ML20154A636
| ML20154A636 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1985 |
| From: | Weiss E HARMON & WEISS |
| To: | Felton J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM) |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-844 NUDOCS 8603040111 | |
| Download: ML20154A636 (2) | |
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l HARMON & WEISS I
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2004 S STREET N.W.
SUITE 430 WAsIIINGTON, D.C. cocoo-ites G All MCGREEVY H ARMOP4 TELEPHONE ELLYN R. W EISS (202)328 3500 DIANE CURRAN DEAN R. TOUSLEY ANDREA C. FERSTER l
December 20, 1985 FRCEDOM OF lNFDhMATION Mr. Joseph Felton T REQUEST Director, Division of Rules & Records Office of Administration yg p3 pg j
U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
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Re: Freedom of Information Act Request
Dear Mr. Felton,
Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, I hereby request a copy of any and all answers provided by the GPU Nuclear Corporation to the attached questions, which were propounded by the NRC Staff as an attachment to Inspection Report No. 50-289/85-26.
Thank you for your prompt attention.
Ver trul
- ours, N
Ellyn R. Weiss ERW/hmp 8603040111 851220 PDR FOIA WEISS85-844 PDR
ATTACHMENT A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TMI-1 EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEM MODIFICATIONS Confirm that ducting, piping and other components that could potentially 1.
impact the backup instrument air bottles in the diesel generator room are either seismically supported or, if not, that their failure would not re-suit in loss of function of the backup air bottles.
For equipment that is seismically supported, provide the criteria used to establish seismic qualification (e.g. Regulatory Guide 1.29).
Provide a discussion which justifies the proposal to change the failure 2.
mode for the new emergency feedwater flow control valves (EF-V30s) to This discussion should address closed rather than open on loss of air.
the importance of assuring reliable emergency feedwater flow against other considerations such as overcooling / overfilling.
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Describe those features (indications) and actions relied on to alert the 3.
operators of flooding in the tendon access gallery in the intermediate building, for example, as a result of a main feedwater line break.
Speci-This discussion should also ad-fy the design basis for these features.
dress the actions taken in the event of inadvertent indication of flooding and an assurance that these actions will not cause unnecessary challenges to safety systems.
What are the adcitional hazards and/or effects on safety-related systems 4.
in the intermediate building (especially the emergency feedwater system) with the storage of hydrogen and oxygen calibration gas bottles in the vicinity of safety-related equipment?
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