ML20151F090
| ML20151F090 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1988 |
| From: | Berry G NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6065 OL-1, NUDOCS 8804180073 | |
| Download: ML20151F090 (22) | |
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' UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR PFr.ULATORY COMMISSION
'88 APR 13 P3 Al BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFET_Y AND LICENSING _ APPEAL BOARy}ghQil('jf;'{[
C BRt,hCH in the Matter of
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- Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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50-444 OL-01 NEW HAMPSHIRE, g al.
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On-site Emergency Planning
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and Safety issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
FF.C STAFF RESFONSF TO NFCNP SUPPLEMENTAL t/Ff/ORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL OUALIFICATION OF PC-50 COAXIAL CABLE Gregory Alan Berry Counsel for NRC Staff April 8,1988 8804180073 080408 DR ADOCK 05000443 4
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r 4 *f UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR PEGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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50-444 OL-01
. NE% H AMPSHIRE, el al.
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On-site Emergency Planning
)
and Safety issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
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FRC STAFF RESPONSF TO NECNP SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONU.FNTAL OUALIFICATION OF RC-50 COAXIAL CABLE 1-1 i
4 Gregory Alan Berry Counsel for NRC Staff i
April 8,1988 f
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD t
in the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
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50-444 OL-01 i
NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
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On-site Emergency Planning
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and Safety Issues (Seabrook Station, Units I and 2)
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NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO NECNP SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANhilM ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF RG-58 COAXIAL CABLE DISCUSSION in March 1987, the Licensing Board rejected New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution's (NECNP) position on Contention 1.B.2.
that Appilcants had failed to satisfy the requirements of GDC 4 in Appendix A to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.
LBP-87-10, 25 NRC 177, 210 (1987).
On appeal, I
NE.CNP challenged the Licensing Board's disposition, arguing that reliance on a vendor letter (NECNP Exh.
4, Ref. 4) was insufficient to find
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compliance with 10 C.F.R. I 50.49(f) and thereby compliance with GDC 4 The Appeal Board agreed and remanded the issue to the Licensing Board, l
f ALAB-875, 26 NRC 231, 270 (1987).
On October 16, 1987, in an unpublished rierrorandum the Licensing Board repiled to ALAB-875 citing the portion of the record which it believed supported its view, i.e.,
Environmental Qualification File No. 113-19-01 which was introduced into i
f evidence as NECNP Exhibit 4 The views of the parties were not solicited j
by the Licensing Board, in ALAB-882, 27 NRC 1 (1986), the Appeal t
T Board again found the Licensing Beard's analysis incomplete and returned
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the issue to consider the Applicants' claim that the high-potential test is l
all that need be satisfied to demonstrate the environmental qualification of the cable, if the Licensing Board agreed with the Applicants, it 'was to
)
Issue another memorandum explicating the evidentiary basis of its belief or in the alternative it was to reopen the record to develop an evidentiary basis for the environmental qualification of the RG-58 cable.
On March 2,
- 1980, the Licensing Board issued a memorandum i
accepting the Applicants' analysis.
The Licensing Board concluded that information in the record showed the cable need not be "fully" qualified, but necd only meet a high potential withstand test.
Licensing Board Men.orandum at C (March 2,1988).
It indicated that NECNP Ex. 4, Ref.
1 and 7, showed the subject RG-58 cable is colored black with a red trace ar.d that Ref. 6 to that exhibit showed that this cable must only remain intact (i.e., net short to ground) to be environmentally quallfled. M. at 8, 10.
There is merit to NECNP's claim that the above described memorandum (NECNP Ex.
4, Ref. 6), standing alone, is insufficient to r
demonstrate that P.G-58 cable docs not have an accident mitigation function, but need only remain intact, to be environmentally qualified.
The memorandum itself does not explain the basis for the statements recitea therein: nor can the qualifications or competence of the maker of the statements be determined from the facc of the memorandum. O 1/
Although the "UE6C separation document" referred to in the memorandum is not included in NECNP Ex. 4, the Staff has obtained
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and submits with this response a copy of the pertinent pages of the
?
(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED ON NEXT PACE)
There is, however, other information in the record which confirms that RC-58 cable does not serve a safety-related, or accident mitigation, function.
Section 8.3.1.4 of the Seabrook Final Safety Analysis Report 9
(FSAR) states that Applicants "have elected to associate all of the Non-Class 1E ll.e., non-safety related) circuits with Class 1E circuits."
i M. at 8.3-40.
According to the FSAR, "[t]his application of associated
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i circuits allows the plant to be designed with one less separation group; that is, instead of having five separation groups consisting of four safety-related separation groups and one non-safety-re'9ted group, Seabrook has only four separation groups." M.
Copies of the pertinent panes of the FSAR are attached hereto.
f The FSAR further indicated that the non-safety related circuits are assigned to either Train A or Train B.
M.
Such circuits are denoted by the color of their cable Jackets: for Train A the color is black with rea tracer: for Train D the color is black with white tracer.
M.,
7 6 8.3.1.3 at 8.3 39.
In this respect the FSAR is consistent with NECNP Ex. 4, Re f. 1, App.1, which establishes that the Jacket color of RG-58 l
coaxial cable is black with red trace, and Ref. 6, which indicates that cable with a multi-colored Jacket is not connected to equipment which must W
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(FOOTNOTE CONTINUED FROM PREVIOllS PACE) 1 l
document.
This document is entitled "Conduit and Cable Schedule, 6
CASP Design Guide for Public Service Company of New Hampshire, i
)
Seabr'ook Station, Units 1 & 2."
That document shows generally that t
"vital circuits" have solid col. c
- jackets, whereas associated "non-vital" circuits are black with a tracer color.
RG-58 cable was l
colored "Black %Ith Red Tracer" (NECNP Ex. 4, Ref.1, App. I at 1), and thus falls in the des 1 n category for use in "non-vital" l
0 circuits. See attached pages 6-3 and 6-3A.
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_q perform a safety function subsequent to accident events.
Taken together, the FSAR and NECNo Ex. 4, Re f. 1, both of which are in the record, independently demonstrate that the RC-58 coaxial cable does not of itself perform a safety function, without any need to rely upon NECNP Ex. 4, Ref. 6.
Consequently, NE CN P's objections to the probative sufficiency of the memorandum (Ref. 6) do not undermine the conclusions reached by the Licensing Board that: (1) RG-58 coaxial cable does not perform a safety function subsequent to an accident; (2) performs only non-safety related functions; and (3) passing a high-potential withstand test will tssure that RG-58 coaxial cable will not compromise the ability of safety-related comperants to perform their intended safety function in the t
es er.t of an accident at the Seabrook Station.
in its memorandum, the Licensing Boaro stated:
4
[W]e find that there is an adequate evidentlary record to show that the full environmental qualification of coaxial cable RC-58 is not required, [and] the high potential withstand test [ls] all that is needed to derronstrate its [RG-58 cable) environmental qualification [. ]
Licensing Doard Memorandum at 9.
A high-potential test, the final step in the environmental qualification process, is conducted to determine whether a cable will maintain its integrity.
See NECNP Ex. 4, Ref. 2 at 10, anc Table 3 at 15.
It is immaterial that the RG-58 coaxial cable was not subjected to the high-potential withstand test.
This is because, as the Appeal Board has observed, "no party appears to dispute that a high-potential test of the RG-58 cable would likely have produced results similar to the acceptable results obtained in testing of the RC-59 cable."
j ALAB-882, silp op. at 7.
Since the Appeal Board has accepted that i
t
RG-58 and RC-59 cables are similar to this extent, it is reasonable to conclude that RG-50 cable will remain intact during an accident.
The Licensing Board stated that R G-58 coaxial cable need only remain intact during an accident and that a high-potential withstand test proviocs that assurance.
However, from these two statements the Licensina Board concluded that RG-50 cable is "environmentally qualified. " See Licensing Board Memorandum at 9.
The Staff agrees with 1
this conclusion but not the reasoning.
In the Staff's view, RG-58 cable is sufficiently similar to RC-59 cable such that the acceptable environmental qualification test results of the latter may be used to establish the environmental qualificaticn of the fermer.
See Affidavit of Harold Walker at A6 f,
All, attached to NRC Staff Response To Mernoranduns Of Licensino Beard And New England Coalition On Nuclear Pollution Regarding Environmental Qualification Of RC-58 Coaxial Cable (December 11, 1967).
t CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, the Appeal Board should hold that RG-58 coaxial cable is fully environmentally quallfled for the function it j
- serves, i.e.,
that it not compromise the ability of any safety-related I
l equipment to perform its intended function in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Station.
Accordingly, the Appeal Board should affirm the
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f 6-i findings regarding RC-58 coaxial cable made by the Licensing Board in the partial initial decision issued on March 25, 1987.
R ctfully submitted, j
v A an
[o'unse or N C Staff o
Dated at Rocl<vitte, Maryland this 8th day of April 1988 h
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g TABLE 3 CABLE CODE CHARACTER SIGNIFICANCE 4 CHARACTER CODE = CCIE Voltage, Conductor and Cable Construction Number of Conductors or Fairs Outer Jacket Color Conductor Size 1se CHARACTER (CONSTRUCTION)
A 600 V Multi-Conductor Control Cable B
600 V Multi-Conductor Power Cable C
600 V.Triplax Power Cable D
600 V. Single Conductor Cable E
600 V Multi-Conductor Shielded Cable G
TP&L Power & Control Cable H
15 KV Loxarmor Power Cable J
5 KV Loxarmor Power Cable K
5KV Triplex Power Cable M
300 V Shielded Twisted Pair Cable N
300 V Twisted Pair Cable q
Specialty Multi-Conductor S
1000 V Shielded Multi-Conductor Control Cable T
Coaxial Cable U
Triaxial Cable V
Three Conductor Twis tei Shielded Cable W
We s tinghouse Supplied Cable X
300 V Copper-Cons tantan Thermocouple Cable Y
300 V Chromel-Alu=e1 Thermocouple Cable Z
300 V Chro=el Cor.stantan Thermocouple Cab 1'e PAGE 6-2
l I
Table 3 (Cont 'd) 2nd CRAAACTER (N0. of CONDUCTORS or PAIRS)
A One V
Nineteen or Two-hundred 8
Two W
Twe nty-s even C
Three X
Thirty-seven or Thirty D
Four Y
Torty-two or Forty-eight E
Tive Z
Torty-seven or Six-hundred T
Six e
C Seve n J
Ni$'
e K
Thirty-f our L
Eleven 1
M Twelve i
N Thirteen or one-Hundred i
P Tourteen Q
Fifteen R
Sixteen S
Eighteen or four-hundred T
Twenty U
Twenty-f our 3rd CHARACTER (JACKET COLOR)
COLOR VITAL CIRCUITS i
1.
Red Train A and Channel I l
2.
White Train 5 and Channel II I
3.
Blue Channel III i
4 Yellow Channel IV t
Page 6-3
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k Table 3 (Cont 'd )
I ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS - Non-Vital r
6.
Black w/ Red Tracer Train A. Channel I and SOP 7.
Black w/ White Tracer Train 8 and Channel II i
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Black w/ Slue Tracer Channel III 9.
Black w/ Yellow Tracer Channel IV t
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Black Temp Power, Fire Fusp House I
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~h E TABLE 3 (Cont'd) 4th CHARACTER (CONDUCTOR SIIE)
A - 750 MGM J - 4 AWG S - # 4/0 AWG AL 3 - 500 MGM K - 6 AWG T - 18 AWG G - 350 MCM L - 8 AWG U - 17 AVG D - 250 MCM M - 10 AWG V - Not Used (19/22)
E - 4/0 AWG W - 20 AWG T - 2/0 AWG N - 12 AVG X - 22 AWG (19/25)
G - 1/0 AWG P - 14 AWG Y - Undefined H - 2 AWG R - 16 AWG I
Flus cable (various oises) 1 - 350 HQi AL 9
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ATPVADJT2 SB 1 6 2 Ame:dme;t $9 FSAR May 1986 4
Seabrook Station's commitment to per form this testing is also described in Subsection 14.2.6, which Jescribes Seabrook Station's interpretation of Regulatory Guide 1.68, Appendix A.
Section 1.g.
d.
Environmental Ef fect s on Electric Equipment All equipment that must operate in a hostile environment during and/or subsequent to a desidn basis event are identified with their
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ambient environmental conditions, and their qualifications are discussed in Sec tion 3.11.
e.
Ef fec ts of Submer:ence on Electrical Equipeent The response to RAI 430.62 presents an analysis of the e f fec ts of submergence as a result of a LOCA on electrical equipment.
The results of this study indicate no detrimental ef fect upon the Class LE electrical power sources as a result of submergence of electrical equipment following a LOCA.
5,-
8.3.1.3 Physical Identification of Safetv-Related Equipment All cables, raceways and safety-related equipment are assigned to a particular channel or train. There are two redundant trains of power and controls, and four redundant channels of instrumentation.
Each channel or train is assigned a particular color, as shown below:
Equipment Raceway Separation Group Nameplate Tae Cable Color A.
Channel I and Train A Red Red Red Train A Associated Black Black w/ Red Tracer l
B.
Channel II and Train B White White White Train B Associated Black Black w/ White Tracer l 1
C.
Channel III Blue Blue Blue D.
Channel IV Yellow Yellow Yellow it Each piece of electrical equipment is marked with the node number indicated on the design drawings, in the particular color corresponding to the channel or trasn to which that equi pment is assigned.
Similarly, trays and exposed conduits are marked with color-coded markers. The cable jacket color code serves as its identification. The operator or maintenance craftsman needs only to observe the color of the nameplate of any piece of equipment or the cable jacket color to determine which channel or train it serves.
For exceptions to the above cable and raceway identification criteria, see Subsection 2.3.1.4.k.
M 8.3-39
f' SB 1 6 3 Amendment 59 FSAR May 1986 8.3.1.4 Independence of Redundant Systems I
a.
General I
The Seabrook Station complies with the requirements of FSAR i
Appendix 8A, IEEE 384-1974 and Regulatory Guide 1.75. Rev. 2.
These documents describe acceptable methods of complying with IEEE 1
279-1971 and Criterid 3. 17 and 21 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 with respect to the physical independence of the circuits and i
electrical equipment comprising or associated with the Class 1E i
power system, the protection system. systems actuated or controlled by the protection system, and auxiliary or supporting systems that must be operable for the protection system and the systems it actuates to perform their safety-related functions.
Preservation of independence of redundant systems within the control boards and all other field mounted recks is discussed in Subsection 7.1.2.2.
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In accordance with the provisions of Section 4.5a and 4.6.2 of FSAR Appendix 8A, Sections 4.5(1) and 4.6.1 of IEEE 364-1974, and Position C4 of Regulatory Guide 1.75, Revision 2, we have elected to associate all of the Nca-Class 1E circuits with Class 1E circuits. This application of associated circuits allows the plant to be designed with one less separation group; that is, instead of j
having five separation groups consisting of four safety-related separation groups and one non-safety-related separation group, Seabrook has only four separation groups. The major advantages of this approach are the ability to provide greater separation l
distances between the groups, as well as to reduce the raceway systes's exposu e to fire.
As a result of this design, all plant circuits are specifically i
assigned to one of the following four separation groups as noted i
in Figure 8.3-571 Group A - Train A, Channel I and Train A Associated Circuits Group 5 - Train 3, Channel II and Train 5 Associated Circuits l
Croup C - Channel III r
Group D - Channel IV The great majority of associated circuits are with Group A, a very limited number are with Group 5, and none are with Groups C and D.
t The circuits that are associated with Train A consist oft 1)
Non-Class 1E power, control, instrument circuits contained within the Nuclear Island.
i 2)
Non-Class 1E power, control, and instrumentation circuits that traverse the Nuclear Island boundary.
3)
Non-Class IE power, control, and instrument circuits outside
)
the Nuclest Island.
47 5 8.3-40
4 SB 1 5 2 Amendment 59 5
TSAR May 1986 The circuits that are associated with Train B consist oft 1)
Non-Class IE power. control, and instrument circuits contained within the Nuclear Island.
2)
Non-Class 1E power', control, and instrumentation circuits that traverse the Nuclear Island boundary.'
47 The Nuclear Island boundary is shown in Tigure 8.3-58.
This figure denotes the buildings, structures, duct baaks, etc., which are part of the Nuclear Island. All other buildings, structures, etc.,
are considered to be outside the Nuclear Island.
C.
The four separation groups are routed through four separate raceway systems per the separation criteria given in Table 8.3-10.
This separation criteria are based on a combination of the following:
1)
Standard separation criteria given in Sections 5.1.3.
5.1.4, and 5.6 of TSAR Appendix 8A and IEEE 384-1974 and 2)
Separation criteria established by analysis and testing as permitted aby Sections 3.1.1.2 and 5.6 of TSAR Appendix 8A and IEEE 384-1974.
This analysis and testing are documented in References (a) and (2) (see TSAR Sociton 8.3.4).
59 4
- 8. 3 -40 a
581&2 Amendment 52 TSAR December ljp83 The following analysis examines the design features and modes of f ailure of associated circuits of each separation group to determine any interaction and challenges with other separation groups. The overall objective is to assure that the ability to achieve a safe 3
plant shutdown under design basis event (DBE) conditions is not compromised.
b.
Train A Associated Circuit Analysis 1.
Associated Circuits Contained within the Nuclear Island Non-Class 1E circuits that remain within the Nuclear Island are permitted to share the same raceway as Train A Class 1E circuits. These circuits are classified as Train A Associated Circuits and are designed and installed to meet all the require-ments placed on associated circuits as required by the compli-j ance documents listed earlier.
Challenges to Class 1E circuits, because of failure in an associated circuit, have been examined and determined to have no detrimental effect because:
(a) When Class 1E power supplies are utill ed, f ailure of a Non-Class 1E motor, load, or device connected to this power supply will be promptly isolated by operation of Class 1E protective devices.
Non-Class 1E loads connected to Class 1E buses are in all cases protected by Class 1E devices.
The breakers protecting Non-Class 1E loads are coordinated such that failure of all Non-Class 1E loads, with proper operation of their own breakers, will not result in tripping of the incoming breaker to the bus.
a Further, in the few cases where credit is taken for the incoming bus feeder breaker to provide backup protection to meet Regulatory Guide 1.63, the associated bus is dedicated to Non-Class 1E loadt only and, therefore, will l
not degrade a Class 1E bus.
(b)
In cases where Non-Class 1E power supplies, such as switchgear, actor control centers, and distribution panels are utilised, these are of identiegt design of the Class 1E counterparts and have been purchased to the same specification requirements inclusive of quality control. Mounting of the Non-Class 1E power supplies within the Nuclear Island is identical to the mounting of their C,ses 1E counterparts; therefore, credit can be taken for this equipment to function under DRE conditions.
$1 8.3-41
SB 1 & 2 Amendee t 55 FSAR J:1y 1985 (c) All Mon-Class lE protective circuit breakers will be periodically inspected appraximately once every five l
years according to a progran developed for the inspection of Non-Class IE equipment. n is program will be in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations for main-tenance and inspections.
Since Class IE and Non-Class IE protective devices are identical, any generic degradation such as setpoint drift, manufacturing deficiencies, and material defects will be detected and corrected as a result of the rigorous program performed on the Class 1E protective devices to satisfy the requirements of ANSI N-18.7-1976 and Regulatory Guide 1.63 therefore, credit can be taken for this equipment to function under DBE conditions.
(d) The probability of an ensuing fire is minimited because all cables utilized for these associated circuits are specified, designed, manufactured, and installed to the same criteria as Class 1E cables. Factors that have bean taken into consideration include flame retardancy, non-propagating and self-extinguishing properties, splicing restrictions, appropriate limitations on raceway fill, cable pulling and termination requirements, appro-priate cable derating, and environscntal qualifications.
The above provisions and considerations used for the associated circuits during the construction phase of the plant will also be used during the operations phase.
(e) Degradation of an associated circuit because of a raceway l
failure during a DBE, has been eliminated because all electrical raceway systems within the Nuclear Island are seismically analyzed.
1 (f) Other design considerations that contribute to the integrity of these associated circuits aret 1)
Cables associated with one train are never routed in races,ays containing Class IE or associated cable of another train or channel.
2)
All cables for instrumentation circuits utill e shielded construction which einf alses any unaccept-able interaction between Class 1E and associated i
circuits.
31 All circuits ente-ing the reactor contain:sent are provided with protective devices complying with Regulatory Guida 1.63.
yor exceptions see Subsection 8.3.1.1.C.7(ai.
l SS i
Based on the above design features and analysis, we do not consider these associated circuits to pose any challenges to any Class IE circuits, nerefore, the ability for safe plant shutdown under DBE conditions has not been jeopardized.
8.3-42 A
SB 1 & 2 Amsndsant 52 FSAR December 1983 2.
Train A Associated Circuits that Traverse the Nuclear Island Boundary For analysis purposes, the associated circuits that traverse
'the Nuclear Island boundary can be further subdivided into two basic types:
(a) those that have their protective device located in the Nuclear Island, and (b) those that have their protective device outside the Nuclear Island.
It should be noted that there are a limited number of power cables in these categories.
(a) Associated Circuits that have Protective Devices Located in the Nuclear Island These circuits are also designed and installed to meet all the requirements as outlined above in Subsections 8.3.1.4 b.l(a), (b), (c), (d) and (f). Though the raceway system outside the Nuclear Island is not seismically analyzed, this ia of no concern because the circuit pro-tective devices inside the Nuclear Island are assumed to perform their protective function. Concerns that design basis events such as a seismic event may cause high voltage cables that are not in seismically analyzed race-ways and not located in Category I buildings to interact with lower voltage cables are analyzed below Recent seismic tests, performed on raceways representing typical installations on SEP plants, proved that the raceways can withstand seismic eventa with no significant failures.
Since the typical non-seismic installation at Seabrook is superior to the tested SEP installations, it can be assumed that they will survive a seismic event.
Failures of raceways resulting from collapse of the non-seismically designed buildings can be dismissed because the conservative criteria and UBC seismic loading used in the construction of the building will ensure little likelihood of collapse.
Not withstanding the preceding, any event involving the raceway system that can cause a higher voltage cable to come in contact with another lower voltage cable will first cause the higher voltage cable to be grounded.
Contributing factors to this are:
- 1) the cables are in grounded metallic trays or enclosures, 2) the 13.8 kV and 4.16 kV power cables are of armored construction, and 3) as indicated in Fig. 8.3-57, separate raceways are designated for the different voltage levels.
61 8.3-43
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SB 1 & 3 Amendment 52 FSAR December 1983 A ground fault in the low resistance grounded 13.8 kV system will cause protective circuit breakers to open and isolate the fault.
In the high resistance grounded 4-kV and 480 V system, although a single ground fault will not cause circuit breaker cperation, it is highly probable that under such a failure, the faults will be such that will cause breaker operation.
Although the protective devices might not be in Category I buildinks, they are of identical design as the Claes 1E devices and, based on operating experience of protective devices that have been subject to actual and simulated seismic conditions, it is highly probable that the pro-tective devices will maintain their structural integrity and perform their functica.
~
In view of the above design considerations and analysis, any possible interaction between cables of different voltage levels is deemed nonexistent.
It is, therefore, concluded that the ability for safe plant shutdown under DBE conditions will not be jeopardi2ed by these associated circuits.
(b) Associated Circuits that have Protective Devices Outside the Nuclear Island Non-Class 1E switchgear, motor control centers and dis-tribution panels outside the nuclear island have been purchased to the same specification requirements as their Class IE counterparts; therefore the probability of failure under DBE conditions is greatly minimized.
These protective devices which are not located in a LOCA environment are identical to Class 1E devices except for seismic requirements. Other design basis events such as pipe break, fire, flood, etc., will not cause failure of the protective device loested outside the nuclear island simultaneously with the failure of load which ie located in the nuclear island. Hence, credit can be taken for their proper operation.
However, if one postulates their misoperation under a seismic event, such an event is likely to disable the power source itself which is also not seismically quali-fled.
Analysis of concerns on interaction between cables of different voltage levels is shown in 8.3.1.4.b.2.(a) above.
61 8.3-44
?,
00LKETE0 U5Nhc UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'88 APR 13 P3 :41 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND !.lCENSillC APPEAL BOMRDg p gp uuCMTam & ' OVICI*
BR4HCe In the Matter of
)
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF
)
50-444 OL-01 NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al.
)
On-site Emergency Planning
)
and Safety issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I
hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO NECNP SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF R G-5 8 COAX 1AL CABLE" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 8th day of April 1988.
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Administrative Judge Board
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Jerry Harbour
- Docketing and Service Section*
Administrative Judge Office of the Secretary Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Thomas G.
- Dignan, Jr.,
Esq.
l Administrative Judge Robert K. Cad, ill, Esq.
I 5500 Friendship Boulevard Ropes & Gray Apartment 1923N 225 Franklin Street Chevy Chase, Maryland 20815 Boston, MA 02110 i
l Atomic Safety and Licensing H. J. Flynn, Esq.
l Appeal Panel
- Assistant General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Federal Emergency Vanagement Agency Washington, DC 20555 500 C Street, SW Washington, DC 20472 l
l
_t,
. Philip Ahren, Esq.
Calvin A. Canney Assistant Attorney General City Hall Office 6f the Attorney General 126 Daniel Street State House Station Portsmouth, NH 03801 Augusta, ME 04333 Mr. Angie Machiros, Chairman Carol S. Snelder, Esq.
Board of Selectmen Assistant Attorney General 25 High Road Office of the Attorney General Newbury, MA - 09150 One Ashburton Place,19th Floor Boston, MA 02108 George Dana Bisbee, Esq.
Allen Lampert Assistant Attorney General Civil Defense Director Office of the Attorney General Town of Brentwood 25 Capitol Street 20 Franklin Concord, NH 03301 Exeter, NH 03E33 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esq.
William Armstrong Diane Curran, Esq.
Civil Defense Director Harmon F. Weiss Town oF Exeter 2001 S Street, NW 10 Front Street Suite 430 Exeter, NH 03833 Washington, DC 20009 Robert A. Backus, Esq.
Gary W. Holmes, Esq.
Backus, Meyer & Solomon Holmes & Ellis 116 Lowell Street 47 Winnacunnet Road Manchester, NH 03106 Hampton, NH 03842 Paul McEachern, Esq.
J. P. Nadeau Matthew T. Brock, Esq.
Board of Selectmen Shaines & McEachern 10 Central Street 25 Maplewood Avenue Rye, NH 03870 P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Judith H. Mizner, Esq.
Charles P. Graham, Esa.
Silverglate, Gertner, Baker, McKay, Murphy & Graham Fine & Good 100 Main Street 88 Board Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Boston, MA 02110 Sandra Cavutis, Chairman Robert Carrigg, Chairman Board of Selectmen Board 'of Selectmen l
RFD #1, Box 1154 Town Of0ce l
Kensington, WH 03827 Atlantic Avenue l
North Hampton, NH 03870 1
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Wil!!am S. Lord Peter J. Matthews, Mayor Board of Selectmen City Hall Town Hall - Friend Street Newburyport, MN 09150 Amesbury, MA 01913 s.
Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road South Hampton, NH 03827
- Durham, NH 038221 Hon. Corden J. Humphrey United States Senate 531 Hart Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510 l
f Med we a Gregory sF. Qelff Counsel f NR: Staff s
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