ML20151Y027
| ML20151Y027 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000601 |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1988 |
| From: | Kenyon T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8805040313 | |
| Download: ML20151Y027 (6) | |
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. April 27, 1988 .
Docket No. 50-601 APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: RESAR SP/90
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING TO DISCUSS REACTOR SYSTEMS CONCERNS FOR RESAR SP/90 On April 21, 1988, representatives of the NRC ar;d Westinghouse Electric Corporation met in Rockville, Maryland to discuss concerns resulting from the staff's review of the reactor systems of RESAR SP/90. Enclosure 1 is a list of meeting attendees.
Enclosure 2 lists review ques: sons that were used as the agenda for the meeting. After discussion of these quescions and Westinghouse responses it was agreed that Westinghouse would respond formally to these questions, and modify the text and former question responses, as appropriate, original signed by Thomas J. Kenyon, Project Manager -
Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, Y and Special Projects
Enclosures:
As stated t DISTRIBUTION:
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,/ April 27, 1988 l Docket No. 50-601 l
APPLICANT: Westinghouse Electric Corporation FACILITY: RESAR SP/90 l
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING TO DISCUSS REACTOR SYSTEMS CONCERNS FOR RESAR SP/90 On April 21, 1988, representatives of the NRC and Westinghouse Electric Corporation met in Rockville, Maryland to discuss concerns resulting from the staff's review of the reactor systems of RESAR SP/90. Enclosure 1 is a list of meeting attendees.
Enclosure 2 lists review questions that were used as the agenda for the meeting. After discussien of these questions ard Westinghouse responses it j was agreed that We:tinchouse would respond formally to these questions, and nodify the text and former question responses, as appropriate.
I t
T as J. Ke , , Project Manager s andardization and Non-Power l Reactor Project Directorate Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, l
V and Special Projects
Enclosures:
- As stated l l I
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Enclosure 1 Attendees REACTOR SYSTEMS MEETING RE5AR SP/90 April 21, 1988
?!ame Organization T. J. Kenyon NRC/NRR/PDSNP L. E. Conway Westinghouse W. M. Schivley Westinghouse Nuclear Safety M. H. Shannon Westinghouse Nuclear Safety C. Y. Liang NRC/NRR/ DEST /SRXB
4 Enclosure 2 Question # Recuested Clarification 440.2 How is the Imroved Thermal Design Procedure (ITOP) factored in tie 2% power as well as the allowances on pressure and temperature? !
440.8 How is the EFW system designed to ensure that any two EFW pumps feed to any two steam generators?
440.13 Under what size LOCA will the steam supply to the turbine driven EFW pump not be available? Discuss the consequences under these accident conditions. ;
440.21 Why does the credible mass input events only include the operation of two centrifugal charging pumps, with the normal letdown isolated?
440.22 A LOCA during RHR mvde may not be limited to a LOCA in a RHR recirculation loop. Discuss the consequences of a LOCA at an RCS loop during RHR mode.
440.41 Your response stated that the most recent decay heat basis (5.4.7) used in determining the SP/90 cooldown is based on ANSI /
ANS-5.1 - 1979, Section 3.6. Confirm that this is more conservttive than the decay heat curves attached to SRP 9.2.5.
440.42 Confirm that the pressurizer PORYs and their control l
{5.4.7) systems are designed to safety grr.de requirements.
Describe procedures for cold shutoown including time required for upper head to reach 350*F prior to RCS l depressurization to prevent upper head voiding during the process. Provide any analysis to backup the 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> total time required for cold shutdown.
440.69 Clarify the response to this question ano describe the (5.4.7) system function with respect to the opening of these isolation valves.
440.72 Mispositioning of a valve is not considered to be an active failure. How does the SP/90 factor this type of failure into its system design?
Why d;es Table 5.4.7-1 not include all possible sirgle ,
failures in the system? (Items c, d, e.....)
440.74 h.(2) Confirm that 5P/90 has incorporated the test headers (5.4.7) and connections for the line connecting valves 9000 and 9001.
Ouestion # Requested Clarification 440.77 What actions will be taken under the scenario described in (5.4.7) your response to this question in responding to RHR pump runout.
440.112 i) What criteria will be used to determine the mesh size (6.3) for the water return from the containment sump to EWST to prevent debris from being carried through pumps and the reactor core?
440.118 Explain why the approach used for other W plants is (6.3) adequate for W Advanced Reactor Design (IP/90).
440.121 Does the FMEA for ECCS consider all active and passive (6.3) failures and operator errors? What is the W definition of a passive failure (broken piping or a leak)7 440.134 The switchover from cold leg to hot leg injection would (6.3) take place one subsystem at a time. Describe the design criteria for the switchover sequence which will be backed up by ECCS analysis. (with respect to flow, timing, etc.)
440.236 What is the design criteria used for sizing of the rupture disc on the pressurizer relief tank? Is the rupture disc sized to accomodate all safety and PORVs lifting per the SRP7 If not, provide justification.
440.245 Require W responses 440.246 Require further clarification to demonstrate that the SP/90 t design could withstand a complete loss of AC power for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> as W comitted. l 440.250 Require further are passive failures clarification consideredto identify to occur(what kind ofin long term) in safety related systems for SP/90 Discuss the rational to assume a check valve failure as lov probability failure. !
440.251 The PDA application (PSAR) should include the comitment stated in W response.
440.255 The PDA applicatien (PSAR) should be clarified based on }]
response.
440.256 The PDA application (PSAR) should incorporate note detail design criteria, including assumations used for mass addition event. (e.g. How many GSI pumps and how many changing pumps inject water into the RCS?)
440.257 Provide a comitment to address this issue during tne FDA stege of SP/90.
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' 440.258 a) Explain why an increase in coolant inventory is not applicable for SP/90 design, b) The Acceptance Criteria for each transient and accident analyzed should be clearly stated:
e.g. For transients with moderate frecuency:
- 1. RC5 not exceeding 10% above cesign pressure j
- l. RC5 not exceeding 10% above design pressure l
- 2. Offsite dose not exceeding small fraction of I 10 CFR 100 For condition 4 events (Accihnts)
- 1. RC5 not exceeding 10% tbove design pressure
- 2. Offsite dose not exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits. l d) Require response j e) Each category of event analyzed should consider a limiting single failure to estimate the worst consequences (with i respect to each of the acceptance criteria associated) l 440.260 The W response deals with instruments uncertainties.
JustTfication is needed for not using a set of initial conditions that are with T/S range which could lead to the worst consequences if the event.
440.261/262 Additional clarification is needed during the meeting.
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