ML20151A012
| ML20151A012 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07109218 |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1985 |
| From: | WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC COMPANY, DIV OF CBS CORP. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| WIPP-DOE-069, WIPP-DOE-069-R02, WIPP-DOE-69, WIPP-DOE-69-R2, NUDOCS 8804060192 | |
| Download: ML20151A012 (82) | |
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,.c a TRU WASTE e,.?*tPP-DOE-069
.a.,,,v:. REVISION 2 '
.a, ACCEPTANCE lQE.-
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CRITERIA 46 i
FOR THE WASTE N.M:/J ISOLATION PILOT PLANT SEPTEMBER 1985
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NOTIC'i This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. Neither the United States nor the Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or impli 'd, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility f or the accuracy, completeness, or usef ulness of any inf ormation, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represente that its use would not inf ringe privately owned rights.
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CONTRACTOR DE-ACO4-78ALO5346 WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.
IT CORPORATION DRAVO ENGRS., INC.
GIBBS & HILL INC.
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t WIPP-00E-069 Revision 2 l2',
UC -70 l
TRU WASlE ACCEPlANCE CRilERIA FOR THE WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT SEPIEMBER 1985 i
2 Wes tinghouse Electric Corporation WIPP Technical Support Contractor a
',o TA8LE OF CONTENTS Page Foreword........................
iv 1.0 INlRODUCTION..
s 1
2.0 MISSION AND DESCRIPlION OF WIPP 3
3.0 DEFINITIONS 11 8
4.0 WASit ACCEPlANCE CR11ERIA is Contact-Handled Waste Acceptance Criteria 15 Remote-Handled Waste Acceptance Criteria......
21 lechnical Basis for Criteria............
26 Gas Generation 26 t
Combustibility 30 Immobilization 33 Explosives and Compressed Gases........
38 Pyrophoric Materials 38 2
Radioactive Mixed Waste............
f 41 Waste Containers 44 4
Waste Package Handling 46 Waste Package Weight i
48 Waste Package Size
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48 Surface Dose Rate...............
50 Surface Contamination.
51 t
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lhermal Power..
1 53 Nuclear Criticality..........
54 Pu-239 Equivalent Activity Limits.......
57 Occumentation.................
60
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5.0 REFERENCES
ss.
11-
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t TABLE OF FIGURES Fiaure No.
Title Page 1
Surface Structures and Plant layout.
7 2
CH Emplacement Flow Diagram..
8 3
RH Emplacement Flow Diagram..
9
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4 WIPP Underground Layout 10
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l FOREWORD Criteria for the acceptance of unclassified transuranium element (1RU) contaminated wastes at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) were documented by the Waste Acceptance Criteria Steering Committee in their May 1980 report, Reference 1.
Revision 1 reflected the results of ongoing project activities, includ ing consultations with the Environmental Evaluation Group (EEG) of the State of New Mexico and the Joint Integration Of fice (JIO).
The revisions to the i 2 1
criteria presented were consistent with the original intent of the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) as presented in Reference 1.
This issue, Revision 2 reflects further engoing project activities, interactions with the above mentioned groups and other TRU program partici pants.
These revisions are also consistent with the original intent of the 2
WAC.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document is intended to delineate the criteria by which unclassified waste will be accepted for emplacement at the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in southeastern New Mexico and describe the bases upon which these criteria were established.
These criteria are not intended to be spec ifica -
tions but rather limits that will allow waste generating and shipping sites to develop their own procedures and specifications for preparation of TRU waste for shipment to the WIPP.
These criteria will also allow waste generating sites to plan future facilities for waste preparation that will produce TRU waste forms compatible with WIPP waste emplacement and isolation requirements.
These criteria only apply to contact handled (CH) and remote handled (RH) transuranic waste forms and are not intended to apply to beta gannu. wastes, spent f uel, high-level waste (HLW), low-level waste (LtW), low specific acti-vity (LSA) waste, or forms of radioactive waste for experimental purposes.
Specifications for receipt of experimental waste forms will be prepared by the responsible projects in conjunction with the staf f of the WIPP project at a later date.
In addition, these criteria only apply to waste emplaced in bedded rock salt.
Technical bases for these criteria may dif fer significantly from 1
those for other host rocks.
The technical objectives of this document can be summarized in three areas:
1.
To provide waste acceptance criteria that will permit demonstrating 2
the safe disposal of TRU radioactive waste at WIPP.
2.
To document the technical justification for TRU waste acceptance criteria for bedded salt as the host medium.
3.
To provide quantitative guidelines, in the form of criteria, that can be used by waste form developers in designing TRU waste processing systems that will produce TRU waste forms acceptable for geologic disposal in bedded salt.
1
1 1
These criteria are to be used as a supplement to lities 10 and 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) as applicable to the WIPP Project.
All
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applicable state and federal regulations relating to shipments of radioactive or hazardous materials will apply tc shipments to the WIPP.
Requests for exception to one or more of these criteria may be submitted to WIPP for approval.
Specific WIPP approval is required prior to shipping a waste package, or it will not be accepted at the gate.
All requests will be considered on a case by-case basis.
Blanket exemptions to any criterion will 2
not be approved.
Each request for exception must be submitted with sufficient justification to convince the WIPP reviewers that there is no significant personnel hazard and no significant potential increase in exposure to the i
public.
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2.0 MISSION AND DESCRIPTION OF WIPP 1
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The primary mission of the WIPP is to emplace in bedded salt the par-ticular type of radioactive waste called defense transuranic (TRU) waste:
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material contaminated with chemical elements heavier than uranium f rom defense p rog rams.
The U.S. defense program has already generated large quantitles of CH TRU waste, which requires no shielding, and RH TRU waste, which requires shielding to protect workers who handle it.
Before 1970, waste containing TRU nuclides was not segregated from other waste contaminated with low levels of radioactivity.
Therefore, a large vol-l ume of material now considered CH TRU waste was buried in a manner similar to conventional sanitary landfill operations, with additional handling precau-tions appropriate for radioactive materials.
The waste was placed in open unlined trenches and then covered with several feet of earth.
At the time of its burial, this waste was not intended to be retrieved.
In 1970, the U.S. Atomic Energy Comission changed its regulations to require wastes with known or detectable contamination of transuranium nuclides to be packaged and buried in such a fashion that they can be readily retriev-able as contamination-f ree packages within an interim period of 20 years (USAEC Imediate Action Directive 0511-21, "Policy Statement Regarding Solid Waste Burial," March 20, 1970).
Later in 1973, the Atomic Energy Comission defined 2'
transuranium solid wastes to be placed in retrievable storage as, "Those wastes with certain alpha emitting radionuclides of long half-life and high specific l
radiotoxicity to greater than 10 nCi/g..."
(ERDA Manual, Chapter 0511 011.)
In 1984, 00E Order 5820.2 redefined TRU contaminated material; that definition is included in Section 3.0.
Remote handled TRU waste has always been handled separately.
Much of it
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has been put into I to 2 foot diameter pipes placed vertically in the ground 3-
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with a shielding plug at the top of each pipe.
Other waste of this type hai heen placed in large shielded containers that reduce the radialion level at the exterior surface to relatively low levels.
At the end of 1983, the accumulated volume of IRll wdste amounteil to een estimated 8.'l million cubic f eet of material (not int luding contaminated soil est imates) containing 1100 kilocuries of alpha radiortriivity, only P.fi million i
c ub i t. f eet (940 k iloc urie<,) of which was readily ret rievable.
By the end of 19H8, this volume is projected to become 9.6 million cubic. feet, including
'l.S million cubic feet retrievably.tored, About 7/,000 cubic feet of Ril IRU waste f rom def ense programs is now in storage; this volume is expec t ed t o grw to about 38,000 cubic f eet by 1989 (Ref erenc e 2).
The ra t e a t whic h t.ont ar t hand led IRU.eas t e is produced is now about 0.73 million cubic feet per year.
The WIPP is designed to handle a maximum of 2
0.5 million cubic feet of CH waste per year on a one shif t per day, 5 day week basis.
Ihus, if the WIPP were to start accept ing wa.te in FY 1989, the eas ily ret rieved and newly generated waste could be placed in deep underground storage f
in 13 years, by ?002.
However, other f ar tors such as the transportation system and current staf fing level will limit the throughput to about 0.3 million cubic f eet per year.
in addition to the current and projec ted volumes, the WIPP could receive some IRU waste from operations such as the dismantling and decontamination of nbsolete and no longer needed weapons produc t ion f ac ilit ies.
4 f.stimates of the volume of such waste range f rom 5 to 95 million cubic f eet.
lhe amount of such waste that could be stored at the WIPP is limited by the total authorized 1RU storage area of approximately 100 acres, which has an estimated capacity of 6.2 million cubic feet.
In sunrnary, the primary need that has led to the proposal f or the WIPP is to remove this large quantity of existing defense generated waste from surface storage and to isolate it from the biosphere in a manner that will be accept able for the indefinite future.
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The WIPP has an additional mission.
Since the disposal of TRU waste will require that a deep mine be built in salt, space will be available for studies of the disposal of other forms of waste not addressed by the WAC.
A small part of the mine will be devoted to experiments using defense high level waste l
(OHLW). Such experiments are needed for developing and testing designs for future bedded-salt repositories.
The area in the WIPP set aside for potential underground storage opera -
tions is about 2000 acres; the remaining acreage will provide a buffer zone 2
around the underground operations area.
The excavation at the storage level I
will provide about 100 acres for waste disposal.
There will be a separate area of about 10 acres for waste experimentation.
Service areas will take up small additional acreage, i
i Because the WIPP will be the first bedded-salt waste research and 1
development facility, the waste will be emplaced in such a manner that it can be retrieved from its place of burial if removal becomes necessary.
At a future time, af ter further tests and analyses, a final decision will be made on whether to leave the waste emplaced permanently.
The WIPP is designed on the expectation that this decision on permanent emplacement will be made for the TRU waste 5 years after the first emplacement of each species (CH and RH).
It is anticipated that retrieval could take up to 10 years if the i
decision for retrieval is made.
The WIPP is designed to receive nuclear waste materials in protective packages, prepare them for underground storage,, ransport them to the salt bed storage locations, and provide retrievable storage.
The annual quantity of CH waste for which the WIPP has been designed is 3
0.5 million f t /yr or one shif t operation (Reference 3), the majority of which will arrive in S S -ga l lon drums banded together in six-packs; j1 4 x 4 x 7 ft and other metal boxes.
Accomodations are provided for both rail and truck shipments.
The quantity of RH waste anticipated is approximately 3
7,500 f t /yr arriving also by both rail and truck.
All RH waste will be in l f, 5-
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canisters contained within shipping casks.
Experimental waste will arrive in 2
special containers or in special shipping tasks, but only a limited number of canisters over a period of several years will be received.
I The overall plot plan for the WIPP is shown in Figure 1.
The truck, semi-trailers, and railroad cars are delivered inside the WIPP boundary and parked in the areas identified in Figure 1.
When these shipments are received, they will be surveyed for external contamination.
Any containers found with external contamination in excess of established limits as defined in these criteria will undergo decontamina. ion.
l A schematic ' low diagram for CH waste is shown in Figure 2.
The diagram j.
shows the major sttps involved in the receipt, inspection, handling, and em-placement of the waste.
Retrieval of CH waste is essentially just a reversal of the emplacement flow.
The RH waste emplacement schematic flow diagram is shown in Figure 3.
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The diagram shows the major steps involved in cask handling, hot cell opera-tion, facility cask transfer operations, and underground transporter and emplacement operations.
Remote handled retrieval from sleeved holes is simply the reverse of the emplacement procedure.
The basic underground development of the WIPP is shown in Figure 4.
l1 The WIPP underground environment during operation will be an average ambient temperature of 02*F (28'C) and an average relative humidity of less than 40 percent.
The composition of the salt is approximately 97 percent halite 2
with the remainder made up mainly of anhydrite.
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I 3.0 DEFINITIONS Contact Handled TRU Waste Transuranic waste materials that are packaged in such a way that the dose rate at the surface of the waste package is not greater than 200 mrem /hr.
Combustible Materials Combustible materials are those materials which will sustain combustion in atmospheric air when exposed to an ignition source of 1475 F (800 C) for a period of 5 minutes.
Comoressed Gas Compressed gases are those materials defined as such by 49 CFR 173, Subpart G.
Corrosive Materials Corrosive materials are those defined as such by 49 CFR 173, SL5part F.
Explosive Materials Explosive materials are those defined as such by 49 CFR 173, Subpart C.
Free Licuid Liquid that is not sorbed into a host material such that it could spill or drain f rom its container, immobilized Materials _
Materials that are fixed in a matrix such as glass, ceramic, cement, concrete, etc.
Overpack An overpack is an additional waste container placed over a waste package.
Pu-239 Eauivalent Activity The Pu-239 equivalent activity ( AM), expressed in PE-Ci, is the sum of the alpha activity which can be characterized by the expression:
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K A
AM =
4 WFj i
i=1 where K is the number of radionuclides, A is the alpha radioactivity.
j associated with radionuclide i (in curies), and WF j (a unitiess number) is the maximum permissible concentration (mpc) weighting factor for radionuclide i. WF is obtained by multiplying the mac specified in 00E j
Order 548G.l A Chapter XI, Attachment XI-1. Table 1, Column 1 for limiting 2
i II credible form by 5 x iC ml/ mci for soluble radionuclides or 2.5 x 1010 ml/uti for insoluble radionuclides to normalize the factor to the mpe for Pu-239.
Pu-239 Fissile Gram Eauivalent The amount of Pu-239 which would produce the equivalent K,77as that determined for the fissile material in the container (assuming all containers are in an optimally moderated infinite array) is called the Pu-239 fissile gram equivalent, i
l For materials other than Pu-239, U-235, and U-233 which shall be treated as equivalent ~, fissile equivalents shall be obtained using ANSI /ANS-8.15-1981 (Reference 4).
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E.y_r,opho r i c Ma te r ia l s Pyrophoric materials are defined as those which may ignite spontaneously under the ambient conditions of shipment or storage in the WIPP.
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comprehensive list ing of many of these naterials is found in 49 CF R 173, Subparts D and E.
t Radioactive Mixed Waste Rattioac t ive mixed waste is radioac t ive waste that also cont ains ha/ardou*,
materials as listed in 40 Cf R 261, Subparts C and D.
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Remote-Handled TRU Waste Iransuranic waste materials packaged such that the dose rate at the surface of the waste package is greater than 200 mrem /hr, but not greater than 100 Rem /hr.
Short Term The period of time which includes loading waste packages into the trans portation system, time in transit, and time in processing through the WIPP 3
underground emplacement is called short tcrm.
This period does not include the WIPP 5 year retrieval decision period.
TRU Watte IRU waste, for the WIPP, it defined as defense waste contaminated with certain alpha-emitting radionuclides of atomic number greater than 92 and 2
half lives greater than 20 years in concentrations greater than 100 nanocuries per gram, as implemented by 00E Order 5820.2.
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Walte.?patainer i i A waste container is the disposable containment vessel for waste mater-1 tals, including any integral liner or shielding materials, that is intended for emplacement at the WIPP.
In the case of contaminated, damaged, leaking, or breached containers, any overpack shall be considered the container, and the original container shall be considered part of the waste.
i Waste Package I
A waste package is the 1RU waste material, any loose liner materials, and the waste container that is intended to be handled and emplaced at the WIPP.
j Wa_s t e_ Pa_c ka ge As s emb l y 4
An assembly of waste packages, such as'a six pack of drums, that is intended to be handled and emplaced as a single unit by the WIPP waste handling system.
i Waste Volume Percent lhe waste material volume, excluding entrapped void spaces, of one waste form, compared to the total volume of all waste forms within that package but 2
not coa. pared to the package volume.
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4.0 WASTE ACLEPTANCE CRITERIA Contact -Handled Waste Accep,tance Criteria Gas Generation Waste packages containing waste forms known or suspected of gas genera-tion such that a combination of overpressure and explosive mixtures might damage the container in the long term, shall be provided with an appropriate method for pressure relief, Each TRU waste shipper shall provide the following data for each waste package:
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Total activity (alpha Cl) o 2
i I
Waste form description (from certification Plan) o Mass and volume percent of organic content o
For purposes of transportation and emplacement (short term) there will be no mixtures of gases or vapors in any package which could, through any credible spontaneous increase of heat or pressure, or through an explosion, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the packaging, immobilitation Powders, ashes and similar particulate waste naterials shall be immobl-lized if more than 1 weight percent of the waste matrix in each package is in 1
the form of particles below 10 microns in diameter, or if more than 15 weight percent is in the form of particles below 200 microns in diameter.
e O
15-
f liquidjsa_itel i
~
Transuranic waste shall not be in free-liquid form.
Minor liquid residues remaining in well drained bottles, cans, and other containers are acceptable.
2 i
i DR osives and Comorened Gases TRU waste shall contain no explosives or compressed gases as defined by 49 CFR 173, Subparts C and G.
l Pyrolhoric Materials i
I 1
Pyrophoric materials, other than radionuclides, shall be rendered saf e t>y mixing with chemically stable materials (e.g., concrete, glass, etc.) or pro-i 3
j cessed to remove their hazardous properties.
No more than 1 percent by weight 1
of the waste in each package may be pyrophoric forms of radionuclides, and f
{
1 these shall be generally dispersed in the waste.
l Radioactive M_ixeA,W sp 1
Iransuranic waste shall contain no hazardous wastes unless they exist as I
I co contaminants with transuranics. Waste packages containing reactive mater -
ials shall be identified with the appropriate Department of Transportation (001) label.
Transuranic -contaminated corrosive materials shall be neutra -
2 lized, rendered noncorrosive, or packaged in a manner to ensure container
)
i
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adequacy through the design lifetime.
Hazardous materials to be reported are listed in 40 CFR 261, Subparts C and D.
i Waste _ Containers Waste containers for emplacement at the WIPP shall be noncombustible and
{
)
meet all the applicable requirements of 49 CFR 173.412 for Type A packaging.
- 2
]
16-4 i
..,_._,,,m-
,,_-_..-m-__,.__-,-.__
r
--,. --,,.-,.,,.,,.,_.,- _ r-
in addition, they shall have a design life of at least 20 years from date of cert ification, including labeling.
i Any waste containers that appear to be bulged or otherwise damaged shall f
be repacked or nverpacked in a container meeting the above requirements.
1 Waste Package,Hanq[i_ng n
Contact handled 1RU waste packages shall be provided with ' cleat s, of f sets, chimes, or skids, for handling by means of fork trucks, cranes, or similar handling devices, lif t ing rings and other auxiliary lif ting devices on the l'
packages, if provided, shall be recessed, offset, or hinged, in a manner which does not inhibit stacking the packages.
Waste Packape Welaht Contact handled 1RU waste packages or package assemblies shall weigh no i
j g, nore than 25,000 pounds (11,360 kg).
2; Waste _Pach gL Size Contact handled 1RU waste packages or package assemblies shall not exceed 1
12 x 8 x 8.5 feet (3.7 x 2.4 x 2.6 m) in overall L x W x H dimensions.
l l
}urface Dose Rate Waste packages shall have a maximum surface dose rate at any point no greater than 200 mReta/hr.
Neutron contributions of greater t',an 20 mrem /hr to 2 I the total package dose rate shall be reported separately in the data package.
purf ace Contamina_t ion Contact handled 1RU waste packages or package assemblies shall have a removable surface contamination no greater than 50 picocuries per 100 cm2 1
1 17-
i l
for alpha emitting isotopes and 450 picocuries per 100 cm2 for beta gamma-emitting isotopes.
J
. Therma} P.owet Individual CH 1RU waste packages in which the average thermal power den-sity exceeds 0.1 watt /ft3 (3.5 W/m ) shall have the thermal power recorded 3
1 in the data package.
Nuj] tit, Criticality lhe fissile or fissionable isotope content for CH 1RU waste containers i
shall be no greater than the following values, in Pu-239 fissile gram equiva lents :
3 200 g per 55 gallon (0.21 m ) drum l
3 100 g per 30-gallon (J.ll m ) drum 500 g per 001 6M container 5 g per ft3 (0.028 m ) in boxes, up to 350 g maximum 3
For matertais other than Pu-239, U-235, and U-233 which shall be treated as equivalent, fissile equivalents shall be obtained using ANSI /ANS 8.15-1981 (Reference 4).
,Pu__239 Equivajent Activity 1
i Waste packages shall not exceed 1000 PE-Ci of Pu 239 equivalent activity.
labeling In addition to 00T labeling requirements, each waste package shall be uniquely identified by means of a labe' permanently attached in a conspicuous i
location.
The following information shall be included on the label:
18-1
Package identification number (to be standardized) in characters at o
I 1 least 1 inch high 1
i o Weight in Ib in characters at least 1 inch high 2
9tLa Packtge lhere shall be transmit ted to the WIPP operator in advance of shipment,
and a hard copy included with each waste package shipment, a Data Package /
Certification attesting to the fact that the waste package meets the require-ment s of these c riteria.
This Data Package / Certification shall be based upon a quality assurance program subject to audit and verification and shall provide information on the items specified below:
o Package ident ification number Six pack identification (if applicable) o 2
4 o Date of waste package certification o Waste generat ion site Date of packaging (closure date) o Haximum surf ace dose rate in mrem /hr and specific neutron dose rate if o
2 greater toan 20 mrem /hr.
o Weight (in kg) o Container type Physical description of waste form (content code) o Assay information, including PE-Cl, alpha Ci, and Pu-239 fissile gram o
^
2 equivalent contents 19-
f
.s Radioactive mixed waste (identity and quantity of ha/ardous waste l2c o
charac teris t ic( s))
l l,,
o Weight and volume percent of organic materials content i
o Measured or calculated thermal power (if over 0.1 wat t/f t )
i o Shipment number o Date of shipment l
o Vehic le number t
l e
o Vehicle type o 1RUPACI number (s) 1 l
i i
o Carrier ident ificallon s
i i
Unbalanced six pack (if applicable) o Other informat ion considered significant by the shipper o
t A hard copy of the above Data Package and a dated certification statement that the waste content and packaging are in accord with the WIPP WAC and that the waste is unclassified shall accompany each shipment, I-I i
l 4
l
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^
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i a
70-
-i
Remote Handled Weste AcceDtance Crlttria Gas Generation All RH waste canisters shall be vented.
2 Jmmob_ilization Powders, ashes and similar particulate waste materials shall be immobi-i lized if more than I weight percent of the waste matrix in each package is in
{;I the form of pa rt ic les below 10 microns in diameter, or if _more than 15 weight percent is in the form of particles below 200 microns in diameter.
Liouid Wastes Iransuranic waste shall not be in f ree-liquid form.
Minor liquid residues remaining in well-drained bottles, cans, and other containers, are acceptable.
Erolosives and Comoressed Gases r
Transuranic waste shall contain no explosives or compressed gases as 1
def'ned by 49 CFR 173, Subparts C and G.
Pyroohoric Materials Pyrophoric materials, other than radionuclides, shall be rendered safe by i
mixing with chemically stable materials (e.g., concrete, glass, etc.) or pro-1 cessed to remove their hazardous properties.
No more than 1 percent by weight I
of the waste in each package may be pyrophoric forms of radionuclides, and l2 these shall be generally dispersed in the waste.
1 i
. I i
21-1
Radioactive Mixed Waste Transuranic wastes shall contain no hazardous wastes unloss they exist as f
co contaminants with transuranics.
Transuranic contaminated corrosive mate -
rials shall be neutralized, rendered noncorrosive, or packaged in a manner to 2
ensure container adequacy through the design lifetime.
Hazardous materials to be reported are listed in 40 CFR 261, Subparts C and D.
Waste _ Containers l
{
Remote handled TRU waste containers shall be noncombustible and meet, as a minimum, the structural requirements and design conditions for Type A pack-i
!2 l aging contained in 49 CFR 173.412 (b).
In addition, all RH waste containers, i
including labeling, shall be certified to a WIPP approved specification to l2 have a design life of at least 20 years from the date of certificction.
i Waste Package Handlina Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall be equi ped with an axial lif ting p
1 pintle of a design acceptable to the WIPP.
The packages shall have no other lif ting devices.
Waste Package Weicht i
Remote handled TRU waste packages shall weigh no more than 8,000 pounds 2
(3,630 kg).
I Waste Package Size Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall be no larger than a nominal l
26 inches (0.66 m) in diameter with a maximum length of 10 feet,1 inch 2
t (3.1 m), including the pintle.
)
~22-
jurface Oose Rate Remote handled IRU waste parkages shall have a surface dose rate at any point no greater than 100 Rem /hr.
Neutron contributlons are limited to l
270 mrem /hr.
Neutron contribution of greater than 20 mrem /hr to the total l
package dose rate shall be reported in the dato package.
On an exception
!2 basis with WIPP prior approval, RH TRU canisters with a dose rate in excess of 1
100 Rem /hr but less than 1000 Rem /hr may be shipped to WIPP.
i I
Surface Contamination i
Remote-handled 1RU waste packages shall have a removable surface contami-i nation no greater than 50 picocuries per 100 cm2 for alpha emitting isotopes 1
2 and 450 picocuries per 100 cm f or beta gartvna-emit t ing isotopes.
The rma l,,Ppwe r
.j 1he thermal power generated by waste materials in any RH TRU waste package
!I shall not exceed 300 watts.
The thermal power will be recorded in the data 2-package.
1 Nuclear Criticality i
The fissile or fissionable isotope content of RH 1RU waste shall not I
exceed 1.9 g/ liter (averaged over any 5 liters with a maximum 50 percent void l
(
space).
If such reasonable distributlon cannot be ensured, then the canister
)
is limited to 240 g total (in Pu 239 fissile gram equivalents).
The canister l
may be loaded with 001 11C or 17H drums, which will provide internal l
partitioning and increase the limits to 100 g each for 30 gallon (0.11 m )
3 2
drums and 200 g each for 55 gallon (0.21 m ) drums.
For materials other than Pu-239, U 235, and U-233 which shall be treated as equlvalent, fissile equivalents shall be obtained using AN51/ANS-8.lS-1981 (Reference 4).
9 23-
i P.u-239 Eauivalent Activity Waste packages shall contain no more than 1000 PE Ci of Pu-239 equivalent 2:
activity.
l.abeling Each waste Dackage shall be uniquely identified by means of an identification number permanently attached to the container in a conspicuous i
location using characters at least 2 inches high.
Data _ Package lhere shall'be transmitted to the WIPP operator in advance of shipment, I
and a hard copy included with each waste package shipment, a Data Package /
Certification attesting to the fact that the waste package meets the require-ments of these criteria.
This Data Package / Certification shall be based upon l
a quality assurance program subject to audit and verification and shall provide information on the items specified below:
l f
o Package identification number 4
Date of waste package certification 2<
o
+
o Waste generation site t
i
]
o Date of packaging (closure date)
)
Maximum surface dose rate in mrem /hr and specific neutron dose rate if 2
o greater than 20 mrem /hr I
)
o Weight (in kg) 1
{-
o Container type 1
. 4 i
Physical descript ion of waste forrii (content code) o o Assay information, including PE Ci and Pu 239 fissile gram equivalent contents 2
Radioac t ive mixed wast e (ident ity and quant it y of haiardous o
waste characteristic (s))
Measured or calculated thermal power o
o Shipn.ent number Date of shipment o
l o Vehicle number o Vehicle type 2
o Cask number j
Carrier identification o
l Other informatlon considered significant by the shipper.
o A hardcopy of the above Data Package and a dated certification statement that waste content and packaging are in accord with the WIPP-WAC, and the l
2 waste is unclassified shall accompany each shipment.
25-
s M hnical Bases for Criteria l
GtL Generation ( Aeference 5) l2 Degradation of TRU wastes potentially produces significant quantitles of gas.
The possibility that enough gas buildup could occur to pressurize the
{1 storage facility and induce fractures in the rock salt has been investigated.
The experimental program to quantify these ef f ects is well summarized in 2
Reference 5.
l Waste degradation by various mechanisms has been studied and the ranges of gas generation rates have been determined.
Analysis of the storage i
1 facility response to gas production requires data on gas flow through rock salt and on the possible deformation of the storage rooms as a response to gas
'1 pressure.
Laboratory studies of rock salt permeability have been considered along with data from WIPP site borehole tests to establish a realistic data base.
Finite difference models were utilized to analyze room response during and after the periods of gas production.
Calculated stress states were e
compared with very conservative criteria for the initiation and propagation of fractures.
An evaluation of all these cansiderations was made in the formulation of the criterion for gas-generating materials.
While bacterial degradation of organic material in the waste is thought f
to offer the potential for a significant gas-generation rate, other sources of i
gas generation must be considered in determining compliance with this crl-j terion.
Radiolytic degradation of some waste matrices also can contribute significant gas generation in the storage array, depending on the activity l 2 level in the waste, and the presence of oxidizers and moisture.
In addition l
to contributing to gas generation, radiolysis can produce flammable gas mix.
i i
tures within the waste container.
The possibility of flawnable gas mixtures l
relates to safety of waste handling during emplacement as well as meeting l
transportation regulations, j
26-
Operational concerns of a shorter term are not related to storage facility j
2.
inflation but rather to the production of combustible gases which combined with overpressure might result in release of radioactive materials.
The ef fects of gas pressurization could be important to the long-term containment of radionutildes in the WIPP.
If fractures could be initiated and propagated to regions where fluids are present, water intrusion of the storage i
facility could follow.
In addition, if room closure is restricted (by gas
{
pressure), a horizontal region of higher fluid transmissivity could develop, i
thereby enhancing the potential for fluid motion through the facility.
The concern for gas generation in the CH TRU waste storage rooms arises from the tightly packed configuration of the waste containers:
the areal 3
storage density is about 72,000 f t / acre (5,000 m / hectare).
Remote-handled TRU waste, on the other hand, is emplaced with an areal l
3 3
storage density of only about 1750 f t / acre (125 m / hectare); even with 1
worst-case assumptions for gas generation, there is no threat to the integrity of the combined CH and RH storage rooms because the increase in storage den-sity is only 3 percent.
There is, therefore, no need for a criterion which limits the amount of gas-producing materials in RH TRU waste.
3 2
Theoretical studies (Reference 5) of radiolytic, thermal, corrosive, and bactert.1 degradation of TRU wastes have indicated that a reference drum containing 60 kg of organics would produce 5600 moles of gas if complete volatilizat son (e.g., in combustion) took place.
Laboratory data indicate that this potential will never be reached.
A more reasonable estimate is
{
that a maximum of 2000 moles of gas per drum could potentially be produced (at a maximum generation rate of about 5 moles / year).
It has been observed l
(Reference 5) that most of the gas is produced by bacterial decomposition of
\\
2 the cellulosic components of the waste.
The response of a sealed storage facility to this empirical gas genera-tion rate has been analyled using techniques that consider permeation of 1
27-
)
l t
gas through the rock salt, the pressurization of the open drif t, and the deformation of the surrounding rock.
Parameters for these calculations are taken from labora*.ory and field permeability measurements that range f rom O.5 to 25 microdarcies, and assumptions of even lower permeabilities, down to 0.05 microdarcy.
Calculations were performed for conditions in which rooms were modeled as rigid volds with 25 percent of original drif t volume, and for conditions in which rooms were allowed to deferm in response to gas pressure.
In the former case, with a total gas generation of 2000 moles / drum in 400 years and with a permeability of 0.5 microdarcy, the maximum pressures were 11 MPa, or 110 atmospheres.
At higher permeabilities, as observed in the field, pres-surization was insignificant.
Coupling of pressurization with room response 7
indicated that maximum pressures were similar, and that the only impact of the gas generation at 0.5 microdarcy was a delay of, full room closure from ap-proximately 100 years to about 800 years.
There was no significant delay for permeabilities in the 25 -microdarcy range.
l The calculations revealed that pressurization did not significantly alter the room volume even at permeabiltles as low as 0.05 microdarcy.
i The gas-generation criterion was developed from the relationship between the allowable gas-generation rate in a fixed volume room (25 percent of original volume) and the ef fective permeability of the geologic formation, with the restriction that the lithostatic pressure could not be exceeded (the assumption being that prop-agation of existing cracks will occur at pressures above lithostatic).
Using a two dimensional porous flow model and a permeability value of 0.1 microdarcy, the allowable gas -generation rate was determined to be 5 moles /yr per drum (particularly from bacterial decomposition).
Conservative judgments have been made as to the impact of the uncertain-ties in the assumed gas -generation rate.
It is Sandia's judgment (Reference 5)
I that the 10 moles per year per cubic meter of storage room volume is unlikely
{2
),
to be exceeded in the WIPP environment from wastes meeting these criteria, I
J I
28-
especially if temperatures are near ambient.
It should be noted that no high 3
heat producing waste such as fuel elements will be disposed of in the WIPP and that the limited amount of defense high-level waste which will be emplaced temporarily during the proposed in-situ experimental program will not perturb the temperature of the TRU waste disposal rooms, due to the large separation 2
distancc-of at least 2600 f t.
The values chosen for permeability are taken f rom state-of the-art laboratory and field data with resolution capabilities between 0.05 and 0.10 microdarcy.
While the measured values (0.5 to 25 microdarcles) are considered to be accurate reflections of the actual pernwability (under the test conditions), lower values were assumed for conservatism; these lower values of permeability, of course, resulted in higher pressures and longer delayed closures, but no potential for f rac ture.
As a final point of dis-
! 2; cussion, bounding case analysis (Reference 6) indicates that even if the most serious consequences of gas pressurization (i.e., fracture and increased fluid transmissivity) do occur, the effect in terms of dose to af fected populations is insignificant.
Therefore, for long-term storage consideration, the waste generators need only provide the data specified in the criterion and this will be handled on an operational basis at the WIPP.
I Methods for reducing gas accumulation in the waste package are available.
i Gas-generation rates can be reduced by controlling the total alpha curie load-t ing of drums containing waste matrices known to produce significant quantitles t
of gases, such as combustibles and sludges.
Another method is the possible-l use of hydrogen getters (recombination catalysts), compounds which selectively 2
react with hydrogen.
Finally, gas accumulation can be reduced by the use of a suitable vent system on the waste package.
The internal packaging materials may impede the flow of gases to the container vent system, however, and must
~
be evaluated.
I Explosive mixtures and container overpressure are addressed in 00T i
I regulations, specifically 49 CFR 173.?l(c), 173.24(a)(3), 173.412(h), and j
173.475(h).
Meeting these shipping requirements will also provide adequate safety consideration to the unloading and emplacement activities at the WIPP.
l
[
f l
Based upon the above, the following criteria have resulted:
i Contact Handled Waste s
Waste packages containing waste forms known or suspected of gas genera tion, such that a combination of overpressure and explosive mixtures might I
damage the container in the long term, shall be provided with an appropriate method for pressure relief.
l Each TRU waste shipper shall provide the following data for ear.h waste
[
package:
i o total activity (alpha Ci) 2 o. Waste form description (f rom Certification Plan)
Mass and volume perrent of organic content o
For purposes of transportation and emplacement (short term) there will be i
no mixture of gases or vapors in any package which could, through any credible spontaneous increase of heat or pressure, or through an explosion, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the packaging.
)
Remote Handled Waste All RH TRU waste canisters shall be vented.
2 1
j C_ombustibility (see Reference 5) i 1
Most of the existing contact-handled TRU waste is stored in 001 17C 2
or 17H 55 gallon drums or in 0017A fiberglass reinforced polyester (FRP)-
coated plywood boxes.
Since the packaged waste is known to contain substanttal amounts of organic material, the waste itself is considered to be com>ustible.
i*
j Examination of the combustibility issue focused on the containers in which the waste is to be received at the WIPP.
Spec ifically, the capability of these 4
30-
-w
l I
i l
L containers to function as "fire barriers" Intended to prevent involvement of the contained waste in postulated fire scenarios was examined, t
Secondary container capability issues were that; a) containers themselves were not to be combustible, adding fuel to the fire, b) containers should not I
aCl as a means of fire propagallon, and c) contdiners should not present problems such as stack instability or explosion hazards that could produce j
high speed missiles.
These items were the subject of fire studies conducted l
by Sandia Laboratories.
I i
The test', f ocused on contact handled waste because, although remote -
handled TRU waste exists in essentially the same variety of forms as does I
contact handled TRU waste, it is always packaged in metallic containers and is always isolated from possible exposure to fires by a shielding cask or, after omplacement, by salt.
There is, therefore, no credible mechanism by which f
romote handled TRU waste could become involved in a WIPP fire.
Because experimental evidence (Reference 7) supplement *d by operational 2
i
'i j
history supports the conclusion that there is no danger of sustained combustion
(
of packaged 1RU waste due to spontaneous internal ignition, the fire hazard to j
the WIPP facility is limited to exposure of waste packages to external fires.
Concern was therefore focused on those areas of the facility where the CH
(
waste handling operations are carried out, and the kinds of external fires which might occur there, specifically the receiving and staging areas at the surface and the active storage rooms underground.
In the surface facilities, the appropriate countermeasure for fire hazards e
is the use of conventional autonatic fire detection and suppression systems j
such as those used in warehouses.
Underground, the presence of water and salt together can produce undesirable ef fects like corrosion and electrical hazards.
j Further, the storage areas are quite extensive and dispersed, and the point of I
greatest vulnerability to a fire, the open f ace of the storage stack, is always i
moving.
Therefore, the problem underground le. somewhat different.
In order to quantify the fire danger, Sandia conducted fire tests which were designed to simulate severe, but not incredible, fires.
l 1
i in these tests, FRP-coated plywood boxes, and 001 17C and 00T 17H type drums were found to pose possible fire hazards in WIPP accident scenarios, in that they fall (under test conditions) to function as a fire barrier to protect the contained waste.
Further, the FRP coated plywood boxe3 actually provide f uel for the propagation of a fire, and the protective coating produces a dense i
toxic smoke. Steel overpacks have been shown in the full scale fire tests to be ef fective as a countermeasure to the combustibility of the FRP coated l
plywood boxes.
i lhe fire tests also demonstrated that venting drums or steel overpacks is an ef fective way to relieve internal pressure in the containers, prevent ing overpressurizing with resultant bulging or exploding.
Filters on vents are i
designed to allow for nsrmal atmospheric pressure relief without release of radioactive material; however, they will probably not prevent drums from
'2i rupturing turing a fire.
The filters would have to have a large flow capacity to handle the rapid outgassing, be able to trap radioactive particles and
{
{
still not clog due to other particles (smoke), not be consumed by tne fire, and not Compromise the container integrity for use in shippi!').
The totality of the combustibility concerns were studied by the WIPP l
Project team because of the fire protection design impact.
The Sandia fire test data consitute only one aspect of the overall fire protection problem.
I Other aspects are associated with the likelihood of the fire occurrence, its potential magnitude, the ability to detect it, and the ability to control it.
Further modifications to the containers have been suggested and were con-3 sidered.
The conclusion reached by the WIPP Project staff is that while the fires created in the Sandla tests appear to be quite severe, they are easily i
prevented and combatted; further the health and safety risks presented by such i
fires do not require more than overpacking the FRP coated plywood boxes in l
appropriate metal containers.
The steel overpacks for organic waste 1
i l
i 32-I a
4 i
containers (FRP coated plywood boxes or similar containers) have been included as a waste acceptance criterion requirement under the heading of "Waste 1
l Containers."
i Operational techniques and administrative controls will be used to further enhance fire safety in the storage areas.
Examples of these are i
administrat ively limiting the amount of vehicular traf fic and vehicle parking in areas adjacent to amassed waste, and continuous backfilling of the storage rooms (with salt) as the stacking proceeds to limit the numbers of containers at risk at any time.
These measures,in conjunct ion with appropriate fire j
detection and suppression methods for use at the "open" face of the storage stacks, essentially eliminate the storage room fire hazard.
1he above leads to the conclusion that there is no need to limit the q
combustibles present in the waste provided that the waste containers are j_
noncombustible.
Consequently, there is no criterion for combustibility in l;
contact handled or remote-handled TRU waste.
,!nunobilizatlo,n -Nobility Enhancement Concern (Reference 5) n i
lhe WIPP experimental program has emphasized waste / rock interactions and
)
the subsequent interaction of the released radioruclides with the local geolo-gic environment.
Studies have been devoted to the identification of concerns that would lead to restrictions on waste form.
The requirement for leachability criteria has been considered in view of the conclusions resulting
)
from bounding consequence assessment calculations.
Waste form and container degradation have 'been shown to produce chemical species whose interactions 2
j with the waste can reduce radionuclide sorption on rock in or near the storage facility.
Consequently, these degradation reactions have been studied to
]
identify potential complexing agents, particularly organics, which can enhance radionuclide mobility.
Observations from these studies have been compared
\\
with data for sorption in the WIPP environment and with calculations that predict the consequences of radionuclido release scenarios.
d l
1 33-
l A byproduct of these studies has been the identification and testing of
' getter
- materials thit are strong sorbers of the radionuclides, particularly the actinides in the waste and can serve as barriers to water movement toward the waste containers.
While there is no present justification for including getters as an integral part of individual waste packages, some materials such as bentonite clays show great promise as an additional element of the 'sulti-ple barrier" concept.
The most effective use of getters may be as a backfill material or a water absorbant.
The prohibition against the presence of free liquids is applied to 1RU waste sludges (some initially containing up to 60 percent water) as well as
)
other liqu 15.
The presence of free liquids would provide a significant poten-t 1
tlal for releasing contaminated liquids if containers failed during receipt, handling, or emplacement operations. Although personnel exposure during such an accident would typically tend to be small, decontamination activities in.
below ground facilities in the salt could be dif ficult.
Elihinating free liquids reduces the probability and potential magnitude of contamination
)
events.
Consequences of ligulds during the retrieval period are related to j
j container leakage.
Liquids could possibly accelerate container corrosion rates from the inside causing a release of liquid to the salt storage meatum.
2 Interaction of the liquids, especially water, with the salt could result in 2
l brine formation.
Depending on the quantities of liquid involved, brine solu-4 tion could spread to adjacent containers, perhaps jeopardizing their structural integrity.
Retrieval, if necessary, would be adversely affected if several containers' integrities were at risk.
i Brine formation or other interactions involving liquids and the salt medium have been evaluated for other possible hazards, such as strong acids, chlorine gas, etc., with the conclusion that toxic substances would not be i
formed.
A4-i
The principal isolation barrier in the WIPP is the local host rock, which inhibits the intrusion of fluid and the subsequent escape of radionuclides.
This isolation is provided by the large thickness of the low-permeability salt at the repository horizon, by a very favorable (regional) hydrology near the site, and by the sorptive properties of the adjacent (or bounding) rock salt 2
and other rock strata.
Calculations which assess the potential consequences of assumed radioactive materials release scenarios have been performed using empirical data for both the flow system and the sorptive capacity of the rock.
Further, very conservative assumptions that the waste dissolves instantly when contacted by water, and that the resulting "solution" moves 2
with the same velocity as water through the host rock, were also employed.
Studies addressing the various aspects of waste-form stablity and radionuclide mobility have led to the following conclusions:
1.
lhe consequence assessments for the WIPP have identified that brine intrusion into the geologic containment will have negligible risk to the 1
public.
These studies assumed waste dissolution rates equivalent to that of the salt itself (and orders of magnitude in excess of those found experimentally in proposed developmental waste forms, or in currently existing TRU waste which contains actinides in forms of extremely low solubility).
l.eaching studies on existing waste forms would be not only experimentally difficult but very likely inconclusive, because of the very large variety and diversity of waste forms.
There is no concern 1
with small quantities of water introduced to the storage area in the long term, and proper packaging can obviate the concern for small quantitles of liquids in containers which might accelerate the corrosion process 2
j during the retrieval period.
2.
Complexing agents have been found that can substantially decrease the sorptive capacity of the host rock for radioisotopes such as Pu.
How-ever, analyses have demonstrated the insensitivity of nuclide release rates at the biosphere outlet to large variations in the assumed 1 ;
t 6
adsorption coefficients (Reference 8). This is due to both the long 2
travel time for natural water flow between the WIPP site and the natural
~
biosphere outlet and the long half-lives of the nuclides involved, 1
it should be noted that processes are available and planned for dewatering and immobilizing sludges at several 00E facilities, such that liquid contents are reduced to as little as 10 to 15 weight percent.
Further, authorization to ship fissile materials in liquid form is most difficult to obtain, and 2
shipments of liquid wastes are not included in the current 00E transportation 1
l plan.
Based on the above, the quantitles of free liquid shipped to WIPP are restricted, j
i immobilization (Dispersibility and inhalation Concern) in addition to long-term concerns about in-situ immobilization, there exists an immediate hatard to the general public and WIPP operating personnel if powdered or potentially airborne TRU waste forms are routinely handled.
A breach of a waste container containing a finely divided waste form could cause l
widespread contamination (which is another kind of radionuclide mobility).
Studies have shown that particles less than 10 microns in diameter pose the greatest hazard of being inhaled and retained in human lungs (Reference 9).
Therefore, it is desirable to minimize these respirable fines in any waste
- package, i
Since it cannot be guaranteed that there are absolutely no respirable particles in a waste package, the criterion effectively limits the quantities i
of respirable dust to a restrictive, but achievable level of I percent by I
weight.
I.
t Further analysis for the WIPP Safety Analysis Report supports the one-percent criterion by showing that dose conmitments to WIPP operating personnel are acceptable, under accident conditions, if the 1 percent criterion is used.
4,
4 Particles under 200 microns in diameter (fine sand size) are readily dispersible and would contaminate the immediate vicinity in the event of a spill.
These do not create a situation as hazardous as respirable particles, 1
but decontamination and clean up do increase overall personnel exposures.
Fif teen percent by weight was selecteo as an upper limit to minimize the ef fect of a spill involving particles of this size range.
Therefore, the associated criteria read as follows:
I Contact Han/ led Waste Immobilization--Powders, ashes, and simliar particulate waste materials shall be immobilized if more than 1 weight percent of the waste matrix in each 1
package is in the form of particles below 10 microns in diameter, or if more than 15 weight pe.rcent is in the form of particles below 200 microns in diameter.
Liquid Wastes -TRU waste shall not be in free-liquid form.
Minor liquid 2
residues remaining in well drained bottles, cans, and other containers, are acceptable.
1 Remote-Handled Weste immobilization -Powders, ashes, and similar particulate waste materials shall be immobilized if more than 1 weight percent of the waste matrix in each package is in the form of particles below 10 microns in diameter, or if more 1
than 15 weight percent is in the form of particles below 200 microns in d iameter, kiauid Wastes--TRU waste shall not be in free-liquid form.
Minor liquid residues remaining in well drained bottles, cans, and other containers, are 2
acceptable.
t 4
Explosives and Comoressed Gases Certain materials could present an extreme hazard if they are contained in TRU waste packages.
Explosive materials and compressed gases, by their nature, not only present a hazard to operating personnel during shipment and handling, but also increase the chance of failure of individual waste packages containing such materials during storage and provide an improbable but pos-sible source for a propagating failure of waste packages in a storage array.
Therefore, a criterion to prohibit these materials in the WIPP has been established.
i The WIPP is not designed to handle or store explosive materials or com-pressed gases, nor are TRU-contaminated explosive materials or compressed gases expected to be generated in any appreciable quantitles at the waste generating sites.
Accordingly, neither explosive materials nor compressed gases will be accepted for emplacement at the WIPP.
Therefore, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact -Handled Waste Transuranic waste shall contain no explosives or compressed gases as i
defined by 49 CFR 173, Subparts C and G.
l Remote-Handled Weste Transuranic waste shall contain no explosives or compressed gases as i
defined by 49 CFR 173, Subparts C and G.
Pyrophoric Materials Pyrophoric materials which could ignite spontaneously under conditions of transportation, handling, or emplacement also present a special hazard.
A comprehensive listing of these materials is presented in 49 CFR 173, Subparts D and E. 1
l l
Presently, many waste generating < ttes rout inely dispose of small quanti-ties of materials of a pyrophoric nature (and form) in IRU waste packages.
'I Comonly used materials that would fall under the pyrophoric classification, in addition to the radionuclide materials themselves, are titanium, magnesium, and zirconium metals and alloys; white and yellow phosphorous; and alkali 2
metals.
Uranium and plutonium metals are considered pyrophoric under many conditions.
Packaging, transportation, handling, and emplacement of uncon-trolled quantit les of these potentially pyrophoric materials could result in fires, personnel injury, and contamination spread via products of combustion.
l Even though these meterials are packaged in accordance with 001 regulations to
)
preclude ignition and are not expected to ignite under the normal environ-mental conditions encountered during transportation, handling, and emplacement (Reference 7), the instability of these materials reasonably justifies either liciting their quantity and requiring their dispersion (to minimize their l
pyrophoric nature) in any single 1RU waste package or requiring their 2
precessing to a nonpyrophoric form.
l l
1he waste forms being produced at the waste generating facilities include small quantities of transuranic metals in pyrophoric form (i.e., primarily I
small dustlike particles in the form of IRU contamination).
Fnrtunately, these pyrophoric inras of the transuranic metals are relatively uniformly t
dispersed throughout the waste packages, thereby rendering the material safe since it is not concentrated in suf ficient quantitles to become hazardous, lhe waste forms being produced at the waste generating facilities also includes certain quantities of nonradionuclide pyrophoric material'. such as magnesium and zirconium metals and alloys, as well as others.
Studies at Rocky Flots (Reference 10) have shown that small quantitles of pyrophoric plutonium can be accomodated in other nonpyrophoric materials with:ut an unacceptable hazard.
Rocky Flats allows up to 3 percent pyrophoric plutonium metal in nonpyrophoric plutonium oxide.
A 1-percent limit has been established in the criteria for the WIPP as an acceptable level of pyrophoric material in a transuranic waste package.
This allows a limited quantity of
. )
1 nonfissionable waste (which varies according to package weight) to be con-tained in each package beyond the 100, 200, and 350 gram limits for fissile isotopes in the various-sized waste containers.
The i percent is used instead i
of 3 percent since TRU waste forms are not as uniform or homogeneous as the materials in the Rocky Flats study, and there is no guarantee of uniform i
dispersal of pyrophorics in TRU waste.
The waste acceptance criteria for pyrophoric materials or materials which i
in combination are pyrophoric permit nonradioactive, TRU-contaminated pyro-2 phoric materials in any quantity to be emplaced in the WIPP if such materials have been rendered safe by uniformly mixing them with chemically stable mater-tais such as concrete, glass, ceramics, etc., or by processing them to remove the hazardous pyrophoric properties.
These requirements are imposed in order to restrict the quantity of pyro-phoric materials emplaced at the WIPP in any single waste package and thereby reduce any potential hazard.
The pyrophoric forms of the radionuclides cannot be excluded from the waste packages emplaced at the WIPP, since they can be construed to be pyrophoric under almost any condition.
However, other pyro-phoric materials must be restricted to acceptable levels to avoid the I
possibility of using the WIPP as a hazardous chemical disposal facility.
Therefore, based upon the above, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact Handled Waste Pyrophoric materials, other than radionuclides, shall be rendered safe by mixing with chemically stable materials (e.g., concrete, glass, etc.) or pro-cessed to remove their hazardous properties.
No more than I percent by weight 1
3 of the waste in each package may be pyrophoric forms of radionuclides, and these shall be generally dispersed in the waste, I
l 1,
f i
Pgmote-Handled Waste i
Pyrophoric materials, other than radionuclides, shall be rendered safe by mixing with chemically stable materials (e.g., concrete, glass, etc.) or pro-cessed to remove their hazardous properties.
No more than 1 percent by weight
- 1 of the waste in each package may be pyrophoric forms of radionuclides, and these shall be generally dispersed in the waste, t
Radioactive Mixed Waste i
L The WIPP is not intended to be a hazardous waste disposal facility, and j
there are no plans to ship highly toxic substances as such to the WIPP.
However, some of the TRU waste to be shipped to the WIPP might also fall within the accepted definition of hazardous waste.
Waste which falls within
[
both TRU and hazardous waste definitions is called ' Radioactive Mixed Waste."
^
defined and addressed in 00E Order 5480.2,' ' Hazardous an'd Radioactive Mixed Waste Management,' specifically. 00E Order 5480.2, Chapter II, paragraph 2(a) l states:
'For high level and transuranic mixed waste, 00E 5820.2' radiological 1
control requirements for handling, packaging, transportation, storage, dis-posal, and monitoring shall be applied.
The field of fice manager shall verify 2
I that these requirements provide adequate protection for the public and the environment from potential hazards which may derive from hazardous character-l istics other than radioactivity, and shall impose any additional requirements I
that will be necessary to achieve such protection".
The 00E has decided that mixed waste shall be handled by a program com-j parable to that imposed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) under regulations written by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
{
Mixed waste for shipment to the WIPP must first meet the definition for 1RU waste.
Nonradioactive hazardous waste, low-level mixed, or high-level 01xed wastes are not to be shipped to WIPP.
Further, the hazardous waste constitutents (components which make waste hazardous) must exist as co-contaminants due to gwnerator site work activities. Adding hazardous
-41
wastes to TRU waste streams for ease for hazardous waste disposal is not
- i allowed.
Radioactive mixed wastes are a health and safety concern to the
)
WIPP, and their presence requires a determination that plans for packaging, handling, shipping, emplacement, retrieval, and long term storage at the WIPP include adequate health and safety considerations.
]
I The four characteristics which make waste hazardous are:
1.
EP Toxicity The primary health and safety concerns relative to public and worker t
{
safety involve human exposure to either respirable airborne or I
driniting water concentrations of toxic materials.
The transuranic (radioactive) constituents in wastes contribute the most substantial toxicity hazard.
Therefore, adequate considerations of the hazards inherent in shipping, handling, and disposal operations at the WIPP for the TRU radioactive components will, by definition, provide adequate protection from hazards to the presence of other substances 2
identified in the EP Toxicity list.
Neither the regulations governing hazardous waste disposal nor the WIPP-WAC allow disposal of waste in liquid form.
Hazardous waste in solid form is normally disposed of by shallow land-burial techniques.
These techniques are judged adequate to protect the health of the public from the basic toxicity characteristic.
Because of the TRU radioactive materials component of the waste for i
the WIPP, disposal is in a dry salt formation about 2100 feet below the surface.
The containment provided by the salt formation is orders of magnitude greater than shallow land burial requirements for hazardous wastes.
WIPP criteria require all waste to be packaged in approved 00T
.l Type A containers for disposal.
For shipment to WIPP, the Type A containers wi)) be overpacked in a 00T Type 8 equivalent container.
Oue to the rigorous requirements for packaging, labeling, placarding,
)
transportation, storing and disposing of TRU radioactive waste under i
42-i
l 00t orders and related DOT regulations, these requirements are equivalent to or more stringent than regulations applying to other
{
types of hazardous or toxic substances.
In short, health and safety
,{
protection required by these criteria, because of the presence of the toxic TRU component, provide more than adequate safety for i
handling and disposing of the radioactive mixed wastes.
P 2.
Corrosivity i
Corrosives possibly present problems to the WIPP from a safety handling standpoint and from a retrievablitty standpoint (container degradation could adversely affect retrievability).
Corrosives, however, are easily neutralized or reacted chemically to produce a I
noncorrosive form.
Forther, use of a corrosive-resistent inner j
liner (a go-mil rigid polyethylene liner, for example) with the standard Type A container is adequate to ensure that the waste
'2 package will remain intact for the retrieval period.
Therefore, WIPP criteria adequately address corrosivity.
j
\\
3.
Reactivity It is possible that small quantitles of TRU weste might contain reactive materials (magnesium, sodium, potassium, etc.) distributed on radioactively contaminated components as a thin film, or present as residue inside cracks, crevices, etc. When properly pac'saged, these materials present little or no harard.
Since raat.tive mate-rials are hazardous when they come in contact with water, handling and storage at the WIPP might present safety problems (in the event of a fire fought with water).
Therefore, the WIPP requires that reactive materials be specifically identified by the appropriate DOT label on the container and in the Data Package.
Liquid waste forms are not allowed in the WIPP wastes and storage is in dry, bedded salt.
-4 3 -
s 4.
Ignitability Ignitable (pyrophoric) materials are precluded by the WIPP criteria.
I Therefore the protection af forded by adherence to the WIPP criteria i.
and the 00T regulations for packaging has been shown to be more than adequate for the major health hazards from hazardous westes, namely toxicity, corrosivity ignitability, and reactivity.
The require-ments of 000 5480.2 Chapter 11, paragraph 2(a) are met by adherence tu the WIPP WAC.
Based upon the above, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact Handled Waste l
l Transuranic wastes shall contain no hazardous wastes unless they exist as 2
co-contaminants with transuranics. Waste packages containing reactive mate-rials shall be identified with the appropriate 00T label.
TRU-contaminated l
corrosive materials shall be neutralized, rendered noncorrosive, or packaged in a manner to ensure container adequacy through the design lifetime.
l Hazardous materials to be reported are listed in 40 CFR 261 Subparts C and O.
Remote Handled Weste Transuranic waste shall contain no hazardous wastes unless they exist as l
co-contaminants with transuranics.
Transuranic -contaminated corrosive mater-j tais shall be neutralized, rendered noncorrosive, or packaged in a manner to ensure container adequacy through the design lifetime.
Hazardous materials to be reported are listed in 40 CFR 261, Subparts C and O.
Weste Containers i
Past practice in TRU waste disposal has been to package TRU waste mater-l1 ials in waste containers (' packaging
- as used in 001 regulations) that meet 3
I, the currently applicable requirements of the DOT for Type A radioactive
)
material packaging as specified in 49 CFR 178.350.
These containers, such as 44-l l
l
i I
the Spec.17H $$-gallon drums and the Spec. 7A Rocky Flats boxes, meet certain minimum requirements for durability and are capable of passing prescribed tests to ensure their suitability for transport.
Most 001 Type 8 packagings, which are capable of withstanding hypothetical accident conditions, are required to have their contents packaged in Type A containers.
1 The CH waste handling system at the WIPP is not appreciably different in operation from past practices in CH waste handling and will not expose waste packages to any additional handling stresses.
However, the WIPP does impose a l1 15 year retrievability period on 1RU waste while maintaining waste container
'1tegrity, which may affect use of single-trip containers such as the 17C and 17H drums.
In addition, the combustibility studies (Reference 5) have shown that the FRP-coated plywood boxes are unacceptable without an overpacking 2
steel container.
Remote handled waste will be hnndled only by remote means in the WIPP hot cell and facility cask. This will minimize personnel exposure to potential accidents and will permit on site handling of RH waste in Type A containers.
Remote-handled waste packages emplaced in the WIPP must also be retrievable for a pertoo of 15 years after emplacement and those containers must be fitted 2
[
with filtered vents.
In addition, RH containers must also be compatible with i
the remote handling equipment used at the WIPP and must not have any protru-Sions that could interfere with insertion and removal from casks, racks, i
storage sleeves, etc.
I Since RH canisters for the WIPP will be of 5$ecial design, certification l2 l
j will be required that RH containers have been designed, fabricated and tested i
to a specification acceptable to the WIPP Project.
I
(
j Since much waste will be packaged and put in interim storage several 2
I years prior to being shipped to WIPP, 20 years has been established as the design life.
1 45-l 4
)
t Based upon the above, the following criteria result:
Contact-Handled Waste Waste containers for emplacement at the WIPP shall be noncombustible and meet all the applicable requirements of 49 CFR 173.412 for Type A packaging.
In addition, they shall have a design life of at least 20 years from date of 2
certification, including labeling.
waste containers that appear to be bulged or otherwise damaged shall I 1 he
- c
+d or overpacked in a container meeting the above requirements.
{2 Ref3,x pd Waste Remote-handled TRU waste containers shall be noncombustible and meet, as a minimum, the structural requirements and design conditions for Type A pack-aging contained in 49 CFR 173.412.
In addition, all RH waste containers, 2
including labeling, shall be certified to a WIPP approved specification to have a design life of at least 20 years from date of certification.
Waste Package Handlinq l
Contact-handled waste has been historically packaged mostly in 55-gallon drums or in boxes and bins which are routinely handled with standard fork type trucks or fork trucks with drum-handling attachments.
Tne packages are occasionally handled with overhead cranes.
Remote-handled waste is less well characterized as far as normal packag-ing and handling practices.
Most RH waste appears to be stored in 30- and l2 55 gallon drums, although there are great variations in other packages used for the remainder.
Many of the drums have been overpacked with concrete containers to reduce the surface dose rate to allow contact handling of the concrete-encased package in temporary storage facilities.
I I
46-
)
The WIPP CH waste handling system is designed to use standard fork trucks or fork trucks with drum handling or special six-pack handling attachments as the basic prime movers for use both within the waste handling building and in the underground emplacement areas.
This does not appear to be significantly dif ferent than the handling methods used at various waste generating sites around the U.S.
The WIPP RH hot cell facility will only handle standardized waste con-tainers and will handle them only in a vertical orientation.
Each container must have attached to it an axial lifting pintle that will engage the lifting l2 devices in the RH hot cell and facility transfer cask.
All RH waste packages must be cylindrical, smooth sided, and have no flanges or protrusions that would hinder insertion or removal from casks, storage racks, sleeves, etc.
The WIPP RH handling requirements will require waste generating sites to fabricate and use standard-sized waste containers with axial handling pintles that are compatible with WIPP RH handling equipment.
Therefore, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact -Handled Waste All waste packages shall be provided with cleats, offsets, chimes, or skids, for handling by means of fork trucks, cranes, or similar handling devices.
Lifting rings and other auxiliary lifting devices on the packages, 1
if provided, shall be recessed, offset, or hinged, in a manner which does not inhibit stacking the packages, i
Remote Handled Waste Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall be equipped with an axial lifting pintle of a design acceptable to the WIPP.
The packages shall have no other 1
lifting devices.
9
-4 7 -
i Waste Package Weicht The CH waste handling system of the WIPP is limited in waste package weight-handling capability by the capacity of the large fork trucks that will load and unload the CH waste materials from the waste hoist that transfers waste between the surface and the storage level.
These fork trucks are 1
presently specified to have a rated lif t capacity of 30,000 pounds, and all waste-handling operations are to be carried out within the capacity rating.
This rated capacity must include an allowance for pallets and overpacks that may be required, which is estimated to be 5,000 pounds.
Therefore, a CH 2
waste package may weigh a maximum of 25,000 pounds.
i The WIPP has established a RH TRU overpack gross weight limit of 10,000 pounds.
It is estimated that a full-size 28-inch by ll-foot,1-inch
.RH TRU overpack' may weigh 2,000 pounds, leaving a maximum gross weight of 8,000 pounds for a 26-inch by 10-foot,1-inch RH waste package.
Based upon the above, the following criteria result:
Contact-Handled Waste Contact-handled TRU waste packages or package assemblies shall weigh no more than 25,000 pounds (11,360 kg).
2 Wemote -Handled Waste Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall weigh no more than 8,000 pounds (3,630 kg).
Waste Package Size The size of CH waste packages in the WIPP is limited by access to the waste hoist and the size of the waste hoist cage.
The waste hoist cage has a floor that is capable of accepting a package that is 8 x 12 feet in width and
length respectively, with a clearance of 3 inches for loading and unloading.
The hoist cage access door from the CH handling area has a door height of 12 feet.
Contact-handled waste packages are loaded on the hoist cage with a cage loading car. Allowing for cage loading car clearance from the floor.
this leaves approximately 8.5 feet, and provides a nominal 3-inch clearance for loading end unloading the hoist cage.
The RH waste hot cell handling equipment is designed to handle an overpacked RH TRU waste container with overall dimensions of 28 inches in 2
diameter by 11 feet,1 inch in length.
The overpack will be able to accept an RH TRU waste package with 26-inch diameter by 10-foot,1-inch length dimen-sions, including the lifting pintle.
The nominal diameter of the RH TRU waste package is important, since in the WIPP facility the waste package is moved f rom the hot cell to its emplaced location in a facility transfer cask.
Throughput and canister handling requirements indicate that for the WIPP RH 2
facility to meet the cubic foot throughput requirements (10,000 ft /yr, 3
Reference 3) all canisters handled mest be near the largest allowable length of 10 feet, 1 inch.
There is no technical problem in handling waste packages of shorter length, but shorter packages would be less economical (they require shipment, handling, and a storage location) and would reduce facility through-put capabilities.
Therefore, RH TRU waste must be packaged in a standard WIPP 2
c8ntainer which must approach the 26-inch diameter by 10-foot, 1-inch maximum size in order to meet WIPF throughput goals.
Based upon the above limits, the size criteria read as follows:
Contact-Handled Waste o
Contact-handled TRU waste packages or package assemblies shall not exceed 12 x 8 x 8.5 feet (3.7 x 2.4 x 2.6 m) in overall 1. x W x H dimensions.
1 Remote-Handled Waste Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall be no larger than a nominal 26 inches (0.66 m) in diameter with a maximum length of 10 feet, 1 inch 2
(3.1 m) including the pintle.
Surface Oose Rate The WIPP design for the CH waste handling facility is a large throughput warehouse-type facility that will unload over-the-road transportation con-tainers of their CH waste package contents and palletize the packages onto standardized WIPP pallets for transfer to the underground level for emplace-ment.
The CH handling personnel will use standard fork trucks and similar handling devices to handle the CH waste packages.
A study of dose rates (Reference 11) has shown that unshielded CH personnel at the WIPP would be expected to receive an annual dose of less than 700 mrem if the waste packages handled average about 6 mrem /hr per package.
The WIPP has a design goal for 2
personnel doses of 20 percent (1 Rem /yr) of the allowable 5 Rem /yr whole body dose.
A shielded storage area will be provided in the'CH handling area ~to store temporarily those CH waste packages which have surface dose rates between 100 and 200 mrem /hr.
This will minimize the background radiation level and l1 resulting personnel doses in the CH palletizing and surge storage area.
The WIPP operations will check for neutrons as a matter of policy. Waste packages with significant neutron emissions (> 20 mrem /hr) shall be so noted in the 2
Data Packages.
All RH waste that will be handled by the WIPP RH handling system must pass through the RH hot cell in the waste handling building.
Remote-handled waste packages will pass through the cell upon receipt and then be transferred via a facility cask to the underground level.
The facility cask for RH waste i, designed to provide adequate personnel shielding of RH waste packages with surface dose rates up to 100 Rem /hr (Reference 12).
The 100 Rem /hr is a maximum which will allow the design of a facility cask that provides for ade-quate personnel shielding and complies with the rated capacity of the waste hoist.
Remote handled waste packages are limited to neutron emissions of no greater than 270 mrem /hr.
Neutron contribution of greater than 20 mrem /hr to 2
the total package dose rate should be so noted in the data package.
a The applicable criteria which result read as follows:
Contact-Handled Waste Waste packages shall have a maximum surface dose rate at any point no greater than 200 mrem /hr.
Neutron contributions of greater than 20 mrem /hr to the total package dose rate shall be reported separately in the Data Package.
2
{
Remote-Handled Waste Remote-handled TRU waste packages shall have a surface dose rate at any point no greater than 100 Rem /hr.
Neutron contributions are limited to 270 mrem /hr.
Neutron contribution of greater than 20 mrem /hr to the total package dose rate shall be reported in the data package.
2
. Surface Contamination Surface contamination levels for shipping packages are delineated in 49 CFR 173.443 for radioactive materials intended for over-the-road transport These levels are considered by 001 to be adequate for transportation.
- However, for high-throughput facilities such as the WIPP, even these levels can result in a buildup of contamination levels within the facility over a period of time that will require significant decontamination efforts.
This holds true for all aspects of the system, including the possible buildup of contamination within transportation packagings and vehicles.
Experiences in the Naval Nuclear program have shown that facilities can be maintained ' clean" if removable alpha-contamination levels are kept at or 2
below 50 picoeuries/100 cm and removable beta-gamma contamination at or 2
below 450 picoeuries/100 cm.
Experience has also shown that these levels are readily achieveable.
The WIPP facility design in the CH area is basically a large open warehouse-type building that will receive, palletize, and deliver loaded G
pallets of CH waste packages to the waste hoist for transfer to the under-ground level.
The CH facility will handle between 20 to 30-thousand 5
( 5 x 10 ft ) individual CH waste pack 3ges in a year.
At this throughput, contamination buildup using the 001 1!inits would be a problem.
3 The RH waste in the WIPP, 250 canisters /yr (7,500 f t /yr), will be 2
handled using the RH facility hot cell and the facility transfer cask.
The goal of the design is to maintain these facilities in an essentially "clean" condition so that needed maintenance can be performed "hands-on" to the great-est extent possible.
For this reason, contamination levels should be as low as possible.
1he 00T requirements in 49 CFR 173 must be met for TRU waste that is to i 2 be shipped over the public highways and rails However, to prevent the build-up of contamination levels in WIPP facilities and throughout the waste system,
. contamination levels are required to be even lower'
)
Therefore, based upon the above requirements, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact -Handled Waste Contact-handled TRU waste packages or package assembiies shall have a removable surface contamination no greater than 50 picocuries per 100 cm2 1
for alpha-emitting isotopes and 450 picocuries per 100 cm2 f or beta gamma-emitting isotopes.
Remote-Handled Waste Remote-handled 1RU waste packages shall have a removable surf ace contami-nation no greater than 50 picocuries per 100 cm2 for alpha-emitting isotopes 1
2 and 450 picocuries per 100 cm for beta gama-emitting isotopes.
l 0
52-
, Thermal Power Thermal power generation within TRU waste packages due to nuclear decay 1
is of concern both because it can cause package failure from waste decomposi-tion and gas formation and, in the case of high levels of heat generation, can cause changes in the isolation medium, such as salt.
Thermal analyses of WIPP-type generic repositories have been performed l2 (Reference 13) that show that more than 150 kW of heat-generating waste can be emplaced in an acre of a storage facility without unacceptable impacts on the 1
salt beds or the surrounding environment.
As a conservative design basis for the WIPP, a reduced limit of 30 kW per acre has been chosen.
The emplacement density of CH waste in the WIPP is approximately 72,000 cubic feet of waste per acre.
This is based or, using the available.
drif t area in a given acre of salt on the CH horizon with 9-foot high waste arrays, taking no credit for the packing space losses between drums.
Using the 30-kW limit, this would allow an average heat generation of 0.42 watts per cubic foot or 3.1 watts per 55-gallon drum.
The present emplacement plan for RH waste calle, for an emplacement density of 70 canisters of waste per acre in conjuction with a room filled with the CH waste.
The calculated maximum internal heat-generation rate of less than 1
60 watts per canister would contribute only 4.2 kW per acre.
Contact-handled waste in general has very low heat-generation rates and will not even approach the 30-kW-per-acre limit.
However, some inventory control of heat source waste must be maintained to prevent localized hot spots in waste a rrays.
Remote-handled waste could generate up to 300 watts per canister without exceeding the thermal limit for the WIPP.
1 Based on the above, the criteria read as follows:
c f
Contact-Handled Wasg, Individual CH TRU waste packages in which the average thermal power 1
density exceeds 0.1 watt /ft3 (3.5 W/m ) shall have the thermal power 3
1 recorded in the data package.
Remote.-Handled W4ste The thermal power generated by waste materials in any RH 1RU waste package l1 shall not exceed 300 watts.
The thermal power will be recorded in the data j
package.
, Nuclear Criticality (Reference 5) 1 The criticality calculations that support the existing transportation and storage (at INEL) limits for the fissile material content of TRU waste packages suggest that the same limits are adequate to guarantee criticality safety in the WIPP.
These calculations have almost always treated 210-liter drums of
{
waste, since the permissible concentration of fissile nuclides is greater for drums than for other containers.
In TREE-1064 (Reference 15), EG&G (Idaho) l 2 reports a KX (neutron-multiplication factor for an infinite array) of 0.974 for worst -case drums (001 17H 210-liter drums with a 2.3-mm, (90-mil polyethylene liner), containing a homogeneous mixture of 200 g of 239Pu and 91 kg (200 pounds) of graphite.
For finite arrays of real TRU waste K,77 can never approach this value for the following reasons:
I 1.
K is inherently about 25 percent higher than K,77 for a very X
large (but finite), fully reflected array of worst-case drums.
2.
The concentration of fissile material in worst case drums is about 1 g/ liter, whereas the average concentration in DOE (Rocky Flats) waste packages is only about 0.02 g/ liter for 210 liter drums and 0.002 g/ liter f or 1.2 x 1.2 x 2.1 -m plywood boxes.
a i
..~.
J 3.
No mixture of materials in real TRU waste can be as effective in moderating neutrons as the graphite assumed to be present in the I
worst -case drums.
4.
lhe inhomogeneities of real waste reduce K by about 15 percent.
g 5.
The presence of any material, even a moderator, in the spaces between drums reduces K.
(The EG&G calculations assumed that g
these spaces were void.)
There are two events which might be possible mechanisms for criticality l
1 in the WIPP: water intrusion and room closure due to creep or rockfall.
As seen above, water intrusion actually decreases reactivity.
The compaction of waste which accompanies room closure would obviously increase Kgg, but in
.no case could.K,fg exceed K for the same waste composition and, from 1
X TREE-1064, K is less than unity even for the worst-case waste composition.
X For waste forms that may be compacted by treatment (e.g., incineration) before disposal in the WIPP, there would be no significant effect on critt-cality.
Analysis of the 71 categories of Rocky Flats waste indicates that (because of the large fraction of noncombustibles in the waste) the overall increase in fissile nuclide concentration (in a given cubic foot of waste matrix) which would result from waste processing would be only a factor of 2 to 3.
In any case, the fissile inventory of each drum will not be allowed to exceed the existing 200-gram fissile limit regardless of processing and any resulting nuclide concentration.
incineration (or similar processing) and combination of the waste product with glass or concrete, or making the waste into a slag, would reduce the reactivity of the stored array from the values calculated in TREE-1064 since the new matrix would be a less effective moderator than the graphite matrix assumed in TREE-1064.
Any boron in boro-silicate glass or in slag would actually act as a neutron absorber rather than a moderator.
55-
c 1
The distinguishing feature of remote-handled 1RU waste is its fission product content and not its fissile nuclide content.
For the purpose of WIPP safety analyses, the fissile material content of remote-handled TRU waste is limited to 1.9 g/ liter (averaged over any 5 liters with a maximum 50 percent void space).
If such reasonable distribution cannot be ensured, then the canister is limited to 240-g total.
Internal partitioning using 001 17C drums l
inside the canister may be used to increase the overall limit to 100 g each I
for 30 gallon drums and 200-9 each for 55-gallon drums (e.g., three 30-gallon drums inside a canister would have a 300-gram limit, and three 55 -gallon drums 2
l inside would boost the limit to 600 grams).
Other loadings may be requested by the shipper for WIPP approval if the request is accompanied by a supplemen-tary criticality analysis.
Such criticality analyses should use assumptions similar to those specified in Reference 16.
I Existing regulations limiting the fissile materi,a1 content of contact-I handled TRU waste packages, which were formulated to ensure criticality safety during transportation and in INEL storage geometries, are adequate to ensure the criticality safety of packaged 1RU waste in the WIPP.
{
Therefore, the applicable criteria read as follows:
Contact-Handled Waste lhe fissile or fissionable isotope content for CH TRU waste containers 1
shall be no greater than the following values, in Pu-239 fissile gram equivalents:
2 3
200 g per 55-gallon (0.21 m ) orum 3
100 g per 30-gallon (0.11 m ) drum 500 g per 001 6M container 5 g per ft3 (0.028 m ) in boxes, up to 350-g maximum 3
For materials other than Pu-239 U 235, and U-233 which shall be treated
~
as equivalent, fissile equivalents shall be obtained using ANSl/ANS-8.15 1981.
2Property "ANSI code" (as page type) with input value "ANSl/ANS-8.15 1981.</br></br>2" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. 56-
.o Remote-Handled Waste The fissile or fissionable isotope content of RH TRU waste shall not exceed 1.9 g/ liter (averaged over any 5 liters with a maximum 50 percent void space).
If such reasonable distribution cannot be ensured, then the canister is limited to 240 g total (in Pu-239 fissile gram equivalents).
The canister may be loaded with 001 17C drums which will provide internal partitioning and 3
increase the limits to 100 g each for 30-gallon (0.11-m ) drums and 200 g 3
each for SS-gallon (0.21-m ) drums.
For materials other than Pu-239, U-235, and U-233 which shall be treated l
as equivalent, fissile equivalents shall be obtained using ANS!/ANS-8.15-1981.
Pu-239 E_quivalent Activity _ Limits Reference 17 reports 8400 PE -Ci per CH waste package and 55,000 PE-Ci per RH waste canister as the maximum Pu-239 equivalent activity for individual 2
waste packages.
These values ensure that the radiological performance requirements applicable to WIPP are not exceeded.
For conservatism, an operating limit or 1000 PE-Ci for each waste package l
is established.
If this operating limit of 1000 PE-Ci significantly impacts a waste generator, a variance may be considered on a case-by-case basis, provided that the parameters of reference 17 are not exceeded.
Other criteria of the WAC (criticality limits) generally limit the activity in the waste containers to significantly less than 1000 PE-Ci.
The Pu-239 equivalent weighting factor is the ratio of the maximum per-missible airborne concentration (MPC) for the alpha-emitting isotope of interest divided by the MPC of Pu-239.
The MPCs are f rom 00E Order 5480.1, Chapter XI, Attachment XI-1, lable 1 Column 1, for the limiting credible form.
Any alpha-emitting isotope not specifically listed in that table shall
-13 use an mpc value of 6 x 10 Ci/ml.
9 i
- t i
6 1.isted below are weighting factors and curie quantitles e~quivalent to 1000 Ci Pu 239 for the anticipated isotopes:
lsotope Weighting.. Factor LWJ g) 10_0.0 Ci_ Pu 239 Eguivalent'(CIL)
[
U -233 (S) 250 250,000 I
U ?33 (1) 2.5 2,500 Pu-238 (S) 1 1,000 Pu 238 (1) 0.15 150 Pu 239 (S or 1) 1 1,000 i
Pu 240 (S or 1) 1 1,000 Pu 242 (S or 1) 1 1,000 Pu 244 (S or ()
1 1,000 Am 241 (S) 3 3,000 Am 241 (1) 2.5 2,500 i
Am 242M'(S) 3 3,000 l
Am 242M (1) 7.5 7,500 I
1 Am 243 (S) 3 3,000 Am 243 (1) 2.5 2,500 2
cm-243 (S) 3 3,000 Cm 243 (1) 2.5 2,500 Cm-244 (S) 4.5 4,500 l
Cm 244 (1) 2.5 2,500 i
Cm 245 (5 or *)
2.5 2,500 l
Cm 246 (S or 1) 2.5 2,500 Cm 24/ (S or 1) 2.5 2,500 i
Cm 248 (S) 0.3 300 I
Cm 248 (I) 0.25 250 Cm 250 (S) 0.3 300 Cm 250 (1) 0.015 15 i
Cf 249 (S)
I 1,000 Cf 249 (1) 2.5 2,500 Cf 251 (S) 1 1,000 Cf 251 (1) 2.5 2,500 e
58-
.o Isotope Weichting Factor (WF )
]000 Ci Pu-239 Eauivalent (CiE) 9 Cf -252 (S) 3 3,000 l
Cf-252 (I) 0.75 750 8k-247 (5) 0.3 300 Bk-247 (I) 0.015 15 (S)= Soluble (1) Insoluble lo determine if a waste package with several isotopes does not exceed 1000 Ci Pu-239 equivalent, the following formula is used:
Ci Alpha-emitting Ci Alpha-emitting Ci Alpha-emitting IsotoDe A
+
IsotoDe B
+....
IsotoDe
= < l.0 CiE Isotope A CiE Isotope B CiE Isotope n
No estimate of non-TRU isotopes, except those within the scope of the above description, will be included.
However, generators will be asked to characterize any waste stream which contains an unusually high Sr-90 content 2
relative to normal fission product isotopic distribution.
Therefore, the applicable Criteria read as follows:
Contact-Handled Waste Waste packages shall not exceed 1000 PE-Ci of Pu-239 equivalent activity.
Remote-Handled Weste Waste packages shall not exceed 1000 PE-Ci of Pu-239 equivalent activity.
Note:
Any exception to the above limit will require approval from the WIPP Project Office on a case-by-case basis.
6 Documentation O
With the first-of-a-kind pilot facility such as the WIPP, it is important that all pertinent par 3 meters that affect the design and safety analyses, such as thermal power generation, nuclide contents, gas generation, combustibility, toxic potential, etc., be known and documented.
The WIPP will have to main-tain strict inventory controls on waste emplacements in order to ensure that technical specifications are adhered to and that the plant is operated within established limits.
The retrievability requiremeats of the WIPP also require that adequate permanent records of inventory and emplacement histories are kept to ensure safe operation of future recovery efforts that may occur many years af ter actual emplacement.
The fonnat for data transmitted to WIPP is 2
defined in WIPP-00E-157.
The actual implementation of the inventory control system will be the responsiblity of the WIPP operator.
However, the information required by the
~
system must be supplied by the waste generators and shipping sites.
Contact-handled data that are of direct, immediate concern to operating personnel safety would be surface dose rate and weight.
These items should be available directly on the waste package.
Additional data required by these criteria, of concern to facility personnel, could be provided in a separate data package with each shipment.
Inventory control and long-term safety considerations require information on nuclide contents, the waste generating site, date of packaging, container type and certification, physical description of the waste form, assay infor-2 mation, hazardous materials (nonradionuclide), percent of organics and gas generators, thermal power, date of shipment, the carrier, any other data the 2
shipper may have that is significant, etc. (see listings in the criteria).
All of these data, if appropriate, would be provided for each package shipped to the WIPP.
Each package would be assigned a serial number with a prefix unique to the shipping site, and the serial number would be placed both on the waste package and on the data package.. _ -.
The WIPP data and computer system will be directly tied to most waste 1
generation and shipping sites so that data packages for waste shipments can be transmitted directly to the WIPP prior to shipment release from the site.
This will allow the WIPP to make any needed adjustments to inventory or em-placement plans or to implement special safety procedures prior to receipt at the WIPP.
Remote-handled documentation requirements will be similar to CH with the 2
exception of the weight percent of organic material present in the waste.
Since the RH canisters will always be remotely handled; consequently, the information will be on the canister itself, such as the package serial number 2
must be placed in such a manner as to allow remote reading.
Extensive data and inventory control will be required for all wastes emplaced in the WIPP to ensure safe operation within technical specifications.
Therefore, the criteria for documentation read as follows:
1 Contact-Handled Waste Labelino--In addition to 001 labeling requirements, each waste package l2 shall be uniquely identified by means of a label permanently attached in a conspicuous location.
The following information shall be included on the label:
1 Package identification number (to be standardized) in characters at o
least 1 inch high Weight in Ib in characters at least 1 inch high 2
o Data Packace -There shall be transmitted to the WIPP operator in advance of shipment, and a hard copy included with each waste package shipment, a Data 1
Package / Certification attesting to the fact that the waste package meets the e
i
~
requirements of these criteria.
This Data Package / Certification shall be based upon a quality assurance program subject to audit and verification and shall 1
provide information on the items specified below:
o Package identification number o Six-pack identification number (if applicable) o Date of waste package certification 2
o Waste generation site o Date of packaging (closure date) o Maximum surf ace dose rate in mrem /hr and specific neutron dose' rate if' 2
greater than 20 mrem /hr o Weight (in kg) o Container type o Physical description of waste form (content code) o Assay information, including PE-C1, alpha C1, and Pu-239 fissile gram equivalent contents 2
Radioactive mixed waste (identity and quantity of hazardous o
waste characteristic (s))
o Weight and volume percent of organic materials content 3
o Measured or calculated thermal power (if over 0.1 watt /f t )
2 o Shipment number __
a o Date of shipment o vehicle number 2
o Vehicle type o TRUPACl number (s) o Carrier identification Unbalanced six-pack (if applicable) 2 o
Other information considered significant by the shipper o
A hard cop'y of the above Data Package and dated certification statement that the waste content and packaging are in accord with the WIPP-WAC and that 2
the waste is unclassified shall accompany each waste shipment.
Remote-Handled Waste Labelino -Each waste package shall be uniquely identified by means of an identification number permanently attached to the container in a conspicuous location using characters at least 2 inches high.
Data Packaae -There shall be transmitted to the WIPP operator in advance 1
of shipment, and a hard copy included with each waste package shipment, a Data Package / Certification attesting to the fact that the waste package meets the requirements of these criteria.
This Data Package / Certification shall be based upon a quality assurance program subject to audit and verification and shall provide information on the items specified below:
o Package identification numbar o Date of waste package certification 63-
o Waste generation site Date of packaging (closure date) o e
Maximum surface dose rate in mrem /hr and neutron radiation in 2
o mrem /hr, if greater than 20 mrem /hr o Weight o Internal container type Physical description of waste form (content code) o Assay information, including PE-Ci and Pu-239 fissile gram o
2 equivalent contents i
Radioactive Mixed waste (identity and quantity of hazardous o
waste characteristic (s))
Measured or calculated thermal power o
o Shipment number o Date of shipment 2
o Vehicle number o Vehicle type o Cask number o Carrier identification i
Other information considered significant by the shipper o
1 a
A hard copy of the above data package and dated certification statement that waste content and packaging are in accord with the WIPP-WAC and that the 2
waste is unclassified shall accompany each shipment.
145o l
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9 4
6. _. - - _ _ _ _ _ _. _. - _,. _ _ _. _
.=
5.0 REFERENCES
l.
WIPP-00E-069, ' Report of the Steering Committee on TRU Waste Acceptance Criteria for the Weste Isolation Pilot Plant," May 1980.
1 2.
00E/RW-0006, "Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventories, Projections and Characteristics,' September 1984.
2 3.
WIPP-00E-71, Rev. 3, Design Criteria, "WIPP Revised Mission Concept-IIA," Dec. 1982.
4.
ANSI /ANS-8.15-1981, "American National Standard for Nuclear Criticality Control of Special Actinide Elements.
5.
Report SAN 079,-1305, "Summary of Research and Development Activities in Support of Waste Acceptance Criteria for WIPP,' Sandia Laboratories, November 1979.
6.
FEIS 00E/EIS-0026, "Final Environmental Impact Statement, Waste 2
Isolation Pilot Plant," U. S. Department of Energy, October 1980.
j 1
7.
Report LA-7674-MS, ' Gas Generation from Radiolytic Attack of l
TRU-Contaminated Hydrogenous Waste", Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, June 1979.
i 8.
Report, "Modeling Verification Studies, Long Term Waste Isolation Assessment, WIPP Project, Southeastern New Mexico." D'Appolonia, i
January 1981.
9.
Task Group on Lung Dynamics, li!Lalth Physics 12, 173-207 (1966) and Health Physics 13 1251, (1967).
10.
Report FET898-14-116, "Plutonium in Oxide to be Shipped to the Savannah River Plant", Rocky Flats Plant, March 1974 2
~.
- 11. WTS0-TME-009, "Preliminary Radiation Dose Assessment to WIPP Waste 2
Handling Personnel,' February 1985.
12.
Design Basis 0-41 F-04, "Remote Handled Waste (RH) Handling System",Bechtel Inc., Revision 2, May 1^79.
13.
Report Y/0WI/SUB-76/07220, "The Selection and Evaluation of Thermal Criteria for 6 Geologic Waste Isolation Facility in Salt,' Office of Waste Isolation, September 1976.
14.
"First Modification to the July 1, 1981, ' Agreement for Consultation and Cooperation' on WIPP by the State of New Mexico and U.S.
Department of Energy," November 30, 1984.
2 15 Report -7REE-1064, ' Safety Review Document for the Radioactive Waste Managenent complex at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,"
EG&G Idaho, Inc., May 1977.
- 16. WAESD-TR-83-0015, "Nuclear Criticality Safety Analysis for Remote Handled TRU Waste Containers Stored at the WIPP', April 1983.
- 17. WTSD-TME-062, "Assessement of Transuranic Activity Limits for WIPP TRU Waste," April 1985.
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