ML20153C538

Recommends That Commission Approve Notice of Proposed Rulemaking That Would Amend 10CFR50 to Set Out Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading & Initial Low Power Operation

ML20153C538
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/20/1988
From:	Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:
Shared Package
ML20153C481	List: ML20153C477 ML20153C538
References
TASK-RINV, TASK-SE SECY-88-109, NUDOCS 8805060242
Download: ML20153C538 (25)

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RULEMAKING ISSUE April 20, 1988 SECY-88-109 For: The Comissioners From: Victor Stello, Jr.

Executive Director for Operations

Subject:

EMERGENCY PmANNING AND PREPAREDNESS REQUIREMENTS FCR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FUEL LOADING AND INITIAL LOW-POWER OPERATIONS (PROPOSED RULE)

Background:

On August 19, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission published revised and upgraded emergency planning regulations culminating a process that had been initiated by the events at Three Mile Island. See 45 FR 55402.

Less than two years later, the Comission revisited those regulations in order to clarify them in two respects, one of them central to the Comission's current proposed

' rule. The other, whether emergency preparedness exercises may be litigated in Comission proceedings, has since been resolved that they may [See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F. 2d 1437 (D.C. Circ.1984),

cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Union of Concerned Scientists, 469 U. S. 1132 (1985)] and is not relevant to the rule proposed in this notice.

The Conmission recognized that its 1980 rulemaking had not addressed the subject of low power operations and had not differentiated with respect to whether and to what extent emergency planning requirements should be applicable to' fuel '.oading and low power (up to 5% of rated power) testing. The Comission then issued a proposed rule for coment (46 FR 61132) and thereafter on J71y 13, 1982 promulgated as a final rule a new section 50.47(d) to provide that only a finding as to the adequacy of applicant's onsite emergency planning and preparedness is required for low power. 47 FR 30232.

Nonetheless, the Comission provided that review of an applicant's onsite emergency plan would involve aspects of some offsite elements.

Contacts: Martin G. Halsch 0GC 492-1740 Mike Jamgochian, RES 492-3918 8805060242 880502 PDR SECY 88-109 PDR

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More specifically, the Commission'1said in the rule preamble (but not in the rule itself) that prior to low power it would review the following offsite aspects of applicant's plans:

a) Section 50.4'(b)(3). Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accomodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

b) Section 50.47(b)(5). Procedures have been es.tablished for notification, by the licensee, of State and local resporae organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the ccntent of initial and follow up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

c) Section 50.47(b)(6). Provisions exist for prompt comunications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

d) Section50.47(b)(8). Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

e) Section50.47(b)(9). Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

f) Secticn 50.47(L)(12). Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individuals.

g) Section 50.47(b)(15). Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

The foundation for the July 1982 rule change was the Comission's determination that the degree of emergency planning.and preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety is significantly less than that required for full power operation in light of the significantly lower risks associated with even low likelihood accidents at that state. 47 FR at 30233 (See also n.1 citing conclusions that low power risk is several orders of magnitude less than full power risk according to staff evaluations in several operating license cases).

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Discussion: Recently attention has been refocused on the emergency preparedness requirements for low power operation. This is so because existing siren systems that were to serve 1 for prompt notification throughout the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook offsite emergency planning zone  ;

in the event of an accident with potential offsite consequences had been or were about to be dismantled.

The absence of a prompt notification system was brought i to the attention of the Appeal Board which, entertaining ,

the matter in the first instance rather than as appellate reviewer, reopened the record in the Seabrook operating license proceeding for litigation of contentions related ,

to the absence of a prompt notification system. '

l Moreover, the Appeal Board held that low power testing must await the resolution of those issues before an l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. ALAB-833, slip op, at 18-24.

Petitions for Comission review of the Appeal Board decision were then timely filed with the Comission.

This was the first time that contested issues regarding

. compliance with any of the seven offsite elements of

.appliccat's onsite plans (item (a)-(g) above) had come before the Commission.

The Comission itself had not until then had occasion to j apply and interpret this aspect of the 1982 rule change in an adjudicatory hearing context.

A. The Need for Rulemaking The staff reexamined the July 1982 rule change in 3rder to determine whether there 1.s any safety basis for continuing public notification as a requirement for low power, and if there was not, whether further rule changes were needed. As a part of this rulemaking consideration, the staff reevaluated and sees no reason to doubt the safety rationale statad by the Comission in promulgating its 1982 rule. Although at low power plant operators typically have less experience and there is a greater potential for undiscovered defects, the risk to public health and safety at low power is significantly lower than at full power as a result of several factors. Those reasons were stated earlier by the Comission as follows:

First, the fission product inventory during initial low power testing is much less than during higher power operation due to the low level of reactor power and short period of operation. Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of systems

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4 designed to mitigate the' consequences of accidents com-pared to the required capacities under full-power opera-tion. The staff notes that the regulatory requirements for safety systems during reactor power operation, including containment intagrity, emergency core cooling, and redun-dant power supplies are the same for 5% power operation as they are for 100% power. Third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power.

This means the operators should have sufficient time to prevent a radioactive release from occurrin In the worst case, the additional time available (g. at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />), even for a postulated low likelihood sequence which could eventually result in relaase of the fission products accumulated at low power into the contaimcnt, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the site. 47 Fed. Reg. 30233.

The safety basis for the 1982 rule was reviewed. The analyses done at that time are still applicable. The staff reexamined the need at low power to review those aspects of applicants' onsite plans that seem relevant only to offsite protective measures that may be needed if there were an accident with offsite dose effects.

Several considerations recommend the choice of a rulemaking forum for this effort rather than address these factors in the first instance in the context of the Seabrook adjudication. First, and most important, the question is essentially a generic safety question with applicability to all pending and future applications for fuel loading and low power, and the belief that the proposal should be subjected to a broader spectrum of j public coment than simply the litigants in the Seabrook 1 case. Second, to the extent that offsite preparedness is required b_any reviewlow efore initial bearing on power, including a limited review of applicants' plans as contemplated by this proposed rule, the current rule language codified in 10 CFR 50.47(d) is misleading in that it suggests that no such review is needed.

B. The Proposed Rule The proposed rule requires NRC findings on the applicant's onsite plan and only those offsite elements '

of that plan which could reasonably be expected to be

.needed in the event of a radiological emergency at low power. The principal focus of these requirements is on such coordination by applicants with offsite agencies as may be necessary to bring offsite personnel and equipment to the site to a11tigate and contain the accident. For i l

5 example, offsite fire equipment and medical services may be needed to deal with a fire and to treat injured plant workers. A secondary focus of such requirements is on coordination with offsite agencies to ensure that offsite authorities are kept informed of plant status, including details of the er:ergency and of the onsite response so that they can be of maximum assistance to the response l and can respond fully and accurately to questions from i the media and the public. The offsite elements include l establishing arrangements for requesting and using '

offsite assistance resources on site as well as i arrangements to accommodate State and local staff (or appropriate members of the utility emergency organization) at the near-site emergency facility, and identifying other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response. I I

They also include establishing procedures for licensee )

notification of State and local response organizations, i provisions for prompt comunications among principal response organizations to offsita emergency personnel who

. would be responding to onsite emergencies; providing .  !

adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support  !

the emergency response planned onsite; providing adequate I methods, systems, and equipment for assessment and i monitoring of actual or potential offsite consequences; making arra.ngements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals on site, and providing radiological emergency response training to those offsite who may be called on to assist in an emergency onsite.

It has been difficult on at least initial consideration for the staff to discover a continued need before low power for review of prompt (within minutes) notification of the public when a worst case analysis of a low likelihood accident at low power would appear to recognize that such notice would be far in excess of what would reasonably be needed. Under the proposed rule, review would not be required before low power operations to establish compliance with the full power standard which requires that means be established to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. For low pcwer, to the extent persons offsite beco.ce concerned about an accident and its potential effects, plans will ~

be in place for the licensee to keep offsite. planning and response agencies fully informed of the details of the emergency, and licensees, in conjunction with these offsite agencies, can keep the media and the public informed. Other offsite as plans,aslistedin(a)-(g)pectsofapplicants'onsite above from the 1982 rule l

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6 preamble, have been modified-to reflect the proper focus of offsite coordination for low power operations, and inserted into the rule itself.

Alternatives: For the ConrAssion to address the. emergency planning and preparedness requirements for initial Fuel Loading and Low Power Operations in the context of the Seabrook adjudication.

Coordination: OGC has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection.

Recomendation: That the Comission:

1. Approve a notice of proposed rulemaking (Enclo'sure

1) that would amend 10 CFR Part 50 to set out emergency preparedness requirements for nuclear power plant fuel loading and initial low power operation.

2. Certify that this rule, if promulgated, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities in order to satisfy the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act [5 U.S.C.605(b)].

3. Note:

a. The proposed rule would be published in the Federal Register for a 30-day public coment period.

b. Appropriate Congressional comittees will be notified of the proposed rule change,

c. An environmental assessment prepared in connection with the subject amendment indicates 1 that the proposed rule would not have j substantive or significant environmental impact. (Encl. 2)

d. The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration will be informed of the certification regarding economic impact on small entities and the reasons for it as -

required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. .

e. That this proposed rule contains no information I collection requirements subject to the Papentork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 etseq.). ,

f. A public announcement will be issued when the proposed rule is filed with the Office of the Federal Register.

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g. A regulatory analysis has been prepared (Enclosure 3).

Sunshine Act: .Reconsnend consideration at an open meeting.

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Victor Stello, Jr.'

Executive Director for Operations

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

2. Environmental Assessment

3. Regulatory Analysis l

l Commissioners' comments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by c.o.b. Wednesday, May 4, 1988.

Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted I to the Commissioner's NLT Wednesday, April 27, 1988, with an information copy to the Office of the Secretary. {

If the paper j is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the l l

Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.

DISTRIBUTION: 1 Commissioners '

OGC OI OIA GPA i REGIONAL OFFICES l EDO l ACRS l ASI.BP ASLAP SECY l

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ENCLOSURE 1 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading and Initial Low-Power Operations AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule and request for comment.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend its regulations to establish more clearly what emergency planning and preparedness requirements are needed for fuel loading and low power operation of nuclear power plants. Current rules provide for a finding prior to fuel loading and low power on the licensee's plans and state of preparedness for dealing with accidents that could affect persons onsite.

Current rules also provide that no finding regarding the planning or preparedness of offsite agencies for dealing with accidents that could affect persons offsite is required at this stage. The Commission is not proposing to change these aspects of the em rent rules. However, practice j e

under the current rule has been to consider aise, as part of review of licensees' plans, certain offsite elements of those plans that seem unnecessary for low power operation in view of the low degree of risk posed to offsite persons by fuel loading and low power operation (up to 5% of '

rated power). It is the purpose of this public rulemaking to consider whether this practice should be discontinued or modified. Specifically, the Commission is considering amending Section 50.47(d) to include as prerequisites for low l

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3 power operation, seven standards with offsite aspects that are believed I

to be appropriate for fuel loading and low power operation. The capability ,

for prompt notification'of the surrounding populace (as distinct from the capacity to keep offsite emergency planning agencies informed l promptly of plant accidents) is not included in the rule as a requirement for fuel load and low power operations. Nothing in this proposed rule is intended to change the emergency planning standards which must be satisfied before operations at full power.

DATES: The comment period expires [30 days after publication in the .,

FEDERALREGISTER]. Coments filed after this date will be considered if l practical to do so, but only those coments filed on or before this date can be assured of consideration.

ADDRESSES: Coments may be sent to the Secretary of the Commission, Attention: Docketing and Service Branch, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, or may be hand-delivered to either the Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, or the Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, between the hours of 1

8:30 a.m. and 4:45 p.m. weekdays. 1 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Martin G. Malsch, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Washington, D.C. 20555; 1

telephone (301) 492-1740, or Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear ~

Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. )

20555; telephone (301) 492-3918, 2

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• 4 SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

i A. Background On August 19, 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Comission published revised and upgraded emergency planning regulations culminating a process that had been initiated by the events at Three Mile Island. See 45 FR )

55402. Less than two years later, the Comission revisited those regulations in order to clarify them in two respects, one of them central to the Comission's current proposed rule.

Specifically, the Comission recognized that its 1980 rulemaking had ,

not addressed the subject of low p'ower operations and had not differentiated with respect to whether and to what extent emergency planning requirements should be applicable to fuel loading and icw power (up to 5% of rated power) testing. The Comission then issued a proposed l rule for coment (46 FR 61132) and thereafter on July 13, 1982 ,

promulgated as a final rule a new section 50.47(d) to provide that only a finding as to the adequacy of applicant's onsite emergency planning and preparedness is required for low power. 47 FR 30232. Nonetheless, the Comission pro'vided that review of an applicant's onsite emergency plan would involve aspects of some offsite elements. More specifically, the Comission said in the rule preamble (but not in the rule itself) that prior to low power it would review the following offsite aspects of applicant's plans:

• The other, whether emergency preparedness exercises may be litigated in Comission proceedings, has since been resolved that they may (See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735.F. 2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.

1984), cert. denied sub nom. Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Union of Concerned Scientists, 469 U.S.1132 (1985)) and is not relevant to the rule proposed in this notice.

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(a) Section 50.47(b)(3). Arrangements for I requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and  !

local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency l Operations Facility have been made, and other i organizations capable of augmenting the planned 4 response have been identified. l (b) Section 50.47(b)(5). Procedures have been l established for notification, by the licensee, of State l and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure l

pathway) Emergency (c Section PlanningProvisions 50.47(b)(6). Zone have exist been forestablished, prompt comunications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

(d) Section 50.47(b)(8). Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

(e)Section50.47(b)(9). Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring I actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

(f)Section.50.47(b)(12). Arrangements are made for medical services for contaminated injured individusis.

(g) Section 50.47(b)(15). Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency. j The foundation for the July 1982 rule change was the Comission's determination that the degree of emergency planning and preparedness necessary to provide adequate protection of the public health and safety is significantly less than that required for full power operation in light of the significantly lower risks associated with even low 1

likelihood accidents at that stage. 47 FR at 30233 (See also n.1 citing ccnclusions that icw power risk is several orders of magnitude less than full power risk according to staff evaluations in several operating license cases).

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'd B. Comission Consideration of the Appeal Board's Decision in Seabrook, Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-883 (February 3, 1988).

Recently the Comission has had its attention refocused on the emergency preparedness requirements for low power operation. This is so because existing siren systems that were to serve for prompt notification throughout the Massachusetts portion of the Seabrook offsite emergency planning zone in the event of an accident with potential offsite consequences had been or were about to be dismantled. The absence of a prompt notification system was brought to the attention of the Appeal Board which, entertaining the matter in the first instance rather than as appellate reviewer, reopened the record in the Seabrook operating license proceeding for litigation of contentions related to the absence of a prompt notification system. Moreover, the Appeal Board held that low power testing must await the resolution of those issues before an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. ALAB-833, slip op. at 18-24.

Petitions for Comission review of the Appeal Board decision were then timely filed with the Comission. This was the first time that contested issues regarding compliance with any of the seven offsite elements of applicants' onsite plans (items (a)-(g) above) had come before the Comission.

The Comission itself had not until then had occasion to apply and interpret this aspect of the 1982 rule change in an adjudicatory hearing context.

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i C. The Need for Rulemaking Related to its consideration o.f whether to take review of the need l

for a prompt notification system in Seabrook prior to low power, the Comission reexamined the July 1982 rule change in order to determine whether there is any safety basis for continuing public notification as a l requirement for low power, and if there was not, whether further rule changes were needed. As a part of this rulemaking consideration, the Comission reevaluated and sees no reason to doubt the safety rationale j stated by the Comission in promulgating its 1982 rule. Although at low power plant operators typically have less. experience and there is a~

greater potential for undiscovered defects, the risk to public health and safety at low power is sigrificantly lower than at full power as a result of several factors. Those reasons were stated earlier by the Comission as follows: First, the fission product inventory during low power testing is much less than 'during higher power operation due to the low  !

level of reactor power and short period of operation. Second, at low power there is a significant reduction in the required capacity of systems designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents compared to the required capacities under full-power operation. The Comission notes that the regulatory requirements for safety systems during reactor power i

operation, including containment integrity, emergency core cooling, and l redundant power supplies are the same for 5% power operation as they are j for 100% power. Third, the time available for taking actions to identify accident causes and mitigate accident consequences is much longer than at full power. This means the operators should have sufficient time to l 1

. prevent a radioactive release from occurring. In the worst case, the additional time available (at least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />), even for a postulated low likelihood sequence which could eventually result in release of the 6

fission products accumulated at low power into the containment, would allow adequate precautionary actions to be taken to protect the public near the sitel (47 Fed. Reg. 30233).

l The safety basis for the 1982 rule was reviewed. The analyses done i l

at that time are still applicable. The Comission reexamined the need at l 1

low power to review those aspects of applicants' onsite plans that seem j relevant only to offsite protective measures that may be needed if there were an accident with offsite dose effects. Several considerations recomend the choice of a rulem.aking forum for this effort rather than address these factors in the first instance in the context of the Seabrook adjudication. First, and most important, the question is essentially a generic safety question with applicability to all pending l and future applications for fuel loading and low power, and she Comission should subject its proposal to a broader spectrum of public coment than simply the litigants in the Seabrook case. Second, to the

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i extent that g y review bearing on offsite preparedness is required before l low power, includirq i!mited review of applicants' plans as contemplated by this proposed rule, the current rule language codified in 10 CFR 50.47(d) is misleading in that it suggests that no such review is needed. .

1 The level of risk associated with low-power operation has been estimated by the staff in several recent operating license cases: .

Diablo Canyon, Docket Nos. 275-OL, 323-OL, San Onofre, Docket Nos.  !

361-OL, 362-OL, Shoreham, Sequoyah, TMI-1 and LaSalle, Docket Nos. I 373-OL, 374-OL. In each case the Safety Evaluation Report concluded that low-power risk is several orders of magnitude less than full-power risk. These findings support the general conclusion in the text that a number of factors associated with low-power -

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, operation imply greatly reduced risk compared with full power.

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D. The Proposed Rule The proposed rule requires NRC findings on the applicant's onsite plan and only those offsite elements of that plan which could reasonably be expected to be needed in the event of a radiological emergency at low power. The principal focus of these requirements is on such coordination-by applicants with offsite agencies as may be necessary to bring offsite personnel and equipment to the site to mitigate and contain the accident.

For example, offsite fire equipment and medical services may be needed to  !

deal with a fire and to treat injured plant workers. A secondary focus of such requirements is on coordination with offsite agencies to ensure that offsite authorities are kept informed of plant status, including details of the emergency and of the onsite response so that they can be of maximum assistance to the response and can respond fully and accurately to questions froi he media and the public. The offsite elements include establishing arrangements for requesting and using offsite assistance resources on site as well as arrangements to accomodate State and local staff (or appropriate members of the utility l i

emergency organization) at the near-site emergency facility, and I identifying other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response.

They also include establishing procedures for licensee notification of State and local response organizations, provisions for prompt communications among principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel who would be responding to onsite emergencies; providing adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response planned onsite; providing adequate vathods, systems, and equipment for assessment and monitoring of actust or potential 8

offsite consequences; makinp arrangements for medical services for contaminated injured individuals on si,te, and providing radiological emergency response training to those offsite who may be called on to assist in an emergency onsite.

It has been difficult on at least initial consideration for the ConnMsion to discover a continued need before low power for review of prompt (within minutes) notification of the public when a worst case analysis of a low likelihood accident at low power would appear to recognize that such notice would be far in excess of what would reasonably be needed.

Under the proposed rule, review would not be required before low power operations to establish compliance with the full power standard which requires that means be established to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. For low power, to the extent persons offsite become concerned about an accident and its potential effects, plans will be in place for licensee to keep offsite planning and response agencies fully infonned of the details of the emergency, and licensees, in conjunction with these offsite agencies, can keep the media and the public informed.

Other offsite aspects of applicants' onsite plans, as listed in (a)-

(g) above from the 1982 rule preamble, have been modified to reflect the proper focus of offsite coordination for low power operations, and inserted into the rule itself.

I ENVIRONMENTAL. IMPACT 'I l

There is no significant environmental impact from this rule.

Accordirgly no environmental impact statement is required. An environmental assessment supporting this conclusion may be examined at  ;

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• the Comission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, Washington, D.C.

. 20555.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The proposed rule contains no new information requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 53501 et seq.).

BACKFIT ANALYSIS If this proposed rule becomes final, it will not modify or add to the systems, structures, components, or design of a facility; or the design approval or manufacturing license for a facility; or the '

procedures or organization required to construct or operate a facility.

Therefore the backfit rule does not apply.to this proposed rule and no backfit analysis is required pursuant to 10 CFR 5 50.109(c) for this  !

proposed rule.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT CERTIFICATION The proposed rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. The proposed rule will reduce or at least postpone the procedural burden on NRC licensees by reducing the process required before low power operations'may be comenced. Nuclear power plant licensees do not fall within the definition of small businesses in section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 9 632, the Small Business Size Standards of the Small Business Administration in 13 j CFR Part 121, or the Comission's Size Standards published at 50 FR 50241 (Dec.9,1985). Therefore, in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 9 605(b), the Comission hereby certifies that the proposed rule, if promulgated , will r.ot have a 10

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities and that, therefore, a regulatory flexibility' analysis need not be prqared.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Comission has prepared a regulatory analysis for the proposed rule assessing the costs and benefits and resource impacts. It ray be examined at the Comission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20555.

LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, and' Reporting requirements.

For the reasons set out in the preamble and under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 6 553, the Comission is proposing to amend 10 CFR Part 52 6 50.47(d) to read as follows:

1. The authority citation for Part 50 reads as follows:

Authority: Secs. 103, 104, 161, 182, 183, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2239); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1243, 1244, 1246 (42 U.S.C.

5841,5842,5846), unless otherwise noted. Section 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152). Sections 50.80-50.81 also issuedundersec.184,68 Stat.954,asamended(42U.S.C.2234).

Sections 50.100-50.102 issuedundersec.186,68 Stat.955(42U.S.C.

2236). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2273), 5 50.54(i) issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949 (42 U.S.C.

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2201(i)),is50.70,50.71,and50.78issuedundersec. 1610, 68 Stat.

950, as amended; (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)), and the laws referred to in Appendices.

2. In 5 50.47, paragraph (d) is revised. The revision is to read as follows:

(d) Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, and except as specified by this subsection, no NRC or FDtA review, findings, or detenninations concerning the state of offsite emergency preparedness or the adequacy of and capability to implement State and local offsite emergency plans are required prior to issuance of an operating license authorizing only fuel loading or low power operations (up to 5% of the rated power). Insofar as emergency planning and preparedness requirements are concerned, a license authorizing fuel loading or low power operation or both may be issued after a finding is made by the NRC that the state of onsite emergency preparedness provides l reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. The NRC will base this finding on its assessment of the applicant's onsite emergency plans againstthepertinentstandardsinparagraph(b)ofthisSectionand Appendix E. Review of applicant's onsite plans will consider only the j following standards with offsite aspects:

(1) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using offsite assistance onsite have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's near-site Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned onsite response have been identified.

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'S (2) Procedures have been established for licensee communications j with state and local response organizations; including, initial notification of the declaration of emergency and periodic provision of plant and response status reports.

(3) Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to offsite emergency personnel, who would be responding onsite.

(4) Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response onsite are provided and maintained.

(5) Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are available.

(6) Arrangeme'nts are made for medical services for contaminated and injured onsite individuals.

(7) Radiological emergency response tr'aining has been made available to those offsite who may be called to assist in an emergency onsite. -]

l For the Comission Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission l l

Dated at Washington, D.C.

this day of , 1988 ,

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ENCLOSURE 2 ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR PROPOSED RULE AMENDING 10 CFR 50.47(d)

1. Need for the Proposed Action As explained in the proposed rule preamble, the proposed rule is needed to delineate more carefully what offsite aspects of applicants' emergency plans must be reviewed before low power. s

2. Alternatives as Required by Section 102(2)(E) of NEPA The proposed rule does not entail any unresolved ,

conflict concerning alternative uses of available resources. .

3. The Environmental Impacts of the Proposal and Alternatives The proposed rule focuses solely on risks from nuclear power plants during fuel loading or low power operations (operations at t!p to 5% power). As its preamble explains, the rule is premised on the Consnission's detennination that the risks of fuel loading or operations at low power are extremely low. 'The rule change should effect r,o significant

chsnge on those risks.

Jaause the chance of an accident at low power with ,

off-site consequences is so small as to be remote and  !

speculative, the National Environmental Policy Act does not j require th::ir evaluation in an environmental impact

2 statement or environmental impact appraisal. The alternative of maintaining the current practice would also have no significant environmental impact.

4. Agencies and Persons Consulted

• The proposed rule was developed by the Commission; FEMA was informed about the proposed rule. No other outside agencies or persons were consulted because the rule relates primarily to NRC's exclusive regulatury responsibility to assess the safety of nuclear plant operations and to evaluate applicantc' onsite emergency plans. Of course other agencies a:id persons may comment ,

d'uring the comment period. The proposed rule preamble discusses all the sources used in developi.g the rule change.

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ENCLOSURE 3 REGULATORY ANALYSIS 4

(1) The objective of the proposed rule is to require as prerequisites to fuel loading and initial low power operations )

only those emergency plenning and preparedness requirements that are consistent with the minimal risks associated with those levels of activity.

1 (2) No anticipated changes from adoption of the proposed rule would require any additional activity on the part of licensees or applicants for compliance since the rule does not involve any additional requirements for low power and leaves the requirements for full power unchanged.

(3) There should be no change in the potential risk to the public from an accidental off-site release of radioactive i 1

material since the amourts of such materials at the low power stage are themselves considerably less than at full j power and there is sufficient time to take any measures that might become advisable.

(4) The proposed rule, if adopted, vrould have no potential ,

impact on radiological exposure of facility emplortes since 1

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it retains all the protections of onsite emergency planning and preparedness which are designed for the protection of employees and others onsite.

(5) There should be no installation and continuing costs associated with the proposed rule change.

(6) As the proposed rule's preamble explains, the premise of the rule change is that chere will be no safety impact by the change; the change will merely postpone entil the full power review certain emergency planning and preparedness requirements that have no reasonable relationship to the low power activity. ,

(7) There will be no additional resource burden on the NRC as a result of the proposed rule change, if adopted, since it does not add any requirement on NRC staff and any timing 4

change will have the effect of giving staff more rather than j l

1ess time.  !

(8) There will be no differences in impact of the proposed rule, if adopted, on any facility since the rule does not

. change or add any requirement and simply affects the point (low power versus full power) at which the requirements will ,

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4 apply. That point would not vary because of age or the

design of the plant.  !

(9) The proposed rule change,~if adopted, will be a final

[ rule to be made~ effective as soon as legally pemissible.

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