ML20153E628
| ML20153E628 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 08/29/1988 |
| From: | Bess J, Garrison D, Holler E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153E606 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-498-88-47, 50-499-88-47, NUDOCS 8809060370 | |
| Download: ML20153E628 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000498/1988047
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APPENDIX B
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0hMISSION
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REGION IV
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NRC Inspection Report:
50-498/88-47
Operating License: NPF-76'
50-499/88-47
ConstructionPermit(CP):.CPPR-129
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Dockets: 50-498
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50 499
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Licensee:
Houston Lighting & Power Company (HL&P)
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P.O. Box 1700
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Houston, Texas 77001
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Facility Name: South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2 (STP)
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Inspection At: STP, Matagorda County, Texas
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Inspection Conducted:
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Inspectors:
S/11/99'
f.E. Bess,SeniorResidentInspector, Project
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Section D Division of Reactor Projects
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Resident Inspector, Project
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D. L. Garrison
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Section D, Division of Reactor Projects
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Approved:
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E. Holler, Chief. Project Section D.
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Division of Reactor Projects
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Inspectior. Summary
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Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1988 (Report 50-498/88-47)
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Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection included onsite followup of
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events, engineered safety feature system walkdown, monthly surveillance
observation, operational safety verification.
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Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to
perform surveillances in accordance with TS, paragraph 3.a).
Inspection Conducted July 1-31, 1988 (Report 50-499/88-47)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection included observation of
electrical component work and mechanical equipment and process work
observation.
Results: Within the areas inspected, one violation was identified (failure to
implement naintenance requirements in accordance with NRC requirements,
paragraph 7).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
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HL&P
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- W. P. Evans, Licensing Engineer
- T. J. Jordan, Project Quality Assurance Manager
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- M. L. Duke, Engineer
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- D. C. King, Construction Manager, Unit 2
- A. R. Mikus, General Supervisor, Construction
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- S. M. Dew, Manager, Operations Support
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- J. T.. Westermeier, Project Manager
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- J. N. Bakey, Engineer and Licensing Manager
- A. C. McIntyre, Manager, Support and Engineering
- W. A. Randlea, Security Manager
- W. G. We11 born, Supervising Project Engineer
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- S. D. Phillips, Licensing Engineer
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- M. F. Polishak, Licensing Engineer
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- J. E. Geiger, General Manager, Nuclear Assurance
- G. L. Parkey, Plant Superintendent, Unit 2
- M. A. Garcia, ECI Construction
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- S. M. Head, Supervisor, Licensing Engineer
- W. H. Kinsey, Plant Manager
Bechtel
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- R. W. Miller, Project Quality Assurance Manager
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- K. P. McNeal, Project Quality Assurance Engineer
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- R. D. Bryan, Construction Manager
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Ebasco
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- D. D. White Construction Manager
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P. Rosen Site Manager
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In addition to the above, the NRC inspectors also held discussions with
various licensee, architect engineer (AE), constructor and other
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contractor personnel during this inspection.
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- Denotes those individuals attending the exit interview conducted on
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August 1, 1988
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2.
Plant Status
South "sexas Project (STP), Unit 1, reached 75 percent power on July 6,
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1988. Following the successful completion of the large load reduction
(75 percent power to 25 percent power) test on July 17, 1988, reactor
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power was reduced to approximately 6 percent to allow maintenance on the
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High Pressure Turbine Generator Governor Valve No.1. The valve indicated
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erratic seating position during power escalation. After maintenance and
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retesting of the valve, the licensee resumed power escalation to
75 percent. On July 19, 1988, at 9:24 a.m., the reactor tripped from
54 percent power, and the plant was brought to Hot Standby. The trip was
caused by an !&C Technician resetting the wrong Quality Display Parameter
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System (QDPS) train.
The licensee wili report this incident in greater
detail pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73.
Following the completion of an
investigation as to the cause of the trip, the licensee resumed power
operation and reached a power level of 100 percent of rated reactor
thennal power on July 27, 1988. On July 28, 1988, the reactor was
the ability of the
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manually tripped from 100 percent power to verify (a requirement for tie
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to sustain a trip from 100 percent reactor power
initial startu) testing at 100 percent power plateau).
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criteria for t1e test appeared to have been met, and the primary systen
functioned as designed.
The licensee planned to stay in Hot Standby
(Mode 3) for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> to repair steam leaks and other
required maintenance before resuming power operation. At the close of
this inspection period Unit 1 was in Hot Standby.
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STP, Unit 2, is 97 percent complete. Hot functional Testing started on
July 15, 1988. On July 22, 1988, the plant was brought to cold shutdown
to replace the number 1 seal in Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) 1C.
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replacement was completed on July 28, 1988. At the c19se of this
inspection period, Unit 2 RCS temperature was 250 degrees F and RCS
pressure was 350 psig.
3.
Onsite Followup of Events - Unit 1
(93702)
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a.
Failure to Meet Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements
During this inspection period, there were two instances where TS
surveillances were not perfonned at the time required. The Mcensee
has previously implemented corrective actions to preclude such
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incidents. The two cases are discussed below'
On June 23, 1988, during a review of plant surveillance data-base,
the licensee discovered that surveillances pertaining to TS
Surveillance Requirements 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.2.1 were scheduled with a
method that could result in inappropriate staggering of test
intervals. Further reviews by the licensee determined that the
surveillance tests for the reactor trip breakers under voltage and
shunt trip devices did not meet the staggered test basis requirement
from June 20-23, 1988. The licensee identified the causes and
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corrective actions in Licensee Event Report (LER)68-040.
On July 12, 1988, the licensee discovered that the surveillance test
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to verify that fuel oil particulate contamination was within
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acceptable limits on No. 11 Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) Diesel
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Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank had been missed. TS Surveillance
Requinnent 4.8.1.1.2.d requires this test to be perfonned every
31 days. The test was due on July 10, 1988. The Shift Supervisor
was notified at approximately 9:45 a.m. on July 12, 1988, that the
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test had not been performed and the No. 11 ESF Diesel was declared
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Imediate actions were taken to perform the required
surveillance. The results of the test were satisfactory and the
No.11 Emergency Safety Feature Diesel Generator was declared
operable at 11:14 c.m. on July 12, 1988. The licensee intends to
identify the causes and corrective actions in LER 88-043, which is
due on or about August 11, 1988.
TS 4.0.1 states, in part, that surveillance requirements shall be met
during the operational modes or other conditions specified in
individualLimitingConditionsforOperations(LCOs).
Contrary to
this requirement, the licensee has demonstrated failure to comply
with surveillance requiren.ents as illustrated by the examples above.
Between March 11 and June 13, 1988, three other examples of the
licensee's failure to adequately implement TS surveillance
requirements occurred (LER 88-023,88-035,and88-038).
Corrective
actions implemented to date do not appear to be effective in
preventing failure to meet surveillance requirenents. This is an
apparent violation (498/8847-01).
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4.
Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) System Walkdown - Unit 1 (71710)
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The NRC inspector conducted a walkdown of the accessible portions of Train
"B" of the Component Cooling Water (CCW) System to independently verify
the operability of the system. A review was perfonned to confirm that the
licensee's system operating procedure matched plant drawings and the
as-built configuration.
Equipment condition, valve position,
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housekeeping, labeling, an0 support subsystems essential to actuation of
the system were inspected.
The NRC inspector identified the following items to licensee management:
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The label on Breaker ElB2B2 indicated as follows, "CCW to Charging
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Pump Return." The CCW electrical lineup indicated this breaker
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supplied power to the CCW Return Header Isolation from Charging Pumps
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Cooler,
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The label on Breaker E181F1 indicated as follows, "CCW to Charging
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Pump Supply Valve." The CCW electrical lineup indicated this breaker
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supplied power to the Moter Operated Isolation from CCW Train "B" to
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Charging Pumps Cooler.
The label on Breaker E18281 indicated as follows, "CCW Pump 10
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Cubicle Cooler Fan llB." The CCW electrical lineup indicated this
breaker supplied power to the CCW Pump 1B Cubicle Cooling Fan 118.
The label on Breaker ElB4B2 indicated as follows, "CCW Pump Essential
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Chiller Area Supply Fan Room." The CCW electrical lineup indicated
this breaker supplied power to the CCW Pump Essential Chiller Area
Supply Fan Coil Unit.
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The above listed discrepancies did not render the CCW System inoperable;
however, they were examples of lack of attention to detail.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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Monthly Surveillance Observation - Unit 1
(61726)
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The NRC inspector observed selected portions of the surveillances listed
below to verify that the activities were being perfonned in accordance
with the TS and surveillance procedures.
The applicable procedures were
reviewed for adequacy, test instrumentation was verified to be in calibra-
tion, and test data was reviewed for accuracy and completeness. The
inspector ascertained that identified deficiencies were properly reviewed
and resolved.
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Procedure 1 PSP 06-DJ-0001. Revision 6. "125 Volt Class 1E Battery
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7-Day Surveillance Test." The NRC inspector witnessed data
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acquisition and verified specific gravity checks on Unit 1 Class 1E
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batteries. The NRC inspector noted that the results were within TS
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limits.
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b.
Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0001 Revision 5 "Standby Diesel 11 Operability
Test." The NRC inspector observed pcrtions of Test
Procedure 1 PSP 03-DG-0001 on Standby Diesel Generator 11 and verified
that the Diesel Generator performed in accordance with the TS. The
NRC inspector verified that data acquired was accurate and complete.
No discrepancies were identified.
c.
Procedure 1 PSP 02-FW-0574. Revision 1. "Steam Generator Narrow Range
Level Alarms." The NRC inspector witnessed performance of
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this procedure and verified that the procedure was followed
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sequentially,
Data was properly documented.
No problems were
identified.
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No violations or deviations were identified.
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Operational Safety Verification - Unit 1
(71707)
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The objectives of this portion of the inspection were to verify that the
facility is being operated safely and in confonnance with regulatory
requirements, management controls are effective, selected activities of
the licensee's radiological protection programs are implemented in
compliance with regulatory requirements, and to verify licensee compliance
with the approved physical security plan.
The hRC inspector observed control room activity on a daily basis to
verify that control room staffing, operator behavior, shift turnover,
adherence to TS LCOs and overall control room decorum were being conducted
in accordance with NRC requirements.
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Inspections were conducted throughout the plant to observe work in
progress. Radiological work practices, posting of barriers, and the
correct use of dosimetry were observed.
Four Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs) were reviewed.
A review of the four RWPs was made to detemine whether the work process
was cone in a safe manner and under controlled conditions.
The NRC
inspector also verified that the RWPs contained information which
referenced job description, radiation levels, contamination levels,
respiratory protect ve equipment, dosimetry, and expiration dates.
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No violations or detiations were identified.
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7.
Electrical Component: Unit 2 (51053)
An inspection of various electrical components was performed to assess the
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adequacy of the installation and workmanship. The inspection focused on
basic installation practices, storage requirements, and an assessment of
any damage or deterioration.
The following equipment was inspected for installation; cleanliness;
damge; termination of cables; condition of terminal boards, fans, motors,
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closure panels and doors; maintenance; and general overall condition.
Cable and cable tray C2XE6-CT-EAB at elevation 79 feet in the
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Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB) - This tray carries "C" train
power cables through the plant.
High range radiation alam controls in the EAB at elevation 65 feet
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in lhe electrical penetration room - This panel is designated
CMA-R1-8051A and was turned over for startup testing.
heutron Flux Amplifier 4Z3522-IP-686 at elevation 65 feet in the
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CAB - This equipment had components removed for use in Unit 1;
however, the status of the unit was in accordance with site
placedures. The electronics were subjected to the construction
environtrent because an excess of large, nonterminated cable coming
into the equipment prevented closing the door. The licensee took
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immediate corrective action to protect this piece of equipment.
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Electrical penetration Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, and 64 in the
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EAB penetration room at elevation 60 plus - These units were
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inspected for general condition and gas purge. The NRC inspector
noted that some penetration cabinets had covers removed for several
days which allowed the internals to become covered with construction
dust. This condition was immediately corrected by the licensee.
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NRC inspector also noted that the nitrogen gas pressure in the
penetrations was as follows:
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No.
pressure (psig)
No.
Pressure (psig)
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11
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30
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56
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48
55
57
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64
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The NRC inspector detennined that the' constructor had maintained
nitrogen gas pressures in the penetration assemblies between 30 and
65 psig prior to March 1983. These pressures were checked monthly by
the construction maintenance department.
In March 1988 these itcms
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were turned over to the licensee operations maintenance department.
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The operations maintenance department has not picked up these items
for continued maintenance and had not written a maintenance procedure
to cover the items.
(Procedure FM EM-1-PH87016768 "Inspect
Electrical Penetrations" has been implemented for the same activity
inUnit1.) Thisisanapparentviolation(50/499-8849-02).
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Auxiliary Relay Panel 3E252 ERR 114 and the hydrogen recombiner power
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supply at elevation 65 feet in the EAB
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Tennination Cabinets 3E122ETC80 2. -3, -4, and -5 at elevation
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65 feet in the cable vault - These units are lacking shields, which
preclude the entry of contaminants; however, they are acceptable at
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4160 volt switchgear for High Head Safety Injections (HHSI) Pump
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Motor "B" No. 3E152ESGOElB at elevation 32 feet in the EAB - This
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unit was inspected visually on the outside for damage to panels and
cable entry.
Battery chargers at elevation 32 feet in room 213 - These units were
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under control of the Nuclear Power Operations Department (NP00).
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This room had been recently painted. All related equipment in the
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room was in a satisfactory condition.
During the inspection, the NRC inspector noted that the status of the high
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radiation alann, 4160V switchgear, and the battery charging equipment were
not in accordance with licensee procedures. This is an additional example
ofapreviousviolation(50/499-8824-01) for which the licensee is
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implementing corrective action,
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Safety-Related Components and Process Work Observations - Unit 2 (50073)
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The NRC inspector examined the following rechanical equipment and work
processes as a part of general plant inspections concerning standard work
practices or conditions of equipment and structures.
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Essential Cooling Water (ECW) Chillers (3V112VCH))at elevation
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70 feet in the Nechanical Auxiliary Building (MAB - These three
units are York 300 ton capacity units driven by Roliance electric
motors. One unit was in operation during the inspection and two were
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on standby. The NRC inspector observed that the motor bearing
temperature sensors were not wired, nor could an ininediate status of
this item be determined. The NRC inspector brought this matter to
the attention of the licensee.
CCW pumps, motors, and coolers - The "B" train of the three units was
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operating. Maintenance was being perfonned on the "A" and "C" units.
The NRC inspector visually inspected the units for oil levels,
external damage, leakage, and general condition.
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Small bore ECW bronze pipe fabrication - This system has been subject
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to deterioration and leaking because of the dealuminization of cast
materials.
The licensee has removed the deficient cast components
and is replacing these parts with forged fittings. The NRC inspector
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reviewed the work in the MAB and materials in the fabrication shop.
Diesel Generator No. 23 - This unit, which is one of three, is a
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Cooper KSV Turbocharged V20, 7650 H.P. Diesel Generator. The unit
has been the subject of several inspections during this reporting
period. After a recent test run, maintenance was perfomed which
required removal of two fuel injector lines and turning over of the
engine. On turning the engine, water was observed coming out of the
injector bosses in two heads.
These two heads were removed and found
to be cracked. On further investigation, all 20 heads were removed,
and a total of 18 were found to be cracked.
Further review found that the timing chain was two notches off, which
represented a timing error of approximately 20 degrees advance.
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licensee has issued a purchase order to the manufacturer,
Cooper-Bessirner, to examine the rods, bearings, crankshaft, and other
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moving corrponents. The resident inspector will follow the licensee's
actions including any licensee reports regarding the matter.
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Coatings - At this time, the paint / coating activity is at a maxirnum
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in all areas of Unit 2.
The NRC inspector observed the work on the
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bridge crane, EAB fire doors, and electrical cabinets in the battery
charger room (213) at elevation 32 feet. Additionally, the floor
preparation in the reactor containment building at elevation -11 feet
was inspected.
Insulation - Insulation installation is progressing in all piping
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areas. The NRC inspector examined the in-process work at
elevation 29 feet in the MAB. The work was checked for condition of
pipe, cutting, fit, wiring, and sheathing.
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Security facilities - Construction of the west gate security i;uilding
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has been inspected on several occasions. The structure appears to
meet standard construction practices for the structural steel portion
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of the building and specific design engineering drawings for the
secured portion. Also, the installation of the ultrasonic detection
system within the double fence appears to be satisfactory.
No violations or deviations were identified.
9.
Exit Interview
The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in
paragraph 1) on August 1,1988, and summarized the scope and findings of
the inspection. Other meetings between NRC inspectors and licensee
management were held periodically during the inspection to discuss
identified concerns. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of
t.)e infornation provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors during this
inspection.
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