ML20151H681
| ML20151H681 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs |
| Issue date: | 04/21/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20151H674 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8305040793 | |
| Download: ML20151H681 (3) | |
Text
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. UNITED STATES
/~ l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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WASMNGTON D. C. 200EE 3;
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUPPORTING AMENDMENT N05. 82 AND 65 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-53 AND DPR-69
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BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT NOS. 1 & 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-317 AND 50-318 Introduction By application for license amendment dated February 24, 1983, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (BG&E) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2.
The proposed changes to the TS would (1) correct typographical errors as they appear in TS 4.7.7.1, "ECCS Pump Room Exhaust Air Filtration System" and TS Bases 3/4.4.2, " Safety Valves", (2) establish TS 6.8.1.g. to require pro-activities, (3)g overtime for personnel involved in safety related cedures limitin change TS 3/4.7.2, " Steam Generator Pressure / Temperature Limitation" ano associated Bases to increase the steam generator minimum pressurization temperature (MPT), (4) delete a requirement on the pres-surizer safety valve acoustic flow monitor, and (5) change the administrative requirements of Section 6 of the TS to provide for yearly audit and review of the safeguards contingency plan and the facility emergency plan, respec-tively.
In the course of reviewing the proposed TS submitted with the February 24, 1983 application, the staff fot/nd it necessary to make certain changes in the TS. These changes were discussed with and agreed to by BG&E.
Discussion and Evaluation The February 24, 1983 application identifies two typographical errors in the TS and proposes the corrective wording ~. The first error appears in TS 4.7.7.1 in which the flow rate for ECCS pump room exhaust air filter bank testing is.given as 2000 cfm i 10%.
BG&E has indicated that this value should be 3000 cfm + 10%.
A review of the TS indicates that the re-quired system ficw rate is shown in TS 4.7.7.1.b.4 as 3000 c-fm i 10%.
This value is in agreement with Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) data shown i n Ta bl e 9-19.
Accordingly, the flow rate presently contained in TS 4.7.7.1, 2000 cfm i 10%, is in error and should be changed to 3000 cfm f.10%.
The second typographical error identified by BG&E appears in the Bases for TS 3/4.4.2. The Bases identifies the pressurizer safety valve relief flow rate as 7.6x105 lbs per hour.5 BG&E has indicated that the correct value should be "approximately 3x10 lbs per hour." This value is consistent with information contained in the Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) design specifi-cations. A review of the FSAR Table 4-19 indicates that two safety valves are installed with relief flow rates of 2.96x10gressurizer and 3.02x105
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lbs per hour.
These values can be described as "approximately 3x10 hs pr hour " Accordingly, the gresent TS bases value for the pressurizer safety valvhreliefrate,7.6x10 lbs per hour, should be changed to "approximately 3x10 lbs per hour."
A second area of TS change involves the addition of an administrative TS re-quirement to establish written procedures to control "... the amount of over-time worked by plant staff members performing safety related functions" in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 82-12.
Generic Letter 82-12 was issued on June 15, 1982 and contains the NRC position on limiting overtime for per-sonnel involved in safety related activities. The limiting of overtime f,or personnel involved in safety related activities was established as TMI Action Item I.A.1.3.1 in NUREG-0737. A review of the proposed TS, as modified by the NRC and agreed to by BG&E, indicates that it is in agreement with the wording proposed by the NRC in its Generic Letter 82-16.
This generic letter was issued on September 20, 1982 to licensees of Pressurized Water Reactors to provide guidance on acceptable wording for TS related to TMI Action Items.
We conclude that the proposed wording of TS 6.8.1.g is in accordance with the NRC guidance contained in Generic Letter 82-16 and is therefore acceptable.
The third area of TS change involves the minimum pressurization temperature (MPT) for the steam generators.
The establishment of an MPT assures that the steam generators will behave in a ductile fashion in response to transient 0
pressure conditions. The MPT is presently specified as greater than 70 F at steam generator pressures greater than 200 psig per TS 3/4.7.2. BG&E has proposed that the MPT be increased to greater than 800F for Unit 1 and greater than 900F for Unit 2, for steam generator pressures greater than 200 psig. The proposed increase in MPT is based upon recommendations by the NSSS supplier.
MPTs are established in recognition that the primary system materials undergo a transition from ductile to brittle behavior at low temperatures. Avoidance of operation of the steam generators in a temperature range where brittle failure could occur is important to prevent sudden failure of the reactor coolant pressure boundary represented by the steam generator tubes.
Since brittle failure is a low temperature effect, the raising of the MPT is conser-vative in that it provides additional margin to the temperature range where brittle failure could occur. Accordingly, the increase in MPT as reflected in revised TS 3/4.7.2 and the associated Bases is acceptable.
A change to TS 3.3.3.6 is considered herein for deletion of a footnote in TS Table 3.3-10.
This footnote would have allowed the inoperability of the acoustic flow monitor for Unit 1 Pressurizer Safety Valve PV-201 until June 1, 1981.
Deletion of this relief is appropriate since the applicable date has passed. This is an administrative action with no safety significance and, accordingly, is acceptable.
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~w finci L change consicerec nereir. re.ates tc t w e.ien and audit of emergency prepareoness and safeguards contingency plans.
On October 1, 1982 the NRC issued Generic Letter 82-17 which infornec li:er. sees and applicants of the recuirements of 10 CFR 50.54(t) for an annual review of the facility emcrgency plan; a request was made for incorporation of this requirement in the TS.
On October 30, 1982 the NRC issued Generic Letter 82-23 which informed licensees and applicants of the requirements of 10 CFR 73.40(d) for an annual audit of the safeguards contingency plan.
A request was also made in Generic Letter 82-23 for incorporation of a requirement in the TS l
for annual audit of the safeguards contingency phn. BG&E has agreed to
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appropriate changes to TS 6.5.2.8 which would make the annual audit and review of the safeguards c6ntingency plan (and implementing procedures) and the emergency plan (and implementing) procedures) a responsibility of the BG&EIn this reg Off-Site Review Committee (OSSRC.
between a " review" and an " audit" as contained in ANSI Standard N18.7-1976,
" Administrative Controls and Quality Assurance for the Operational. Phase of Nuclear Power Plants." An audit is defined in ANSI N18.7 as a methodical examination to determine conformance to requirements; a review represents a
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critical examination and evaluation to determine the adequacy of the requirements.;
We find the proposed cha.nges to the TS ~ acceptable since they meet the requirements; contained in Generic Letters 82-17 and 82-23.
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l Environmental Consideration We have determined that the amendments do not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendments involve an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environ-mental impact appraisal need not be ' prepared in connection with the issuance of these anendments.
l Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) because the amendments do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, j
do not creata the possibility of an accident of a type different from l
any evaluated previously, and do not involve a significant reduction l
in a margin of safety, the amendments do not involve a significant l
hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance l
with the Commission's reculations and the issuance of the amendments will l
rat be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: April 21, 1983 Pricipal. Contributor:
l D. H. Jaffe
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