ML20151F445
| ML20151F445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/08/1988 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| References | |
| ACRS-T-1658, NUDOCS 8804180267 | |
| Download: ML20151F445 (179) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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In the Matter of:
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336th ACRS f1EETING
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1 Pages:
167 through 291 Place:
h'a s h i ng to n,
9.C.
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Date:
April 8,
1988 i
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HERITAGE REPORTING CORPORATION onuwRepesm Q
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Washington, D.C. 20005
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1 PUBLIC NOTICE BY THE 2
UNITED STATES UUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S 3
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 4
5 6
r 7
The contents of this stenographic transcript of the 8
proceedings of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 9
Commission's Advisory Committee on Raactor Safeguards (.ACRS),
t 10 as reported herein, is an uncorrected record of the discussions 11 recorded at the meeting held on the above date.
12 No member of the ACRS Staff and no participant at 13 this meeting accepts any responsibility for errors or s
14 inaccuracies of statement or data contained in this transcript.
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!NISSION y
i ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 2
3 o
In the Matter of:
)
4 336th ACRS Meeting
)
5
)
I 6
7
- Friday, g
April 8, 1988 9
Room 1046 1717 H Street, N.W.
10 Washington, D.C.
20555 11 The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, l ~'
l pursuant to notice, at 8:30 a.m.
13 j
BEFORE:
DR. WILLIAM KERR Chairman g
Professor of Nuclear Engineering Director, Office of Eneroy Research 15 University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Michigan 16 37 l
ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT:
DR. FORREST J.
REMICK gg i
Vice Chairman f
Associate Vice-President for Research g,
j Professor of Nuclera Engineering The Pennsylvania State University 20
!,j University Park, Pennsylvania l'
21 d j
DR. HAROLD W.
LEWIS hlj Professor of Physics
);
l Department of Physica Univ rsity of California 23 p
Santa Barbara, Califorr..a lf f~}
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ACRS MEMBERS PRESENT ( CONTINUED ):
2 MR. CARLYLE MICl!ELSON Retired Principal Nuclear Engineer 3
Tennessee Valley Authority
(
Knoxville, Tennessee, and 4
Retired Director, Office for Analysis & Evaluation of Operational Data 5
U.S.
NRC Washington, D.C.
6 DR. DADE MOELLER 7
Professor of Engineering in Environmental IIcalth Associate Dean for Continuing Education 8
School of Public Itealth
!!arvard University 9
Boston, Massachusetts 10 DR. P7sUL G.
SHTMON Professor, Metallurgical Engineering Departnent 11 Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio 12 DR. CIIESTER P.
SIESS lllh
!3 Professor Emeritus of Civil Engineering University of Illinois 14 Urbana, Illinois 15 l
DR. MARTIN J.
STEINDLER I
Director, Chemical Technology Division 16 Argonne National Laboratory Argonne, Illinois 17 MR. DAVID A. WARD 18 Research Manager on Special Assignment E.I.
du Pont de Nenours & Company 19 Savannah River Lab Aiken, South Carolina 20 l
MR. CI'ARLES J. WYLIE 21 Retired Chief Engineer Electrical Division 22 Duke Power Company
)
Charlotte, No*th Carolina.
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ACRS COGNIZANT STAFF MEMBER:
O 2
RAYMOND FRALEY 3
4 NRC STAFF PRESENTERS:
5 Brian Grimes Loren Bush 6
7 8
9 10 11
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I' P R O C E E D'I N G S 2-CHAIRMAN'KERR:
The. meeting will come to
'3 order.
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'4:
This is the second day of the'336th meeting 5
of the'.ACRS.. He plan to' discuss operator training and 6
- qualification, training of NRC technical' persons, generic 7
issues, IAEA safety princ
.es and some.-important safety-8 related issues.
9 Items for consideration at' Saturday's meeting 10 are. listed =on the schedule outside the meeting-room door.
-11 The meeting is being conducted in accordance with the
-12 pro' visions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act'of the.
lh 13 Government and the Sunshine Act.
14 Mr; Raymond Fraley is the designated, Federal 15-official for this part of the meeting.
We have received 16 no statements or requests.to make oral statements from 17~
members of the public regarding'today's session.
18 '.
A transcript of this part of the meeting is 19 being kept.
I ask that each_ speaker identify himself 4
1 M
or herself and use a' microphone.#
21 Before we.go to.the meeting itself, I call your 22 attention to a memorandum from "r.
Zech dat'ed April 1
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0 23 which is entitled, Securi ty - at NRC !!eadquarters Buildings".
24 If you have not seen it, it points to the need
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-time's...It'does not designate this, building but it talks f
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about.the.one atiWhite Flint.
3 DR'.- 210ELLER:
Do we ha,' a copy of it?.
'4' CliAIRMAN KERR:
No,'we haven't got a copy of 5-
"it..
I willipass~it around if you want a' copy'of.it.
I'am 6
.surelyou.can get one.
.u s
7 (Pause while document is passed around) 8' MR. SIIEWMON:
That one item of White Flint was 9
frust' rating because I couldn't get in.
And it turns 10 out that this new badge we have goes~in the slot and 11 fine..
Well, sonie. people are just smarter than others 12 are.
i.
13 (Laugh'ter)
I 14.
MR. WARD:
Forrest is in trouble.
15
.Ilow wide'is.the slot?' Could you describe that?-
L 16 (Size of' alot is. indicated with gesture) l:
t 17 MR. WARD:
Okay.
I 18 Cl!AIRMr.N KERR:
We are going.to hav e a training 19 session for those people who have trouble.
?
20 (Laughter) 21 This brings us to the first item on the agenda 22 which is operator. training and qualification.
Mr. Ward
- D.
23 is the Cognizant Subcommittee Chairman.
24 MR. WARD:.Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
25 The subject is specifically the updated policy i
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' statement on' training and qualification.
LO:
2
-You have in your book'behind Tab 9 the report 3
on'the subcommittee meeting that was held.
It is a written.
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4 report by:Mr. Alderman. There was a succommittee meeting 5
of the. Human"Factors Subc'ommittee on' March 28 which 6
covered several topics including.this one.
7 I chaired this portion of the subcommittee 8
meeting on this topic because Dr. Remick is involved 9
in the industry side of this activity through his work 10 on'the INPO Accreditation Board.
11 Just to give you a little background, we won't 12 have any staff presentations today but'I will=just' lllh
-13 spend a few minutes telling you what this is about and 14 then I.have a recommendation.
15 Back in 1985 the Commission published a 16 policy statement'on the training and qualification of 17' nuclear power plant personnel.
18 And this policy statement endorsed.the INPO program.
19 The INPO program was called the Managed Training Accredita-20 tion Program.
21 And one of the reasons'for the policy statement 22 endorsing the INPO program was a rather firm, strong O-j 23 commitment from the industry through NUMARC that they I
24 unanimously would involve themselves in the program and in
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25 fact have all of the training programa accredited by the l
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end of calendar 1986.
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2 There are 16--61 nuclear power plant sites in the 3
country.
At each of these there are ten training programs-p 4'
'for various types of nuclear power plant personnel; not' 5.
.just the'operatorsLbut maintenance mechanics, support staff, L6 tecnnicians and so forth; ten separate training programs 7
there.
8 So because of this what~seemed to be a good program 9
and the backing of the entire inductry, the Commission 10 through this policy statement deferred any rule-making 11.
on training and qualification for two years and directed
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12 the staff to evaluate the inplementation of this training i
lllh 13 program as it developed.
14 Last year in a Commission paper SECY-87-121 the 15 staff d,eumented its conclusions that the industry's 16 effort.to improve' training had been very successful and
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l 17 that in fact all 610 programs were accredited by the end of 18 1986.
19 And the staff recommended that the Commission 20 continued to endorse this indte&ry accreditation program 21 and' defer any rule-making as long.as this was working t
22 out.
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- O 23 So in response to'that, the Commission has approved l
- 24 the staff's reconmendations and directed them to update
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25 the policy statement.
And the staff has done that.
And in l
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'l fact:it:is this policy, statement which I guess.in summary--
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!it'is this policy. statement, updated policy' statement, 3-which'is going out now for public comment.
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And the policy statement,.I' guess the thrust'of
'5 it is, quote, "Subject to the continued success of, 6
these industry' programs and the NRC's ability to monitor' 7
its' effectiveness, the Commission'will continue to refrain-i 8
from new rule-making in the area of training."
9 MR. SIIEWMON :
Does this have anything to do 10 with the exauination.or re-examination of' operators?
i 11-MR. MARD:
No.
12 MR. SHEMMON: Okay.
9 13 HR. WARD:
I think the general feeling of the 14 subcommittee was that we think this is a good course of.
15 action for the Commission to take.
We really see no problem 16 with it.
17' In fact I think this has been overall one of the I
18~
most successful, cooperative--there really had to.be f
19 cooperation of the total industry and with.the NRC in
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I 20 this.
I 21 It has been very-successful..
I think one of the 22 things that really has improved since the Three Mile
- O 23 Island accident of what, nine years ago now,' I!think is
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24 comprehensiveness in quality of training of all plant 25 personnel.
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- So I think the Committee.should endors'e this.
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2 IJdon't really know whether it is necessary for us to
^3 write.a letter.
' Os
'd 4.
I. guess ~if we write a letter we are sorteof
-- 5
.in the,same boat as.we'were.in ye'sterday with,Dr.-~Moeller's-6 proposed letter on the Q list and that'the Committee has
~
7 not heard a report on this.
8 But in my. mind it is fairly noncontrovers'ial.
9 It is only going out for public comment.
I do not know 10 whether the staff feels they need a letter from us or 11 not.
12 Tony, do you know if there is any particular need gfhh 13 for a letter?
l 5
14 MR. CAPPUCCI:
Not at this time that I know of.
15 MR. MARD: I guess we could just record in the 16.
minutes that we have no objection to this thing going out 17 for public comment, something to that effect.
e 18 CIIAIRMAN KERR:
Dr. Moeller?
19 DR. MOELLER:
I would favor a letter because it 20 is an outstanding example of the successful industry 21 effort.
22 And a one-paragraph letter from the Committee, t O 23 instead of being negative, here is a very positive statement 24 that we could make.
y 23 And although we are not hearing from them at this Heritage Reporting Corporation
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. !L time,-many of us'have heard' previous reports.
I.have
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. visited INPO, you'know, and am quite familiar with what they 3
.are doing.
4 M R '. WARD: I mean I have no problem with that.,
5 I can1 draft for tomorrow a.short-letter endorsing that.
6
'MR.
SHEWHON:
A noncontroversial letter..
7 MR. WARD:
Yes, sir. Absolutely.
8 CHAIRMAN'KERR:
Should it go to'Mr. Zech or to 9
Mr. Stello?
10 -
MR. WARD:
Oh, I think it'should go to Mr. Zech.
- 11 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Okay.
Why don't you draft 12 -
something and we will consider it.
lllh 13 DR. MOELLER:
While we are on the subject, Marty and 14-I were talking about it this morning and we may propose-tomorrow that we reconsider one of the alternatives which 15 t
16 was mentioned yesterday ^on the Q' list, to send a memo 17 -
from Fraley to Stello on_it just to get it off the table 18 and get it finished.
'19 MP.1tARD:
I guess I should give any of the other 20 subcommittee members a chance to comment.
Forrest, you are 21 certainly free to comment on it.
22 DR. REMICK:
Just one commen't.
You indicated that 23 the 610 programs were accredited.
They had to be ready j
s 24 for accreditation by December 19.86 being that they had sent
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25 in an acceptable self-evaluation report.
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'Those 610 programs will probably be accredited
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-by about June of this y?ar.
They met the commitment 3~
which was to be rea'dy.
There are others.
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4 Those 610 were the utilities who had-loaded fuel 5f
'by December of.'84.
There have been.other plants come 6
along so there are more programs thatIhave.been accredited 7
or are in the process and the second round is' started.
8' The Cooney was the first plant to be accredited 9
and it has now been--it is going through the second round.
10 Every four years they have to reaccredited, re-evaluated 11 every two years.
~
12 And the INPO evaluation visits also look at the lh 13 accreditation when they do those ever--excuse ne, they 14 look at the training programs when they do those every 18 15 months.
16 So it is a continuous process..
17 DR. MOELLER:
Mell, there is a lot more to this i
18
.than simply a training program. I know when I visited
. 19 several of the plants we carefully checked on their 20 follow-up of LERs and the feedback process.
21 And anytime that anything happens anywhere 22 that pertains to their plan, they try as.soon as possible
.O' 23 to incorporate the lessons learned into the appropriate 24 t
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training program, 25 DR. REMICK:
They have been particularly good at i
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_getting it in the continuing training.
They have been ni/
2 weak at'gettingLit back into the initial training for 3-
-the next round'.
,That is one of the things'that the staff 4
5 pointed _out at.our subcommittee meeting as one of~their 6
' findings, that area.
7 They do a good job of capturing it, getting it 8
into immediate training for the people but not necessarily 9
getting'it back'to the next round of fresh recruits p3 going through.
11 That is not consistently _true but largely true.
12-One other. thing that I might mention, if I might.
DOE lh 13 now has apparently decided to oroceed with-setting up its
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own accreditation program for DOE facilities I think 15 following the INPO pattern.
s 16 MR. CAPPUCCI:
Do'they license their operators 37 of some type?
18 DR. REMICK:
They certify them.
}
MR. CAPPUCCI:
Certify them.
Is there a 19 f
rigorous process for certification?
20 21 MR. MARD:
Well, it is just each site.
i 22 MR. CAPPUCCI:
Each one does its own?
Each site l
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does its own?
23 l.
24 MR.. WARD:
Right.
Cl! AIRMAN KERR:
This is for reactors'or reactors 23 l
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and other kinds of. facilities?
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-2 nn,:MARD:
Well, with us it is quite formal.a 3
process for the reactors and there is a less formal 4
for other facilities.
5 DR.' REMICK:
The one other bit of116 formation, 6
if I-might.
Paul asked a question does this include the 7
requalification.
8 It doesn't.
However, because of the fact that 9-
.that-may ha"o issued say a few more words, one of the 10 reasons that I think that the raqualification programs 11
.have not been as good as one might expect is that the 12 NRC had regulations, Part 55, Appendix A, that prescribed g
13 how those were to be done.
14 They were very prescriptive.
And-all licensees, 15 including nonpower reactors, had to submit a requalification 16 program some years ago which the NRC, then the AEC, 17 approved..
18 So they have approved programs that they are 19 inspected against that they are car *ying out.
That is 2
20 not consistent with the systematic performance-based 21 approach.
22 And so they were in a bind.
The utilities said 23 they couldn't change'the progr'.ms because this is what 24 the rules says.
We-have an approved program.
So there 25 have been major inconsistencios in bow that has been Heritoge Reporting Corporation
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2 Now that Part 55 has been changed so that there 3'
can be performance-based type of training programs imposed.
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4 INPO has added an llth program which is the requalification--
5 or.they call it continuing training for'licens'ed 6
operators.
7 And they have done that just--so that will get 8
specific special attention and that will be addressed by the boards and the evaluation teams and there will be 10' guidance to look specifically at that.
4 II So there is a relationship to what you are 12 saying but it is just pulling that out and looking at it' I3 as a separate program to make sure it gets attention.
14 The staff did indicate at the subcommittee f
15 meeting that they were concerned about that and their
~
16 concern being if you pull out the requalification or 17 -
continuing training for licensed personnel, you might I8 think that is the most important continuing program.
I9 But how about the rad tech, the chem tech, l
the maintenance people ano so forth.
The answer to that 20 21 is continuing training is required in all that but INPO has decided that for now they are going to pull out 22 23 continuing training for licensed personnel and look at it 24 separately to make sure it gets proper attention.
25 MR. S!!EWMON:
There was this "bruhaha" vaguely tieritoge Reporting Corporation
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a year ago when the industry was complaining ~that there
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was this mismatch between what they were being tested
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3 on and what was relevant to their job.
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4 DR. REMICK:
Yes.
I don't know if you. caught 4
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5 my question t'o I guess it was to Murley when they were.
6 here yesterday.
7 They had. stopped testing because industry came 8
.in and said we are losing people.
They'just won't put 9
-up with'this and more.
10-So back last' fall the Commission or EDO,.'one of-11-them ordered stop requalification training.
They have 12 now started a new program working closely'with INPO lllh
'13 providing help, utilities providing help, a new program 14 of requalification.
15 And it has been conducted at Robinson so'far 16 and Fort Calhoun is the second one.
And I forget if that t
17 has been done or just about to be done.
The feedback I 18 get is very favorable both from the staff and from the L
19 utilities.
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4 20 As I pointed out yesterday, some of the feedback 21 I.bave gotten from the utilities saying if our operator 22 can't pass that examination, we don't want them as 23 operators.
t 24 So they are pleased.that it is performance-based.
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25 lloweve r, it is extremely manpower-intensive.
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the staff put in 50' man-weeks for that one examination h
2 at Robinson.
3 They do not have that manpower to be able to O-.
4 sustain that.
And.so the' question ~I had of Tom Murley 5-is don't you think we are heading to a place'where industry 6-is going to have to do that and.they will end up with 7'
a check operator type system after all.
8 So on a trial basis, it'is more favorable and 9
they indicated I guess that they are going to start next 10 fiscal year.
11 MR. SIITWMON: The contractors for at least the 12 next fiscal year, too.
13 DR. REMICK:
And that's part of the problem.
P 14 MR. MICHELSON:
llas the staff given any serious 15 consideration to check operators?
16 DR. REMICK:
They did back when we.first proposed 17 it and it was poo-pooed both by the industry and by the 18 staff.
19 The feedback that I get is people are starting I
20 to think about it.
I do not think they have put two and 21 two together yet that this new recualification program 22 might just be logical.
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23 As I said yesterday, my gut feeling is that 24 that is where we are; heading;but we do not know it.
25 MR. MICl!ELSON :
As far as we know, the staff isn't Heritage Reporting Corporation
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pursuin'g that on a low-key. basis?
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2 DR. REMICK:
To the bes't of my., knowledge' they are 3
not?but I am not positive.
4 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, that was the' official
'5.
answer.
I just wondered whether they.were really thinking 6
about'it.
How about INPO?. Do you know if they are thinking-7 about it?
8 DR. REMICK:
No.
Basically their response.is
{
9 the same thing.When I pointed out to them that I think that to is where we are headed and we don't know it, the feedback
~
-11 is that people are thinking about it again but I do not 12 know of 'ny effort.
I 13 But I would not necessarily-know of it, either.
I4 CIIAIRMAN KERR:
Any other questions or comments?
15 (No response) 16 The next item on the acenda is--
17 DR. MOELLER:
Excuse me.
Could I raise a f
18 quick point additionally?. You had called out at the I'
opening of the meeting this morning the security at NRC 20 headquarters and I just read Rule No. 1:
"Certain articles 21 such as recording devices are prohibited in NRC facilities" r
22 and I was wondering what the machine was that our Reporter 23 is using.
24 HR. LEWIS:
That is not a recording device.
I 25 DR. MOELLER:
Oh, okay.
Thank'you.
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1 We allow the-public-to. record the meetings.
O 2
'They'are permitted so I think that particular statement ~
3 should be questioned.-
4 MR. LEWIS:
And'that is routine for classified
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5 areas.
And of course this is in some mystical way a
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6 classified area.
You are going to have trouble fighting 7
that one.
8 DR. MOELLER:
Excuse me.
I just tried to read 9
what you assigned us.
10.
CIIAIRMAN KERR:
I presume that at 9:15 the 11 beginning of the next item is based on is based on the 12 schedule of the staff that are coming down to participate.
lh 13 Mr. Shewmon?
14 MR. SHEWMON:
Can we take up the letter to 15 Deckjord'that showed up on your desk this morning or do L
16-you have something more worthwhile?
'17 CHAIRMAN KERR:
I am willing to take up that 18 letter at this time.
4 i
e 19 Do each of you have a copy of a memo to 20
-Beckjord from Shewmon which has not yet been Shewmonized?
21 DR. MOELLER:
This follows up the earlier letter i
t 22 you sent us.
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23 MR. WARD:
What earlier letter?
24 DR. MOELLER:- On the inspection of the pressure i
25 vessel at THI-II.
l l
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I MR. SHEWMON:
That other letter is in' green r.
2 number'16 which was in the front of your-folder.
-3 DR. MOELLER:
Right.
This supercedes that?.
4 MR. SHEWMON:
Yes.
This is something.that I r
5 wanted to send because Eric asked a question and I' asked 6'
Ray.about-it'an'd he said well the Committee' technically.
7 has to say they don't want to write a letter on the 8
subject before you should send a private letter.
9 MR. WARD:
So you sent one?
s 10' MR. SHEWMON:
No.
I just gave it to Ray.
I 11' abided by'the rules.
I now would like your permission 12 to send it or your decision to--
13 -
(Pause) 14 MR. LEWIS:
Why do you need permission?
15 (Pause) b 16 DR. MOELLER:
I.think he raised a very good 17 question and called for some additional testing that 18 otherwise will not be done and I respect his opinion.
19 MR. SHEWMON:
Okay. This is comments on the I-20 program.
l 21 DR. MOELI.,R:
Do we know at all what the l
22 interface between the steel vessel and the molton core 23 looks like?
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24 MR. SHEWMON:
No.
l 25 DR. MOELLER:
We haven't gotten that deep?
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i MR. SHEWMON:
This is actually a special-program 2.
which will run like six or seven mill' ion dollars where 3
they will~go in to core.out for' reasons that you can 4
guess.
5 But> basically they wanted to go all the way 1
6 thr'ough and.GPU said no way, you. haven't got enough money 7'
to go close that thing up again afterwards and. certify it 8
and so on..
9 So they will go with bolts that go in'I am to not-sure how many inches and they have got a special cutting 11 tool that will do that.
.12 And they can get a pretty good idea.
My main llh 13 Point here is that as much as I love metallurgy I think 14 the more interesting question is really what happened f
15 on the surface that this stuff was just really hotter than l
16' "Billy be' damned" my father might say; he was.
17 nontechnical.
18 (Laughter)
When it came down it didn't melt the steel.
19 l
20 MR. MICHELSON:
Well, wasn't it high pressure 21 for at least a portion of that scenario perhaps, wasn't 22 it?
23 MR. SHEWMON: Well, the system was still at 24 high pressure.
)
I 25 MR. MICHELSON:
That's what I mean.
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1 1
MR. SHEWMON:And it certainly crusted over 2
coming through this water and apparently that crust 3
kept it.from kept it from transferring.
4 And'the staff pointed out that it'did sit'there 5-for.a good while- -
6 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
7 MR. SHEWMON:
--so there was fair equilibration.
8 MR. STEINDLER: Do you know the composition of that 9
melt?
i f
10 MR. SHEWMON:
Yes. People have had pieces of it l
e 11-out and it was well over 2000 C to be molten.
i 12 MR. STEINDLER:
Was there a' fair amount of fuel ~in 13 it or was'it all metal?
14
.MR.
SHEWMON:
I don't know.
No, no.
It was
[
15 oxidized.
j 16 MR..MICHELSON:
Maybe a good ceramic--maybe 17 put a ceramic dish in the bottom of the vessel.
l 18 MR. SHEWMON:
It is more urania/zirconia type i
l i
19 of stuff is my impression.
[
i 20 DR. MOELLER:
Have they seen the inside surface j
j
~21 of the Pottom of the pressure vessel yet?
}
e l
22 They have not?
3 O
I 23 MR. SHEWMON:
Not well enough to do anything about
[
I l
j 24 it.
23 CHAIRMAN KERR:
I see no motion to send a letter
[
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on the part of the Committee and therefore I conclude 2
that Mr. Shawmon is free to send it.
3 MR. LEMIS:
Are we open for suggestions?
i
)
4 CHAIilMAM KERR:
Yes.
5 MR. LEWIS:
Add a "u"
to the word "poured" 6
at the end of the first paragraph.
That will change 7
the meaning to the proper one.
8 (Laughter) 9 l
MR. SHEWMON: There are a few other words I will 10 change.
I will be pleased for any other comments.
II CHAIRMAN KERR:
If we change it too ruch it then 12 becomes a Conmittee letter so we can't do too much of I3 that.
14 (Laughter) 15 MR. LEWIS:
I will bring up later the question 16 of whether you can legally talk to Mr. Beckjord on the 17 side.
18 (Laughter) 19 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Anything else?
20 (No response) 21 Carl, is your retyped letter in a position where 22 r~
we can--
(
o 23 MR. MICHELSON: I doubt that it is ready yet.
r 24 CHAIRMAN KERR:
I assume that, unless the N')
25 people are heavy coffee drinkers, that that break was Heritago Reporting Corporation (M2) 6N 4884
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scheduled because the staff couldn't be here until 9:15.
1 1
2 MR. MICHELSON: I think that letter is about 3
ready.
.,: f')
1\\~/
4
-(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken at l
5 this time after'an off-the-record discussion
'6-was held) 7 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Back on the record.
8 The next' item is training of the NRC technical 9
personnel, 10
'This is.to provide'an opportunity for the 11 NRC training center personnel tx) tell~us about 57me of 12 the training programs they have developed.
lllll 13 It is a fair request and we welcome them.
Ed, 1
14 I welcome you here.
Are you going tx) take the lead?
l 15 MR.-JORDAN:
I will start off.
16 CHAIRMAN KERR:
All right.
Fine.
For the I'
17 benefit of tne Committee, this has not been before a 18-subcommi'ctee so we are all hearing it for the first 19 time.
20 DR. REMICK:
And this is training of NRC
[
21 personnel?
22 MR. JORDAN: Training of NRC oersonnel.
23 MR. JORDAN:
My name is Ed Jordan.
I am the
~
24 Director.of the Office cf Analysis and Evaluation of 25 Operational Data.
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-In April of last year, the reorganization
/T U-2 transferred the technical = training from'I&E to AEOD-along 3
with some other things.
4 The subcommittee was.last briefed I be'lieve in 5
March of 1987 on-some,of the functions of the technical 6
training. program and that preceded the reorganization.
7 We feel-that before and since that the technical 8
training'is a real success in the NRC and we believe that 9
is true because of the coordination that ha's occurred
-10 between the. Office of Personnel, Byrd's caucus and 11 through Pete Dolmane the Associate Director for 12 Training who is here with us today.
'13 And through the dedication of the technical 14 training center'itself, its personnel there.
The 15 scope of training after the reorganization has been 16 expanded to all'NRC technical positions whereas pre & ding 17 the organization it was fundamentally the inspector-38
.presonnel, j
19.
And so we have now initiated a qualification and 20 training program that we have issued in February and are 21 implementing which identifies the training needs rather 22 than training desires of the various program offices.
23 The program offices have personnel that are 24 working with us to identify their needs and then we will
)
25 develop further programs to match those needs to then Heritoge Reporting Corporation r
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provide a level,of technical qualificati~on reaching the i
2 major job topics.
- 3 So we are extremely pleased with the way it p#
4 is' proceeding.
Ken Raglin, who is the Director of 5-the Technical Training Center, will provide a presentation-6 that goes through the entire program and capability of 7
the Technical Training Center.
8 This is an information briefing but I think 9
there is something that we can get from the ACRS that 10 would be very, helpful to us.
11 You nave the connection with tl.e academic 12 world.- That is not orincipally our world.
I think we q
llllk 13 would like some advice from you and perhaps request a 14 subcommittee meeting %1th the Training Center personnel 35 at Chattanooga at the appropriate time.
16 So that will be the end product that we are 17 looking for.
18 DR. REMICK:
At the human factors meeting that l
19 we had several weeks ago I think Carlyle Michelson i
20 suggested that s.o might just do that sometime.
21 MR. JORDAN : We would appreciate that.
We 22 are changing our program and trying to find ways of 23 getting more for our dollar.
24 We now have two simulators installed and a third l
(}
25 being installed.
I am about to preempt your entire L
l Heritoge Reporting Corporation m su.e
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.l
'3
~I
~ presentation, Ken; ' Ii will -' s top.
3 s.
2 (Laughter)
~.
3 And the capability with more' licensed, senior 4
licensed' personnel than any other single place in the 8
Agency and with'the shift towards.other technical training beyond reactor operations, we feel it is 9
7 important to get good advice-on how we might best do i
8
--it.
The Office of Personnel has been very helpful 10 in providing the advice on training methods and ways-of II expanding our programs.
12 But I~think you people could help'us even I3 further.
I4 So, Ken, with that I would like for you to make 15 your presentation.
E I'
Cl! AIRMAN KERR:
Ed, is the idea that you are 17 setting up these. programs to become.available to people 18 who want to take them or do you propose a schedule I'
in which people are required, encouraged or whatever to 20
.take training if they are in a specific area?
21 MR. JORDAN:
The latter so that we would be providing a level--obviously there is grandfathering of 22 personnel.
Suddenly you are not unqualified as a 23 24 project manager today because we have a training program.
t l
25 But there is now a specified set of courses that Heritage Reporting Corporation msu
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one would be expected to either qualify with or have
'T 2
been accepted from because of previous experience and 3
knowledge.
4 And so the idea is that we then bring the 5
entire staff in each of the major areas up to some level 6
of knowledge.
7 DR. REMICK:
For example, the operator licensing 8
branch personnel consultants have to go throue,h something 9
like this, is that correct?
10 MR. JORDAN : That's correct.
There is presently 11 a qualification program for a number of positions in 12 operating licensing personnel.
13 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Mr. Lewis?
14 MR. LEWIS:
Yes.
Are you open to specific 15 questions about the curricula that you distribute?
16 MR. JORDAN: Let me have Ken go through his 17 presentation and then we will answer those questions.
18 MR. LEWIS:
Then ask questions.
19
.' t R. JORDAN:
Then ask questions, yes.
20 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Mr. Moeller?
21 DR. MOELLER:
Well, maybe I should hold mina but 22 are your courses only technical or do you have--see, I can zm iL j>
23 envision a course that would be very helpful to you and r^
24 to many of us.
V 25 And that would be how to deal with the Press, how Heritogo Reporting Corporation (392) 626 ASH
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to give'an effectiveloral; presentation,;
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2 MR. JORDAN: ~ Good.'
3
'DR.~MOELLER:' Are you'doing that?
O-4-
MR. JORDAN :
We have that interface with the 5-Office of Personnel so'our courses are jointly established.
~
And so we interact and that particular course'is being 7
held through the' Office of Personnel.
~8 MR. GOLDMAN: We have a Request for Proposal out now to provide three or two sessions here at 10 Headquarters, one session in each of the regions'one II day, that deals with that microphone being jammed in your 12 face when you are out there trying to read a statement of I3'
..what has happened.
I4 We conducted it three times now for some of the 15 most senior staff members.
I6 MR.'JORDAM:
And I went through the course I7~
also.
It was extremely good.
38 DR. MOELLER:
Well, I am pleased that you are l'
seeing the full range of the needs.
MR. JORDAN: And so we are interacting.
We have 21
-very close ties.
And so where there is a fuzzy one, 22 we decide who is going to do it and under what--
23 DR. MOELLER: Sure.
Sure.
24 CHAIRMAN KERR:
Any further questions or 25 comments?
Heritoge Reporting Corporation m ma
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DR. REMICK:
Let me just ask before you start.
-l We haven't scrubbed this in a subcommittee.
If you had 2
3 no questions, how much time would your presentation 4
take so we have some way of knowing where we are headed 5
here?
6 MR. JORDAN:
About 45 minutes.
7 DR. REMICK:
Okay.
All right.
8 MR. JORDAN:
Ken Raglin, why don't you proceed?
9 (Whereupon, a slide show presentation is to presented)
II I think somehow I forgot to introduce Lee Spessard.
12 Lee Spessard is the Division Director for Operations and gggg 13 Analysis.
14 MR. RAGLIN:
I appreciate the opportunity to 15 be here today.
16 I would like to give an indication of the 17 technical training that goes on throughout the NRC, some 18 of which is not directly associated with the Technical 19 Training Center, although the focus of the briefing will be 20 on the Technical Training Center programs.
21 I think it is appropriate to give credit where 22 it should be given, though, in the other areas.
As we em (v) 23 look at the scope of NRC technical training, it can be I
c' 24 classified into formal training which is either done C
25 in-house through Technical Training Center staff or Heritogo Roporting Corporation
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other personnel or contracted out through commercial 2
contracts, interagency agreements, other offices, methods 3
like that.
4 And in that broad category, there are the 5
Technical Training Center programs and those are the 6
ones which are described in that syllabus of courses 7
which was also passed out along with the bullet.
8 The TTC programs consist of four separate 9
reactor technology curricula. There is a separate one 10 for the GE, for tiae Westinghouse, for the Babcock and 11 Wilcox and the combustion engineering product lines.
12 Additionally, there is a TTC specialized llll 13 technical training curriculum which essentially includes 14 everything else besides the four major reactor vendor 15 designs.
16 I will explain a bit more about the TTC programs 17 shortly.
18 In addition to those programs there are programs 19 that are mentioned through the Office of Personnel.
20 A couple of examples on the slides up here are the PRA 21 technclogy transfer programs.
That program is a curriculum 22 of several forces which the training center supports fo*
r3O 23 two of the seven, I believe, courses.
24 The others are done primarily through some
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25 mixture of government lab and other NRC personnel.
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..I AddJtionally,-there-is the~end-usr,/ADP' training-l 2
cur.:iculum:that.is done by the Office of Personnel.
_s 3
CHAIRMAN KERR:f Whati lis ::PRA' techhol'ogy transfer?
4 MR. RAGLI :
That is the
.vatlistic risk 2
s assessment technolog'y tra sfer program hich is a serie's T
6 of~seven courses >which include ~PRA fundamentals, PRA 7
processes for evaluation of technical specifications, 8.
-PRA applications, boiling water reactor technology,
{
9-pressurized wate reactor technology.
l 10 MR. SHEWMON:
Would it have almost the same 11 content if you called that a PRA training curriculum?
12 MR. RAGLIN: ' Yes.
That is what it-is.
Pete, do-
- 13
-you want to--
14 MR. GOLDMAN:
It was researched. Originally l
15 doing the research, the rest of the Agency didn't have very L
l 16 much understanding or know2.,Jge of it.
I 17 So it.got the terninol.ogy technology transfer" 18 because we are trying to teach the remainder of the
)
19 Agency what PRA was.
20 MR. SEEWMON:
Thank you.
27 MR. RAGLIN:
In addition to the TTC and OP 22 programs, there is al-o e technical training '.urriculum
[
l ' :b 23 within governmental and public affairs office, particularly i
24 the state programs curriculut" there.
h i
25 Thrt invol"es technical training for personnel Heritoge Reporting Corporation
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from agreement states, primarily in nuclear materials 2
area.
3 Ue are working with GPA to take best advantage h
4 of the courses that are in that curriculum, allow then 5
to take best advantage of the courses that are in the 6
Training Center curriculum and trying to economize the 7
overall Agency effort there.
8 The bottom line is that there are some courses 9
in the GPA program that MRC personnel will attend more to frequently in the fue to than has been done in the 11 past.
12 Initially there are periodic or intermittent llh 13 region or program Office initiatives. This is a situation 14 where maybe a need exists for a particular technical 15 training course.
16 It is not part of the formal curriculum.
In 17 the past, program offices in regions have either contracted 18 for the training or arranged to have it contracted.
19 In many cases it lias been a one-shot training 20 initiative.
And typically if it stays that way it isn't 21 necessarily included in the ongoing curriculum.
If 22 there is a perceived need for it on an ongoing basis,
- s
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25 MR. HARD:
Ken, a question.
So your responsibi.'ity I
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.is'for the first of those, the~1TTC program, is that it?
2 MR. RAGLIN1: Yes, directly.
Although there is a j
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lot of interface throughout.the rest of it.-
4 MR.
7ARD:? I mean dre ouinbhattanooga?
5 MR. RAGLIN:. Yes.
o-73 L-6'
.MR.~ WARD:
Okay.
)
7 MR. RAGLIN:
The TTC and the staff are in 8
Chattonooga.
9 MR. WARD:
And.the Office of Personnel programs 10 are physically cer.tered where?
il MK.'RAGLIN:
Here in Bethesda.
12 ftR. WARD:
Bethesda.
lll 13 MR. RAGLIN:
Okay.
In addition to the formal 14 technical training, there are a number of formal
-i That was-the subject that Ed Jordan l qualification programs.
15 16 was mentioning in the introduction.
37 And.we are talking about < situation where thereL Ic are a number of progrrms.that already exist.
And I 1,
mention it becauec the formal technical training is only 1
20 a part of this overall qualification program.
[
21 Good examples are associated with the 22 inspector qualification processes for categories of l
()
23 inspectors such as resident inspectors, region-based I
24' operations inspectors.
25 Engineering support inspectors, radiation j
Heritoge Reporting Corporation m
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protection inspectors, dif ferent groups of in spectors
~
2 typically have formal qualification requirements which 3
include these types of things:
regional qualification i
')
4 cards, a number of activities that have to be done in 5
order to satisfy those cards--
6 CIIAIRMAN KERR: 'Uhat is a regional qualification 7
card?
8 MR. RAGL7 ti:
I'm sorry?
9 CIIAIRMAN KERR:
What is a regional qualification 10 card?
l 11 MR. RAGLIti:
It is a qualification card that 12 includes check-offs, study testing on a number of 13 activities.
It includes--
14 CllAIRMAN KERR:
Is it informal or what is it?
15 MR. RAGLIN:
It is a qualification card in 16 that the individual gets it.
Ile has these things to do.
17 Gets signed off for doing them.
They include getting 18 orientation in the region, a study of the Code of Federal i
19 Regulations, a stud */ of the final sufety analysis report, 20 regulatory guides.
21 MR. FARD:
No, but is the point then that he 22 is t aen qualified to serve as an inspector at certain ex 23 facilit.ies and on certain systems?
(
24 Is that the idea?
In order to be formally certified to 25 MR. RAGL Heritage Reporting Corporation j
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be an independent inspector, that individual would have 2
to complete all of this which includes formal technical 3
training as one part of it and the last part is typically 4
.4 4
an oral qualification board.
5 At that point, that given individual is formally 6
certified to do the independent inspection.
7 Now throughout the process, the individual goes 8
out and does assistance on inspections.
Or if there are 9
certain areas that the regional administrator considers 10 the individual formally qualified, he can certify that 11 person on a interim basis.
12 MR. SHEWMON:
One of the questions implicit is llll 13 is that a junior grade, and if they are a senior grade, 14 thcn they have a natione'. qualification card and the 15 asnwer is apparently no.
16 MR. RAGLIN:
It really started the other way.
17 MR. SHEWMON:
Yes.
18 MR. RAGLIN:
There was--
19 MR. SHEWMON: Thank you.
Let's go on.
That's enough.
20 MR. RAGLIti: Okay.
?!
At any rate, the process is fairly lengthy 22 and the formal training is only one part of it.
We feel 7
L )
23 it is an important part but we also recognize that there 24 are a number of other things that must be done in order
(')
V 25 to make a given inspector or other technical position Heritage Reparting Corporation
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1
,~~k DR. MOELLER:
OJT. ;Uhat does that' stand for?
2
(
t i
s That would
-[
3 MR. RAGLIN:
On-the-job training.
4-include, for antinspector, that would include going to 5
'different sites and'participati'ngrin differentstypes of j
6 inspections for which he,would be._ ultimately responsible.
~
t, ici 7
It would include writing the inspection reports s
and doing research,-whatever is necessary.
9 CHAIRMAN KERR:
What is a practical factor?
10 MR. RAGLIN:
It depends on the position.
It is 11 something that would have to be done.
A good: example --
I 12 these kind of go together:
OJT and Practical factors.
13 (Mr. Raglin refere to slide) f 4
14-But if we are talking about writing an inspection 5
15 report, that is something that the individual is going 16 to actually have to do.
t 17 So he would go do the inspection, assisting i
is someone who is fully qualified. Draft the inspection 19 report:
that is really a practical factor.
lie is doing i
i 20 that.
l 21 MR. SilEMMON : I think "Practical Factor" is a I
22 Navy term and it is kind of like a task.
,O 23 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes.
r 24 MR. SHEW?!ON :
It is something you have to do and 5
it is usually checked by somebody else filling out a call card j
t Heritoge Reporting Corporation m mme
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that yes, I saw him do it and he followed the procedure 2
and he did it properly and the guy signs off.
3 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes.
4 MR. S!!EWMON: That is quite often called practical 5
factors, I believe.
6 MR. RAGLIN:
Right.
That is the context we are 7
using it in here.
8 So there is a number of things and we feel it is 9
a pretty strong process.
The close out is usually an oral H) check out in the form of an oral qualification board which 11 is no trivial event for the individual going to the 12 board.
llll 13 The boards are typically tough and they are 14 typically required for the different inspections and other 15 positions.
16 CIIAIRMAN KERR:
What fraction of failures /Jes 17 one see?
18 MR. RAGLIN:
I do not have good data on that.
19 MR. JORDAN:
I do not have data either but the 20 object is that thac particular person may not at that 21 time be ready.
And, if so, there may be need to do 22 more in the way of inspection accompaniments to go back
--y 1,
j and review a particular regulation, for instance, or some 23
,r w.
24 remedial relook.
(
Or even sent back to the training center for 25 Heritage Peporting Corporation m uu
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another course.
What we wanted to say was that there is E/
2 for inspectors a fairly formalized gaalification process.
3 One mioht even say that it coald be excessively formalized.
4 But it does provide the Agency then with a 5
consistency among the inspectors.
First of all, there 6
are some pretty stringent requirements and secondly, before 7
they are sent out independently there is a qualification 8
process which includes training.
9 And there is a need for other positions to have 10 similar if not the same--similar programs--to insure 11 the right consistency.
12 MR. RAGLIN:
I would now like to focus a bit lllg 13 on the TTC programs.
The next slide gives an indication 14 of the TTC training-sponsored training that was done in 15 FY 1987.
16 (Slide) 17 A total of 115 different courses representing 18 1162 students.
Now that number is a little misleading 19 because there are some students who might go to several 20 courses during a given year.
21 They are counted each time they come to a 22 courue.
So certainly we are not talking about 1162 unique
~s
)
(-
students there.
23 24 C!! AIRMAN KCRR:
The capacity factor, did that 25 get slipped in there from some nuclear power survey?
Heritage Reporting Corporation
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(Laughter) 2 MR. RAGLIN:
No.
That is a term that we have 3
adopted also.
The capacity factor for the training 4
center is calculated by looking at the total number of 5
slots that were available to be used for training 6
and t'en dividing that number into the total number of 7
slots which were filled.
8 So it reflects attrition which is a fact of 9
life in our course series which is the mainline training 10 for the operations inspectors such that it is a requirement 11 that a certain score be obtained in the examination of 12 the first course to progress to the second course and so 13 forth.
l4 It also reflects that sometimes things come 15 up and people end up being cancelled and it is not possible 16 to reclaim a slot, 17 But overall it is a pretty good usage of the total 18 available slots.
19 DR. MOELLER:
So you have about ten people 20 per course?
21 MR. RAGLIN:
The class size varies depending on 22 the nature of the course.
Typically for simulator courses i
23 it is around six.
For classroom courses it is either 18
/3 24 or 24.
l
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s j 25 The next indicator is course-weeks which is Heritage Reporting Corporation (902) 626 44M
dle 206 I
something that can be correleated to the level of effort
{
's i
2 or dollar value associated with presenting a given 3
course.
4 It can be correleated to how many instructors 5
are needed on the staff in order to do a given amount 6
cf training and also be correlated to how much money is 7
needed to fund commercial contracts to give a two-week 8
corrse twice a year or whatever.
9 So we track in terms of course-weeks where if it 10 is a three-week course and it is given once, then that 11 constitutes three course-weeks.
And a single week course 12 is simple one course-week.
(gll 13 The distribution of those courses is shown 14 up there.
15 DR. REMICK:
I think you just have to assume 16 we can read the distribution to conserve time.
17 MR. RAGLIN:
Fine.
18 DR. REMICK:
I think we have to move along.
19 MR. RAGLIN:
Okay.
The bulk is in the reactor 20 technology area.
21 (Slide) 22 The next slide shows the distribation of slot usage
()
23 throughout the Agency.
Our biggest c1'.ents are the r~x 24 regians--one, two, three, four and five.
L.)
25 The biggest regions taking the lion's share of Heritogo Reporting Corporation
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the pic there.
And then the balance of the pie is 2
distributed among other NRC offices with relatively small 3
usage in the past and then non-NRC personnel.
)
4 And these represent the courses that are 5
taught by the training center starf or are controlled 6
through contracts or DOE agreements or interagency I
7 agreements.
8 MR. WARD:
The use of tne courses by research 9
is surprisingly, to me at least, small.
10 MR. JORDAN:
That was the benefit of doing this 11 kind of review and looking at the overall training needs 12 and qualification programs of the Agency.
lllh 13 We don't really have training distributed at 14 all proportional for the sizes of the various offices.
15 So that is why we are going through this process now.
16 CHAIRMAN KCRR:
Are you surprised that it is 17 so small or that big?
18 MR. WARD:
No.
I am surprised that it is that 19 small.
20 But what I am vondering is is this because the 21 research office perceives that they don't have a need for 22 this?
-s t
)
23 MR. JORDAN:
This is reflecting the training 24 program as it was easentially a year ago in terns of
(~))
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l 25 haring projected needs and the enphasis on the regional l
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/
2 So we are saying that we are in the process of 3
shifting that and providing more training opportunities J ';
f
^
for research and the staffs.
(f 4
5 I hope that in a year'the pie chart will look 6
sonewhat different.
We don't misunderstand the need for 7
making it different.
8 MR. WARD:
Well you have mentioned a couple 9
times the dif ference between what they want a d what they 30 need.
gg And who defines what they need?
12 MR. JORDAN: The problem has been in the past 33 the individuals hnve had wants and offices haven't really gggg i4 expressed needs.
15 And so we are now trying to get the offices to 16 express needs of their staff and we are doing that through 17 a couple of committees.
And the needs are then derived from a gg 39 qualification program that identifies what each major 20 position ought to have in the way of training.
21 MR. WARD:
Thank you.
22 DR. h0ELLER:
In a similar comment, Dave, you
(
)
l 23 could say AEOD spends all of their time in training.
24 I mean AEOD, a very small qroup, occupies 6.4 por cent.
Y]
25 They are half as nuch as all of NRR.
Heritage Reporting Corporation imi m
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209;
~ - -
i MR. JORDAN: I suppose-I should respond to that.
2 (Laugh'tcr) 3 MR. RAGLIN:-
Parttof those~AEOD numbers'arel 4
AEOD staff who were formerly in the Office of' Inspection.
andEnforcementbefore(thereorganizatiohand.thenumbers 5'
6 have been adjusted to>showJthe new location of the people
- y,
who attended the training.-.
o, 7
~ _
l e
i
'8 MR. JORDAN: 'But"we do'have a'surpris'ingly
~ !
~
I 9
large fraction'of training based'on operations officers.
TheoperationsofficersIcrtheoperationscenterare 10 r
18 an input to the Agency that those people have to go 12 through qualification programs and they have a' dwell time 13 of about two years in the position.
k lllll 14 So they then+become a fairly large fraction of
. {
l 15 the training.
i It DR. MOELLER:
I presume, too, that if you check i
17 the data of Region V that it must have sent a lot of 18 people the previous two years or something.
19 MR. JORDAN:
It is cycled depending on the rate f
20 of hiring.
21 MR. RAGLIN:
They don't have as much turnover i
I 22 in Region V as some of the other regions do.
}
[
23 (Slide) 24 The next slide deals with the quality of technical 25 training and we feel that what we do has high quality.
Heritoge Reporting Corporation n=n.
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We have an excellent outstanding group of
)
2 instructors at the training center.
3 We seek the same level of expertise in the t
4 4
commercial contracts although we feel it is more difficult 5
to attain.
6 We have implemented within the last year or 7
two a very strong Technical Training Center instructor 8
qualification process which is not unlike that associated 9
with the inspectors.
10 Cur aim is to have instructors who are well-versed 11 in what is going on in the different reactor technology 12 areas.
lllh 13 DR. REMICK:
Do you give them courses in 14 instructional skills?
15 MR. RAGLIN: Yes.
16 DR. REMICK:
Do they get continuing training 17 in that area?
18 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes they do, i
I 19 l DR. REMICK:
Okay.
And you do have technical and I
20 '
professional developnent opportunities for then?
21 MR. RAGLIN:
The instructor position definitely f
includes not only classroom and simulator instruction but 22 my i
23 development of training materiala in the course initiatives.
(i 24 DR. RE!!ICK :
I think their own professional
(
/
25 development, is that addressed?
Heritogo Reporting Corporation I
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4 i
t 3-
-(Pause)
~[
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2
-Make sure that they keep.up-to-date technically?
l
- 3 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes.
4 DR. MOELLER: In the areas where-they are 5
qualified?
~:
6
- MR. RAGLIN: 'Yes3it-is.
x 7
The courses at the training center are all l
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+
3 intense.
There is no secrettabout'that'.? The people who
{
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come to the training center quickly find out that it is j
10 not e. free week or a"free.three. weeks down there because they have a great deal of outside activity required in f
12 order to successfully complete the courses.
}
13 _ ~
It is a lot of work on 'the students.
And the g4 reason is that we just cannot get the' students for'as much f
15 time as we would like. -There are too many'other pressing 16 activities in the Agency.
[
17 And so we have to optimize the use that we do is
-have.
As a result, there is a great (*eal of material to
-g, cover in a rolatively short period of time.
So they are all 20 irtense.
l 21 DR. MOELLER:
What is a typical daily regimen?
i 22 MR. RAGLIN:
We like to teach seven of the eight
'O i
23 hours2.662037e-4 days <br />0.00639 hours <br />3.80291e-5 weeks <br />8.7515e-6 months <br /> and have a review session at either the start or t
24 the end of a given day.
j O
25 It does not always work out that way and it depends Heritogo Repordng Corporadion
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dlc 212 1
on whether it is a one, two or three week course, how 2
flexible we are.
3 In some cases we have taught for basically 4
the eight hours and it does not work out as well.
It is 5
just too intendse.
6 MR. SilEWMON :
Do they have reading at night 7
then or is that supposed to cover it?
8 MR. RAGLIN :
They do read at night, typically 9
catching up on what was covered during the day and 10 reading ahead for the next day's material.
11 We do examine on most courses.
Our standard 12 of merit is 70 per cent or above is pnLsing.
Below that llll 13 is failing a course.
14 We do solicit feedback from a number of sources.
15 of course we obtain student comment sheets for every 16 course that we give.
17 Additionally we have a pretty active training advisory group which is a group of representatives from 18 l
19 the program offices and regions, senior management 20 type representatives that come to the training center 21 twice a year and consider different possibilities, advise 22 the training center on the best ways to address new 73
(
)
x 23 initiatives.
,r' 24 There is a meeting scheduled of this group at
's v
25 the Training Center April 20th and 21st.
That's one l
Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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excellent method.
2 DR. RE!!ICK :
Do you get feedback from the I
3 trainees after they have gone back to the workplace a t s 4
l year or two later or do you get any feedback from their 5
supervisors on whether training is helpful?
l 11R. RAGLIN:
We do get it from the supervisors 6
l 7
from time to time.
Fe do not formally survey past 8
course attendees at a one or two-year mark, though.
9 And we have a number of ways in which we get 10 current information into the technical training programs:
11 AEOD reports, bulletins, orders, daily reports, just all 12 sorts of sources for getting the current material into g
13 the pipeline wherever we can.
The reactor technology curricula constitutes 14 i
15 what most of the training center staff spends most of 16 its time doing.
Parallel curricula for the GC, Westinghouse, 17 18 CE and B&W designs, each of the reactor technology curricula involves classroom and simulator training.
19 20 Down here are some types of reactor technology 21 courses which show some of the difforent course links 22 and difforent types.
,- )
j 23 l
Our methrd of addressing the varied necds is l
to have a spectrum of courses that represent variations 24 v
25 in length, size, methods that are used for teaching,
(
Heritago Reporting Corporation i
dic 214 3
depth of the material.
2 And that constitutes a significant part of l what we do.
Additionally, there is other reactor 3
I TxJ 4
technology training for the IITGR design through a 5
contractor; a very elementary course, reactor concepts, 6
for nontechnical NRC personnel.
7 News media seminars given to news media 8
personnel around the country as requested by the public 9
affairs function.
10 And we are working on a new initiative for 11 nonpower reactor training test reactors that would be 12 for insr9cto: s and possibly for operator license lllh 13 examiners.
14 That one is in its infant stage right now.
15 The main part of the reactor technology 16 curriculum historically has been that associated with 17 the resident inspector program and it involves a 18 full course series, a series of three cources:
a three-19 week technology course followed by a two-week c.dvanced 2C technology course followed by a reactor simulator course.
21 That is what we consider to be our top of the 22 line training.
The technology course includes coverage i
)
N_j 23 of reactor physics, thermal limits, mechanical systems,
/~T 24 control systems, emergency core cooling systems,
\\.
25 containment, all the mejor systems.
Heritage Reporting Corporation m.a
dic 215 The advanced technology course has different modules that provide coverage of transient analysis which 7
makes a correlation between FSAR Chapter 15 type
( )
transients and what people will later see on the reactor 4
simulators.
5 Coverage of technical specifications which 6
stresses the bases of the technical specifications; safety 7
limits limiting conditions for operation and eliminating g
safety system settings.
9 n
n re loc smades 10 from actual events that have haopened at plants sometime g
la the past; technical issues which represents an area g) a e can shp new matodal in aM back out oMer 13 material as the needs change.
g And then in the case of boiling water reactor 15 advanced technology course, we spend a significant amount g
of time talking about product line differences.
g The reason we do that is our baseline plant in 18 the GE design is a BWR-6.
Me know there are not many
,9 perating BWR-6s so we feel an obligation to prcvide 20 coverace of system differences going back through the
),
other GE product lines.
g
\\
When we act to the simulator course we typically start with 19 peoole in each of these two and then
\\
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split into three groups of six for the simulator course Heritage Reporting Corporation mm
dic 216 because you can't have many in a simulator room and get much g
,I done.
2 The focus there is some hands-on training for 3
the inspectors.
He are not trying to make them operators.
)
4 Uhat we are trying to do is to give them a feel for what 5
6 the operator needn to do, what is involved in doing different evolutions, how hard is it to do.
7 Additionally there are a number of demonstrations, g
some in which we ask the group to take some actions as 9
the operators would do, others where we simply want them 10 to see what happens with operator action, without gg operator action, with incorrect operator accion.
12 The possibilities are almost endless there.
llh 13 Reactor technology curriculum additions.
Since g4 the reorganization, we have included these things here.
15 A reactor technology and operations mini series which 16 is a shortened version of this full series attempting g7 to compress the best parts of six weeks of training into 18 three weeks of training here.
g9 And we have just done the pilot on that and we 20 may have to make some adjustments to what we have already 21 done.
22
/
An ther initiative is Emergency operating 23 i
procedures simulator courses that we have given for both
,y 24
)
inspectors and operator license examiners.
That has gone 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation im> m
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over real well.
2 We have given a number of those near the end 3
of the last calendar year and then recently we have 4
just trained four teams of EOP inspectors who are going 5
out to do the NRR-sponsored accelerated EOD inspection 6
program.
7 The Inst initiative shown here is a seminar 8
on severe accident overviews which picks up some contracted 9
degraded core training that was done in the last couple of 30 years.
We have consolidated that training, brought it 12 in-house to the training center, standardized it and we llh 13 offer it for the GE/ Westinghouse /B&W and CE product 34 lines on request to the regions.
15 The first one of those was just given this week 16 in Region 1.
17 Yes?
Ig AR. MICIIELSON:
Excuse me.
The emergency 19 operating procedures, llow long did you say it was?
20 MR. RAGLIN: That is a one-week simulator 21 course where we are using--
22 MR. MICITELSON:
So it is all on the simulator c( )
l then?
23 j!
,s 24 MR. RAGLIN:
Let's say that 90 per cent of it
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25 iS-Heritage Reporting Corporation
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dlc 218 MR. MICHELSON:
Okay.
I thought that maybe it
(' 'j 2
was a text thing.
3 MR. RAGLIN: It is stepping through the emergency
~
operating procedures that can be shown on the sinulator 4
5 and evaluating.
Show how the EOPs work.
6 MR. MICHELSON:
The person that takes that course has taken one of the others first?
7 8 {
MR. RAGLIN:
Yes, sir.
He would have been through 9
the full series.
So there is a great deal of assumed go knowledge coming into that one.
11 The specialized technical training curriculum 12 is expanding.
When the training center was first set 13 un, it was called a reactor training center in Chattanooga.
llll 34 In 1983, it was changed to a technical training center 15 as an indication of increased responsibilities.
As a result of the reorganization, we see a 16 lot of growth in the specialized technical training 17 18 curriculum.
What this consists of is the training that is 39 20 not associated with the four major reactor vendor l
l 23 l designs.
It is the other things.
And we have some subcategories that are in that 22
)
23 course syllabus that you have which include engineering l
24 support courses.
N]
An example there would be motorized valve actuator 25 Hesitage Reporting Corporation
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61c 219 courses, electrical technology and codes, instrumentation
'i N /
technology and codes, nondestructive exanination, that 2
3 type of material.
Second, there is a health physics curriculum 4
which will probably be split into a reactor health 5
6 physics curriculum and a nuclear materials health physics curriculem.
7 i
8 We are not satisfied with that one the way it 9
is, particularly in the reactor area.
The materials area curriculum has gotten a pretty thorough review by NMSS 10 along with the regions and we are taking steps to implement gg 12 the recommended new program in that area.
Me need to do the same thing to the reactor (llh 13 health physica curriculum because when we stack it up g4 against the reactor technology curriculum for inspectors 35 we ' n see an inequity there.
16 Another broad category is safeguards training and 17 the final one is inspection or examination techniques gg training.
g, Examples of this last category would be an 20 23 inspecting for performance course, PRA for inspections 4
l course.
22 f
1
(
MR. MICllELSOM:
Ouestion.
The human factor is 23 ]
l I
inportant and I realize that it appears in a lot of the l
24
(
25 earlier part.
But to what extent if any do you teach the Heritage Reporting Corporation (MI) 4M este
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human factor aspects as an area that maybe insnectors
'j ought to be observing and so forth and yra teach them a 2
3 few of the techniques at least of what to watch for to
(
know when he needs naybe professional help in looking
(
4 5
at a problem, Do you teach human factors at all as a line 6
item?
7 MR. RAGLIN:
I would say we don't really do it 8
9 for the inspectors.
We are more headed that way for the xaminers, though.
10 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes, but the inspectors are gg the people who see this on a day to day basis.
Maybe it 12 would be nice if they know at least a few things to look gggg g3 for from the human factors aspect in deciding whether or g4 15 not there might be such a problem.
Because we keep thinking that naybe a large 16 17 part sf the safety problem at a plant might be human error and so forth and how do you know a human factors gg problem when you see one.
g, MR. JORDAN :
That is a good comment that we don't 20 have an answer for.
21 MR. MARD:
I would say really beyond the 22 I
J l
inspectors and part of your general training on the 23 l
issues of management and organization.
l 24 L
I mean there is a technology of management 25 l
Heritage Reporting Corporation
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and organization and human factors.
And it seems to be 2
absent.
1 3
MR. GOLDMAN:
In the area that addresses your s
4 last comment, we have taken to the regions and niven 5
preliminary training in management systems so that the 6
inspector understands what to look for in the way of what 7
is good management.
8 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
There is a little bit 9
of theory that goes with that.
10 MR. GOLDMAE: We don't give them Theory X, il Theory Y.
12 MR. MICHELSON:
Yes.
13 MR. GOLDMAN:
But do we give them further 14 practical aspects of what is the management system, 15 how do you tell from top to bottom what it looks like 16 because they have not had much.
That is being further 17 developed.
18 MR. MICHELSON:
I was thinking more on the 19 inspector level.
Even the resident inspectors:
how do 20 they recognize?
I 21 MR. GOLDMAN:
It is being given to the inspectors 22 when they come in for the counterpart meeting.
)
~
23
- R.
MICHELSON:
Yes, that would be helpful.
I l
was getting more towards the kinds of problems that one
(~]
24
/
l 25 ran inte at Peachbottom and elsewhere.
Apparently the Heritage Reporting Corporation c au.a
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inspector must have been observing something over the 1
2 years that he was there and maybe he was not adequately 3
trained to pick up on it.
)
4 MR. JORDAN:
I agree.
The recognition of some 5
kind of a culture problem.
6 MR. MICl!CLSON :
Enough recognition capability l
7 l
so he knows when to ask for professional helo from the 8
NRC to come in and look at the problem.
9 MR. JORDAN : It would be fair to say it is an 10 area we are looking at in conjunction with NRRs/ human 11 factors group.
12 It is one of the places we are working with lllh 13 in the diagnostic evaluations--Lee spessard--using human 14 factors people in selected plans to try to understand 15 that kind of a problem.
16 We have done two of those so far and another one 17 is being planned. So with that feedback we will have to 18 definitely go into the training program.
19 MR. MICHELSON: Eventually you might be able to 20 build a course curriculum on the basis of those 21 observations.
22 Thank you.
7~
()
23 DR. REMICK:
Mr. Raglin, you will have to pace
(~}
24 yourself.
We have 15 more minutes, v
25 MR. RAGLIN:
- Okay, I would like to show you the Heritogo Roporting Corporation imi m
N dlc-223'
,m n
a training center facility just=very briefly.
L
'2 It is-a modern office building located in l
3 Chattanooga.
This' slide shows the building.
-4 (Slide)-
s'
-Inside that building-is a_ space which has the t
6-offices for the instructors,.the classrooms.. We have
.i 7
five classrooms.
8 We have two reactor simulators.
The General 9
Electric Black Fox Simulator is on the fourth floor of 10 this building.
We've got a Westinghouse SNUPPS Simulator on' the first floor oI' this, b'tfilding. -
~
31 12 Wc-occupy the entire second floor of this s
+
+
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.- ~
13 building.
In May we'will havela Babcock & Wilcox g
14 Simulator also on the second floor (of the building.
i
~
15 MR. MICllELSON:
Which plant will it look like?
' It is the Wilkes II, Washington 16 MR. RAGLIN:
17 Public Supply System Unit II, Babcock & Wilcox Simulator.
18 DR. REMICK:
You are no longer using the facility at the TVA training center?
19 1
20 MR. RAGLIN:
Only rarely.
We use the interagency agreement to arrange for motorized valve actuator training 21 S
22 through TVA and it is done out there.
But we really O
don't use the building for reactor simulator training.
23 DR. MOELLER:
Did you tell us how many people 24 25 you have?
j L
i i
Heritoge Reporting Corporation 988) M f
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7.dic.
224 s
'I MR. RAGLIN:- No I didn't.
Our staff authorized
['}
2 is 27 right1now and we have 24-on-hand and are seeking to 3-fill-three positions right now.
I r
4 This slide shows the GE design simulator.
5 (Slid' e) -
6 It is the-Black-Fox Simulator..This is a 7
class in session.
The' value of this simulator to us 8
could be shown a whole lot easier at the training center 9
if.wo-visit there.
10 But there are a number.of=CRTs that provide.the 11 system drawings right above the controls and we can call 12 up different drawings on each of the DRTs or-the same h
13
. drawing on alliof the<CRTs'.
-?
~,
14 And it' allows a very compact view of the appropriate 15 instrumentation for a given, system and!it allows us i
16 the facility for training greatly in comparison with the 17 standard control room design.
t 18 MR. MICilELSON:
Do you have a maintenance l
j 19
' contract for that simulator?
a 20 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes we do, through GE.
21 PR. MICHELSON:
GE.
22 MR. RAGLIN:
GE does the maintenance for both 23 the--well, for all of the simulators that we are going to
(
i 24 have.
i 25 The other simulator that we presently have is I
E' Heritoge Reporting Corporation r
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dic 225 the SNUPPS Simulator.
This is a photo of the simulator g
2 before it was moved to Chattanooga.
3
' Slide)
But it looks essentially the same except for 4
5 there is no glass-enclosed instructor consolo.
The SNUPPS Simulater was obtained through Westinghouse.
They 6
build the simulator.
7 8
The reference plant here is Callveay, a four-loop 9
Uestinghouse plant.
lt is installed on the first floor of the buildin and so that is essentially what it looks like in gg at the training center.
12 Mk. WARD:
Is this the one chey had at the--
13 outside of Pittsburgh?
llh MR. RAGLIN : No.
This is the one fron Zion.
g4 At Zion they had a Zion simulator and a SNUPPS I Simulator Isli and at Pittsburgh they had a SNUPPS II Simulator.
16 We have the SNUPPS I which has been upgraded 17 to the SNUPPS II design and it is now locatad in Chattanooga.
18 Okay.
gg 20 (Slide) l Training Center staff organization.
There are 23 22 l two branches:
BWR and PMR technology.
Recently we
)
23 i
have created a specialized technical training staff N
/
I
]
in recogniticn of the importance of these other nonreactor y -
24 L) l areas.
25 Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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dic 226 We have got 24 technical positions, three g
N t
t clerical.
A total of 27 for this year.
2 3
We have got 24 on-board right now.
And the 7
4 experience of our staff is probably our greatest asset.
5 He had several people who are former SRO license holders 6
or SRO certification completion.
7 He have got 14 former SRO licenses, 12 different g
neople out of the technical staff of 24.
Fe have got 9
three who are former resident inspectors, two who are 10 former operator license examiners, 11 who are former gg Navy nuclear operators. three who are former Navy 12 engineer officer qualified personnel and four who were lllh 13 former vendor training personnel.
Eleven who were former utility training personnel.
g4 15 MR. MICHELSON:
Let me interrupt you for just 16 a moment.
These instructors down there, I am reasonably 17 acquainted but a long time ago on the training conter.
18 I even took some courses.
It was an extremely fine 39 facility.
l But these people are an excellent resource 20 i
when you want to talk about the operators viewpoint 21 i
22 l of problems because they were once operators and have a good i')
f perspective.
23 Do you have any particular objection that wo 24 would like to chat with some of ther.e peonle directly 25 Heritogo Reporting Corporation (at
dlc 227 1
from time to time on general operator kinds of problems 2
and what have you?
3 MR. JORDAN: Not at all.
They are a resource
~
4 that we have tapped I think more extensively in the past 5
year.
6 He have drafted those individuals to go on 7
augmented inspections.
They participated in the 8
diagnostic that Lee has put on.
And they have been an 9
outstanding resource.
10 MR. MICllELSON :
I assume that I cnn just call 11 your office an6 tell them the kind of problem I would 12 like to talk about and then you would recommend who is the 13 best man to talk to or arrange so we can chat.
34 MR. JORDAN : Yes, sir.
15 llR. MICHESLON:
Because it is awfully hard to 16 get an operator-type that would be willing to talk to 17 any CRA.
Ig
'IR. JORDAN:
Yes.
19 MR. RAGLIN: That happens all the time.
We do l
20 I
get frecuent calls.
21 1
MR. MICilELSON:
Okay.
22 DR. MOELLER:
A question.
Can three clerical I, )
people keep up with 24 to 27 technicians?
23 l
g ')
24 MR. RAGLIN:
It is difficult but we nanace.
[
t /
We absorb part of those functions throughout the whole 25 l
Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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dic 228 staff and we make extensive use of other aids like 7
2 personal computers.
3 The basic answer is yes.
4 DR. MOELLER:
llow many of the 24 are women?
5 MR. RAGLIN:
None.
6 DR. REMICK:
The NRC sends people along to 7
l observe INPO accreditation evaluation visits.
Do any of g
these people ever get selected to do that?
It seems like 9
it would be an excellent opportunity for them to compare go notes with licensees.
gg MR. JORDAN: We provide training for the people 12 that have but I don't think the staff--
13 MR. RAGLIN: Nobody from the training center has lllh 34 seen an INPO--
15 DR. REMICK:
You might think about that 16 because the NRC sends people to observe and these would 37 be the ideal people, 18 MR. JORDAN: We need to do that.
I (Slide) gg 20 MR. RAGLIN:
This next slide does give an 21 indication of the typical usage of the staff in addition to instruction which is the lion's share there.
22 i
-w
(
)
I
)
L 23 l
Response to technical questions from the NRC t
24 l
staff is an ongoing thing.
It happens frequently.
Then
(
)
25 support for CRGP reviews, AEOD studies, IIT support, i
i Heritogo Reporting Corporation g
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11
dlc 229 1
various NRC team ir.spections, diagnostic evaluation and c
2 participation in incident response exercises.
3 So these are being used or have been used 4
in the past or will be used more in the future.
But 5
it is a recognized resource and we support as we can.
6 i
We can't do everything in-house, of course, 7
and it requires a number of other possibilities.
8 (Slide) 9 Our budget frr Fy 88 is $2.5 million which 10 includes both the program support and administrative support.
31 Ue have a number of commercial contracts which I won't 12 go into.
There are several associated with reactor 13 simulator training which uses most of that S2.5 million, 14 probably two-thirds to three-fourths of the total 15 there.
16 In addition, we have commercial contracts for 17 other initiatives like the electrical course.
We have 18 four task order contracts in place, one in BNR technology, 19 one in PWR technology, one in radiation protection and one 20 in specialized technical training.
l We are in the process of cutting the first task 21 f
22 to the specialized technical training task order for the 23 presentation of an eddy current testing course, i
r'~T 24 j Additionally we make use of interaqency acreements, LJ I
25 use of other government agencies such as OSHA for sone o
f Heritogo Reporting Corporation I
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health and safety training that will become part of the J
2 materials inspector curriculum.
3 And we take advantage of off-the-shelf training
)
wherever we can find it.
That is, we are able to cut 4
5 a purchase order to buy a course as-is and just send students to it.
6 7
DR. REMICK:
We are short of time.
Do you want 8 l to pick out which of your remaining slides you think are 9
most important because there are several members who are waiting to ask questions very patiently.
10 I
l gg MR. RAGLIN:
Okay.
12 DR. REMICK:
They will not have an opportunity.
13 MR. JORDAN: While he is doing that, I will make lll y
a point on the budget.
Although the training center has 15 been increasing its responsibilities and the number of 16 people who teach and acquiring simulators, the budget I
17 has not been increasing.
We have been able to purchase the simulators 18 19 l
for the same kind of cost that we were previously bidding f
in limited fashion of getting back-shipped only use of 20 I
simulators in utilities.
2 Now we have a much larger capability.
We have 22 i
/
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excess simulator time that costs us nothinq essentially.
23 j
l We are now instructor limited rather than hardware
-)
24 N
/
25 limited paying the sane price for that particular service.
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231 (Slide)
!!R. RAGLIN :
For the GC Simulator we have access 2
3 to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year which translates into essentially
)
all the day shift for the whole year unless we want to 4
use swing shift.
5 For the Westinghouse Simulator we have 4000 6
hours which is all day shift, all swing shift.
He will 7
8 have the same arrar.gement for the B&W Simulator once it 9
is available.
And we have essentially been able to fit the 10 lease / purchase of these three simulators within the gg g;
existing cash flow for a lesser number of hours, MR. MICIIELSON :
Is there any effort to fit g
13 your simulators into the human factors research program g4 where a number of those proposed tasks might involve 15 studies of responses on simulators and so forth?
16 It looks like you have got the ideal laboratory 37 tool and you have got the students and the facility.
18
!1R. JORDAN:
We now post it with the human 19 20 factors group.
MR. MICllELSON :
Oh, you are?
Okay.
Jack Early's 21 division.
22
(
)
i MR. MICHELSON:
Looks like an ideal laboratory.
23 ;
I r3 24 j MR. JORDAN:
Yes it is.
(
)
b MR. RACLIN:
With the renaining stuff, I would
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like to skip ahead to the last one, the slide or. 16 2
which shows the continuing initiatives.
3 (Slide) 4 They are oncoing right now.
One is the 5
exploration of the use of nuclear plant analyzer 6
technology in the technical training curriculum.
7 We have been working with research.
We have 8
looked at the Brookhaven Analyzer, the Idaho National 9
Engineering Lab Plant Analyzer.
And we can see some p) possibilities for the future; possibilities to enhance 11 what we can do with these training simulators and we 12 recognize that the modelling on the training simulator lllh 13 sort of falls apart the further you differ from normal 14 operations.
15 And we have in fact found that the modelling 16 will not support some things that we would like to do.
17 For example, we cannot run an anticipated transient without scram from full power on our simulators and have 18 i
19 fidelity in the modelling.
20 So we are looking towards the NPA technology 21 i in support of--
't 22 DR. RF. MICK :
Do you have the NDA, the one that I
i 23 the NRC just recently got, I think?
Will it be located
)
,o 24 at Chattanooga?
v i
l MR. JORDAN:
No.
We have access to the computer 25 i
L lj Heritage Reporting Corporation h
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233 dic and we are working to see what works best.
J MR. RAGLIN:
We see some interesting possibilities to enhance the way that a lot of things are being done, 3
s The next bullet has to do with the qualification and technical training of the staff.
This is what Ed Jordan mentioned in the introduction.
We feel that we have these very strong programs 7
for a numbef of the inspector positions.
We would like 3
to have equally as strong programs wherever they are 9
necessary for the other technical positions within the NRC staff, So the process is modelled after the success g
ass cia W w M de inspector qualWcadon process.
g 13 There is a phased program which is in the implementation stage right now.
g The phases have to do with identifying the g
l' j
groups--different groups of people that would have similar g
f a
ng r qu ns n
n n ng w a r qu mns l
18 c
are, reconciling the fact that we will not be able to have 20 l
uniqu course for every type of individual throughout I
f the NRC staff.
g Ue may have to hit 80 per cent of seve.al g
)
I groups with a given course, determining the qualification d
programs and implementing f orrial requirements if those are
-,T
,4 j
L indeed justified.
g I
Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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This is not a job the training center or OP 2
are really doing.
What we are doing really is offering 3
assistance and facilitating the process.
It is really the I
4 program offices who have to determine what the training i
i 5
is required for their people in order to do the job that 6
their people need to do.
7 This process either involves a job analysis 8
for offices that really are essentially starting from I
9 l
scratch or it involves an intuitive process where a great 10 deal is already known and the training needs are pretty 11 well identified but not implemented.
12 An example of an office using the job analysis l
13 is HMSS and they are proceeding through the first phase of 14 this program using that process.
An example of the intuitive process is NRR.
15 l
l They have jumped ahead in several of the phases and have 16 I
l intuitively determined the sane type of requirements that 17 fexistforinspectorsright now.
18 d
19 So that is a big initiative that is ongoing Il h
throughout the Agency right now.
Curriculum expansion or 20 l
21 enhancement that we know is going to happen, the reactor 22
!!P area.
N]
23 We know we have to do some different things in l
24 there.
We have to beef it up. It hasn't been done right
.i 25 [
now, yet, l
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Heritogo Roporting Corporation j
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Nuclear materials / fuel cycle HP area.
There
)
2 is a new curriculum that has been developed by NMSS and 3
the regions and we are now in the implementation phase.
4 The first part of that was to add new training 5
that we are obtaining through OSHA.
There will be other 6 l new training that we have yet to determine the best method l
of providing.
7 l
8 Reactor technology training.
We know that 9
there will be additional requirements there coming out to of the space program.
One thing that we have already got a 11 head start on is new reactor technology training for 12 operator license examiners.
l 13 f The examiners in the past have gone through out lllh 14 course series for operations inspectors.
In addition, 15 we believe that the pipeline training will include 16 additional simulator training going over integrated 17 operations, spending more time hands-on looking at 18 different evolutions.
19 It will also include another simulator course 20 involving emergency operator procedure training so that i
21 l
the examiners have a real understanding of the EOPs and I
x 22 their use on sinulators.
]
1 b
23 DR. REMICK:
Mr. Raglin, I am going to have to q
apologize and interrupt at that point.
I do want to em 24
( _,]
25 recognize Dr. Lewis who has been waiting very patiently to f
j Heritage Reporting Corporation j
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ask a question.
So let's terminate the presentation and have 3
questions.
4 Do you have your ques. tion yet?
5 MR. LEWIS:
I have long since forgotten.
6 (Laughter)
But I was asked to wait until the end and I have 7
8 been very patient and I want the record to show that.
9 DR. REMICK:
Yes you have been.
MR. LEWIS:
This is a training curriculum.
Two 10 gg questions come to mind.
- First, as a preamble:
12 I try to distinguish between training and education; that 13 is, training enables you to do the job you are about to g4 do; education gives you perspective about how you do it and enables you to meet the job situations which were not 15 16 anticipated.
17 Okay.
Second preamble is that most training gg programs reflect the state of the technology at the time the trainers were educated and yet the training programs 39 N
]
have to last through the life of the trainee who will meet 20 21 different situations.
f Having made those two creamblen, if I look 22 around at the NRC there are two areas in wilich I notice 23 that there are virtually no people with education.
f 24 Nj
- $ lj One is the area of statistics which is extremely l
I Heritage Reporting Corporation m m am
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important and becoming more important and virtually
)
nobody at NRC has any training or education in statistics.
2 ;
3 And the second is electronics because old 4
reactor technology was not dependent on electronics but more and more it is becoming an important issue.
n 6
I don't see either of those reflected in the curriculum.
And the question is really is there anyone 7
8 on the training staff who has expertise in either statistics i
9 or electronics?
l l0 MR. GOLDMAN:
Yes there is.
We have three.
11 The chief of the training group that is supporting the 12 technical training has a Masters--is a PhD Psychologist /
lllh 13 Sociologist but with a statistical background.
34 MR. LEUIS:
I don't know what a statistical is background means.
16 MR. GOLDMAN-Her ninor is in statistics and 17 computer.
18 MR. LEWIS:
A minor in statistics?
19 MR. GOLDMAN:
Yes.
Correct.
And we have two 20 very excellent statisticians, Dan Lorie and Lee Abrams.
21 And those two do a great deal in supporting these areas.
And we teach, of course, statistics, too.
22 m
t
\\
< J 23 MR. LLdIS: I didn't see it, MR. GOLDMAN:
It is taught through the auspices f
c3 24
\\
25 ]
of the training staff, not in the technical area.
Heritogo Reporting Corporation I
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1 OP, the Office of Personnel, sponsors it.
l 2
MR. LEWIS:
Who takes it?
3 MR. GOLDMAN:
Most of our technical people.
4 MR. LEUIS:
- Okay, llow long a course is it?
5 MR. GOLDMAN:
(Pause)
Six to eight weeks.
It 6
is a couple of times a week.
It is given like a college 7
course.
It is not a concentrated, you-are-there-five-days-I 8
a-week course.
9 MR. LEWIS: Is there a text I can look at?
10 MR. GOLDMAN: Yes, we have a text.
I can get 11 Dr. Lorie to get that.
12 MR. LEWIS:
How about electronics?
lllh 13 MR. GOLDMAN: We do not give any specific training 14 in electronics as a course.
But what we do is support 15 college level training through individual training at l
16 local universities for a variety of electronics courses 17 !
and technical areas.
I l
But this in general is somethina that is not a 18 l
19 (
management directed thing.
It is an individual member /
b employee saying I want to take this and it is approved 20 21 by the office as a--
22 MR. LEWIS:
Do many of them do it?
c i
l 1
23
?!R. GOLDMAN:
The exact number?
I can't give r~N 24 you an exact number.
We have an enormous number of people j
h 25 though that do take individual training on their own in the l
I, I
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evening supported by the Agency at a 100 per cent.
2 l MR. LEWIS:
So do you believe that because of l
3 i this, what I perceive as really a tremendous gap in the training of the NRC staff, will be improved over the 4
years?
5 MR. GOLDMAN:
I think we are doing it in the 6
j statistical area and there isn't a gap that you are alluding 7
8 to.
In the area of electronics, we have not pushed 9
10 that particular area.
I think what can generate it is some of t.he things we have done by selecting certain gj programs that we say that we will carry that through and 12 I
13 provide funding to a degree, to receive a degree.
If the Agency determines that you can do that, 34 15 then you can skirt the law.
The law says you can't send somebody to school for the sole purpose of getting a 16 decree.
37 What we do is designate certain procrams where gg we know we need that expertise: project--technical g,
20 project nanagement and safety systems, engineering 21 management.
And we do fund to a degree people reaching a 22 1
/
l 23 Masters, Doctorate Degree, MR. LEWIS:
Okay.
Back to statistics, one nore 24 (c')
J v
point.
You. said something that bothered ne a little bit.
25 [
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I am distinguishing statistics from teaching people how 2
to read a PRA.
3 MR. GOLDMAN: Oh no, I am talking about--this m
/
4 course we give is a pure statistics course.
5
!!R. LEWIS:
Okay.
6 DR. REMICK:
Dr. Showmon?
7 DR.
SIIEUMON: You alluded briefly to HP and 8
nuclear materials a couple times.
I don't understand it 9
cuite.
But the NRC is also responsible for what happens 10 in hospitals and how people use isotopes there.
11 Does that get covered under nuclear materials?
I 12 MR. RAGLIN:
Yes.
13 DR. SIIEWMON :
Okay.
And you also distinguished 14 between examiners and inspectors.
Are the people that go 15 out to the hospitals, examiners or inspectors?
16 MR. RAGLIN:
When I used the terms examiners I 17 was referring exclusively to operator license examiners.
18 The people that go out to the hospitals would be the inspectors, also, 19 ;
h 20 DR. RPMICK:
Gentlemen, I think we should move h
21 l along.
I apologize to the staff for speeding thinqs up 22 to cut you off.
')
j 23 [
The !!uman Factors Subcommittee will take you up h
24 g on your offer sometime to visit the facilities where we (o)
H v
25 h can have so:ne more in-depth discussion.
I am firstly
?
Herilogo Reporting Corporation j
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impressed with the scope of the activities.
I didn't 2
realize that you had come this far in the recent 3
- history, l
e-V 4
I didn't know the fact that you had the I
l additional simulators.
I found it interesting and the 5
6 I
Iluman Factors Subcommittee will follow up with a visit 7 l-as soon as we can, il 8 jl MR. JORDAN: We would appreciate it.
{
DR. REMICK: Okay.
And we thank you very much.
9 10 MR. JORDAN:
Thank you, 11 DR. REMICK:
Mr. Chairman?
12 CllAIRMAN KERR:
Let's take a 15 minute break.
13 Pe will get started again at twenty of.
14 (Whereupon, at 10:25 a.m.
a brief recess is was taken) i I
16 17 18 l
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19 20 21
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24 (D
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3 AEIER_E99E EEEE19E n
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!j (1:42 p.m.)
2 d
h DR. KERR:
This afternoon we are fortunate to have 3
L i
4 l!
as the first speaker on our agenda Dr. Herb Kouts who is going 0
y to describe some of the components of the proposed IAEA 5
H
]
fundamental safety principles.
6 h
7 /
Herb, we are pleased that you are willing to come I
)
talk with us and look forward to hearing from you.
8 9 0 DR. KOUTS:
Thank you very much, Bill, b
ll 10 ]
(Slides shown.)
4 11 DR. KOUTS:
First I want to say a little bit about 12 !
INSAG which is the International Nuclear Safety Advisory y
llll 13 Group which has prepared the report I am going to talk about W
14 Q today.
And now I will lead into the report.
p H
15 INSAG is the International Nuclear Safety Advisory 16 Group; it is a group of 13 individuals appointed by the 17 Directer General of the International Atomic Energy Agency d
18 [
in 1985 to be advisory to him on matters affecting nuclear d
4 19 g
plant safety.
U 20 He appointed this committee for a three year trial F
23 h period, and that three year trial period has just ended.
It n
22 ended with the publication of the document I am describing l
n 23 h today.
1 V
ggg The group was formed as a result of a recommendatior 24 25 made somewhat previously by the International Association i
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I.
of Engineering Societies; and they did this in response, 2
themselves, to a suggestion which had been made by Manning
'i
[j Munsing when he was President of the American Nuclear Society.
3 4P Manning with his usual foresight could see that the time was 4
approaching when an international concordance on nuclear plant 5
o 6
safety might be very valuable, and he thought that the 7
International Atomic Energy Agency along with, perhaps, c
8 h assistance from the International Engineering Societies could F
h help to produce this; so the committee was appointed.
9 t
10 The 13 people are appointed by the Director General, Y
11 l they do not represent any countries.
He selects them from fj the community of nuclear plant safety interested individuals 12 a
h 13 throughout the world.
4 14 1 As I said, the trial year period is ended; the 0
15 '
Director General says he will now reappoint a new INSAG to 16 j take on a neXt stage of this process; and presumably there d
17 will be some tenure to the organization from this time, h
18 L The group is an advisory group solely to advise 19 the Director General.
Since it is not selected from countries 1
20 D it does not advise countries, l
21 I In addition to providing advice it was given the l
22 job of formulating, where possible, commonly shared safety 23 principles, that is commonly shared across the surface of i
24 the earth in all countries where nuclear power is accepted l
25 as a means of generating electricity.
Heritogo Roporting Corporation
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I.
3 I h After the Chernboyl accident in 1986 the IAEA held i
2 1
a meeting in Novenber of 1986 to consider the program IAEA h
q meant to intreduce in response to that accidcnt.
And one 3
h 4
of the principal recommendations that came out of the November H
5 H 1986 meeting was that INSAG should now proceed with all 3
a 6
h dispatch to identifying the commonly shared safety principles u
7 L in accordance with its fundamental charter.
e 8
That was the origin of the push which led to the L
9 issuance of this book in March of this year.
In 1987 INSAG n
0 13 f devoted all its attention to this process.
So that is the 4
11 h origin of the concept.
1 12 h There is an introductory section of the book.
lllh 13 Incidentally, the slides I am about to show I believe are a
[t at tab 12 of your looseleaf, that is what I understand, and 14 il 15 f the report I am describing is also -- are the slides at tab f
16 [
127 s
f 17 n MR. LEWIS:
The slides were just handed out.
o 18 !
DR. KOUTS:
The slides were just handed out.
The 19 book is at tab 12, almost entirely.
20 L In approaching this job INSAG recognized that with 21 i the 400 nuclear plants which come into existence in the world, 22 i two of thcac plant: have had severe accidentc *,;hich have led 23 !
to their complete destruction and they will never operate 24 again.
This led to the 31 deaths at the Chernobyl incident 25 l in 1986; the first deaths from nuclear power accidents that Heritogo Reporting Corporation L
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't i
245 I.
l have ever occurred.
I In terms of fatalities and in terms of loss of 2
f 1
3 L capital investment, a record of this kind for an industry I
4 h as broad and as extensive as nuclear power would probably hI not be considered an untoward safety record for industries 5
6 ) as a whole.
U 7
But we started in the INSAG process with the recognition that because of unusual public sensitivity to the 8
9 questions attached to nuclear power, it was going to be u
h necessary to achieve the safety standards at a level consider-10 h
11 ably higher than those which one expects of industry as a 12 whole.
And so this record is considered not acceptable in l
lllh 13 the future and safety principles that would lead to better ti 14 0 performance than this or desired, f
15 Two other items -- two other points motivated the d
f 16 h way that the process continued.
Two other points motivated I
17 L the structure of the report.
The first of these was that (i
18 it is recognized, especially since Chernobyl, that there really h
19 has been a maturing and a coalescing of views on safety J
around the world.
This seemed a very timely thing to do, 20 F
21 L to get on to the job of trying to find out what it is that 22 people generally feci around the world makes nuclear plants g
0 23 safe and what underlies the regulatory requirements which 24 have been established.
gg 25 oddly enough, this particular job had never been Horitogo Reporting Corporation c....
G 246 l
1 carried through before.
2
[
The second point was that, as Chernobyl demonstrated, 4
3 ll accidents now have international consequences and safety of u
4 j nuclear plants in any one country is no longer a concern solely l\\
5 of the country in which those plants are existed and in which a
h they operate.
6 L
7 Since they are no longer solely a national concern 8 li and have international component, it becomes necessary to F
9 search for those things whcih can underlie a basis for 10 reassurance in any given country that nuclear plants operated 4
Il j in other countries, especially those its border meet the e
[h 12 standards which it, itself, has set, llll 13 An internationally accepted concept of safety is j
14 [
the only way one could do this.
l 15 The report that was developed and which I discuss h
16 !l applies to nuclear plants of current types.
It is not possible 17 9 to review requirements with respect to plants that have not h
18 ji yet been built, have not yet been assessed.
But the report 19 l is meant to be applicable to electricity generating plants f
20 '
of all types as they are operated currently throughout the 21 world.
This means not only the lightwater pressurized and 22 boiling water types in this country, the gas cooled reactors i
23 l as they appear in several versions throughout the world, heavy 24 water reactors as well, and heavy metal cooled reactors, also.
25 There are some extensions of the concepts that are Horitogo Reporting Corporation me
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247 hl discussed here which could be generated in the I
future, but 2 o?
are not strictly addressed in the report here, n
3
[
Our Soviet colleague pointed out to us that there 1.
[
is an increasing interest and an increasing movement in the 4
i I l 5 j Soviet Union toward construction of nuclear pirnts for space 0
[l heat purposes.
A number of space heat plants are under 6
l j
construction or have been built and are in operation, and 7
8 he says that the principles in this report, clearly to him, q
e n
9 [
are almost all equally applicable to those plants.
We did n
i h
not really consider this document from that standpoint, but 10 e
h this is an interesting input to our thought prccess.
11 F
12
}
DR. MOELLER:
Excuse me, are these cogeneration lllh 13 j or exclusively for space heat?
O 14 1 DR. KOUTS:
Exclusive for space heat.
These are i
15 I usually plants which operate at very low power, very low 16 0 temperature, say, with water below the critical point, below 17 1 the boiling point.
18 ?
MR. SHEWMON:
They are nuclear.
19 DR. KOUTS:
T1. 'r are nuclear.
Plants which presum-20 ably could get extra safety from the fact that if you lose 21 primary pressure boundary, you do not get flashing coolant.
22 DR. MOELLER:
And this means then they are locating 23 them near residential or businers factories?
24 DR. KOUTS:
Yes, it does.
Although various studies 25 on space heat, even in this country, has shown that there i
Heritage Reporting Corporation
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248 I h are attractive economic advantages, even if they are as far h
i 2
as 20 or 30 miles away.
There is a second class of reactors that we discussed 3
\\l 4
in connection wi.h the report that did not address the report 5
to and this is, reactors that are considered now in several 6
countries with the characteristics that their proponents say i
7 make them inherently safe.
So we call them inherently safe i
reactors.
We have not considered inherently safe reactors b
9 in thie report, and the applicability of the safety princip1.es e
10 h that we have derived or written cut, the applicability to F
11 [
plants of tht
'ind, a
12 The..aittee's view in this respect was, there h
13 may be featurco of inherently safe reactors cuch that inherently 14 h some of the objectives, some of the safe'y principles are 1
15 l met automatically because of inherent properties of these 16 reactors; but if this is the case you must demonstrate that 17 is the case.
And so, this does not undercut the safety 38 principles at all, it just provides another way of seeing 19 how they are accomplished.
i 20 !
There arose the question of, do we generate 21 principles which are applicable to existing plants as well 22 as to future planta.
We did in fact generate principles whieb l
23 are equally applicable to both.
But in considering how to g
apply these principles to existing plants, where the question 24 of backfit might come up, we raise in the introductory part 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation 1..,...
6 249 1
of this report several flags, which I illustrate here.
2 First of all, the requirement for balance in any assessment of this kind.
And by balance we mean something 4
on the order of cost benefit study associated with any backfit 5
question.
6 Second, the recognition that nothing is absolutely 7
safe and that absolute safety should not be any goal with 8
respect to application, either to existing or to future plants,
9 but in considering how to meet the objectives, to recognize 10 the fact tlut there must be an optimum use of resources, not 11 only in the nuclear field but in all fields of safety.
12 If you want to make things safe, you want to achieve h
13 the maximum safety you do not concentrate resources on areas 14 which have only marginal retu :n.
15 And finally, note the fact that changes frequently 16 and commonly have good effects and bad effects; there are 17 un sides and down sides to them and one should not consider 18 simply the benefits to be associated with the backfit, but 19 also the disadvantages that might accrue as well.
These are 1
20 remarks that are made on the subject of backfit.
21 A point which arose in the course of the delibera-22 tions was the role of high technology in the nuclear field.
23 We recognize that nuclear plants are high technology.
They 24 are among the highest technology that is to be found in moderr 25 day.
But the fact. that they are of high technology should l
Heritage Reporting Corporation l
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not be the cause of the fear which frequently people feel 2
concerning them.
As a matter of fact high technology in this 3
particular field is the means by which safety is derived.
4 This is the way by which plants are made safe.
And the 5
opportunities for drawing on high technology in this field 6
as well as in other ficids where high technology is used, 7
when exploited provide levels of safety which cannot be achieved 8
in low technology areas.
This is why these plants are safe.
9 In fact, high technology is the basis for the defence in depth 10 which is applied to the nuclear field, and should commonly come to be seen as the source of strength and not the source 12 of weakness.
lllh 13 One of the concepts strongly stressed in the report l
is that of safety culture.
Safety culture is a term which 14 15 appeared in an earlier INSAG publication on the Chernobyl 16 accident.
This was the agency's issuance on the Chernobyl 17 accident which I an sure you have seen.
And one of the principle conclusions in this report was that there was lacking.
18 I
19 in that particular case, a safety culture on the part of 20 operating staff which would have completed avoided the 21 accident if it had existed.
i l
Safety culture is strongly stressed in this report.
22 l
Safety culture in this application means a pervasive presence 23
)
of safety thinking on the part of all those individuals who 24 25 are engaged in activities associated with nuclear power.
I N
Heritogo Reporting Corporation uen ns ass,
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The report as it was written is not a regulatory O
2 report.
It is not directed to regulators.
It is not written 3
in a way that regulators would use.
It does not use the words 4
"should, shall, must," and directive sounding verbs of that 5
kind or assistant verbe.
It is written in fact in the present 6
tense.
And this recognizes the fact that the principles that 7
are in this document are not newly derived principles.
They 8
are not newly discovered principles.
We are after all seeking 9
commonly shared principles, and if they were new they would 10 not be commonly shared.
11 We have been putting together a set of principles 12 which reflect the fact that when they are in current use, g
13 in well managed situations of the kind that are advocated 14 in the report, would lead to a level of safety of the kind 15 which is advocated.
For that reason the report is in the 16 present tense; everything is said as if these practices were 17 in current use.
This has caused some questions to be raised 38 among some individuals on review of the report, but we think 19 it is the proper way to go.
20 In the original planning for the report there was 21 some feeling that we might be able to proceed a long way down 22 i
the road of arriving at the structure of these safety 23 principles by deductive methods; by procedures which went 24 from the general to the particular, and presented the results 25 l
in something of a tiered fashion.
What are you trying to I
t Horitogo Roporting Corporation oen u. a..
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achieve and what are the things that you do in order to b
2 achieve that objective?
It is not possible, of course, to 3
do this.
Reactor safety like any other kind of complex 4
socio-technical undertaking is not as logical as that.
5 But it was found useful to retain the tiered 6
structure that we had in mind to provide objectives, general 7
principles or fundamental principles and specific principles, 8 !
each more general than the layer above it; and that is used.
l I
9 Each of the objectives and principles in the 10 document is stated in as short and concise and snappy way 11 as possible, so that it can easily be remembered.
But you 12 cannot put all the thoughts into such short statements, and lllh 13 so every objective or every principle is also attached to 14 a section which follows in which there is an expansion made 15 on the points made in the statement of the objective or the l
16 principle.
You will see this as I go through some of them.
17 In the discussion which follows there are statements l
18 made which tell what the meaning is -- the meaning is defined 19 better.
The limitations of what is said are laid out.
20 i
Exceptions are discussed.
Examples are discussed and so on.
I l
21 l
All of this to make each principle clearer and less ambiguous f
than it might otherwise bed.
22 l
23 !
There are three safety objectives.
There are 12 l
24 fundamental principles in the document.
And there are 50 specific principles.
There is no point in my going through 25 i l
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them all, they are in your book.
But I would like to go 2
through the fundamental principles which themselves have a 3
breadth of application which does not make them easily under-4 stood as a basis for application.
And then I will illuctrate 5
what the specific principles are by going through only a few 6
of them.
And then I would like to show you something of the 7
logic of the document.
8 So first the objectives.
As I said, there are three 9
objectives.
There is a general objective which encompasses 10 the other two.
This is an objective which I think is not 11 inconsistent with the safety goals considered by the Nuclear 12 Regi11atory Commission, and we think it is not inconsistent llh 13 with similar structures of safety goals which have been 14 considered in other countries around the world.
15 It is that to protect -- the objective is to 16 protect the individuals society and the environment by 17 establishing and maintaining in nuclear powerplants an Il effective defense against radiological hazard.
It is a very 18 19 general statement, and one that would be difficult to argue l
with.
20 21 It is made clearer in terms of the two subsidiary objectives; radiation protection objective and the one that 22 23 follows.
The radiation protection objective, I have given 24 in shorthand version here, and it is actually stated much gg gg l
longer in the report.
25 I
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Let me read the full objective:
"To ensure in 2
normal operation that radiation expose-
'ithin the plant 3
and due to any release of radioactive material from the plant 4
is kept as low as reasonably achievable and to ensure 5
mitigation of radiation exposure due to accidents."
6 This has two parts: one, the application of ALARA 7
in normal operation as stated; and secondly, the mitigation i,
8 of radiation exposure from accidents, the second thing stated.
9 In the discussion this is related to stochastic 10 and non-stochastic effects of radiation.
And it is made clear 11 that we have in mind precluding non-stochastic effects and 12 keeping the stochastic effects controlled in such a way that g
13 tb y are below prescribed limits and also as low as reasonably 14 achievable.
I i.hink no one argues with that either.
15 The technical safety objective is the one that we 16 more customarily look at in reactor safety areas.
And again, l
17 this is in a shorthand version.
I really would like to read l
it as it exists on page eight of the document itself.
18 f[
19 It is to prevent accidents, and especially those 20 with high consequences, but it is stated more fully and more b
21 !!
correctly here:
"To prevent with high confidence accidents N
22 l
in nuclear powerplants.
To ensure that for all accidents 1
23 C taken into account in the design of the plant, even those i
24 il of very low probability, radiological consequences, if any, e
0 25 1 would be minor.
And to ensure that the likelihood of severe i
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accidents with serious radiological consequences is extremely
)V 2
small."
3 In other words, this objective puts a cap on both 4
of the aspects of risk analysis which are probabilities and 5
consequences; and the objective is to keep the probabilities 6
low and to keep the consequences low by separate methods, 7
if necessary.
8 I
In this connection, there is a discussion section 9
which says that the first priority of reactor safety is the 10 prevention of accidents.
And this is done by the provision 11 of reliable structures, plants and people; and by the adoption 12 of a safety culture.
13 It says that:
"The prevention of accidents occurs 14 in three steps."
The prevention of accidents and the preven-15 tion of effects of accidents in three steps.
One, the 16 prevention of accident initiators.
Second, those measures I?
which prevent initiators from developing an accident sequence, fandwhichcancutoffanaccidentsequencewhichprevent 18
{
19 escalation, in other words, to a dangerous point.
And thirdly 20 mitigation, should anything to occur.
I 21 A target is established which corresponds in a way h
22 to a numerical safety goal.
This target is that severe core li 23 f damage should not exceed 10 to the minus 4 to 10 to the minus 24 l
5 per plant year.
10 to the minus 4 for existing reactors; g
25 f 10 to the minus 5 for future reactors.
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I And that the probability of large offsite releases S
\\
2 requiring extensive offsite safety measures should be at least 3
one order of magnitude smaller.
4 Now, this target is very closely the numerical 5
guideline which is adopted in the United States.
It is not i
6 inconsistent with similar guidelines in other countries; 7
although we have to recognize that even smaller numbers have 8
been set as safety goals in the United Kingdom, for instance, 9
and in some other countries.
But the statement and the target 10 do not preclude the adoption of more stringent objectives, II if any nation wishes to do that.
12 MR. WYLIE:
When you say, future reactors, youmeanl I3 future design reactors, that have not been designed; right?
I4 DR. KOUTS:
Have not yet been approved for 15 construction, let us say.
llave not undergone the safety 16 review process.
37 MR. WARD:
Herb, what is the background for the c
! decision to have two different numbers there for existing I8 i
19 plants and future plants?
'O DR. KOUTS:
Well, the level 10 to the minus 4 is
'l l much better than the level which we have seen historically fsofar.
We have seen with two severe accidents out of 400 Il 23 l reactors, we have seen an accident rate which really exceeds 24 the 10 to the minus 4 objective.
25 We believe, and without good numerical justification H
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but we believe by seat of the pants that adoption of principle s ibh 2
along the lines of those that we are talking about here, could 3
be a basis for operation of existing reactors to achieve 4
10 to the minus 4 as a goal.
5 10 to the minus 5 is such an extrapolation of 6
existing record that it is something that we simply have to 7
attach to a more careful adoption of safety principles.
This 8
is the kind of thinking that we went through, and it was not 9
much better than that.
10 i MR. WARD:
So you are saying, you are convinced l
11 I that adoption of the safety principles would give you plants 12 at the 10 to the minus 4 level, but not necessarily to 10 g
13 to the minus 5 level?
14 l DR. KOUTS:
No.
We believe that adoption of the 15 safety principles for existing operating reactors could lead 16 to a safety record consistent with the 10 to the minus 4 17 number.
18 We believe that adoption and putting them into 19 practice for future plants where all of the possibilities j
can be exploited in design planning of the plants, could better 20 h
4 21 [
limit the 10 to the minus 5 level.
22 fi I think you gentlemen have gone through similar l
considerations.
23 24 MR. WYLIE:
That is what, four accidents every 100 25 i
years, 10 tc the minus 4?
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DR. KOUTS:
Yes.
Four severe core damage accidents.
11 2
MR. WYLIE:
Four severe core damage every 100 years.
3 DR. KOUTS:
Or.4 accidents, that is taking the 4
second half of this into account,
.4 accidents every 100 years 5
that would lead to severe of fsite conseque nces.
6 MR. WYLIE:
It seems high.
7 MR. SHENMON:
Well, our batting record hasn't been 8
that good.
9 MR. WYLIE:
I know.
But as a goal, the target seems 10
- high, 11 DR. KOUTS:
Well, it is not a goal.
12 MR. WYLIE:
No, I know; it is a target.
lllh 13 DR. KOUTS:
It is a target.
And furthermore, it 14 seems to be that which we could accomplish with existing 15 limits.
16 MR. WARD:
Herb, when you go back -- I think some 17 of your earlier comments about wanting to get balance and 18 a proper allocation of resources, even outside of the nuclear 19 power business, it is very interesting, you know, I think 20 that is a good perspective, but did you have any discussion 21 about whether numbers like 10 to the minus 5 or 10 to the l
22 l minus 4 are consistent with that?
I don't know if I made l
23 [
myself clear.
- l hl DR. KOUTS
Yes.
We had quite a bid of discussion 24 i
25 l on this.
And we have generally come to the conclusion that l
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most of the departure of the historical record from objectives IS 2
of this kind has been the result of human factors; and human 3
factors are much more easily backfit into an existing plant 4
than hardware is.
5 So we think that substantial benefit can be got, 6
taking into account those precautions that I talked about i
7 along these lines, and this would be the prinipal means of 8
improving the records.
MR. WARD:
The point I'm trying to --
10 DR. KOUTS:
To put it farther let's discuss that II a little more, because that really is an important point.
12 There is a question of what you do in accident I3 management.
And this report leans heavily on accident manage-I4 ment.
I am going to discuss accident management shortly.
15 There are two aspects to accident management, as 16 it is pointed out here.
There are two kinds of accident 17 management.
There is the accident management which is under-18 taken to respond to an abnormal situation and to prevent it I'
i from becoming an accident.
This is very important accident i
20 management.
j!
'l Then there is accident management which one introduc es h
22 4 ll if all the above have failed and your goal at that time is
'i 23 i
to take measures which would avoid consequences to the public.
i 24 gllg We are recommending in this report substantial 25 l l
advances in accident management of both kinds.
And I think l
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that this is the principal means, as a matter of fact, for N
2 introducing new information in the fault trees and event trees 3
in risk assessment, which could lower even risk assessments, 4
if in fact, one establishes well founded accident management 5
plans, accident management procedures in which staf f of nuclea: :
6 plants are well trained and well tested and well checked out.
7 And these are then introduced into the event trees themselves 8
as numbers which -- on the basis of your faith in them, 9
numbers which could be relied upon to modify the probabilities 10 if the calculated the event trees, these will have substantial 11 effects.
This is the principal way to modify the risk 12 analysis to be attached to existing plants.
g 13 We feel that measurse of this kind could and should 14 carry the numbers into the range we have in mind.
15 You had a point, Hal?
16 MR. LEWIS:
Herb, this is really a red herring, i
17 but let me try it on you.
You said that we have been having 18 accidents, counting the two we have had, at a rate which is 19 sort of inconsistent with 10 to the minus 4.
I found myself 20 trying to apply the criterion that biologist habitually use i
21 !
for the occurrence of a disease and there is a well 22 established culture in biology which is, that you calculate 23 the chance that it could be an accidental occurrence, and l
if that is less than.05 then it is considered significant; 24 f
if it greater than
.05 it is not considered significant.
25 Horitago Roporting Corporation l
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Now, there is, of course, no real reason for 2
choosing.05, but all my biological friends are sold on it 3
in drugs, you know, marketing and all that sort of thing.
4 So if you used that, how many reactor years do we 5
have in the world up to now?
I 6
DR. KOUTS:
About 4,000.
7 MR. LEWIS:
4,000, okay.
So I take.4 square and 8
I get.16 divided by 2.08, multiplied by each of the minus 9
.4 and I get just a shade more than.05.
So my biological 10 friends would say that you cannot draw the conclusion that 11 the experience is inconsistent with 10 to the minus 4.
- Now, 12 you may want to, but you may not if you are going to be a lllh 13 good biologist.
Now, of course, either of us is a biologist, 14 so we needn't accept that.
15 But I wonder if we may be jumping a little fast 16 in concluding that 10 to the minus 4 is --
l'7 DR. KOUTS:
Is what?
18 MR. LEWIS:
Is inconsistent with our turn of 19 experience of two events.
20 l
DR. KOUTS:
My feeling would be that if practices 21 were still in effect that were in use at Three Mile Island 22 l
and in use at Chernobyl, that would be a reasonable number.
i l
I mean, 10 to the minus 4 would be a great objective still.
23 24 MR. LEWIS:
Yes.
25 DR. KOUTS:
And that the two per 4,000 years would 1
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not be considered small.
I mean, I would expect something 2
like that to continue to occur.
3 MR. LEWIS:
Well, of course, it is a dynamic 4
situation.
But 10 to the minus 4 may be right, whereas it 5
may not have been right before Three Mile Island.
I am just 6
worried about drawing too much from this small number.
7 DR. KOUTS:
Of course, we are always trying to 8
extend the use of these problemistic methods to places where 9
we really are not able to apply problemistic reasoning.
10 MR. LEWIS:
Well, I have heard people around this 11 table say that PRA bottom lines, you know, uncertain by a 12 factor of 10; and then when a plant comes in at 2 times 10 llg 13 to the minus 4 they say we have got to fix it.
So there is 14 a lot of trouble.
15 DR. KOUTS:
We try to establish objectives to any 16 rate, and because people are interested in introducing numbers 17 as well as they can, we produce numbers as well as we feel 18 we can possibly do so and assign them the degree of importance 19 that they probably deserve, b
l DR. KERR:
Herb, you mentioned ALARA as a principle 20 ll 21 to be applied in plant operation; does that extend to abnormal l
22 operation as well?
I mean, for example, if you have a safety
!I i
goal that is fixed do you give them ALARA, assume that if 23 1
l4 you can achieve a safety goal at a reasonable cost, I
4 bl 24 25 !
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cost, you keep on trying to do that or have you explored that?
h 22 2
DR. KOUTS:
I personally have explored it quite 3
a bit.
I extend ALARA to the accident situation in only one 4
way and that is, that once an acciden" has occurred ALARA 5
comes into play, that is, you try to make the consequences 6
at that point as low as reasonably achievable.
7 Planning ahead of time on an ALARA basis in the 8
' accident field I think is a fruitless objective.
I don't 9
subscribe to it.
The report is written that way, also.
10 Now, there are 12 fundamental principles in the 11 area of management; three in an area of defence in depth; 12 and three, for one of a better adjective or term, technical llgg 13 objectives.
So I would like to go into these.
14 The first fundamental objective is the statement 15 of safety culture.
It says, that an established safety 16 culture governs the actions and interactions of all individual s 17 and organizations engaged in nuclear power activities.
And i
18 l this principle in its discussion defines just what is meant.
i f
The safety culture concept has many components and 19 h
20 j many implications.
It includes the requirement for dedication d
21 and accountability on the part of all the individuals on whom b
22 it impacts.
A feeling of dedication and accountability which 23 starts with senior management of the organizations involved.
24 They establish in their term clear policies; clear lines of i
L F
25 4 responsibility and communication in their organizations.
1 l
i
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They require strict adherence to requirements and procedures 23 2
that have been established in the safety field.
They provide 3
for reviews and training by their staff in the application 4
of safety requirements.
And they encourage an openness of 5
thinking about safety and the questioning attitude and the 6
comnitment to excellence.
I could be reading INPO propaganda 7
when I say this.
8 j
So safety culture is precisely defined as those 9
aspects which are fostered by NRC so strongly in all its 10 interaction with the operating organizations for nuclear plants, 11 the licensees, and which are emphasized by INFO in its 12 dealings with the industry.
g 13 This is not an empty motherhood statement.
There 14 has been a great deal of movement in this direction in the 15 United States which is not altogether reflected in the rest 16 of the world, in all the rest of the world.
And to say all 17 these things in a document of this kind is not only necessary, 18 but it will carry a great deal of impact, in our view, l
And this I would like to say is true of, essentially 19 d
20 l every safety principle in the document.
You may recognize 21 it very closely as something that you have seen over and over, 22 and which has been required of licensees in this country.
L 23 In most cases that is true.
But the existence of these, in 24 a single structured document which says, this is the way you a
25 y achieve safety in a nuclear plant is a new experience in a i
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large fraction of the world.
And I believe it is going to A4 2
be a new factor in recognition of safety in many components 3
of industry in this country.
Safety culture is certainly 4
one of the things which is emphasized in this way; and it 5
is emphasized throughout the document and appears in many 6
places as a feature of many of the other principles.
7 The second fundamental principle is again one that 8
you recognize and that is that the ultimate recponsibility 9
for the safety of a nuclear plant rests with the operating to organization.
This responsibility is in no way diluted by 11 the separate activities and responsibilities of designers, 12 suppliers, constructors and regulators.
lllh 13 Now, what is talked about here is not financial 14 responsibility, but moral and procedural responsibility.
15 Once the responsibility is accepted by accenpting a nuclear l
plant, the operator accepts that responsibility from the 16 i
17 cradle to the grave., that is, he is even responsibility for 18 g those things which have taken place before he accepted the h
19 responsibility; and that'is part of'the ultimate responsibility lg which is discussed.
20 li 21 j But tne principle also discusses the separate L
N responsibilities of the other organizations which are importar t
22 E
F 23 l and are especially important for third world countries who 1
e 24 L also had considerable amount of input into the way this 25 Lt document is written.
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}
[
1 These are responsibilities of manufacturers, a5 2
suppliers, designers, constructors, and as a matter of fact, 3
respcnsibilities of the technical community as well, which 4
is relied upon for backup in safety areas.
These 5
responsibilities are defined in the principle.
6 This principle caused substantial amount of 7
discussion in countries where the concept -- from representa-8 tives on the committee from countries where the concept was 9
fully understcod or even appreciated and there was some 10 trepidation by some of the people who actually operate nuclear 11 plants in other places and did not understand that they were 12 responsible for as much as they were.
lllg 13 The next fundamental principle is one which attaches 14 to this organization itself and the Nuclear Regulatory 15 Commission more generall.y.
The government establishes the 16 legal framework for a nuclear industry and an independent 17 l regulatory organization.
The document is not directed toward i
18 the regulatory organization, but unless you have one the 19 system is incomplete.
So that is why this is a fundamental 20
{
principle.
l 21 MR. WARD:
Herb, do some of the European -- all h
I 22 of the European countries, let's say, consider that they live 4
23 h by this principle?
24 DR. KOUTS:
Yes.
And this principle was very ggggg 25 important to our Russian colleague and who is struggling 4
0 i
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to establish an organization of this kind with powers in the
^
Soviet Union.
2 3
Let me read that principle more further.
In its 4
full statement it is much more interesting: "The government 5
establishes the legal framework for a nuclear industry and 6
an iladependent regulatory organization which is responsible 7
for the licensing and regulatory control of nuclear powerplant s 8
and for enforcing relevant regulations."
9 Then it says:
"The separation between the 10 responsibilities of the regulatory organization and those 11 of other parties is made clear, so that the regulators retain 12 their independence as a safety authority and are protected l g 13 from undo pressure."
14 The origin of that is that in many countries there 15 is not the separation of powers which exists in the federal 16 government here, and which is represented by the fact that 17 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is not part of the 18 administrative structure of the United States and is therefore 19 isolated.
I 20 In most countries the regulatory organization 21 reports, through the administrative structure, to the boss g
of the country or to the boss group in the country.
And it 22 h
23 is necessary to set up an artificial way of insulating the i
l regulatory organization in cases of that sort.
24 p
25 DR. KERR:
Let's take a hypothetical situation i
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in which the utility in the country is part of the government 27 2
and the regulatory organization is also part of the government,
fisthatconsideredindependent?
3 i
l DR. KOUTS:
It is considered independent if it is 4
5 made independent and functions independently.
I.
6 j
DR. KERR:
I'm just not sure what it is independent 7
l of -- certain about independent; neither is independent of l
the government and maybe they are independent of each other 8
9 in some fashion.
But they certainly report, for example, 10 to the head of the government.
11 DR. KOUTS:
It is enabled to act independently and 12 arrive at decisions independently without undo influence being lllh 13 applied to it; and that is the definition of independent here.
14 MR. LEWIS:
But DOE is an example of that.
15 DR. KERR:
I was thinking of our colleagues --
16 MR. LEWIS:
I know you were.
17 MR. WARD:
France and the U.K.
l 18 MR. LEWIS:
I just think it is closer to home.
19 l
DR. KOUTS:
It was very interesting that when this i
20 was being discussed and we went back and forth on whether i
21 l
to include that last statement in the principle, a representa-22 lj tive from France was especially strong in saying he didn't i
q think we should put it in because this is not something that 23 li 24 ever arises in France; and he thought this would be used ggg h
against the regulatory organization in France and might 25 i
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1 weaken it.
QS 2
MR. WARD:
I see there is now discussion with the 3
French Parliament about creating some different sort of
, structure, I believe, isn't there.
4 5
DR. KOUTS:
There is some discussions about creating 6
an independent regulatory organization which I don't know 7
I how it would report; it does not report to the Prime Minister.
8 Also, the three administrative fundamental principles.
9 Then there are three on defence in depth.
The first one is 10 l a very general one and simply says t'.iat safety is accomplished I
i However, that is a l through the use of defence in depth.
11 l
shorthand,andtheprincipleitselfis;erylong.
I think it 12 I
g 13 nonetheless would be useful to read it.
14 "To compensate for potential human and mechanical i
15 failures of defence in depth concept is implemented, centered l
on several levels of perfection including successive barriers, 16 1
17 l preventing the release of radioactive material to the h
18 l
environment.
The concept includes protection of the barriers 19 f!
by averting damage to the plant and to the barriers themselves L
[
It includes further measures to protect the public and the 20 21 b environment from harm in case these barriers are not fully 22 effective."
h This means that there are two sides to defence in 23 I
24 depths prevention of dissemination of radioactive material; h
and mitigation of any effects of dissemination.
And these 25 d
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are taken up in the two separate corollary principles that 21 2
follow.
I 3
l There is incidentally an appendix in the documer.t 4
which discusses defence in depth in some detail.
It was put 5
together by our Soviet and American consultants and is very l
6 good, I think.
I think you will find it very helpful in 7
dealings that you may have, subject in the future.
I think Ll it adds something to what has been said in the past.
8 l
I 9
The second fundamental principle of defence in depth 10 says that the special attention is devoted to the primary 11 means of achieving safety which is the prevention of accidents,
l particularly any which could cause severe core damage.
And 12 i llll 13 this is achieved through quality products; through inspection 14 to ensure that quality is present; through monitoring to 15 ensure that quality is maintained and through training to 16 ensure that questino is taken advantage of in the operation 17 of the plant.
I 18 And the second fundamental principle of defence 19 in depth is that, in plant and out of plant mitigation d
[1 measures are available or prepared which would ensure 20 4
21 ll substantial reduction of the effects of any accidental h
O release of radioactive material.
22 4
23 h This underwent a great deal of modification during ld I
our drafting because we had to fully understand a lot of 24 25 [
things that we didn't feel were fully understood before.
Hl
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We finally realized that there are three aspects to mitigation D
2 The first of these is accident management, which is given 3
a lot of attention in the report.
Accident management on 4
its two levels in preventing and mitigating accidents.
5 This, as measures, to be taken by the operating 6
Staff at the plant.
Accident management is a set of measures 7
that people take.
ll 8
Then there are engineered safety features which 9
provide an inherent mitigated capability to the plant.
And i
10 finally, there are offsite countermeasures which also mitigate i
II but under more extreme circumstances.
12 The objective of all mitigative exercises is to h
33 restore the plant to its final -- to a final state which could 34 be considered acceptable in the sense that all reactivity 15 matters have ended and any reactivity excursions have been u
~ {
terminated, cooling is continued and assured, and radioactive i
37 h
material is confined or its further spread is prevented.
Ii 18 o y
These are the objectives of mitigation.
F I'
Then come the six fundamental principles which we 4
'O 1
O call technical.
The first is proven engineering practice.
1 21 Nuclear powerplant technology is based on engineering 2,
3
[
practices which are proven by testing and experience, and n
- 3 f
d which are reflected in approved codes and standards and other d
g appropriately documented statements.
[i This is the standarda principle.
Standards which 25 j
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are to be applied during design, supplier, manufacturer,
@\\
2 operation, maintenance and repair.
3 MR. WARD:
I have a question on that one.
Codes t
4 I and standards, proved codes and standarda, now are you thinking
[
f there or is the committee thinking of codes and standards 5
t f
developed and approved particularly for nuclear power or codes 6
7 and standards that have been used in the industry more 8
generally; and is there a preference for one or the other?
9 DR. KOUTS:
We are talking about both and we state 10 that where nuclear standards exist, the preference is the 11 nuclear standard because nuclear standards are generated for 12 more demanding circurt. stances than the ones that they supplement.
I3 These are approved in the sense that they have been Id generated and have gone through a review -- an approval 15 procedure in connection with activities usually learned at 16 societies.
And the definitions are given in the report.
0ll 37 The next is related, and has the same general h
- coverage, I8 that is, it is quality assurance is applied through-U I9 out nuclear plant activities as part of a comprehensive d
- o i
system to ensure with high confidence that all items delivered
- l in services and tasks performed meet specified requirements.
[1 22 h Quality assurance is considered to be a system.
O Its most important part is quality control; the assurance a
that. quality is there in the first place.
But also important g
25 9 is the third party assurance which is given by QA in the h
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sense that someone makes sure that somebody else has done 5E 2
the job properly, and someone else audits the entire process.
The objective is, assurance that tasks are performed 3
)
4 l Deviations, if any, have been identified and corrected; and 5
that recurrence is prevented.
6 This is a human factors principle.
Personnel i
l engaged in activities bearing on nuclear powerplant safety 7
I 8
are trained and qualified.
Design and operations promote 9
safety through preventing wrong actions and compensating for 10 their effects.
This is again a shorthand statement of what 11 is in the document, but it carries the essential points raised I
l 12 l
in the document.
l lllg Where human factors are properly applied, approved 13 14 L procedures are developed and followed.
Plant design is I
15 j conducted along the lines to make good conduct as natural 16 as possible.
17 As illustrated by what controls and information l
are to be F aced where in the olant, in the control room, 18 il l
[\\
and how they are placed in the control room.
And how practices 19 d
20 encourage the fact that independent actions, for instance, 21 [
by roving members of the operating crew are prevented or made 0
22 i
very difficult.
23 In this principle we go a little bit beyond the L
24 0 current practice by joining the maintenance staff of the M
0 25 ll plant to the operating staff.
And throughout the document 1
h
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we consider maintenance staff to be equally important to the 33 h 2
operating staff in safety.
We introduce, as you will see, measures -- we 3
j 0
4 ;
introduce the concept that measures are applied so that 5
maintenance staff are trained and qualified in their activitie s 6 i as well as operating staff.
This is something which is not l
7 commonly done.
8 MR. REMICK:
In the text you refer to the use of 9
simulators, do you have any difficulty getting that incorporated 10 because in many parts of the world they don't have extensive 11 use of simulators, they have the national center?
i 12 DR. KOUTS:
They are working fast to catch up llll 13 including in the Soviet Union.
Simulators are being introduced 14 at the RBM cable incident.
I can't say anything about how 15 l
good they are; they are probably comparable to some of our 16 earlier simulators which have faults we all know about, but 17 at least they are movi.ng in the right direction.
h 18 Principle on safety assessment.
Detailed safety 19 l assessments are made before design and operation of a nuclear b
20 ?
plant again.
These are well documented and independently e
21 h reviewed and updated as necessary in the subsequent operation 0
22 I]
of the plant.
i!
]
This principle does not say how many steps there 23
!i 24 are to a licensing process.
It would permit one step l
I licensing; two step licensing; in-step licensing depending 25 il H
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upon what the current requirements seem to be the case.
34 h 2
The principle defines the contents of a safety 3
analysis report and it introduces the concept that problemis-4 tic analysis is used on an equal level with deterministic 5
analysis in establishing the safety of the plant.
6 There is a fundamental principle on radiation 7
protection which simply implements the radiation protection 1
8 l
objective, so I won't go into it.
l 9
And the final fundamental principle which says that 10 organizations concerned ensure that operating experience and 11 I the results of research relevant to safety are exchanged, 12 reviewed and analyzed, and that lessons are learned and acted g
13 on.
I think this is a substantial extrapolation beyond l
34 i
15 i
current practice, even in this country.
The principle as l
it is stated defines responsibilities to be assumed by the 16 i
17 operating staf f of the plant.
In disseminating information il 18 concerning activities in its own sphere, I mean, what happens i
19 at my plant should be made available to people in other plants.
h The responsibilities associated with disseminating information 20 0
21 ll among the operating staff on things that have taken place n
I l4 in other plants.
22 h
a 23 h A responsibility on the part of the regulatory 24 organization to disseminate such informatino as it comes withqn 25 its purview.
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The responsibility on the part of industry to ensure 3rh 2
that things which are learned in one part of industry are 3
taken advantage of in other parts of industry as well.
4 h This couples, the results of safety research with 5
results of operation in that both of them contribute to the 6
same store of information to be used in improving nuclear 7
plant safety at any given location.
l So these are the fundamental principles.
It is 8
9 very difficult -- it would be very difficult to establish, to just from these fundamental principles, how plants are made 11 safe.
But when we begin to illustrate them through the j
i 12 j
specific principles that follow, I believe it becomes l
llll) 13 substantially more clear.
14 This is the structure of the specific principles.
15 There are seven categories of principles.
The first five 16 of these citing design, manufacture and construction, commissioning and operation are historically arranged, pro-17 j l
18 ceeding from the earliest phases of a plant when you consider I
19 h its concept and its location, to the time when it is finally L
20 operating and in fact to decommissioning which is included i
21 in the commissioning operation, as part of the commissioning.
J 22 ]
There are the indicated number of principles in i:
23 4 each case; four citing principles, 12 design which include b
I three on the design process, seven on general features of 24 h
0 25 h design, 12 on specific principles of design, two on il J
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manufecturing, construction and so on, down to the end where 3b h 2
there are three on accident management and three on emergency 3
preparedness.
4 These last two areas are not in the history of a 0
5 !I plant; there's not very many plants at any rate, only two d
1 6
so far.
But they are put in for completeness because they i
l 7
are part of the safety picture.
I 8
Now, I don't want to describe all of these 50 I
specific principles.
I thought I could describe the three 9
l that are under design process and you can see from that what 10 specific principles look like, and how the statement of the 11 12 principle itself is augmented in the discussion that follows.
i g
13 l I would like to point out before I do that, among i
14 all the safety principles we have somatimes gone a little 15 bit beyond simply stating what is commonly accepted in current 16 practice; and we he.ve tried to take into account that trends fareunderway, the extrapolatlon of which should also be taken 17 i
O h
into account.
Here are some ofthe things of that kind.
38 0
ll The first of these is the fact that the safety 19
(
principles state that problemistic risk assessment 20 is used I'
21 in safety analysis along with deterministic meth'ds of 22 analysis, as I stated earlier.
It has not been a common i
23 practice.
I know that this appears now in more recent 1
24 Commission issuances, for instance, in the severe accident l
25 l
policy statement that the Commission has issued.
But it has l
Heritage Reporting Corporation c
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l l
1 not been a practice in most of the reactor world in all 37 l
2 countries.
The United States is somewhat more advanced than 3
[
most countries in the applications of PRA and safety analysis.
Il L
4 '
And we have agreed in the INSAG community that practice should 5
be a general one.
6 Second, we have established reliability targets 7
for safety systems.
This is also an extrapolation of current 8
practice.
It is a practice which is followed to some extent 9
and has been for a number of years in this country, because 10 reliability targets have been set for things like diesels 11 in plants and are checked on by start /stop tests of diesels.
j 12 Reliability targets have been set for a great many g
13 years on containments; and tests of containments are under-14 taken as a result of this.
15 We extend this concept of reliability targets to 16 other systems that are dependent upon for safety.
Not in l
the sense of subdividing the safety and subdividing risk in 17 i
18 risk analyses because we are entirely opposed to that.
But 19 we take the view that where -- in a risk analysis where, shall i
20 we say, in a safety analysis which is partly a risk analysis 21 where advantage is taken of an assumed reliability of a certain h
safety system, 22 there should be a way of ensuring yourself I
23 and the regulatory organizations that that level of reliability 24 is in fact achievable and is achieved.
And this is uhat we g
25 !)
mean by reliability targets and why we assign such targets.
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The third is this concept of training and qualifica-i
%h 2
tion on a formal basis of maintenance personnel.
I mentioned 3
that before.
l l
Another concept which is introduced is the instruc-4 j
tion of operating staff at the plant and of certain mainten-5
.l ance staff of the plant in the implications of risk assessment 6
s 7
which have been made for safety analysis.
This does not mean fthatthepeoplewhoaretrainedaretounderstandrisk 8
1 9
assessment or to know how the numbers are put together or 10 to know how they are derived, but after all there are pathways 11 l pointed out in risk analysis; pathways that represent possible I
1: I vulnerabilities of the plant, and these should be understood g
13 by the operating staff of the plant.
They should know in 14 what ways the device that they are operating should operate.
15 l What their jobs mean in this respect.
So we assume that this I
16 is done in a well organized plant.
l 17 Furthermore, we assumed that these PRA results
!I 18 f are included in accident management procedures and in accident 19 management training.
1 c
N ll We proceed to a design process specific principles.
l l
21 These three principles are on design management, proven i
22 technology, and the general basis for design.
[
I 23 j For each of these I have the statement of the I
24 principle and then a slide which shows the principle content g
25 of the discussions, design management.
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The assignment and subdivision of responsibility F1 2
for safety are kept well defined throughout the design phase 3 l of a nuclear plant project, and during any subsequent jl modification.
4 H
5 Discussion it says the following:
"Design manage-l fmentisunderasingledesignmanager.
This single design 6
i 7
i manager has a line organization with clear interfaces and j
h clear responsibilities assigned to its components."
Now this 8
il 9 l is true not only for those components which are directly under 10 i his control, but say those which are subcontracted to other I
i 11 organizations.
d 12 He includes in his organization a safety coordinating 1
llll 13 group.
This safety coordinating group has the responsibility t
14 l of ensuring that those features of the plant design which 15 are meant for safety and those objectives of plant design 16 [
associated with safety have clearly been established and y'
17 followed.
This safety coordinating group also has the 18 d
19 responsibility for coordinating with the operating organiza-20 tion which at a later time is to take over the plant to 21 ensure that the operating organizations' views of what should D
22 L be incorporated in the plant have been folded into the design 23 h process, and to ensure that the operating procedures, as they E
24 y are being put together, take into account properly the safety W
F v
25 [
aspects of the plant.
This is part of the design process e
h Heritogo Reporting Corporation g
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responsibility.
2 The single manager assures -- the senior manager t
1 3
makes sure that quality assurance is recognized and exists l
4 j in the design, and that configuration control is followed ly l
including up to date drawings and specifications for the 5
i 6
plant.
So that is what is meant by the first design process t
7 principle.
8 The second design process principle is proven 9
technology.
It largely repeats what is said about proven 10 i
technology in the fundamental principle which I described 11 earlier, but makes it more specific to the design process.
i h
12 Q It says:
"The technologies incorporated into design
!l llll 13 have been proven by experience and testing.
Significant new J
14 design features or new reactor types are introduced only after l
thorough research and phototype testing at the component system 15 16 l or plant level as appropriate."
l 17 And then in the discuGsion it says:
"Proven i
h technologies use appropriate standards," of the kind I 18 H
19 mentioned earlier, "where analytical methods are relied on h
20 !!
to establish adequacy of design methods."
These analytical u
21 methods are validated by methods which are discussed from H
22 the discussion section.
And where possible, realistic 23 design methods are used, and where it is not possible to use 24 h realistic methods, conservative methods are used.
That is l
I
(( the principal content of that principle.
25 Il l
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And finally, the most important principle is the 4
1 2 il general basis for design which states that:
"A nuclear power-U P
3 q
plant is designed to cope with a set of events including norma l i]
conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, extreme 4
l 5
external events and accident conditions.
For this purpose 6
conservative rules and criteria incorporating safety margins 7
are used to establish design requirements.
Comprehensive 8
l analyses are carried out to evaluate the safety performan.cc 9
or capability of the various components and systems in the h'j plant."
10 l.
11 Under this that la made clear as follows:
"The H
12 plant is so designed that no damage of any kind would be f
caused by normal operation.
The plant is so designed that g
13 14 no plant damage of any kind would be caused by reasonably I
15 l
anticipated events.
The plant is so designed that for d
16 important accident sequences that would contribute importantly 0
17 to risk, engineered safety features are provided to prevent 18 plant damage and to mitigate consequences."
n 19 And skipping a line, this has the implication that 20 h where you have -- where the risk analysis of the plant has 0
h identified particular event trees as contributing excessively 21 i!
22 p to rist as compared to other event trees these engineered li 23 !
safety features have been so introduced in the plant that 24 there are no longer any risk outliers.
Risk outliers are 25 designed out of the plant.
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The discussion section also defines design basis Ulk 2 g accidents which we find not well defined elsewhere in literature, ll 3 g and says that, during the design process this general basis 4 L for design should also provide that -- attention is given I
t, 5 jf to the future requirements for maintenance and testing of o
D 6 l systems.
I f
MR. SHEWMON:
I'm intriqued some by the definition 7
8 of risk outliers; those are things you have to be smart enough 0
9 to foresee and where the operator doesn't have to be negligent
]0 enough to make the risk outlier out of something that you 10 lt a
11 !
didn't think was a risk outlier.
I mean, is that what a risk l,
12 l outlier is?
I think back to the few accidents we have had l
llll 13 where you could say there were no risk outliers there, but there sure was a risk.
14 4
N u
15j DR. KOUTS:
That second thing sounded like a second 0
16 h thought.
Hq 17 y MR. SHEWMON:
Well, fine, if you see them separate, ilo 18 j answer them separate or speak on either one, h
9 19 DR. KOUTS:
When you do a risk assessment at any i,
h time you derive contributions to risk as attachments to 20 4
a 21 p ind.ividual event trees; each event tree makes its own contri-4 bution to risk.
If in that risk assessment you determine 22 )a 23 [
that some particular event tree, say, station blackout is
?
h a principal contributor to risk.
At that point, because you 24 L
25 j.
have not yet completely designed your plant, you go back and h
Heritogo Roporting Corporation tan.n a
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284 redesign into it those features which remove that as an 90 h
outlier.
That is what the principle states.
2
.Iln
[
MR. S!!EWMON:
So an outlier is something you know 3
Ii
[ about and calculate and is significantly higher than the other 4
5 cluster of events that you have remaining, il 6
DR. KOUTS:
If you find that half the risk attached i
)
to your plant is the result of one particular accident 7
h sequence, that plant should not be made captive for the 8
1 9,
possibility of that sequence; that is the thought.
h o
10 4 MR. LEWIS:
But I think that one point Paul may b
i 11 l or may not have been making is that the decision on whether n
0 something is an outlier it does depend on how you cluster 12 l
llll 13 it, because each of them in a PRA is really a surrogate for 14 j a class of events; nobody pretends to see all the details 15 4 of every event.
So depending on how you subdivide them you h
g 16 [ can turn outliers into non-outliers and non-outliers into Ny 17 outliers and either way it would be a lie.
J 18 DR. KOUTS:
I think you will find cases where that 19 trap exists.
The clustering that you are talking about, n
20 j though, is usually an artificial thing which is introduced F
23 for the purposes of calculation, f
22 j MR. LEWIS:
- Right, h
hI DR. KOUTS:
Right.
And no one pretends that these 23 U
24 p are the same accident or the same event tree.
They are M
P 25 different event trees, but you put them together because I
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somehow you join them together for ease in computation.
I;q MR. LEWIS:
I understand that.
But that affects 2
i the definition of an outlier, because if I take an outlier 3
o i
L 4 f and do it in more detail and divide it into two events, why i
[
suddenly neither of them is an outlier.
So, you know, it 5
a 6
is just a caution about the definition.
J 7 h DR. KOUTS:
Yes.
Those are the three general n
I 8
design criteria -- general design principles.
I have just I
9 d one more slide in this sequence and this is accident manage-1 1
10 ment.
I just wanted to point out that these are the names 11 l of the three accident management, specific principles.
- One, Il 12 l
a strategy for accident managemenc' ; second, training and I
lllh ll procedures for accident management; and three, engineered i
13 14 j
features for accident management, i
15 The principles exist with respect to each one of h
these.
The strategy for accident management is a strategy 16 i
first prepared for b'
which is established when procedures are 17 I
18 4 the reactor and, of course, as they are refined for the reactor.
j!
The risk assessment establishes a cluster of events 19 l
20 which are considered as contributory in some important way 1
21 to risk.
And attached to each of these is an accident manage-i h
ment procedure, which is to prevent that particular event 22 il 23 [
tree from remaining important.
And secondly, for dealing 0
24 with its consequences should it go through to complete 25 [
fruition.
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The establishing of the strategy by which this is I
I 45 W h to be done is an accomplishment in the process of putting 2
!I e
3 j the procedures together.
Procedures in accident management Y
4 ll are to be used during the training of operators and are to 5 0 be used on the same plane as training in the procedures for e
i 6 l managing the plant along its normal line of function.
I h
And finally, engineered features are provided along 7
l!
8 with he procedural ones for the accident management.
This q"
9 is an area which is not well spelled out in r.gulatory issuanc es 9
to !l in the past and we have tried to provide a logical structure C
1 h
for it.
11 n
d 12 !!
I have some 35 millimeter slides.
)
lllh 13 MR. MICHELSON:
Can I ask a general qucstion before jl you go to those.
14 ii U
l1 DR. KOUTS:
Sure.
15 0
16 MR. MICHELSON:
The process that you have laid out n
a 17 H here is find for the case where it is all carried out in a P
18 jf given country with design organizations and so forth; how n
U 19 L about the case of many of these third world countries that b
20 l would be involved and would be using the IAEA type standards i
21 when the only part of the process they really get involved 0
22 I
in is with the oper'ation.
Doesn't there have to be certain 23 1
kind of adjustments, if the ultimate responsibility is with 24 h the operator, how much more does he need to do than follow d
for operation that is in this document?
j[
your guidancc 25 I;
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DR. KOUTS:
Well, if he follows our guidance --
2 MR. MICHELSON:
For operation, you gave guidance 3
for operation which I assume he would be following, but how il about he hasn't done any of the design review and all the l
4 o
I!
5 L other things because that wasn't a part of his process?
j DR. KOUTS:
It was rude shock.
We have members 6
7 of INSAG who come from these countries.
One member of INSAG d
hl from India.
One member from Brazil.
One from Kcrea, South 8
l 9
Korea.
One from China.
There may be one or core additional 10 l to that.
But these are members of INSAG, too.
It was a rude 1
I 11 shock to these people to realize that once they began to 12 operate their plants they were responsible for accidents that il I
might be caused by defects in design or manufacture; and that g
13 14 they had better begin to adopt measures associated with 15 preventing bad things from happening during those phases of h
16 the operation as well.
17 They thought that you simply sit back and take the d
9 d
plant on a turnkey basis.
This is one of the -- I mean, all 18 i
lj these plants are on turnkey bases.
And in fact, in some of 19 20 the countries plants are not even started up by the final 1
21 h operating organization; they are started up by somebody else.
i 22.
It is quite a shock for the operating organization to realize i
23 that even if an accident occurs during the startup procedure, h
they may be responsible, even though they are not doing the 24 i
25 operation.
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This is a responsibility they have which we have 47 2
not pulled back from them.
We have said they have the same f
3 responsibilities in third world countries as people who operata I
i reactors in advanced countries; they simply must prepare for 4
5 l this.
l 6
MR. MICHELSON:
But it seems like there is another 7
type of document then these would be prepared to provide the 8
guidance for those who only buy turnkey plants.
We then have 9 i to have some kind of a means of assuring these other things I
10 l
are all done correctly.
11 DR. KOUTS:
We are telling them that if you are 12 going to buy a turnkey plant, you had better start putting g
13 together your opera *,ing organization on the first day that 14 you begin to plan this, and to have your operating organization 15 work with the turnkey organization in the same way as if you j
H 16 were building the plant yourself.
That is the only way you l
can do it.
17 18 l
MR. SHEWMON:
These people, to a certain extent, i
19 buy a country when they buy a plant, because at least the F
20 !!
Taiwanese who have bought their reactors from here sure as 0
21 heck pay attention to the in-stamp on that pressure vessel; o
22 they follow the NRC's regulatory position quite closely; and P
23 h if we ordain something, then I think there is a very good 24 chance it is ordained in Taiwan, too.
25 MR. MICHELSON:
But they don't all buy them from
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1 l the U.S.
Well, they don't, but they -- they 3
are there too for the Germans and --
dl l
DR. KOUTS:
I think you will find that the practices 4
N
[l are better in Taiwan than they are most places.
5 Il j{
MR. SHEWMON:
I don't know.
6 l
Il 7 y DR. KOUTS:
They weren't maybe for the first two h
I plants built in Taiwan, but they have moved up since that 8
t i
9 '
time.
They go a long way, I think, towards satisfying these 10 l requirements; maybe not fully doing so yet.
11 h DR. KERR:
Herb, how many slides do we have?
We 12 hate to impose a schedule on anybody, but we are running n
13 into --
h
~
14 L DR. KOUTS:
I thought I had an hour and a half.
15 DR. PERR Go ahead.
h DR. KOUTS:
Oh, I see, an hour and a half is up, 16 i;
d 17 (Laughter) f 18 i (Slides being shown.)
19 h DR. KOUTS:
This is something like a logic diagram, 0
20 h but it is not a logic diagram.
And it is not in your i
21 document, because your document really is page proof and n
22 not final document; they left out the slides.
4 This is just a diagram that shows how the specific
}h 23 g
]
principles are put together.
Each one of these boxes is a 24 25 specific principle; there are 50 of these boxes, s
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You proceed along this way from siting design, 49lllh 2
,; manufacturing and construction, commissioning, operation, h
j And if you proceed in this way to more and more operation 3
i 4 l!
related and severe event related situations.
Down to this N
h 5 [
point you are in design and construction and normal preparatio a e,
6 and so on of the plant.
Below this you have accident H
7 conditions.
8 The blue refers to siting and design, und this is H
9 i how the principle on siting and design are put together, h
hj The green is manufacture and construction.
The 10 i
Il I
red to operation and commissioning.
0 12 d The yellow going across this way is radiation v
llll 13 protection.
When you get a final copy of this report with 4
14 this slide in it, this may make the whole process scmewhat li 15 more understandable.
I have only tried to illustrate how h
16 some of these carry.
u h
17 h This is a second slide which is not in your folder, h
18 and simply relates the safety processes and safety systems h
19 [
of the plant to each other in connection with, again, 20 proceeding to normal operation to the most severe emergency n
21 situations.
22 This has a great deal of interest to me cecause m
L 23 L it provides an interesting basis for definition of many terms
(
24 that I think have been used loosely in the past such as ggggg relationships between accident prevention, accident mitigation 25 i Horitage Reporting Corporation L
c..t.a
)
I 291 I,
d I
1 between the various phases of accident management.
Su h 2
And then a very pretty diagram of a Soviet u
3 L colleague that shows how defence in depth is provided.
I 4
Defence in depth is provided by making it difficult to get u
5 out of the box.
Successive barriers and protection of barriers.
[ll 6
DR. SIESS:
Using that box where was the line 7 4 between prevention and mitigation?
H h
8 DR. KOUTS:
Where do you find prevention and 0
9 [
mitigation?
l 10 l}
DR. SIESS:
Yes.
Which one of those lines would 0
Il j represent the boundary between prevention and mitigation?
U 12 DR. KOUTS:
Well, mit,ation includes measures to llh 33 prevent; that is the problem I am having with your question.
9 f
34 DR. SIESS:
That's the problem I was having with h
15 Q your previous slide.
You had a line prevention on one side H
16 and mitigation on the other, and it was a diagonal line; it n
17 sort of suggested that there was no way it was suppose to 18 j go either.
That's all right.
19 :'
DR. KOUTS:
Okay.
20 1 DR. SIESS:
You answered my question.
2I L DR. KOUTS:
I am through, Bill.
t 22 DR. KERR:
Thank you very much.
That was informatiN e L
23 and interesting.
A 15 minute break, 24 (Whereupon, at 3:10 the meeting was adjourned.)
gggg 25
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1 CERTIFICATE (1) 3 This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the 4
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
5 Names 336 th ACRS MEETING 6
7 Docket Number:
8 Place:
Washington, D.C.
9 Date:
April 8, 1988 10 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 11 transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 12 Regulatory Commission taken stenographically by me and, 13 thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction 14 of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a
(}
15 true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings.
16
/S/ e oet e
<4f 17 (Signature typed):
JOAN ROSE 18 Official Reporter 19 Heritage Reporting Corporation 20 21 22 23 24 25
()
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
i I
O
.i;.__.___.-.,..___..____,...____.___.__._.._..._.__.__.,.____,
NRC Technical Training Program ACRS Briefing Edward L. Jordan, Director, AEOD R. Lee Spessard, Director, DOA, AEOD O
Kenneth A. Raglin, Director, TTC, DOA, AEOD April 8,1988
Contact:
Kenneth A.Raglin FrS 852 8121 Page1 O
f.
O l
i Scope of Technical Training
- Formal Training (In-House or Contracted)
- TTC Programs
- Reactor Technology Curricula
- STT Curriculum
- OP Programs
- PRA Technology Transfer Curriculum
- End User ADP Training Curriculum O
- GPA State Programs Curriculum
- Intermittent Region /PO Initiatives _
- Inspector Qualification Process
- Regional Qualification Cards
- Self-Study / Quizzes
- Required Seminars
- Checklists and Practical Factors
- Oral Checkouts
- Informal Seminars (Local) l Page 2 O
r Quantity of FY 1987 TTC Training
- 115 Courses
- 1,162 Students
- Capacity Factor: 86 %
- 162 Course-Weeks (C-W)
- 106 C-W in Reactor Technology
- 41 C-W in GE Technology O
- 42 C-w in westinghouse Technology 5 C-W in CE Technology
- 10 C-W in B&W Technology 8 C-W in Generic or Other 56 C-W in Specialized Technical Training
- 12 C-W in Engineering Support
- 28 C-W in Health Physics
- 16 C-W in Insp. or Exam. Techniques Page 3 O
O
.-.c I
Distribution of Technical Training
- Composite Distribution of Slot Usage
- All Courses Presented or Controlled by TTC
- Totals for FY 1987
- Distribution of Students I
i Non-NRC-7%
Contractors 2.2%
RI-12.7%
% Other NRC-4.8%
State / Local 3.3%
AEOD-6.45 Total 7.0%
i RII-21.8%
NRR-15.4%
NMSS 0.7%
RES 1.0%
OSP 0.7%
All others 2.4%
RV-3.5%
Total 4.8%
RIV-9.5%
RIII-18.9%
i l
}
Page 4 O
O Quality of Technical Training
- Instruction
- Quality Instructors
- High Standards
- Instructor Qualification Process Methods to Keep or Improve Quality
- Intense Courses O
+ Course Exams and Passing Criteria
- Training Advisory Group (TAG)
- Other Feedback Channels
- Current Information
(
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1 Page 5 O
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Reactor Technology Curricula 1
i Parallel Curricula for 4 Vendor Designs
- Classroom and Simulator
- Spectrum of Courses
- Variations in Length, Size, and Methods Other Reactor Technology Training
- HTGR Technology
- Re t r Concepts Courses O
- News Media Seminars (Coordinated by GPA)
- Non-Power Reactor Training Types of Reactor Technology Courses
- Technology (1,2, or 3 Weeks)
- Advanced Technology (2 Weeks)
- Simulator (1 Week)
- Simulator Refresher for Inspectors (1 Week)
- Simulator Refresher for Examiners (1 Week)
- Technical Managers (<1 Week)
Page 6 j
i O
l l
O
,l Reactor Technology Curricula (Continued)
- TM Content Technology Course (3 Weeks)
Advanced Technology Course (2 Weeks)
- Transient Analysis
- Technical Specifications
- Operational Events
- Technical Issues
- Product Line Differences (BWR)
O Simulator Course (6 oays)
- Hands-On
- Demonstrations
- Curriculum Additions Reactor Technology & Operations (RTO)
Mini Series Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP)
Courses for Inspectors and Examiners
- Severe Accident Overview Seminars Page 7 O
O
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..u Specialized Technical Training (STT) Curriculum
- STI' Curriculum Areas Engineering Support Health Physics Safeguards Inspection or Examination Techniques
- Specialized Training in Specialized Areas
- Training in Non-Reactor Technology Areas I
Page 8 O
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..... _.ju TTC Facility
._--=_;_-_-
- Modern Office Building
- Conviently Located
- Office Space for TTC Staff
- Classrooms
- Full Scope Reactor Simulators
- Engineering Models of Cancelled Projects O
+ various Training Aids 4
I Page 9 O
2
)
O TTC Staff
- TTC Organization
- BWR Technology Branch
- PWR Technology Branch
- S'IT Staff
- Authorized Staff Complement
- 24 Technical Positions 3 Clerical or Administrative Positions O
- Existing Staff Complement
- Technical Staff Experience
- Former SRO Licenses
- Former Resident Inspectors
- Former Operator License Examiners
- Former Navy Nuclear
- Former Navy Engineer Officer Qualification
- Former Vendor / Utility Training Experience Page 10 O
1 O
f Use of TTC Staff Expertise l
,=
- Instruction in TTC Courses
- Response to Technical Questions from NRC Staff
- Support for CRGR Reviews
- Support for AEOD DSP Studies j
- Participation in Incident Investigation Program
- Participation in NRC Team Inspections
- Participation in Diagnostic Evaluation Program O
+ Participation in Incident Response Exercises Page 11 O
y.
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Contract Support i
,l A
ll, Fiscal Budget of $2.5M for FY 1988
- Program Support
- Administrative Support
- Commercial Contracts
- Task Order Contracts Inter sency ^greements O
Other Government Agencies Off-The-Shelf Training i
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Page 12 I
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4
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O Other Technical Training Support 1
- Regional or Program Office Initiatives
- Non-TTC Agency Experts
- Fundamentals ofInspection (Various)
- Transportation of Rad. Matl. (NMSS)
- Sim. Ref. for Examiners (TTC + NRR/ Regions)
- NRC Form 368 for Individual Training
- OP Contracting Support O
- GPA State Programs Curriculum
- Training Resource and Data Exchange (TRADE)
I Page 13 O
O Evolution of Existing Programs
~-
RC Staff with Diverse Training Needs
- Range of Jobs and Responsibilities
- Range of Experience and Background
- Typical Students
- Changing Needs and Areas ofInterest
- Past Emphasis on Inspection Programs
- Determination of Training Needs O
- ^nnual Training Needs Survey l
- Budget Process and Original Sch,edule
- Validation and Prioritization of Needs
- Effort Reprogramming and Revised Schedule
- Recognition of Changing Needs
- Switch from Licensing to Operations
- Emphasis in Nuclear Materials Area
- New Operator License Examiner Training
- Support of Strategic Plan & Five Year Plan l
1 Page 14 O
l l
O Improved Resource Utilization
- Long Term Simulator Solutions
- Lease / Purchase Agreements
- GE Simulator Project Success
- Westinghouse Simulator Project Success
- Cash Flow, Hours, & Other Advantages
- Curriculum and Schedule Adjustments
- Reinstatement of Inspector Refresher Training O
- Revised, Optimized Schedule
- TTC Instructor Qualification Program
- Efficiency Enhancements for TTC Staff
- Coordination with Other Offices l
l l
l Page 15
O Continuing Initiatives
- Use of Nuclear Plant Analyzer (NPA) Technology
- Qualification and Technical Training of Staff
- Modeled after Inspector Qual. Program
- Phased Program under Development
- Determined by Program Offices
- Assistance by AEOD and OP as Needed O
- Job ^nalysis or intuitive Process
- Curriculum Expansion or Enhancement
- Reactor HP Area
- Nuclear Materials / Fuel Cycle HP Area
- Reactor Technology Areas
- Other STT Areas
- Exploration of Alternate Training Methods
- Exploration of Other Opportunities Page 16 l
0 1
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O SLIDES FROM H. K0VTS' PRESENTATION TO ACRS ON IAEA SAFETY PRINCIPLES FRIDAY, APRIL 8, 1988 O
O
O O
O SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES SITING (4)
DESIGN (22)
DESIGN PROCESS (3)
GENERAL FEATURES (7)
SPECIFIC FEATURES (12)
MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION (2)
COMMISSIONING (4)
OPERATION (12)
ACCIDENT MANAGEREENT (3)
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PRA TO BE USED M SAFETY ANALYSIS RELIABILITY TARGETS FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS (RAINING AND QUALFICATION OF MAMTENANCE PERSONNEL OPERATING STAFF INSTRUCTED M PRA RESULTS l
ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND TRAINING l
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DESIGN PROCESS DESIGN MANAGEMENT PROVEN TECHNOLOGY GENERAL BASIS FOR DESIGN l
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l UNDER A SMGLE MANAGER CLEAR INTERFACES AND CLEAR RESPONSIBE.ITIES A SAFETY COORDINATING GROUP i
l QUALITY ASSURANCE M THE DESIGN CONFIGURATION CONTROL i
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DESIGN MANAGEMENT (1)
THE ASSIGNMENT ABE) SUBDIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFETY ARE KEPT WELL DEFBIED THROUGHOUT THE DESIGN PHASE OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT PROKCT, AND DURING ANY SUBSEQUENT MODIFICATION.
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4 PROVEN TECHNOLOGY (1) i l
l TECHNOLOGIES INCORPORATED INTO DESIGN HAVE BEEN l
PROVEN BY EXPERENCE AND TESTWG.
SMINIFICANT NEW DESIGN FEATURES OR NEW REACTOR TYPES ARE l
INTRODUCED ONLY AFTER THOROUGH RESEARCH AND PROTOTYPE TESTING AT THE COMPONENT, SYSTEM OR 3
PLANT LEVEL, AS APPROPRIATE.
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l PROVEN TECHNOLOGY (2) 1 USE APPROPRIATE STAfWARDS j
VAUDATE ANAL _YTICAL METHODS USE REALISTIC OR CONSERVATIVE METHODS
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GENERAL BASIC FOR DESIGN (1) l A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IS DESIGNED TO COPE WITH A SET l
OF EVENTS INCLUDING NORMAL CONDITIONS, ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES, EXTREME EXTERNAL EVENTS i
AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
FOR THIS PURPOSE, i
CONSERVATIVE RULES AND CRITERIA NGCORPORATING SAFETY MARGINS ARE USED TO ESTABLISH DESIGN REQUIREMENTS.
COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSES ARE CARRIED OUT TO EVALUATE THE SAFETY PERFORMANCE OR CAPABILITY OF THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS IN THE PLANT.
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i GENERAL BASIC FOR DESIGN (1) i NO PLANT DAMAGE FROM NORMAL OPERADON NO PLANT DAMAGE FROM REASONABLY EXPECTED EVENTS FOR IMPORTANT ACCIDENT SEQUENCES:
ESFS TO PREVENT PUU6T DAMAGE
~
ESFS TO MITIGATE CONSEQUENCES
(
F NO RISK OUTLIERS
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ATTENTION TO MAINTENANCE AND TESTING i
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i TRAINING AND PROCEDURES FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT ENG50EERED FEATURES FOR ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT i
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400 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS i
2 SEVERE ACCIDENTS 1
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CONSIDER GOOD AND BAD EFFECTS OF CHANGES l
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j NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USE HIGH TECHNOLOGY t
THIS IS WHY THEY CAN BE SO SAFE l
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OBJECTIVES l
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES i
i SPECIFIC PRINCIPLES O
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GENERAL OBJECTIVE I
TO PROTECT INDIVIDUALS, SOCIETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT i
BY ESTABLIStW4G AND MAINTAINSIG IN NUCLEAR POWER PLAIRS AN EFFECTIVE DEFENCE AGAINST RADIOLOGICAL HAZARD.
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i RADIAT!ON FROTECTION OBJECTIVE ALARA M NORMAL OPERATION N2ATION OF RACtATION EXPOSURES FROM ACCIDENTS
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TECHNICAL SAFETY OBJECTIVE PREY.MT ACCIDENTS ESPECIALLY THOSE WITH HIGH CONSEQUENCES i
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h FUNDAMIENTAL PRINCIPLE AN ESTABUSHED SAFETY CUSTURE GOVERNS THE ACTIONS AND INTERACTIONS OF ALL INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGED lH NUCLEAR POWER ACTIVITIES.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE i
THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHES THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK l
FOR A NUCLEAR DNDUSTRY AND AN BIDEPENDENT REGULATORY ORGANIZATION.
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THE ULTasATE RESPONSIBOUTY FOR THE SAFETY OF A BOUCLEAR l
POWER PLANT RESTS WFTH THE OPERATW8G ORGANIZATION. THIS I
IS DE NO WAY DILUTED BY THE SEPARATE ACTNITIES AND l
RESPONSIBILITIES OF DESIGNERS, SUPPLIERS, CONSTRUCTCRS, i
AND REGULATORS.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE i
1 SAFETY IS ACCOMPUSHED THROUGH USE OF DEFENCE IN DEPTH.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE i
l SPECIAL ATTENTION IS DEVOTED TO THE PREVENHON OF ACCIDENTS, PARTBCULARLY ANY WHICH COULD CAUSE SEVERE CORE DAMAGE.
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i IN-PLANT AND OFF-SITE BRITIGATION MEASURES ARE AVAILABLE OR PREPARED WHICH WOULD ENSURE SUBSTANTIAL REDLETION OF THE EFFECTS OF ANY ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL l
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O FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECl#00 LOGY BS BASED ON ENGINEERING PRACTICES WHICH ARE PROVEN BY TESTING AND EXPERIENCE, AND WHICH ARE REFLECTED IN APPROVED CODES AND STANDARDS AND OTHER APPROPRIATELY DOCURSENTED STATERIENTS.
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i FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE 1
QUAUTY ASSURANCE IS APPt.4ED THROUGHOUT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACTIVITIES AS PART OF A COSAPREHENSIVE SYSTEM TO
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EttSURE WITH IBGH CONFIDENCE THAT ALL ITERAS DELIVERED i
AND SERVICES AND TASKS PERFORMED MEET SPECIFIED REQUIREMENTS.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE i
PERSONNEL ENGAGED DE ACTIVITIES BEARING ON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY ARE TRAINED AND QUALHED.
DESIGN AND OPERATIONS PROBAOTE SAFETY THROUGH PREVENTING WRONG ACTIONS AND CORAPENSATING FOR THEIR EFFECTS.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE l
DETAILED SAFETY ASSESSMENTS ARE MADE BEFORE DESIGN l
AND OPERATION OF A PLANT BEGNf. THESE ARE WELL l
DOCUMENTED AND INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED, AND UPDATED AS j
NECESSARY.
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A SYSTEM OF RADIATION PROTECTION PRACTICES, CONSISTEMT WNH RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ICRP AND THE IAEA, IS FOt_ LOWED IN THE DESIGN, COMMISSIONING AND OPERATIONAL PHASES.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ORGANEZATIONS CONCERNED ENSURE THAT OPERATING EXPERIENCE AND THE RESULTS OF RESEARCH RELEVANT TO SAFETY ARE EXCHANGED, REVIEWED, AND ANALYZED, AND THAT LESSONS ARE LEARNED AND ACTED ON.
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