ML20151L656
| ML20151L656 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Waterford  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1997 |
| From: | Beckendorf E ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19063D105 | List: |
| References | |
| LER-97-S03, LER-97-S3, NUDOCS 9708070108 | |
| Download: ML20151L656 (7) | |
Text
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NHC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OM8 NO. 3150-0104 10 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THl3 MANDATORY NFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE I lCENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) gg^c l,
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$ 8 T ET E
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1 mum Potentf al for Undetected Entry Into Plant Vital Area EVENT DATE (5)
LER NUMBEM (6)
REPORT DATE (7)
OTHER FACluTIES INVOLVED (8)
J F ACluTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER I
SE IAL R
CONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NM N/A 05000 F ACIUTY NAME DOCKLr NUMBER 07 04 97 97 - S03 00 08 04 97 N/A 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF to CFR 5: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 5 20.220i(d) 20.2203(aH2Hv) 50.73(aH2)(i)
So.73(aH2)(vm) 20.2203(aHH 20.2203(aH3HO 5033(aH2Hi0 50J3(aH2Hx)
POWER LEVEL (10) 000 20.2203(a)(2)(i>
20.2203(a)(3)(u) 50.73(aH2Hin) x 73.71 20.2203(aH2Hid 20.2203(aH4) 50.73(aH2)0v)
OTHER l
20.2293(aH2)(m) 50.36(cH1) 50.73(a)(2Hv)
Spec in Abstreet below 20.2203(aH2)(iv) 50.36(cH2) 50.73(a)(2Hvid UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS 1.ER (12) l TELEPHONE NUMBER Hnotude Aree Cooel NAME E.G. Beckendorf, Security Superintendent (504) 739-6340 COMPLETE ONE UNE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPO.- a '3)
R A
Rh0RTA E
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER QY i
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
MONTH DAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
X NO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces,i.e., approximately 15 single spaced typewntten bnes) (16)
On July 4,1997, Security personnel discovered scaffolding that permitted egress from the +40 foot elevation of the turbine building to within the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure on the turbine deck (+67 elevation). Because the enclosure doors were unsecured, the scaffolding permitted undetected access to the turbine deck, a non-vital area, and the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) roof, a vital area. A contract ernployee with unescorted access to both the turbine deck and the RAB roof used the scaffold to gain access to the turbine deck. The contractor did not enter the RAB roof. The contractor informed Security within minutes of entering the turbine deck; however, Security failed to recognize the potential for undetected access onto the RAB roof for approximately 36 minutes. Once the vulnerability was i
recognized, Security took immediate compensatory actions and searched the area for unauthorized personnel and evidence of sabotage or tampering. No problems were identified.
The apparent cause of this event is inadequate communications regarding proper High Pressure Turbine Enclosure controls when normal steam flow is absent. A Security Directive will be developed to address outage configurations and appropriate compensatory measures.
This event did not compromise the health and safety of the public.
9708070108 970804 PDR ADOCK 05000382 S
l REQUIRED NUMBER OF DIGITS / CHARACTERS FOR EACH BLOCK BLOCK NUMBER OF NUMBER DIGITS / CHARACTERS 1
UP TO 46 FACILITY NAME DOMET WMBER 3 IN ADDIT N TO 05000 3
VARIES PAGE NUMBER 4
UP TO 76 TITLE
]
6 TOTAL 5
^
2 PER BLOCK 7 TOTAL 2 FOR YEAR 6
LER NUMBER 3 FOR SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 1
2 FOR REVISION NUMBER 7
ORT DATE 2 PER BLOCK UP TO 18 - FACILITY NAME
^
8 TOTAL -- DOCKET NUMBER 3 IN ADDITION TO 05000 9
1 OPERATING MODE j
10 3
POWER LEVEL I
OF 10 CR CHECK BOX HAT APPLIES
^
12 LICENSEE CONTACT 14 FOR TELEPHONE CAUSE VARIES 2 FOR SYSTEM 13 4 TOR COMPONENT EACH COMPONENT FAILURE 4 FOR MANUFACTURER NPRDS VARIES l#
A 0
CHECK BOX THAT APPLIES
^
15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE 2 PER BLOCK
m NRC FORM 3664 U.b. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSeON 14a51 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) l TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (1) l OOCKEY LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
Nu"EEn" 05000 OF 2
6 l
Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 382 97 '
S03 -
00 TEXT (11 more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17) l REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE A contract employee gained access to the turbine deck, a non-vital area, and could have entered a vital area (Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB) roof) without detection. The individual has unescorted access to both the vital and non-vital area. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix G, Paragraph l(c) as a discovered vulnerability in a safeguards system that could allow undetected access to a vital area. Appropriate compensatory measures were not implemented within ten minutes of discovering the event. On July 4,1997, a one hour report of this event was issued per the same requirement.
l INITIAL CONDITIONS At the time of this event, Waterford 3 was in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). Refuel Outage Eight (RF08) activities were in progress. Doors 180 and 181, which provide positive entry / exit control to the turbine deck and the RAB roof, were operable. A scaffold was installed that permitted egress from the +40 foot elevation of the turbine building into the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure on the turbine deck (+67 elevation). The enclosure doors were unsecured. Security had initiated compensatory measures pending startup of the turbine by increasing the frequency of armed security patrols of the turbine deck.
i I
'pC FORM 306A (4 961
NRC FORM 3664 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (4 BS)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FAClUnf NAME 0)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
"OuYsEn" Eu$$
05000 OF Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 382 97 -
S03 -
00 3
6
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EVENT DESCRIPTION During RF08, Doors 180 and 181 were maintained open to facilitate the egress of plant personnel performing turbine / generator maintenance. Positive entry / exit control to the RAB roof was maintained by a posted armed security officer.
On June 12,1997, subsequent to completion of turbine / generator maintenance, the Security post at the +67 Turbine Generator Building (TGB) was relieved, Doors 180 and 181 were placed in the secure mode, and the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure was f
secured. Security officers were instructed to perform periodic patrols of the turbine deck. If the enclosure doors were found open, the officers were instructed to report the i
situation to Security Supervision.
On July 4,1997, a contract employee gained access to the turbine deck via scaffolding that permitted egress from the +40 foot elevation of the turbine building into the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure on the turbine deck. The scaffolding was being built to allow removal of oil soaked insulation. The employee, needing additional scaffolding materials, entered the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure, exited through an open door, and proceeded to Door 180 to key card out of the turbine deck area. At approximately 1309 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.980745e-4 months <br />, upon carding out the employee received four flashing green lights. At that time, a security officer entered the area to perform an assigned 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> surveillance tour. The employee questioned the security officer regarding the flashing green light.
The officer instructed the contract employee to run his key card through the card reader a second time and exit the area upon receipt of a solid green light. Neither the security officer nor the contract employee recognized that an undetected pathway to a vital area had been created. At 1347 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.125335e-4 months <br />, a second Security employee discussed the event with the contract employee and recognized the vulnerability for access to the RAB roof.
NRS FORM 366A 14 95)
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION im LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6) l PAGE (3)
NuYBER "duS!!
05000 OF Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 382 97 -
S03 -
00 4
6 TEXT (It (nore space os required, use additional copies of NRC Forrn 366A) (17)
~
The contract employee had authorized access to both the turbine deck and the RAB roof. There was no malevolent intent involved with the entry. The potential for an undetected pathway via the scaffolding was created, identified, and eliminated on July 4,1997.
CAUSAL FACTORS A Root Cause Analysis (RCA) team investigation into this event is not yet complete.
However, preliminary investigations indicate the root cause of the event is inadequate communication. For example, Security Supervision ineffectively communicated expectations for controlling access through the floor of the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure when normal steam flow is not present in the secondary piping. With steam flow present, ambient temperatures preclude personnel egress into the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure from the +40 foot elevation. In addition, Doors 180 and 181 would be in the secure mode, and an armed security officer would not be posted.
Though security performed rounds every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, it is apparent that at least one security officer was confused about the access requirements for this area. This Security Officer erroneously presumed that the enclosure doors were permitted to be open for ventilation or to facilitate work in the area.
The contract employee did not recognize he had gained undetected access to the turbine deck and the consequences of that action. Additionally, the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure doors are not labeled or positively controlled (i.e. locked) to alert employees that the doors must remain closed when Doors 180 and 181 are in the secure mode and the plant is not operating.
NRC FORM 306A 44951
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ie LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (1)
DOCKET LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3) 05000 OF Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 382 97 ~
S03 ~
00 5
6 TEXT (11 rnore space os required, use addit;onal copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
CORRECTIVE MEASURES The following corrective measures were (will be) implemented:
Security immediately initiated compensatory measures (Security Officer posting and a walk-down of the area for evidence of sabotage and tampering). Those measures were established at approximately 1347 hours0.0156 days <br />0.374 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.125335e-4 months <br />, about 36 minutes after the contract employee initially brought the situation to the attention to Security personnel.
A permanent sign was affixed to the High Pressure Turbine Enclosure doors to alert employees to keep the doors closed and notif Security if they must be opened.
f The individuals immediately involved with this event were briefed by Security Management on the correct access requirements for this area.
'. A Security Directive will be developed to include specific instructions re'ating to outage or off-normal situations and identification of access requirements.
This SIR will be revised when the RCA investigation is completed if the investigation identifies additionalinformation that meets the revision criteria of NUREG -1022.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The safeguards vulnerability was discovered the same day it was created. The employee who gained undetected access through the unprotected pathway had authorized access. The entry in the area was not malevolent, but was implemented in support of efforts to facilitate planned maintenance.
I
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NRC FORM 386A (4951 i
.... -. -. ~ ~
- ~. _ - -. _ - - _ _ -.. -
NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION new LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
(
TEXT CONTINUATION FACIUTY NAME (1)
DOCKET LE>t NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
"nin" "s'a
=
05000 OF 0
0 Waterford Steam Electric Station Unit 3 362 97 " S03 ~
00 TEXT lit snore space is reqwred, use addition.sl copies of NRC Forrn 366A) (17)
I Subsequent to the discovery of this event, secur.ty completed a RAB roof walk-down/
search to ensure that no unauthorized personnel were in the area. The search revealed no unauthorized activities (sabotage or tampering) and no presence of unauthorized personnel. This event did not compromise the health and safety of the public and the safe operation of the plant.
1 SIMILAR EVENTS Within the last two years no similar events reported as SIRS were identified.
NRC FORM 385A 148w