ML20151N899
| ML20151N899 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 11/04/1987 |
| From: | Colburn T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Miraglia F, Murley T, Sniezek J NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151N884 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-88-165 NUDOCS 8808090132 | |
| Download: ML20151N899 (152) | |
Text
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/p maag'o g UNITED STATES
! n NUCLE AR REGULATORY COMMISSION
; y WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 k . . . . . p# November 4, 1987 Docket No. 50-440 MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Murley* J. Partlow G. Knighton J. Sniezek F. Congel
- 0. Wigginton F. Miraglia* J. Roe D. Huller R. Starostecki* S. Black
- J. Calvo
- 3. Varga* 8. Boger D. Crutchfield* G. Lainas L. Shao* C. Rossi*
G. Holahan S. Richardson
! i ' A. Thadani W. Lanning -
R. Cooper 8 {
} THRU: Martin J. Virgilio, Project Director l l
Project Directgrate III-1
, Division of Redctor Projects - III, IV, V I
& Special Profects l
)
j. FROM: ! Timothy G. Colburn, Project Manager ! i Project Directorate III-1 .- Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, .V
, & Special Projects
SUBJECT:
DAILY HIGHLIGHT I Perry On October 29, 1987, while performing surveillance testing of MSIVs (individual cycling to verify closure times within 3-5 seconds), three of the eight MSIVs failed to close within the allowed time. The inboard and outboard valves in the "D" Main Steam Line closed in 22 and 77 seconds, respectively. The outboard valve in the "B" Main Steam Line closed in 12 seconds. All failures were immediately followed by successful tests. The licensee was unable to determine cause. the root cause but suspected dirt in the instrument air line as the The MSIVs are solenoid pilot valve, air-operated to open, spring m loaded air-assist to close valves.
)
l The licensee had planned to continue operation until a planned November 3,1987, r full closure program). test of all MSIVs from 100% power (as per their startup test The licensee had committed to an additional surveillance test F cycling of individual MSIVs just prior to the November 3,1987, full closure m:;. l test to confirm operability of the MSIVs. While performing the individual ~ ' cycling test, P. MSIVs failed to close within the allowed time. . MSIV in the "0" Main Steam Line closed within 18 seconds. The inboard .. 'i: in the "0" Main Steam Line had not begun to close after 2 minutes Both MSIV t The outboard valves were imediately retested and closed within the required 3-5 seconds. - All other MSIVs were tested successfully. s 8809070132 880708 PDR FOIA - MAXWELL 88-16S PDR r/.s
h l - t
.g. , As directed by Region III, the licensee began proceeding to cold shutdown.
The reactor was shutdown at approximately 6:00 P.M. on November 3,1987. An Augnented Inspection Team has been formed and dispatched to the site. Region III plans to issue a Confirmatory Action Letter to the licensee for L Perry to remain shutdown until the root cause has been determined and corrected. b b5 WYm.. Timothy G. Colburn, Project Manager
, Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V
, & Special Projects i.
1 L. i
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MSIV-Chronology of Events + October 29, 1987 i 1835 - Stroked INBD MSIV 1821-F0022D for STI-B21-025A Section 8.3, per ERIS valve did not close for 18 seconds. Level 1 Test Exception Report written (STA Log) 1842 - Re-opened 1B21-F0022D (Plant Log) s 1900 - Declared 1B21-F0022D Inop, closing time was 22.8 seconds free 1 STI data (Plant Log) (LCO written, 87-2031) 2103 - Re-stroked 1821-FOC22D - time to close 3.2 seconds (Plant Leg) i 2106 - Stroked 1B21-F0022D again - time to close 2.9 seconds (Plar.t Log) 2144 - Stroked 1B21-F0028D , time to close 77 seconds (Plant Log) 2152 - 2220 stroked all MSIVs (Unit Log) 2221 - Decision (had been) rade by Plant Management to stroke all MSIV's to check for coc: mon mode failure. Found 1B21-F00282 had , an initial slow streke time of 11.9 seconds, second stroke was l 3.9 seconds (Plant Log) 2230 - 1B21-F0022D was re-stroked, valve closed in less than 3 seconds. l Valve was stroked again and stroke time was less than 3 seconds (STA Log) 1B21-F002D and F0028B alsc experienced long closing times (77 seconds ar.d 12 seconds). When restroked valves had j times of approx. 3 seconds each. In all cases the solenoid lights on 1H13-P622 and -P623 de-energized (STA-Log) Isolated "D" Main Steam Line (STA Log) l 2236-2250 - Isolated "D" MSL (Unit Log) 2240 - Isolated "D" MSL (P. ant Log) 2310 - All MSIVs were verified to stroke within 3-5 seconds. Cou.d not
- repeat the initial condition causing MSIV to slow close. Stroking the MSIV has freed up the Solenoid / Pneumatic valves, which control MSIV stroking, of any foreign matter or moisture. In 5 to 7 days MSIV Isolation Scraa test is scheduled, if this is delayed we'll fast stroke the MSIV's again to see if event is repeatable. De-clared 1B21-F0022D, F0028D and F0028B operable. (Plant Log) 2340 - Restored "D" MSL (Plant'i.,og)
October 30, 1987 0010 - Made 4hr. report on slow closing MSIV's (Plant Log) zi
' 0300 - Test Exception Report (TER) 451-1 for MSIV closure was approved.
All MSIV's restored. (STA Log) (1)
Octeter 30, 1987 0330 - TER 451 1 (MSIV Fast Closure) was resolved and closed. No restrictions to going back to TC-7 (Plant Log) 0355 - Increasing power (Plant Log) Noveeber 2,1987 : 1942 '- Comenced SVI C71-T0039, MSL Isol Valve Closure Channel functional (Unit Log) (10% stroke - partial c1csure - RPS) 2142 - Completed SVI C71-70039 - Sat November 3,1987 1145 - Decreased power to 80% to stroke MSIVs (Plant Log) 115'-1222 - stroked MSIVs (Unit Log) 1157 - 1B21-F022D took 18 seconds to close (Plant Log) 1 1158 - Unit Supervisor declared F022D Inop (Unit Log) 1159 - 1B21-F022D restroked in 3.0 seconds (Plant Log) 1200 - Unit Supervisor declared F022D operable (Unit Log) 1212 -control IB21-F028D didinnot switch was close in the 2 minute 49 seconds that the "close". Took switch back to "Auto", then to "close", valve shut in 3.4 seconds (Plant Log) 1212 - Unit Supervisor declared F028D Inop (Unit Log) 1230 - Declared MSL "D" Inop based on repeated failure of 1B21-F022D and F028D to stroke in required time. entry) (Plant Log) (ALCO written, 87-2128)(see 10-29-87 20-24 shift 1330 - Infonned (Unit Log)System Operation Center of intended plant shutdown 1337 - Comenced PWR decrease (Unit Log) Comenced a normal Rx shutdown (Plant Leg) 1353 - Closed 1821-F022D 3.4 se'conds (Unit tog) 1354 - Closed 1821-F028D 3.3 seconds (Unit Log) 1355 - Shut 1321-F022D and F028D, out of T.S. 3.4.7 and 3.6.4 report (Plant Lcg) Made 4hr. Atta:hments: Unit [4g Plant Log STA Log (2) CR 87-503 CR 87-513
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PERRY ] DELAYED CLOSUPE OF MULTIPLE MSIVs LPOTENTI AL COMPON MODE FAILURE) OCTOBER 29, 1987 PROBLEM THREE OF EIGHT MSIVs DID NOT CLOSE WITHIN ALLOWED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TIME (3-5 SEC). CAUSE l UNKNOWN, BUT SUSPECTS DIRT IN THE AIR SYSTEM HUNG UP (DELAYED OPERATION) THE SOLEN 0 IDS IN THE CONTROL CIRCUIT, b SIGNIFICANCE DEGRADED MSIV PERFORMANCE MAY PRECLUDE REACTOR ISOLATION OR l ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT I OR TRANSIENT, DISCUSSION o BOTH THE INB0ARD AND OUTB0ARD VALVES IN LINE D HUNG UP - 22 SEC, AND 77 SEC, RESPECTIVELY, o NO PREVIOUS INSTANCES OF SLOW CLOSURE, o LICENSEE CURRENTLY PLANS TO CONTINUE REACTOR OPERATION UNTIL AN MSIV ISOLATION TEST ON TUESDAY, o LICENSEE WILL EXERCISE MSIVs PRIOR TO TEST, l 0 LICENSEE DOES NOT KNOW ROOT CAUSE - PROCESS OF ELIMINATION l INDICATES POSSIBLE DIRT IN AIR SYSTEM, o LICENSEE HAS A MAINTENANCE OUTAGE SCHEDULED TO START 12/0]/87, I l FOLLOWUPS o REGIONAL STAFF WILL MONITOR TESTING AND EXERCISING OF MSIVs, L i
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- w. W4 CONTACT: J. CARTER 7/A
REV 0 11/05/87 SEQUENCE OF TROUBLESHOOTING PLAN NRC Date Component Description of Work Document Approval Complete
- 1) Inboard Field - Inspect all 4 WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 MSIV's ItSIV's
- 2) B21-F022D Field - Stroke B21-F022D WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 open
- 3) D21-F022D Field i WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 Remove junction box box cover Verify tightness of terminal screws Record voltage at term 1 & 2 Record voltage at term 3 & 4 Install pressure gauge at B21-F083D (Accumulator drain)
- 4) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 Cps slow stroke E21-F022D app. 50% then finish with fast stroke Cbtain "Pillow Case" air samples of exhaust ports Monitor for lowest pressure
- 5) B21-F022D Field Open B21-F083D WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/37 (Accumulator Drain) and blow down for app. 1 min.
into pillow case G) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9293 Yes Disconnect 3/8" and 1 5/8" air supply to air pack Unbolt and remove air pack Transport air pact to shop 74
- i 1
l
- ponent Description of Work Document Approval Complete 1
- 7) B21-F022D Field WO 87- No 1 Perform blowdown of 1 5/8" air supply
- Obtain a "pillow case" air sample
- Perform a dewpoint reading
- Perform a particle count E) 321-F022D shop WO 87-9372 No '
- Perform shop testing by cycling valve with N 3 supply and temp.
p5wer supply and
- document results
- 9) B21-F022D Shop WO 87-9372 No Perform a detailed disassembly of each component as follows:
- 1) Inspect air pack bolts for tightness Inspect air ports for cleanliness Look for signs of foreign material Photograph air pack
- 2) Disassemble ASCO 3-way (Part #4) Model 68323 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid 'A' Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts Document findings
Component ;escription of Work Document Approval Complete
- 2) Disassemble ASCO 3-way (Part #4) Model #8323 (continued)
Disassemble Solenoid 'B' Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts
- Document findings
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way WO 87-9372 No (Part #5) Model 8320 Remove solenoi'd Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free revement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way valve (Part #1)
Remove 4-way valve Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts j Document findings ; l
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 3-way -
valve (Part #2) Remove 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve
- Disassemble 3-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive j wear 1 Examine for condition of parts Document findings !
l
Component Description of 'a'Ork Document Apprc'tal Complete
- 6) Disassembly cf Norgren 2-vay va19e (Part #3)
- Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve Disassenble 2-way Examine for free movement Examine for oxcessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 10) Outboard Field - Inspect all d MSIV's MSIV's
- 11) B21-F028D Field Ops to slow stroke B21-F028D app. 50%
then finish with fast stroke Obtain "Pillow Case" air sample cf exhaust parts Monitor solenoid actuation from energizcd to de-energized Document findings
- 12) B21-F028D Field Disconnect 3/8" and 1 5/8" air supply too air pack Unbolt and remove air pack Transport air pact to shop
- 13) Bil-F028D Shop l Perform shop testing by cycling valve with N 3 supply and temp. ,
power supply and j document results l i I I
^
\
i j i Component Description of Work Document Approval Complete i
- 14) B?l-F028D Shop Perform a detailed disassembly of each l component as follows:
- 1) Inspect air pack bolts for tightness
- Inspect air ports '
for cleanliness Look for signs of foreign material
- Photograph air pack
- 2) Disassemble ASCO'3-way (Part #4) Model #8323 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve
- Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid 'A' Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts Document findings Disassemble solenoid 'B' Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of 1
parts Document findings h
Component Descriptier. of Work Document Approval Complete
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way .;' .
(Part 45) Model 8320 Rencve solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve
- Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way valve (Part #1)
Renove 4-way valve Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #2)
Retcve 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-way valve Examine for free ! movement l Examine for excessive wear 1 Examine for condition I of parts l Document findings l 1
- 6) Disassembly of l Norgren 2-way valve l (Part 43) i Remove 2-way valve I Examine 2-way valve !
Disassemble 2-way Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts ! Document findings l
0 Component Description of Work Document Approval Corplete
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way .T .
(Part #5) Model 8320 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve
- Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts
- Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way valve (Part #1)
- Remove 4-way valve Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings ,
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #2)
Remove 3-way valve
- Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 6) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #3)
Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve Disassemble 2-way Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
Component Descr :-ion of Work Document Approval Complete
- 3) D.s assemble ASCO 3-way ./' . ,
( art #5) Model 8320 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way valve (Part #1)
Remove 4-way valve Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement - Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #2)
Remove 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 6) Disassembly of Ncrgren 2-way valve (Fart #3)
Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve Disassemble 2-way Examine for free I movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition l of parts Document findings I j
Cceponent Description of Work Document Approval Cemplete
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way .;' . .
(Part 15) Model 8320 Remove solencid Examine actuater and solenoid valve
- Examine pilot. air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine fer free movement Examine fcr excessive wear Examine fer condition of parts Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgron 4-way valve (Part #1)
Remove 4-way valve
- Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine fer free movement Examine fer excessive wear Examine fer condition of )
parts Document findings
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #2)
Remove 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-way valve Examine fer free movement Examine fer excessive wear Examine fer condition of parts Document findings
- 6) Disasrembly of Norgren 2-way valve ;
(Part 43) j Remove 2-way valve 1 Examine 2-way valve 1 Disassemble 2-way l Examine for free I movement ! Examine fer excessive l wear Examine fer condition i of parts Document findings l J
O Ollbert/ Commonwealth ens =,w wwwe 6ftl(RTICoMMONW14TM. MC, P.0 to WW Aegine.Pa itecstfor tilD6300/ Cama 4xatec/Teita 63641 l November 6. 1987 PY-GA!/CEl-19150 Inforniation l The Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company l Project Organization Document Control Center Perry Site l i Post Office Box 97 ; ! Perry, Ohio 44081 l Attention: K. R. Pech Re: Perry Nuclear Power Plant Evaluation of Exclusion Boundary
' Dose with a single MSIV Closure at 18 seconds Oear Xen:
l Per your verbal request of 11/5/87, we have evaluated the potential radiological consequences at the Exclusien Boundary (ES) based upon the following: ,
- 1. The postulated accidents result in no fuel damage per Reference 1.
- 2. The reactor ecolant activity levels are per Reference 2.
- 3. Two cases were considered for the steam line break outside containment mass release for the first 5.5 seconds of the transient. The first is based on the data contained in FSAe section 15.6.4.4 and the second is based on data generated by GE using the SAFE 06 conputer code. After ,
5.5 seconds the mass release in both cases is the same. Attachment 1 I contains the GE data as verbally modified per our telephone conference to extend the table beyond 5 seconds.
- 4. Inboard MS!V closes in 18 seconds.
\ '
The details of the evaluation performed are presented as Attachment #2. The evaluation concludes:
- 1. That the enveloping accident is a double ended rupture of a esin steam line outside containment. The reasoning behind this conclusion is as follows:
Given release of. the reactor coolant inventory with the above noted realistic activity levels, it becomes obvious thit the maximum Y2IEU$.Y --. _ _ . - . . . . . _ .__ D.'_-
Cthert/ Commy.melsh erw,,ve =n, , usewenno oc n > im e ng m meo, ::mases en==,.= mwr Mr. K. R. Fech November 6, 1987 l radioactivity release to the environment occurs with the event that releases the most mass to the environment. Thus the main steam break outside containment (SB00) becomes the enveloping case. All postulated ruptures 9nside containment release coolant and the associated activity into the confines of containment. Thus less activity is released to the environment than in the 580C. Breaks smaller than a full guillotine double ended rupture SBOC release less mass and activity in 18 seconds than a full size 5800. Feedwater breaks release mainly ' clean' fluid and are isolated normally.
- 2. For the FSAR case the results are:
EB iodine dose with 18 secord single M51V closure = 192 @ EB iodine dose with 79 second single MSIV closure = 300 Rem l EB noble gas dose for delayed single MSIV closure = 4.1 Rem l
- 3. For the GE case the results are: l EB iodine dose with 18 second single MSIV closure = 82 Rem CB iodine dose with 120 second single MSIV closure = 300 Rem i EB Noble gas dose for delayed single MSIV closure = 4.1 Rem It should be noted that these results are not based on design verified safety related calculations. To complete a design package, verified design input regarding mass release and timing would be required from GE.
Should you have any questions, please contact us. Very truly yours, , MP M. . Waselus Project Engineer - AEA J. Ioannidi Pro,fect Manager HHW/JI:(11 cc: J.Ioannidi(2) P0/DC(R-290) J.Eppich(E-110) R. C. Anderson Enclosure l
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GENERAL @ ELECTRIC I FERRY SITE NUCLEAA ENUK3Y BUSINESS OPEAADoNS GENERM ELECTRIC COwnu e 175 (URTNER AWNUE
- SAN JOSE, CMJFORNIA 95125 November 6, 1987 To: Gary Rhoades Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Subject:
Estimate of Mass Flews for Break Outside of Containment Per your request, the Malculated mass flow rates for a steamline break outside containment with failure to isolate one steamline are attached. These values were calculated with the GE ' ECCS analysis code SAFE. All assumptions are identical to those l in the FSAR for the steamline break outside the containment with the exception of only 3 lines isolating. These calculations have ; been verified and are filed in DRF 668-000036.
]
Also attached is a plot of these values compared to the 1 original hand calculated estimate. The basis for the hand calculation was as follows: l
.t_ assumptio_n 0-4 sec flow = FSAR calculation 4-5 sec linear ramp to flow for 1 steam line open 5-10 sec liquid bread flow based on Moody critical flow model 10-30 sec steam break flow based on Mcody critical flow model i seen, !
As can be the hand calculation was an excellent l estimate of the SAFE results. Please call if there are further questions. 4 D. D. ones Lead Site System Engineer
\ Extension 6908 DDJ/vjc c: D. A. Hamon T. R. McIntyre l TA' ,
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[ , f i TIME PRESSURE BRK 1 FLcW BREAK (16)
; j i
PSIA , LB/SEC OVALITY *
, ; 0. 1.080E 00 7.086E 03 1.000E 00 1 ..
O 1865234 1.035E 03j 6.907E 03 1.000E 00 A 1 i.
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'g i 2.3994141 9.296E 02 6.179E 03 1.000E 00
.i ..- 2.8104760 9.208E 02 6.118E 03
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& , 4 I 3.0809141 9.151E O2 G.079E 03 1 OOOE 00 l :
I f't 3.5244141 9.081E 02 1.'17E 04 4.0GGE-01 t 3.9931041 9.080E 02 1.670E 04 l 1.734E-01 '
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[ 4.4619141 5,2744141 9.08dE 02 1.456E 04 1.563E-01
& 9.154E 02 5.801E 03 2.170E-01
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n u (' 0.2119141 9.279E 02 3.449E 03 '2.836E-01 I 5
!j 7.1494141 9.393E 02 4.169E 03 1.858E-01 l 7.9150391 9.473E 02 4. 885E 03 .1.128E-01 '
..) .)i 8.1494141 9.499E 02 2. 812E 03 4.008E-01 l
[, . 8.3837891 9.511E 02 1. 582E 03 1.000E 00 h" -
'j. 8.0181041 0.520E 02 1.583E 03 1.000E 00 I
h 8.6525391 9.520E 02 1.585E 03 1,000E 00
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9.0869141 9.3212891 9.535E 9.541E 02 02
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l 1.587E 03 1.000E 00 b ; E 9.555G041 9.546E 02 1.588E 03 1.000E 00 3 ! h 9.7900391 9.549E 02 1. 589E 03 1.000E 00 ( .* I h i 10.024414 10.258789 9.552E 9.554E 02 O2 1.589E 03 1.589E 03 1.000E 00 5 L' 1.000E 00'
! 10.493164 9.555E 02 1. 590E 03 1.000E 00:
l , j h} i 10.727509 9.555E 02 1.500E 03 1.000E 00' 10.961914 9.555E 02 1. 589E 03 1.000E 00' l; . ij 11.196289 9.553E O2 1.589E 03 1.000E 00
; i 11.430664 9.550E 02 1.589E 03 1.000E 00' 11 ! l 11.605039 9.547E O2 1.588E 03 1.000E 00 f i 11.899414 9.543E 02 1. 587E C3 1.000E 00 f
;'. 12.133789 9.538E O2 1. 587E 03 1.000E 00 h ,, 12.308164 9.500E 02 1. 586E 03 1.000E 00
'l 12.602539 9.527E 02 1. 585E 03 1.000E 00 h }'. : 12.836914 9.520E O2 1. 583E 03 1.000g 00
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f s {h 13.071289 13.305664 9.510E 9.505E 02 02 1.582E 03
- 1. 581 E 03 1.000E 00 1.000E 00 i
l h' 13.540039 13.774414 9.497E 02 1. 579E 03 1.000E 00
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9.487E 02 1. 578E 03 1,000g 00
.j !j 14.00878G 9.478E 02 1.576E 03 1,000E 00 0" , 14.243164 9.467E 02 i 1. 574E 03 1.000E 00 l 14.524414 9.453E 02 1.572E 03 1.000E 00 L j q 14.993164 9.400E O2 1.568E 03 1.000E 00 I -
l 15.461914 9.405E 02 1. 564E 03 q 1.000E 00 J 15.930604 9.379E 02 1. 559E C3 1.000E 00 [ :j 10.399414 9.351E 02 1. 554E 03 1.000E 00 [ , >; 16.868164 9.323E 02 1.549E 03 1.000E 00
,, y 17.336914 9.293E 02 1. 544E 03 1.000E 00 L
d q 17.805664 9.262E 02 1. 539E 03 18.274414 1.000E 00 i Il' q 9.231E 02 1.503E 03 1,000E 00 i
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18.743164 19,211914 9.200E 02 1.788E 03 8.250E-01 9.170E 02 i 1.864E 03 1
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- t 20.149414 9.102E 02 1.511E 03 1.000E 00 d
' 20.868104 9.048E 02 1.502E 03 1.000E 00
!! .. l: 21.586914 8.995E 02 1.648E 00 22.118164 8.790E-01
- [1 8.954E 02 1.486E 03 1.000E 00
<j lr - 22.805664 8.901E 02
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!, 23,461914 1.477E 03 1.000E 00 1
8.048E 02 1.468E 03 1.000E 00 24.055664 8.802E O2 1.460E 03 1.000E 00 El i 24.711914 8.748E 02 1.451E 03 l 1.000E 00 f.
. D. i 25.274414 8.705E O2: 1.443E 03 1.000E 00 )
4 25.868164 8.657E 02 1.435E 03 1.000E 00 E : li 26.461914 8.009E 02 1.427E 03 1 ' l- 1.000E 00
" 27.024414 8.503E O2 1.419E 03 1.000E 00 M I 27.586914 8.518E 02 fi 1.411E 03 1.000E 00 28.211914 8.467E O2 1.400E 03 1.000E 00
$I!'1: I- 28.836914 8.417E 02 1.394E 03 1.000E 00 j,l.k
!- 29.461914 8.367E 02 1.386E 03 1.000E 00
>i ,' 30.024414 8.324E 02 1.378E 03 1.000E 00 9
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l l REV 3 11/07/87 i l SEQUENCE OF TROUBLESHOOTING PLAN NRC Date Comoonent Description of Work Document Anoroval Qomolete 1
- 1) Inboard Field - Inspect all 4 WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 l MSIV's MSIV's 1
- 2) B21-F022D Field - Stroke B21-F022D WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 l Open l l
- 3) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 l Remove junction box box cover "
Verify tightness of terminal screws " l Record voltage at term 1 & 2 " Record voltage at term 3 & 4 " Install pressure gauge at B21-F083D (Accumulator drain a
- 4) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 Ops slow stroke B21-F022D app. 50% then "
i finish with fast stroke l Obtain "Pillow Case" air " samples of exhaust ports l Monitor for lowest " pressure
- 5) B21-F022D Field Open B21-F083D WO 87-9323 Yes 11/05/87 (Accumulator Drain) and blow down for app. 1 min.
into pillow case
- 6) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9293 Yes 11/05/87 Disconnect 3/8" and 1 5/8" air supply to air pack "
Unbolt and remove air , pack " Transport air pact to shop "
NRC Date l Comoonent Description of Work Document Approval comolete
- 7) B21-F022D Field WO 87-9405 Yes 11/06/87 l Perform blowdown of 1 5/8" air supply ,
Obtain a "pillow case" I air sample (to be repeated) Perform a dewpoint i reading
- Perform a particle count ,
1
- 8) B21-F022D Shop WO 87-9372 Yes 11/06/87
- Perform shop testing by cycling valve with N2 supply and temp.
power supply and document results
- 9) B21-F022D Shop Perform a detailed disassembly of each component as follows:
1
- 1) Inspect air pack bolts WO 87-9372 Yes 11/05/87 for tightness Inspect air ports for cleanliness = l Look for signs of foreign material a Photograph air pack "
- 2) Disassemble ASCO 3-way WO 87-9372 Yes (Part #4) Model #8323 Remove solenoid 11/06/87 Examine actuator and solenoid valve 11/06/87 Examine pilot air lines 11/06/87 Disassemble solenoid 'A' 11/06/87 Examine for free movement .
Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts Document findinga M -
NRC Date ComponeDi Descriotion of Work Document Aceroval Comolete
- 2) Disasscxble ASCO 3-way WO 87-9372 Yes 11/06/87 (Part #4) Model #8323 (continued)
Disassemble Solenoid 'B' " Examine for free movement " Examine for excensive wear " Examine condition of parts " Doctiment findinga "
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way WO 87-9372 Yes 11/D6/87 (Part #5) Model 8320 Remove solanold "
Examine actuator and solenoid valve " Examine pilot air lines " Disassemble solenoid " Examine for free movement " Examine for excessive wear " Examine for condition of parts " Document findings "
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way WO 87-9372 No valve (Part #1)
Remove 4-way valve Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren WO 87-9372 No 3-way valve (Part (2)
Remove 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
-3 -
I NRC Date Comeonent Descriction of Work Document Accroval Corolete ,
- 6) Disassembly of WO 87-9372 No Norgren 2-way valva (Part #3) 1 Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve j Disassemble 2-way Examine for free movement j Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings )
- 10) Outboard Field - Inspect all 4 MSIV's MSIV's J
- 11) B21-F0289 Field WO 87-9439 Yes Perform blowdown of 1 5/8" air supply 1 Obtain pillowcase sample l 1
- 12) B21-F028D Field WO 87-9440 Yes Perform dewpoint Perform partcal count
- 13) B21-F028D Fiel'd Ops to slow stroke SOI Yes 11/05/87 B21-F028D close then finish with fast stroke
- 14) B21-F028D Shop WO 87-9456 Yes 11/07/87 Perform a detailed disassembly of each component as follows:
- 1) Inspect air pack bolts Yes for tightness Inspect air ports for cleanliness Look for signs of foreign material Photograph air pack 4-
l
\
l 1 I NRC Date I Component Description of Work Document Acoroval Complete
- 2) Disassemble ASCO 3-vay WO 87-9444 Yes (Part #4) Model #8323 1 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines l Disassemble solenoid 'A' !
Examine for free , movement l Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts Document findings , Disassemble S'olenoid 'B' l Examine for free i movement Examine for excessive wear Examine condition of parts Document findings
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way Yes (Part #5) Model 8320 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear l Examine for condition I of parts Document findings l
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way '
valve (Part #1) Remove 4-way valve l
- Examine 4-way valve Disassemble 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- , ~+-- --,, , -
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1 l l l NRC Date l Component DescriDtion of Work Document Accroval Cer:1sta l
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part #2)
- Remove 3-way valve Examine 3-way valve I Disassemble 3-way valve I Examine for free !
movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 6) Disassembly of -
Norgren 2-way va#1ve (Part #3) Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve Disassemble 2-way Examine for free movement I Examine for excessive ' wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 15) B21-F028B Field WO 87-9324 Yes 11/06/87 Disconnect 3/8" and 15/8" air supply too air pack Unbolt and remove air pack Transport air pact to shop
- 16) B21-F028B Shop Wo 87-9433 No Perform a detailed disassembly of each component as follows:
- 1) Inspect air pack bolts for tightness Inspect air ports for cleanliness Look for signs of foreign material Photograph air pack
I I NRC Date l Component Description of Work Document Acoroval Complete { l
- 2) Disassemble ASCO 3-way l (Part #4) Model 18323 l Remove solenoid 1 Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid 'A' 1 Examine for free l movement )
Examine for excessive ) wear l Examine condition of l parts l Document findings : Disassemble solenoid 'B' Examine for free 1 movement Examine for excessive wear , Examine condition of l parts ' Document findings
- 3) Disassemble ASCO 3-way (Part (5) Model 8320 Remove solenoid Examine actuator and solenoid valve Examine pilot air lines Disassemble solenoid Examine for free movement l Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 4) Disassemble Norgren 4-way valve (Part fl)
Remove 4-way valve Examine 4-vay valve ' Disassembl 4-way valve Examine for free movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
NRC Date i Cerecnent DescriDtion of Work Document ADoroval Conc *.ete l
- 5) Disassembly of Norgren 2-way valve (Part $2)
Remove 3-way valva l Examine 3-way valve Disassemble 3-vay valve Examine for free movement l Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition of parts Document findings
- 6) Disassembly of
, Norgren 2-way va#1ve I (Part #3) l Remove 2-way valve Examine 2-way valve Disassemble 2-way I Examine for free i movement Examine for excessive wear Examine for condition ; of parts Document findings e,
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NOV 09 '87 18:29 P02 tCV 09 '87 18:36 P.2 1 l l ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
This document describes, the evaluations performed to deter-mine the cause of events on October 29 and November 3,1987 when Perry close onUnit 1 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) failed to fast command. The most probable root cause, based on data currently (ASCO) Model 8323 is available, failure of an Automatic Switch company 3-way dual solenoid valve. The primary suspected cause is hardening and dimpling of the EPDM rubbe; disc seat material and other EPDM seals, assembly to wedge in place when the causing the disc holder Several mechanisms have been proposed thatsolenoid was de-energised. degradation, the most probable of could lead to EPDM temperature environment. which is a local high This docurent is organized into four sections. Section 1 describes the most probable root cause selection as such. Section 2 gives an , overview and theofbasis for its how the root cause analysis team reached its conclusions. Section 3 describes potential to close,component failure modes that could lead to MSIV failure and finally, Section 4 describes specific failures within the ASCO Model 8323 valve that could lead to the observed conditions, and discusses environmental conditions that could lead to the failure. O 11/09/87 Th
NOV 09 '87 19:31 P71 NOV 09 '87 19:39 P.71 1-1 SECTICH 1 MOST PROBABLE ROOT CAUSE close The most probable root cause of the observed MSIV failure to is failure of the Automatic signal Company (ASCO) Model 8323 3-way dual de-energized solenoid valve to shift from the energized to position. Within the component, the Ethylene Propylene Diana Monomar (EPDM) found to be deformed. A "dimple"rubber (see figure 1 and 2) was found disc seat material was in the EPDM seat material on the disc holder. This is almu indicative of a general hardening and degradation of the rubber seals within the valve. the MsIV will not close.If the disc holder sticks to the orifice Delayed closure is consistent with de-energizing of the solenoid, fe,llowed by sticking of the disc holderbreaks holder to the orifice for some period of time, when the dise through the orifice. loose and ' allows the air pressure to relieve will close. Once the air pressure is relieved, the MsIV P Failure of this component is the only failure that is consistent with the observed failure. failure will result in a delayed MSIV closure.No other single component The EPDM degradation the tamperature limits of the EPDM is mostmaterial. probably caused by exceeding
'this spplication because of its radiation resistance from an EPDM was chosen for equipment qualification standpoint. Perry has experienced bulk drywell and steam tunnel temperatures which have approached tech spec limits during much of the startup test program.
steam leaks have occurred in the vicinity of the affected MSIVAdditionally, solenoids. While no data exists to actually confirm that the local . temperatures have exceeded the espability of the EPDM rubber a
. good correlation exists between the location of steam leaks a,nd the affected valves.
Several other mechanisms have been postulated for the EPDM degradation, and sufficient data does not currently exist to absolutely prove or disprove any hypothesis. It is true, howev-er, that the temperatures near the valves have been close to the maximum cause. allowable for RPDM material, and this is the most likely
NOV 09 '87 18:30 P03 l
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. 2-1 SECTION 2 ASALYSIS TECHNIQUES AND OVERVIEW Following the failure of the B21-F022"B" and "D" Main Steam Isolation Valves, a multi-discipline team was convened with the charter to deter:nine the mest likely cause of the problem. This i
activity would be useful prior to actuator disassembly and inspection. The team consisted of senior engineers from the CEI mechanical and electrical engineering and . technical departments, as well as the architect engineer (Gilbert) and NSSS supplier (General Electric) . Problems analysis proceeded using standard Kepner-Tregoe (KT) Problem Analysis techniques. The initial thrust of the team was to determine which equipment failures would cause the failure of a MSIV to close in the delayed manner observed. An initial brainstorming cession was held to determine potential component fallure which might cause the observed behavior. These potential ftiens, ailuresusing were then compared with known facts and design condi-
"is/is-not" techniques to rate the postulated f allures as to probability.
postulated.Twenty four (24) potuntial component failures were initially Of these, 19 wera rated as unlikely, one (1) as potential, and four (4) as probable causes. All five of the potential and highly likely candidates involved either the ASCO Model components. 8323 3-way Dual Solenoid Valve, or the air supply to these incorporated specific in other work items and inspection steps were thus site action plans to address components in detail. these section 3 of this report documents each of the 24 postulated component failures. It is organized in order of highest to lowest probability. Each potential cause is described, discussed and conclusions drawn with regard to root component failure.
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l , HOV 09 '87 18235 P06 POV 09 '87 18:42 P,6 l 2-2 Following disassembly of the actuator air packs and diagnos-tic tests on the air supply system, it was determined that the most likely f ailure mode was, in f act, the Asco Model 8323 3-way dual solenoid valve. The suspected cause was dimpiing of the EPDM rubber disc seat material, causing the disc holder assembly to wedge in place when the solenoid was de-energized. The team was again convened, this time to evaluate the environmental and design conditions which cod 1d be responsible for the observed component failure.
~
Analysis techniques similar to those utilized in the compo-nent evaluation were used to screen the potential causes. Absolute determination of the root cause is difficult. However, the most likely condition leading to the failure was local high temperatures leading to EP:M degradation. Analysis results are given in Section 4, again describing each of the nine (9) postulated root cause conditions and discussion of the evidence to confirm or deny the postulated condition as root cause.
l l l EDO HIGHLIGHT PROJECT DIRECTORATE 111-1 November 10, 1987 l l l l l l l l l PERRY A Region III/NRR AIT visited the plant November 4-9, 1987, to detemine the cause of events on October 29 and November 3,1987, when MSIVs failed to close on command. The AIT considers that the most probable root cause of the observed MSIV failure to cluse is failure of the Automatic Signal Company Model 8323 3-way dual solenoid valve to shift from the energized to de-energized position. Within the component, the Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) disc seat material was found to be deformed, most probably caused by exceeding the temperature limits of the EPDM saterial. Failure of this component is the only failure that is consistent with the observed failure. closure. No other single component failure will result in a delayed MSIV The licensee has proposed a corrective action program to pemit plant restart , for discussion at a meeting held in Region III on November 10, 1987. e r/4
. - - . _ - - -- - ~- - -
E(E%'T FOLLOWUP REPORT 87- U2 50.72 EVENT #10515, OCTOBER 30,19L PLANT-PERRY 1 gg 4 g g PPCJECT MANAGER- T. COLBURN CZ AIZANT ENGINEER- J. CARTER PROBLEM M5IVs did not close withir. the time allowed by Technical Specifications. CAUSE TnTtTally unknown but subsecuently determined that a higher than anticipated ambient temperature cause: the main pilot control (solenoid valve) to hangup. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE Reactor isolation or containcent integrity may not be possible in the event of an accident or transient. DISCUSSION During full closure tests of individual MSIVs, three valves exceeded the 5 second closure time of the technical specifications. Times were 22, 12, and 77 seconds with the tw: slowest valves being in the "D" stear lire. Subsequent testing of these valves resulted in closure times of 3-5 seconds. The licensee initially suspected that dirt in the air systi' caused the solenoid valve to hangup, thereby delaying the on-set of va we closure. Since there had bJen no previous instances of slow MSIY closure, the licensee continued power operation while reviewing maintenance records and preparing for their last pre-operational test, full MSIY isolation. The licensee and NRC regional and headquarters staff agreed with this approach. Prior to running the full MSIY isolation test, the licensee again tested individual MSIVs for closure. Slow valve closure was observed again. The licensee shut down the reactor without performing their full MSIY isolation test. NRC dispatched an AIT to the site to be present during disassembly of the solenoid valves and to evaluate the problem. Initial conclusions were that steam leaks in the vicinity of the MSIVs and the control circuit valves (includes the solenoid vahes) had caused ambient temperatures in the vicinity of 300* F at the highest temperature location which also was the location of the "D" isolation valve. The elastomer seal in the solenoid vahe hao hardened and was believed to have held the solenoid in the closed position thereby preventing air fron being vented, thereby keeping the MSIY open. FOLLOWUP The AIT will document th?ir findings and present any followup to be done, plant specific or generic. No further action by EAB is necessary. Je Carter l BWR Section Events Assessment Branch cc: T. Colburn E. Rossi Z//
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December 2, 1987 ) PROJECT DIRECTUATE 111-1 EDO HIGHLIGHT l l o PERFY n D"nTc tober 29, 1987, and again on November 3,1987, several Main Steam Isolation Vahes (MS Vs) failed to close within the raxt:num allowable time prescribed in the Technical Specifications. As a result of these events, an Augmented Inspecticn Tearr (AIT) was dispatched. Based on troubleshooting and analyses, the licensee concluded that the slow closure timet were caused by temperature induced dearadation of the elastomer material in the ASCO dual coil solenoid operated pilot valse. Repairs were made and the plant was subsec.ently restarted and returned to
; power. To ensure that the root cause had in fact been identified and corrected, i the licensee initiated confirmatory laboratory analysis and a special monitoring and surveillance program. On November 29, 1987, during a special surveillance test, ore of the MSly solenoid operated pi'ot valves malfunctioned. An orderly ,
shutdcwn was imediately initiated, and the licensee began an investigation to detennine the cause of the malfunction. Region 111 inspectors were dispatched to the site on November 29, 1987, and the AIT was reconstituted and arrived at I the site on December 1, 1987. i u l ( I 9 I TN'
i e l l l 0PERATING REA# TORS EVENTS BRIEFING 87-43 I TUES_ DAY DECEMBER 8, ] M7, 11 A.Pu THE AGENDA INFORMATION MAY ALSO B,E OBTAINED BY DIALING EXTENSION 27174, l H.B. ROBINSON SINGLE FAILURE IN SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM PERRY MSIV FAILURE TO OPERATE (FINAL UPDATE) N!NE MILE POINT 2 CST RUPTURE I GENERIC ISSUE SAFEGUARDS EVENTS REPORTING l 4 i
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1 : PERRY MSIV FAILURE TO OPERATE (FINAL UPDATE) ) PROBLEM MSIV FA'.LS TO CLOSE, ; 1 CAUSE PILOT S0LEN0ID DID NOT MOVE WHEN DE-ENERGlZED, l l SJGNIFICANCE j o PRIOR 'P0UBLE SHOOTING HAS NOT MADE MSIV OPERATION RELIABLE, o REACTOR ISOLATION OR CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY MAY BE PRECLUDED l FOLLOWING ACCIDENT / TRANSIENT, i DISCUSSION o SURVElLLANCE TESTING ON 11/29/87 DETECTED ONLY ONE FAILUPE (F022B), o LICENSEE SHUT DOWN THE REACTOR, o AIT SENT TO SITE, o VALVE WAS NOT ONE THAT FAILED ON 10/29/87 OR 11/3/87. - 0 BLACK FOREIGN MATERIAL FOUND IN. LOWER SOLEN 0ID AREA,
- o. MATERI AL BELIEVED TO HAVE COME FROM AN "0" RING THAT WAS REPLACED; o CAUSE OF IN0 PEP. ABILITY BELIEVED TO BE A PIECE OF "0" RING HINDEPING SOLEN 0ID MOVEMENT, o PROBLEM SIMILAR TO THAT AT GRAND GULF IN 1985, o All EIGHT SOLEN 0 IDS REMOVED AND P.EPLACED WITH NEW SOLEN 0 IDS, o NRC HAS APPROVED RESTART, FOLLOWUP _
ADDITIONAL SURVEILLANCE TESTING FOR MSIV JPERABILITY TO AUGMENT W CH SPEC REQUIREMENTS CONTACT: J CARTER
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- 2. MSIV Contro' l Two control switches for each MSly are provided on panel P601. Thest
'l switche: are tne manual control switch and the test control switch. The manual control switch is a three-position, saintained contact selector switch with Ct.0SE-AUTO-TEST positions. The test control switch is a push button.
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momentary contact switch. Table 5 lists the function of each MSIV switch i position. The manual control switches and the test contrc1 switches control the MSIVs by means of the MSly control logic (Figure 12) and a pneumatic
- control unit (Figure 13). The control logic for each MSIV provides valve position 1 I indication, see Table 3, and provides control power to the solenoids of the pnematic control unit. The pneumatic control unit for each MS!Y is attached l to the valve's operating cylinder. An a':cumulator is installed on the air supply line to provide the capability of conducting one air-assisted closing l operation withwt Instreeht Air System (PS2) header pressure. A check valve on the air supply line ensures that the stored energy in the accumulator can "I be used to shut the MSly and not bleed back into the air header on lon of air header pressure.
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- Each pneumatic control unit contains:
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- A f our way, pilot operated main control valve whose f unction is to direct air to either the top or the bottom of the operating cylinder, q
- A two way, pilot operated auxiliary air pilot valve whose function is #
to ensure venting of the bottom of the operating cylinder wnen closing the MS!v,
- A three-way, dual solenoid operated maia pilot control valve whose g function is to reposition the main control valve and the auxiliary air pilot valve, .
- A three way, pilot operated test control valve, with an attached air q aetering valve, whose function is to ensure venting of the bottom of ,j the operating cylinder cylinder when testing the MSIV, and j
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- - A three way, solenoid operated test pilot control valve whose [
function is to reposition the test contrcl valve. In the remainder of this section MSIV manual and automatic control oper tions will be discussed. Since each MSly has almost identical control circuitry, the discussion will be confined to outboard MS!V B21-F02M. l
- a. Manual 0paning Operation Refer to Figures 12 and 13 during the following disucssion.
Valve B21-F028A cc. be opened if the following conditions are set- I
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- Power available (RPS bus A and p) to pilot and test solenoids, and j
- Trip logic is reset and KS1 and K14 relays are energized.
With these conditions net, valve B21-F028A is opened by taking its manual
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control switch, S2A, to the AUTO position. This switch action will cause the following to occur in the F028A control circuitry: B21/N11 - Rev. 4 .
- $2A switch contact opens to deenergize relay K74A, (
- Relay K74A closes contacts to energize the A and 8 pilot solenoids,
- Solenoid action positions the main pilot control valve to admit air to the main control and auxiliary air pilot valves,
- The auxiliary air pilot valve blocks air from exhausting off the bottom of the air cylinder,
- The main control valve passes air via the test control valve to the bottom of the air cylinder, which causes the MSlY to open.
- Ai r from the top of the air cylinder is exhausted through the main control valve, and
- When the valve is 90% open, a limit switch LS-1 will open to de-
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energize the green closed indication light. At the same time, limit switch LS-2 will close to energize the red open light.
'o , Manual closing Operation j Refer to Figures 12 and 14 during the following discussion.
Valve B21-F028A is closed by taking its manual control switch, S2A, to !
. the CLOSED position. This switch action will cause the following to occur '~
the control circuitry:
- $2A switch contact closes to energize relay K74A,
. Relay K74A opens contacts to deenergize the A and B pilot solenoids.
NOTE: Both pilot solenoids must deenergize to initiate a valve closure,
- Solenoid action positions the main pilot control valve to exhaust air of f of the auxiliary air pilot and main control valves,
- The main control valve repositions to admit air to the top of the air l cylinder and to exhaust air from the bottom of the cylinder via the I test control valve ;
- The auxiliary air pilot valve repositions to provide a second exhaust path for venting air from the bottom of the air cylinder.
- When the valve is 10% closed, limit switch LS-1 closes to energize the green closed indication light. At the same time, LS-2 opens to deenergize the red open indication light. -
W B21/ Nil - f.ev. 4 . _ ~ . _
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- c. Manual Testing Operation ,
Refer to figures 12 and 15 during the following discussion. While in the open position, i.e., the pilot solenoiss energized, B21-F028A may be test closed by first placing its manual control switch, 52A, j to the TEST position, and then depressing the test control pr.hb utton , S4A. These switch actions cause the following to occur in the B21-F028A control ci rcuit ry: l l
- 54A switch contact closes to energize the test solenoi:. Note: with S2A in TEST, contact K74C in the test solenoid circuit will' already !
be closed,
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- Test solenoid action repositions the test pilot control valve causing it to admit air to the test control valve, and 1
- The test control valve repositions to bleed air.of f the bottom I portion of the air cylinder, causing the M51V to move slowly in the close direction.
1
- d. MISV Automatic Isolation Refer to Figure 12 during the following discussion.
The MSIV automatic isolation logic has fou: logic channels A,B,C and D, each with an associated relay, K7A,B.C and D. An MSIV automatic isolation condition deenergizes these relays causing relays K51A and K14A to deenergize. Deenergizing relays K51A and Ki4A causes an interruption of power to the A and B pilot solenoids resulting in MSly closure. The following conditions will initiate an automatic MSly is:1ation: !
- Low RPY water level, Leiel 1
- Low main steam line pres'sure, with reactor mode switch in RUN,
- Main steam high temp turbine building, j
- Main steam line area high temperature.
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- Main steam line high radiation, - - Main steam line high flow, B21/N11 - Rev. 4 _
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- Condenser low vacuum, or
- Manual isolation.
The logic channels are arranged so that f ailure of any one instrument or channel will not cause MSly isolation. Ref er to SOM B21H, f or a more detailec description of MSIV automatic isolation.
- 3. Main steam Shutof f Valve Control ,
Ref er to Figure 16 during the f ollowing disucssion. the use of a 3-Each MSSV is controlled from panel P601 by The keylock switch position keylock switch with CLOSE-NORM-0 PEN positions. spring returns to NORM. The key can be removed while in the NORM position. To open (close) the valve, the switch is placed in the OPEN (CLOSE) position. Since the contacts seal ip, the switch does not have to be held in position while opening or closing the : the OPEN or CLOSE Assuming the MSSV is closed initially, taking the keylock switch to f valve. l OPEN will cause the following to occur:
- 42F (open relay) will energize causing its respective seal-in contact (42Fa) to close and causing contact 42Fb in the closing circuit to open,
- 42F contacts (not shown) close to energize the 480 VAC motor, j
- Valve motor drives valve open until a limit switch contact "opens to deenergize relay 42F, and ll
- Limit switch contacts reposition during valve stroking to extinguish green closed light, and tiluminate red open light.
Assuming the MSSV is open initially, takin3 the keylock switch to CLOSE, will cause the following to occur: i 42R (close relay) will energize causing its respective stal-i n I 4 B21/hlt - Rev. 4 .
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( - 1 I in the opening contact (42Ra) to cloje and causing contact 42P.b circuit to open. l motor. :
- 42R contacts (not shown) close to energize the 480 VAC 3 l valve motor drives valve closed until a limit switch contact opens
- I to deenergize relay 42R.
- Contacts reposition during valve stroking to extinguish red open itght and 111minate green closed.
4 Turbine Bypass Valve Control l The control f eatures f or th'e turbine bypass valves are explained in SDM N32/C85.
!!!. OTHER SYSTEM RELATED INFORMATION
( A. OPERATIOMAL 4
- 1. MSly Hydraulic Damper Cylinder Failures At an operating BWR, inboard MSIV's were opened at a reactor pressure of l
850 psig with the outboard MS!V's closed. The piping between the inboard and l outboard MSIV's, was at approximately atmospneric pressure before the event. As the inboards were stroking open, a pressure spike in the steam lines , betwecn the KSIV's accelerated the lifting of the main disk and ' caused a Consequently, it is pressure spike in the hydraulic damper cylinder. important to adhere to operating procedures that limit differtntial pressure against which the MISV's are opened.
- 2. Low-tow Set Function Upon reaching the opening setpoint of the first SRV in the relief mode, Thi.s means that inveediately the 1103 psig, the low-Low Set function is armed.
second low-Low Set SRV will open because RPV pressure will be above its 4 B21/Mll - Rev. 4 ,
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Low-Low Set opening valve. This is consistant with GE design and has proven q successful in preventing the next group of valves f rom opening at 1113 psig. f ll ( l l l 1 4 B21/N11 - Rev. 4 -22
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TABLE B21-5 MSIV SWH POSITIONS AND FUNCTIOMS SW!lCH NAME POSITIONS EUNCTIONS (NUMBER) INDICATION Inboard MSIV CLOSE Deenergizes pilot solenoids, Manual Contre' Switch causing the valve to close. (SIA,B,C, anc 0) AUTO Energizes pilot solenoids causing the valve to open. TEST Energizes pilot sol' enoi d s , causing the valve to open. Also energizs s test solenoid in conjuction with the test control switch Outboard MSly CLOSE Deenergizes pilot solenoids to Manual Control Switch cause the valve to shut. (52A,B,C ar.d 0) ( Deenergized pilot solenoids to AUTO
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cause the valve to shut. TEST Energizes p110t solenoids, causing the valve to open. Also energizes test solenoid in conjunction with the test control switch. Inboard MSIV Pushbutton switch used in Test Control Switch conjunction with the (53A,B,C and 0) MSIV manual control switch to test KSIV.
- Outboard MSly Pushbutton switch used in Test Control Switch '
conjunction with the (54A,B, C and D) MSIV manual control switch to test MSIV.
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With both control switches, one-on panel P601 and one on panel P631', for ( a selected SRV in the OF posit on, the relief mode of 'operatico fo hat SRV is disabled. The safety function and the A05 func* ~on, if the s Ncted SRV is an ADS SRV however, woulc,dt be af fected. In order to reduce' the number of SRV - that reopen fo loving a reactor , isolation event six/o'f the 19 SRys, see able 1 and Fig e 9, have a Low-to Set (LLS) functid . Th s f unction )s artned whenevep any SRY opens in i s a rmed , the M'ormal setpoints fr/ he the relief mode,/ hen the L;S functi af f ected SR s are overrio:en by he low-low setpoi ts. For two of t 6 SRV's (F051C a F0510), the LLS f ction lowers both the open and clos setpoints. l For the other four valves, ly the close setp nt is lowered.
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j ollowing the ope /ing of SRVs due t a reactor isola ion event, see f Fig'u re 11, those vapi 5 af fected by the LpS function will stay open longer, peciosing at a lowe'r setpoint than the upaffected valve . This reduces the number of valves [ycling for a given condition, thus prolonging valve life, i
- 2. MSIV Control l Two control switches for each MSly are provided on panel P601. Thest switches are the manual control switch and the test control switch. The manual control switch is a three-position, maintained contact sel2ctor switch with CLOSE-AUT0-TEST positions. The test control switch is a push button, momentary contact switch. Table 5 lists the function of each MSIV switch
) l position.
The manual control switches and the test cont rol switches control the MSlvs by means of the MS!V control logic (Figure 12) and a pneumatic
- control unit (Figure 13). The control logic for each MSIV provides valve position indication, see Table 3, and provides control power to the solenoids of the i pneumatic control unit. The pneumatic control unit for och MS!V is attached I to the vaive's operating cylinder. An accumulator is installed on the air supply line to provid.e the captbility of conducting one air-assisted closing operation without Instrument Air System (PS2) header pressure. A check valve on the air supply line ensures that the stored energy in the accumulator can be used to shut the MSly and not bleed back into the air header on lo'.s of air header pressure.
B21/N11 - Rev. 4 -
_4 PERRY AIT REPORT J. Stefano AIT Cha ter, Question 4.4, "Does the accident analysis bound this event?" In resp:nse to this question, the licensee was tasked to perform an analysis to evaluate the safety significance of the event which occurred on November 3, 1987, when both the inboard and out, board MSIV's in one of the four main steam lines failed to close within the 3-5 second time required in the plant Technical Specifications. The MSIVs that failed to close within the required time were identified as F0220 and F028D. The F0220 (inboard) MSIV took 18 seconds to close; the F0280 (outboard) MSIV did not close until the valve switch was recycled in the control room. Both General Electric (GE) and Gilbert Associates (GAI), the Perry Architect Engineer, assisted the licensee in the performance of this analysis. First GE determined that two accident scenarios and three transients described in the FSAR took credit for closure of the MSIVs. The events were the following:
- 1) Steam line break outside containment
- 2) Inside containment breaks which reach Level 1
- 3) Pressure regulator failure transient
- 4) Loss of condenser vacuum transient
- 5) Loss of AC power transient The bounding event was determined to be the steam line break outside containment, since that event would permit the largest amount of activity to reach the site boundary. Therefore, GE was tasked with determining what the mass flow would be for a main steam line break outside containment given the
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as found conditions that existed on November 3,1987 (i.e. , tree main steam lines isolated within pecper times, and the remaining main stets line isolating in 18 seconds). The analysis was performed using the GE "SAFE 06" Code, an NRC approved Code which Sad been previously used by Perry in 1. e ECCS performance analyses (FSAk Chapter E). It should be noted that the mass release determined by this Code was much less than the mass release discussed in :SAR Section 15.6.4.4 for the main stea- line break outside containment due to the conservative assumptions used in the FSAR analysis (assuming 1. at level rise time is 1.0 second; that steam-water mixture quality is a constant 7.0%, and that the system pressure remains constant at 1060 psig through:ut MSIV closure). In addition, GAI was asked to perform two additional calculat4:ns. The first calculation considered t9e mass release given in the FSAR (FSM page 15.6-10) for the first 5.5 seconds of the event and then using the GE s.pplied flow data after 5.5 seconds with one main steam line is open. The second calculation used the GE supplied data throughout the event. Fcr each calc 21ation two results were determined. First the postulated amount of radiation whi:h would be released in the 18 seconds its took for the F0220 (inboard) M5:V to isolate on November 3, and second the postulated total time it would take with one main steam line unisolated before 10 CFR Part 100 limits were excee:ed. It was assumed used for these calculations that there would be .n_o pla:eout or hold up time for the release and that no fuel failure would occur. For the calculation usin; the FSAR mass release the following :onclusions were drawn: EB Iodine dose with 18 second single MSIV closure - 192 Rem EB Iodine dose with 79 second single MSIV closure - 300 Rem For the calculation using the GE data the following conclusions were drawn: EB Iodine dose with 18 second single MSIV closure - 82 Ren EB Iodine dose with 120 second single MSIV closure - 300 fem
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As shown above for either calculation the slow closure (18 second) of the l F0220 MSIV on November 3 would not have resulted in a release exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. Also, depending upc which calculation was used, the plar* l would have had between 79 and 120 seconds to isolate that line under accident conditions prior to exceeding 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. Therefore, the licensee concludes that the 18 second sle. closure of the F0220 (inboard) MSIV has been shown to be within the bounds of accident guidelines, j The NRR technical staff reviewed the calculations performed by GE and GAI addressing the MSIV slow closure ev,ent which occurred on November 3,1987 in j the "0" raain steam line, and finds the licensee's conclusion to be reasonable j that the accident guidelines of 10 CFR Pa-t 100 would not have been exceeded ; had a LOCA occurred during the time the ir. board MSIV (F0 220) remained open. - i
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HOV 09 '87 18:37 P09 ref 09 *87 18:44 P.9 SSINS No.: 6835 IN 85-17 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RECtlVED OFFICE OF INSPECTION AN? ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, DC 20555 MAR 121985 March 1, 1985 R& dab IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-17: POSSIBLE STICKING OF ASCO SOLEN 0ID VALVES Addressees: 3 All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an eperating license (OL) or constructi:n pernit (CP).
Purpose:
This notice is provided to inform recipients of a potential problen with ASCO - solenoid valves that may prevent the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) from closir.g on BVRs and may prevent other safety functions or: UWRs or other types of plants. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this in' formation notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Descriotien of Circumstances: On February 10,1985, at Grand Gulf Unit 1, one inboard and two outboard MSIVs failed to remain shut following manual closure. The problem is now attributed to failure of the ASCO solenoid valves used to provide fast closure of the MSIVs in the event of an accident. At the time of the event, the plant was using a slow-closure procedure to close the KSIVs prior to a drywell entry following a reactor scra:. The procedure calls for one set of solenoid valves to slowly close the MSIVs and another set of solenoid valves, which are the fast closure solenoid valves used in an accident, to hold the MSIVs closed. Evaluations and tests performed subsequent to the event have attributed the probles to the second set of solenoidvalvas(typeHTX 8323-20V). Each of these solenoid valves contains two solenoids, one solenoid rated at 16 watts and the other solenoid rated at 6 watts. Preliminary test results, to date, have reproduced spurious sticking of the solenoid actuator of the solenoid valve when the solenoids are subjected to temperatures of about 180'F. However, these tests have not been definitive.
. , u .
m
i NOV 09 '87 18:38 P10 tof 09 '87 18:45 P.10 1 IN 95-17 Marc'i 1, 1985 Page 2 of 2 Discussion: Although the NRC is not aware of all applications of this type of dual so)enoid valve in all types of plants, a list provided by General Electric of BVRs that are. believed to use this valve for closing the MSIVs includes: Brunswick 1 & 2 Clinton Cooper Duane Arnold Fitzpatrick ; , Grand Gulf 1 & 2 Hatch 2 LaSalle 1 & 2 , Shoreham
- 1 No. specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you need additional information about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical contact listed below. dwa
/ L. Jordan, irector Div en of Emergency Prepareer.e4s a ~ Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforceeent Technical
Contact:
Eric W. keiss, IE i (301) 492-5005 i
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices i I 1 1 1 1 l l J
NOV 09 '87 18:38 P11 p 09 'Er7 18:46 P.11 i Attachment 1 1 IN 85-17 March 1,1985 1.IST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION HOTICES l Inforn.ation Date of . Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85 16 Time / Current Trip Curve 2/27/85 All power reactor Discrepancy of JTE/Siemens-facilities holding Allis Molded Case Circuit an OL or CP Breaker 85-15 HanconformingStruhtural 2/22/85 All power reactor Steel For Safety-Related facilities holding Use an OL or CP i 85-14 Failure Of A Heavy control
- 2/22/85 All power reactor Rod (84C) Orive Assembly facilities holding To Insert On A Trip Signal an OL or CP 85 13 Consequences Of Using 2/21/85 All BWR and PWR I Soluble Dams facilities holding
, an OL or CP i 85-12 Recent Fuel Handling Events 2/1U85 All power reactor :
fecilities holding i an OL or CP 85-11 Licensee ~ Programs For 2/11/85 All pewer reactor Inspection Of Electrical Raceway And Cable Installation facilities holding a CP 85-10 Posttensioned Containment 2/6/85 All power reactor Tendon Anchor Head Failure facilities holding an OL or CP 85 09 Isolation Transfer Switches 1/31/85 All power reactor And Post-Fire Shutdown facilities holding Capability an OL or CP 85-08 Industry Experience On 1/30/85 All power reactor Certain Materials Used In facilities holding Safety Related Equipmu.t an OL or CP 85 07 Contaminated Radiography 1/29/85 Scurce Shipments All NRC licensees authorized to possess industrial radiography sources
~
OL = 0perating Licente CP = Cc struction Fernit
NOV 09 '87 18:39 I P12
, NoV 09 '87 18847 P.12
./ j SSINS Nc.: 6835 .
IN 85-17, Supplement 1 - UNITED STATES , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 REC'EIYEO October 1, 1985 C'.T 0 31985 R & DAS IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-17, SUPPLEMENT 1: POSSIBLE STICXbG 0F ASCO SOLEN 0!O VALVES 3 Addressets: All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating licer.se (OL) or a construction perstit (CP).
Purpose:
This notice is to inform recipients of the results of followuo investigations regarding the reasons for sticking of Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) solenoid valves used to shut main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) under accident conditions. Recipients are expected to review the inforcation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude sinflar problems occurring at their facilities. Newever, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Descriptien of Circuesta9ees: Inforntion Notice No. 85-17, "Possible Sticking of ASCO Solenoid Valves," described the problem that occurred with ASCO M: del HTX 832320V solenoid valves at Grand Gulf Unit 1. General Electric (GE) anc ASCO conducted tests to determine the cause and any further corrective actions. The following is a sumary of the GE and ASCO tests and analyses: Two of the three solenoid valves which failed at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station also sporadically failed to transfer during testing at* elevated tenveratures. These two valves were the only valves that failed during these tests. However, these failures were not predictable. Subsequently, five valves from Grand Gulf service were disassembled and insp9cted. This inspection identified a microscopic foreign substance on the lower core / plug nut interfaces on all five valves. Further evaluations of this microscopic substance were inc:nclusive because of the small foreign substance sample size. After cleanin; and reassembly of these valves, tests were conducted on four of these five valves at elevated temperatures. These four valves functioned normally. ASCO felt certain that the valve failures resulted from high tempera:ure sticking of the lower comta-plug nut faces resulting from a foreign substance or combination of substances collected at this interface.
NOV 09 '87 18:40 P13 tov 93 *87 18:48 P.13
.t IN 85-17, Supplement 1 '
October 1,1985 Page 2 of 2 A detailed dimensional analysis and comparison among the valves returned from. Grand Gulf indicated that all parts were within allowable limits and differences'were not enough to cause a failure to shift. Therefore, this examination tended to relieve concerns related to a generic design defect. GE has attempted to locate additional foreign substance from other valves of the same type in use at Grand Gulf to determine how the foreign substan:a got in the valve, or where it originated. GE was able to scrape some saali amounts of foreign substance from the lower core to-plug nut interface. However, there was not enough residue to make a definitive identification of the nature of the foreign substance. GE has recommended that the licensee replace the potentially contaminated MSIV sciencid valves and institute a periodic examination and cleaning of the HSIV l solenoid valves. Grand Gulf has replaced the eight MSIV HTX832320V dual so'enoid v31ves with fully environmentally qualified ASCO Model NP 8323A20E dual solenoid valves. The environmentally qualified valve Model NP 8323A20E was in:1uded in a control sample placed in the test ovens with the solenoid valves that stuck at Grand Gulf. The environmentally qualified model did not stick under the test conditions that cause sticking in the other solenoid valves. No specific action or written response is ' required by this information notice. If ycu have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Ad:inistrator of the appropriate regional office or this office,
.are . ban ~, Dire'etor Divisi of Emergency Preparedness and gineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement To:hnical
Contact:
Eric Weiss, IE (301) 492-9005
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Inforsation Notices .
HOV 09 '87 18:41 P14 l tov 09 '87 18:49 P.14 i Attachment 1 IN 85 17, Supplement 1 October 1,1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES . Information Date of - Notice No, Subject Issue Issued to 85-79 Inadequate Communications 9/30/85 All power reactor Beten Maintenance, facilities holding Operations, And Security an OL or CP; research Persennel and nonpower reactor
, facilities; fuel fabrication and processing facilities 85-78 Event Notification 9/23/85 All power reactor - facilities holding an OL or CP 85-77 Possible loss Of Emergency 9/20/85 All power reactor !
Notification System Due To facilities holding Less Of AC Power an OL or CP 85-76 Recent Water Hammer Events 9/19/85 All power reactor ! facilities holding l an OL or CP 85 75 Improperly Installed Instru- 8/30/85 All power reactor tentation, Inadequate Quality facilities holding Control And Inadequate Post- an OL or CP sodification Testing 85-74 Station Battery Problems 8/29/85 All power reactor facilities holding an OL or CP 84-70 tellance On Water Level 8/26/85 All power reactor Sup. 1 Instrumentation With A facilities holding Cossen Re,ference Leg an OL or CP 85-73 Emergency Diesel Generator 8/23/85 All power reactor , Control Circuit logic Design facilities holding l Error
- an OL or CP l
85-72 Uncontrolled Leakage of 8/22/85 All power reactor l Reactor Ccolant Outside facilities holding Containment an OL or CP 4 OL = Cperating Lkaase CP = Construction Ptmit l
HOU 09 '87 18:42 P15 4 ! .- , *Of 09 '67 30:59 . P.15 l l l i SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-57 UNITED STATES I NUCLEAR REGULATOM COMMISSION R E CEj YE D - j g 3 g g8.' OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT - WASHINGTON, D.C. l 20555 July 11, 1985 R & DAS If INFORP.ATION NOTICE NO. 86-57: IPERATING PROBLEMS WITH SOLEN 0ID OPERATED YALVES AT NUCLEAR POWEA PLANTS -
, , *3 Addressnes: ' '
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a construction permit.
.' l
Purpose:
l l This notice is to advise recipients of a series of valve failures that have occurred recently at several nucient power plants. It is expected that recipt-ents will review the events discussed baiow for applicability to their facili-ties and consider actions, if a occurring at their facilities. ppropriate, to preclude similar valve failures However, suggestions contained in this noti:e do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required. Description of Circumstances: ' The NRC has received reports from licensees of operating nuclear power plants involvin ! valves (g failures of certain valves that are actuated by solenoid operated ' SOVs)tooperateproperly. These failures have adversely affected the l intended functions of the main stets isolation system fluid control systems. Attachunt 1 to this informathpressure relief and l n notice describes the failure events and the corrective' actions taken. Discussion: In ecst of the cases described in Attachment 1, the cause for triggering the event was attributed to a malfunctioning 50V that served as a pilot valve. This in the of turn resulted SOVs can bein the to traced malfunction the following of different the associated causes: sain valve. The fail 1 potentially high-temperature ar.bient conditions art not being continuously (mo)ni where contt.minants, 50Vs arebecause probably installed backup air and systems operating in anydrocarbon energ(ized st air syste.is) are being used periodically and are not designed to 'cil-fret *e.g., specifications as required for Class IE service (3) chloride' contaminants causing open circuits in coils of the S0Vs, poss,ibly as a result of questienable handling, packaging, and storage procedures, (4) an active replacement parts program associated with the elastomers and other ahort-lived subcompenents used in SOVs has excessively not been during adequately maintained, and (5) lubricants have been used r.atntenance. ASCO provides installation and maintenance
NOV 09 '87 18:44 P16
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t . IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 Page 2 of 2
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sheets with all its valves and rebuild kits. For additional inforsation ASCO .' should be contacted. Because of the recurring 50V failures discussed above, NRC's evaluation of the
!' problem is continuing. Depending on the results of the evaluation, specific -
actic ns may be requested. No specific actien or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
- Administrator of the appropriate regi,onal office or this office. '
- P W $ - dward L. ordan, Director Division Emer ency Preparedness I and Engineerin Response r
Office of Inspec ion and Enforcament r Technical Contacts: Vincent D. Tho.tas, IF, j (301)492-4755 George A. Schnebli, Region II (404)331-4875 Attachments:
- 1. Examples of Solenoid-Operated Valve Failures at Operating Nuclear Pcwer Plants 2, List of Recently Issutd IE Information Notices O
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1 NOV 09 '87 ist44 P17
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Attachment 1 ' IN 86-57 July 11, 1986 Page 1 of 4 DEPLES OF $0LEN0ID-0PERATE0 VALVE FAILURES AT OPEAATING NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS S m wick Station 1. Main Stm Isolation Valve [MSIV) Solenoid Failures ' On September'27, 1935 et Brunswick Unit 2, during the performance of e periodic test to demonstrate bperability of the MSIVs, three out of eight isolation valves failed to fast close as designed. The fast-close tsst was required before returning Unit 2 to full pcVer operation after the
. plant had been placed in cold shutdown on September 26, 1985. Two of the
~ three affacted valves were installed as inboard and outboard MS same main suam line, which would be a significant safaty probles in the <
event of a failure of that steam line, l The licensee's initici investigation isolated the caust for the MSIV air to the MSIV operators to open or close the MSIVs. fail were identified as Automatic Switch Company (ASCO) Modal A NPL8323 more detailed review of the problems determined that the causes for , failure were attributed to valve disc-to-seat sticking of the 50V and These fallares prevented closing the associated Ethylene pmpylene MSIV. por (EP) this was acael 50V. the elastomer substance used for seals and valve The licensee's failure analysis of the 50Vs included technical assessments of the problems from the valve manufacturer (ASCO , the su material (Minnesota Rubber), and Carolina Power an)d Light'pplier of th s(CP&L's) research center (Harris Energy and Environmental Center, Carolina). Raleigh, North tM SOV failures could have been caused by a combi contamination of the air tystem and high ambient temperature conditio causing degradation of the EP valva seating and seal atterial. The ASCO Hodel NPL8323A36E SOVs were installed in Brun June 1983Progres and inrequirements. Unit 2 in August 1984 to meet the Environmental Qual cation (EQ) The Unit 1 50Vs were subsequently replaced HSIVs. during the 1985 outage when modifications were being made to th the valves contained Viton seats and seal materials Addit 9nclly, the inforeatien provided from ASCG shows the followir,g a. Ethylene propylene (200 megarads) is resistant to higher levels of radiation than Viton. However. EP absorbs h J cause swelling and loss of mechanical properties.ydrocarbons that can in applications specifications. where the air system is not designed to "oil-free"'It is u
NOV 09 '87 18246*' P18 NCN 09 '87 18:53 o P.18
, g Attachment 1 IN 86-57 July 11,1986 ,
Page 2 of 4
- b. Viton has superior high-temperature performance when ccmpared to EP and is impervious to iydrocarbons. Itsmajurdisadvantageisthatit is iets resistant to radiation than EP by a factor of ten. ASCO ,
recomends Viton for applications that are not oil-free and where ,, radiation levels do not exceed 20 megarads. - $' On the basis of a licensee review of the Brunswick Station maintenance - history, which showed the performance of Viten to be satisfactoiy in ASCO valves, and the available li'terature and industry experience, the licensee
' replaced all Unit 2 dual solenoid valves with valves having Viton seats anc seals. Because Viten has a 20-megarad limit, the licensee plans to I replace these elastomers every 3.3 years to meet environmental qualifica-tien requirements for the MSIV application.
I-
} After replacing the faulty valves with valves having Viten disc nad real material, the licantee experienced several 50V failures resulting from open circuits of the de coils on Unit 2. (Brunswick Station employs ASCO NP8323A36V valves that use one ac cell and one de coil in applications using the subject dual solenoid valve.)
)
On October 5,1985, the de coils of two KSIVs failed during the perfor-mance of post maintenance testing of the KSIVs. Investigation into the failures indicated an open circuit in the de coils. The cot.ls wre replaced and the valves subsequently ratested satisf actorily, t . On October 15,1985, an unplanned closure of an MS1V occur ed while Unit 2
! was operating at 99 percent full power. Closure of the MSIV occurred when l the e solenoid coil portion of tie MSIV associated 50V was de-energited
' in accordance with a periodic test procedure. It was not known then that l
' there was an open circuit in the associated de solenoid coil portion of ;
the dual SW. Consequently, when the ac ct,11 was de-energized, closure of I l the KSIV resulted. The failed de coil was replaced and then ratested satisfactorily. l I
' Investigaties into the failures of the de coil by the licensee determined that the failures appeared to be separation of the very fine c* o il wire at the junction peint where it connects to the auch larger field lead. This connection point is a soldered connection that is then taped and i.cquered.
l Further analysis of the coils (two failed de coils plus five spares from storage) hf the CP&t. Research Center indicated the separation might be corrosion induced by chloride contaminants. To date, the licensee and ASCO are unable to determine the source of the chloride. However
' ' followup levestigation by the NRC revealed that ASCO had previously experienced siellar de coil open circuit anomalies after a surface ship-aent of 5Ws overseas to Japan. At that time, ASCO believed that the salt water ambient conditions during shipping may have been the source of the ch1:rine-indered failures. 'ASCO recommends specific handling, packaging, and storege conditions for spare parts and valves at facilities.
l HOV 09 '87 18 47 P19 l
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e.ss l J '. : Attachment 1 IE 86-57 July 11, 1986. Page*3,of 4
- The licensee initiated a temporary surveillance program te monitor opera-1985. A modification was bility performed of the solenoid to install a voltagecoils dropping on October res 16,ister in the ingividual ,
circuits so that they can be monitored directly from cabinets in the I control room. This allows continuity of the coil circuitry to be verified by measuring a voltage drop across the resistor. Accordity to the licensee, until the cause for failure can be determined, pians are to
- check the coil circuitry for' continuity on a daily basis. '
I
- 2. Scram Discharge Solenoid Valve Failure l
enced problems wIth several scram discharge 50Vs.In were November The problass ! identified during periodic surveillance testing to deterstne the single ' rod insertion times and resulted in several rods with tiow insertion i times. Initial troubisshooting isolated the problem to the 50Vs in the ' scram discharge line for two 'of the control rods, which were subsequently replaced and tested satisfactorily. The licensee disassembled the failed SOVs, which were manufactured by ASCO (Model MV 90 405-2A), for failure analysis. When the valves were disas-sembled, it was noted that copious amounts of silicone lubricant had been applied by the Itcensee to all gaskets, seals, and diaphrages intarnal to the valves during puvious routine maintenance. The licenset believes that the excessive ancunt of lubricant may have blocked soet of the
.contributing valves' internal passages or caused sticking of the diaphra;ns, thereby to the slow insertion +.imes.
subject valves states that body The technical tamal for the moderate aaounts of Dow Corning' passage gaskets should be 1ericated with equivalent high grade silicone grease.s Yalve Seal Silicone Lubricant or an The licensee conducted successful scram tests on all other reds. A periodic retest of 10 percent of the control rods every 120 days as required by the Technical Specifications provides sufficient assurance that this problea does not exist in other 50Vs. In addition the licensee stated that saintenance procedures and practices would be rev,iewed and sodified, as required, to prevant the application of excetshe amounts of lubricant during repair or overhaul of components. Haodam Neck Nuclase Swer Plant On September 10,1925, the Haddam Neck Nuclear Power Plant was operating at 100 percent power when one of the six SOVs In the auxiliary feedwater system (AFW) failed to chang, state when de-energized. This failure was detected during the performance of a preventive maintenance procedure developed to pHodically cycle each of the six $0Vs to prevent a sticking problem similar *.o 50V fail-ures previously agerienced on November 2,1984. In that earlier event, two feedwater eined bypass 50Vs. to be sticking selves failed to open automatically and the caust was deter-w , w, u , s... a . * - The u. 'ault,v
- SOV was ASCO Model HP832014SH and the
HOU 09 '87 18:48 P20
..- mv m >e7 is:56 .
P.20 Attachment 1 IN 86-57 I July 11, 1986 i Page 4 of 4 I licensee's plans are to periodically cycle the 50Vs until they are either replaced with an upgraded model or the specific cause of the existing sticking problem is determined and corrected. l
, l 4
Millstone Nuclear Poyer Station.' Unit _1 ! On Decer.ber 24, 1965, while performing' a control rod scram time test at Mill- ! stone Unit 1, three conteci rods fai, led to insert during the performance of ! single rod scram time testing. In all cases, the control rod was immediately, , inserted and electrically disabled.
^
Investigation into the failures revealed that in the first case the cause for _ failure of one sticking 50V was attributed to deterioration of the BUNA-N valve disc material within the valve. According to the licensee, this type of failure had been identified by General Electric in their Service Information Letter No.128, Revision 1, dated March 2,1984. The licensee's investigation of the other two control rod drop failures failed to reveal the causes for failura other than a misalignment problem of one 50V's internals, which prevented proper movement. Hewever i were disasoe. bled, overhauled, retested satisfactorily,n and returnedeach case, to the SOVs service. Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. Unit 1 Another failure of sticking SOVs occurred at Grand Gulf Unit 1 on February 10, 1985, and was the subject of IE Information Notice No. 85-17, entitled "Possi-ble Sticking of ASCO Solenoid Valves." e e _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-- , _ _ _ , , . , . _ . . ~ . . _ _ , _ _ , . - _ _ . . , . . - , - , . . , - , , , , ~ , . . _ . _ _ , , _ _
HOV 09 '87 18:35 P07 tOf 09 '37 18:43 P.7 SECTION 3 ^ COMPONENT FAI MRE DESCRIPTIONS e S% /F enn
NOV 09 '87 18836 P08 Nov 0? '8718:44 P.8 3-1 Potential Cause Failure of the Part #4 ASCO Model 8323 3-way Dual solenoid Valve Discussion i Failure of the Asco Model a323 3-way dual solenoid valve to shift from the energized to de-energized position could cause the delayed closure event experienced by Perry. This failure mode has heppened in the past due to various reasons as evidenced by IE Notices 85-17 and 86-57, (copies attached) and INPQ SER 57-85. O Conclusion This failure mode is t' 4est likely candidate for root conponent failure of % problem. The post-disassembly inspection has found dimpiing of the EPDM rubber disc seat material. This could cause the disc holder assembly to wedge in place when the solenoid is de-energized. This would in turn not allow air pressure to relieve through the (3 air port, and preclude MSIV closure. 9 i / 0 / C *7
HOV 09 '87 18:49 P21 l to/ 09 '87 18:57 P.2a l 3-2 l Potential cause - l Instrument Air System Quality (oils, noisture, particulates) Discuseien This potential cause has been experien:ed at ! other plants. This is evidenced by IE Information Netices No. 86-57 and 85-17. In the likelihood that poor instrument air quality, such as the presence of moisture, particulates, and/or oils, the possibility of failure 'related to several Main Steam Isola-tien Valve components would be highly likely. The main l concerns would resolve around the Autenatic switch Company (Asco) solenoid valves. Since the seal and discs internal to these valves are Ethylene propylene, any intrusion of oil into the instrument air system could cause degradation. j Degradation of the seals and discs would, in this case, be caused by hydrocarbon contamination that would distort them ! and could result in malfunction of the valves. Perry this is However, at unlikely because of the "oil free air" compresso: a. Disassembly and inspection of the NP8323-20E dual solenoid valve ASCO l from MSIV F022D did not l reveal any hydrocarbon substance which could have been borne from the instrument air (as described below) . 1 A visual inspection of the EPDM parts cf the ASCO solenoid valves was conducted. This inspection indicated that the EPDM disc was hard and brittle versus a new EPDM dise which is pliable and resilient. In addition, the discs were handled with white cotton gloves, and no residual was left on the white cotton gloves. The surface of the disc also did not appear to be sticky or tacky while it was being handled with the gloves. This is important since any residual would be an indication of the EPDM breaking down due to hydrocarbon contamination. The possible intrusion of water or moisture into the air system could cause residue to form on the ASCO valve inter-nals and cause malfunction of the valves over a period of time. The moisture may collect during outage periods and form residuo during plant operation when the ambient temperatures are higher. Dewpoint measuraments were performe:1 for the supply air to both the inboard and outboard MSIVs. Measured devpoints were minus $50 F or lower indicating that intrusion of moisture into the air system is not a concern. Grab samples from the instrument air to containment were analyzed for hydrocarbons usingsupply gas chromatography. Neither cample analyzed revealed detectable condensable hydrocarbons greater than 0.1 ppm. 11/9/87
NOV 09 '87 18:51 P22 Nov 09 '87 18:58 P.E i l 3-2 Twelve particulate air samples were also obtained. The results froa all, the samples have not been completed. The results that are available show a trend of very low total particle counts with relatively few particles above 40 microns. Results from pa it air analysis havn shown numerous counts for particles below 40 micron with relatively few indications of particles greater than 40 micron. The disassembly and inspection of the ASCO NP8323-20E dual solenoid valve revealed no traces of moisture or particulate contamination. There was no wear on either the EPDM or the metal components of the solenoid valve. This result, in addition to the very low number of total partic)es in the air system and the low dowpoint temperatures would indicate that the root cause is not associated with the instrument
- air quality.
The concerns addressed above also apply to the C.A. Norgren Shuttle Valves; however, the shuttle valves are much more tolerant to poor instrument air quality. Conclusion The air samples taken do not reflect a problem with hytiro-carbon contamination. The presence of this type of interac-tion between the valve materials and hydrocarbon contamine.- tion would be seen as a swell of the material. This is not the case where the material has been found to be embrittled. The investigation as the cause of failure will be pursued with conversations to be held with Susquehanna, Brunswick and Riverbend. Possible causes of the failure could be related to elevated temperature of the valves due to steam leaks in the vicinity. There will be further investigation l i to determine the root cause of the failure which could ' involve destructive testing of the components. The air sample counting will be complated and particles greater than 1 40 micron vill be quantified. Our past experience with higher distribution of total particles indicates l failure of the component was not attributed to the that the particle size or quantity since our total results had been low. ASCO has determined that particles less than 50 micron are acceptable for reliable operation of their valves. We plan to continue our investigation as to the root cause through analysis of the EPDM conponents. With the technical information we will obtain from the plants mentioned above, our plans are to formulate a testing plan that addresses both embrittlement and hydrocarbon contamination as the failure mechanics. The existing data obtained will allow us to envelop and. quantify our failure analysis. 11/9/87
NOV 09 '87 18:52 P23 t<)V 09 '87 19:33 P.23 3-3 Potential cause obstructions / Foreign Materials in Air Lines / Accumulators Discussion This potential cause has been experienced at other plants as evidenced by IE Information Notice 86-57 and 85-17. Ob-structions/ Foreign Materials in the air is a likely cause sind's it would permit valve lines / accumulators failures as experienced. The obstructions may permit periodic operation l of the valves and depending on the instrument air cycling I could temporarily become dislodged. This could result in
- the same characteristics discusssd in the write-up on "Poor '
Air Quality". Conclusion This item was initially considered to have a high potential as root conponent failure. Inspections of the air lines and accu =ulators found no defect that could cause the observed operational pattern, however, so this potential cause is unlikely to be a root component failure. i 1 11/9/87
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E o, g NUCLEAR stb NOTES.- -_
- l. FOR GENERAL NOTES. SEE ONG. 0-209-001 SHEETS 1 AND 2. .. #6
- 2. TERMINAL BOX LAYDUT SEE ONG. 0-209-001, SHEET 1.
- 3. FOR PHYSICAL LAYOUT AND WlRING INFORMATION, SEE ATWOOD & MORRILL COMPANY 3 DWG.13560-01-H, SHEETS 1 THRU 4. "
(FLD40-003, SHEETS 1 THRU 4) OR G.E. DNG.10505228.
- 4. WIRED BY VENDOR.
- ^
- 5. JuaPERS FIELD TO INSTALL, COLOR PER RELD CABLE DIVISION. TF 1
- 6. FOR CONAX CONDUIT SEAL ASST: MOLY WI R IN C, i nETAILS,SFF nWr D-709 -001 SWEETS 7J,9 i f0. _ _
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- 7. bisco TYPE LOCA SEAL INSTALLEb IN CON butt ASSEMI5LY FOR :
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. NOV 09 '87 18:55 P27 l TOV 09 '87 19:03 P.27 l
l l > 3-4 Potential cause one or both of the pilot solenoid valves'for each of the MSIVs failed to decouple (mechanically separate) upon de-energization. Discussion Electrical control circuits identify positive de-energization of the . respective pilot solenoids. This is verified via the indicating light and any meters as shown per elementary diagrann per B-208-013 E011 and H036. The testing sequence and visual verification has identified that the solenoids have been de-energized, although the MSIVs
, failed to open or dele.yed opening. If either solenoid fails to decouple, the MSIVs will not operate. No method exists to remotely determine whether one or both of the solenoids for a particular valve failed to decouple.
The mis-operation (erratic) closure or deferred closure may possibly be attributed to this occurrence. As such it may be a highly susceptible cause. Further evaluation identi-fled that each of the pilot solenoids were sealed with Bisco Locaseal at the conduit entry point. This design change implemented per DCP 850618 is the only change initiated recently. The degradation and/or migration o! foreign matter could also be a cause to prevent decoupling of the solenoids. 1 conclusion This item was initially classified as a high potential, and ccndition of the Bisco Locasaal was evaluated upon solenoid disassembly. Since no interference with the valve operation l was noted, this cause has been eliminated from considera-tion. l l l 11/9/87
1 HOV 09 '8718856 P28 tOf 09 '87 19:04 P.29 l 3-5 ; 1 P_otential C_ause l Solenoid valve exhaust port blocked. l Discussion Blockage cf the exhaust port could occur through internal or external concamination. The port is open to the ambient. Particles may f all below the disc preventing shif ting of the solenoid valve from its normally energized to normally de-energized position. > Subsequent actuation could blow the blockage e t of the valve allowing normal operation thereaf- I ter. This is considered a potential cause for the Perry I delayed M3:V closure experience. l Conclusion This was initially considered to be a pctential cause for j the Perry delayed MSIV closure experience. Inspection for ) blockage vas performed, and on one solenoid a piece of tape l was discovered to be blocking one port. Subsequent testing i determined that, this blockage was insuf ficient to preclude MSIV actuation. l 4 i
NOV 09 '87 18857 P29 KOV 09 '87 19:05 P.29 3-6 Potential Cause 1 Failure of the Part (3 Norgren Model B0004A 2-way shuttle valve. l
~ Discussign l The 2-way shuttle valve works in conjunction with the Part fl 4-way shuttle valve to open and close the MSIV. The 4-way shuttle valve proyides the primary logic for pressur-ization and venting of the actuator cylinder. The potential failure mode description is the same as that for the 4-vay l shuttle valve operation. '
The 2-way shuttle valve cannot by itself open or maintain I the actuator in the open position unless the 4-way valve is energized or stuck in the energized position, gcmelusion l The delayed closure event experienced at Perry is unlikely to have been caused by the 2-way valve failure, since it requires dual mode failure. 1 11/9/27
NOV 09 '87 18:58 P30 ; TOV 09 '87 19:05 P.30 ! l 3-7 l 1 Potentia)._Cause Hydraulic Speed Control Failure Discussion l l I The hydraulic cylinder function is to slow the closing speed of the MSIV to specification limits under a wide variation of applied forces. The closing speed of the MSIV is accomplished through adjustment of the Monatrol needle flow control valves Parts 66 and (7 as shown in the drawing 13560-01-4 hydraulic flow . logic schematic. l should either or both flow control valve (s) and also all other fluid leak paths (e.g. ring gaps in piston) become totally blocked, motion would be prevented. Such a situation is unlikely because:
- 1. The amount of contamination would need to be so large that it would not. disappear after one cycle. l
- 2. The hydraulic fluid was installed under clean controlled ;
conditions. The system is closed and pressurized, preventing contcmination from external sources.
- 3. such a failure mechanism is not supported by historical experience. ,
1 NOTE: The flow control valves are designed to provida a flow path even at the maximum choked condition. Conclusien Unlikely to be occurring. 1 11/9/87 ,. . _-
l NOV 09 '87 18:58 P31 l FCV 09 '87 19:06 P.31 l l 3-8 Eo,tential cause MSIV internal binding. Discussion 1 Poppet binding against the upper body ribs due to poppet ! rotation is very unlikely due to poppet concentricity and long length of rib engagement. Binding of the stem against l the packing gland edge the valve manufacturer.,isPotential consideredforextremely unlikely by the lantern ring to cock and bind to the stem is a possibility with inadequate packing compression but is also considered unlikely. The
. packing compression used in the reassembled valves is esti-mated to be adequate to prevent lantern ring movement.
Conclusion The low probability of binding and lack of reported industry cases, is inconsistent with the multiple valve failures or the time factor seen in the free up of some valves. This is unlikely to be occurring. 11/9/87
HOU 09 '87 19 00 P33 I TOV 09 '87 19:07 P.33 3-10 Potential cause Failure of the Part #5 ASCO Model 8320 3-way solenoid valve. Discussion The model 8320 3-way solenoid valve is used to slowly stroke the MSIV (close MSIV when energized). When the solenoid valve is energized (opened), pnetmatic pressure is routed to the Part (2 3-way air' valve. This causes the 3-way air valve to vent the rod. side of the actuator through a flow control orifice, while ' blocking the inist air from air valve Part fl. The gradual loss of pressure from beneath the piston allows the actuator springs to slowly close the MSIV
. (up to 60 seconds).
The potential failure modes of the valve are:
- a. Stuck open (failure to close when de-energized)
- b. Stuck closed (failure to open when energized)
- c. Stuck partially opened
- d. Catastrophic failure of valve body The effects of these failure modas are as follovst
~
- a. A stuck open valve prevents reopening of the MSIV,
- b. A stuck closed valve prevents operation of the MSIV in the slow closure mode. This is the normal (
(nontest) mode of the valve and dcas not affect the I nornal closure functions of the other i subcomponents. l
- c. A partially opened valve will tend to close the MSIV; however more slowly than the normal fully opened condition. This affect can be visualized in l the drawing 13560-01-H schematic. The 3-way '
solenoid valve, partially opened, would bleed inlet air from the system, e.g., exhausting it. Additionally it could pressurize the 3-way air valve resulting in further exhausting of both inlet and air pressure,
- d. A catastrophic failure of the valve body would result in loss of pneumatic pressure resulting in i MSIV closure.
None of the above f ailure modes support the delayed closure event at Perry. conclusion Unlikely to be occurring. 11/9/87
- NOV 09 '87 19:01 P34 tOf 09 '87 19:06 p 34 3-11 Potential Cause Valve packing too tight.
Discussion Grafoil packing has replaced earlier asbestos packinet on 7 of 8 MSIVs. While it is likely that the grafoil packing has greater breakaway friction due to increased compression of the softer material, the circunstances of the events showing quick closure after initial release make this somewhat unlikely as tbs cause. conclusion Because other valves with grafoil packing and equal packing compression requirements showed no effect during fast or slow speed testing and the lack of industry experience of an MSIV being held up due to packing, this cause must be considered unlikely. I 1 l 11/9/87
l-HOU 09 '87 19:01 P35 N3V 09 '87 ',9:09 P.35 1 3-12 Pctential Cause Failure of the Norgren Model F0013A 4-way shuttle valve. Discussion The 4-way shuttle valve is energized by the Part #4 3-way dual solenoid valve. Upon ene g ization it routes pneumatic pressure to the rod (bottom) side of the actuator cylinder piston and vents the blind (top) side of the piston. The resulting pressure differential across the piston forces the rod up, opening the KSIV. The 3-way dual solenoid valve when de-energized, vents l (de-energizes) the 4-way shuttle valve, venting the rod side i and pressurizing the blind side. The resulting pressure ; differential across the piston in conjunction with the l springs forces the MSIV closed. j The Part $3 2-way air valve is provided in the circuit to eliminate a single mode failure of the 4-way valve. The failurs mode of interest concerns failure of the MSIV to close when the 3-way dual solanoid valve is de-energized. Should the pressure leg of the 4-way valve stick, the l pressure is still vented by the Part #3 2-way valve. If the exhaust leg sticks upon de-energitation of the valve, the I springs alone are capable of closing the MSIVs although at a i slower rate. I If either leg partially sticks, the inlet pressure is exhausted, promoting closure of the MsIV. conclusion The only failure of the 4-way valve which can result in delayed closure of the MSIVs as experienced at Perry is sticking of the pressure leg with a concurrent failure of the Part #3 2-way air valve. This is unlikely as it is double mode failure - requiring failure of two separate subcomponents. Thus this is unlikely to be occurring. 11/9/87
NUV 07 O( 17401 FOO KCM 09 '87 19:09 P.35 I 3-12 Potential cause Failure of the Norgren Model F0013A 4-vay shuttle valve. Discussion The 4-way shuttle valve is energized by the Part #4 3-way dual solenoid valve. Upon energitation it routes pneumatic pressure to the rod (bottom) side of the actuator cylinder piston and vents the blind (top) side of the piston. The resulting pressure differential across the piston forces the l rod up, opening the MSIV. ! l The 3-way dual solenoid valve when de-energized, vents I (de-energites) the 4-way shuttle valve, venting the rod side l and pressurizing the blind side. The resulting pressure differential across the piston in conjunction with the springs forces the MSIV closed. The Part #3 2-way air valve is provided in the circuit to eliminate a single mode failure of the 4-way valve. The failure mode of interest concerns failure of the MSIV to close when the 3-way dual solenoid valve is de-energized. Should the pressure leg of the 4-way valve stick, the pressure is still vented by the Part #3 2-vay valve. If the exhaust leg sticks upon de-energitation of the valve, the i springs alone are capable of closing the MSIVs although at a slower rate. If either leg partially sticks, the inlet pressure is exhausted, promoting closure of the MSIV. conclusion The only failure of the 4-way valve which can result in delayed closure of the MSIVs as experienced at Perry is sticking of the pressure leg with a concurrent failure of the Part 13 2-vay air valve. This is unlikely as it is double mode failure - requiring failure of two separata subcomponents. Thus this is unlikely to be occurring. 11/9/87
l . .w w w, w. *< w= . ww ( *CV 09 '87 19810 P.36 \ l I 3-13 Potential Caunu valve line-up of instrument air header system. Discussion i Had an improper valve line-up in the instrument air header ' system occurred, numerous other air users throughout the ; plant would have been affected. Key valves and the possible ! consequences had they been advertently closed are listed below. l
- 1) 1P52-F640 (manual dryvelL isolation) . Improper line-up l of this valve would hava prevented repeated actuation l of B21-F022A, B, C, and D. This valve would also l isolate the MSR valves as well as the personnel air lock at 599'-0" Elevat!.on.
- 2) 1P52-MCV-F646 (dryve3,1 isolation). Had this valve closed, it would have been indicated by status lights on both H13-P501 and H13-P870 panels in the control roca. ERIS poi".ts EC-007 and 008 wculd have also indicated closed.
- 3) 1P52-MCV-F200 (containment isolation). (A) Had this valve been closed the entira air supply into contain-ment would have been isolated which in turn would have affected instrument air supply to all the air users off of the air distribution manifolds P52-J600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 506, 607, 608, 609, 610, Cil, and 612.
(B) Also, had this valve been closed it would have been indicated by status lights on both the H13-P601 and H13-P870 panels in the control room.
- 4) Manual valves P52-7554 and F605. Had these valves been closed they would have isolated a large nunbor of the air users throughout the containment.
With all of the discussien above the fact remains that the valves did operate as observed. This would not have been the cause since the MSIVs would not have repeatedly func-tiened. Conclusion Unlikely to be occurring. 11/9/87
nuv c7 or 1 :r . c0 rar trJv U3 '87 19811 P.37 3-14 Potential Caggs Air pack wiring and termination failure resulting in a hot short. Discussion The air pack units are self contained for each solenoid and wired to a conmon junction box. This wiring and associated hardware is providra by the manufacturer. The field wiring is terminated at the respective solenoid valve junction boxes. Refer to drawings D-209-013 Sheets 2 through 9 for each of the MSIV assemblies. Per review of the interconnection wiring diagrams and corresponding elementary schematics, the wiring and termina-tion information is correct. The control schematic for operation of the respective solenoids is "fail saf a" by design basis, which requires the solenoid cell to be energized to prevent an isolation. De-energi:ation would result in closure of the valve. Tha wiring to each valve is classified as Class 1E. Al-though the 120VAC power to each of the A & B pilot solenoid valves pairs is contained in a connon cable, each conductor is properly sized and meets the separation requirements. l The cables are rated for soo volt insulation, besides having ; minimum current draw. Therefore, the potential for a hot l short is improbable, j References l D-209-013 Sheets 2 through 9. I Conclusion Unlikely that wiring or hot short is a potential cause. 11/9/87
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NOV 09 '87 19:12 P46 POV 09 '8719:19 P.46 3-15 Potential cause Glared contacts on control and relay components creating a high resistance which would result in discontinuity and potential mis-operation of the MSIV circuitry.
Discussion contact integrity and circuit continuity of the respective solenoid valve coils is constantly monitored by measuring the coil circuit current, in addition to an indicating light, (white) which relies on actuating contact integrity to remain energized + Refer to attached partial of drawing B-209-013, Sheet 10 and Sheet 11.
The isolation control circuit (s) are a Stail safe" design, which requires the solenoid coil to be energized to prevent l an isolation. If contact glazing had occurred resulting in a discontinuity (high resistance at cyonnection or contact points) in the control circuit (s), the resulting effects would cause the lack of voltage to the coil (s). This l condition, due to the "fail safe" design, would cause an l undesirable isolation (cloture of the MSIV valves), rather l than a failure to isolate.
Rafargng11 3-208, Sheets 805, H10, Hll and B36.
conclusion Evidence of repetitive tasks to cycle these valves along with the proper configuration for power and control indice-tion does not suggest any potential failure. Also, the control circuitry and electrical components for each of the inboard and outboard MSIVs are identical. In that there is no past or present evidence to support thf1 causa scenario, it is highly unlikely that this is the root cause of the problem.
e 11/9/87 .
NOV 09 '8719:12 P47 NOV 09 087 19:20 P.47 3-16 Potential cause Relay failure or incorrect operation resulting in mis-operation of the MsIV valves.
Discussion
'Ihs associated control and relay components are located in the PGCC which is designated as a non-harsh environment and is aise seismically designed. Furthermore, this area is controlled for relative humidity and tenparature. The likelihood of a failure or incorrect operation due to component failure is highly improbable in that this failure would have to occur on three (3) different MSIV log-ic/ control circuits. The proper operation and closure of these valves and repetitive testing positively indicates that relay failure is not the cause. . Also, as shown through testing and verification, the control functions and indica-tion was. correct.
conclusien Unlikely and highly improbable that relay failure is a potential cause.
1 11/9/47
l NOV 09 '87 19 13 P48 p l NOV 09 'Er7 195 21 l
3 -17 Petantial cause -
Panel cont.o1 switch failure or mis-operation.
Discussion The control switches nos. 81A-D and 82A-D are General Electric type CR2940, 3 position Raintained contact switch-es. All of these are located in the PGCC. The control schematics, as shown per drawing B-200-013 sheet 10 (in-board) and B-208-013 Sh, set 11 (outboard), are identical. No test data or evidence has been identified to suggest a failure of the switches. Repetitive. testing has demonstrat-ed the proper operation of each of these control switches.
~
References B-208-013 sheet H04, H10, and Hil.
conclusien Evidence of repeated acceptable testing to cycle these valves does not suggest any potential failure. As such it is highly unlikely that this is a potential root cause of the problem.
l 1
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11/9/87
.. ..- - . _ - - . . - _ _ . - - _ . . _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - . .. a
l NOV 09 '8719:14 P49 NOV 09 '8719 21 P.49 3-18 Detantial Cause Limit switch settings incorrect or inoperable.
Discussion The limit switches (total of 6 each) for each of the MSIV inb ard and outboard valves are NAMCC type, as furnished by Atwood & Morrill Company. These limit switches are not an active component in the control scheme which initiates opening or closure of the respective MSIV valves, rather they monitor and provide local indication in the control toom for valve position. Refer to elementary drawings B-208-013 sheets H10, Ell, and H36.
The potential for inaccurate limit switch settings is possible, but other independent sources can verify and provide indication for closure or opening of the valves via l
1 instantaneous steam flow and steam line pressure. Again, this issue would not impact the actual operation of the valves.
References B-208-013 sheets N10, Hil, and H36.
Cenelurion In that the limit switches are not part of the control circuits, mis-operation would not affect valve closure. )
1 1
11/9/87 - - - - - - - - - - - -
NOV 09 '87 19:15 P50 l tt.W 09 '87 19:22 P.50 l
s-1, l
Detantial cause Misviring for indication of instrumentation or switches.
Discunnien .
1 This potential cause was recently a problem wherein ths "A" l and "B" solenoid valves were wired to a common Reactor i Protection System (RPS ), bus. The basis of the design requires that each of the trip rolenoids A and B for each of the MSIVs be wired to diffarent RPS buses. This issue was corrected via the preparation and issue of Design Change package (DCP) 870414. As part of this design package and a ;
prerequisite for start-up, each of the MSIVs were verified !
and tested for applicable power sources and functional operations. The probability of additional wiring errors is highly unlikely in that repetitive testing of these valves did not indicate mis-operation.
References B-208-013 Sheets N05, H10, Ell, And H36.
cenelusion Although this item was a problem previously, it is highly unlikely that a similar type of problem could be the root l cause. The afforts to resolve this RPS problem, retesting I and management exposure significantly rule out this poten- l tial cause. Also, recent testing of the specific valves in question indicate that the instrumentation and switches are '
correct.
NOV 09 '87 19:16 P51 NOV 09 '87 19:23 r p,g3 l
3-20 Potentini cause
{
Data acquisition failure.
l Discussipri Failure in the data acquisition and recording system could lead to improper assessment of closing speed.
Valve speed data is taken and recorded sing the TRA subsys-tem of ERIS. ' This system has the capability to sam data from a wide variety of signals for later analysis. ple !
Data reactor power, steam flow reactor pressure, limit switch on j position, and solenoid curr,ent are all consistent. Measure-ments exterior to ERIS, main control panel and back panel indicating lights, for example, are also consistant with the !
ERIS data. In summary, multiple concurrent failures neces-sary for this scenario to occur make it incredible.
Conclusion Highly unlikely to be occurring, i
i e i
I -
l 4
G 11/9/87
NOV 09 '87 19:16 P52 P.52 pov 09 '8719:24 2-21 Potential cause Procedural error for test W . Most previous fast speed MSIV closures have been performed using SVI B21-T2001. The first failure was noted while performing the test per STI-321-025A section 8.3 and the remaining using failures were noted while performing the MSIV strokes the system operating instruction (8.0.I.)
Discussion i Although most previous tests have beenanperformed using the STI has been per-SVI, this is not the first time that formed. As early as 10/12/86, STI-B21-025A section 8.1 was used to fast stroke the valves. Additionally, the use of the Sol has been denenstrated before and after the failures. on During the B21-F022D, B21-F02BB, and B21-F02sD f ailure 10/29/87 and thh B21-F022D and B21-F028D failure on 11/3/87, the 80I was used. However, this is the same 80I that was used for the remaining valves which passed their stroke time.
Conclusion It it highly unlikely that there is a procedura problem.
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NOV 09 '87 19:17 P53 NOV 09 '87 19:?' P.53 3-22 Potential cause High steam Flow /High ReactJr Power Interaction. All previ-ous low and high speed MSIV closure tests have been per-formed at low to medium reactor power. The potential exists that the higher steam flows associated with high reactor power could interfere with MSIV closure.
Discussien Although a?.1 previous tqsts have been run at low power, the valve design basis is closure at full flow, and the capabil-ity of the valve to close under full power conditions has been demonstrated numerous times at numerous operating BWRs.
The valves that showed delayed closure are identical in
, an the designtovalvesthatclosedwithinspecifications[ng.d affected valves closed successfully following cycl The valve design is such that pressure drop associated with
. steam flow will actually assist in closing the valve.
_Concluaien l It is highly unlikely that this is the cause of the problem. l l
I l
0 11/9/87
i l HOU 09 '87 19818 P54 l NOV 09 '87 19:25 P.54 1
l s-23 Potential cause Incorrect reassembly and installation of the air pack. The air packs were all removed, but not disassembled, during the September 22, 1987 forced MSIV outage. The purpose for removing all of the air packs was to allow for temporary air supply to be installed and allow local stroking of the MSIV to check stroke measurements.
Discussion ,
During the september 1987 outage all air packs were removed from the MSIVs to facilitate local stroking of each valve to set the stroke length. After final reinstallation of the air packs there were several fast and slow strokas per-formed. These strokee were performed using SVI C71-T0039 and SVI B21-T2001. Even though sVI c71-T0039 (slow stroke testing) does not test the same valves as 8VI B21T2001 (fast stroke testing) the same air pack is used and the mating surface between the air pack and actuator remains the same, as do all hose connections.
conclusion It is highly unlikely that this is the problem due to the number of strokes perforced after reassembly.
1 l
n/0/07
l HOV 09 '87 19319 P55 NOV 09 '87 19:26 P.55 3-24 Potentini causa Actuator binding /stam binding Discussion Binding of the actuator internals for both the hydraulio and pneumatic assemblies is highly unlikely. Neither assembly is subject to external loads to cause stem bending. The hydraulics are not subject to external particulate contami-nation and contamination within the main air cylinder may score the cylinder but could not likely stop the movanant by resisting the air pressure force.
Conclusion This cause would likely have shown up during ptior history of strcking the valves and would not likely apply to multi-ple valves at one time. Nor would such binding likely apply to the top of stroke only. Thus this cause is estimated to be highly improbable.
1 1
1 l
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NOV 09 '87 19:19 P56 NOV 09 '87 19127 P.56 0
4 4
SECTION 4 FAIIERE R001 CAUSE DESCRIPTIONS 4
d I 11/9/87 1
HOV 09 '87 19 20 P57 l NW e9 '87 A9:27 P.57 l i
4-1 Pctential cause Local High temperature has caused deterioration of EPDM seal materials.
l Discussion '
perry has experienced drywell and steam tunnel temperatures which have approached the Tech Spec limits during much of the startup test program. Figure 1 gives a history of the bulk .drywell temperature since June of this year. In addition, localized temperatures in excess of the l bulk drywell temperature during the past year. In addition, localised temperatures in excess of the bulk drywell temperature can be postulated to have occurred due to steam l leakage from several valves. In particular, main steam l isolation valve 321-F0223 had a major steam leak just prior l to the actuator / stem separaticn incident during September 1987. Leakage control systen valves E32-F001N has also experienced several body to bonnet steam leaks. Figure 2 shows the physical location of these valves relative to the location of Mi!Vs B21-F022D, 321-F028B, and 321-F028D. One of ths soler. aids from 321-F028D was found to have rust and cota sion, indicative of a steam environment.
I 1
Adiabatic result in aexpansion of steam fromof1000 steam jet temperature aboutpsia 300to,15 psia will F. This I
jet will, of ecurse, rapidly cool and condense to saturation at drywell conditions. This local condition, along with the proximity of the leaking valves to the MSIVs which failed to close is indicative of a temperature related cause. l Discussions with Automatic switch company (Asco), the manufacturer of the failed component, has indicated that
^ elevated temperature is a potatial cause of the hardening of the proprietary EPDM rubber compound used for the valve meals and o-rings. Reals and 0-rings taken from MsIV solenoids for valves that had not demonstrated delayed closing do not have the level of degradation seen in seals from the failed valves. In particular, preliminary inspec-tion of the seals from MsIV B21-F0280 indicated this valve to have seals in a near-new condition. As shown in Figure 3 arrangement of ventilation in the steam tunnel is such that this valve would be expected to see the lowest ambient temperature, and conversely, F028D & B would see the highest ambient tamparature. In combinatin with the previously discussed . steam leakage, it is clear that F028D & B have been exposed to higher than expected ambient temperature.
11/9/87
1 1 1 l l NOV 09 '87 19:21 P58 l
t<>V 09 '87 19:29 P.58 l
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4-1 genclusion Elevated local temperature is the Ecst probable cause for l degradation of the EPDM seals in the ASco Model 8323 pilot i solenoid valve. The raterial is known to be temperature sensitive, the potential for elevated temperature has been shown to exist, and the best performing valves are in the lowest temperature locations.
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. NOV 09 '87 19:25 P62 NOV 09 '8719:32 P.62 4-2 Potential cause Blockage of the dual solenoid valve exhaust port with tape.
Dimeussion During the previous NSIV refurbishment where the air packs were removed, duct tape was used to cover exposed ports, including the solenoid valvd exhaust port. on F028D the exhaust port tape had apparently not been removed following the refurbishment. B16ckage of the solenoid valve exhaust port could delay the clostce of the MSIV.
However, the strength of the tape adhesive is considered weak compared to thn pneumatic pressure forces. Typically, the tape will blow outward, remaining connected on one side during de-energizatic.n and fall back in place like a flap.
Further tests of the F028D valve has verified the tape is not an effective block.
cenelusion very unlikely to be occurring.
I 1
11/9/87
- HOV 09 '87 19 25 P63 l POV 09 '87 19:33 P.63 l l
l 4-3 Potential cause Jamming of kinematic components.
Discussion In order for the valve to shift to the de-energized condi-tion, both solenoid movable cores must slide within their guides. The disc holder assembly is also a guided component whichmustshiftforthyvalvetooperate.
Failure of the co:ponents to shift any be caused by foreign material contamination of the sliding surfaces, either particulate or fluid (adhesive in nature), or by physical damage to the valve parts.
Examination of the F022D valve, and the air supply system has not identified any unusual substances or damage which could explain the MSIV delayed closure condition. Consider-ing the proportion of valves which demonstrated the delayed closure (3 of 8), an extremely dirty system would be expect-ed for this effect.
conclusien Unlikely to be occurring.
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11/9/87
nw ev '87 198 26 P64 Nov 09 '87 19 34 P.64
- s. l 4-4 Potential Cause 0xidation of EPDM rubber compound used in gaskets, seals and disc seal materials. t Discussion l oxidation has been of EPDM rubber suggested in the presence of a brass catalyst as cause for a similar incident at Brunswick-2. This has been docu: tented in INPO Significant '
Event Report 57-85.
although catalytic Review of SER 57-85 indicates that oxid$ tion is a potential cause for the Brunswick situation, that utility was never able to determine the exact however, a relatively large cause for EPDM degradation. There is, l data base for use of EPDM l elastomer in brass valve bodies with acceptable results.
The solenoid evidence valve supplier has stated that there is no to suggest that catalytic occurred. The condition of other Perry oxidation has ever valves would be expected not occurred. to be similar if oxidation were at fault. This has conclusion Catalytic oxidation of EPDM in the presence of brass cannot be ccmpletely failure. Whileruled postulated out as the as aroot cause for pilot valve validity has not been proven, If catalytic failure mechanism its oxidation, does play a part, it is mort likely as a contributing factor, in the high temperature scenario, for example.
I e
11/9/87
NOV 09 '8719:27 P65 NOV 09 '8719:35 P.65 4-5 Potential cause Residual magnetism following coil de-energisation.
Discussion l Sufficient residual magnetism of the ferritic steel materi-als in the region of the coil could cause the valve to remain open following de-energization. '
No similar orparience has been found elsewhere. The ASCO I
' valve represantative ha's identified that the solenoid valva l return spring is sufficiently strong to overcome residual l nagnetism of the ferritic steel components. Any residual magnetic forces would be low compared to the closure force l unless additional magnetic mass was added to the coil vicinity.
coneiumien Unlikely to be occurring.
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' 11/9/87
l HOV 89 '87 19:28 P66 NOV 89 'B7 19 35 p, g 4-6 Potential Cause Wrong material,s.
1 Discussion This f ailure root cause description considers the use of wrong materials for the disc holder elastomer seal. The potential for wrong lubricant is considered se.parately.
Dimpling of the disc homer seal in the dual solenoid valve is postulated to result in wedging of the seal in the exhaust to cylinder port. The use of a wrong material could result in the ebserved dimpling. The proper disc material i is an ASCO proprietary EPDM, utilised in their nuclear i qualified valves. Material problems may include the follow- i ing
)
- Wrong material of lower strength or thermal capability.
l
- Improperly cured EFDM. ]
- Improperly formulated EPDM.
An analysis of the disc material may be performed to identi-fy the material or formulation; however, it is unlikely to i determine the relative cure of the compound.
l Conclusion 4
This is not expected to be occurring, and wili be confirmed by material analyacs. !
. 1 4
4 11/9/47
NOV 09 '8719 29 P67 t()v 09 '87 19:36 P.67 4-7 Potential cause Locaseal vapors Discussion In order to seal the solenoid housings on the solenoid valves a Locasaal is poured in the opening and allowed to cure. The compounds contain no oils, solvents or reactive materials. Also, the alkylated phenols and aromatic amines are highly cross-linked'and polymerized. This configuration c does not allow the re? ease of hydrocarbons. Furthermore, (
the lowest temperature that decompositice takes place would be approximately 500 degrees F. The arlient temperature of the air pack asse=blies are greatly below 500 degrees F.
conclusion Unlikely to be occurring.
R I
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f4 11/9/87 ?
NOV 09 '87 19:29 P68 NOV 99 '87 19837 P.68 ,
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4-s j
\ Potential Cause i I l 0-ring / lubricant interaction !
! Discussion 1 During the disassembly and inspection of the Asco dual I
solenoid valves, the three body gaskets (o-rings) were found l to be significantly degraded. Degradation included ha-den-ing, flattening and adherence to the mating valve body.
The observed condi' c ion bf the gaskets could be caused by an improper lubricont. The EPDM gaskets are susceptible to i hydrocarbon oils. Nor= ally a silicone oil (Dow corning 550)
! is used as a gasket lubricant. EPDM is compatible with
- silicone fluids.
The degradation of the gaskets could not affect the valve i itself, as they are located away from the moving components.
However, vapors from the lubricant (no signs of fluid i
migration were observed) could result in softening of the i
disc pads resulting in the dimple effect suspected as being the physical cause of adherence.
Conclusion
! Possible but unlikely since similar valves have not shown the same condition. The o-rings will be investigated for proper material and lubricant.
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11/9/87 l L - - - - ---J
I NOV 09 '8719:30 P69 l N0Y 09 '87 19i38 P.69 l
4-9 Potential cause Corrosion within solenoid enclosure, l
Discussion l The 'B" coil housing in the F028 MSIV dual solenoid valve was found to contain moisture and corrosion.
Corrosion within the solenoid coil housing cannot affect the internals as the valve body is protected from valve {
external j contamination through body gasket seals in tr.a vicinity of the coil. The subject coil ("B" side) is the lower coil, i such that any corrosion products escaping the coil enclosure would fall down away from the solenoid valva body. Addi-tionally, corrosion products were not found within the valve body.
conclusion very unlikely to affect performance.
l 11/9/87
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