'. iga chaam j (ECN) revealed that 12 out uf the 55 ECN's were prepared, reviewed and approved by the same persor,; b. Elgar has failed to assure that the cumulative effect of aultiple design changes on a given drawing does not affect the function-ality of the safat:--related system or compunent in regard to I the original des %n. A review of the 55 forerentioneo ECN's revealed that no design function reviews are perforted by Elgar to assess the possible affects of the collective design changes on the original system design function; f ~ 14

ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORFORATION ) SAN O! EGO, CALIFORNIA i PEFORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 3 of 11 1 Elgar could not provide previous revisions of its current c. I drawings to the NRC inspector for any of the nine safety-related inverter component drawings that were being reviewed to deter-mine the extent of design changes. This activity was being j performed in parallel alth an ECN review; and i I d. Nine ECN's that were reviewed did not indicate whether an . engineering evaluation had been performed. 3. Contrary to Criterion XVI!!, "Audits." of Appendi-B to 10 CFR. r ~ Psrt 50, it was noted that the last two internal QA department audits used QA personnel as audit team mer.bers and the OA manager was the I audit team leader for one of the two audits (88-01-04). C. UNRESOLVED /0 PEN ITEMS: 1 i 1. Setpoints Technical discussions were conducted with the cognizant Elgar enginners to determine whether or not generic problems may exist in regard to maintaining setpoint parameter; on its logic system l i t j circuit c4rds. A problem with the setpoints was identified at the l PVNGS uni:s 11 and III and has not been fully resolved by Elgar to date. The secpe of the cidcussions between NRC staff and Elgar l personnel ncluded the collective functional affect on a system due l to several minor design changes over a period of tire. Additional i discussions and evaluations are required. Therefore, this issue will be classified as an CPEN ttem (88-01-05). 2. Notification of end users - Numerous ECN dccuments were generated with "design error /ceviation" stated by Elgar as the reason for the change. i The functionality of Itcensee inverter units with respect to the original design parartters is in question. This issue is UNRESOLVED (88 01-C6). 3. IC Sockets (ECN 1680) - This issue could effect the seisnic qualifica-tion of licensee inverters that are currently using the associated circuit card. Until further Elgar review is performed, this issue will rent.in UHRE50LVED (88-01-07?. l 4 Field Changes Further review and discussions will be performed l curing a future inspection to detertnine the rethed in which Elgar controls its field design changes. This issue is an OPEN item i (80-01 08). (;. STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS: Neither reviewed ner dispussed during this irispection, = 15 l

c ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN O! EGO, CAllFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: DAGE 4 of 11 E. INSPECTION FlhDINGS AND OTHER COMMENTS: 1. Entrance and Exit Meetinos, The NRC staff informed the Elgar Corporation management representa-tives of the scope of the inspection during the entrance meeting on January 25, 1988 and sumarized the inspection findings, observa. tions, and NRC stat f concerns during the exit meeting on January 28, 1988. 2. Backoround The NRC Region V staff revealed in May of 1987, that the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVhGS) Units !! and !!! had experienced numerous problems with its Elgar electrical inverters. However, the licensee was not able to adequately resolve the inverter problems and PVNGS continued to experience an undesirable number of outages due to problems such as blown fusos, failed silicnn controi rectifiers (SCRs) and printed circuit logic card problems. The PVNGS facility uses four 25 KVA single phase inverters (model INV253-1-101) and two three phase 25 KVA inverters (model INV253-3-101) on each of its three units. The four single phase inverters are energized during normal operation to supply power to the vital bus while the three phase inverters are in a standby condition to supply emergency power to the shutdown cooling isolation valve motor. An overall review of the problems that PVNGS experienced was perfomed by the staff, and an inspection at Elger was deemed appropriate. 3. 10 CFR Part 21 Requirements Section 21.21, Notification," of 10 CFR Part 21 requires, in part, that each corporation adopt procedures to provide for either evalus-ting deviations identified in a basic comporent delivered to a nuclear power plant facility or to infom the custoner of the deviation in order that the custetter may cause the deviation to be evaluated. Contrary to this, two examoles were found where Elgar identified ceviations or errors in its desigred components and neither perfoired the required evaluation nor inforfred the applicable customers. Viola-tion item 88 01 01 was identified in this area. h 16 -_ A

} l ORGANIZATION: ELGM CORP 0 RATION SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA REFORT INSPECTION n0.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 5 of 11 The first example was discovered during oiscussions with Elgar personnel. Elgar determined that PVNG$'was having a high nutter of silcon controlled rectifier (SCM failures because they were not applying adequate torque when installing SCRs. Without the proper torque applied, the SCR will heat up beyond its normal operating temperature and prenaturely fail. However, further discussion determined that Elgar had omitted the specific SCR torque requirement in its mainteance instructions for the 25 kVA inverters. Consequently, if a licensee replaced an SCR in an inverter, the required teque value may not be applied. For a nomally energized inverter application, the resulting consequences could be a loss of power to important instrument and contrci functions causing an electrical transient which could include a reactor trip. Converi,ely, if a SCR wa$ replaceo on an inverter used for a standby function, a premature SCR failure could cause a total loss of that function during an actual transient when the inverter was energized for erergency Operations. Consequently, since a prenature SCR failure in an inverter perfoming a safe snutdewn function cuuld result in the 10ss of that function, this issue should have been reported to all customer

• The second exanple was discovered during a review op as I

engineeringchangenotices(ECN's). Several ECN' n.~ s siewed which indicated that they were gererated because of a di cor or deviation. Even though the Elgar ECN corrected ths ,ediate problem, notifications were not rade to other customers that they rey iiave 1 equiprNnt which would require modifications nor was a review perfomed by Elgar to determine what other equipment was involved. Examples of the errors /deviationi include the foibwing: a. ECN 6379, oated April 1, 1987, "25 KVA Inverter PAN Analog Logic r Card," tag. 643-102 41. The problem involved a.1 microfarad disccapacitor(partnurber 821-10405) that was replaceo because l "tha leads are weak and broken easily causing custoner corplaints." No Part 21 evaluation was perforved; b. ECN E539, dated December 14, 19E7, "7.5 K"A Inverter Filter Assembly," C%g. 642-211-43. The ECN was issued to correct a occumentation erior in that a "non nuclear" SCR had to te changed to "nuclear-grade" for ei ht assembl/ drawingt. Hcwever, Jven though a large nutter of CRs and circuit boasJs were involved, \\ ( 17 F L

ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION h0. 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 6 of 11 no review was performed to determine if the incorrect SCRs had I been sold for use in nuclear power ' plants prior to the tire l period that the ECN was approvedi c. ECN 1499, December 30, 1980, "25 KVA Inverter Alam logic Board " Dwg. 643 103 42, referenced the need to increase resistor wattage in order to "reduce the stress factor of resistors" in accorcance with IEEC 650, which is the qualification stanotrd fur nuclear inverters. No Part $1 evaluation was performeu d. ECN 4530, dated June 22, 1984, "Static Switch Logic Assembly." Dwg. 549 000 2. Ibidem; I l e. ECN 5589, dated August 30, 1985 "Stat'ic Switch Logic Assembly." Ibidem; snd f. ECN 3530, dated February 14, 1963 "25 KVA Inverter Alarm logic l Board," Dwg. 643 103 42. This TCN was isseed to change the i value ol' a resistor on a printed circuit board in order to effect latching of an al.am function, i.e., ensure that an out-of-tolerance condition remained annunciated. This change was indicated as "mandatory" r* quiring rework of all units in production; however, no determination was documented as to the affect on previously shipped units. The above examples are issues that should have been reported to the end user as a minimum so that the end user could perfom the evalua-tion for substantial safety hazard required by 10 CFR Part 21. 4 0A Pregram istablisment and frplementation in parallel with the inspector's ECN review, the applicable CA manual sections, procedure., and instructions that control Elgar's safety-related design end engineering activities were reviewed. The review identifieri numerous inconsistencies and an overall lack of specificity in the documents that are supposed to provide guidance for the enginee.*ing department's safety related activities. Certain aspects of the regulations were not fully and/or currectly translated into the Elgar program reouirements. Nonconformente item 88 01-02 was identified in this area. As an example, for design changes, Elgar's QAM section 04, "Design," requires, in part, that engineering will maintain drawing and change control as prescribed in CAM Section 07. Section 07 requires in l 18

ORGAN!ZATION; ELGAR CORPORATION SAN O! EGO CALIFORNIA f REPORT INSPECTION 50.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 7 of 11 part, that engineering will assure that "drawing and change controls are maintained in accordance with this procedure." However, the procedure did not provide specific instructions for the engineering personnel. The lower tier documents were'found to be written in the l Sare manner. The. documents were found to not clearly establish what the specific duties and authorities of Elgar's engineering personnel l were. Conversely, the Elgar "Engineering Design Review" procedure, number EEP-20, delineates s" m t w duties for the Design P.eview Board Members However, the duties, p rformed as stated, do not meet the intent of an NRC Appendix B n ;;, CFR Part 50 requirement which states, in i part, that "reasures c%il be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials and parts that are l essentialtothesafety-relatedfunctions(ofasystem)." The section of EEP-20 that was found to be incoasistent with the regulation states, in part "Design Review Bot ' Trbers will...ask questions, probe...to sufficiently satisfy thim i ts that the design i approach is sound...They should be on the lookow;.or over-designed i hsrdware...giving the customer more than he asked for. The members shenld be mindful of prodVct costs. Any process, material, or part { type that appears too expansive should core under investigation to cetermine if a less expensive approach could suf fice." Other Elgar i documents that were found to not clearly establish its engineering duties and responsibilites include: i i Part 5.u. "Cesign " of Section 04 of Elgar's QAM. j Section 17. "QA 9ecords," of Elgar's QAM. t Procedure EEP-1, "Engineering Release and Change." Procesiure EEP-3, "Er.gtreering Change Requests." (e Proc ( %. 5600701,"FlowDia3 ram"(designchanges). I { (f Procedure 6000201,"ChangeNotices*[designchangenotices). (g Procedure 60003-01, "Change Control Board." [ l 5. Desian control j j The NRC inspectors reviewed numerous Elgar engineering design changes (ECNs), drawings, and change requests (ECRs) to evaluate the adequacy of the Elgar design change control in its 25 and 7.5 KVA electrical inverter areas. As a result of the design control review, three major l areas of inadecuate design change control were revealed. Noncon-formance item SS 01 03 was identified in this area. The three areas i are as follows: l l I 19 _ _,... _ - _ _. = _ _ _ _.

T ORGAN 1ZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: ) AGE 8 of 11 a. Lack of Independence In The Preparation, Review and Approval Process for Design Control - A review of 55 ECNs revealed that 12 out of 55 were prepared, reviewed and approved by the same individual. The 12 ECNs are: ECN If04, ECN 1397, ECN 1473 ECN 1493, ECN 1499, ECN 1687, ECN 1796, ECN 1836, ECN 2212 ECN 3800. ECN 5988, and ECN 6216. b. Inadequate Technical Evaluation of The Collective Effect of Multiple ECNs - A review was performed of the majority of. ECN's associated with a particular drawing to verify whether or not an engineering evaluation was periodically performed to assess the cumulative effect of the design changes on the original design function of the system / component. While their individual importance varies for ECNs, even minor design changes, when considereo cumulatively, may significantly change the ability of the equipment to operate within its original design specif t-cations. No objective evidence could be provided to the inspectors that would ir.dicate such a review was performed or that Elgar identi-fied and controlled its design interfaces. Additionally, discussions with the cognizant design engineers revealed that reviewing for the cumulative design change affect was not a typical past or present engineering practice. Examples include the following ECNs: (1) ECN 1680, dated March 10, 1981, 25 XVA Inverter, multiple drawings. This ECN was issued to add integrated circuit (IC) sockets to certain safety-related printed circuit boards. The documentation associated with this change does not include or address the added mass in regard to its seismic integrity, nor does it address the seismic qualifi-cation of the subassembly and inverter panel; (2) ECN 2790, dated May 19, 1982, 25 KVA inverter, multiple drawings. This ECN was issued to negate further implemen-tation of ECN 1680 and to revert back to soldering the ICs to the boards. However, it could not be determined if any boards shipped during the 14 month interval when IC sockets were used have bcen identified to the end users so they may either change out the cards or evaluate the impact on their inverter panel qualification; I 20 f

ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN DIEG0, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: ) AGE 9 of 11 (3) ECN 3252, dated November 19, 1982, Owg. 643-209-42 (INV253-1-101). This ECN was issued to change the existing model GE-364 SCR to SCR model GE-384. However, no docu-mentation was provided to indica'te that an evaluation of the affect of the change on the original circuitry design and function was performed; (4) ECN 4031, dated November 30, 1983, Dwg. 643-209-42 (INV253-1-101). This ECN changed the size of fuse F1 from 200 amperes to 250 amperes. No calculations (or reference to) were documented to indicate that adequate protection of internal components and circuitry would still exist. The design change was not referenced back to the previously shipped inverters (INV253-1-101) even though the ECN indicated "Nandatory" action and "Rework" was required; (5) ECN 4812, dated January 7,1985. Dwg. 643-102-41 (INV253 101). This ECN changed resistor and capacitor values for the Analoc Logic Board. No documented evidence existed to indicate tRat an evaluation was performed to ensure that the original design criteria and functions were within l tolerances; (6) ECN 5988, dated January 30, 1986, Dwg. 549-000-2. This ECN for the Static Switch Logic Assembly required the replacement of circuit board resistors because the SETPOINTS on the overvoltage and undervoltage trip and reset points were too close together. This change was indicated as mandatory for new units and those in production, but did not indicate whether or not an evaluation was performed to assess the impact on the origint.1 design function or the existing cards at any licensee facilities; (7) ECN 5711, dated October 16, 1985, Dwg. 549-000-2. This l ECH for the Static Switch Logic Assembly required the addition of a resistor and a diode to a circuit board to I I correct a problem in which the static switch would not l stay in "Reverse" when manually selected. The ECN stated that the change was not safety-related even though the i referenced drawing is labeled "Nuclear Safety Related;" (8) ECN 2075, dated August 11, 1981. Dwg. 643-101-42. This ECN for the 25 KVA inverter Logic Board changed the 21

ORGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATf0N SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA 0 99900871/88-01 PAGE 10 of 11 resistance values for three resistors. It was not indicated whether or not an evaluation to' assess the impact on the original design or other ECN changes was, performed; (9) ECN 3116, dated September 27, 1982 Dwg. 642-211-43. This ECN for the Filter Assembly of the 7.5 KVA inverter required the addition of a 2.5 K, 25 watt resistor across the primary of the transfomer. No reference to an evaluation of the impact on the original design or other ECN changes was in evidence; and (10) ECN 3726, dated June 1, 1983, Dwg. 642-107-40. This ECN for the Analog Logic Board for the 7.5 KVA inverters reyatred several resistive and capacitive device changes. No reference to an evaluation of the impact on the original design was in evidence, i i Inadequate Objective Evidence of Satisfactory Perfomance of c. 5afety-Related Activities - During the review of the ECRs and ECHs it was obvious that in many cases the design change docu-ments did not contain enough detail to show circuit changes, device location changes and other associated details. The applicable drawing revisions were requested that the specific ECNs were written against. It was then revealed that Elgar had not retained any of the previous revisions to its current drawings that were requested by the inspectors. Therefore, the ECNs and other change documents could not be compared or correlated with the applicable drawing revisions that would show the "Before" condition and following revision, the "After" condition. Without the benefit of all the associated documentation to review, it could not be determined if Elgar adequately perfortned its safety-related design change activities. 6. Quality Assurance Records As discussed in 5.c above, it was revealed that Elgar has not retained previous revisions to several of its 25 and 7.5 KVA inverter drawings, even though its QA manual requires that it retain "obsolete drawing masters." The specific drawings that were requested by the NRC inspectors for their previous revisions are as follows: Drawings 643-209-42, 643-101-42, 643-102-41, 642-107-40, 643-103-42, 642-211-43, 549-000-2, 543-118-1 and 549-000-9. Nonconfonnance item 88-01-03 i was identified in this area. 22

GRGANIZATION: ELGAR CORPORATION SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900871/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 11 of 11 7. Audits Criterion XVIII, "Audits" of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires, in part, that a comprahensive system of planned and periodic audits be carried out to verily compliance with all aspects of the quality assurance program and to determine the effectiveness of its QA program. The audits shall be perfonned by personnel not having direct responsibilities in the areas being audited, and the audit results will be reviewed by she management having responsibility in the audited area. Contrary to the above, the inspectors revealed that the Elgar 1987-1988 audit schedule, revision 1, indicated numerous examples of Qll personnel performing the duties of "auditor" in different QA depart-ment audits. Tne last two QA department audits. "Inspection" (July 1987) and "Incoming Inspection" (September 1987) did not have personnel from any department other than auditors from the QA depart-ment <* the audit team. The ' inspection" audit contained two auditors i.ho were both assigned to Elgar inspection activities. The "Incoming Inspection" audit included one auditor who was assigned to "Receiving" inspection activities. Additionally, on the later audit, the QA manager was the l I designated audit team leader. Nonconformance item 88-01-04 was identified in this area. F. PERSONS CONTACTED:

• T. Erickson
• S.

Reeves

• R. Parrish t
• C. McVicker l
• D. Risdon l

H. McAlpin i S. Sedio

• Attended entrance and exit meeting.

23

ORGAN 12AT10N: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION INSPECTION N0 : 99900735/88-01 DATES: 03/7-11/88 AN RTTr unnoe-5! CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Mr. Thomas Goin, Vice President Quality Assurance Southern Bolt & Fastener Corporation Post Office Box 7196 Shreveport, Louisiana 71137 ORGANIZATIONAL CONTACT: Mr. Walt Oehlkers, QA Coordinator TELEPHONE NUMBER: (318) 221-4251 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ACTIVITY: Supplier of large studs, nuts and fasteners. ASSIGNED INSPECTOR: b d,k / C. M. Abbate, Program'Detelopment and Reactive at InspectionSection(PDRIS) OTHER INSPECTOR (S): C. Czajkowski, Consultant APPROVED B /, 5 j T. paker, Acting Chie~f, PDRIS, Vendor Inspection Branch ate INSPECYION BASES AND SCOPE: A. BASES: ASME BPV Code, Section III, Subsection NCA-3800,10 CFR Part 21. B. SCOPE: This inspection was performed to review Southern Bolt & Fastener's QA program and its implementation. Areas examined during the inspection j included the procurement program, the calibration system, the NDE program, 1 l the heat treating program, upgrading of ASME material, nonconforming item l control and finished product packages. The inspection consisted of obser-l vation of work and review of racnrde-I FLANT SITE APPLICABILITY: Multiple plants. 25

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900735/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 2 of 8 A. VIOLATIONS: There were no violations identified during the inspection. B. NONCONFORMANCES: 1. Contrary to Paragraph NCA-3867.4(e) of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code and Paragraph 1.A. of Section 65.0 of the SBF QA Manual, Revision 0, dated November 13, 1986, material being upgraded for SBF Production Orders 4016 and 4097 lacked the required number of tensile tests needed to meet the ASME BPV Code requirements. The material has been shipped to the purchasers (88-01-01). 2. Contrary to Paragraph NCA-386/.3 of Section III of the ASME BPV Code, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the SBF QA Manual, Revision 0, dated November 13, 1986, and Paragraph 4.5.2 of Section 410.01 of the SBF Procedure Manual, Revision 2, dated January 31, 1985; a. Nc. nonconformance report (NCR) was written for studs, nuts ard bolts which required rework. The rework was performed due to various nicks and dings which were identified during a SBF final /receiptinspection(88-01-02). b. No NCR was written for two measurements of lateral expansion (Charpy Impact test results) for SBF Production Order 421B which did not meet the minimum value specified in Section NB-2333-1 of the ASME BPV Code (88-01-03). c. No NCR was written for material for SBF Production Order 4218 which containeo a high carbon content and was rejected by the purchaser, Hub Inc. (88-01-04). 3. Contrary to Paragraph NCA-3867.3 of Section III of the ASME BPV Code and Paragraphs 3, 6, and 9 of the SBF QA Manual, Revision 0, dated November 13, 1986, NCRs 1345 and 1352, dated August 15, 1987 and August 16, 1987 respectively, could not be located by SBF; a number of NCRs initiated in 1987 have not been closed out; and some NCRs have been signed as closed out, but no disposition was recorded (88-01-05). 4. Contrary to Paragraph NCA-3861(a)(3) of Section III of the ASME BPV Code and Paragraphs 4 and 8 of Section 50.0 of the SBF QA Manual. Revision 0, dated Novemiser 13, 1986 Metallurgical Services was not 26

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900735/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 3 of B listed as evaluated and approved for an NCA-3800 program on the Approved Vendor List (A.V.L.) although it is used by SBF to provide chemical analy.,is of ASME Section III material (88-01-06). 5. Contrary to Paragraph 10 of Section 50.0 of the SBF QA Manual, Revision 0, dated November 13, 1986, four suppliers on the A.V.L. were being evaluated every three years as opposed to the required annual evaluation (88-01-07). C. UNRESOLVED ITEMS: No unresolved items were identified during the inspection. D. STATUS OF,PREVIO'JS INSFECTION FINDINGS: 1. (Closed) Nonconfomance (Item A, 81-01): Contrary to Subsection NF-23G0 of the ASME EPV Code and Section 130.0 at the SciF QA Man 9al, records did not exist to substantiate that calibration had been performed on temperature instruments or the impact test machine. The calibration program in place et SBF was reviewed during the inspection. A sample of ring gages, plug gages, and other test equipment itsed at SBF was examined to verify calibratton at the correct fraquencies and to verify that the calibrations were perfonned t,y qualified calibration venoors. The inspectors also observed the calibration of the Charpy Impact machine. ho noncon. formances were identified in this area and further details can be found in Section 3 of the report. This nonconformance is closed. 2. (0 pen) Nonconfomance (Item B, 81-01): Contrary to Paragraph NCA-3867.4(e) of the ASME BPV Code, Section III and Section 60,0 of the SBF QA Manual, certain materials used in ASME Code Section III applications had been received from unqualified vendors and verification of compliance of these materials with material specifications had not been accomplished in accordance with 1 the provisions of NCA-3867.4(e). j Additional nonconformances were identified during the inspection in these areas, therefore, this nonconformance is closed. This item will be tracked as 88-01-01, i r l l i 27 i l

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION NO.! 99900735/88-01 REKlHTS-DW A M E. OTHER FINDINGS AND COMMENTS: 1. Entrance and Exit Meetings An entrance meeting was conducted on March 7,1988 at the SBF facility in Shreveport, Louisiana. The purpose and scope of the inspection were discussed during this meeting. During the exit meeting, conducted March 11, 1988, the inspection findings and observations were sumarized. 2. Observation of Work Throughout the inspection, the inspectors observed work being performed at SBF. The inspectors observed tensile tests, the calibration of the Charpy Impact machine and r.easurements of the lateral expansion of test specimens (results of impact tests). The inspectors also observed hold tags in use, heat treating being performed and production order packages accompanying material on the shop floor. It was observed that the appropriate revisions of the procedures were present at the work stations and the personnel were knowledgeable of the procedures. The inspectorc also examined the controlled warehouse. This is where stock material which is traceable back to certifications is kept. The inspectors selected four control numbers from items in the warehouse and reviewed the certifications. All four certifica-tions were readily available for review and correctly identified the stock material. 3. Calibration Program The inspectors examined the calibration program in place at SBF. Section 120.0 of the SBF QA Manual and Section 430 of the SBF Proce-dure Manual were reviewed. The inspector selected at random a i number of ring gages, plug gages and go-no-go gages in the controlled test equipment cabinet to ensure proper calibration. All of the selected equipment was marked with a serial number, last date calibrated and calibration due date. The equipment serial number was traceable to the calibration log which listed the same information. Also reviewed were the calibration results received by SBF from the calibration vendors. If a piece of equipment was found to be out of calibration, it was pulled from service and the infcrmation was noted in the log and on the piece of equipment. 28

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900735/88-01 RESULTS: PAGE 5 of 8 The equipme examined was properly calibrated and the records reviewed we., kept in accot danc2 with the QA manual and the procedure. thus closing out Nonconformance Item A in inspection renort No. 81-01. 4. Approved Vendor List (A.V.L.) The A.V.L. was acquired frem SBF personnel to ensure the require-ments of Section 50.0 of the SBF QA Manual and Section 440 of the SBF Procedure Manual were being met. Various production orders were reviewed to identify what suppliers SBF procures material from and if the suppliers are qualified and on the A.V.L. During this review, it was noted that Metallurgical Services had not been evaluated and approved for an NCA-3800 program. Metallurgical Services is used by SBF to perform chemical analysis on Code and non-Code production orders. Also identified during this review was the fact that four vendors who hold Quality System Certificates (QSC) were being evaluated every three years instead of being evaluated annually. The three year evaluation schedule by SBF corresponded to the three year interval of the QSC. Because a QSC can be terminated during the three year period, the suppliers need to be evaluated on a yearly basis. During the NRC inspection, SBF contacted the four suppliers to ensure the QSCs were still in effect. Nonconformances 88-01-06 and 88-01-07 were identified in this area. 5. Review of Production Order Packages Several production order packages were reviewed during the inspec-tion. The review consisted of completed production orders and in-process production orders. The packages includad the purchase order to SBF, purchase orders to suppliers, Certificates of Test, heat treatment reports, NDE reports, NDE personnel qualifications, results of chemical analyses, test data reports, and Certificates of Compliance. Durit.g this review, it was noted that rework had been performed on bolts, studs, and nuts received from Texas Bolt (purchase order 20011) without an NCR written to identify the noncont'ormance. Various nicks and dings were identified on the threads of the finished parts during a SBF final / receipt inspection. The nicks and dings required i rework which would require an NCR to be written. The results of the rework and reinspection were noted on the SBF "Finished Fastener Receiving Inspection Report." .5 29

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORAT80N SHREVEPORT, LOUTSIANA i REPORT INSPECTION l NO.: 99900735/88-01 RESULTD PAGE 6 of 8 l 1 Nonconformance 88-01-04 was identified in this area. During the review of the package for ProdJction Order 4218 (purchase i order T-8027103 from Hub, Inc.), it was noted that the Test Data Sheet (Lab order No. 05302))had two measurements of lateral expansio (Charpy Impact test results which did not meet the minimum value specified in Section NB-2333-1 of the ASME BPV Code. The material was accepted by SBF QA without an NCR being written. The finished parts were shipped to the customer with one of the out of specifica-tion values noted on the Certificate of Test. The other out of specification value was apparently transcribed erroneously onto the Certificate of Test and appeared as an acceptable value. During the i NRC inspection, SBF issued NCR 1525 and required the three test coupons be remeasured for lateral expansion. The NRC inspectors l observed the remeasuring performed as a result of NCR 1525 and these measurements were significantly different from the original measure-ments. The second set of measurements fell within the acceptable values, thus rendering the material acceptable. Because of the large variation in results between the original measurements and the second set of measurements, SBF is conducting a search for previously inspected impact test specimens to perform a reinspection of tnose specimens. This is being done to develop a level of confidence in the data taken by the inspector who measured the first set of values. Nonconformance 88-01-02 was identified in this area. 6. Upgrading of Stock Material for Code Work A total of four packages which contained material upgrades were reviewed. Two of the four packages met the requirements of the ASME BPVCode,SectionNCA-3867.4(e). The two remaining packages failed to meet certain requirements of that section. Production Order 4016 was for 144 manways studs and nuts being manu-factured for Westinghouse under purchase order MN 83129. AISI 4140 material was being upgraded to ASTM-A-193 Grado B7 material. The Code requires that a tensile test be performed on each piece of stock material. For this order there were three pieces of stock used, but only two pieces of stock had tu sile tests performed on them. SBF cannot trace which studs and nuts came from which piece of stuck and therefore plans on notifying the customer that the material was not properly upgraded. 30

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION NO.: 99900735/88-01 RESULTS: PArJ 7 nf A This problem was previously identified during an ASME accreditation survey and SBF was in the process of responding to the ASME survey team's finding. Production Order 4097 was for 32 trunnion bolts being manufactured for Westinghouse under purchase order PE 21815 MSA. This material was being upgraded fium ASTM-A-193. Grade B16 to SA-540 Grade B21. As with Production Order 4016, the code required a tensile test be performed on each piece of stock material. Three pieces of stock material were used for this order while cnly two pieces were tensile tested. The individual bolts cannot be traced to the piece of stock used to manufacture the bolts. At the time of the inspection, SBF stated they plan on notifying the customer of the improper upgrading. Nonconformance 88-01-01 was identified in this area. Nonconformance 88-01-03 was identified in the upgraded material package for Production Order 4218. In this package, material had been upgraded, but contained a carbon content value in excess of that allowed by the chemical specifications. The purchaser, Hub, Inc. (purchase order T-8027103), rejected the material in a letter to SBF, dated November 5, 1987, due to the high carbon content. No NCR was written to identify the disposition of the material. During the NRC inspection, SBF issued NCR 1523 and the NRC inspectors l verified th3t the mater".al was being kept in the controlled ware-house with the prepar certification available for review. I 7. Nonconforming item Control The SBF nonconforming item control program was reviewed. Section 110.0 of the SBF QA Manual and Section 460.01 of the SBF Procedure Manual describe the requirements of the program and were reviewed by the NRC inspectors. NCRs, corrective action reports and the noncon-formance/ corrective action report log were reviewed. During this review, it was noted that a number of NCRs which were initiated in 1987 had not been closed out. Additionally, upon review of several NCRs, it was noted that the former QA Hanager had signed NCRs as being closed out, but no disposition had been indicated on the NCR. Two NCRs, 1345 and 1352, dated August 15, 1987 and August 16, 1987 respectively, were written on nuclear production orders and could not be located by SBF. The nonconformance/ corrective action report log indicated that they had not been closed out, but the material has been shipped to the purchasers. It is not known what type of noncon-formance existed for these two NCRs nor is it known what disposition, 31

ORGANIZATION: SOUTHERN BOLT & FASTENER CORPORATION SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA REPORT INSPECTION l N0 : 99900735/86-01 RESULTS: PAGE 8 of_8 _ if any, was performed. SBF indicated that in effort is being made to correct problems associated with the NCR program. i Nonconformance 88-01-05 was identified in this area. 8. Heat Treatment The inspectors examined SBF's heat treating facilities. The equip-ment was calibrated and the latest revision of the procedures were available at the work station. The SBF personnel were knowledgeable of heat treatment and the procedures. Heat treatment charts which were included in production order packages were also reviewed to ensure the material was kept at the correct temperature for the appropriate amount of tine as specified in the Code. 9. Nondestructive Examination (NDE) The inspectors reviewed the certification for NDE personnel and found them in accordance with SBF's writtca practice, which meets the requirements of SNT-TC-1A. The inspectors also reviewed the certifications of the material used at SBF for magnetic particle testing and liquid penetrant testing. This was done to ensure that contaminants were not present in the material. NDE test reports were reviewed in addition to inspecting the facilities used for NDE. Based on the review, the NDE program is being performed in accordance with the SBF QA Manual and the accompanying SBF procedures. 10. Internal Audits The inspectors reviewed the SBF internal audits for 1986 and 1907. Both audits were performed with checklists and in accordance with Section 250.0 of the QA Manual and Section 450 of the SBF Procedure Manual. Corrective action was taken for daficient areas identified during the audits and follow-up was performed. F. PERSONS CONTACTED: Thomas A. Goin, Vice President, Quality Assurance Peter Lillys Vice President, Technology E. W. Nelson, President Walter G. Oehlkers, Quality Assurance Coordinator R. Pettway, Forge Foreman G. Sepulvado, Chief Inspector J. Williams, Warehouse Foreman A, J. Wilsor;, Supt. Heat Treating 32

1 _ = - ii r I t l I I I i t I t 4 SELECTED INFORMATION N?TICES i i i I k l t t I l I b I l L t i I i i l P t

s UN'TED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COP 941SS10N OFFICF 0F NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 24, 1988 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-44: MECHANICAL BINDINfi 0F SPRING RELEASE DEV!CE IN WESTINGHOUSE TYPE 05-416 CIRCUIT BREAVERS 8 Addressees: All holders of operating licenses or construction pennits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose:

This infomation notice is being providd to alert addressees to potential problems resulting from the mechanical bi.' ding of the spring release device (SRD) in Westinghouse type D5-416 metal clad circuit breakers. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facili-ties and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this infomation notice do not constitute NRC require-ments; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. b Description of Circumstances: L On May 25, 1988, the South Texas Project Unit 1 (STP-1 or licensee) performed a loss of-offsite power test. During this test, two Class 1E electrical circuit breakers failed to reclose as required during load sequencing. Subsecuent in-vestigation by the licensee identified the faile'd breakers as Westinghouse type 05-416 metal clad breakers. These DS-416 electrical breakers are located in main 480-Vac load centers and are tie and feeder breakers for 480-Vac components. The breaker has an SRD that initiates the sequence for the breaker closing. The SRO is attached to the breaker housing and is comprised of a coil housing tnat is attached to the breaker casing, a closing coil, and a lever that is attached to the coil housing. The lever travels up and down through a window (a punched out opening) in the breaker casing. Vhen the breaker is signaled i to close, the coil is energized and the lever is designed to move up and make contact with the spring release latch that mechanically releases the breaker closing springs. These SR0s also are used in Westinghouse t.vpe 05-420 and i 05-2C6 circuit breakers, l i Discussion: l l The licensee's preliminary investigation indicates that the breakers failed to reclose because the closing coils had everheated and bur".ed out. The licensee I 8806210028 1 33 \\

l IN'8A-44 i June 74, 1988 f Page ? of 2 { l l believes that the coils burned out as a result of mechanical birding between the lever and the edge of the breaker casing.. indow. The licensee physically inspected and electrically tested 28 other 05-416 hreakers installed in Unit 1 and 18 breakers installed in Unit 2 as of June 16, 1988, and identified 10 ad-ditional cases where the lever and the edge of the breaker casing window were making contact. i Although the root cause of the binding has nnt been determined, the licensee l has taken several steps to alleviate the problem. The licensee has replaced t the SRD in the STP-1 breakers that indicated signs of possible binding and has i verified that the clearances between the lever and the casing are sufficient j to preclude further binding. In addition, the licensee has extensively briefed l the STP control room personrel on this binding problem. It shnuld be noted 4 that although the SRD may biod, it is still possible to manually trip the i breaker closing springs by pushing the "CLOSE" button located at the circuit l breaker. 4 1 The licensee has contacted Westinghouse for assistance in detemining the root cause of the binding. The NRC will remain cognizant of any new developments i and await the results.rf the South Texas and Westinghouse investigation. The NRC will issue a further generic comunication if warranted by the availability l of additional infonnation or if additional regulatory action is deemed necessary. t No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. I i 4T fvu have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office. t t i fh4fhm Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i l l Technical Contacts: Kanal Naidu, NRR [ t (301) 492-0980 i i l Jaime Guillen, NRR { (301) 492-1170 l l l

Attachment:

List of Recently issued NRC Information Notices l 4 I i i I i i l 1 4 i j 34 <4. .. ~. .. _ ~ _ _ _ _ t

Attechment IN 88-44 June 24, 1988 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Natice No. Subject issuance Issued to 88-43 Solenoid Valve Prob

• ens 6/23/88 All holders of OLs or cps for nuclear power reactors.

88-42 Circuit Breaker Failures 6/23/88 All holders of OLs Due to Loose Charging or cps for nuclear Spring Motor Mounting Bolts power reactors. F8-41 Physical Protection 6/2?/88 All holders of OLs L'eaknesses identified or cps for nuclear Through Regulatory Ef-power reactors, fectiveness Reviews (RERs) 88-40 Examiners' Handbook for 6/22/88 All holders of Ols Developing Operator or cps for nuclear i Licensing Examinations power reactors. 88-39 LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of 6/15/88 All holders of OLs Recirculation Pumps With or cps for BWRs. Power Oscillation Event 88-38 Failure of Undervoltage 6/15/88 All holders of OLs Trip Attachment on General or cps for nuclear Electric Circuit Breakers power reactors. 88-37 Flow Blockage of Cooling 6/14/88 All holders of OLs Water to Safety System or cps for nuclear Components power reactors. 88-36 Possible Sudden t.oss of RCS 6/8/88 All holders of Ols Inventory During Low Coolant or cps for PWRs. level Operation 88-35 Inadequate Licensee Performed 6/3/88 All holders of OLs Vender Audits or cps for nuclear power reactors. 88-34 Nuclear Material Control 5/31/88 All holders of OLs and Accountability of or cps for nuclear Non. Fuel,Special huelear power reactors. i tieterial at Power Reactors OL = therating License CP = ',onstruction Perrit i 35 4

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION l WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 July 8, 1988 I NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-46: LICENSEE REPORT OF DEFECTIVE REFURBISHED j CIRCUIT BREAVERS i Addressees: All holders of operating licensas or construction perm!*s for nuclear power reactors. I

Purpose:

This in5 rmation notice is being provided to alert addressees of licensee reported information that defective refarbished electrical equipment, such as circuit breakers (CBs), may have been supplied to nuclear power plants. It is expected that recip;ents will review this information for applicability

t. their faciliti's and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances: Pacific Gas 3rd Electric (ompany (PG&E) has informod NRC that it placed a purchase order for 30 new, non-sifety-related, molded-case, KHL 36125-type CBs manufactured by the Square D Company (Square D) with a local electrical distributor. These CBs were intended for use in non-safety-related applica-tions at PG&E's Diablo Canyor. Nuclear Power Plant. According to PG&E, the distributor in turn placed the order with a local sup-plier who bid the lowest price and promised the quickest delivery. The CBs were delivered directly to the Diablo Canyon plant by the supplier; the dis-tributor did not have an opportunity to inspect the CBs. Square D, aware of the purchase order, questioned its failure to receive an order for the unique i vintage KHL 36125-type CBs. With PG&E's permission, Square D inspected the i CBs and determined that PG&E had been given refurbished, rather than r.ew, CBs. l Square D tested and perfortned detailed examinations of the CBs and the results reported by PGtE follow. 2 L ] A. Physical Examina tion ) The yellow side labels used on the CBs were suspect in that the CB mode' numbers were typed on the labeld whereas authentic labels are preprinted. l The CBs departed from normal appearance in other respects as well. l 8807080006 1 1 1 36

IN 88-46 July 8, 1988 Page 2 of 3 The individual CB cases and each of the CB components appeared to be Square D products; however, the individual CBs incorporated components of diffe. tnt years of manufacture. Each CB bore evidence of having been opened and reassembled. B. Electric Testing Square D subjected the CBs to five electrical tests. None of the CBs complied with Square D or Underwriters' Laboratory (UL) specifications for all of the tests, and several of the CBs were out of tolerance on l each of the tests. At least four of the CBs failed to trip under circum-stances in which they are designed to trip. Discussion: In the past, there have been instances in which licensees purchased corrnercial-grade components, such as CBs, relays, trip units, and other electrical compo-nents, from electrical distributors and have received components that did not meet the original purchase order requirements. NP.C has received additional information indicating that the problem of surplus or defective refurbished CBs may also apply to CBs sold under other manufacturers' names (e.g., General Electric, Westinghouse, ITE, Cutler Haniner, and Sylvania). The electrical suppliers involved in refurbishing and sales of circuit breakers, including the Diablo Canym, Square D circuit breakers, apparently include five California corporations. These companies are (1) General Circuit Breaker & Electric Supply, Inc., (2) HLC Electric Supply Co., Inc., (3) Pencon Inter-national, Inc., doing business as General Magnetics / Electric Wholesale, (4) California Breakers, Inc., and (5) Anti-Theft Systems, Inc., doing business as ATS Circuit Breakers and as AC Circuit Breaker-Electrical Supply. NRC has an investigation and vendor inspection in progress at the above compa-nies. On the basis of the information developed to date, a preliminary list of customers of the five companies including a list of nuclear utilities (where available) is provided in Attachment 1. contains a list of original j equipment manufacturers whose names may have been used on surplus or refurbished equipment sold as new equipment. The inforn.ation included in Attachments 1 and 2 is only prelininary and is provided to assist licensees in reviewing the potential of having procured suspect electrical equipment at their facilities. Licensees are reminded of the requirements to ensure that procured items meet the relevant specificctions and codes and are suitable for the intended appli-cation. Licensees shou'd consider, as a matter of prudence, the need to inquire of and to verify dith their authorized distributors the sources of procured t materials, equipment, and components. Licensees may meet these requirements by effectively implementing their quality assurance (QA.) programs, particularly t in the areas of vendor evaluations, vendor surveillances, receipt inspection, bench tests, and post-installation tests. l i 37

'N 88-46 July 8,' 1988 Dage 3 of 3 l NRC is gathering additional infonnation to detennine what further actions are necessa ry. The primary purpose of this information notice is to alert addressees l of the situation as soon as possible. The NRC is considering issuing a bulletin l to followup on this information notice when the NRC has sufficient information j to define requirements. No specific action or written response is required by this infonnation notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact one of the techni-cal contacts listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate; regional office. nh b l Charfes E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ( 1 Technical Contacts: K. R. Naidu, NRR i (301) 492-0980 Jaime Guillen NRR (301) 492-1170 f Attachments: 1. Preliminary List of Customers (Intermediata Suppliers) of Suspect Electrical Equipment ?. Preliminary List of Original Equipment Manufacturers Vhose Names May Have Been Used on Surplus or Refurbished Equiornent Sold as New Equipment 3. List of Recently Issued NRC Infonnation Notices j l l l a i I l i j l 38 IN 88-46 i July 8, 1988 Page 1 of P l PRELIMINARY LIST OF CUSTOMERS (INTERMEDIATE SUPPLIERS) 0F SUSPECT ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Organization Lc.ation Nuclear Utility (if available) ~~ Westics.Jur-fWetric St. Louis, MO Boston, MA; Supply Co. iWFSCO' noise, 13; Atlanta, GA; Charleston, SC; Panama, Ft; Sants f.lara, CA; Fresno, CA; Sacramento, CA; Shreveport, LA; Gnon Bay, WI; Elk Creek, IL; Albuquerque, NM; Mobile, AL; Ft. Worth, TX; Baton Rouge, LA; i Birmingham, AL; East Hartford, CT; Kokomo, IN; Jackson, MS; Milwaukee, WI; Beaumont, TX; i Nashville, TN; Skelton, WV; Albany, NY; Hartford, CT; Portland, ME; St. Paul, MN; Minneapolis, MN; other locations Power Conversion Huntington Beach, CA Rockwell International Los Angeles, CA Arkansas Power and Light Little Rock, AR ANO Southern California San Clemente, CA; SONGS Edison other locations Phoenix Electric Phoenix, AZ l 1 4 Rensenhouse Electric Topeka, KS Breaker and Control Houston, TX l General Electric Ceepany Baltimore, MD; Houston, TX; l Landover, MD; Chantilly, VA; Emeryville, CA; Elmhust, IL i Southern Electric Alexandria LA l Supply Cornpany 1 Cleveland Electric Company t t 39 i

IN 88-46 July 8, 1988 Page 2 of 2 PRELIMINARY LIST OF CUSTOMERS (INTERMEDIATE SUPPLIERS) 0F SUSPECT ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT i Organization Location Nuclear Utilit (if available Stokley Enterprises Norfolk, VA Taylor Electric Company Portland, OR Graybar Ventura, CA; Atlanta, GA i I Hughes Aircraft El Segundo CA Houston Electric Houston, TX Distribution Company ITE Electrical Products Atlanta, GA:. Knoxville, TN Knudson Corporation Los Angeles, CA t Georgia Power Company Milledgeville, GA i i t 4 i i i 1 i t l l l l 40

IN 88-46 l July 8, 1988 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED l NRC INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of i Notice No. Subject Issvance issued to 88-45 Problems In Protective 7/7/88 All holders of OLs Relay and Circuit or cps for nuclear i Breaker Coordination pcwer reactors. t 88-44 Mechanical Binding of 6/24/88 All holders of OLs Spring Release Device or cps for nuclear 4 in Westinghouse Type power reactors. D5-416 Circuit Breakers 88-43 Solenoid Yalve Problems 6/23/88 All holders of OLs or cps for nuclear power reactors. 88-42 Circuit Breaker Failures 6/23/88 All holders of OLs l Due to loose Charging or cps for nuclear Spring Motor Founting Bolts power reactors. I 88-41 Physical Protection 6/22/88 All holders of OLs Weaknesses Identified or cps for nuclear Through Regulatory Ef-power reactors. fectiveness Reviews (RERs1 j 88-40 Examiners' Handbook for 6/22/88 All holders of OLs Developing Operator or cps for nuclear Licensing Examinations power reactors, 88-39 LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of 6/15/88 All holders of OLs l Recirculation Pumps With or cps for BWRs. i Power Oscillation Event 88-38 Failure of Undervoltage 6/15/88 All holders of OLs Trip Attachment on General or cps for nuclear Electric Circuit Breakers power reactors. j i 88-37 Flow Blocksge of Cooling 6/14/88 All holders of OLs Water to Safety System or cps for nuclear Components power reactors. 88-36 Possible Sudden loss of RCS 6/8/88 All holders of Ols Inventory During Low Coolant or cps for PWRs. Level Operation r [ OL = Operatir9 License CP = Construction Pemit i i 1

IN 88-46 July 8, 1988 Page 2 of 2 PRELININARY LIST OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS WHOSE NAMES MAY HAVE BEEN USED ON SURPLUS OR REFURBISHED EQUIPMENT SOLD AS NEW EQUIPMENT 1 Manufacturer Model Number Equipment Description l Westinghouse 225N Navy trip units ITE EF-38100 100-amp circuit breaker General Electric AK 2-75-3 Circuit breaker General Electric AK-2 Circuit breaker General Electric AK-1-50 Circuit breaker General Electric AK-1-75 Circuit breaker General Electric B; TDQ; TFJ Circuit breakers General Electric TCVVFS Circuit breaker ITE ET; XA Circuit breakers Cutler Hammer Circuit breakers Zinsco/Sylvania Circuit breakers Bryant Circuit breakers Murry Circuit breakers Federal Pacific Electric Circuit breakers Company 42

IN 88-46 July 8, 1988 Page 1 of 2 PRELIMINARY LIST OF ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS WHOSE NAMES MAY HAVE BEEN USED ON SURPLUS OR REFURBISHED EOUIPMENT SOLD AS NEW EQUIPMENT Manufacturer Model Number Equipment Description Square D B19.5; B22 Heater for overload relay General Electric 12HGA11SS2 Auxiliary relay Exide Company NX400 Spectro Inc. V00014 Mercury lamps Bussman Company REN15 15-amp 250-V fuse Bussman Company N05-30 30-amp 600-V fuse (unknown) FSN 5925-628-0641 Circuit breaker Westinghouse DB-50 Trip unit Weetinghouse 0B-25 400-amp circuit breaker Westinghouse HXB3150T Trip unit Westinghouse KB3250F Frame Westinghouse FB3020 Circuit breaker 1 Westinghouse FB3070 Circuit breaker e Westinghouse FB3050 Circuit breaker ] Westinghouse EHB3040 Circuit breaker Westinghouse EHB3025 Circuit breaker i Westinghouse LBB3125 Circuit breaker 1 Westinghouse HKA31250 Trip unit Westinghouse JA3200 Circuit breaker Westinghouse EMB2100 Circuit breaker Westinghouse CAH3200 Circuit breaker l t 43

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0m1SS10N OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACT 00. REGULATION July 12, 1988 l NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 88-48: LICENSEE REPORT OF DEFECTIVE REFURBISHED ( VALVES j l Addressees: { All holders of operating licenses or construction pemits for nuclear power

reactors, t

Purpose:

inis infomation notice is being provided to alert licensees to potential problems with refurbished valves. It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability to their facilities and consider action, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, sugoestions contained in this infomation notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific { action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: 4 in April 1988. Pacific Gas and Electric (PGAE) informed the NRC about a poten. l tial problem concerning Vogt 2-inch valves (Vogt Figure No. SW !?lli), which 1 were leaking steam at the bonnet and packing. According to PGlE, the valves 1 were purchased from a local supply company in May 1986 and installed in non-safety-related applications. Although the supply company is now out of business, additional infomation was obtained by PGLE that indicated that the valves, although supplied as new, were actually shipped from CMA international of Vancouver, Washington, a valve salvage supply house. Henry Vogt Company i j examined the valves at the Diablo Canyon plant end deterinined that it had not manufactured the valves. The valves at Diablo Canyon had square flanges, and all Vogt-nanufactured valves have round flanges. Discussion: 1 i NRC again stresses the importance of the licensee's role in ensuring that J procurement activities for both safety-related and non-safety-related cori-I ponents and materials are given attention comensurate with their importance. Had an adequate review of the source of the valves been performed, this problem would have been identified and salvage valves would not have been installed. 1 On the basir of discussions with Vec,t representatives 4 th v valves would not 1 be appropriate as replacement valvet in safety-related appfications. These valves are full-port design; that is, the valve port is the same size as the t 88071?0291 l 44 l [

IN 88-4R July I?, 1988 Page ? of ? inside diameter of the pipe. Vogt valves designed and sn'.d for safety-related use are standard-port design; that is, the valve port is slightly smaller than the inside diameter of the pipe. Vogt representatives were not aware of any full-port design valves sold for safety-related applications to nuclear power plants. No specific action or written response is required by this informatien iiotice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contict listed below or the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional offica. (Y%k b-Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessnwnt Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical

Contact:

Edward T. Baker, NRR (301) 492-3221

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices l l i l 45

Attachment ) IN 88-48 July 12, 1988 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NPC INFORMATION NOTICES Infomation Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance issued to 88-47 Slower-Than-Exp!cted 7/14/88 All holders of OLs Red-Orop Times or cps for PWRs. 88-46 Licensee Peport of 7/8/88 All holders of Ots Defective Refurbished or cps for nuclear ) Circuit Breakers power reactors. 4 88-45 Problems in Protective 7/7/88 All holders of Ols Relay and Circuit or cps for nuclear Breaker Coordination power reactors. i 88-44 Mechanical Binding of 6/24/88 All holders of OLs Spring Release Device or cps for nuclear in Westinghouse type power reactors. 05-416 Circuit treakers 88-43 Solenoid Valve Problems f./23/88 All holders of OLs or cps for nuclear power reactors. 80-42 Circuit Breaker Failures 6/23/88 All holders of OLs ,t Due to Loose Charging or cps for nuclear Spring Motor Mounting Solts power reactors. 88-41 Physical Protection 6/27./88 All holders of OLs r Weaknesses identified or cps for nuclear Through Regulatory Ef-power reactors. fectivenessReviews(RERs) 88 40 Exaniners' Handbook for 6/2?/88 All holders of OLs Developing Operator or cps for nuclear [ Licensing Examinations power reactors. l B8-39 LaSalle Unit 2 Loss of 6/15/88 All holders of Ols l Recirculation Pumps With or cps for BWRs. Power Oscillation Event 88 38 Failure of Undervoltage 6/15/88 All holders of OLs Trip Attachment on General or cps for nuclear Electric Circuit Breakers power reactors. l n OL = Operating License CP = Construction Pemit l 46

INDEX FACILITY REPORT NUMBER PAGE Crucible Materials Corp. East Troy, Wisconsin 99902008/88-01 1 Elgar Corp. San Diego, California 99900871/88-01 13 Southern Bolt & Fasteners Corp. Sherveport, Louisiana 99900735/88-01 25 47

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