ML20151W567
| ML20151W567 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/03/1988 |
| From: | Zech L NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Lujan M HOUSE OF REP., INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151W569 | List: |
| References | |
| CCS, NUDOCS 8808250031 | |
| Download: ML20151W567 (12) | |
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4 UNITED STATES t *n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
%.....o August 3, 1988 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Mariuel Lujan, Jr.
Subcommittee on Energy ana the Environment Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Cong/essman Lujan:
This is in response to your letter of June 14, 1988, in which you requested information to supplement that provided by Mr. Hayes, Director of the Office of Investigations, at the April 26, 1988, hearing held by the Subecmmittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on the reorganization of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Enclosed are specific answers to your questions. I hope they will be helpful to you and members of the Subcommittee.
If I can be of any further assistance, please let me knew.
Sincerely, IW.
Lando W. Ze
, J W.
Enclosure:
As Stated cc:
Rep. Morris K. Udall f
I 8S08250031 880803 6
PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDC
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QUESTION 1.
Has the Commission noted any changes in the candidness or quality of 01 reports as a result of the Office of Investiga-tions reporting to you through the Executive Director for Operations instead of directly to you?
ANSWER.
No.
The Office of Investigations (01) does not now, nor did it prior to its realignment under the Deputy Executive Director for Operations, routinely.
provide copies of its reports of investigation to the Commission. OI reports are, except in special circumstances, provided to the staff element which requested the investigation and not to the Commission. The staff has not noted changes in the candidness or quality of OI reports as a result of the change of reporting, nor has the Commission questioned the candidness or quality of those OI reports which have been specially brought to their attention.
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00ESTION 2.
Do you believe that your Office of Investigations should be granted the authority to conduct criminal investigations, concurrent with the FBI, for violations of statutes or regulations otherwise within the civil jurisdiction of NRC?
ANSWER.
The Commission does not believe that a grant of authority to 0I to conduct criminal investigations would enhance our ability to protect public health and safety or the government's ability to prosecute criminal violations of the Atomic Energy Act. The granting of such authority is unnecessary to fill any gap in existing civil or criminal enforcement powers and would merely duplicate existing authority vested in the Department of Justice (D0J).
Under the Atomic Energy Act, the Commission has broad investigative powers that the Coninission has authorized 01 to exercise in resolving allegations of wrongdoing in activities regulated by the NRC.
Evidence gathered by 01 mcy provide the basis for civil enforcement action as well as reveal possible criminal wrongdoing.
In the latter e.ase, NRC, through 01, refers possible criminal violations to C0J for its review.
00J may elect to pursue the matter fyrther using its investigative resources and prosecutorial powers and often requests the assistance of our investigative or technical staff, which we provide. The Commission believes this arrangement has worked well.
To expand 01's role by granting it independent criminal investigative authority would unnecessarily complicate civil investigative matters without any appreciable improvement in the government's ability to investigate or
4 QUESTION 2.
(Continued) prosecute criminal acts.
For example, exercise of criminal authority by 01 would trigger certain procedural rights (such as Miranda warnings), might require separation of the civil and criminal investigative staff, or could cause delays in civil investigations necessary to resolve public safety issues. The Commission believes the existing scheme of parallel investigative powers in the NRC and 00J better serves our mutual interest in effective civil and esiminal law enforcement.
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1 QUESTION 3.
Does the Commission "find (s) itself with a surplus of some technical personnel" as Mr. Hayes stated in his April 26, 1988 testimony before the subcommittee? Is any such surplus pro-jected?
If so, in what technical areas and would they be of use to Mr. Hayes?
ANSWER.
The Comission does not have a surplus of technical personnel. With the decline in the number of plants under construction, as well as a decrease of overall agency staffing levels, the NRC has had on occasion a few temporarily displaced technical staff personnel whose qualifications and experience were close?y associated with licensing and inspection activities. Normally, a combination of attrition and cross training allows us to absorb these indi-viduals in other programs.
Whether cross trained technical personnel could be of use to 01 is question-able. 01 is an investigative organization staffed almost entirely with expe-rienced criminal investigators. On those occasions when 01 believes it needs technical support during the course of an investigation, it obtains it from the NRC staff. Given that 01 investigations may involve at one time or another a wide range of technical disciplines, it is not generally useful to assign such technical personnel to 0I on a full time basis. 01's experience is that such personnel would not be used frecuently enough to justify permanent assignment to 01. At the same time, these technical personnel probably would not have the investigative experience and training needed to conduct investigations.
OVESTION 4.
In your April 26 testimony, you cited a high workload coupled with a chronic shortfall of resources.
Is thic the current situation? Do you have any information comparing the workload on 01 investigations to Federal investigators involved in in-vestigations with other government agencies? Do you foresee a decline in workload as the number of plants in the late stages of licensing decreases?
ANSWER.
As the question is addressed to Mr. Hayes, he has provided the following response:
"This remains the current situation. We do not have any hard data comparing 01 I
workload with that of other federal investigative agencies. Although we had expected to see a decline in investigative workload with the decrease of the number of plants under construction or in the late stages of licensing, this has not occurred, nor do we now believe it will.
It appears that there are an increasing number of cases involving the materials and vendor programs. The latter in particular have significant implications regarding operating plants.
Another program that is expected to impact investigative workload is a potential NRC rule covering Fitness for Duty in that investigations of the use l
of illicit drugs, which are currently routinely handled by licensees, could, in the future, be given 01 for investigation.
i QUESTION 4.
(Continued) '
"In addition to the foregoing, it appears that 01 is conducting an increasing percentage of labor-intensive investigations. Thus, while the r. umber of cases actually investigated has declined, the number of staff hours per cases is trending upwards.
Part of this increase in hours per case is due to 01's u
ema.51 sis on developing more safety-significant or complex investigations.
In order to do this, 0! has been required to close less significant cases adminis-tratively for lack of resources.
For instance, 01 has closed a total of 60 in this manner since May 5, 1986."
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4 QUESTION 5.
Do you believe the Office of Investigations suffers from a high workload coupled with a chronic shortfall of resources? If so, has its mission been adversely cffected and what has been arJ is being done to rectify the situation?
ANSWER.
OI has asked for additional resources several times since the office was created in 1982.
The Comission has gradually allowed the 01 staffing level to rise to 45 FTEs from the original 38. We have attempted to manage the investi-i gative workload by better articulating the threshold.for investigations, and have injected more discipline in the entire process of receiving and tracking allegations.
The Comission has some indications that its judgment on the appropriate level of 01 resources has been reasonable.
For example, the Commission convened a review group to review the organization of agency investigative functions. The review group hired a consultant, Mr. Charles Dempsey, formerly Inspector General at Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who reviewed'the OI organization.
It was noted in the review group report that Mr. Dempsey and others expressed the belief "that the current and past caseloads of OI investigators c.ppeared to be low." Additionally, the Commission recently received a copy of the TVA Inspector General's semiannual report on its investigation.
In the six-month period ending May 31, 1988, that office had closed 450 cases, including 200 in which investigative reports were issued. We
OUESTION5.(Continued) understand that the TVA Inspector General'ss office employs approximately the same number of investigators as 01. OI currently has a backlog of approxi-mately 125 open investigations and initiates between 60-90 new cases each year.
01 has been issuing approximately 35-45 investigation reports a year with current resources.
Direct comparison of'the experiences of the for.ner HUD and TVA Inspectors General to 0I productivity may not be entirely valid.
For example, 01 investigacions tend to involve investigations of organizations rather than individuals, which may involve more interviews to resolve a given issue.
Nevertheless, the coments of !!r. Dempsey and our review of the TVA Inspector General's report do give us scme confidence that the Commission has provided 0I with adequate resources.
While the Comission does not believe that 01's mission has been adversely affected by its resource allocations, we will continue to carefully monitor 01's program implementation, and if warranted, make necessary adjustments to researce allocations.
QlJESTION 6.
How many people have left your office for other investigative positions since you have been reporting to th'e Executive Director for Operations? How many of those who left gave the new organizational reporting arrangement as the primary reason for changing jobs?
I ANSWER.
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1 As this question was apparently addressed to him, Mr. Hayes has provided the following response:
1 "As I testified before the Comittee on April 26, 1988, the movement of OI under the Office of the Deputy Executive Director for Operations on February 1, 1988, was a devastating blow to the morale of OI investigators.
Based on a subsequent conversation with Chairman Zech, I have undertaken a vigorous pro-gram to prevent or reduce the loss of experienced investigative personnel.
I have traveled to each of our field offices, and have talked with virtually every 0! investigator. All I could tell them really is to wait and see, wait until a final decision is made regarding our orcanizational placement, either through Comission action or passage of any of the legislative proposals we support.
I particularly pointed out the benefits of PP. 4140 and some of the provisions of the E aaux-Simpson Bill that would establish a statutory 01 with specified investigative authority.
I think I have been partially successful in that no one has yet left (although one investigator who just retired indicated that the organizational change played a role in his decision to leave now), but I would attribute this success mostly to their willingness to wait to see the outcome of these legislative changes.
QUESTION 6.
(Continued) "On the other hand, not all investigators are willing to tell their boss they it are actively seeking employment. Thus, I cannot be certain I know of all investigators who may be applying elsewhere. Nonetheless, I do know the fol-8 lowing: Of my four neadquarters employees in the 1811 classification series, each has appliea on other positions cutside the NRC at their current grade, i.e., they are indicating their willingness to move laterally rather than only for a promotion.
In one 01 Field Office, three investigators have applied and have been interviewed for positions at the same grade with the U.S. Customs Service.
In another Field Office, a GS-14 investigator has appliea for and is a serious candidate for a GS-12 position with the Treasury Department. Two Field Office Directors have filed on positions at the same grade, and one has applied for a promotional opportunity.
Lastly, a headquarters GS-15 has just been interviewed by an inspector general's office in another federal agency.
"There presently are a total of 31 persons in the 1811 investigator series in
- 01. Of these, ten hold supervisory or managerial positions, including me. Of these 10, only 4 (including me) have not applied elsewhere.
Thus, I stand to lose 60% of my supervisors / managers.
I also stand to lose about 20% of my most experienced field investigators--that I know of.
"The fact that I have only thus far lost one person, to retirement, is of little comfort given the notoriously long time that most agencies take to extend employment offers, a facter that troubles me as I think how long it might take to replace any losses I riay incur assuming I could find investigators with their knowledge, skil S, and abilities.
QUESTION 6.
(Continued) "Lastly, each of those persons who I am aware are applying elsewhere has indicated that the new organizational placement for 01, most particularly the possibility that it will continue in this configuration notwithstanding the various legislative initiatives to the contrary, is a primary reason, for their changing jobs."
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