ML20153H414
| ML20153H414 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 02/13/1986 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Wenzinger E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| 2NRC-6-015, 2NRC-6-15, NUDOCS 8603030079 | |
| Download: ML20153H414 (3) | |
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 ATTENTION:
Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Project
SUBJECT:
Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2 Docket No. 50-412 USNRC IE Inspection Report 50-412/85-25, Supplenental Response
REFERENCES:
(a) Inspection Report No. 50-412/85-25, dated December 20, 1985 (b) 2NRC-6-008, dated January 16, 1986 Gentlenen:
In Reference (a), Region I transnitted a Notice of Deviation as Appen-Duquesne Light Conpany (fron DLC regarding the Notice of Deviatio)n DLC) provided a response in Reference (b.
dix B.
This is a suppleuental response (85-2b-02).
Response
The B/PS-2 progran for identifying potential interactions between safety rel ated QA-I struc tures, systens, or conponents (SSC) and nonseisnic equignent is given in Section 8.2 of Project Procedure 2BVM-165, Rev. 2.
The progran requires that any nonseisuic equipnent considered credible for f ailure shall be evaluated for potential interaction with safety related targets.
This progran is limited to Category I structures with exception of por-tions of the main stean lines in the Turbine Building. Each QA-1 structure is divided into review zones.
These zones are reviewed for potential interactions using a conbination of drawing reviews, site model review and in-plant walkdowns.
Once identified as a potential interaction, the QA-1 target (s) and the nonseismic hazard source are entered into a database by review zone for tracking and monitoring.
The criteria for resolution of any interaction is contained in Project Procedure 2BVM-ll4 Rev. 7.
It states that for identified interactions, it will be detennIned that either the safety related QA-1 equipnent is unaffected, the nonseisnic equipnent is adequately restrained or that structural upgrading of nonsafety equipnent is required.
All identified interactions are carried as open itens pending their resolution.
As noted in the opening paragraph, the BVPS-2 Hazards Analysis Progran requires that any nonseisnic equipnent considered credible for failure 8603030079 060213 ADOCKOSOOg2 PDR g6 0
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief C
USNRC IE Inspection Report 50-412/85-25, Supplental Response Page 2 shall be evaluated for potential interactions with safety related targets.
Because the specification for the monorails which are the subject of Devi ation 85-25-02 did not identify those conponents as Seisnic Category it was II or provide the vendor with explicit seismic design criteria, in these conponents the necessary to address the seisnic adequacy of
- Hazards Analysis Prograns.-
Iten 7 of Section 8.2 of Project Procedure 2BVM-165 Rev 2 specific ally indic ated that the monorails and hoist equipnenf, are.not considered to be credible sources of failure.
- However, this statenent did not provide the full technical rationale for the statenent that the high f actors of safety for vertical loadings of the conponents provide the necessary confidence that they will maintain their structural integrity under seismic loadings.
The rationale for the seisnic adequacy of the conponents as purchased was in In addition, ion provided in the original response to this deviation.
considerat evaluating the seisnic adequacy of the rail and enbedments, ilizing ' rigid is given to the support detail.
For monorail systens ut supports, the natural frequency is above 12 cps.
Therefore rigid range values for seisnic acceleration are used for both horizontal,and vertical directions. The plant envelope of rigid range values are 0.602 horizontal and 0.561 vertic al.
Sufficient margin exists in the enbedinents and oionorail tracks to conclude seisnic adequacy and no further evaluation is required for monorail systems with rigid supports.
The other type of supports used are rod hangers which are flexible sup-ports whose frequencies are below the predor.inant structural frequency.
No significant load will be transferred to the enbedinents and it can be concluded that the monorails and enbed.nents are seisnitcally adequate.
case assessnent for each monorail located over safety related The case-by ill equipnent w be clearly documented in the BVPS-2 Hazards Analysis Progran.
Note that the number of monorails located over safety related equipnent is eleven, not eight as indicated in the original response. This increase is due to equipnent relocation which was verified by a site walkdown.
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY By v'
- u. y. t,erey Vice President RWF/wjs Mr. W. Troskosk)ect Manageri, Sr. Resident Inspector Mr.
D. Tan, Pro, cc:
Mr. G. Walton, NRC Resident Inspector SUBSCRIBEDfgSW9RNTOBEFOREMETHIS N
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Mr. Edward C. Wenzinger, Chief USNRC IE Inspection Report 50-412/85-25, Supplental Response Page 3 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA SS:
COUNTY OF BEAVER On this Afkdayof
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_, before me, a Notary Public in and for said Conmonweal th n
County, personally appeared J.
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Carey, who being duly sworn, deposed and said that (1) he is Vice President of Duquesne Light, (2) ne is duly autnorized to execute and file the foregoing Submittal on behalf of said Canpany, and (3) the statenents set fortn in the Submittal are true and correct to the best. of his knowledge.
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