ML20150F715
| ML20150F715 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07106678 |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1988 |
| From: | Mauck C ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| To: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| 24474, NUDOCS 8807190018 | |
| Download: ML20150F715 (4) | |
Text
RETURN TO m,21-!37
+
7460?
ss
-~
c r S S gEcENED A i lepartment of Energy god %
j Q fjt07 g)((
c D
oc Washington, DC 20545 g
y p
JM 101988 p.
s..
i Mr. Charles E. MacDonald, Chief t
Division of Safeguards & Transportation, NMSS 13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission w,
Washington, D.C.
20555
'na
Dear Mr. MacDonald:
J'-p pI o A letter was transmitted to you on February 18,1988, (Torre,s to MacDonald) describing an incident, which occurred at the Savannah River Plant on November 18, 1987, and outlining the recommended corrective actions.
The following is a more detailed report of the incident and the actions taken by the Department of Energy (D0E) as required by the conditions of approval under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (CoC) No. 6678.
INFORMATION The Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) authorizes the shipment of LP-50 packagings with special order Hoke Valve and Cajon 4 VCR stainless steel couplings. Containers with numbers 531 to 905 were originally built with a Fulton-Sylphon valve and compression tube starting in 1957 through 1963.
Containers with numbers 906 to 1065 were originally built with a special hoke valve and compression tube during 1963 through 1968. LP-53 containers 1066 through 1142, due to design changes in 1979, are not covered by the current CoC.
Repair campaigns are required to replace leaking valves, and/or if the present valve on the container is a Fulton-Sylphon valve.
Also, if the present coupling on a container is a compression tube, it will be removed and a Cajon 4 VCR coupling will be butt welded to the valve tube.
Use of containers with the unapproved weld has been satisfactory to date.
There have been no incidents regarding integrity of the LP-50 or LP-12 containers nor any incidents involving the seal valve and associated wel dments.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
During the Quality Assurance Surveillance of a planned LP-50 repair campaign it was revealed that containment vessel valves were about to be replaced with a weld not authorized by the SARP (SARP-DPSPV 74-124-5, Rev. 1, 4/78). A similar welding technique, also not authorized by the SARP (SARP-DPSPU-74-124-4, NRC Certificate No. 6677) had been used tu repair LP-12 containers. A review of available records indicated that the unapproved weld may have been used during any of the container repair campaigns from 1979 to y9,,
fa
\\
l
~ r n ~..,
b
[
~ ' m, y
\\ p%+'j Q~*
\\
l
'Ve Cckbrating the U.S. Constituri<m Hicentennial M2 7-1987
-4 y
8807190018 880613 h474 PDR ADOCK 07106678 N
C PDC
L November 1987.
The serial number of each container modified in this manner is not available although the records do indicate that 60 or more containment vessels have been refurbished by this unauthorized procedure. The records show also that following valve replacement the containment vessels underwent pressure and leak testing per the requirements specified in the SARP.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS All LP-50 and LP-12 product containers were temporarily removed from service and 00E-HQ was notified. All secondary users of the packaging were notified to suspend use of this packaging until such time that the deficiency was corrected.
A program was initiated to inspect all LP-50 product containers with j
radiography to establish which vessels have beer, refurbished by the unauthorized method. X-ray of the weld connecting the valve tube to the top j
of the container from two directions, 90 degrees apart, readily indicates whether the weld is the SARP approved socket fillet weld (Figure 1) or the j
unauthorized flush fillet weld (Figure 2).
All flush fillet welded containers are being removed from service. A repair method which utilizes the SARP approved socket fillet weld has been developed and implemented. To date twenty-two LP-50 containers have been repaired and returned to service. Those that meet the specifications (per radiographic inspection) can be so indicated in their record file and returned to service. The Department of Energy Savannah River (00E-SR) is coordinating the inspection and refurbishment of the containers.
l The LP-12 container has a similar valve arrangement for closure. Shipment of these containers was stopped. Though infrequently used, the LP-12 has the potential to have been modified by the unauthorized method.
Any LP-12 containers to be used will be radiographed and examined to ensure that the weldments and valves comply with the applicable SARP.
Documentation of.
inspection will be added to the container record files.
PREVENTATIVE MEASURES l
Shipment documentation will be annually audited to ensure its completeness and additional surveillance auditing of repair campaigns will be completed to ensure compliance to procedures. The previously approved LP-50 SARP has been revised and submitted to NRC for licensing. This document covers those containers fabricated in the years 1957 to 1968 (Serial Numbers below 1066).
The procedures for "Replacing Product Container Valve" and "Welding Cajon Fitting on Product Container Valve" has been included.
Sincerely, p
Charl s
. Mauck, Chief Packag ng Certification Staff Office of Security Evaluations Defense Programs Enclosure Figure 182 j
t, Enclosure FIGURE 1.
SOCKET FILLET WELD Approved by SAR 1
7 7
/
/
)
h h d ~
Nr A
<\\
4-W FIGURE 2 SUMACE FILLET WELD
- V" c?
lt x
(X
's, 1 l~_b.
b_
Dr' " '!0.
CONiiiX,,J.
kbh. ____
i}31 b DATE RCVD.3Uk(Ar t_b,_
bb DATE OF 000. _
FCUF
$DR
/
FCAF _ _____
LP]R 1 & E REF. /
S.-dGUARDS FCTC
/
CTHER DATENl!bh INITIAL i