ML20151N079

Insp Rept 50-458/85-74 on 851021-25.Violation Noted:Failure to Have Required Records of Standby Liquid Control Sys Explosive Valves

ML20151N079
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	12/11/1985
From:	Bennett W, Jaudon J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20151N034	List: ML20151N029 ML20151N053 ML20151N079
References
50-458-85-74, NUDOCS 8601020798
Download: ML20151N079 (5)

See also: IR 05000458/1985074

Text

'

.

, , .

u; -\

APPENDIX B

, s

'

C U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-

-

,

REGION IV

,

-

NRC. Inspection Report: 50-458/85-74 License: NPF-40

,

Docket: 50-458

'

1'

x

'

Gulf States Utilities

'

. Licensee:

_ - P.O. Box 2951

-

4 Beaumont, TX 77704

,

Facility Name: ' River Bend Station

Inspection At: River Bend Site, St. Francisville, Louisiana

,.

Inspection Conducted: October 21-25, 1985

Inspectors: /A///[/f

W. R. Bennett, Project Engineer, Project Date

Section A, Reactor Projects Branch

' Accompanying Personnel: Won Ky Shin KAERI

t

pproved: z,# M / // 8[ 4

Chie", Project Section A - Date'

df P./Jaudorf,jects Branch

(,Reattor P{o

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted October 21-25, 1985 (Report 50-458/85-74)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of TMI action items, followup

on previous inspection findings, and the potential for HPCS system relief valve

. failure. The inspection involved 37 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC

-

inspector.

<Results: Within the three areas inspected, one violation was identified

(failure to have required records, paragraph 2).

E

B601020798 851210

PDR ADOCK 05000458

G PDR

,

x

-

- -

. _

,

<

l Q ..

,

m .

g

'

,

.

'

'

,

• 2 ,s

', ' '

. DETAILS' , ,

. ,

,

,'

- r .

1. Persons Contacted

/

Gulf States Utilitie's '(GSU) " '

>

- *

..

• T. L. Crouse, Manager-Quality Assurance-(QA)

<

_ *P. E. Freehill,. Superintendent Startup-and Test . .

• D._ R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager *

• B. E. Hey,-Licensing Engineer .-

F -

• G. R. Kimmell, Supervisor Operations QA

,

• T. F. Plunkett, Plant'Manageri

- *F. L. Richter, Operations QA :

• J. E.-Spivey, QA Engineer ,

• R. B. Stafford, Director Operations QA

'*P. F. Tomlinson, Director Quality Services

• R. E. Turner, Quality Engineering -

Stone and Webster (S&W) , ,

- , .*B. R. Hall, Assistant Superintendent, Field Quality Control

L~ The NRC inspector also contacted other site personnel l'ncluding

"

administrative, clerical, operations, and testing personnel >

r

u ,

• Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted on October 25, 1985.

'

'

3 2. Licensee Action on' Previous Inspection Findings i

a. (C1'osed)Open' Item l(458/8558-02): Procedures for demon'stration of

-leakage detection system operability did not meet Technical

Specification requirements end' confusion existed over independent

verification. 4

The NRC inspector reviewed River Bend Procedures STP-511-4528,

-

STP-511-4248, and STP-000-0001 and determined that these procedures-

now met Technical Specification requirements. River Gend

Procedure ADM-0015 was also found to contain a definition of

" independent verifier," which clarifies requirements of independent

verification.

-

This' item is closed.

. b. (Closed) Open Item (458/8551-07): A question was raised about

whether RHR pump runout was a concern during a system realignment

from the test modr to an injection mode.

- ,

3

k

'

. . . . ..

3

The NRC inspector reviewed a General Electric (GE) letter to the '

licensee dated September 25, 1985. This letter stated that, if a

Loss'of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurred with the RHR system in the

-test mode, sufficient net positive suction head would be available to

prevent cavitation and the effects of pump runout would be nil. In

addition, the combined probability of being in the test mode, plus

LOCA, plus exceeding 10 CFR 100 limits is estimated to be less than

2 x 10 8 events / year, which is less than acceptable limits.

s This item is closed.

. c. (Closed) Deviation (458/8551-02): Testing did not ensure that the

RHR system would realign ~and inject to the reactor vessel from the

test mode as committed to in the River Bend FSAR.

The NRC inspector reviewed GE design specification 22 A 3845 which

stated that the RHR system shall not be required to recover from 3

'

secondary modes of operation, such as testing, within the specified -

LFC1 injection time, because the interval.of time the RHR system

remains in these secondary modes is so short that the effect on

overall reliability is insignificant. The licensee has prepared an

FSAR change clarifying the test objectives of the Emergency Core

Cooling System Integrated Initiatiors Curing Loss of 0ffsite Power

Preoperational Test.

'

This item is closed.

-

. d. (Closed)OpenItem(458/8551-10): Data packages for reactor vessel'

internals were found to have some errors.

The 1icensee contacted the NSSS supplier and the required records

~

were delivered to the site. The NRC inspector reviewed these records

and' determined that they met all requirements.

The NRC inspector reviewed the quality data packages for NSSS

supplied, non reactor vessel internal, ASME code, equipment. The

package for the standby liquid control system explosive valves..

(MPL No. C41-F004; serial No. 464 and 465) contained only a product

quality certificate and a certificate holder's data report. GE

specification 21A1937 requires that material property records, heat

treatment records, and other records as applicable, be included in

the quality data packages. This is an apparent violation

(458/8574-01). No' program exists at River Bend Station to ensure

that data packages are received and reviewed from the NSSS supplier.

The NRC inspector reviewed the quality data package for the standby

liquid control system pump (Serial No. N7422610530) and found all

required documents to be included in the package and satisfactory.

No other violations or deviations were identified in this portion of

the inspection.

_ _ _ . _ _ _ ___ __.

. . . .

4

3. TMI Action Items

The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to determine the status

of post TMI Action Plan requirements.

Item 11I K.3.28 Verify Qualification of Accumulators on Automatic

Depressurization System (ADS) Valves - This item is to ensure that

accumulators will withstand a hostile environment and still perform their

functions for 100 days following an accident.

,

Findings - The licensee submitted the qualification of ADS accumulators to

the NRC. This position was accepted in Supplement 3 to River Bend Safety

Evaluation Report. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the

inspection.

4. Potential for High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System Relief Valve Failure

The purpose of this portion of the inspection was to evaluate the

potential for HPCS system relief valve failure at River Bend Station.

Region IV received a memorandum from the Office of Analysis and Evaluation

of Operational Data (AE00) dated September 16, 1985, documenting failure

of HPCS system relief valve bellows at LaSalle Units 1 and 2. The

memorandum concluded that the failures were caused by excessive back

pressure on the discharge port of the relief valve and that River Bend had

the potential for similar failures.

It was determined that several differences exist in the HPCS relief valve

piping configurations between LaSalle and River Bend. The most

significant difference was that the safety valve at LaSalle discharges

through a 1" x 2" reducer to the 6" minimum flow line, while the safety

valve at River Bend directly discharges to the 10" full flow test return

line. The configuration at LaSalle could lead to a more dynamic thermal

hydraulic transient than would be experienced at River Bend.

It was also determined that the relief valve bellows at LaSalle failed at

least once during preoperational testing while performing satisfactorily

during preoperational testing at River Bend.

The NRC inspector determined that River Bend does not have the potential

for relief valve failures of the type which occurred at LaSalle. This is

based on the significant piping differences between the two plants and the

testing at River Bend which has shown no problem with the safety valves.

No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the

inspection.

n

-

c-.

+

=,*..

L 5

5. Exit Interview

An exit interview was held on October 25,-1985, with the personnel denoted

in paragraph 1 of this report. The NRC senior resident inspector also

attended this meeting. At this meeting, the scope of the inspection and

the findings were summarized.

.

1

I

4

p.

L

l-

!

i .

..

i

L