ML20154D226
| ML20154D226 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/12/1985 |
| From: | Stello V Committee To Review Generic Requirements |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8603050550 | |
| Download: ML20154D226 (17) | |
Text
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/pm as% o UNITED STATES E
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION p
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 s.,*****/
NOV 121985 MEMORANDUM FOR:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Victor Stello, Jr., Chairman Comittee to Review Generic Requirements
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NUMBER 82 The Comittee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) met on Wednesday, October 23, 1985 from 1:00-5:00 p.m.
A list of attendees for this meetingisenclosed(Enclosure 1).
1.
R. Burnett (NMSS)~ presented for CRGR review the proposed final " Insider l
Safeguards Rules. sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
I 2.
E. Rossi (IE) presented for CRGR review the proposed IE Bulletin l
entitled Motor-0perated Valve Comon Mode Failures During Plant 1
Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings. sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
3.
E. rodolak (IE) presented for CRGR review responses to CRGR comments l
concerning the proposed Comission paper regarding Offsite Medical l
Services. sumarizes this matter (Category 2 item).
Enclosures 2, 3, and 4 contain predecisional infonnation and therefore will not be released to the Public Document Room until the NRC has considered (in a public forum) or decided the matters addressed by the information.
In accordance with the ED0's July 18, 1983 directive concerning " Feedback and l
Closure on CRGR Reviews," items 1, 2 and 3 above require written responses from l
cognizant offices to report agreement or disagreement with CRGR recomendations I
in these minutes. The responses, which are required within 5 working days after l
receipt of these meeting minutes, are to be forwarded to the CRGR Chaiman and l
if there is disagreement with the CRGR recomendations, to the EDO for decision-i making.
Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Walt Schwink (492-8639).
,g
- s,.
victor Stello, Jr., Chainnan Comittee to Review Generic Requirements
Enclosures:
As Stated dO cc:
See next page 30g g
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nttTING002
NOV 121985 cc: Comission (5)
SECY Office Directors Regional Administrators CRGR Members G. Cunningham R. Burnett E. Rossi D. Matthews l
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. to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 82 CRGR Review of the Proposed Final Version of the " Insider Rules" R. Burnett and G. McCorkle (NM.SS) presented for CRGR review, the proposed final l
version of the " Insider Safegu3rds R & s."
The attachment (briefing slides) l was given to the CRGR during the meeting.
1
(
The staff proposal is for rulemaking in three areas (rules) to provide increased assurance that nuclear power plants (NPPs) are adequately protected against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety.
In addition to the rulemaking, the proposal acknowledges and discusses an industry (NUMARC) proposed alternative to the staff preferred rule concerning access authorization. Guidance (a Regulatory Guide) for the performance oriented rules is under development. The " Insider Rules" concern the following three areas:
i 1.
Access Authorization Program requirements (final rule):
Establish uniform minimum criteria for granting individuals unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas at NPPs. The emphasis is on trustworthiness of persons having access to NPP controlled areas.
l 2.
Search Requirements (final rule):
Clarify requirements for searches of i
individuals entering NPP controlled areas. The emphasis is on deference and detection of those persons who might attempt a malevolent act to I
l degrade NPP safety by the introduction of firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices.
3.
Miscellaneous Amendments (final rule):
Provide a more operational safety-conscious safeguards (NPP protection) system while maintaining adequate levels of protection against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety. The emphasis is on balancing NPP protection and operational safety considerations to optimize net NPP safety.
The rule concerning access authorization requires that NPP licensees conduct a l
background investigation, psychological assessment, and a continual behavioral
{
observation program for persons who need unescorted access to protected areas and vital areas of a NPP.
(" Protected areas" are areas that have controlled act. ass and are enclosed by physical barriers such as fences or walls.
" Vital areas" are areas containing equipment or systems whose d3 gradation / failure i
could endanger NPP safety.) The background investigation inquires into a person's employment, credit, educational, military, character, and criminal history for the past 5 years. The psychological assessment consists of written personality tests and clinical interviews for persons whose personality tests were invalid or indicate abnormal personality traits.
(The clinical interviews must be conducted by qualified and, if applicable, state-licensed psychologists or psychiatrists.) Continual behavioral observation is to detect changes in behavior that could threaten NPP safety. Any person who is employed at a NPP on the effective date of the rule concerning access authorization and who has
been screened in accordance with an industry standard will not be required to have a background investigation or psychological assessment. However, the person will be subject to behavioral observation requirements. Licensees are required to submit for Comission approval an access authorization plan describing how they will meet the new regulations.
The rule concerning search, clarifies requirements for searches of individuals seeking entry to protected areas at a NPP. The rule requires equipment search (for contraband - explosives and firearms) of all individuals seeking protected area access, except on-duty police officers. This differs from the NRC existing search requirement by allowing visitors to be subject to equipment search rather than " pat-down" search. However, " pat-down" searches will be required of all personnel when detection equipment fails or any person is suspected of carrying contraband.
The miscellaneous amendments concern:
1.
Refinement of NRC existing requirements for access to vital areas to ensure adequate access for operational safety purposes as well as necessary physical security protection.
For example, the amendments to NRC existing requirements for vital area access controls during emergency conditions include a requirement that licensees periodically review NPP physical protection and contingency plans to ensure that they do not conflict with safe operation of the NPP bothduring normal and other than normal operations. The amendments also allows licensees to suspend safeguards (protection) measures if necessary to facilitate responses to a NPP emergency condition.
2.
Protection of specified physical security equipment that could impact significantly the protection of the plant if such equipment were degraded or inoperative.
3.
A requirement that keys, locks and combinations be changed or rotated once each year and whenever a person's access authorization is revoked for cause or compromise of the locks is suspected. This relaxes NRC existing requirements which require such change when any employee with access to a key, lock or combination changes employment.
The CRGR reviewed an earlier version of the proposed " Insider Rules" at CRGR Meeting NO. 40 (June 1, 1983). As reported in the meeting minutes, the CRGR supported the purpose of the proposed " Insider Rules" and recommended that the proposal go forward after CRGR comments were addressed. A significant CRGR recomendation concerned including in the proposed " Insider Rules," a clearance program. After CRGR recomendations were addressed, the then current version of the proposed " Insider Rules" was considered and approved by the EDO and then the Comission for public comment. Execot for elimination of the clearance program from the proposal, the Comission decided to publish the proposed
" Insider Rules" for public comment after relatively minor modification. The current final version of the " Insider Rules" reflects changes made as a result of public and staff coments. The changes concern:
1.
Elimination of the Vital Island concept / requirements from the rules, and
2.
Acknowledgement and discussion of the industry (NUMARC) proposed alternative to the access authorization program requirement in the staff preferred " Insider Rules."
The staff anticipates the following benefits from implementation and compliance with the " Insider Rules":
1.
Improved human trustworthiness to reduce the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety; i
2.
Reduced (if not eliminated) conflict (balancing of competing risks) between NPP operation and NPP protection during both normal and other than nomal NPP operation; and 3.
Reduced burden associated with adequately safeguarding (protecting) a NPP.
The benefits along with the rulemaking need/ background are discussed in the staff's proposal. The nature of the discussion is deterministic rather than probabilistic since the malevolent insider threat is not amenable to quantitative risk analysis due to the unpredictability of a malevolent insider's intent, ability, means, opportunity and target system (s)/equ1pment which may perform preventive or mitigative functions.
Improved human reliability (trustworthiness) is the focus of the " Insider Rules." The staff believes that the increased emphasis on human reliability (trustworthiness) rather than access restrictions will result in substantial additional protection against the insider threat to NPP safety.
Experience ii dicates that while access restrictions do not eliminate " insider" malevolent acts, they do conflict with normal and other than normal plant operations to the extent that NPP and personnel safety could be adversely affected.
In this regard, overall NPP and personnel safety could be improved with more emphasis on human reliability (trustworthiness) rather than on access restrictions.
The most important benefit expected by the staff from implementation and continuing compliance with the " Insider Rules" is associated with the access authorization rule which requires that NPP licensees establish an access authorization program. The staff believes that such a program will materially assist in assuring that a satisfactory, uniform approach meeting minimum criteria will be applied in detemining an individual's eligibility for unescorted access to NPP protected and vital areas. The rule increases the ability of licensees, within the framework of NRC's regulations, to detect an individual at a NPP whose current behavior, behavioral history or emotional makeup could be a precursor to the commission of acts detrimental to NPP safety and, potentially to public health and safety. The program would permit reciprocity in granting an access authorization to a contractor, manufacturer, or vendor br.ied upon screening conducted by another licensee, and provides a method of a commodating temporary workers during major outages for refueling.
Each element of the proposed program (background investigation, psychological assessment and continual observation) is intended to provide increased assurance of trustworthiness. The background investigation elements and their associated benefits are:
, _A
1.
True identity - Assures that the individual seeking unescorted access is not assuming the identity of another.
2.
Employment history - Verifies the individual's claimed experience and qualifications and identifies possible past behavioral actions which might be predictive of future actions that could be detrimental to NPP safety.
3.
Educational history - Verifies the individual's training, credentials, and true identity.
4.
Credit history - Establishes financial responsibility and relates to the possibility that the individual may be subject to coercion, influence, or pressure to act in a manner contrary to NPP safety.
5.
Criminal history - Determines if the individual:
a.
Has been involved in any malevolent act; b.
Has been convicted of any felony or a series of lesser offenses indicating a pattern of criminal behavior; or c.
Is a habitual abuser of a controlled substance or alcohol.
Both the psychological tests and clinical interview are for the purpose of detecting behavior attributes which indicate a high potential for comitting acts detrimental to NPP safety or, personality attributes which, when combined with the expected work environment, could develop into a potential for comitting acts detrimental to NPP safety. The continual observation program is to detect changes in an individual's behavior or emotional condition which might be precursors to the commission of acts detrimental to NPP safety. The program requires that individuals exhibiting such behavioral changes be referred to the person responsible for adminisi; ration of the licensee's access authorization program. This person would determine if further referral of the individual to competent medical authorities and/or suspension or revocation of the individual's access authorization is appropriate. The rule provides a licensee with a previously unavailable Opportunity to provide unescorted access to unscreened temporary workers under certain plant conditions, waives the background investigation and psychological assessment requirements for persons employed prior to the effective date of the rule, and provides for licensee acceptance of an access authorization granted under an approved plan by another NPP licensee.
It should be noted that much of the NPP industry currently i
utilizes such a three component program in varying degrees. Furthermore, I
background investigations have long been recognized as a valid screening tool in both civil and government sectors. Psychological assessment and behavioral observation programs have been used extensively as adjuncts to background
)
investigations in screening out individuals showing tendencies toward aberrant behavior. As an example, psychological assessment tests have long been in use by the FAA in identification of individuals unsuitable for high stress positions such as air traffic controllers. The utility of psychological assessment has withstood scrutiny by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. The increased assurance (against malevolent insider acts) derived from these
. programs is considered by the staff to far outweigh the regulatory burden imposed by this action. The need for rulemaking has been confirmed by both the General Accounting Office and Congressional Committee; the NRC has committed to both parties that progress in this area is forthcoming.
In this regard, in 1977, the Commission directed the staff to undertake rulemaking to address this matter.
The cost for NRC/ industry to implement and have continuing compliance with the
" Insider Rules" is estimated by the staff to be as follows:
" Insider Rules" Implementation Compliance Total NRC
$822.7K
$ 0
$822.7K Industry
$18M
$13dM
$152M The average site cost (assuming 76 sites) is estimated to be about $2 million.
The staff noted that most of the cost is attributable to implementation and continuing compliance with the access authorization program rule.
The CRGR agreed with the staff's conclusion that the proposed final version of the " Insider Rules" will contribute to resolution of the malevolent " Insider Threat" to NPP safety in a manner that promises easier, more efficient and safer NPP operation. 1he Committee recommended that the following modifications be made to the proposal:
1.
In the context of the NRC's recently enacted backfit rule, the proposal should include a thorough discussion of how implementation of the " Insider Rules" at a cost of roughly $2 million/ plant ($152 million backfit) will provide substantial increased protection of NPPs against the malevolent insider threat to NPP safety.
2.
The proposal should include a legal discussion of whether or not there is a need and precedent for an appeal process concerning denial of access to NPP protected and vital areas. The discussion should address past, current and proposed appeal process practices and requirements in the context of both the industry and staff proposed access authorization programs. This matter should be highlighted for the Commission.
3.
The proposal discussion of whether the industry supports the staff preferred access authorization program rule or an alternative industry access authorization program without a rule needs clarification.
Specifically, it was not clear who was speaking for the industry. The staff should attempt to clarify this matter and appropriately modify the discussion.
If the matter cannot be resolved, it should be highlighted for the Commission.
4 The proposal should both highlight and discuss thoroughly the OMB view
"...that the psychological assessment and behavioral observation aspects
6-of this proposed system do not meet criteria for approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act."
(Extracted from OMB letter dated September 27, 1984, Goad to ?!orry.) The word system refers to the access authorization rule requirements concerning psychological assessment and behavioral observation. The OMB letter enclosed U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (OHHS) letters which include comments that do not endorse the.
proposed psychological assessment and behavioral observation aspects of the " Insider Rules."
The CRGR recommends that the proposed final version of the "Ir.',ider Rules" be approved after the aforementioned recommendations have been r.fdressed.
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i o ACESS ALITHORIZATION ( 3 CorumENTS)
I o PAT-l)0WN SEARCH ISSUE j
o 111SCELLANEOUS APEf0MENTS (VA ACESS, KEY. APO LOCK CONTROL, ETC.)
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I PUBLIC_COMMEi!T i
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180 DAY PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD - 142 COMMENTERS
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O CHARACTERIZATION OF COMMENTS
- MOST PERTAINED TO ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM -
l REVISIONS CLARIFYING IN NATURE i.
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- SEARCH RULE - NO CHANGE
- MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS - VITAL ISLAND CONCEPT DELETED e
4 1
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HAJOR COMMENTS ON ACCESS AUTHORIZATION RULE O
PHOTO IDENTIFICATION FOR AUTHORIZATION IRANSFER (Dr* M n1 rs M )
W 0
APPEAL PROCEDURES (**M "idrenM)
O BACKGROUND INV'ESTIGATIONS
- EDUCATIONAL / EMPLOYMENT DATA -- INTERVIEW H CORRESPONDENCE
- ASSURANCE ya OBJECTIVE Y"
0 6RANDFATHERING - SCREENING UNDER INDUSTRY STANDARD 0
NON-LICENSEE EMPLOYEES:
CONTRACTOR / SUPPLIER PROGRAMS AND AUDITS O
BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
- INDUSTRY STANDARD
- ONE E IWO TESTS -- CLINICAL INTERVIEWS 0
TEMPORARY WORKER ACCESS DURING COLD SHUTDOWN O
INTERIM CLEARANCE PENDING COMPLETION OF FULL SCREENING e 6 MONTHS O
INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION - THE NUMARC INITIATIVE
1 THE NUMARC INITIATIVE 1
e O
GUIDELINES FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM, TO BE ENDORSED BY NRC POLICY STATEMENT O
THREE COMPONENT SCREENING BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT BEHAVIORAL OBSERVATION O
NUMARC SP,0NSORED GUIDELINES i
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CONSIDERED AS ALTERNATE APPROACH TO RULEMAKING 1
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I
MAJOR DIFFERENCES:
GUIDELINES VS RULE MV m hnt NRC i
ISSUES GUIDELINES RULE APPEAL PROCEDURES NO YES TEMPORARY / INTERIM PSYCH ASSESS &
FULL SCREENING PENDING CLEARANCES FOR CREDIT CHECK & 1 RECEIPT OF CRIMINAL &
PA/VA ACCESS REFERENCE (180 DAYS)
MILITARY HISTORY (180 DAYS) l "GRANDFATHERING" INDIVIDUALS GRANTED INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN UNESCORTED ACCESS SCREENED UNDER A PUBLISHED AUTHORIZATION ON OR INDUSTRY STANDARD COMMITTED l
BEFORE EFFECTIVE DATE TO IN AN NRC-LICENSED OF GUIDELINES SECURITY PLAN.
INSPECTION / ENFORCEMENT NO DATA A'VAILABLE NRC REGIONAL INSPECTION TO ASSESS PROGRAM AND ENFORCEMENT.
EFFECTIVENESS PERMANENT EMPLOYEE APPLIES TO ALL GRANTED APPLIES TO ALL GRANTED RECIPROCITY UNESCORTED ACCESS UNESCORTED ACCESS TRANSIENT EMPLOYEE NONE UNDER IEMPORARY YES FOR ALL CLEARED RECIPROCITY CLEARANCE INDIVIDUALS l
1 i
WHY NUMARC GUIDELINES f
L t
l O
SELF IMPOSED BURDEN - NOT REGULATORY l
O MOST UTILITIES ALREADY CONDUCT SCREENING UNDER j
ANSI STANDARDS TO VARYING DEGREES O
OPTION OF RULEMAKING ALWAYS EXISTS 6
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- i WHY A RULE 2 O
BASIS FOR CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF STANDARDIZED PROGRAM O
REGULATION BY FEDERAL AGENCY PROVIDES IMPARTIAL PROTECTION OF PRIVACY RI.GHTS FOR BOTH INDIVIDUALS AND LICENSEE MANAGEMENT I
O PROVIDES FOR APPEAL PROCEDURES I
O NRC OVERSIGHT PROVIDES MECHANISM FOR PROMPT, EFFECTIVE REMEDIAL ACTION AS NECESSARY 4
0 CONSISTENCY:
ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF NRC SECURITY PROGRAMS REGULATED BY RULEMAKING t
0 SUPPORTED BY GA0 (JULY 1933 REPORT) 4 0
RULE CONSISTENT WITH COMMISSSION RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES 4
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CAPTURES SENSE OF UNIONS' VIEWS (12/1/83) COMMISSION MEETING)
O INSPECTABLE DATA TO JUDGE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROGRAM i
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COMMISSION P.1PER RECOMMENDATIONS l
0 Tw0 OPTIONS FOR ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAM
- NUMARC PROGRAM
- RULE, SUPPORTED BY STAFF 0
PUBLISH FINAL RULES
- SEARCH REQUIREMENTS
- MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS l
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