ML20151M709
| ML20151M709 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109213 |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Odegaarden R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8804250113 | |
| Download: ML20151M709 (5) | |
Text
.
MAR 3 0 N06 SGTB: RHO 71-9213 MEMORANDUM FOR:
The Files FROM:
Richard H. Odegaarden, SGTB, NMSS
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING - MODEL NO. TN-GEMINI PACKAGE Attendees TN NRC A. Eggers C. R. Chappell A. Hanson E. P. Easton K. U. Margotta G. Lear T. Weider H. W. Lee R. H. Odegaarden C. E. Williams L. Yang Introduction A meeting was held at the request of Transnuclear, Inc. at Rockville, Maryland, on February 4, 1988, concerning the Model No. TN-GEMINI package design.
Discussion Transnuclear, Inc. (TN) conducted 1/3 scale puncture tests and concluded the outer shell wall thickness could be reduced from 1-inch to 3/4-inch thickness.
Future tests will be based on the 3/4-inch outer and 1/4-inch inner containment vessels shell thicknesses.
Each containment vessel is closed with 36 bolts and double 0-ring seals.
The NOP of 30 psig is based on two months, with one month shipping time.
The actual shipping time would not exceed two weeks. The package would hold 55-gal drums with an internal heat load of 112 watts.
The maximum content temperature was calculated to be 257'F.
The NRC staff stated that the hydrogen content should not exceed 5%. The outer containment vessel is provided with one penetration.
The staff suggested the tests be conducted with 30 psig in the inner containment vessel and between containment vessels.
The buckling of the inner and outer vessels should be tested with a vacuum between vessels and also with 30 psig between vessels with atmospheric pressure within the inner vessel.
4 8804250113 880330 m e omou.G Poe. 6 Doc <
s I
The Files 2
The AD0C program is being used to detemine force / deflection curves for the.
impact limiter and the ANSYS program detemine maximum stresses in the package l
for the worst orientation.
Half scale-tests would be conducted to verify the calculational results and determine force / deflection curves for the impact limiters.
Stresses for the inner and outer containment vessels should be tabulated (inner and outer surface nodes on each vessel). An oblique drop should be made on the outer shell near the flange area.
A puncture test should be conducted on the penetration.
Proposed puncture and drop test are given in the enclosures in addition to the applicants' sumary of the presentation.
Expect to meet with TN in early March to find out the results of the impact limiter tests and discuss the thermo and criticality aspects of the package design.
OrHitHvei hy R. H. 0%nc%
Richard H. Odegaarden Project Manager
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION: w/encls Meeting Attendees wo/encls i
- NRC File Center ~
PDR Meetin'g' Notebook
~
CEMacDonald NMSS r/f t
SGTB r/f I
A
...[
...................I...__...!..____...[............
NAME:RH0fgaarden: CRC $ifell:
bbb bh Ibb DATE O 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY
I STATIC IMPACT LIMITER TESTING ORJECTIVES:
- VERIFY ADOC COMPUTER ANALYSIS
- OBTAIN FORCE-DEFLECTION CURVES OF IMPACT LIMITER CRUSHING
- DETERMINE THE ADEQUACY OF THE IMPACT LIMITER ATTACHMENTS
- EVALUATE DEFORMATION INCURRED BY LID FLANGE. AND IMPACT LIMITERS DURING TESTING TEST MODEL 1/2 SCALE TOP IMPACT LIMITER AND OUTER LID LOADING CONFIGURATIONS
- END CRUSH
- SIDE CRUSH
' CORNER THROUGH C.G. CRUSH ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- IMPACT LIMITERS MUST ABSORB 1101 0F THE POTENTIAL ENERGY BEFORE IMPAIRING THE INTEGRITY OF THE LID.
TEST DATA
- GAPS BETWEEN FLANGES AND TEST FIXTURE
- STRAIN OF ATTACHMENT BOLTS
- LOAD VS. DEFLECTION CURVE 3
- DEFORMATION TO OUTER LID
- EVIDENCE OF CRACKING IN OUTER LID WALL SCHEDULE:
LAST WEEK IN FEBRUARY 0073c/9
30 FOOT DROP TESTS OBJECTIVES
- VERIFY LEAKTIGHT INTEGRITY OF PACKAGE AFTER THE 30 FOOT DROP HYP0THETICAL ACCIDENT
- DETERMINE WORST DROP ORIENTATION TEST MODEL 1/2 SCALE MODEL 0F IMPACT LIMITERS, INSULATING SHELL AND OUTER CONTAINER DROP ORIENTATIONS
- SIDE DROP
- CORNER THROUGH CENTER OF GRAVITY DROP
- OBLIQUE ANGLE DROP (15 DEGREES)
- TOP END DROP ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
- NO EVIDENCE OF LEAKAGE
- NO CRACKS IN OUTER CONTAINER WALL
- NO DAMAGE TO FLANGE AREA TEST DATA l
' GAPS BETWEEN FLANGES l
- ACCELERATION OF PACKAGE
- DEFORMATIONS OF IMPACT LIMITERS AND OUTER CONTAINER
- EVIDENCE OF CRACKING IN OUTER CONTAINER SCHEDULE:
EARLY APRIL 0073c/11
SUMMARY
I.
ALLOWABLE STRESSES IN KRUCKLE AREA BASED ON LOCAL STRESS
( M A5MC'j hTA NB I)
(P 4 1.5 S )
t g
II.
PUNCTURE TEST CONCLUSIONS A.
THE WORST PUNCTURE ORIENTATION IS ADJACENT TO THE FLANGE, WITH THE PUNCTURE BAR ALIGNED WITH THE PACKAGE CENTER OF GRAVITY B.
OBLIQUE PUNCTURE DROPS ARE MORE SEVERE THAN PERPENDICULAR PUNCTURE DROPS C.
CARGO CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE RESULTS OF THE PUNCTURE TESTS A NON-ENERGY ABSORBING CARG0 IS MOST l
CONSERVATIVE D.
INTERNAL PRESSURE HAS LITTLE EFFECT ON PUNCTURE TEST l
RESULTS III.
REDUCING THE DUTER CONTAINMENT WALL THICKNESS FROM 1.0 INCH TO 0.75 INCH WILL NOT IMPAIR THE PACKAGE'S ABILITY TO REMAIN LEAK TIGHT DURING THE HYP0THETICAL ACCIDENTS IV.
THE IMPACT LIMITER DESIGN HAS BEEN SIMPLIFIED AtlD IMPROVED TO ACHIEVE GREATER RELIABILITY FOR REMAINING INTACT AND ATTACHED DURING THE HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENTS.
IMPACT LIMITER PERFORMANCE WILL BE VERIFIED THRDUGH TESTING.
0073c/9
_