ML20151C999
| ML20151C999 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/13/1988 |
| From: | Barton P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Wylie C Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1917, NUDOCS 8804130329 | |
| Download: ML20151C999 (4) | |
Text
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CT-M/7 o
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Memorandum to:
C.
J.
Wylie, Chairman Ad Hoc Subcommit t ce on TVA Reorganization At t ent ion.
Richard Savio Senior Staff Engineer From:
Paul H.
Barton, Consultant Subject February 2-3, 1988 Meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on TVA Organizational Issues Chattanooga, Tennessee Review of Sequoyah Restart.
Review of Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan (CNPP) Revision 5.
The following comments are based on the information nresented by the NRC Staff and TVA Personnel at the February 2-3, 1983 meeting of the ACRS Subcommit tee on TVA Organizational Issues and selected documents distributed to the Subcommittee since their Novembor 4, 1987 meeting in Washington.
The presentations given by the personnel from the Office of Special project s concerning their various inspection and reviews of TVA and Sequoyah demonstrated their confidence in the present TVA Management organization and depicted the out-standing progress that has been made in the last three months toward pulling t he total project together for a Sequoyah Unit 2 restart.
They confirmed to my sat isf act ion that most of the concerns that remained after the Movember 4, 1987 Subcommittee meeting have been satisfied.
The presentations that followed, given by t he Ts'A Personnel, further satisfied my concerns for the key issues regarding Sequoyah Unit 2.
(More specifically, the key issues listed in Enclosure 1 of Victor Stello's January 13, 1988 report to the Commissioners, SECY-88-11.)
Issues worthy of comment are as follows:
Integrated design insnection of the essential raw cooling wat er syst em.
(IDI)
Following the November 4, 1987 Subcommittee meeting, I thought the 64 inspection findings could require several years to resolve.
I war pleased to learn that none of the GA04130329 300413 PDR ACR5 CT-1917 PDR
- 2.
- G4 items represented a major safety problem and that corrective actions, primarily reanalysis, have taken care of the concerns.
This IDI confirmed that an IDI of all of the Sequoyah safety systems is not justified.
Cable Insta11atjon.
My original opinion that the concerns for inadequate cable instal 10 tion practices was poorly handled by both TVA and t he Staf f st ill remains.
It has become clear that t here are bett er ways to install electrical cable than the methods used by TVA at Sequoyah, but the extensive testing and cable replacement that this concern produced has given added assurance that the silicone rubber insulated cables should give reliable service.
Engineering Ct.lculations program.
The results of the program for reviewing, revising, and regenerating design calculations gives considerable support for confidence in the design of Sequoyah in that less than 1% of the work required hardware modifications, excluding pipe support.
pipe support modifications are an industry wide problem, slowly being resolved.
Operational Readiness-Restart.
l Of all the items identified by the key issues list, I believe operational readiness deserves the most attention at this time.
The plant has not been operated for over two years; with most of the systems shutdown, operators may become complacent and develop bad habits.
Most all of the attention for the past two years has been placed on the plant design, configuration and equipment.
In my opinion, under the present circumstances, operator errors rather than equipment failures have the highest probability of developing an unusual event.
The point is that more attention should be i
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~.1 a
- ?T given to operator training, attitudes,and morale, along with adherence to procedures and equipment surveillance, rather than design and hardware failure.
This concern however, should not prevent the restart of Sequoyah No. 2 especially when considering the good reports presented by the Staff personnel and the Sequoyah plant Manager con-cerning Operational Readiness.
It was pointed out that t he "Nuclear Ethic" among operat ional personnel had improved remarkably, though not yet to the level that it should be.
The performance of the Operations Staff should be wat ched very closely during the heatup in Modes 4 and 3.
The visit to the Sequoyah plant gave added assurance that the activities of the past two years have not been just a paper exercise.
The plant's overall appearance gave the impression of a well managed facility in which the personnel take pride.
The plant was clean, free of excess material and debris, and the equipment appeared to be in good condition.
The personnel with whom we came in contact were performing in a professional manner and appeared to be dedicated to the task ahead.
The presentations made by the TVA personnel at the November 4 Subcommittee meeting described a strong, experienced, and well qualified management team.
The February 2-3 meeting gave us a chance to observe that team in action.
They clearly demonstrated management talent and adequate self confidence.
With only minor exceptions, they spoke from personal knowledge and did not avoid probing questions.
I am still not satisfied with the way the Office of Nuclear Power is organized.
There are still too many people reporting directly to Mr. Whit e; but at least for now, the
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organization appears to be achieving its intended goals, including establishing more and more TVA employees in management positions.
I was favorably impressed by all of the TVA presentations being given by TVA employees.
I also have some reservations concerning the stability of the management organization.
Many of the positions are filled by new employees who have no long time loyalty t o TVA or an at t achment to the Tennessee area.
They accept ed posit jons under the new employee home purchase and relocation incentive pay program.
The statutory limitation on salaries of TVA employees will soon catch up with these people too.
The older, long-term stable TVA employee may resent these "new-comers" in top positions, see little opportunity for promotion, and look for ot her jobs.
The continuation of the long-term program for developing young, qualified managers from within thc TVA organization is very important.
The February 2-3, 1988 meeting of the Subcommittee gave me additional assurance that the management structure established under the Office of Nuclear Power is capable and qual ied to manage the TVA Nuclear Program.
I also have reasons to believe that the Sequoyah Plant has been designed, built, and now modified, to very closely meet the current standards and regulations governing the operation of nuclear power plant s in t he Unit ed States.
At the present time, I can find no outstanding concerns of sufficient importance to prevent the heat -up of Sequoyah Unit 2 (Mode 3), and with acceptable performance by operations during the heat-up period, permission for return to power cperations should be granted.
/_.
/ & //.
I tL&v Paul H.
Barton, P.E.