ML20151W105
| ML20151W105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vogtle  |
| Issue date: | 08/17/1988 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Hairston W GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| References | |
| EA-88-167, NUDOCS 8808230294 | |
| Download: ML20151W105 (4) | |
See also: IR 05000424/1988024
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AUG 171988
Docket No.
50-424
License No. NPF-68
EA 88-167-
Gjergia Power Company
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' ATTN: Mr. W. G. Hairston, III
Senior Vice Preside? -
Nucleer Operations
Post Office Box 4545
At'.anta, Georgia 30302
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Gentlemen:
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SUBJECT: NOTICE OF VIOLATION
(NRC INSPECTION REPOR NO. 50-424/88-24)
This referr, to the Nuclear 3egulat:ory Comission (NRC) inspection conducted
at the Vogtle facility on June 7-9, 1988. The inepection included < review of
the circumstances surrounding the June 3, 1988, event where water leakage
through the (:pper cable spreading room penetrations occurred.
The report
documenting this inspection was sent to you by letter dated June 29, 1988. As
a result of this inspection, a significant failure to ccmply with NRC
regulatory requirements was identified, and accordingly, NRC concerns relative
to the inspection findings were oiscussed in an Enforcement Conference held on
July 5, 1988. The letter summarizing this Conference was sent to you on
July 21, 1989,
The violation described in the enclosed Notice of Violation involved a failure
to adequately design the upper cable spreadi:g room penetration sealing syetem
to be water tight. The event that resulted in this violation included water
leakage into the control room which in turn caused the spurious operation of
safe shutdown components and the cubsequent identification of an unreviewed
safety issue.
This water leakage into the control room occurred as a result of
inadequate hydrostatic prototype design testing of the upper cable spreading
room penetrations to assure a water tight seal.
A postulated fire in the "B" train cable spreading room with eithee automatic
actuation of the cable sp 9ading room sprinkler system anu/or manual fire
suppression activities as
-esult of a fire could have rendered the "B" train
of safe shutdown equipmen
v3 'ble.
As demonstrated by the June 3,1988
cation
i s with respect to their inability
event, the condition of ' .e p o
,
to preclude water from en?
.he cor'
mm could have rendered the "A"
eaking through the "B" train
train instrumentat1on ine_
t
to
e
cable spreading room pent- :
1(ltrating into the associated
"A" train instrumentatio
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, e control room i..imediately below
an increased importance of
the *8" trein cc hie sprenir.
u
sperable status because a fire in
maintaining the "A" train c
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AUG 17 G88
Georgia Power Company
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the "B" train cable spreading room would render the auxiliary shutdown panel
reqaired to meet the fire protection shutdown criteria inoperable.
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In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC
Eaforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation described
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in the enclosed Notice has been classified as a Severity Level III violation.
Normally, a civil penalty is considered for a Severity Level III violation.
However, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the
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Deputy Executive Director for Regional Operations, I-have decided that a civil
penalty will not be proposed in this case because of your prorept and extensive
compensatory measures and short term corrective actions in response to the
June 3,1988, event; your proposed corrective actions associated with the
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redesign of the penetration sealing system; and your prior good performance
with respect to design control.
You are required to respond to this letter and the enclosed Notice and should
follow the instructior.s specified therein when preparing your r9sponse.
In
your iesponse, you should document the specific actions taken and any additional
actions you plan to prevent recurrence.
In particular, describe the final
design of the penetr4Llon seals to ensure a water tight seal. After reviewing
your response to this Notice, including your proposed corrective actions and
the results of future inspections, the NRC will determine whether further NRC
enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with NRC regulatory
requirements.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2,
Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure
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will be placed in the NRC Public Doc m nt Room.
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The responses directed by this letter and its enclosure is not subject to the
clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1 20, Pub. L. No.96-511.
Sincerely.
ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:
1. NELSON GRACE
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J. Nelson Grace
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Regional Administrator
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Enclosure:
cc w/ encl:
R. P. Mcdonald, Executive Vice
President, Nuclear Operations
tPID. Rice,VicePresident, Project
Director
cc w/ encl: (cont'd on page 3)
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AUG 171988
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-Georgia Power Company
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(c:w/ enc 1:-(cont'd)
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. W. Hayes, Vogtle Quality
)ssui'anceManager.
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w..Bockhold, Jr., General Manager,
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Jiuclear .0perations
lV.-Gucwa, Manager, Nuclear Safety
. and Licensing
6(A. Bailey,ProjectLicensing
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LK W. Churchill, Esq . Shaw,
. fittman, Potts and Trowbridge
W. Kirkland, III, Counsel,
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Office of the Consumer's Utility
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J:ouncil
W. Feig, Georgians Against
Nuclear Energy
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Georgia Power Company
Docket No.
50-424
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
License No.
Unit 1
EA 88-167
During the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on
June 7-9, 19PB, a violation of NRC requirements was identified.
In accordance
with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement
Actions", 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1988), the violation is listed below:
License Condition 2.G requires that the licensee implement and maintain
in effect all the provisions of the approved Fire Protection Program as
described in the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility and as
approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-1137) through
Supplement 5.
Section 9.5.1.1, "Fire Protection Requirements," of the SER (NUREG-1137)
dated June 1985, states that General Design Criteria (GDC) 3 requires
that fire fighting systems be designed to eneure that rupture or
inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability
of structures, systems, and components important to safety. The SER also
states that in order to satisfy the requirements of GDC 3, the licensee
by letter dated February 22, 1985, stated that the components required
for shutdown are designed so that rupture, inadvertent operation, or
intentional operation of Fire Suppression Systems will not adversely
affect the operability of these components.
In addition, redundant
trains of components that are susceptible to damage from water spray
are physically separated so that manual fire fighting activities will
not adversely affect the operability of the components not involved in
the postulated fire.
Contrary to the above, as of June 3,1988, the fire suppression systems
were not designed to assure that operation of the systems or manual fire
fighting activities would not adversely affect the operability of compo-
nents required for shutdown er components not involved in the postulated
fire. Specifically, because of improperly designed floor penetration
seals, a fire in the "B" train cable spreading room could have caused a
loss of the auxiliary shutdown panel, the "B" train safe shutdown
functions, and due to th? woter leakage into the control room from firr
suppression activities, tne "A" train safe shutdown process monitoring
could have been rendered inoperable.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIIIviolation(SupplementI).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Georgia Power Company is hereby
required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Nucle'.r Regulatory
Comission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy
to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident
Inspector Vogtle, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this
Notice. This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to Notice of Violation'
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Notice of Violatiott
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and should include:
(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2)- the reasons
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for the violation if admitted, (3) the corrective steps which have been taken
to avoid further violations, and (4) the corrective steps which will be taken
to avoid further viciations, and (5) the date when full c.ompliance will be
achieved. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending
the response time.
If an adequate reply is not received within the time
specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license
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should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such o+.her action as may
be proper should not be taken.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
ORIGINAL SIGNic gy,
1. NELSON ggggg
J. Nelson Grace
Regional Administrator
Dated at Atlanta, Georgia
thisI7#3 day of August 1988
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