ML20153G488

Submits Summary of 980715 Workshop on Operator Licensing Exam Techniques with Representatives from All Region II Facilities.Invitation Extended to Members of Operations & Training Staff to Attend 981105 Training Manager Conference

ML20153G488
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	08/24/1998
From:	Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:	Fulmer S SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9809300088
Download: ML20153G488 (96)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. i August 24,1998 - Southem Nuclear Operating Company, inc. ATTN: Mr. Scott Fulmer, Plant Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager ' Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant P. O. Drawer 470 Ashford, AL 36312

SUBJECT:

MEETING

SUMMARY

AND

PUBLIC MEETING ANNOUNCEMENT

- JULY 1998 NRC REGION 11 EXAMINATION WORKSHOP AND NOVEMBER 1998 TRAINING i MANAGERS' CONFERENCE - JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT )

Dear Mr. Fulmer:

Region 11 facilitated a workshop on Operator Licensing Examination Techniques on July 15, 1998, conducted at the Richard B Russell Building. The workshop attendees included representatives from all Region 11 facilities. It is our opinion that the workshop was beneficial 1 and provided an excellent opportunity for open discussion on the operating test portion of the operator licensing examination process. j During the workshop, we covered a preliminary response to concems expressed at the January 1998 workshop and a synopsis was promised, but due to the status of the program, cannot be provided. The slides used for our discussions are enclosed. I Also, I would like to extend an invitation to you, and to members of your operations and training staff, to attend this years Training Managers' Conference to be held on November 5,1998. Our goal for the meeting is to provide an open forum for discussion of operator licensing issues. The site for this years conference will be in the Richard B. Russell Building Auditorium on Spring Street in downtown Atlanta. As of this date, the agenda is open. We encourage you to submit,'via telephone, a list of topics that you would like to have discussed, Additionally, we would appreciate an update of the home addresses of your licensed operators. 'l Please send them in an envelope marked "To Be Opened by Addressee Only" to either Ms. Beverly Michael or myself. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Bev at (404) 562-4640 or me at (404) 562-4638. i Sincerely, (Original signed by T.A. Peebles) Thomas A. Peebles, Chief Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.: NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosures:

As Stated 9809300008 980824 PDR ADOCK 05000348 V PDR 4

.. -. ~.. -.. n,.. _'f le ..f SNC 2 cc w/encls: M. Stinson, General Manager, ' Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant . Distribution: PUBLIC B. Michael, DRS - i r I ,f, l - () 200012 (Q): AcRs i 1 4/8/ /D2G/ 2 Rit:DRS RitDRS POC T LES:BTM / 1 8/ ' 198 8/) 198 'y ,u -, 4 j

OPERATING TEST WORKSHOP Richard B. Russell Auditorium July 15,1998 - . 8:00 Opening Remarks (Johns Jaudon) 8:20 Standard JPM format (SSNTA) 8:40 JPM critical tasks (Hopper & Mellen) What constitutes a critical task? < The importance of measurable criteria?

• Good examples
• Bad examples Discrimination (it has to be failable!)
• Good examples i
• Bad examples

- 9:30 JPM Questions (Baldwin) Direct look up. As defined in ES-602. Attachment 1, B.2.e (p.15)

• examples -

' * " fixes" to those examples Use of Open and Closed Reference items as defined in ES-301, D.1.1 (p.9) which states: " closed reference items may be used to evaluate the immediate actions for emergency and other procedures, certain a,utomatic actions, operating characteristics, interlocks, and set points..

• examples
• " fixes" to those examples j

10:30 Administrative JPMs (Steiner) 11:00 Scheduling (Steiner)

• ways to optimize the material developed
• simulator bottle necks
• control room JPMs
• reasonable daily work loads '

'* candidate stress

• exam delays 11:30 Lunch

) 1:00 Exam predictability and exam security (Payne). 1:30 Simulator scenario development (Payne & Hopper)

• scheduling and crew makeup
• evaluation tool
• malfunctions in relation to major event
• level of detail 3:30. Questions and Answers 4:30 Closing

.i 1 a

l i REGION 11 WORKSHOP - OPERATING TEST JULY 15.1998 Richard B. Russell Building Strom Auditorium David Lane Examiner - Sonalysts Larry Kelley. Training Advisor-OHN/Pickering. ~ John Brewer Manager-Authorization Training - Ontario Hydro Nuclear 9 Carolina Power and Liaht Company Tom Hackler . Requal Training - Brunswick . Curtis Dunsmore Initial Training - Brunswick .. Tony Pearson Initial Training - Lead - Brunswick Terry Toler - Instructor - Harris l Rick Gamer. Spen /iisor - Ops Training - Harris t Dwayne Coffey LOCT Supervisor - Robinson ' Dave Neal OIT Lead - Robinson Scott Potest Support Lead - Robinson Duke Enerav Corporation - Catawba. McGuire. and Oconee i David Re Training Instructor Charles Sawyer ' Senior Tech Spec James Presten - Instructor Brent Moore Instructor Bill Caudill Nuclear Instructor. E. T. Beedle Instructor - Catawba Reggie Kimray - Nuclear instructor - Catawba John Supte Operations -. Catawba Rob Billings Instructor - McGuire Steve Helms - Instructor - McGuire 'l Robby Pope Supervissor - Mcguire i Rick Robinson Ops Training Coordinator-Oconee 1 Robin Lane-Training instructor - Oconee J. R. Steely . Training instructor - Oconee l David Covar ' Nuclear instructor - Oconee Randall Yarbrough Nuclear instructor - Oconee Bobby Ayers Ops instructor - Oconee ' Florida 'ower Corooration Ivan Wilson Ops Manager Jack Springer . Supervisor - Training - Crystal River Johnie Smith Ops Training Supervisor - Crystal River i

Operating Test Workshop 2 July 15,1998 Florida Power and Liaht Comoany Dave Brown Initial Training - St. Lucie Tim Bolander Simulator and Exams - St. Lucie Mike Croteau instructor - Training - Turkey Point Rich Bretton LOCT Supervisor - Training - Turkey Point South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Jim Callicott Senior Instructor Perry Ramicone Instructor - V. C. Summer Southern Nuclear Ooeratino Company. Inc. (SNC) Tom Blindauer Senior Plant Instructor - Simulator - Farley Bill Oldfield Training - Farley Steve Be Training - Hatch i Ken Drawdy Training Instructor - Vogtle i Thad N. Thompson Ops Training instructor - Vogtle Peny Tucker Ops Training Instructor - Vogtle Michael Henry Nuclear instructor - Vogtle Leon Ray Ops Training Supervisor - Vogtle Fred Howard Ops Reg instructor-Vogtle { Perry Vannier initialTraining Vogtle Charlton Sal Requal Training - Vogtle Steve Dyer Requal Training - Vogtle Tennessee Vallev Authority Phillip H. Case Simulator Instructor - NC Training Denny Campbell Ops Instructor Browns Feny Marvin Meer Ops Instructor-Browns Ferry Jim Kearney Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Dave Davidson Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Steve Taylor Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Ricky C. King Senior Ops Instructor - Sequoyah Ed Keyser Simulator Instructor - Sequoyah Tom Wallace Supervisor - Watts Bar Terry L. Newman Ops Instructor - Watts Bar Jack Cox Training Manager-Watts Bar John Roden Ops Training Manager - Watts Bar Randy Evans HLT Lead - Watts Bar o 1

. - ~. I ( i i Operating Test Workshop 3 July 15,1998 - Viroinia Electric and Power and Power Comoany h L -Walt Shura . Supervisor - Training - North Anna Steve Crawford Senior Instructor (Nuclear) - North Anna Ken Grove ' Senior Instructor - Surry Ray Simmons ~ Senior Instructor - Surry i I I L i ) 1 i. i l l i j . ~ j

EXAH REVIEW GUIDELINES I. TECHNICAL ACCURACY Is there more than one correct answer? Is the given answer correct? Adequate data in the stem? Is data in the stem consistent and plausible? II. PSYCHOMETRICS: The process of applying sound qualitative processes to mente' measurements. PSYCHOMETRIC FLAWS THAT COULD DIMINISH THE VALIDITY OF THE EXAMINATION! FLAW . GUIDANCE APPENDIX B REFERENCE

1. Low level of Question should be written to reflect App. B

./ knowledge the level of knowledge most 1.d appropriate for a specific K/A. When there is a choice, try to write the question to reflect the higher level.

• SEE LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE BELOW

2. Low operational Does the question test the intent of App. B validity the K/A?

1.a/b/e Could someone do the job safely and 2.k effectively without being'able to answer the question?

3. Low discriminatory Will a less than competent candidate App. B validity miss the item?

1.d Can a person understand the principle 2.g being tested and still miss the item?

• SEE LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY BELOW.

4. Implausible Can a distractor be eliminated with App. B Distractors out understan_ ding the concept being 2.b/f/h/m tested?

5. Confusing or State the question as concisely as App. B ambiguous language possible but provide all necessary 1.c information.

6. Confusing negatives Avoid negative stems.

App.B 2.e

7. Collection of Each item should focus on one K/A App.B true/ false item determined by the stem.

1.f 2.c

8. ba'ckwards logic Examine on a topic in a way that is App.B consistent with how the K/A should be 1.h remembered and used.

l ) l LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY Establish a level of difficulty that will enable an applicant who is capable-of-safely operating the plant to complete and review the examination within four hours and achieve a grade of 80 percent or greater. [ES-401 p.4] Since item difficulty can.usually be decreased or increased by revision. the examination author need not be overly preoccupied with difficulty when writing the items. The author should focus on achieving a valid measure of the concept he is attempting to evaluate. [ Appendix B. p. 6] LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE Level 1: FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE The recall or recognition of discrete bits of information. l - knowledge of terminology - definitions

/.

- set points - other specific facts f -Level 2: COMPREHENSION Involves the metal process of understanding the material through a relating it to its <>en parts or some other material. - describing or recognizing relationships -_ recognizing how systems interact - consequences or implications of events . Level 3: ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS OR APPLICATION Involves assembling. sorting or integrating information to predict an event or outcome. Requires mentally using the knowledge and its meaning .to solve problems. l' i e I l' f

1 M). REG-1021. APPENDIX B. GUIDANCE 1. Generic Principles a. Ensure that the concept.being measured has a direct, important relation ship to the ability to perform the job. b. Make sure that the question matches the intent of the K/A. c. State the question unambiguously and precisely. d. Write the question at the highest level of knowledge reflected in the testing objective. e. Avoid questions that are unnecessarily difficult or irrelevant. .f. Limit the question to one concept or topic. unless a synthesis of concepts is being tested. g. Avoid copying text directly forma training or other reference material, b. Avoid backward logic questions. 2. Other Construction Guidelines 1 a. Use four answers b. Do not use none of the above" or "all of the 'above" c. Do not present a collection of true-false statements. d. Define the question, task or problem in the stem. e. Avoid using negatively stated stems when possible. ] f. Provided sufficient counter balance in questions with multi-part answers. 1 l g. Include common misconceptions as Distractors. j h. Make all answer options homogeneous and highly plausible. I. If the answers have a logical sequence. put them in order. j. Avoid overlapping answer options. k. Do not include trivial distractors with more important distractors. 1. Vary the location of the correct answer. m. Avoid specific determiners that give clues as to the correct answer.

)

(1) distractors that do not follow grammatically from the stem

- (2') o]tions that can be judged correct or incorrect without reading l t1e stem. '(3)

equivalent and /or synonymous options which rule out both options.

1 4 (4) an option which includes 'another option.

(5)

-implausible distractors. i F (6) a correct answer which;is longer that the distractors. -(7) cualifiers ~1n the correct answer unless they are used in. cistractors. (e.g. probably, ordinarily) (8)- words such as "never". "always" which suggest a wrong answer. 4 (9)- a correct option that differs from-the distractors in favorableness, style, or terminology, [ t e ix J a ' b i kU 4 -t l, e f

• e

-,c..,... N, m

t-III. BEANS i

A. AG.......::Au. -........ :.- <b- -

BEAN LIMIT REFERENCE-Knowledge level questions < 50 ES-401 p.4 SRO / R0 overlap 5 75 ES-401 p.5 I Questions from-training class quizzes 5 25 ES-401 p.5 OR last two NRC exams. Questions from licensee audit exam 50 ES-401 p.5- .(same author for audit exam) ./ Questions from licensee audit exam 55 ES-401 p.5 (independent author for audit exam) Questions from licensee bank 5 50 ES-401 p.5 New questions at comprehension or > 10 ES-401 p.5 analysis-j

i ( l 4 i i l i 8 l JPM CRITICAL TASKS I t l AND MEASURABLE i i CRITERIA G. -033ER VE__E\\ i

,f

3.

Develop Performance criteria The JPM should have meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the examinee's ability to i safely operate the system or the plant. Artificially subdividing., existing tasks to generate new ones may dilute the value of the JPMs to a point where they become meaningless. The JPM shall identify specific performance standards, or check points, that will permit the examiner to evaluate successful progress toward completing the task in accordance with the procedural references. Detailed control and indication nomenclature and criteria (e.g., switch positions and meter readings) should be identified whenever possible, i even if these criteria are not specified in the procedural step. The JPM should also note any important observations that should be made by the examinee while performing the task. ~ i The JPM must clearly identify the task standard; i.e., the predetermined i outcome (qualitative and/or quantitative) against which task performance will be measured. My.epygp.t;o.cedural step that.the~e.xaminee must perform y (6bfiect<Ty,3(ds3tol~aEcomplish"the task standard shall be identifi d and-atuthe propere i siiii)'43Ii20f e a s""d iccitica71s.tep'and shall have an associated performance standard. i t Ifi.there are any specific procedural restrictions on the sequence in ~ which the steps are performed they shall be clearly noted in the JPM. i, i I I

,Measuraile Per=ormance Inc icators A measura]~ e Jer =ormance incica :or consists o = Jositive ac: ions :na: an o3 server can oJjec:ive y icen: 1=y taken ay an incivicua~ (/ crew). ~ Exam 3 es: Ac: ions

acen in

le

,~03s suc1 as in res]onse

o an A-~WS.

~ Con: Po' mani'Ju a: ions suC1 as a manua reac:or

ri'] or

le s:ar: of

~ an ECCS 'Jum'3. VerJa reJor:s or no:1=ica: ion o= ~ a] norma 3arame:ers or conci: ions. ~

~ \\on-measura.] e 3er=ormance

ncipa: ors:

Veri =icacion cla; an ex3eccec res]onse las occurrec:

.) Veri =icasion anc/or ensure sce'3s w1ica recuire no accion.

3assiVe oaserva: 1ons suc, as moni;oring le 'Jer =ormance 'o = a sys;em. L..

JETINED TAS( S ANDADS ~ ast s:ancarcs slou c inc~ uce ~~ oJjec:ive recuiremen~:s wi:1 a owai e ~~ ~ l ~:0 erances agreec u'Jon .Jy

le

=aci~ i :y anc

le

\\ RC. i ~~he acceatance criteria must be af e to ciscriminate/ identify aoor aerformance ~ 3ac Exam 3 es: l ~~ ~ ":: = 'Dressure =a s .Je ow :.L00 'Jsi, s:ar: Jum'] is a 'Jer=ormance measure

la: is no: oJjec:ive.

~~ 1e ~ oJera :or Jer =orming

lis ~;as( cou c

conceivaf y s~:ar:

le Jum3 w1en Jressure reacles 0 Jsi anc s: 1~~

no: vio~a:e

le Jer=ormance measure l

s:a:ec in

le Jrocecure, even

lougl l

le =aci~i:y ~icensee exJec:s

le oJera:or

o s:ar:

le Jum] sooner.

~ 1e \\RC anc ~=aci~i:y ~icensee slou c ~~ agree in wri:ing

la:

le ~imi:s

=or eac1 CS or C-~ are acce3:ai e.Je= ore l

le examina:1on.Jegins.

or

le examie given aJove, accing an

~ e 3ressure to~erance (e.g., i acce']:a.] wi :lin 200 Jsi) wou~ c c~ ari =y

le s :antarc o~

'Der ormance

la :

,. s l ex'Jec :ec l l l "::mmecia~e~ y ,3 ora :e

le RCS i

= ]e~ ow roc lnser: ion ,mr:s ,e re ,. s no C e ,..,.n r: o n 0 - ,. mmec,. a :e ,. n

,,. s si :ua : ion.

Anywlere =orm one

o

en m,. nu:es m,. g T:

.Je arguec as a C C e'3 : a.] e. l. I j l l l l I L' i l i 4 I

l Proper Cueinc Ex:erna~ s imu~ us slou c 'Jrom'3; an ~ o'Dera :or ~;o res'Jonc.]y

acing cer

ain

~~ ac ions. 1e incica: 1ons o= a sys:em ~ or a.com'Jonen~; ma 'unc: ion (inc~ ucing 'Jassive =ai~ures).]y me:ers anc a~arms must Je accurate anc. incluce a~ l exaectec incications.

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate Initial conditions: A Station Blackout has occurred on Unit 2. Unit 1 is in a LOOP with both Emergency Diesel Generators in service. The NPS and ANPS have determined the need to crosstie electrical

iower from the 1 A EDG to the 2A3 4.16 KV switchgear via the SBO AB Bus Crosstie.

initiating Cue: The ANPS has directed you to accomplish the Unit to Unit crosstie to the 2A3 4.16 KV Bus by performing 2-EOP-99, Table 7 and theri 2-EOP-99, App. V within 10 minutes. .:? l i I % 16 d16 0821129. Rev 02

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE c' (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 1. (C) Element / Step QEEN and GREEN FLAG the following startup transformer I breakers: I A. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-30102) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN B. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2B (2-30202) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: S.U. Transformer 2A (2-20102) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: S.U. Transformer 28 (2-20302) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 2. (C) Element / Step Ensure the following breakers are GREEN FLAGGED and QPEN: A. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-30101 ) (2W87) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-30201) (2W85) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Comments; i I I 0821129. Rev D2 % 6eM6 I l

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) indicafe's a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST i

2. (Cont'd)

' B. Standard: Aux Transformer 2A (2-20101) (1WBS) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Aux Transformer 2B (2-20301) (1W84) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Element / Step Tie breakers between normal and emergency 4160V buses: Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A2-2A3 (2-20109) l l Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2A3-2A2 (2-20209 Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B2-283 (2-20309) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: 4.16 KV Bus Tie 2B3-2B2 (2-20411) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN r D. Element / Step 4.16 KV Bus 2AB Tie breakers Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20208) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN j Standard: incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 2A3 (2-20505) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN % 7 af 18 j os21129. hv 02 l

~ l I I JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l s' l (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 2.D. (Cont'd) Standard: incoming feeder from 4.16 KV bus 283 (2-20504) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN Standard: Feed to 4.16 KV Bus 2AB (2-20409) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN 3. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 4.16 KV feeder breakers to the station service transformers: A. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A1 (2-20110) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A5 (2-20210) 1 Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON. C. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2A2 (2-20213) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON l D. Standard: Station Service Transforrner 2B1 (2-20310) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON E. Standard: Station Service Transformer 2B2/2B5 (2-20402) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON l DB21129. Rev o2 % 8 of 15

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 4. (C) Element / Step OPEN and GREEN FLAG the following 480V feeder breakers from the station service transformers: A. Standard: 480V Bus 2A1 Feeder (2-40103) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN B. Standard: 480V Bus 2A5 Feeder (2-40361) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN C. Standard: 480V Bus 2A2 Feeder (2-40219) l Cue: CREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN D. Standard: 480V Bus 281 Feeder (2-40419) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN E. Standard; 480V Bus 2B5 Feeder (2-40653) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN F. Standard: 480V Bus 2B2 Feeder (2-40503) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON, FLAG GREEN SAT UNSAT Comments-0521129. Rev 02 Page 9 of 16

.=- l JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE i (C) Indicatis a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l S. (C) Element / Step OPEN the following 480V bus tie t.eakers A. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2A2-2AB (2-40220) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON B. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2A2 (2-40702) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON C. Standard: 480V Bus Tie 2AB-2B2 (2-40706) Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON D. Standard: 4BOV Bus Tie 2B2-2AB (2-40504) i Cue: GREEN LIGHT ON SAT UNSAT Comments: t l 1 o 4 l os21129.n.vc2 % 10 =M 5 L 1

I ~ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE i (C) indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST 6. (C) Element / Step Establish communications with Unit 1 I Standard: ESTABLISH COMMUNICATIONS with Unit 1 via Gai-Tronics or plant radio (if available). Cue: COMMUNICATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED 7. Eleme.nt/ Step PLACE the following purrip switches in the PULL TO LOCK position: (C) A. Standard: 2A ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK B. Standard: 2B ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK Standard: 2C ICW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK l (C) D. Standard: 2A CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK E. Standard: 2B CCW Pump Cue: SWITCH IN PULL TO LOCK I Standard: 2C CCW Pump Cue: SWlTCH IN PULL TO LOCK SAT UNSAT Comments: j 0821129. Rev O2 Page 11 of 16 l l

.=- JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l (C) Indicatis a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST B. (C) Element / Step Verify the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus is open Standard: VERIFY the EDG output breaker on the selected 4.16 KV bus (2-20211)is OPEN . Cue: GREEN LIGHT IS ON. REPORT UNIT 1 IS READY TO CROSSTIE AB 4.16 KV BUSES. i i 9. (C) Element / Step Close in the Unit 2 SBO breaker Standard: CLOSE IN the Unit 2 SBO breaker 2-20501. Cue: RED LIGHT ON 10. (C) Element / Step Request the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SRO breaker Standard: BE9UEST the Unit 1 control room to close the Unit 1 SBO bneaker 4 ' 20501. Cue: UNIT 1 ACKNOWLEDGES REQUEST. END Element / Step TERMINATION Standard: Student requests Unit 1 to close the Unit 1 SBO crosstie breaker. Comments-i i \\ 0821129, Rev C2 % 12 of 15 l i

%) qwfe. dp WTTM ' ' ~ ~ ' JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST .se 1. Element / Step: Review the EOOS log and determine if channel RM-26-18 (PAG-203) has been declared out of service. Standard: Verifies RM-26-18 is not out of service. .,a*" # g#( p6* Cue: RM-26-18 IS NOT OUT OF SERVICE W,,,, 2. Element / Step: . Check the Met Towerfor operability Standard: Verifies Met Tower chart necorder working property.. Cue: MET TOWER CHART RECORDER TRACKING PROPERLY. t 3. Element / Step: Verify gas release permit properiy filled out and authorized, enter release permit number and tank to be released on procedure. Standard: Verifies permit filled out property and authorized, enters release permit number (98007) and 2C GDT on procedure. Cue: 98-007 AND 2C GDT ENTERED ON PROCEDURE

4. (C) Element / Step:

Verify the following valve alignment: VS745 Closed V06142 Open V7071 Open V7070 Open V7072 Locked Closed VS742 Locked Closed - Standard: Verify all above listed valves in pmper positions Cue: VE745 FULLY CLOCKWISE V06142 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7071 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7070 FULLY COUNTERCLOCKWISE V7072 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED V6742 FULLY CLOCKWISE WITH LOCK ATTACHED . SAT UNSAT Comments: l 0521153. Rev Do % w 12

\\ l i JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indicates a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l 4. Element / Step Checic closed FCV-25-9," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Filter inlet." Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VEffTILATION HVAC PANEL: VERIPf CLOSED FCV-25-9 1 Cue: 0%, GREEN LIGHT ON, RED LIGHT OFF j SAT UNSAT Comments:

5. (C) Element / Step Throttle FCV-25-28," Continuous Containment / Hydrogen Purge Control Valve Bypass" to approximately 10% OPEN position.

Standard: At the NON-SAFETY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POSITION FCV l 28 to the open position UNTIL the valve position indicates 10% OPEN Cue: 10%, BOTH RED & GREEN LIGHTS ON SAT UNSAT Comments: S. Element / Step Start HVE48," Shield Building Exhaust Fan." Standard: At the B TRAIN EMERGENCY VENTILATION HVAC PANEL: POSITION HVE4B control switch to START Cue: RED LIGHT ON, GREEN LIGHT OFF SAT UNSAT Comments: os21oss.Rev os Pap eof 12

l 7 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l C. 8 The system / equipment status reflects the overa!! intent of what the JPM required upon completion. D. Cormctly perform all critical steps. All steps where procedural guidance exists may be considered critical. Performance of Off-Normal Operating Procedure immedate actions will be from memory. During the course of the JPM, there may be some tasks you will have to perform that will require you to implement contingency actions in order to complete them. Even in ~ these cases, you are expected to make decisions and take actions based on the indications available and in accordance with the facility's'pmoedural guidance. l lr. h.c C ue(s t The ANPS has directed you to respond to the abnormal alarm LAW 1-0120035. l References

• l ONP 1-0120035, Rev 18 During the performance of the task I will tell you which steps to simulate or discuss.

Verbalize each step before you do it. This gives you a chance to self<: heck and use STOP during the performance of each task element. 1 Verify the position or condition of equipment or components by pointing to the j instrumentation and providing a brief explanation of how the indication is used for verif; cation. I will provide you with the appropriate cues for steps which are simulated or discussed. You may use any approved reference materiais normally available in the execution of this Job Performance Measure, including logs. l = Do you understand these directions? If you have any questens, ask them now, and I will answer them. During the test I cannot answer questions. When you complete all steps corre::tly, you will pass this job performance measure, i Begin the task now. i 0821043. Rev D6 % 4of10 l

7 JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l f l 1. Element / Step Verify pressurizer spray, proportional and backup heaters are operating properly in automatic. Standard: OBSERVE any of the following Pressurizer pressure indications on RTGB 103 and/or RTGB 106 to DETERMINE improper automatic response: PR-1100 PIC-1100X PIC-1100Y PI-1102A PI-1102B PI-1102C Ph1102D PIA-1102ALL PIA-1102BLL PIA-1102CLL PIA-1102DLL Observe the proportional heater control and indication for P-1 and P-2 Observe the B/U heater control and indication for banks B-1 through B-6 Observe the spray valve contmlier HIC-1100 NOTE TO EXAMINER: The CUES should provide sunicient information to diagnose the failure of the selected pressure channel W. It should be recognized that Pressurizer pressure is actually increasing. All of the indicators listed may not be used by the operator when diagnosing this pmblem. The student may refer to Appendix "A" for expected automatic responses. Cue: For PR-1100, PIC-1100X, PIC-1100Y : SELECTED CHANNEL-DOWNSCALE LOW, NONSELECTED CHANNEL IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For other Piinstruments: INDICATED PRESSURE IS =2300 PSIA AND SLOWLY INCREASING For Pressurizer heaters: SWITCHES IN AUTO, HEATERS LIGHTS INDICATE ON For Pressunzer spray controller HIC-1100: INDICATES NO OUTPUT SAT UNSAT Comments: l ggggg, g.w 06 Page 5 ef 10

~ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (C) Indica [es a Critical Step PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST s

2. (C) Element / Step Lf the selected pressure channel has failed, Then shift to the operable pressure channel.

Standard: At RTGB 103: POSITION HS-1100 to the attemate pressure control channel Cue: ALTERNATE CHANNEL SELECTED. PROPORTIONAL HEATER OUTPUT REDUCING, SPRAY VALVE OUTPUT RISING, PZR PRESSURE RETURNING TO NORMAL.' NOTE -The ANPS directs that the rest of the ONP be carried out. SAT UNSAT Comments: 3. Element / Step Verify SE-02-03 and SE-02-04 " Auxiliary Spray Valves", are closed Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE keyswitches and indicating lights for SE-02-03 ~ and SE-02-04 to be CLOSED 4 Cue: SE-02-03, SE-02-04 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments: 4. Element / Step Verify power operated relief valves are closed. Standard: At RTGB 103:: DETERMINE position indicating lights for both power operated relief valves CLOSED Cue: PORV-1402, PORV-1404 GREEN LIGHTS ON AND RED LIGHTS OFF SAT UNSAT Comments: DB21043, Rev 06 Page 6 of 10

.. _. _ _.~ JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE l 8 PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST l. 5. Element / Step Ensure that PORVs V1402 and V1404 hand switches are in the proper position for existing plant conditions. Standard: At RTGB 103: DETERMINE PORVs hand switches are in NORMAL Cue: PORVs HAND SWITCHES IN NORMAL l

SAT,

'UNSAT Comments: l* I . 6. Element / Step Verify pressure anomaly is NOT caused by a large rate of change of Tavg. j Standard: At RTGB 103: OBSERVE any of.the following indications and DETERMitg that Tavg is fairty stable-TR-1111X/1121X, Ti-1102A, TR-1115/1125, Tb11028. TIA-1111X, i TF1102C, TIA-1121X, TI1102D, tlc-1111Y, TIC-1121Y ' Cue: Tevg HAS BEEN STABLE THROUGHOUT THE EVOLUTION SAT UNSAT Comments: I L END Element / Step TERMINATION Standanf: The pressurizer pewssure control system is responding property to L control pressure at 2250 psia. ll f' l 152100. Aw 06 Page 7 of10 l l _,.y..

OPERATING TEST l WORKSHOP L RUSSELL BUILDING l JPM QUESTIONS

r i

RICK BALDWIN ) JULY 15,1998 i i 4-

ES-301, D1(l) S':a':es: T1e 3rescriotec cuestions "or Catecories A anc B may incluce a com 3l nation o~ 03en-anc c osec-i re"erence items. Open-reference items that rec uire a 33licants ':0 anolv t1eir knowledge of the 3l ant to '30s':ulatec normal a3 normal anc emergency situatio,ns are oreferred. Closed-i reference iterns may be used to evaluate the immeciate actions o" ! - emergency anc other arocecures, i certain autorna':ic actions oaeratina l charac': eristics., interloc<s,, set ooinfs as l a33roariate to :le facility. Min'imize t1e use of closed-reference cuestions tlat re y solely on memory, anc avoid t1e use of oDen-reference auestions whose answer can sid13lv be looked .up if the applicant can "idd the correct document. h j Refer to Section B.6 o". Appendix C for more guidance regarcir ceveloament anc use o~jg 17e i 03en re~erence c uestions for the wa <-t1roug1 test.

Appendix C: S':ates:

6. Develoa Pre-scriatec Foi ow-uo Questions If the JPM will 3e usec curing an initial licensinc examination, it shalTincluce a sufficieri: number of 3rescriated cuestions <\\with answers anc references to evaluate the examinee's uncerstancinc of two knowlecqe anc/or a3ility (K/A1 s:atements relatec to the -

system or fask. More than one question may ae recuirec to effectively evaluate some K/A statements. The mos': a33roariate format for this a33lication is the short-answer to compo, whichrecuires the examinee c uestion se a response rather than select from among a set of alternative res3onses as is 'he case with multiale-i choice, ma,tchinc,the following anc

rue /fa se cuestions.

Keea guidelines, in accition to the generic item construction 3rinciales in A33encix

i B, in minc when are3aring the i c ues':lons: i i

a. Provice clear, ex3 licit cirections

/guicelines for answering t.le question so that the examinee i uncerstancs what constitutes a i fully correct response. Choose words carefully to ensure j that the stiaulations anc requirements of the question are i a3proariately convey'ec. Worcs such as "eva uate." outline," anc t "exa ain " can invi':e a lot o" cetai tha': is n,ot necessari y relevant. i

3. Make sure that the answer key l

to) ponse matches (and is limitedquestion.quiremen in the res i the re i When a33roariate, incicate the amoun': of Jar:ia crecit j to be grantec for an incomalete j answer. For questions requiring comaytation, i specify the degree of precision i expecfed. Trylo make the answer ,i turn out to 3e whole num3ers.

!~ l

c. Avoic givinc away 3 art or all o t1e l

answer ay_Yle way the cuestion is j worc ec -or exam 3le: I "If the letdown line 3ecame obstructec, cou c 3 oration o the l alant be accom3lishec shortly l after a reactor tria to out the 3l ant in colc shutcown? If so, how?" A test-wise examinee can realize i l that the answer has to 3e yes, or i else the seconc 3 art of the cuestion woulc have reac something ike "I' not, why not?" 4

c. Avoic wlat coulc 3e consicerec

" trick" c uestions in w1ich the answer l key coes not 3recisely match the q'co]stion. For examaie, asking "How ue the SI termina': ion criteria change followinc a SI reinitiation?" imalies that the":ermina': ion criteria wiI change, when in actuality they do no':.

e. Avoid direct look-up quest. ions that only require the examinee to l

recall where to find the answer to the question. I The oaera':iona orienta': ion recuirec l of cuestions on the walk-through test anc the examinee's access to I reference cocumen':s, araue acainst t7e use o' c uestions ':laf' test fo' r recall anc memorization. Any questions that do not requi l analysis, synthes,s, or appl.re a.ny i ication of inTormafion by the examinee l should be answerable without the aid of reference materials. Re'er ':0 ES-602., Attachmer)t :, for a more cetal ec ciscussion o~ cirect oo<-u] c uestions. Form ES-602 "NRC Chec< is': for 03en-Reference, Test items " con ~:ains a is': o c uestions ~:, hat can 3e usec to evalua':e t7e sui':aaili:V of ':le ollow-ua cuestions 3 annec for t7e walk-tarougl 3ortion of the 03eratinc tes:. A tlough the clecklisf was cevelo3ec for use in

evaluating recualification written examinations, most of the criteria <i.e., all exce o': 9,10 applicable anc coulc),11, anc ttje (/A. rating on item 7 are genenca ly 3e usec as a basis for revisina or rejectinc proposec walk-through cues: ions. ---e

__.m 1 ES-602 NRC Checklist for Form ES-602-1 Open-Reference Test items = l Test item Level 1. Does each test item have a documented link to important licensee tasks, K/As, and/or facility learning objectives? 2. 'Is each question operationally oriented (i.e., is there a correlation between job demands and test demands)? [ 3. Is the question at least at the comprehension-level of knowledge? 4. Is the context of the questions realistic and free of window dressing and backwards logic? 5. Does the item require an appropriate use of references (i.e., use of analysis skills or synthesis of information either to discern what procedures were applicable or to consult the procedures to obtain the answer)? 6. Is the question a " direct look-up" question, or does one question on the examination compromise another? A " direct look-up question"is defined as a question that immediately directs an licensee to a particular reference where the answeris readily available. 7. Does the question possess a high K/A importance factor (3 or greater) for the job position? 8; Does the question discriminate a competent licensee from one who is not? 9. Is the question appropriate for the written examination and the multiple choice j format? 10. Do questions in Section A take advantage of the simulator control room setting? 11. Does any question have the potential of being a " double-jeopardy" question?

12.

Is the question clear, precise, and easy to read and understand? - 13. Is there only one correct answer to the question? 14. Does the question pose situations and problems other than those presented during training? 15. Does the question have a reasonable estimated response time?

i l CONCLUSIONS i i @ 03en-reference questions whose I answer can simary 3e lookec ua if l ':he a33licant can finc the correct document are NOT acceatable. l @ Analy. sis, Synthesis, Comarehension l cues':lons sloulc be usec to avoic l cirect look-u a problems. l @ On all questions where the exaectec i responses are multiaart, we will l notify the cancicate of tie number of I known correct answers anc the j number neecec for full crecit. @ Examiners will ask non-arescriatec follow ua cuestions, as necessary, to clarify or confirm the cancicate's uncerstanding of 3rescria':ec questioris or are-planned tasks. The followua cuestions should be to further explore the lack of candidate quest. edge in the saeci"ic area in knowl ion u

@ Assian aoin': values to each answer that Y1as mu tiole aarts,istency. to ensure examiner grading cons ~ @ Identify on the cancicate's sheet the status of reference material usage. @ There is aro30 sal to im30se an allowance o" only 30% closec-reference questions of either Category A or B. I a 4 5 4

I i e L 1 DIRECT LOOK QUESTIONS i i l WITH ACCEPTABLE i i i i t CORRECTIONS i

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 3,9/4.0 QUESTION: Given the following plant conditions: Reactor shutdown for refueling outage Unit offline: 1/1/9712:01 AM Entered Mode 3: 1/1/97 2:10 AM e Entered Mode 4: 1/1/97 6:17 AM e Entered Mode 5: 1/1/97 11:45 PM e What is the earliest date/ time core offload can commence? ANSWER: 1/5/97 6:10 AM 10f'liours after shutdown

REFERENCE:

GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1 \\ '/ . 01/06/98 5:43 AM

..~. AUTHERIZED C!PY l e INIT t ^ 5.2:28 ~ IF needed for SFP water clarity, THEN place the SFP skimmer in service IAW OP-910. 5.3 Fuel Assembly and Core Component Movement ~ ~ " ' NOTE: A case evaluation has been performed IAW PLP-037 for each major evolution in this section. The case determina%n is defined prior to each applicable evolution. W 5.3.1 Cneck that the Reactor has been subcritical for at least 100 hours AND record hours suberitical. (TRMS 3.12) hrs 5.3.2 Verify EST-001 is complete. ENG NOTE: The following equipment tests rieed to be completed prior to moving fuel. 5.3.3 Verify the following equipment necesary to support fuel off-load has been tested IAW EST-03( AND mark the equipment m that is ngt needed to support fuel off-load N/A. - Fuel Transfer System (Section a.6.2) ENG - Manipulator Crane (Section 8.6.3) ENG - CV RCC Change Fixture (Section 8.6.4) ENG - New Fuel Handling Equipment (Section 8.4) ENG - NFB New Fuel Lift (Section 8.5.1) ENG - SFP New Fuel Monorail (Section 8.5.2) ENG SFP Bridge Crane (Section 8.5.3) ENG - SFP New Fuel Elevator (Section 8.5.4) ENG s l Rev.36 Page 24 of 79

Decay Time 3.12 3.12. DECAY TIME TRMS 3.12 Movement of fuel within the core shali not be (CTS 3.8.1.h) initiated prior to 100 hours after shutdown. APPLICABILITY: MODE 6. COMPENSATORY MEASURES CONDITION RE(bjIRED. COMPENSATORY MEASURE COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of TRMS A.1 Sus and movement of fuel Immediately not met, wit 11r the core. TEST REQUIREMENTS TEST FREQUENCY None. NA 3.12 1

Decay Time B 3.12 8 3.12 DECAY TIME BASES The restriction of not moving fuel in the reactor for a period of 100 hours after shutdown reduces the consequences of a fuel handling accident by 'providing for decay of short lived fission products and the reduction of fission gas inventory in any potentially failed fuel. Fuel handling accidents in containment and the Spent Fuel Building have been evaluated by postulating that the failure of all fuel rods in one assembly occurs 100 hours after shutdown. i i i B 3.12 1

RO Admin. A.1 (Fuel Handling), Question 1 2.1.23 1,9'4.0 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION: Given the following plant conditions: . Reactor shutdown for refueling outage Unit offline: 1/1/9812:01 AM - Entered Mode 2: 1/1/9812:38 AM e Entered Mode 3: 1/1/98 2:10 AM = Entered Mode 4: 1/1/98 6:17 AM e Entered Mode 5: 1/1/98 11:45 PM e What is the earliest date/ time core ofEoad can commence? ANSWER: 1/5/98 6:10 AM (100 hours after shutdown)

REFERENCE:

~ GP-010, " Refueling", step 5.3.1 PLP-100 (Technical Requirements Manual), section 3.12 l 3 y,ti ' l 02/13/98 9:58 AM

l e RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 K103 4.2/4.3 s l QUESTION: Given the plant conditions: Mode 1,100% power Accumulator levels / pressure j "A" 68 % 600 psig l "B" 70 % 630 psig "C" 70 % 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated Describe the basis for NOT being allowed to raise the pressure in the "A" Accumulator and lower the pressure in the "C" Accumulator by simultaneously opening the vent valves for the two accumulators. l l ANS'WER: Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops ("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis. (Not required for crediti Accumulator design capacity is based on one accumulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulators fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" l l l 01/06/98 5:43 AM

UPDATED FSAR l 3. Finally the second low level alarm on the RWST sounds. At this ) time, the, operator performs the switchover operation. The changeover from injection to recirculation is effected by the operator in the Control Room via a series of manual switching operations i according to written procedures. Valves SI-856A and B are manually closed at the valves. Remotely operated valves for the injection phase of the SIS (Figures 6.3.1-1 and 6.3.1-2) which are under manual control, (this is, valves which i normally are in their ready position and do not receive a SI signal) have their positions indicated on a common portion of the control board. At any time during operation, when one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection, it is shown visually on the board. Table 6.3.2-1 is a listing of the instrumentation readouts on the control board which the operator can monitor during recirculation. In addition, an audible annunciation alerts the operator to the condition. 6.3.2.2.5.1 Location of the major components required for recirculation. The RHR pumps are located in the RHR pump pit (Elevation 203 ft 0 in.) which is below the basement floor of the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). The RHR pump pit is located between the Containment Building and the Auxiliary Building. The residual heat exchangers are located on the first floor of the Auxiliary Building. The high head SI pumps, component cooling pumps and component cooling heat exchangers are located in the Auxiliary Building (Elevation 226 ft 0 in). The service water pumps are located in the intake structure, and the redundant piping to the component cooling heat exchangers is run underground. 6.3.2.2.6 Accumulators. The accumulators are pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. During normal plant operation, each accumulator is isolated from the RCS by two check valves in series. Should the RCS pressure fall below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the RCS. Mechanical operation of the swing-disc check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulators to the core via the cold leg. l The accumulators are passive engineered safety features (ESF) because the gas forces injection; no external source of power or signal transmission is needed to obtain fast-acting, high-flow capability when the need arises. One accumulator is attached to each of the cold legs of the RCS. The design capacity of the accumulators is based on the assumption that flow from one of the accumulators spills onto the containment floor through the ruptured loop. ine flow from the remaining accumulators provides l sufficient water to fill the volume outside of the core barrel below the nozzles, the bottom plenum, and one-half the core. 6.3.2-6 Amendment No. 12 9

O 4.0 (Continued) 16. A case evaluation has been performed for each section of this procedure IAW PLP-037. The case determination and any associated additional requirements are defined at the beginning of each section. 17. The Dedicated Operator utilized for filling SI Accumulators shall be any active licensed individual other than the Reactor Operator on watch, and shall remain at the RTGB until the filling evolution is complete. 18. If any SI Accumulator level increases greater than 10% (70 gal) due to inleakage when the RCS pressure is >1000 psig, then the affected accumulator shall be sampled within the next 6 hours. (ITS SR 3.5.1.4) 19. When drawing an oil sample from an SI Pump, remove the Control Powat Fuses. Reinstall the Control Power Fuses when sampling has been completed AND the oil reservoir has been refilled to the normal level. During the interval with fueses removed, the SI Pump is inoperable. l ~ 20. Do N2I open more than one SI Accumulator Vent valve at a time when the SI Accumulators are required to be operable to prevent invalidating the LOCA Analysis. (Westinghouse Memo CPL-96-210) 21. Operation with RWST level greater than the high level setpoint should be avoided to prevent water level at the Spring Line of the RWST. 9 OP-202 Rev. 44 Page 10 of 120

RO JPM CR-019, Question 2 006 K1.03 4.2/4.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION: Given the plant conditions: Mode 1,100% power Accumulator levels / pressure "A" 68 % 600 psig "B" 70 % 630 psig "C" 70% 645 psig Annunciator APP-002-B4 "SI ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" illuminated QUESTION A: Determine which accumulator parameter (s) are outside the normal operating band. ANSWER A: "A" Accumulator pressure is low (normal band = 614 to 646 psig) REFERENCE ALLOWED - QUESTION B: Can this evolution be performed and describe the basis for your response. ANSWER B: No, not allowed. Simultaneously opening the accumulator vent valves would connect the _two accumulator gas spaces. If a large break LOCA were to occur on either of the loops ("A" or "C") both accumulators would depressurize invalidating the LOCA analysis. (Not required for credit: Accumulator design capacity is based on one aceunulator spilling to the containment floor through the break, the other two accumulatoc fill the core to the mid-plane.)

REFERENCE:

FSAR section 6.3.2.2.6 4 OP 202, step 4.20 APP-002-B4 "Si ACCUM A HI/LO PRESS" fl '. { c j ovl3/98 9:58 AM

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K407 3.2/3.5 l QUESTION: L Given the following plant conditions: RCS cocidown is in progress e l Plant is in Mode 4 RCS T.v is 348*F RCS pressure l i + N-402 = 468 psig j + M-403 = 470 psig + PT-404 = 472 psig What must be done to operfM~d 50n51 to place RHR in service? ANSWER: Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201, " Residual Heat Removal System", :, System

Description:

Residual Heat Removal System l l. 01/08/98 12:51 PM p y

) AUTHORIZED COPY $D q ' P'RECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS l 4.0 4.1 Reactor Coolant System temperature and pressure shall be less than 350*F and 375 psig before the Residual Heat Removal System is put in service, and the RHR system will be removed from service before RCS pressure and temperature are raised above these values. 4.2 - To prevent boiling the CCW liquid contained in an RHR HX, CCW flow should ) i not be isolated to an RHR HX when the temperature of the RHR System is E greater than 200*F. (CR 95-00565) ) C.3 'heither RHR-750 nor RHR-751 will open unless trie following conditions are ~ I satisfied:. f ~ -- The breakers fo'r SI-862A and B are closed. i - The breakers for SI-863A and B are closed. - The ' control power switches for SI-862A and B are in NORMAL. - The control power switches for SI-863A and B are in NORMAL. { , Valves SI-862A and B are closed. I - Valves SI-863A and B are closed. i - RCS pressure is less than 465 psig. i 4.4 - SI-862A & B, and SI-863A & B are interlocked so they cannot be opened unless the RHR loop pressure is less than 210 psig. 4.5 When the Residual Heat Removal System is providing Core Cooling AND seat injection flow is desired to maintain a positive AP across the Thermal Barrier of the Reactor Coolant Pumps, letdown flow through HCV-142 and PCV-145 should be maintained to provide makeup to the VCT. 4.6 When RHR-757C or RHR-757D is closed,3,350 gpm flow, indicated on FI-605, with one RHR pump running or 6,700 gpm flow with two RHR pumps running shall not be exceeded, except as allowed / required by approved test procedures i for which flowrates on F1-605 may be as high as 3800 gpm for one pump or 7600 gpm for two pumps. Rev.34 Page 6 of 67 . +.,,

RO JPM CR-025, Question 1 005 K4 07 3.2/3.5 s REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION: Given the following plant conditions: RCS cooldown is in progress Plant is in Mode 4 e RCS T.,,is 348'F RCS pressure + PT-402 = 461 psig + PT-403 = 470 psig + PT-404 = 472 psig What conditions must be satisfied to open MOV-750/751 to place RHR in service? ANSWER: [.5] Reduce RCS pressure (sensed by PT-403) to less than 465 psig [.5] Verify SI-862A/B "RWST TO RHR" and SI-863A/B "RHR LOOP RECIRC" closed with breakers closed and control power switches in " NORMAL"

REFERENCE:

OP-201," Residual Heat Removal System", step 4.3 System

Description:

SD-003, Residual Heat Removal System l l l ) d4 v L: w 02/13/98 9:58 AM

RCS Specific Activity 3.4.16 ACTIONS (continued) CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3 with 6 hours associated Completion T,,, < 500*F. -Time of Condition A -not met. E DOSE EQUIVALENT I 131 in the unacceptable region of Figure 3.4.16 1. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.4.16.1 Verify reactor goolant gross specific 7 days activity 5 100/E pCi/gm. h SR 3.4.16.2 -- -- NOTE--- Only required to be performed in MODE 1. Verify reactor coolant DOSE EQUIVALENT 14 days I 131 specific activity s 1.0 pCi/gm. AND Between 2 and 6 hours after a THERHAL POWER change of a 15t RTP within a 1 hour period (continued: 3.4 46

O RCS Specific Activity B 3.4.16 BASES (continued) i SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.16.1 REQUIREMENTS 1 SR 3.4.16.1 requires performing a gamma isoto31c analysis as a measure of the gross specific activity of t1e reactor coolant at least once every 7 days. The analysis shall consist of a qualitative measurement of the total radioactivity of the primary coolant in units of C1/gm. i While basically a quantitative measure of radionuclides with half lives longer than 15 minutes, excluding iodines, this measurement is the sum of the degassed gamma activities and the gaseous gamma activities in the sample taken. This Surveillance provides an indication of any increase in gross specific activity. Trending the results of this Surveillance allows proper remedial action to be taken before reaching the LC0 limit under normal operating conditions. The Surveillance is applicable in MODES 1 and 2. and in MODE 3 with T at least 500*F. The 7 day Frequency considers the unlikelYfiood of a gross fuel failure during the time. ~ SR 3.4.16.2 This Surveillance is performed in MODE 1 only to ensure iodine remains within limit during normal operation and 1 following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. The 14 day Frequency is adequate to trend changes in the iodine activity level, considering gross activity is monitored every 7 days. The Frequency, between 2 and i Y 6 hours after a power change = 15% RTP within a 1 hour h period, is established because the iodane levels peak during this time following fuel failure: samples at other times would provide inaccurate results. SR 3.4.16J A radiochemical ar,alysis for $ determination is regt. ired every 184 days (6 months) with the plant opeating '.n MODE 1 equilibrium conditions. The E determination directly relates to the LC0 and is required to verify plant operation within the specified gross activity LCO limit. The analysis for E is a measurement of the average energies per l disintegration for isotopes with half lives longer than (continued) B 3.4 102

SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 2.1.14.2.5/3.3 REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION: Given the following plant conditions: The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM) Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM) A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM = Recovery actions are in progress e QUESTION A: What are the chemistry sampling requirements for this plant condition? ANSWER A: [.5] Between 2 and 6 hours following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified < l.0 micro-curies / gram. (Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM) i NO REFERENCE ALLOWED QUESTION B: i What is the basis for the ne frame after the power change? ANSWER: [.5] Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is i more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours following a power change of t 15% in a 1 hour period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

OMM-001-13," Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 ITS, SR 3.4.16.2 At\\_ C:{. L'- 02/13/98 9:58 AM

~. u l. l l SRO(I) Admin. A.1,(Plant Chemistry), Question 1 [ 2.1.14 ; 2.5/3.3 QUESTION: Given the following plant conditions: The plant is at 100% power, equilibrium Xenon, all systems aligned for normal operation (Jan 15,1998,12:01 AM) Chemistry personnel report they have completed obtaining RCS and Pressurizer liquid samples (9:00 AM) A runback due to a dropped rod occurred at 9:15 AM The plant is now stable at -68% l. Recovery actions are in progress - What are the chemistry sampling requirements and basis for this plant condition? ANSWER: Between 2 and 6 hours following a reactor power change of 215% in I hour (in Mode 1), RCS Dose Equivalent I-131 shall be verified s.1.0 micro-curies / gram. (Between 11:15 AM and 3:15 PM) Ensure Iodine remains within limit following fast power changes when fuel failure is more apt to occur. 2 to 6 hours following a power change of 215% in a 1 hour period is established because this is when the Iodine level in the RCS would peak due to fuel failure.

REFERENCE:

Plant Chemistry", section 5.2 SR 3.4.16.2 l l, 01/08/98 10.38 AM -

___.___m POOR QUESTIONS KA: 062AA1.01 Importance: 3.4/3.8 Reference allowed (FSAR) Question: What is the limiting factor on the amount of current that can be passed from Unit 1 to Unit 2 i through the SBO crosstie? Expected Response: The electrical cable between the two units is the limiting factor. f

KA: 033000K303 Importance: 3.0/3.3 Reference allowed Question: What is the response of the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System KF], and why. regarding temperature and level following a Blackout? ' NOTE: Assume NO operator action is taken: 4 Expected Response: Spent Fuel Pool level and temperature will increase due to decay heat of the spent fuel assemblies. )

..... ~. -. - ~... -... fConduct of Operation (SRO 1) Fire Brigade 4 KA: 194001K116 3 5/4.2 . Lesson Plan: EAP-SEP

Reference:

Fire Plan, (E-Plan) RP/1000/29 Fire Brigade Response,. NSD 112, Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities Task: 2610000, 3710001 1 Source: NEW PRA 3-18-97 1 4. As the Operations Shift Supervisor serving as the Fire Brigade Leader during an actual fire or fire l drill, you have several responsibilities.. Describe the normal duties as the Fire Brigade Leader at the fire scene? ANSWER: 1-Serve as the Fire Brigade Commander and direct the Fire Brigade during the event. 2-Obtain support as needed such as Security, Radiation Protection, Chemistry, Offsite Fire Department and Hazmat. j (3-Ensure all fire protection equipment is restore to full capability immediately following the event). (4-Complete the Fire Emergency Report and forward the report to the EP (Emergency Planning) Section). i 1 b 1 I 4

. _.. - -.... ~.. - -.. .. _.. -. -... ~. -......... - - - 4 I-l i l J l l-KA: 062000A401 (3.3/3.1) i ' Lesson Plan: EL EPD Objective R8 page 25 l

Reference:

OMP l . Task: 002630001 Source: LBank EL 96 (JPM CRO 08) RO l l I. QUESTION: Describe the safety and personnel requirements for manual operation of switchyard disconnects. i ANSWER:. . Rubber safety gloves and safety glasses must be worn. At least two people in the crew performing the task, one of which i l 1s a' supervisor. Nomex suita should be worn by the breaker operator. [, 9 l I t i i i I (I 1 i

~~. Conduct of Operations (SRO 1) Self Checking / STAR KA: 194001K101 (3.6/3.7) Lesson Plan: ADM-OMP

Reference:

OMP 1-22, Job Assignments Task: 3610052 Source: PRA 3-6-97 NEW 1.- As an SRO (Shift Supervisor) you have the responsibility of performing Pre-Job Briefs with other operators on your shift, you make the decision of the level of detail and information within the Pre-job Brief. What are several guidelines that you will use to determine the amount of detail of the Pre-Job nrief presentation and E describe the " STAR" component Pre-Job Brief? ANSWER: (2 of 5) L1) Complexity of the task-Consequences of the task Importance'of the task Frequency of the task Unfamiliarly of the task to the performer 2) " STAR" is a self checking method (that operators use to reduce the potential of errors). ("S" - Stop)' ("T" - Think) ("A" - Act) ("R" - Review)

l ACCEPTABLE QUESTIONS l i Importance: 2.6/3.0

Reference:

Steam Tables Question: The RCS is at 2250 psia, Quench tank pressure is 3.5psig. If a small leak developed in the seat of Code Safety V 1201, what temperature would you expect to see on TIA-1107? Expected Response: 230 degrees i i

~ _. I Question #1. l KA: 001KS.02 i importance: 2.9/3.4 j

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: Unit 2 has 6,000 EFPH on the core and j experiences a dropped rod resulting in the NI power j level changes from 100% to 93%, what is the i approximate worth of the dropped rod? Expected Response: Approximately 75 to 100 pcm. j Question # 2. KA: 001K5.28 Importance: 3.5/3.8

Reference:

Unit 2 Plant Physics Curves Question: In order to withdraw the same CEA without changing the power level or temperature of the RCS, how much would RCS boron concentration have to be changed?(PPM)

• • lf Question 1 is lissed: Assuming the worth of a dropped CEA was 100 pcm, how much would boron concentration have to be changed to withdraw the rod without changing power level or temperature?

Expected Response: approximately 12 PPM (Boron worth for the present conditions is 8.38pcm/ ppm)

l 1 i "HLC EXAM DEVELOPMENT EXAM BANKH TEST ITEM DATA SHEET 1 4 .=============..=================================================== i

==

I. CROS8-REPERENCE DATA l RECORD NUMBER: 1427 TYPE: General Use i LESSON 1: LOR-8IM-JP-019-A05 LESSON 1 OBJECTIVES: 01 STYLE: Short Essay /Other POINT VALUE: 1.00 4' REVISION: 3 TIME TO COMPLETE: 4 Minutes ENTERED BY: DATE ENTERED: 10/10/94 MODIFIED BY: DATE MODIFIED: 04/27/98 DATE LAST USED: (approved by: ~~ ASSOCIATED TASKS;, i No Tasks are vurrently referenced to this question. ASSOCIATED K/A's: I 206000 A1.01 ROI: 4.3 SROI: 4.4 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating HIGH PRES 8URE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM REACTOR WATER LEVEL: BWR-2,3,4 controls j

REFERENCES:

2 APP A-01 3-1 /R21 3

===========================================================

l II. QUESTION: 4 HPCI started on high drywell pressure, but tripped on high RPV level. Explain how HPCI responds as level lowers from the high level trip to Lo Level 3. Additionally, if you wanted to restart HPCI at 120", what actions would be required to perform that action?

===========================================================

III. ANSWER: As level lowers, HPCI will not restart until level reaches LL-2 (105"). - HPCI will then reset its trips and start and inject with no operator cction. HPCI will continue to run as level lowers to LL-3. To restart HPCI prior to reaching LL-2, depress the high water level - trip reset pushbutton, the drywell signal will then restart HPCI and' cause it to inject. PAGE 1 OF 1

"NRC JPM 98, Rev O" EXAMINATION QUESTION 3 POINT VALUE: 1.00 Using the attached diagram, explain how it is possible to reset a scram with the mode switch in SHUTDOWN. PAGE 3 W w

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• N -UP

I TDC i I ) 2 SCC u- ,- a . " T, ~ ~ ~ ~' J 2 l i e i L := si 16A g3g d SCRAM e i SCRAWSw(R) WANUAL ~p i K15A K15C i s ? e NA17A A T / TCD0 l-{

• K16A

\\ 2 SEC' 1.K15A:tK15C:: K19C i K19A = = RESET RESu ) U 1 REACTOR MANUAL SCRAW -lm SHUTDOWN SCRAW RESET WTERLOCK d m TMP CHMNO. 'AT "l' TRIP 5(STEM "A" 7j i Figure 03-21 Shutdown Scram Reset interlock i 1 .: e ', 2' Pace SC Of 10' .l 2 SCC 2 l

JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Provide this page to the Candidate Health Physics has performed a survey of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms and I hallway. Given a survey map, determine how each room and hallway should be { posted. 1 d. k i Page 6 of 7

-. - -.... -..... ~. _. ~... - ~. - f y ( ) c ( h E i f l I i [ P$k3* j a e ja ej ~ 1 I i 8 8 i g\\ 8 l 3 e J ~ va e yj [ l ' mec'! 4 j [ m h 7 Ik ? C l, I -t l ,-m i g i, E i '[ I ( 4 l I ( 3 r l g.4 E E E ~ z!g l u xux a v ;; ; x a E j l syg'Q--------2:: e : - a <- 6 ggj 8g l Figure 4 2301205. Rev. 7 FOR TRAINING USE MLY

• 7

1 a a I j i f, e 1 l JPM SC-DJL::NG PAUL STEINER i I ~-

L PV SC J _.::NG C0\\S::JERA-~::0\\S Amount of material. to be generated: Licensee Cost. Licensee Manpower. Examiner Review Time. Validation Time on Simulator During Prep-Week. The current trend is a shift towards a single JPM set, administered piece by piece, with all applicants receiving the same piece each day. Considerations with this technique: Availability of both Simulator and Booth Operators for two shifts. Sequestering. Candidate Stress. Examiner Stress. (No laughing please!)

Currerr: 3roi ems s JPMs are lasting 30 minutes to 1 hour. Longer is not better. Take the time it takes a staff instructor to perform the task, with questions, and double it. The last three examinations have run past 10:00 pm and were scheduled to end at 6:00 pm. Applicants are arriving at 7:00 am and are not being exam.ined until 7:00 pm. No margin for error or simulator failure.

I t 4 j T + i i i l ~ 03 ERA-~::NG EXAV:: NA-~:: D \\ ) i i i A M9.. N.. S-RA .. V. " 3.. "S .= u v i 3I/,S VS'mc _,"3 j --..p\\,"3 o .. u d 4 Paul Steiner I i i

ES-301 Specific Instructions for Category A Although Admin topics may be examined separately, it is preferable, whenever

possible, to link, associate, or integrate them with tasks and events conducted during Categories B and C Using a single Admin JPM is generally e

preferred, however, two prescripted questions may be used. If the applicant has a "U" in only one Admin topic, the examiner may fail the applicant in Category A depending on the importance of the identified deficiency. - Topics in the administrative portion of the NRC initial examination are weighted the highest of all examination areas, and are thus the most likely to result in a failing grade. - A single knowledge weakness / or applicant error can result in an initial examination failure.

l l l Common Single Failure Points: Clearance Error. Reactivity Balance Error. The key is a balance between questions and JPM's. All JPMs will result in a long Admin exam, with a high potential to fail a candidate for a single error. All questions usually results in a weak Admin exam. i I'

Exami es o= Gooc Acmin ? Ys Shutdown Margin Calculation. e Approval of a Clearance Order. ECP Calculation. Manual Leak Rate Calculation. Risk Matrix Utilization. Off-Site Dose Projection. Review a Survey Map and Demonstrate Knowledge of Radiological Hazards in a Work Zone. Evaluate the Applicants Scenarios for Emergency Plan Application and Make Protective Action Recommendations. ~ - The key to success with these types of tasks is solid and thorough validation. - If the task is not clear. and well defined, the applicants will become confused. L - If the task is too

long, it will begin to

[ loose its evaluating ability.

Examples of Poor Admin JPMs Check out a key from the key locker. e Make a log entry. e Frisk out an item. Do you want an applicant to fail for touching the surface? Make a call-in for emergent work while reading from a procedure. Perform a pre-job brief. These are items of Low Discriminatory Validity, and if performed poorly can result in severe grading. g._ ( L

Otler Jifficu~ ties Wit 1 Acmin SRO applicants should be evaluated at greater depth on Admin topics. There must be a difference between the 4 R0 and SRO Admin examinations. Control Room Software not available on the simulator or applicants don't have the proper password. The question does not solicit the answer. ~ Put validators in the mind set of applicant. Assigning point values to multiple answer questions. The limit is 80%. f there are four 1 answers, the applicant must get a7 7 four correct. Don't require applicants to catch integrity issues, or misspelled words when approving clearances or valve line-ups. Direct look-ups are prohibited!

d v.. p .= .. ul -4 l _. s ~ AN) EXAM::NA-~ ION 3E)::CTA3I_::TY 'a C. 3AY\\'E a o. 4 e I 4 6.

^ EX/MINATION SECURITY t PER 10 CFR 55.49 - " APPLICANTS, LICENSEES, AND FACILITY LICENSEES SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN ANY ACTIVITY THAT COMPROMISES. THE INTEGRITY OF ANY APPLICATION, TEST, OR EXAMINATION BY THIS PART" ^ RULE IMPLEMENTED IN NUREG-1021 ES-201 - C.1 & C.2 & C.3 (RESPONSIBILITIES) ES-201 - D.2 (PERSONNEL RESTRICTIONS) ES-201 - ATTACHMENT 1 (PHYSICAL SECURITY & EXAM BANK LIMITATIONS) ES-201 - FORM ES-201-3 (SECURITY AGREEMENT) e e ES-205 - GFES EXAM ADMINISTRATION e ES-402 - C.1 (RESPONSIBILITIES) e ES-402 - E.3 (POST-EXAM REVIEWS) o ES-50' - POST-EXAM DOCUMENTATION APPENDIX D, SECTION F (SIMULATOR SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS) e

EX/MPLES n INSTRUCTOR SIGNED SECURITY AGREEMENT AND DISCUSSED EXAM CONTENT WITH EXAMINEES REVEALING OF WHAT IS NOT ON THE EXAM (APPLICANTS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PREDICT OR NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT OF EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES) BIAS OF SCOPE, CONTENT, OR LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY OF AN EXAM TO ENHANCE CHANCES OF CANDIDATES PASSING TEST LOSS OF CONTROL OF EXAM MATERIAL (NOT LOCKED UP WHEN LEAVE OFFICE, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN COPIER, PARTS OF EXAM LEFT IN. SIMULATOR BOOTH AFTER VALIDATION) INSTRUCTOR ON SECURITY AGREEMENT INTERACTS WITH SR0(U) CANDIDATE DURING REQUAL (TAUGHT CLASS, EVALUATED SIM. SCENARIOS, SAT ON AUDIT BOARD) WRITE EXAM TO SAME FORMAT EVERY TIME S0 IT BECOMES PREDICTABLE CHANGING K/A NUMBERS ON OLD QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO FIT NEW SAMPLE PLAN PERSONNEL NOT ON SECURITY AGREEMENT IGNORE WARNING SIGNS AND WALK IN ON EXAM DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES DRAFT EXAM MATERIAL NOT PROPERLY PACKAGED WHEN SENT TO NRC AND WAS DELIVERED OPEN

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CONSEQUENCES NUREG-1600, " GENERAL STATEMENT OF POLICY-AND PROCEDURES FOR NRC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS" APPLIES l

IF HAVE INDICATION 0F COMPROMISE, ACTION WILL BE-TAKEN TO ENSURE AND RESTORE THE INTEGRITY AND SECURITY OF PROCESS. INCLUDES: e NOT-GIVING EXAM MAKING ADDITIONAL CHANGES TO EXAM VOIDING EXAM RESULTS IF EXAM ALREADY GIVEN e 4 REEVALUATING LICENSING DECISIONS PER 55.61(b) e POSSIBLY IMPOSING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS INCLUDING: e CIVIL PENALTIES ORDERS l IMPLEMENTATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT RULE (10 CFR 50.5) I t i

EXHf PREDICTABILHY

~ APPLICANTS lSHOULD:NOTLBE.ABLE T0. PREDICT OR' NARROW THE POSSIBLE SCOPE OR CONTENT 0F EXAM BASED ON YOUR TEST DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES 1 i EXAM DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES:0R RULES SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED!WITH THE CANDIDATES (e.g., 25% OF WRITTEN WILL BE OFF THE MOST RECENT EXAM) EXAM.METHODOLGY.SHOULD BE VARIED FROM: EXAM TO' EXAM (e.g. SECTION A.4 SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE " CLASSIFY THE SCENARIO" FOR SR0's) i EXAM DEVELOPMENT CRITERIA LIMITATIONS SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE THE BASIS-OF THE1 EXAM. CONTENT (e.g., NO OVERLAP WITH THE AUDIT TEST'SHOULD NOT BE A RULE STRICTLY FOLLOWED WITH'NO EXCEPTION) IF DONE CANDIDATES CAN EXCLUDE.EVERY THING FROM THEIR AUDIT AS NOT BEING ON THEIR TEST WHICH ' NARROWS THE SCOPE. ALLOW AUDIT AND LICENSE EXAMS TO' DEVELOP INDEPENDENTL-Y AND IDENTIFY TO THE CHIEF EXAMINER THOSE AREAS THAT OVERLAP WITH A PROPOSED RESOLUTION, IF NEEDED. AREAS TO WATCH: NO OVERLAP FRGH AUDIT EXAM 25% FROM THE LAST TWO NRC EXAMS 50% FUNDAMENTAL KNOWLEDGE NO TEST ITEM REPEATS FROM DAY T0 DAY WRITTEN EXAM ANSWERS FAVOR a,b,c, OR d ALL JPMs DONE ONLY ON A-SPECIFIC UNIT

} t R f a l l SIMULATOR SCENARIO t 1 Y l DEVELOPMENT f. C. DAY \\E 4i j. G. F0P3ER i i e f i {. t l i 1 4 1 l

i-t I CR.. ..CA_ - AS(S 1 L dlcT Cons ~;i :u:es a cri :ica-tas(? ~~1e recua~ 1 =ication examina : ion uses cri :ica~

as(s (C-s)

=or eva~ ua :1ng i crew Jer=ormance on :as(s

1a:

lave sa-e:y signvlcance

o

le

'3 an: or j

le Ju]~ic.

The cts are objective measures for determining w1etler an individual's or a crew's performance is satisfactory or unsatisfactory. i A~ : 1ougl C~~s are no: cirec:~ y usec

o

~ eva ua:e o] era:or Jer=ormance on ile ini:ia~ ~ icensing examina:1ons,

le l

conce']; o= focusing on those :as(s L that have a significant imaac: on t1e I safety of the p~ ant or t1e pualic - remains valid anc slou c Je

acen

~ in~;o consicera: ion w1en eve ua:ing ~ -:ie com'Je:ence cr fnf: 1a~ ~ 1 cense ~ a))~ican:s. t 1 o

t l l The Importance Cf Sa=e:y Significance and Measurable Criteria

n reviewing eac13ro30sec C-assess

~;1e :as(

o ensure

la: 1: is essen:ia

o sa=e:y.

A tas( is i essential to safety if t1e imaro]er l performance or omission of this task l by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or in L-significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the alant.

1. an au:oma:ica~~y ac:ua:ec 3

an~; ~ ~ sys:em wou c lave.3een recuirec

o mi: iga:e ~;1e consecuences o= an incivicua~'s incorrec: Jer=ormance or L

le Jer'ormance necessi:a:es

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ha: wou~ c L

com3 ica:e

le even~: mi: 1gation

~ L s':ra :egy,

le ~;as(

1s sa=e:y L signi =ican~;.

Exam]~ es of C~s invo~ ving esserr:ia-sa =e:y ac: ions inc~ uce

1ose ~=or w1ic1 0Jera": ion or correc:

3er#ormance prevents-- degradation 0 = any 3arrier ~;o e =ission Jrocuc: re ease. cegradec. emergency core coo ~ ing sys:em (ECCS) or emergency Jower caJaci:y. a violation o = a sa =e:y imi:. = 4 ~ a viola': ion o =

le

=aci~ i :y = icense conci::1on. incorrec: reac:ivi:y con:ro~ (suc1 e as ~=ai~ ure ~:0 ini ;ia :e emergency ,Jora: ion or s:anc Dy icuic ~~ con:ro or manua y inser; con:ro rods). a slgnlflcan~; recuc:1on o-sa-e:y e margin Jeyonc

la: irreJara.] y

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le scenario.

t

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lose or w11c1 a crew cemons:ra:es

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le

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o / . 1. - 4 Accen ix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Objec*ives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator level transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction; and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined with an Excess Steam Demand (EOP-15) Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL. Tumover: Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. the 2B Charging pum a is out of service i for packing acement, expected back in four hours. The 2A Heater Drain Pump has a uniso le oil leak requiring the instructions is to teduce power to 92% pump to be taken out of service. Shift j and remove the 2A Heater Drain Pump from ( service. Additional failures: 2A Containmern Spray Pump fails to start on CSAS Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type' Descriotion 1 N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 92% R-RO l 2 l-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure transmitter) drifth$ 3 C-BOP, 2AB Load Center deenercizes _ _, l.~ a nL,, A ]; 4 C-RO 2B CCW Pump trips 5 !-BOP FIC-9011,2A Steam Generator flow transmitter fails low. 6 M-2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GFM),2A BOP main steam line break inside containment on reactor M-RO trip. ebr6 TS W t. 1 euw sm 4> f I i i . i nummmmL .,e (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor ~ 'L_

i l' J i i i j Facility' Scenario No.: 1a Op-Test No.: 1 Objectives: To evaluate the students ability to implement ONOPs for loss of a vital 480V 1 load center, an off-normal Pressurizer pressure and Letdown condition, and failure of a Steam Generator steam flow transmitter; to perform a normal power reduction: and to execute EOPs for a Steam Generator Tube Rupture combined with a Main Feedwater line break inside containment (EOP-15) i Initial Conditions: Unit 2 is at 100% power, MOL. Tumover Unit 2 is at 100% power MOL. The 2A Charging pump is out of service for a lube oil PM, expected back in three hours. The 28 Main Feedwater Pump has a unisoliible discharge flange leak requiring the pump to be taken out of service. 2A Main I 4 Steam Line Radiation Monitor is out of service, not expected back this shift. 2-HVS-1 A 1 i containment cooler is out of service. Chemistry reports a 15 GPD tube leak on the 2B S/G. Management has decided to continue power operations due to the system load. Shift instructions are to reduce power to 45% and remove tne 2B Main Feedwater Pump from service. Thunderstorms have been reported to be approaching the St. Lucie County 3 area Additional failures: A train CSAS fails to actuate and FCV071 A fails to fully open 1 2B Containment Spray pump develops a sheared shaft on start. i 2A Main Feedwater pump fails to tnp on low suction pressure l 2A Main Feedwater isolation valves fail to close on MSIS Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type

• Description 1

N-BOP Power reduction from 100% to 45% R-RO 2 1-RO PIC-1100X (PZR pressure setpoint) drifts high 3 C-RO 2AB Load Center deenergizes,2B Charging pump tringkao 4 N-BOP -Realignment of charging and letdown 5 C-BOP 2B CCW Pump trips ---4 ' ?? " SOP, 2.^ e!C eter-for tr:W.: t!!: 5!;;" 7 M-BOP 2A Steam Generator tube rupture (250 GPM), 2A main ~ M-RO feed line break inside containment on reactor trip C A train CSAS fails to actuate C 2A Main Feed isolation valves fail to close on MSIS (MFIV failure, continues to feed containment) C FCV 071 A fails to fully open

• (N)oimal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

( \\

4 e ie i i-l ES-301-Simulator Scenario Quality Assurance Checklist Form ES-301-4 v J Feeuny-Does of Esem: Seenado henbers: / / Opereams Test No.: QUALTIATWE ATTRBUTES anitiale f j e b c f 1. The seenenee how eles=ty stated obseeewes in the - - 9 summenes t 2. The inisiel eenssons are veehese, in that some espapment and/or instrumentesen eney be out of sorwooe. but it slees not eue the operatore into expected events. 3. The - ---- eensnet nessely of seisted ewones. 4. Emeh event desenpeen eenssets of the point in the seeneno when it is se he isemated the meNunemonis) that are entered to inreste the ownt the symptoms /eues that wEl be essible to the erow the esposeed operator sceons ery shift peeseen) the event _. _ _ n point Of assisemble) e 5. No more then one norwnechemste failure (e.g., pipe breek) is E-___ -.- f into the soonesio tutthout e erstede precedmc inondent such as a seismic event. S. The ewones are walid with regard to shvenes and thermodynamies 7. 7-

and tinuing of events is veneenshie, and snows the enemination team to obsein esmeiste eweiuscen resuhm =-

rene with the esen.no obiectiws. S. If time comprosessa technsques are aseed, the seeneno summary eieerfy so indsesses Opeenters hows sufflesent linm 'o aerry eut espected answeses wrthout unslue time sonstremts cues are given. 9. The esmulater meeleline is not setored 10. The soonenes have been weindsted 11. Every operator esilt be eweluesed using at least one siew econono. All other seenense have l been meeWied in seeerdenee with Session D.4 of ES-301. 12. As inshwedual operuser sempetenoies een be ewelueend. as worWied using Form ES 3016 (subnet the form elen0 484th the esmulater t:). 13. Eseh appliment wel be ;.1 :;inwelved in the nosemum number of trenssente end ewones speosfied en Form ES-301-5 toubemt the term eien0 with the emiuletor soonesses). .14. Time iewel of dINieulty is espreenese to support disonome cleasesens for each evow peerson. TARd3ET GUANTTTATWE ATTMBUTES (PWI emamen) Actual Attributes 1. Teesi malfunseens (5 8) / / 2. MsNunemens efter EDP entry (1-2) / / 3. Abnemiel swants (2-4) / / 4. Meier trenesents (12) / / 5. EOPs entered /requinno substantive acteens (1-2) / / 6. EOP eonemeenesee voeuiring subetemswo accens (0-2) / / 7. Cntlet teoks (2-3) / / p mm - NUREG-1023 24 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997

l ES-30] Transient and Event Checklist Fom ES-301-5 1 OPERATING TEST NO.: Applicant Evolution Minimum Scenario Number Type Type Number 1 2 3 4 ^ Reactivity 1 l Normal 1 Instrument 2 RO Comoonent 2 \\ Major 1 Reactivity 1 l Normal 0 Instrument 1 As RO Component 1 Major ] SRO-I Reactivity 0 Normal 1 As SRO Instrument 1 Component 1 Major 1 Reactivity 0 Norinal 1 SRO-U Instrument 1 Component 1 Major 1 Instructions: (1) ^ Enter the operating test number and Fom ES-D-1 event numbers for each evolution type. (2) Reactivity manipulations must be significant as defined in Appendix D. Author: Chief Examiner: l NUREG-1021 25 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 \\

4 P l / ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 i Applicant #1 Applicant #2 . Applicant #3 RO/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U RO/SRO-I/SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 understand and Interpret Annunciators and Alarms Diagnose Events i and Conditions Understand Plant ) and System Response Comply With and Use P ocedures (1) Operate Control l Boards (2) Communicate and I Interact With~the Crew I Demonstrate Supervisory Ability (3) Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3) Notes: (1) Includes Techhical Specification compliance for an R0. (2) Optional for an SRO-U. (3) Only applicable to SR0s. Instructions: Circle the applicant's license type and enter the event numbers that test the competency for each scenario in the set. Author: Chief Examiner: NUREG-1021 26 of 26 Interim Rev. 8, January 1997 -}}