Text

Nuclear Evacuation Planning:Blueprint for Chaos
	ML20151T905
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	07/06/1977
From:	; MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP
To:	;
References
	CON-#288-6540 2.206, DD-87-14, NUDOCS 8808180329
	Download: ML20151T905 (60)
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BLUEPRINT FOR CHROS M

ae-July 6,1977 I c. e i

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r fDassachusetts Pubile Interest Resecuch Group, Inc.

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233 N. Plaasant St., Amnerst, Ma. 01002(di3)2564434 O tI '.

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w estos irpossible to predict what vitt ha the best we aan & e just gener'.1 eart of ptersing,ppen in advance.

getting rea& for what you hopo viLt never happen. Imgine: If it 's 2:20 a.s., and it's been enovi.sg einoe 9 the previous night, and the tementure is 28 degrees, '

do you evacuate er not? the choices are even tough in the swrur.

l If it 's Priday night, that 's probably okay to evacuate. But if it's Later DaV veekend, with the twnpika and the roads to the beaches ahoked with cars, then do you evacuote? I just don't kaa. What would you do?

Berbert Da1As, First Selsetman, Waterford, Conn., location of Miltstone Point Ruotear Plant w telt you ve have an acceptable plan for all ths nukes in the state vould be a blatant tie. Lake Nichigan is to the east, than are urbanised O!p areas to the north and south, and you can's send then vest sinos most of the roads run north and south between the big cities. So when I ask my.

self, 'Can ve get 'en out in timet

I have to say to.yself:

'I'm seri-ee ously doubtful. '"

E. $s. Tones, Director of Ittinois Office q

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Existing and prcposed nuclear pcuer plants which, if they had as accident, vould jeopardise the safety of pecpts in kssachusetts.

Depicted is the current five mile evacuation limit used for energency naponse planning cd kas PIRC's proposed !$ nits evacuation tirris.

A 40 mits evaeustias limit, which kas PIR0 believes should be used wder certain conditions, is not shwn.

of the stato. Suoh a tirrit, kvever, would affect att but a smit part Lbe.

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, ABSTRACT

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Massachusetts is not prepared to respond to, nuclear reactor accidents since its emergency evacuation plans are inadequate and poorly administered.

r The nuclear industry has led state authorities and the public

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to believe that major reactor accidents cannot occur and this atti-tude has curbed the development of comprehensive emergency evacuati plans.

There are several operating reactors in the. state and if there were an accident at any one of them, citizent, living near the reactors would be unable to prot &ct themselves.

No public education progrem has ever been initiated to arplain what procedures to follow in the event of a react. or accident. Bowever, any efforts to educate the pub'lic vould be mis' leading since existing plans do not address f

9 many issues.

over 20 federal, stato ano local agencies and organlaations i

could be:orne involved in responding to a nuclear accident, but severe

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coordination problems would greatly hamper any emergency response actions.

Since past history has 5hown that nuclear power plant offi-cials have sometimes been hesitant to alert offsite authorities ot accident, there is no guarantee there will be enough time to develop and implement emergency procedures to protect the public.

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f Massachusetts plans to allow existing nuclear plants to con-tinue operating and the development of new reactors within its bor-m.-

ders, state off.cials must safeguard the public by guaranteelne, 25 that utility cor.panies adopt a different. attitude concerning citizen

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safety and simultaneously ensure that state authorities charged with developing emergency response procedures do just that.

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TAB 2.E OF COMTENTS I.

BACKGROUND..................................................

1 II. I N TRO DUCT I ON.................'r.............................. 6 I

I I I. A UTHO RI TY FO R PIANN IN G...................................... 9 A.

Th e Nu cl e a r I nd u s try.................................... 9 State Emergency Response Org anisation.................. 10 8.

1.

De pa rtJeont o f Public Re al th........................ 10 2.

Civil Defense Agency........................'....... 10 l

IV. THE GRAND FAILt*RE: NRC PLANN ING........................... 12 i

A.

Cl a s s e s o f A ccid en t s...............'.................... 12 i

.. Evacuation u.1 t..,..................................... a L i ab i li ty In s u r anc e....,................................. 15 C.

3 DTIL I TY EME RGEN CY PIAN S.................................... 17 V.

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v1. sT ATE PIANN IN G EFFO RTS..................................... 2 2 A.

C iv il De f e n s e P l ann ing................................. 2 4 t

B.

The Ro le o f DP H and NIAT.......................... e... 2 9 1.

Department of Public 8ealth........................

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2.

Nucle ar Incident Advis ory Te aa..................... 31

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VI I. P UBL I C E D UCATI ON........................................... 3 4 w

VI I I. S UWA RY................................................... 3 9

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II. RECOMMENDATIONS............................................

41 I. APPENDICES.................................................

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Results of Randon Tele Planning.............. phone Survey on Evacua tion

................................. 46 B.

Eme r'sency Information and Evacuation Routas for Chk e lemont, Ma s s a chus e tts.............................. 4 8 C.

P roto type Re spons e P1 ans............................... 5 0 XI. FOOniOTES..................................................

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l from the public concerning redioactivo Icaks, ths officiency of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), and the total damage which might result from an accident. The ICCS is the major safety feature to protect a reactor during an emergency, but it has never been fully tested. Utilities themselves are unwilling to assume any risks and current insurance liability limits only reach $560 million. However, studies have revealed that a major accident could cause 314 cillion damage.1 The nuclear industry bases itt. protective planning on a 1974 safety-analysis report conducted for the Atomic Energy Coassission, now the NRC.

The Reactor Safety Study, headed by MIT nuclear engineer, D,r. Norman Rasmussen, e current member of

'N Northeast Utilities Boai'd bf Directors, concluded that in the worst type of reactor accident, a meltdown, 3,000 people would be 3

l killed, 5,000 would suffer acute illness and property damage could u.

amount to $6.8 billion.2 m

.1 The major response to a meltdown, which results in a signifi-cant release of radioactive material irato the atmosphere, is the mass evacuation of people away from the danger area. The decision to evacuate or not is a complicated question, since both options s-. -

have associated costs: the risks of evacuation must be weighed against the potential costs to people if they remain and take shelter.

Along with the financial costs of evacuation, the big-gest risks are deaths and injuries from automobile accidents as people flee a disaster area. If the decision were made not to evacuate, people could suff er short-and-long-term radiation pol-soning.

The Reactor Safety Study made the assumption that 90 per cent 2-i I

y of the po; miction af feteted by an cecident could be cvacuated at least 20 miles within eight bours o.f the accident.3 The Rasmussen study als5 reported that without successful evacuation, deaths and injuries could triple. Critics of the nuclear study, including the American Physical Society (APS) and the Dnion of Concerned Scientists (DCS), have questioned the evacuation percentage and disputed the accident probability and casequence scenarios pro-posed by the study. Documents recently released by the,DCS, which were obtained under the Federal Freedom of Information Act, reveal l

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that the Reactor Safety Study was conducted, to support the nuclear industry and show that nuclear power could be developed on a S

nassive scale since associa',ted risks would be small.

6 The APS has stated tha't the Rarmussen study underestimated

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the damage to the public which might result from a radioactive e

release. Their critique noted that the delayed effecta of low-level radiation, to which large numbers of people might be exposed if not evacuated, would be much greater than the Reactor Safety Study concluded.

The Massachusetts rewrd ssion on Nuclear Safety was conve7ed in 1974 to study issues related to the operation of nuclear reac-tors in Massachusetts. They concluded in their final report that the Rasmussen study methodology was open to criticiam in its pre-dictions of accident probabilities and consequences. The Conreis-sion also felt that the _ Reactor Safety Study inadequately addressed the issue of people living within a 50 nile radius of a reactor site and receiving doses of low-level radiation.

Mass PIRG has investigated Massachusetts' ability to deal with nuclear reactor accidants. Evacuation planning is currently a a nsuun 3

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$sint venturo Mtween tho stato cade ths etility coepanics which operate nuclear power plants. He utility congany must detelop an emergancy response plan which the NAC will review befoce' grant-ing an operating lie.nse. Utility emergency plans must include provisions for notifying agencies and officials beyond the reactor boundary in the event a nuclear accident threatens the public's safety.

PIRG's study analysed the various actors and agencies involved Sfi in evacuation planning in terms of their responsibilities, inter-g g action with one another, existiag efforts, and problems. The over-i O

S all conclusion reached by the study is that while the nuclear in-i g '<

dustry's emergency planning is inadequate, severe problems exist 8 O with the state's efforts.

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g,g Mass PIRG examinei the NRC regulations utility capanies must the comprehensiveness of specific recctor emergen,cy plans,

meet, state and local planning of forts, coordination among utilities and

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state of ficials and public knowledge of emergency response planning.

As part of the investigation, pIRG researchers conducted a random telephone survey and personal interviews with local of ficials i

and residents living in communities which would be affected by a reactor accident. The intent of the survey was to determine how prepared, based on state planning efforts, cossuunities are to respond to reactor accidents. The results further support the conclusion that existing planning is shoddy and a reactor accident

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would place citizen's safety in jeopardy.

Finally, currsat thinking within the nuclear ind'stry Pre-a scribes the evacuation of an area extending five miles from a rese-tor, and this is the figure used by utilities and state planners I

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a with the five mile limit. Since government est!. cates have con-cluded that nuclear accidents could contaminate hundreds af i

square miles, emergency planning should be geared toward pro-tecting people who live many miles from a reactor. Bowever, this study is based on the five mile evacuation limit figure.

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II.

INTRODDCTICat in the event of an accialent at sit ser of the two nuclear peer plants in Massachusetta or the reactor just across the border in vermont, the burden of firet "response falls with utility cwpany personnel at the nuclear plant. They must determine whether the accident is serious enough to endanger those outside the plant.

If it is, the utility notifies the state police and then takes immediate acticrn to limit the extent of a radioactive release.

The state police will dispatch a police of ficer to the score of g,

g g the accident and will notify the, Massachusetts Department of Public i

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f e-Bealth (DPH) and Civil Defense Agency CDA) that an incident has gt'.

occurred.

t G O s, The DPE has the primary responsibility for datermining the dan.

Lgi ger presented by an accident.

Radiation inf armation is obtained directly from the utility and/or from independent evaluation teams (Nuclear Incident Advisory Team) sent to the scene. Civil defense officials must implement and coordinate response actions.

State Civil Defense authorities will contact the regional civil defense coordinator who will notify local civil defense coordinators.

Finally, local civil defense officials will contact municipal offi-cials to notify them of the reactor accident.

Af ter gathering available meteorological and radiation data.

the DPH recommends a course of action to the Governor.

The Governor must than decide what emergency response should be implemented to protect those people within the danger area.

The Governor's decision is transmitted by the DPB to whatever local town officials the civil i

dafanse network has been able to alert.

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decide whether or not to follow the DPH recommendation which may be to evacuate or cake shelte r.

This emergency w.trning and action process, which depends on a telephone network for communications, a myriad of agencies and which leaves the final evacuation decision up to a town official who may by unable or unprepared to make a life and death dacision, represents the only plan the state has for reacting to a nucleer accident.

The DPH, civil defense and local towns all have independent pro-f $t g g grams. The groups hardly ever meet to discuss problems, practice O II 8 '

drills only occur when reactor perso"nnel h' ave annual test exercises

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and adequate or accurate eyrgency inforiaation has never been dis-I O'

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tributed to the people who' would be directly affected by an accident.

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t. g, q There is little indication that those responsible are doing anything morU than engaging in a public cover up which relies on the assump-tion that the improbable is actually impossible.

As this report shows, the people of Massachusetts have to ask themselves what will happen it the improbable happens on a snowy day, or at three in the morning or during a power failure 7; or what will happen if a utility company employee, fearful of adverse publicity, and this has happened, underestimates the reverity of an accident and delays notifying the state police?, or the police cannot reach DPH officials?:

or a town official, unprepared for the avesome responsi-bility suddenly forced upon him by an accident makes the wrong deci-sion on evacuation?

Mass PIRC found af ter examining the current emergency planning process that not only is there no planning for an accident which can spread deadly nuclear material beyond an artificial five mile evacu-ation radius, but that even within the five mile radius, there is no l s,9e i 6

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tcliablo plcn catchlish:d to d:a1 with th3 dangsrs which would faca area residonts.

Nuclear power plants have been operating in Massachusetts for almost 20 years. During that time, there has been no formal plan draf ted for dealing with evacuation. Today, emergency planning a-mounts to no more than a ruse conjured up by officials who believe they are b'eing asked to plan for the impossible. Authorities con-tinue to believe major nuclear accidents are impessible even though there have been several near catastrophic nue!rar accidents in the U.S., even though the safety recerds with which authoritics are so d

impressed are based on smallar, safer, more tested reactors than are g

D-now being constructed, and even though the utilities building nuclear' t Q g

power plants have refused to construct them unless they were guaran-

' O teed by the U.S. government that they would not be liable for the O

u. g damsgo serious n.aclear reactor accidents could cause.

If Massachusetta chooses to pursue a source of energy which day by day is proving more unoconomical, more wasteful, more dangerous and more irrespectiina of the concerns of educated citizens, the state should, at the very least, ensure that full and adequate precautions are taken against the dangers they are exposing the state's citisanzy to.

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organisation of offsito survoillance to assess tl.e extant ot' uncontrolled releases of radioactive material:

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and, notification of offsite authorities.

Based on NRC requietions, plant accidsats are classified as:

1.

local emergencies, which are contained within the plant security fence:

2.

site emerge acies, which extend beyond the security fence but are contained within the site boundary a 3.

general emergencies, which result in radiation lavels greater than 10 MREM /hr at the site boundaTy with conditions warranting noti-pq g

fication of offsite authorities.

The utility compa.dy is responsible for initiating accident WD response seasures at th'e reactor, for notifylag offsite authorities 4

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and for the monitoring of radioact've matet.a1 from a release.

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STATE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGAN!!ATI')N 1.

Departnent of Pitble,c He al_t),

To adequately respond tc acy nuclear reactor accident and protect the public, the utility company must establish a working relationship with state and local officials.

In Massachusetts, the uepartrent of Public Health (DPH) is respon-sible for dete 1 mining the nature ar.d extent of a public health hazard and for deciding the tising ar.d type of pre *ective measures to be taken.

To assist the DPH, Nuclear Incident, Advisory Teams (NIAT) exist on a stand-by basis in tre state, and ce be called upon to analyze the anoun and direction of travel of radioactive material released intu the atmosphere. NIAT will then make response recces-mendations to thir Cmaissioner of Public health.

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Civil Defense, rollowing the determination t.

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health hazard and the correct response actions, implementation and

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coordlestion ecsponsibility lies with th3 Massechua:tts Civ.1 Defense Agency, an arm of the Of fice of Public safety.0 Unde r state law, civil defense is authorized t.o plan for all disasters including nuclear reactor accidents. Localities are responsible for developing response plans with assistance and guidance from the civil defense.

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Robert Boulay, Civil Defense Coordinator for Area Four, which includes Massachusetts towns in the vicinity of the Rowe, Massachu-i setts and vernon, Vermont nuclear plants, has ste*ed that the civil O#

defens, plays only an advisory roles the state Civil Defense can-f

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not require the development of local plar.s and there is no law I

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gency response plans. Robert Boulay boJ1d not say what happens if O

I localities do not develop emergency response plans.

The state Civil Defense and DPfl constitute the lead state i

agencies for emergency response planning. In the caue of an actual reactor einergency, over 20 different groups would have to work in close coordination to mount an adequate response. PIRC's investi-gation, however, raises serious questions about the ability of those groups, which includes utility personnel, state and local 1

police, fire departments, hospitals, the ned Cross, nedf a erganiza-tions, NIAT and other federal, state and local agencies and offi-cials to respond in an ef fective and coordinated manner.

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coordipation r:sponsibility lies with tho Ma:scchusetts Civil Defense Agency, an arm of the Office of Public Safety. Under state law, civil defense is autherized to plan for til disasters including nuclear esactor accidents. Localities are responsible for developing response plans with assiJtance and guidance from the civil defaase.

Robert Boulay, Civil Defense Coordinator for Area Four, which g

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includes Massachusetts towns in the vicinity of the Rowe. Massachu-( $( i setts and Vernon, Vermont nuclear plants, has stated that the civil 9 1: t t

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not require the development of local plans and there is no law

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which explicitly mandates that the civil defense formulate ener-S (f I t

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gency response plans. Itobert houlay would not say what happens if localities do not develop eme'rgency response plans.

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6 l The state Civil Defense and DPll constitute the lead state

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agencies for emergency response plannii g.

In the case of an actual reactor emergency, over 20 different groups would have to work in close coordir'ation to mount an adequate response. PIRG's investi-gation, however, raises serious questions about the ability of those groups, which includes utility personnel, state ar.d local poliae, fire departments, hospitals, the med Cross, media organiza-tions, NIAT and other federal, state and local agercies and offi-

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cials to respc.end in an effective and coordinated manner.

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IV.

THE GRAND FAILDRE s Nhc PLAMMIllG A.

CIASSES OF ACCIDENT 3 As part of their safety review of construction plans for nucina plants, the NRt.; must examine the array of potential accidents which might beset a reactor.

The Code of Federal Regulations, Part 100, outlir.es siting guidelines for proposed reactors.

The NRC studies the plant's location in relation to a number of accidents the Coe-afision feels a reactor may suffer. The 3AC recog,nises nine classes of accidents ranging in severity from trivial to catastrophic.

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4 NRC maintains that accidents with aigh-potential consequence have g g* a low occurrence rate, and accidents with a low-potential consequence D.* have a higher occurrence rate. e $ The NRC maintains t'se t accidents in classes 1 and 2 repre cant t 4 situations which are 4xpected to arise during normal operations. Class 3 through 5 occurrences are not arpected to happsn during normal plant operations, but may occur during the lifetime of the plant. The NRC feels that accidents in classes 6 and 7, and small accidents in class 8 are possible, but there is a smaller probability for their occurring than class 3 'hroegh 5 accidents. According to WRC calcult* ions, the risk for large class a accidents is very seatl. Class 9 aes.. ants would represent ' successive failures more severe than those required to be cc,asidered in the design bases of prctac-tion systaas and engineered'eafety features. " Class I and g ac-cidents could constitute a meltdown. The following table is similar to accident scenaries devolcPed for othar reactors and repreeents incidents which could ocw t.t the proposed Montague nuclear plant which is scheduled for constru. tie _ we. s- 0 O' e o O* gy g i 1 l' 1 u I

63

in western Massachusetts.

l I Table I classification of Poetslated Accidents and occurrences class upc Descristjan Applicaat's Examples 1 trivial incidents avaluated as routiae releases. i 2 n=mit releases outside avaluated as routine releases. cont airmt 3 medioactive taste syntes nelease free res9very easele tank, gpa failure 13ak frte charcoal absorbers in i O off-gas system, failure of re9ener. .'4 ant cevtraliser tank. S. 6 ( 4 Fission products to.* Off-design transients that laduce s g primary system fuel failure above those expected. 8 O 5 Fist oc products to Not asy11 cable. D. Primary and soccedary qg syntans 6 Refoolang accidaat Fuel tundle drop, heavy object drop onto fuel la the core. 7 spent fuel handling ruel assembly drop in the fuel accident pool, heevy object drop onto fuel rack, fuel cask drop. 8 Accident initiatizm less of coolaat throup a small events considervd in pipe broek. loss of coolaat throue datign-basis ovaluat/an a '.arge pipe break, instrument line in the safety Analreis ts eak, tod drop socideat, small Deport steam ilme break, latte steaa line hrear. 9 sypothetical sequence Not considered. of falluree sore severe than class a . esame. i i dure,. .S W t I es I

M 3. SVACUATION LIMTf8 Based on potential accidents and the probabil.ty of their occur-ring, utilitias, with MRC concurrence, develop a low population sont ~ (LPI). People located within an LPZ would be evacuted if there was a reactor accident and a certain level of radioactivity was released. LP3 boundary lines are sometimes juggled to omit a certain popu-lation center which,10 there were an emergency, could present ovacu-ation problems. officials at the Browns Ferry reactor in Alabama claimed that an accident would create a danger up to seven miles away. l The cities of Athens and Decatur;. Alabama, located only ten miles f ror the reactor, were excluded from any emergency planning. 8 60 \\ g The Mwe, Plymouth aand Vernon reactors employ a five alle LP3.' 4 Coupling this fact with their philosophy that only minor accidents e, will occur, civil defense planners have made the following emergency response assumpticms t for accidents at the Rowe reactor, certain 4 sections of the towns of Heath, Florida and Charlemont would be evacuated along with the entire towns of Rowe and 7t>nroe. Evacuees would travel to reception etnters in Charlemont, North Adams and Shelburne-Bucklands an accident at the Pilgrim nuclear plant in Plymouth would necessitate evacuating Plymouth residents to recep-tion centers located in surrounding comununitiest and, an accident at the nuclear plant in vernon, Vermont would send Northfield and 4 Bernardston residents to reception centers in creenfield. s Such plans may be acceptable for coping with minor accidents, ij but implainenting the plans in response to a major incident could ause citizens to directly travel into a contaminated area. Medical facilities for truating Rowe accident victims are located in North Adams. Radiation does not stop at the five-mile limit, and a large e-a.4. e .k

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e enough accident could ongulf thw North Adaio area in a short time. l yo plans exist for dealing wit.* any incide* ts which af fect an area l beyond the five sile LP3. Dr. Jan Seyea, of the Center for Environmental studies at Prince-I ton University, testified before the New York City Board of Health in August.1976, concerning the consequences of an accident at the Indian Point reactor located north of New York City. She revealeil that radioactivity would be rapidly dispersed into the atmosphere wAth few irunediate health problems to people living within 25 miles of the reactor site if the release occurred on a clear, sunny day. If the discharge took place at night, however, onder neutral or inversion conditions, or if the sky,was overcast, people living withing 25 miles of the nuclear plant vo'uld be iri danger of receiving doses of 4 radiation for an extended period of time. l Dr. Henry Kendall, a member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1 f has stated that the short-term, acute ef fects of radiation exposure .{ can lead to lethal injury for people living up to 20 miles from a 4 L-reactors non-lethal, acute radiation sickness can ocet at greater ~ distances. Rasmussen's study claimed that evacuating everyone within a five mile radius of the reactor and those people living up to 25 ,t 4. 4 miles, downwind in a 45 degree pie-shaped wedge should be suffi-cient. Dr. Kendall believes that svacuation of the downwind sec-tor should extend ep to 40 miles. ' i C. LIABILITY INSURANCE The inadequacy of nuclear accident liability insurance should act as an impetus for the develo;nent of evacuation plans which .E would guarantee the safe removal of. people frce a danger area. l But it has not. 3 1 i ] i i l 1

\\ 63 i i Congress d2batoJ the nuclear insurance question during the aid-1950's, and passed tre Price-Anderson Act which ensured the devel-opeent of nuclear reactors. Under the Act, a $560 million 11abil-ity limit is shared by all victims. This is af ter industry costs for investigating an accident are subtracted aloag with the costs fcr settling claims-The absurdity of the entire ccsapensation situation is that the 3560 million today reprvsents only a fraction of what it was worth when designated 20 years ago., During those 20 years, the size of reactors has increased from 100 to over 1,000 megawatts, and population.densit.ies are greater around reac- = tor sites. The statute of limitation on Price-Anderson in, ten s* i g years, while long-term accident effects may not appear for twenty years or more. 4 All this'should point out the need for comprehen-sive, indepth emergency' planning, but sadly, it is not happening. 4 w 4 b 4 I W l k ( n t

$7 'y, W11.17Y 2K: AGENCY PLNIS The seergency response p. ans for the Verreont Yankee, Yankee Atomic and ile rim I reactors tre similar since all nuclear plants utilise the same NRC guidelines for formulating their emergency l plans. The utilities main respoasibility is confined to the plant site. In an emergency, utility of ficials must determine the existence and severity of a radioactive release, alert state of fi-cials and take whatever steps are necessary to mininite the releasu. Emergency plaris primarily focus on the procedures to restore control f of the nuclear reactor. i I j Essergency response plans must conthin' emergency phone lists of e offsite authorities and plant personnels a discussion of types of I. ed.- emergencies and response proqedures s coordination and coinnunication I plans: procedures for of fsite monitoring eM environmental air sampling; a discussion of the location of the reactor and the sur-rounding land uses: procedures for dealing with the release of toxic substances or chemicals; a discussion of training for p2 ant personnels plans for recovery and reentry of the plants fire ener-gency plans; equiptent check procedures ands appendices containing state radiological response plans and letters of agreement between reactor officials and emergency service organisations including tae local fire department and ambulance service. To assist utility of ficials in developing their plans, the NRO published an ersergency plantting guide in 1970 which val.; updated l in 1974 and again in March,1977. In 1975, the NRC changed the j rules governing emergency response planning and now requires a at to ],- detahed analysis of local evacuation conditions. Utility companies' Q.,' 17 y O e s 1 i J n____,.

y plans must now include the time requirai fer ovacuation, the aum- ~ bor of f amilies involved, local meteorological and terrain informa- .[ tion and detailed dose information at diffarant points away fra the reactor site. 9 Mass PIRC examined the emergency plans for the Aowe, Vernon i and Plymouth reactors to see if they meet NRC requirements. The a chains of 'comssunication for the three, plants are siallar. . r If an accident extends beyond the plant boundary, the amergency coordin-9 ator notifies officials at the NRC regional office in Brookhaven, b New York. In addition to contacting 'the NRC, the state police are notified. The Massachusetts State Police than contact the stata E l $4 = 9 Department of sealthe.who then alert the Civil Dofense, Red Cross, p hospitals, etc. O. L b! Each utility emerg'ency plan contains the telephone numbers of employees, offsite officials ar.J agencies to be notified if an ac-cident occurs. Yta lists must be updated on a regular basis, some-thing utility officials say now happens. Eowever, a survey in 1975 t [ which involved calling the amergency phone numbers listed in the i Vermont Yankee plan revealed that several numbers had been discon-t -L nected or changed. In an caergency, utility personnel would, mot i have time to look through a telephone directory or seek directory as sistance. Local of ficials are contacted at some point to evacuate their town if a major reactor accident occurs. The local plan for Vernon, Vermont states that municipal officials can decide to evacuate based on information they receive directly from the Vermont Yankee reactor. Since a major radioactive release would require immediate rose-tion to avoid severe health hazards, Vermont Yarkee officials would i 9 b i l 1 J J ..-.,s .... - _ _. _ _.. - _ _ _, _,.__. ___.._ _,,___ _ _, _,__ _ __ _ m_ _ _,_,,.,, -,, ,,w_ m,,,,.%-,w---,w

69 forego notifying health departseent of ficials and onntact the town f, of Vernon. Worthfield and Bernardston residents would supposedly , P be notified through the conventignal state police-health depart-I nant-civil defense chaia of coassunications. The utility asergency plans for the Rowe and Plymouth reactors have no provisions for direct notification of local officials. several years ago, fearing adverse publicity, reactor offi-cials at the Millstone Point power plant in Waterford, Connecticut withheld inforr.ation from state and local officials concerning j several small accidents. A similar situation occurred during the Browns Ferry fire in Alabama in 1975 when offsite officials were ei-ther not notified or were contacted after considerable time had passed. An accidant which first appears limited to the reactor site 4 can quickly escalate and af fect the surrvanding area. FIRC's study F concludes that state police and health department authorities should automatically be notified of any incident which can threaten the public. This does not mean health authorities sust be called whenever a light bulb blows, but quick and early notification is necessary. Utility energency plans call for WRC radiological assistance teams to help conduct air sample monitoring. If the teams are to v-come free the NRC regional of fice in Brookhaven, time is a crucial factor. During the Browns Ferry fire, NRC of ficials came frors l ,[ Georgia, and several hours elapsed before they arrived in Alabama. ,N. Where t.he assistance teams come from is not specifically clear in I the utility plans. f Offsite radiological monitoring is conducted by teams from

i the nuclear plant with help frca N!AT.

Reactor monitoring teams . i .i i 1 1 I i

g must first be cierted, co11cet th2ir equipment, check to seu if its functioning and then drive to monitoring sites. Air sa spling information aust be transmitted to the energency coordinator at the reactor site who then decides what information to relay to the state police. Alerting monitoring teams and transmitting vi-tal information could be hampered by disrupted telephone service, and utility plans make vague reference to using radios as tackup ccmesunications systems. Sf The Mowe emergency plan discusses the release of toxic sub-S stances into the Deerfield River.' ' Response actions are unclear f G and the plan incredibl{ concludes that the accident should be al-g.. lowed to "run its course". Neither the Vermont Yankee or Pilgrim g G emergency plans contain provisions for dealing with non-radiation

G accidents.

Utility plans discuss decontanhation of the reactor site, but any decontamination of of fsite land and facilities is ignored and the entire issue is covered under the Price-Anderson Act, the general insurance liability law for nuclear accidents. Appendix E requires that utilities have ' provisions for test-ing by periodic drills of radiation emergency plans to assure that employees of the licensee are f amiliar with their specific duties and provisions for participation in the drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiation emergency..I A training coordinator with the utility company develops an accident scenario which is approved by the plant supervisor. In all exercises, reactor c,f ficials must netify all ' applicable agencies' who might be involved in an actual emargency to determine if, and to what extent, they want to participate in any exercise. Most utility : G i W. i = '. ll e. en 4 1 e. u ---me, ,_-,w y ,,---,e 4--

11 drills test the connunications systans which would be used in an actual emergency. Civil Defense Coordinator Imbert Boulay revealed that state and local plans are tasted only when the utilities stage their annual exer;ises. l In.susmary, there is no guarantee that offsite officials will be notified of an accident early enough to develop appropriate re- { sponse actions. The three utility emergency plans casp*1y with NRC regulations, but serious questions e,xist as to how effective util-ity plans arer utilities are supposed to e'oordinate their plane L*g. pj with of fsite authorities to ensure a minimum number of problems 4 in the event of a reactor 'acgident. Although utility officials t acknowledged staging annual. test exercises which involved offsite authorities, local officials said they knew little about reactor emergency plans and procedures. I I h l F ( 4 4. I i s MU ) e t. i

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72 VI. STATE FIANEING EFFORTS To provide a mechanism for the coordination of utility, state j and local emergency response plans, the NRC published a Guide and checklist for Develorvient and tvaluation of State and Local Gov-ernment Radiological Emeroency Response Plans in Support of Fixed Nuclear Facilities (WASH 129 3) in 1974.l Designated by the federal of fice of Emergency Preparedness, the WRC is the lead operating agency for coordinating utility compacios' amargency procedures with state and local planning efforts. WA5N 1293 was designed to l 6f* g assure such meshings it is not a.tegulatory document but contains objectives state and local plannera should addreas to ensure the 4 O g,, development of comprefiensive, effective emergency plans. Bovaver, j 8 G Civil Defense Coordinator Robert Boulay, who is developing final e.' , g plans for release this June, a6aitted, 'The Civil Defense has never seen it." WASH 1293 suggests frequent wetings between reactor opera-tors and local officiale, and at least annoal meetings between state and local authorities and reactor officials to review and update energency plans. Based on PIRC's random telephone survey involving communities either housing reactors or towns near reac-tors, PIRC found that there is a poor link between the utility and offsite of ficials and agencies. In that survey, itcal selectmen, fire and police chiefs and civil def ense coordinators stated they had had no contact or very fl Il, little interaction with utility personnel several fire chiefs in-dicated that local fireman had toured a reactor f acility to learn j about radiological hazards in the event there was a reactor fire:

ll' 22 I

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73 - and, a few Colcet;een scid th:y hcd heerd about itc31 emergancy { plans within the past year, but had never been exposed to evacua.

c. ton planning previous to that.

1 WASH 1293 recommends that (tate and local plans 'should be agreed to by the state, the af fected local authorities, the nu-clear plant operators, representatives of contiguous states, regional of ficers of the NRC and other federal agenci6s and other necessary participants. 12 The NRC will review and concur with state and local plans, gpp m, although NRC approval is not require,d. It is clear, however, 4-g,..' that this task is of a low priority to the NRCI the regulatory s agency has only concurred neith one state plan. Massachusetts is , g 9' only now finalizing plans for. responding to nuclear incidents, q yet the Rowe reactor has been operating since 1960, and the g,.,

'4 Vernont Yankee and Pilgrim nuclear plants have been operating since early in this decade. Mass PIRC questions whether the NRC should allow a nuclear reactor to operate in a state which has not clearly demonstrated that it has an adequate energency response plan to process.

{ In 1975, National PI*G and f. ass PIRG filed a show cause peti-tion with the PfRC requesting that the operating license of the Boston Edison Co., aperator of Pilgrim I, be suspended. The petition was based on the f act that the utility emergency plan did not give reasonable assurance that the public's safety was guaranteed based on the inadequacy of state and local emergency response plans. Two years later, that petition is still pending befure the NRC. The NRC's contplete failure to act upon the issues raised in the petition shows its lackadaisical attitode toward i I I Lhi O b >e. O D4

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en)rg:ncy planning. 4 A. CIVIL DEFENSE FIAMN2MG t In August 1975, the state Civil Defense ?gt icy began preparing area and local emergency response plans for implementation in the event of an accident at a nuclear power plant. A state general g disaster plan, which outlines response procedures for any natural or man-made "disaster, is currently being rewritten by civil da-fense officials. Area response plans provide for the evacuation of coessunities surrounding a reactors local plans outline emer-gg gency actions for individual towns near reactors. e Area and local plans are cetently in draft form, and al-though Area Civil Defense Cdordinator Robert Boulay claims the C t 4 plans are in workable prder and could be implamented in the event, of a nuclear accident, ao'st local officials renain ignorant of g S a' rr the content or existence of these plans. The Massachusetts State Police have had general casaster plans since 1958, have.eesived radiological hazard training and are capable of operating radiation monitoring equiptient. Mr. Boulay clair.s the state police have always been prepared to re-spend to any nuclear incident. But due to their lethal, invisible { ic:pa ct, radiation accidents are radically different from ficods and fires, anc' special preparation and planning is needed to re-spond to nuelsar accidents. The criteris the civil defense is using to develop plans consist of ' counting houses, looking at roads to select evacua-tion routes, determining what the tovu's resources are and working with local officials."13 However, Mass PIRG's telephr ne survey revealed that in sost cases. local officials have not participated _ = e l @e e 6 'i O e e M 4

1 75 in the formuletion of cry plans. Area response plans address the res >onsibilities of the Civil Def anse, the Department of Public Health and NIAT. Possible emer-ganey actions include evacuation of an area up to five miles down-wind or taking shelter. Evacuation cornunities and reception creas are listed, and the notification and alert chains are described. The plans reveal who is notified by whom and by what comununications system. There are sections describing the release of infortsation to the news readia, plans for the operation of reception centers by g##* the Red Cross and the control and floe of traffic. O' The major inadequacy of the area plans is their failure to St specifically assign responpibility to t!.e va rious actors. Scru-4 . e tiny of the Rowe area plan re' veals that the civil defense is vague 9*. in delineating that responsibility. The kwe plan states' on page 5, g e Section 5, Point G that 'Coursunities involved in the Rowe area plan will stand by to take further actions as may be specified in their plans or as directed from PCDA (state Civil Defense) or MCDA IV (the area Civil Defense of fice in Belchertown). ' Section 5 also states that ' Key Federsl or State agencies will be alerted for irasediate contingent action," but the appropriate agencies to be i notified are not listed in the plan. 'In the event of a nuclear accident, the following groups i could respond to an emergency: state and local police; local fire departments: the Covernor's af fices the Department of Public Realth: state and local Department of Public Works state, area and local Civil Defense personnel h!AT utility company of ficials: the NRC at the federal and regional levels: ambulance services bus Le s l +9' 3. l g 4 1 L I = mingsp . -. I

'l6 companics, lucci offielols: tho news medica and th3 R:d Crces. With so many d.ver se groups, one aust question the degree of coordination. Is t ner a an overlapping of responsibilities and will various plans fit togethtr and work? Do local plans conflict so that orie cocaunity could evacuate. people into another corusunity which is also scheduled to be evacuated? Based on current plan-ning, Mass' PIRC concludes that during evacuation citisens could be directed into a danger area. The task of coordinating all organizations is M..unental. Of g Time pressures, the possibility of, panic, the inexperience of all O i' groups responding to a nuclear emergency and the nur.bs-s of people f G to be evacuated all aggravate the coordination problem. No con-t G vincing attempt has beeh stade to dost with this issue. c.' g g Civil defense of ficials clain that panic can be avoided dur- $ng an evacuation since they feel there is more than enough time to alert and move people. Area Fo'tr Civil Defenst authorities have stated, 'Ti. rte is really not a crucial factor. There vill be adequate time to notify the public via house-to-house visits by local fizeren. " The civil defense contends house-to-house contact is more of-( f active than alerting citizens by siren or public address system. They feel a personal visit will serve to alley any fears. To rel) on personal contact, however, ignores the possibilities of adverse weather conditions which might cause the rapid movement of radioactive material and co:nmunications problers which might make it difficult to contact volunteers for a house-to-house alert. Emergency plans now lack any time guidelines for executing l ernergency response actions. Civil defense planners should establish i O a. i $6 e e G* e 4 I I L

y

i..'

s,' short but roatistic tico liedts for sotifying end assembling firemen i for house-:o Huse alerts, for running through coussunications lists, i for evacuating certain towns, for readying reception centers, etc. and then stage exercisas to determine how well those functions are carried out under the time constraints: this would enable the plan-nors te. ese how conprehensive and ef fective the plans are they devel-2 oped. i pone of the plans studied have provisions for extended evacua-tions nor for evacuating people living beyond the five v:.te LPt. If f long-term evacuation wera required, or. people outside the LPS and i I outside the nadiation

wedge" had to be moved, confusion would un-5

$4 doubtedly reign because exiAting state and local plans do not even address these issues. Plans do not consider whether reception ~ centers will have sufficient, food and other necessary supplies.

== Massachusetts Civil Defense Director Louis Saba, recent1/ 7 interviewed by the Boston C,lo'oe, noted that many public shelters ' k across the state are not stocked, and that spoiled food supplies are frequently thrown out. The federal government now urges people to bring their own food and drugs te shelters, or as Mr. Saba said, "The normal things they wt:1d take if they were going carping for a ft.t days." This policy assumes there will be the required time to stop at the store for a gallon of milk or a Josen eggs. The assumption of having enough time prevails throughout all civil defense plan-l nJag, but the public is being misled. In an actual emergency, a y major release coula spew radiation over a large area in several minutes. ,g a. The medical f acilities designated to handle accident victims s . y i f 4 46-743 0 - ?> - 5 j l$

78 l are lo ated.*ust cutsida th3 LPE: i there ore no backup medical facila ities located beyend the LP3 for treating victists listed in any plan 1 I And, the entire issue of decontamination and the trestrant of live k stock, crops ard wildlife is tynored. f The area response plans totally fail to address several sub-jects discussed in WAsn th3e i, 1. recovery and reentrj planningt t 2. t. Post-accident operationes t 3. drills and exercises and e 4 radiological emergency response. training. j 5 WAsa 1293 calls for a "state technical group to be established

with responsibilities tq develop, direct and evaluate offsite area k.

Le 4 recovery and reentry ope' rat; ions.

15 Incredibly, when civil defense of ficials were questioned about this point, they replied, "This will O

not be necessary as the release of radioactivity will be insignifi-9 9 cant." This provides just one exasple of the civil defense's failure p ,= q to recognize the carious need for maximum-damage planning. 1 'the issue of deconta4 nation ia not addressed in any plans. a for decontanination, special equipment would be required, and trair and well-protected decontamiration teams would have to be assembled. I* Decontamination ef forts are expe.asive and tinte-consuming, and should I be an integral part of any cereprehensive planning efforts. Both the ) state and the NRC totally neglect this issue. A representative of the NRC regional office in Pennsylvania states that the Price-Anderson Act, which conear;,s accident liability would take care of any problems Utility officials are responsible for decontamination of the reactor ( site, but it is unclear if they are liable for offsite decontamina-tion too. . + 4 ) 4 i 1 l i l I 1 1 1 ,-,n.___-,,

79 To complement ths area piens, local rosponse 01cns provids for actions to protect the Public in individual towns. Local plans con-tain different information depending on whether a municipality will be evacuated, will ' stay put" or will serve as a reception center for residents evacuated from other areas. 14 cal plans are either vague or ignore completely the issues of public education, dissemin-ation of information, testing, review and updating and reentry and de contamina tion. there are no provisions for educating the residents of towns affected by an evacuation to the ranifications of remaining behind or receiving evacuees there are no backup comunications systema ^ Qr for alerting local of ficiple and agencies: there is only one phone ,4 D' nurber to call if people heed help or transportation in evacuating. All local plans suffer from these weaknesses. ~ k. 3. THE ROLE OF OPH AND NIAT ei ~4 1. Dept. of_Public Realth. Primary technical responsibility } for determining the nature and extent of a public health hazard re-sultiny frors a nuclear accident and for determining what protective measures are to be taken lies with the state Departrent of Public Bealth (DPH). Notification of the DPH is required with a general emergency, but is not required with either a local or site energenc/. ' Gerald Parker, Director of the Division of Radiological Control within DPB, confirmed that the health agency is at the mercy of the j utility company for prompt notification. "We have no guarantae that we will be notified f ar enough in advance so that towns immediately de'wnwind will be able to take protective action before the plume hits," he said. Based on the past record of utility companies FIRG ques-tions whether quick notification will occur. B_ s.

f..

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N When and if health officicis are contacted by the stato polics So are notified by utility officials. DPR will decide whether to activate its NEAT evaluation teams. If NIAT is delayed for any reason in determining the exfent of a radioactive release and its f d.irection of travel, DPR will rely on air sang,le readings frors { the reactor site to formulate ee rgency responses. To complicate matters, *4 NIAT team member noted that the higher the Frdiation 4 concentration, the less acc state equipment readings will bas the t { note radiation releasr.d rbove the saturation level. 'he furt t off monitoring readings will be.,, Pollwing data gathering. OPN officials will develop response t i t recommendations and prwent Gem to the Governor who will make a 8 1 final decision.15 sowev' r, local officials have the final say in e sp [ torna of what their town will do and although the Governor might recommend evacuation, authorities in Beath, for example. might 4 0 decide not to evacuate. -g Local authorities might also order their twn's evacuation even though DPI reccanaended taking shelt er. There is no clear-cut policy regarding this issue and no o ne ap-pears concerned about solving it. i To add to the confusion, the Vernon. Vermont local plan states that vermont Yankee utilit y of-ficials can directly notify the "ernon Civil Defense coordinato r to evacuate if radiation levels are high enough { No mention is l made in the Morthfield and Bernardston pla.as about utility of fi cials contacting these t'," ac to evacuate. 1 Cerald Parker stated that DPH plans for the evacuation of a 67 degree wedge, exwdit.g five to seven miles from the reactor site. l The health agency maintains that emergency respones plan-aing shooid cover a five mile.rea around the c.aetor, but only - 3 0- {

== i 1 ! \\\\ l ! r l 1 I i I t i 1 e t 1

k si ~ on tho downwind sid3. Mr. P0rkst fcit thJt people could be Cv;cu* ated up to 20 miles f rors a nuclear plant, but r.oted there are no i plans for such action. We did sa;f that DPfl uses WASH 129) in its planning. DPH of ficials sust decide if there is enough time to evacuate, and such a decision is based on e number of f actors including wind speed and direction, other atmospheric conditions, the time of day and the distance from the reactor site to downwind towns. If there is not enough tir.4 to evacuate, officials magnt be able to i ef*8 warn People to take cover until af tet

the radioactive pluma passes 8

e $1 ( 9 4 If DPH orders peoplo to take shelter instead of evacuating, g decide 'n a course of action following the health of ficials sust o e g S.*. passage of the plume. With' a meltdove, radiation concentrations .,e would be extremely high with severe contamination, and without ade-quate provisions, residents would not be able to remain in their homes. The problem then beecees how to move people out of the area. There are no provisions in any plahs for seving people out of a contaminated a*ea nor for housing contaminated peoF e. Mr. parker l said, 'We know of no such scenario that exists where massive ntsa-bers of people would require decentamination.* Be suggested that reception centers could bandle any decontamination, but according l to the Red Cross, which coordhates reception center operations, I the f acilities are not equipped for decontamination. This confu- { sion points out the lack of coordination which could be alleviated by frequent testing and reviews of emergency response pleas. 2. Nuclear Incident Advisory Team. The work force for the Departneat of Public Bealth is NIAT. The organisation was - - Lha l 6 t .a i an ~ .. - - -. ~, -

82 catablish:d by th: DFB to r:spond to ac2cer cecidents by going to the reactor site and gathering information vbich the Commi s-stoner of Pub 11e Realth would use to determine appropriata eser-gency response actions. NIAT'aeabers will collect air samples downwind from the reactor and perform radiation analysess both jobs present great health risks as the volunteers must enter a highly contaminated ates. NIAT is cnespo' sed of officials from DPH, several advisors gri from the state Depart.nont of Labor and Industry and consultants I O from educational, industrial and,governaar.t circles in Massachu-O (I ' g g se tts. NIAT is broken down into teasse which respond to nuclear O f G-accidents &pending on the location of a reactor. g ie At the present time,,DPH contacts NIAT if their assistance LO is recuired. 31AT mesabers have no backup cosununications system besides the telephone, although one team aer.ber revealed that re-posted requests had been made to DPa for ' beeper' radios. Tele-phone consuunications could be disrupted by a stora, and even with beepers, NIAT taan members might not be able to contact DPH for further instructions. An examination of the HIAT organisation also poings out the liAelihood of time delays between initial notification and the commencement of air sample monitoring. NIAT teams must first collect their egalpaent, check it a.nd then drive to the monitoring stations. NIAT '& ambers have requested updated equipment frere DPH officials. At the present time there is insufficient NIAT coverage in western Massachusetts; only two NIAT members are on call for an area extending frcre isorcester to the New York border. Reviews g , ev e. 94 s4 98 a 4 90 G% i t ik

M i ard drills cro ncn-cxistent, although severcl WIAT members in tho Boston area sometf ees meet. s. l s e I e e .i e... t q g

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M VII. PUBLIC EDUCATICal Repeatedly, it has been apparent that tho worst problem re-garding the status of emergency response paar.ning is that the pub-lic has been totally ignored." Plans ce paper look great, but there is no use in having them if they cannot be implementedt for successful implementation, there must be a well informed citizenry. Conversations with public officials and PIM's randon telephone survey revealed that residents living 'La towns housing retetors q @f and towns surrounding nuclear plants are completely in the dark. \\ I O ED t,. The tassediate need of people.in case of an accident as for ( g information about the dangers of radiation and what steps to take D' f S to protect themselves; ithis includes procedures on evacuation, de-O el contamination, protection.of food and water suppides, livestock %- O and crops. Local officials, including selectman, fire and police chieta and civil defense coordinators, are familiar with potentia?. egress routes, bousing patterns and other aspects of community life. If they are included in the eJnergency response planning process, they can provide valuable input which would guarantee sound planning. In Massachusetts this has not been the case. Following the development of amergency response plans, local of ficials, with the help of state perso-nel, should conduct public bearings to educate community residents about the contents of the plans, and for dieseminating pertinent plan informatior.. State officials should visit individual crasuuunities to provide necessary background information concerning the potential dingers of n,uelear resetors and the consequentes of reactor acc!.d4nts. In Massachusetts __ e

s. e.

94 a e 90 l e 4 I 98 G% u w

g5 l 33, mas not d.en the ocse. g Cosseunity residents should also participate in an annual re-view of plans so they are familiar with any changes. The state a,bould guarantee that local officials have an opportunity to meet ragularly with utility officiais to discuss the coordination of emergency response plans. Eccal officials and residents should decide whether to stage mock evacuation drills. In Massachusetts this has not happened. Although constunities might decide against actua) dr' ills, citi-

gpg, sans would certainly have a better understanding of the potential e G q t dangers of a nuclear reactor through a discussion of the need for drills.

a e G i e 9e i a Public participation in the planning process can guarantee that egress routes will be adequate or that medical f acilities will av $ s

1e suf ficient.

The Civil Defense has developed information brochures contain-ing information from individual local response plans for dispersal to corseunities which may be af fected by a nuclear reactor accident. The only cornpleted paaphlet is for Northfield, Mass., which lies in the impact area of the Vermont Yankee reactor. The information sheet contains pertinent evacuation facts and a map indicates the town's egress routes. The map shows the par-ticular area of town within the five alle EM to be evacuated. The Northfield brochure states that it was desi7ned to respond to a major accident, bn with a five alle LPs, the pan:phlet is only relevant for a small accident. The overall map is blurred and the t road names and route numbers axe illegible. Four television and radio stations are listed as emergency information sources, yet, a s t A

ch2ck t:ith tho serraunications fccilitics revealed that cnly uno radio station is o n tre air 24 hours a day. The Northfield brochure also f alls short of what is needed because it does not address probleau isorthfield residents would face in the event of a reactor accident. There is no phone nurnber listed if residents need help or transportation. Finally, as with all planning ef forts, the Civil Defense has left it up to local officials to distribute the brochures. O# state and area civil defense authorities met with local offi-cials from towns around the Rowe and vernon react;rs in May to dis-e g cuss evacuation planning. Area Four Civil Defense Directo.r Robert Boulay told Northfield, fernardston and Greenfield officials that, ta ( "a plan is only as good as its updating,* and urged there to keep the plans updated. Be noted that if civil defense officials were told to plan for evacuating people living beyond the five mile limit it would be done. The presentation by the civil defense was intended to brief only local of ficials, and it appears the civil defense felt the one meeting was sufficient. Fact sheets and maps, which the civil de-fanse contends will be distributed to residents via local of ficials have yet to be handed out, and it's obvious any public education and reviews must be initiated by local authorities. Northfield Civil Def ense Director David Mroctek said the plans would probably never have to be used and acknowledged that the North-field plan has no provisions for the elderly, bed-ridden or those without transportation, but that such issues would be dealt with at some date. He also noted that food and medical supplies in designated shelters had had to be destroyed due to their age. 36-4 e e 9e e6 g rm.

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ho irtny af the catiro emergancy planaiag situation le t. hat people hr ve be >n led to believe that nuclear accidents will not occur and Planning has thus been done under the assumption that it's

,,tly not importas.tr on the other hand, however, the public has an underlying fear of nuclear power and radiation since they remember all to well the first atomic bomo blast and its consequences. This irony came through at the May meeting when Igorthfield civil Defense Dirsetor David Mrocset said be did not think there greF would ever be a nuclear accident and noted that evacuation plans 8 8' '.' have to be implaisanted cautto2: sly in 'o'rder to avoid alarming the e it i g ge t public. ee.t f G' S 47 1 r, g e e ) l m -n-er e. 96 6- 0 96

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gg VIII. St30putY The extent of emergency response planning in Massachusetts for nuclear accidents is extremely limited. The acet serious prob-les is that no one in authority, including etility and state off t-cials, considers the possibility of a major accider.t or meltdown occurring. Both Civil Defense and Department of Public Realth authorities' state the depth of their planning is limited by a lack of money and manpower whether this is true or note,both agencias now exhibit nothing less than a lackadaisical attitude toward pro-tecting Massachusetts citizens.. + ~ ' ~ ' Although state officials may welcome nuclear power with open g arms, the potential da'ngers associated with this energy form re-G quire that the state exert itself by protecting its citisens. 6 t Massachusetts authorities must realise that many responsibilities 9 I ccee with accepting nuclear pcwer plants, the most important of which is guaranteeing that citizens have a chance to protect them-selves in the event of a nuclear accident. j Meeting that responsibility entails demanding the suspension of nuclear reactor operating licenses if utilities' emergency plans are inadequate as well as allocating funds to ensure the develop-I ment of comprobensive and tested evacuation plans. Lessening the possibility that thousands of people could be killed by a reactor accident demands a two-pronged approach by L state officials: (1) Monitoring utilities could guarantee early notification of state authorities of a reactor accident which would theoretically allow time for the implementation of emergency response procedures: (2) and, those officials charged under state law with me- ><A v. . 1 M t ~. .U i L + I

4 4 developing emergency procedures must be forced to meet those require-ments. meall reactor accidents carr quickly assume catastrophic propor-tiens and the potential release of deadly radioactive saterial de-mands that utilities promptly notify appropriate state agencies. But it state officials are not prepared to deal with such disasters, what good is early notification? The current state emergency response process is makked by seri-ous problems of overlapping jurisdictions, gaps in authority and the ypp probability of comanunications failures and mistakes. The civil de-4.** fanse now dismisses the need for decontamination and overlooks other S-

t pertinent issues. The agency is in the business of preparing for g

disasters except in the case of nuclear reactors. The civil defense e g. believes that public education constitutes disseminating inadequate pa, "" 4 information and sincerely believes that planning for nuclear acci-dents is a waste of time. As state Civil Defenae Director Iou Saba said in 1976, ...we've got to develop all these plans to move thou-vuds.cf people on the basis that something might happen that's never occurred yet...as a practical matter, a nuclear meltdown is never going to happen. None has ever odeurred in the history of nuclear power in this country and no melsdowns will occur."

Granted, the final decision to evacuate a community rests with sach municipality, and localities should eversee their own planning efforts, but the civil defense, especially in the case of nucisar accidents, should provide indepth planning assist'ances this included helping develop plans, making sure there is a link between town of-ficials in contiguous communities as ** ell as between agencies on var-h lous governmental levels and utility officials, and coordinating 6.

L h k 4 f h I k' I

90 frequent tasting cad review of ovacuation plans. Such major problems exist with a five mile evacuation limit, one can only imagine what gld happen if the emergency pir.nning limit were extended to 20 or 25 miles. In 1974, the Atomic Energy Cornission Of fice of Government Liason kgulation complained to the Massachusetts Department of Public Bealth concerning the lack of emergency planning for the Pilgrim I reactor in Plymouth. A letter to Cosnissionar of Public Realth William Sie, knell stated that af ter reviewing a NIAT brochure, a NIAT plan fcr Pilgrim I f and a Plymouth Civil Defense P1&si, ' considerable effort on the part /4 of Massachusetts organisations" would be needed to meet the objec-fa tives of WASH 1293. Three years later, the state as a whole is no t more prepared to deal with a nuclear accident than it was in 1974. 4 e. 4 i i a I e t t l e 4 I i + O 4e e t l L

1i:.-

4. c.

n e y. 9 gg. AEC0 0cDIDATIONS Mass PIRG realises that emergency response planning is not an easy task. This report has docysented where both the utilities and the stata f alter in their plannino efforts. Present inadeauste energency response planning must not continue and can be corrected. If Massachusetts is going ahead with the development of nuclear power, state of ficials must also develop workable evacuation plans. The following recorsendations can help to upgrade current accident re-sponse plans so they become more realistic and comprehens$ve. Since a controversy still exis's' as to whether a meltdown can 9(8?* 1. t s $t t e occur, energency respnse plans should be developed in order to p., , 4 8 O* 8 C respond to any type of nuclear accident, including a switdoen $ t' e e t 2. The minimura evacuation planning radius around a reactor should y g,g a F6 s i be 20 to 25 miles depending on the existing population. Based ut. e s on the prevailing wind patterns around a reactor, the evacuation planning radius should extend 50 miles from the reactor in a 67 degree wedge. This is not to say that everyone living within 25 or 50 miles of a reactor would be evacuated, but tested, workable plans should exist for such riistanceer 3. Planning should include alternatives to evacuation and address degrees of evacuation. Because residents may be ordared to take shelter instead of evacuating, plans should include methods for removing people from a contaminated area af ter a plume passes over Taking shelter, distributing iodine tablets. the selective evacuation of children and pregnant women, etc. should be con-I sidered: ,3 (. All officials and volunteers involved.8.n the development and 1 ) implementation of emergency response plans should undergo [4 e s a 1 1, t * - I t

92 trcining and reorientation ct least en cn ennual basis. nreuga a firm and written agroweent between utility officials and stat e authorities, off aite concerned parties should become familiar witl -adiation hasards and appropriate steps to ccombat them, and have a qwi understanding of the various types of reactor acci-dents which can occurs 5. Specific responsibilities for specific of ficials of specific agencies and organisations must be clearly delineated and a sys-tem established to assure that the appropriate people, or quali-O# fled substitutes are at the Nrrect place at the correct time in e a; the event of an engrgency. Drills and training, as well as O specific procedured, for updating and testing cossaunications lists g and systems can serve to accomplish this objective a 6. Passage of House 6075 which calls for the creation of a Nuclear Advisory Commaission and the annual publication and review of evacuation plans, would give the state a stronger hand in gu,ar-anteeing the safety of nuclear reactors: 7. A Nuclear Advisory Cesamission would be responsible for determin-ing if all parties had well developed and workable emergency response plans. No utility should be granted a license to oper-ate a reactor unless the ady'sory coassission concluded that emergency plans were in proper order. His would require exam-ining the plans against a predeveloped set of criteria 8. A Nuclear Advisory Consission would report any safety violations to the Attorney General who would file a lawsuit to revoke the operating license of a reactor 9. Area Civil Defense officials should have the ultimate responsi-bility for coordinating, updating and revising all plans, and m, =. S e

9

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e g for overseeing frequent test exercises. Copies of emergonef plans and a s.ummary report of reactor incidents and tes's ever the year should be submitted to the Governor ani the Nuclear Advisory Cosetission for review. Again, the advisory ccoueission would review Civil Defense ef forts agalast a set of established criteria (i.e. WASH 1293)

10. The Massachusetts Energy Facilities Siting Council should dis-approve any request for e reactor construction permit unless the utility can denonstrate the existence of comprehensive O##

emergency response plans between it and state and local offi-r 4 cials. The siting Council should examine proposed reactors in e. '-e relation to the execution of emergency response plans; g,

11. Under Civil Defense guidance, state and local of ficials, in e

e e.,., con $unctivn with reactor offietals, should test their plans in ., g response to various accident scenarios. Exercises should test primary and secondary coemunications systems, the workability of reception centers, traf fic emtrol procedures and decentam-ination operations:

12. All f acets of emergency response plans, including notification, evacuation and reception center procedurea should be tested against established criteria and time limits to judge how of-factively the overall plans can be iglemented:

1

13. A specific corna:unications phraseology should be developed for all parties. This would avoid such sitaations as overstating the severity of a reactor accident to offsite officials:

14. Primary and backup medical facilities should be established for the treatment of reactor and of f site victims. Provisions should include a capabGity for handling contaminated individuals and 43 I

s 8 .~ h 5 u->u e.,.., t

N adequatt bed spaces i

15. The Department of Public 5ealth s too.d move to eyaip all NIAT members wit.h radio beepers for fast cassuaications, and possibl*

radios for their cars. Field kits should be updated with func ' l tioning equipment and provisions established for WIAT to have i annual drills and reviews. The number ot' NIAT members in west. een Massachusetts should be increased. i

36. Otility officiala should sign as agreement with the Departnest of Public Realth agreeing to notify the agency whenever there is a local or site emergency as Jell as a general emergency.

, a This way, health,authoritiu will be able to promptly respond 4' e-to any incident affecting the publics l tg

17. Area and local response plans should contain provisions for citisen participation in annual reviews to guarantee f:en111ari-er sation with the plans:

g

18. Each municipality should decide on its own if it wants to stage nock evacuation drills to test their p'lans. The sf. ate should help coordinate such exercises:

8,

19. Distributing an evacuation fact sheet sad map is esential but l

the brochures must be readable and contala more pertinent inforn-ations phone nurbers to call if tranzportation is needed, an explaination that evacuation could be for an extended period of time, eter

20. All plans should address the erscuation of schools, nursing homes, i prieons, hospitals and other institutions:

i

21. The state should work toward ensuring that the nuclear industry wL11 be reaponsible for coordina' tag and finaacing all dec0ntam-ination programs, paying for medical treatment and guaranteeing l

-u-4 i n' L 9 E' F 1 1 I I I know m. e m p l l

95 4 .Y

' ggg egi11ty officials will q Aietly actify offsite authorities of a reactor accident.

l ~ 4 I 1 s' I I ( Offf* a 4: a e s's e 4 Ge i s' e s' 4 4 e r S e S l' 4 1 1 L$* e e i 4 I i e p l l l .u. LW..e O h4 e w. h' M m **FN ~,

96 i I. APPsup!1 &# he sulte Cf haneceu Telephone Seregy en Wation planalag* 3andein telepheme out toy condeeted la the tomme of nowe, Norgoe, rioride, Beeth, I Charlesont, porthi' lead and tornardep with the fo11 ewing geestianos i l The Massachusette Civil Defense Agency has supposed 1r opent time with local efft. eiale preparing emergency response plane la the eveat of an accident et the (varnent Taakee or Yankee Atemic seclear plaats).

1. Bave you ever seen series of any emergener response 31ese er do you know of thele I

esisteneet }

2. Rave you ever atteaded any public heariage to discuse emergency encutica plane gf for your ceemunity?

i O

3. The Area Civil Defense office will be distri$uting, with local officiale'ooopera.

O tion, copies of fact sheets atd maps oce+atning information regardlaat encuation g and the zwtes to follow.iDo yoe feel there abould be more ertassive p operation g such as staging sock eteevotion drittet 4 4. tonly local officials wrs an'ked this guestien along with the preceeding questiend i Sb

- re yw levolved in any planning efforte for preparing eewigency evacuation plaas?

9 Questione 1. 2. 2. 4. Lwns Af fected try Taskee * %.it l Amse he e1A9et 50 30 WO DP2145 = Ree14 ant MO 30 MO D92118 Resident 30 30 30 DRI115 Pollee Chief 30 TES 30 CSIILS Selectmea TES 30 30 082118 FC i Monroe ) Aseident DO 30 30 D8212A i Resident 30 30 RAVE DR212A = Desident WO 30 50 DRI123 Fite Chisf 30 50 50 DRI118 30 Selectmaz/ Police Odef 30 12 yrs.eTo NO D81122 30 civil Defense TEs so 30 DR112A 30 Florida aseideat 30 30 30 DR212A = Reeldent 30 No NO DB212A = Re sidaat 30 50 EnVE DRI12A Dee14ast 30 30 ELVE DRZ12A = 1 Police Chief Its 30 DD DRIZAA l Selectman so ho No Dr212A Civil Defonee TES 3D TIS e -4s. . o O s e \\ I i l t W

M 1. 2, 3. 4 guestitre g elev at aselEt M 30 WO URIMA ~ so 50 30 DeLIus nacideet 30

30 WO DRIu a nesident police Odef 90 30 50 DazuJ 90 0.se 1 yr. ego 50 30 DeJ12A 30 selectmaa civi Defense TEd 138 30 DeLIMA

% some entant seeth 30 7 1ectman 30 30 Civil Defease TIS 30 Toet ecommanicatio9 TES Towns Affected by varisont Yaakee gppp I $I i Northf told _ e 90 EAVE DRIuA ~ posident TES g g* g a Besident W W WO DRILIB = ' I Desideat 133 W RAVE DRIuA u0 90 m DnIIzt no e 4's ( s.12etmaa Civil Defense TES 138 NAVE DeLIud 30 g g ( OI i Earnardston 30 50 SAVE DRIILS L$t i Assident e Desfient 30 m 30 DRIM A = neaidant TES 30 30 DRu13 112 P M rhief TES TES TES Selectman TES 30 Civil Defense TES us RAVE DRIILS 30

mandem esrvey conducted week ett April u.19tf Results of Personal Interviews Conducted in Plymouth, Mass, reguding Evacuation 91anning for the Pilgrim I Jteactor:

In the event of an acalhat et the Pilgria reactor, only part of 71pouth wwld have t,o be evacuated. At a hea. ting before the legislative Joiat EnerTy Co uittee is l ' April the state Civil Defense claimmi to have seat out 50 copies of na enarfontf P an to various places la Flymouth. Townty.eis people, includlag hoc ital. local and state police and fire and enho. lance ps.sonnel were geestioned regard ag plymouth's energency plan. Only four ( 4) people said they had board of a plan erd so one said they keev where it was et had seen it. Four police officers were goeotiemed aboet the plaa and acoe of then knew the evm-where it was. me police officer stated that even if there were a plane Oe e e h $ s. t etice routes would be inadequate. gg,, D$M 6 94 s tr e s 60 s

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98 APPENDIR Bs Town Cf Charlemont, Massachusetts l EMERGENCY INFCMATION Por usa in case of a major accident at Yankee towe Nuclear Plant UFON RECEIPT OF WARNING 1. Turn on one of the following stations: WEAI Creenfield WTIC Wartford, Conn. Channel 32 Reene 2. Close doors and windows of your hoes, school or bus ine s s. 2. Prepare to evacuate if so notJfied. p, g 4. If evacuation is directed, turn off all appliances. 5. Reep te1 phone free for emergency use. 9 t. 6. Follow evacuation route as shown on map. e 7. Do not panic -- proceed with caution to avoid accidents. 6. secure your home and office. 9. Keep car windows and vents closed.

10. If you need special or prescribed medicines, bring them with you.

11. sting blankets, if possible.

FARM FAMILIES: 1. Get livestock under cover. 2. Provide stored feed and water. 3. secure buildings. EVACUATION ROUTES: East on Rte 2 to Buckland exit to Mohawk Regional School. NOTIFICATION: House to house visits by Charlemont Fire Department. 3 Distributed by Charlemont Civil Defen" _ 6 e-s O' eo O 9-

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100 . APPCNDIX C toCA1, PLAN PCR CQTA1HITIES W!Of MAY E DfvotytD CR A177#TED BY l MAJOR ACCTIOr!S AT WlAA POWER PACILITES i I. Purpose To provide offteials and agenotes of W Town of with a short guide to actions dich WLr ecomunity may take in event of such an seeident. II. Au h rity Responsibility for the Wblie safety of W eittnens of each wuntelpality gr lies with the chief elected offietals of that city or town, uiilising all I O appropriate publie and voluntary agencies. The Commonwealth of Massachu. O ** setta provides technical assistance and e6pport, under provisions of the e 4 Civil Defense Act (Chap. 639 of b Aeta of 19%). g,. Aubrity to detamine knd direct protectiva aetica in event of any type 8 G of radioldgical emergeney lies with the Massachusette Coemissioner of gs. ' hb11e Maalth, per Seetico $B of Chap.111 of the General Laws. g g III. Situation Quote the first persgraph of the Area Flaa. he Town of , eose center is approximately miles (specify directice) frtre this twelear power plant,. could be affected by the results of a saJor seeident at the plant as follows: (For 'eveeustion" eccewitties) the citisens and publie safety

forces la the part of W Town (specify area or boundaries) may be advised to take protective action by:

Taking the best kvallable shelter untti the threat is past, or Eyseusting the area to other parts of the eenamity or te owe communities, as specified below. To enable such evacuation, W following evacuation routes are to be kept clear of non-essent'lal traffie for as long as necessary l (Specify roads or routes, and which sections) g * . e e. = e S e e W* l

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f 101 (For "star-put' casummities) In the event that evacuation of the Twn(s) of (ePetity) is directed, the following roads er routes will be kept altar of non-essentiel traffie for so long as may % recesserys .,(epecify) (For ' reception' ecurraities) g r f /* In the event that evarustion in the Tom (s) of (specify) is directed, evacuees will be ta. ken care t $I 4 4 et during the anticipated limited period of erarsency in this town. 14eal S t' i 9 4 and state publie safety forces will keep the following routes clear for such g gi g gi evacuee movement een ordereds S l' f ( i f GI 4 t S t? 4 i (specify) Iy. Leeti Vamina and Alertina i A. De initial aming wi.11 come free (speeityper Area Flan) and will be received locally at (specify location or officials). B. De following departments, ageseies and officials will be notified by telephoes I'?"D) (tnanber) C. 2e fo11owing departaanta, offieials and ur.ite will be plaeed on a stand-by until fur'.her informaticu is availt.ble as to the nakre of !( the serious incident and the type of action regred in Massaahusetta !E ai e (specify) $4 51 De at t 4 et e e t D e en e &e o mas e, a W 8 e 9% s e

== gog (For eveeustion cosmmities) D. Preparations will be ande to alert the publie in h specifie f evaruation sonea by the folleving meanse e Publie warning (fin, horn, sta.) (Speelfy sier j Door-to-dor follow-up by the following letal agencies (specify) Y. Other 14eal Action Of* g g infrie Control - Non-essential movement into potentially hasardous ana ! will be detoured or held up until further information is available as to D I,. the emergency situation, frcre.the Massachuseth State Police oa Massachus t G Civil Defense. Ot g g, To accomplish thief traffic control points win be set up at W fonowir. locatione s G if 4 L, S (specify) (In evacuation conrumities) Assistance to any person in the evacuation sono in moving to designa reception points will % provided through town or volunteer resourse. nached at-(plophone rember). (In neertion eeevs.mities) Initial preparations will be rade by the American Red Cross for h neeption of evacuees, should, such be necessary, at the tonowing location (s)s (*pnity) VI. etico Ponowint _fecietene 09 a her ener Peeponse is soon as possible state patlis offleials will determine et - if aar - protective actica needs to be taken in any Passachusetta ecessanitta S 18 will be tranmaitted to 43 (ffected emunities. (For evacuation scannunities) If*protactive shelter

is adivsed, this win be traramitted throvsti publio information media, with doer-to-door fonow-up by the foUsWI local unitse, s> e e St Ee.

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103 i (opetity) If

evacuation" la directed, tais will be sosisunicated by the puille warnirs deviese (specify eat unit and dat signal), with door-to-door follow-up as specified above.

(In "stay-Puv ecerpunities) Pnpararions for evacuee movement along th. specified routes will be takan, and other traffie control measures continued or estab-lished as may be tirected by the Massachusetts state Pellee. l l Ogp (spee!.fr any dessures set previously sentioned) { $t e g (* t (In "reception" commsanities) e I O' PT,eparations sa.tst be made for directing evacues traffle aloeg the e t' i t specified routes to the neeption senters, and such other trstfie g gi e i control messuna may be required. O' YII. Publie Infonastion 4$e e d (Ta'ie**frcan Area Plan,' plus such additions as desired.) VIII. Canrounications the causanisations systerms.available in the Town of imelude the followings (Specify ytre, Police, etc. radie systes.s) (Teleptvmes) II. Reception Centers (Por 'recep* ion

eoaramities)

Provide details on location (s), sise, and American Red Cross action. Emergency operstican will to dincted free (location) trith the following telephor e arabers: Attaebnent Key officials and agencies of the Town af are" Offletal Position Name Purober G. e d e 53-b46 e 94e i D$M 4 S4 4

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IN e o o XI. FOOTNOTES 1. '7he Case Against Nuclear Pwers m Overview,' h1 ternate Sources of Energy, December,1976, p.22. l Peactor Safety Study. Athe Energy Conesiasion, August,1574. 2. 3. ' Evacuation Af ter A Nuclear Accident Can It se tane7' National observer, July 21, 1975. 4. Guide to the Preparation of__teergency Plans for Production and Utilization facilities, Director of Masardous Materials, Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Coartission, Washington, D.C.,19?0. S. General Laws, Chapter !!!, section 2(b) gives the Cossaissioner gp of Public sealth permission, with the approval of the Governor, to declare an air pollution meergency.. Protection of the G public against air contamination, tahich includes radiation p., natorial, can entail evacuation or restriction from entering , g a specific area. 1 6. The Civil Defense Act of 1950 authorises the Goverr.or, acting through the Massachusretts Civil Defense Agency, to make plans + g+ for response to potential ef fects of any natural or man-made disaster. Incidents at nuclear power stations which threaten ,*O to or do cause ef fects outside the plant property f all within this latter category. The Civil Defense Act also authorises State coordination of similar authority and responsibility within their respective territories. 7. Environmental Impact Statement, mntague Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2. U.s. Nuclear Regulatory Comunission, February, 1977. Section 7-2. 8. Congressional Joint Constittee on Atottic Energy. Hearings follow-ing Browns Terry Nuclear Plant Fire on March 22, 1975. 9. See Reguletory Guide 1.101, Deergency Planning for Nuclear Pc;wer Plants, Nuclear Regula*.ory Cossaission.

10. Appendix t. Part 50,10CTR.

11. W.sr 3.*9 3, Fucles t Regulatory Coussission, Washington, D.C.,

Ib74. The docuw nt points out 16 insces to address in forzu. lating emergency response plans including assignment of respon-sibility, corysunicati;m and notification and protective resr .,e. a2. Ibid., p.5.

13. Interview with Area Tour civil Defense planner Everett Spobert, at Reichertown, Mass. Civil Defense office, April 15, 1977.

l 54-Lm e >e i 9 >e >e 9-

9

J. '... ~ 105

14. ' Civil Defcas:-Empty I rctense,' Sost*n Cl*be, May 22, 1377, g3 IsASH 129), Nuclear Reg'tlatory Cosedesion, Washingtone D.C.,

1174, p.32.

16. CPM of ficials use radiatiert-doses evaputed by the RFA in a 1975 Manual of Protective Action cuides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Inctients: with radiation doses 10 mrem /hr, evacua*

tion is recorviended within 8 hours if the radiation level is expected to continue for more than 15 hours: wita radiation doses of 500aRe n/hr, immediate evacuation is recommended if the radiation level is expected to continue for more than 3 hours. t 4i t t i e t' t i t ( 8e t (' O l' I L i ( 4i e i S 47 4 4 4 LGi4 I I l 4 l e,.. -5 5-88045 e e S$ 4 4 t, e e. e e l esi ta e s.. i 90 e 90 %. I I I

m m XI. FOOTNOTES 1. 'The Case Against Nuclear Power An Ove rview,

Al te rn a te sources or Energy, December,1976, p.22.

Peactor Safety Study. Atbc Entry) Conrtimston, August,1974. 2. 2.

- vacuation Af ter A Muclear Accident Can :t Be Done?'

National Observer, July 21, 1971. 4. Cuide to the Preparation of toergency Plans for Production and Utilisation racilities, Director of Masardous Materiais, safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Comunissi3n, Washington, D.C., 19?O. i 5. General Laws, Chapter !!!, Section 2(b) gives the Cossaissioner gp of Public Health permission, with the approval of the Governor, to declare an air pollution energency.. Protection of the l G public against air contamination, Wich includes radiation p,- material, can ent, ail evacuatinn or restriction fros satoring , g a specific area. 6. The civil Defense het of 1950 euthorises the Governor, acting 4 through the Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, to make plans g. for response to potential of f acts of any natural or nan-made disaster. Incidents at nuclear power stations which threaten O to or do cause ef fects outside the plant property f all within this latter category. The Civil Defense Act also authorises state coordination of similar authority and responsibility within their respective territories. 7. Environmental Impact Statement, pentague Nuclear Power Station Dnits 1 and 2. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Constission, February, 1977, Section 7-2. 9. Congressional Rint Constittee on Atomie Energy. Mearings follow-ing Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Fire on Maren 22, 1975. 9. See Reguletory Guide 1.101, Emergency Planning f or Nuclear Powet P l an.t_s, N u c l e a r R e gul a *.o ry Coesti s s i on.

10. Appendix t. Part 50, 10CTR.

11, v-sr 1. t 3, Fuele4 Regulatory coussission, Washington, D.C., Ib74. The docuvnt points out 15 issues to address in formu-4 lating emergency respor.se plans including assignment of respon-sibility, cornunication and notification and protective roer*

e. j A2. Ibid., p.5.

13. Interview with Area Tour Civil Defense planner Everett spobert, at Selchertown, Mass. Civil Defense of fice, April 15, 1977.

! l I i . i we i 9 >e O >e O-

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l '.. - \\ 105 s'

14. ' Civil Defenso-Mity Protonse,' Dos %, Clobe, May 22, 1977.

3{MuclearRegulatoryCosttission, Wast.ington,D.C., 15. 1

16. DPH of ficials use radiatio > doses computed by the IPA in a 337$ Manual of Protective Action Cuides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents: with radiation doses 10 mrem /hr, evacua=

Lion is recorwended within I hours if the radiation level is exp1cted to continue for more than 16 houres with radiation i doses of 500mRes/hr, inmediate evacuation is recomsended if the radiation level is expected to continue for more than ) hours. t 4i t i; O t! t t i ( G 4 (* O l' t ( i f Gt i t S 17 f 4 4 LGi4 4 ? t 1 i I l

6.

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4. e e i a e See Sa 4 s.

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