ML20150E288
| ML20150E288 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/08/1988 |
| From: | Bates A NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | Shelburne B NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| SECY-88-171, NUDOCS 8807150057 | |
| Download: ML20150E288 (1) | |
Text
.
O Mc,#'o u
UNITED STATES
.-"s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION fM
{
W ASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 ~
July 8, 1988 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY MEMORANDUM FOR:
Betsy Shelburne, Chief Public Document Room
.TliRU:
Sandy Showman,
'e Correspondenc9 ecords Branch gf h ew Bates, Chief FROM:
/dberations Branch
SUBJECT:
RELEASE OF SECY-88-171 TO THE PUBLIC Attached for placement in the PDR are advanced copies of SECY-88-171 "Soviet Academician Legasov's ' Memoirs'."
The request for release was made by the staff and all Commissioners concur.
Attachments:
As stated cc:
DCS - Pl-124 3
pM i )
8807150057 880708 PDR SECY 88-171 PDC
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-June 22, 1988 SECY-88-171 POLICY ISSUE (Information)
For:
The Commissioners From:
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Governmental an A
Public Affairs
Subject:
S0VIET ACADEMICIAN LEGAS0V'S "MEM0 IRS"
Purpose:
To inform the Commission of a description of nuclear safety in the Soviet Union by the head of the team investigating the causes of the Chernobyl accident, Valery A. Legasov, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute.
l Discussion:
I am attaching a remarkable document recently published in Pravda and picked up by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
It is the "memoirs" of V. A.
Legasov, dictated just prior to his suicide on the 2nd anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.
Of most interest is Legasov's indictment of the Soviet system of development of nuclear power which, while begun "reasonably", developed into a bureaucratic organization which fostered abdication of any "personal" responsibility for safety, continued excellence and quality. This leads him to agree with a view he attributes to N. I. Ryzhkov, who observed that the accident at Chernobyl was not pure chance and that, "the nuclear power industry had been moving toward this terrible event with a certain degree of inevitability."
Contact:
Michael B. Congdon, GPA 49-21786 i
y
- 2'-
- Legasov praises the work done by the emergency personnel and describes-first-hand the period right after-the accident.
He.'also points up the the' inadequacy of Soviet emergency preparedness-planning.
7
Attachment:
As' Stated
-- DISTRIBUTION :
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- REGIONAL OFFICES
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-ACRS
- ASLBP ASLAP SECY b
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LOUNTRY: USSR SUBJ:
TAKE 1 0F 10 -- LEGASOV MEMOIRS SLAM NUCLEAR INDUSTRY SOURCE: MOSCOW PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 20 MAY 88 FIilST EDITION PP 3, 8 TEXT:
//((EXTRACTS "FROM THE NOTES OF ACADEMICIAN V. LEGASOV":
"'IT IS MY DUTY TO WRITE ABOUT THIS... '" -- FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS 'ARE INTRODUCTION BY PRAVDA SCIENCE EDITOR V. GUBAR2V))
((TEXT))
((GUBAREV INTRODUCTION))
VALERIY ALEKSEYEVICH LEGASOV WROTE THESE NOTES FOR PRAVDA.
LAST YEAR WE ASKED HIM TO WRITE ABOUT CHERNCBYL AND SHARE HIS THOUGHTS '.4 THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY.
IT WAS THEN THAT THE ACADEMICIAN BEGAN WORK ON HIS "MEMOIRS," AS HE CALLED THESE NOTES...
VALERIY ALEKSEYEVICH NEVER HAD ENOUGH TIME, AND THEREFORE HE DICTATED HIS THOUGHTS ONTO TAPE.
WE TALKED WITH HIM ON THE EVE OF HIS TRAGIC DEATH.
"UNFORTUNATELY, WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH BOOKS ABOUT CHERNOBYL, ALL THE LESSONS OF WHAT HAPPENED HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ANALYZED," HE SAID.
WE RIGHTLY MENTION ACADEMICIAN V.A. LEGASOV AS ONE OF THE FIRST TO EXTINGUISH THE FLAMES OF CHERNOBYL.
IN MY VIEW HIS FEAT THERE HAS YET TO BE PROPERLY EVALUATED.
"LEGASOV IS DON QUIXOTE AND JOAN OF ARC AT THE SAME TIME.
AN INCONVENIENT AND DIFFICULT PERSON FOR THOSE AROUND HIM, BUT WITHOUT HIM YOU HAVE A SENSE OF EMPTINESS AND LOSS OF SOMETHING CLOSE TO THE MEANING OF LIFE" -- THAT IS WHAT ACADEMICIAN YU. TRETYAKOV SAID ABOUT HIM.
HE EXPRESSED THE FEELINGS AND THOUGHTS OF EVERYONE WHO WAS FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO KNOW V.A. LEGASOV AND WORK WITH HIM.
VALERIY ALEKSEYEVICH'S DEPARTURE FROM THIS LIFE IS HARD TO EXPLAIN OR UNDERSTAND -- WHILE AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWERS, HE KILLED HIMSELF.
THIS TRAGEDY SHOULD BE A LESSON TO ALL OF US AND A REPROACH TO THOSE FOR WHOM TRANQUILLITY AND WELL-BEING CCME FIRST.
((CUBAREV ENDS))
NEVER IN MY LIFE DID I THINK I WOULD HAVE TO SET AECUT 'iRITING MEMOIRS WHEN I HAD ONLY JUST PASSED MY SOTH BIRTHDAY.
BUT SUCH UNCLASSIFIED
i
' EVENTS HAPPENED, ON SUCH A SCALE AND INVOLVING PEOPLE WITH SUCH CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS, WITH SO MANY DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF HOW IT HAPPENED, THAT IT IS SURELY MY DUTY, TO SOME EXTENT, TO
' WRITE ABOUT WHAT I KNOW, HOW I UNDERSTAND IT, HOW I SAW THE EVENTS THAT OCCURRED.
~IT WAS 26 APRIL 1986.. A SATURDAY, A FINE DAY.
I WAS WONDERING WHETHER TO GO TO MY FACULTY AT THE UNIVERSITY (SATURDAY IS MY USUAL DAY FOR THE FACULTY) OR TO THE PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV SCHEDULED FOR 1000 HOURS, OR SHOULD I PERHAPS FORGET ABOUT ALL OF IT AND SET OFF WITH MARGARITA MIKHAYLOVNA, NY WIFE AND FRIEND, FOR A BREAK SOMEWHERE7 NATURALLY, BECAUSE OF MY NATURE AND MANY YEARS OF HABIT, I WENT TO THE PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV.
BEFORE IT STARTED, I HEARD THERE HAD BEEN AN ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES.
I WAS TOLD THIS BY THE CHIEF OF A MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTHENT UNDER WHOSE JURISDICTION OUR INSTITUTE IS ((LEGASOV'S INSTITUTE, THE KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE, WAS UNDER THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY -- FBIS)). HE TOLD ME CALMLY ENOUGH, THOUGH WITH SOME VEXATION.
THE~ REPORT BEGAN.
THE REPORT WAS, FRANKLY, BORING AND CONVENTIONAL.
WE WERE ALREADY USED TO HEARING THAT IN OUR DEPARTMENT EVERYTHING IS WONDERFUL AND FINE, ALL THE INDICATORS ARE GOOD, WE FULFILL ALL THE PLAN TARGETS.
THE REPORT WAS OF THE NATURE OF A VICTORY DISPATCH.
SINGING THE PRAISES OF NUCLEAR POWER AND THE GREAT SUCCESSES ACHIEVED, THE SPEAKER MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT, TRUE, SOME KIND OF ACCIDENT HAD NOW HAPPENED IN CHERNOBYL (THE CHERNOBYL STATION BELONGED TO THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION), "THEY HAVE DONE SOMETHING OR OTHER THERE, THERE IS SOME KIND OF ACCIDENT, BUT IT WILL NOT STOP THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY..."
/""H BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 ******/
REF:
. MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY..."
TEXT:
((TEXT)) AT ABOUT 1200 HOURS A BREAK WAS ANNOUNCED.
I WENT UP TO THE SECOND FLOOR, TO THE ACADEMIC SECRETARY'S ROOM.
THERE I LEARNED UIAT A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION HAD BEEN SET UP, AND I WAS A MEMBER OF IT.
THE COMMISSION WAS TO BE AT VNUKOVO AIRPORT BY 1600 HOURS.
I IMMEDIATELY SET OFF FOR MY INSTITUTE.
I TRIED TO FIND ONE OF THE REACTOR EXPERTS THERE.
WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY I MANAGED TO FIND A SECTION CHIEF WHO DESIGNED AND OPERATED A STATION WITH AN RBMX REACTOR -- THAT WAS THE KIND THAT WAS INSTALLED AT THE CHERNOBYL AES -- ALEKSANDR KONSTANTINOVICH KALUGIN.
HE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT THE ACCIDENT, BECAUSE A SIGNAL HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE STATION DURING THE NIGHT -
"0NE, TWO, THREE, FOUR." THAT MEANT:
A SITUATION HAD ARISEN AT THE STATION INVOLVING NUCLEAR, RADI ATION, FIRE. AND EXPLOSIVE DANGER, THAT IS, ALL THE FORMS OF DANGER WERE PRESENT.
AFTER THE INSTITUTE -- STRAIGHT HOME.
MY WIFE CAME HCME EARLY FRCM WORK, I TOLD HER I WAS GOING ON AN CFFICIAL TRIP, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE SITUATICN, I DID NOT KNCW HCW LCNG I WCULD BE AWAY UNCLASSIFIED
4
. OR WHAT I WOULD FIND THERE.
AT VNUKOVO I WAS TOLD THAT BORIS YEVDOKOMOVICH SHCHERBINA, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF HINISTERS, HAD BEEN APPOINTED LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION -- HE WAS CHAIRMAN UF THE BUREAU FOR THE FUEL AND POWER COMPLEX.
AT THE TIME HE WAS CONDUCTING A PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV MEETING OUTSIDE MOSCOW.
WHEN HE APPEARED, WE WERE TO BOARD THE PLANE THAT WAS ALREADY READY AND FLY TO KIEV, FROM WHERE WE WOULD SET OFF FOR THE SCENE OF THE EVENT IN CARS.
DURING THE FLIGHT THE CONVERSATION WAS WORRYING.
I TOLD BORIS YEVDOKIMOVICH ABOUT THE ACCIDENT THAT HAPPENED AT THREE MILE ISLAND IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1979. MOST LIKELY THE FACTORS THAT LED TO THAT ACCIDENT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE EVENTS AT CHERNOBYL, BECAUSE OF THE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT DESIGNS OF THE DEVICES.
THE HOUR-L0iiG FLIGHT PASSED IN DISCUSSION AND. SPECULATION.
IN KIEV, WHEN WE LEFT THE PLANE, THE FIRST THING WE SAW WAS A LARGE CAVALCADE OF BLACK GOVERNMENT CARS AND A WORRIED CROWD OF UKRAINIAN LEADERS.
THEY HAD NO ACCURATE INFORMATION, BUT THEY SAID THINGS WERE BAD.
WE CLIMBED QUICKLY INTO THE CARS AND SET OFF FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. 'I MUST SAY THAT AT THE TIME IT DID NOT ENTER MY HEAD THAT WE WERE MOVING TOWARD AN EVENT ON A PLANETARY SCALE, AN EVENT WHICH WOULD APPARENTLY GO DOWN FOREVER IN MANKIND'S HISTORY, LIKE THE ERUPTION OF FAMOUS VOLCANOES, THE DESTRUCTION OF POMPEII, OR SOMETHING OF THAT KIND.
.ALTHOUGH THE NUCLEAR POWER STATION TAKES ITS NAME FROM CHERNOBYL, IT IS LOCATED 18 KM FROM THIS RAYON CITY, A VERY GREEN, VERY PLEASANT, RURAL CITY.
THIS IS THE IMPRESSION IT MADE ON US.
IT WAS QUIET, TRANQUIL, LIVING ITS EVERYDAY LIFE.
BUT IN PRIPYAT WE ALREADY SENSED THE ALARM.
WE DROVE STRAIGHT TO THE BUILDING OF THE PARTY GORKOM LOCATED ON THE CITY'S CENTRAL SQUARE.
HERE WE W.ERE.. MET Sy LOCAL ORGAN LEADERS.
WE WERE TOLD THAT DURING AN UNOFFICIAQ TEST OF THE FUNCTION OF THE TURBO-UNIT TWO EXPLOSIONS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER, HAD OCCURRED IN RUNAWAY CONDITIONS IN THE No. 4 UNIT OF THE POWER STATION; THE REACTOR BUILDING HAD BEEN DESTROYED, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLE HAD BEEN IRRADIATED.
WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT 2 PEOPLE HAD DIED, THE OTHERS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN HOSPITALS IN THE CITY, AND THAT THE RA9IATION SITUATION AT THE NO. 4 UNIT WAS RATHER SERIOUS.
THE RADIATION SITUATION IN PRIPYAT DIFFERED SUBSTATIALLY FROM THE NORMAL SITUATION BUT DID NOT YET PRESENT A GREAT DANGER TO PEOPLE.
THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, WHOSE SESSION WAS ORGANIZED VERY ENERGETICALLY BY B.YE. SRCHERBINA IN A MANNER CHARACTERISTIC OF HIM, IMMEDIATELY DIVIDED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION INTO GROUPS.
EACH OF THEM WAS SET ITS OWN TASK.
I HEADED THE GROUP WHICH WAS TO ELABORATE MEASURES AIMED AT LOCALIZING THE EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT.
AS WE APPROACHED THE STATION WE WERE TAKEN ABACK BY THE APPEARANCE OF THE SKY.
AT A DISTANCS OF SOME 8-10 KM FRCH THE STATION WE COULD SEE A CRIMSON GLOW.J IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT A NUCLEAR POWER STATION WITH ALL ITS INSTALLATIONS AND PIPES FRCH WHICH THERE ARE NO VISIBLE EMANATIONS REPRESENTS A VERY CLEAN AND METICULCUS STRUCTURE.
AND SUDDENLY IT LC0KED LIXE A METALLURGICAL PLANT OR A MAJOR CHEMICAL ENTERPRISE OVER WHICH THERE HUNG A HUGE UNCLASSIFIED
CRIMSON GLOW COVER 8NG HALF THE SKY.
ITWASIMMEDIATELYOBVIOUSTHATTHEMANAGEMENTOFTHESTATIOy ITSELF AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND!.
ELECTRIFICATION WHICH WAS PRESENT AT THE SITE ACTED ON THE WHOLE7
~
INCONSISTENTLY."JON THE ONE HAND, A LARGE SECTION OF THE PERSONNEL, THE STATION MANAGEMENT AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION ACTED RESOLUTELY. OPERATORS OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS WERE AT THEIR STATIONS AND SO WERE THE STAFF WORKING AT NO. 3 UNIT WHICH WAS IN THE SAME BUILDING AS THE NO. 4 UNIT.
VARIOUS SERVICES WERE IN A STATE OF READINESS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FIND ANY PERSON, T0_I.SSUE_.ANY_,I}{ST.R_UQTIONS..( ANILTHEL WOULIL3F IMPLEMENTED)
BUT PRIOR TO THE_ARR_.IVAL.0F_.THE,00.VERNMENT. COMMISSION THERE WAS DEFfMITE PCKN AS TO WHAT ORDERS AND IN(TRUCTION SHOULD BE ISSUED OR HOW~T!fE SITUATICK'5H00LD BE DEFINED # THE GOVERNHENT COMMISSION ARRIVED ON 26 APRIL AT 8 0' CLOCK IN THE EVENING AND ALL THIS HAD TO BE DONE BY THE COMMISSION.
e
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 '"*/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///BY THE COMMISSION, TEXT:
((TEXT)) FIRST OF ALL THE NO. 3 UNIT RECEIVED THE ORDER TO SWITCH OFF THE REACTOR AND COOL IT DOWN.
THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS CONTINUED OPERATING DESPITE THE FACT THE INTERNAL LEVELS OF RADIATION CONTAMINATION WERE ALREADY RELATIVELY HIGH.
THE INTERNAL CONTAMINATION OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE VENTILATION AIR INTAKE WHICH WAS NOT SWITCHED OFF IMMEDIATELY WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED AND THE CONTAMINATED AIR FROM THE SITE OF THE CHERNOBYL AES REACHED THE PREMISES OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS VIA THE VENTILATION AIR INTAKE VENTS.
B.YE. SMCHERBINA IMMEDIATELY CALLED IN THE CHEMICAL TROOPS, WHO ARRIVED RELATIVELY PROMPTLY HEADED BY GENERAL PIKALOV, AND HELICOPTER UNITS.
THE HELICOPTER MEN WERE HEADED BY GENERAL ANTOSHKIN.
FLIGHTS AND EXTERNAL INSPECTIONS OF THE STATE OF THE NO. 4 UNIT BEGAN.
FROM THE FIRST FLIGHT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE REACTOR HAD BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED, THE TOP SLAB WHICH HERMETICALLY SEALS THE REACTOR COMPARTMENT WAS IN AN ALMOST VERTICAL POSITION BUT AT SOMETHING OF AN ANGLE.
IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT IT HAD BEEN DISLODGED AND THAT THIS MUST HAVE TAKEN CONSIDERABLE FORCE.
THE UPPER PART OF THE REACTOR HALL WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED AND THE ROOFS OF THE MACHINE HALL AND THE SURROUNDING SITE WAS LITTERED WITH PIECES OF THE GRAPHITE BLOCKS, BOTH WHOLE AND BROKEN.
JUDGING BY THE SCALE OF DESTRUCTION, IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT A SIZEABLE EXPLOSION HAD OCCURRED.
FROM THE REACTOR CRATER THEIR ROSE A CONSTANT WHITE COLUMN OF THE PRODUCTS OF COMBUSTION -- GRAPHITE, THAT IS -- SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS HIGH, AND INSIDE THE REACTOR SPACE INDIVIDUAL LARGE PATCHES OF A POWEPSUL CRIMSON GLOW WERE VISIBLE.
AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY WHETHER THE SOURCE OF THIS GLOW WERE THE RED-HOT GRAPHITE RODS, WHICH REMAINED IN PLACE, OR BURNING GRAPHITE, SECAUSE GRAPHITE BURNS EVENLY GIVING OFF THE WHITISH PRODUCT CF THE CHEMICAL REACTION -- THE SUM CF CARBCN OXIDES -- AND THE COLCR ":iAT MAS REFLECTED IN THE SKY WAS THE TEMPERATURE OF THE GLOWING UNCLASSIFIED i
4
{
' GRAPHITE, THE POWERFUL GLOW OF THE GRAPHITE BLOCKS.
THE FIRST QUESTION WHICH PERTURBED US ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE REACTOR OR PART OF IT WAS STILL FUNCTIONING OR NOT, IN OTHER WORDS WHETHER THE PROCESS OF EMISSION OF SHORT-LIVED RADICALTIVE ISOTOPES WAS CONTINUING.. THE VERY FIRST MEASUREMENT 8 WHICH VERE TAKEN INDICATED THE POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF POWERFUD NEUTROW RADIATION 3 THIS COULD HAVE MEANT THAT THE REACTOR $AS STILL FUNCTIONING.
I HAD TO GET NEAR IT IN AN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND MAKE SURE THAT THERE WAS NO SUCH RADIATION.
BY THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL ALL POSSIBLE METHODS FOR FLOODING THE ZCNE HAD BEEN TESTED, BUT THEY PRODUCED NO EFFECT APART FROM A HIGH LEVEL OF STEAM FORMATION AND THE SPREAD OF WATER TO NEIGHBORING POWER UNITS ALONG VARIOUS TRANSPORTATION CORRID0hS.
THE FIREFIGHTERS ELIMINATED THE SEAT OF THE FIRE IN THE MACHINE HALL THAT VERY FIRST NIGHT, DOING THIS WITH GREAT EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY.
IT IS THOUGHT AT TIMES THAT SOME FIREFIGHTERS WERE a v W >5 M EXPOSED TO HIGH DOSES OF RADIATION BECAUSE THEY HAD TAKEN POSITICNS IN CERTAIN SPOTS AS OBSERVERS, WAITING TO MAKE SURE THAT NO NEW FIRES STARTED.
THIS IS NOT SO, BECAUSE THE MACHINE HALL CONTAINED MUCH OIL, HYDROGEN IN THE GENERATORS, AND MANY SOURCES WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED NOT ONLY FIRES BUT EVEN EXPLOSIONS WHICH COULD HAVE DESTROYED THE NO. 3 POWER UNIT.
THE FIREFIGHTERS' ACTIONS IN THESE CONDITIONS WERE NOT ONLY HEROIC BUT ALSO CORRECT, INTELLIGENT, AND EFFECTIVE, SINCE THEY APPLIED THE FIRST PRECISE MEASURES TO CONTAIN THE POSSIBLE SPREAD OF THE ACCIDENT.
THE NEXT QUESTION AROSE WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT A RATHER POWERFUL STREAM OF AEROSOL GAS RADIOACTIVITY WAS BEING EMITTED FROM THE CRATER OF THE DESTROYED NO. 4 POWER UNIT.
THE GRAPHITE.WAS ON FIRE, AND EACH PARTICLE CARRIED A PRETTY HIGH QUANTITY OF RADIOACTIVE SOURCES.
A COMPLEX TASK PRESENTED ITSELF.
THE AVERAGE CCMBUSTION SPEED OF GRAPHITE IS SOMETHING LIKE 1 TONNE PER HOUR.
THE NO. 4 POWER UNIT CONTAINED ABOUT 2,500 TONNES.
CONSEQUENTLY, IN 240 HOURS OF NORMAL COMBUSTION, RADIACTIVITY COULD HAVE SPREAD OVER A LARGE AREA WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INTENSIVELY CONTAMINATED BY VARIOUS RADIONUCLIDES.
SINCE THE RADIATION CONDITIONS MADE IT POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS ONLY FROM THE AIR AND FRCH AN ALTITUDE OF AT LEAST200METERSABOVETHEREACTOR,WHIll~THEAPPROPRIATEEQUI{MEd WHICH'COULD HAVE EXTINGUISHED THE GRAPHITE FIRE BY TRADITIONALI METHODS,'l! SING ilATER,~ FOAM, AND OTHER MEANS, WAS NOT AVAILABLE, kT WAS NECESSARY TO SEEK NONTRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS.
WE STARTED THINXING ABOUT THAT.
OUR DELIBERATIONS WERE ACCOMPANIED BY CONSTANT CONSULTATIONS WITH HOSCOW, WITH A.P. ALEKSANDROV, STAFFEP.S FRCH THE ATHOIC ENERGY INSTITUTE, AND SPECIALISTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND. ELECTRIFICATION AT THE OTHER END OF THE LINF.
ON THE)
~
s VERY NEXT DAY WE STARTED RECEIVING VARIOUS TELEGRAMS AND f.
SUGGESTIONS FROM'ABROAUl. PROPOSING DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR TREATING)
THEBURNINGGRAPHITEUSINGVARIOUSMIXTUREQ
/'***** BEGINNING OF TAKE 004 ***/
REF:
MCSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///
TEXT:
UNCLASSIFIED
- ((TEXT)) FOLLOWING THE DISCUSS 80NS AND NUMEROUS CONSULTATIONS, TWO COMPONENTS -- LEAD AND DOLOMITE -- WERE CHOSEN AS TEMPERATURE
' STABILIZERS....
AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION TO BE SOLVED BY THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION WAS THE QUESTION OF THE FATE OF THE CITY OF PRIPYAT.
THE RADIATION SITUATION THERE IN THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL WAS MORE OR LESS FAVORABLE, RANGING FROM 1 MILLIROENTCEN PER HOUR TO TENS OF MILLIROENTGENS PER HOURS.
THIS WAS, OF COURSE, AN UNHEALTHY SITUATION, BUT IT STILL LEFT TIME FOR SGME DELIBERATION.
THE MEDICAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE LIMITED:
AN EVACUATION COULD BE STARTED IN THE EVENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BEING IN DANGER OF RECEIVING 25 BIOLOGICAL ROENTCENS PER PERSON.
EVACUATION WOULD BECOME MANDATORY IF THERE WAS A THREAT OF RECEIVING 75 BIOLOGICAL ROENTGENS DURING THE TIME SPENT IN THE INFECTED ZONE. THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DECISION ON EVACUATION IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 25 AND 75 ROENTCENS WAS VESTED IN LOCAL ORGANS.
DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD g
IN THESE CONDITIONS.
SENSING THAT THE DYNAMICS WOULD NOT CHANGE FOR THE BETTER, PHXSICISTS INSISTED ON MANDATORY EVACUATION. MEDICS SEEMED TO CONCEDE TO THE PHYSICISTS AND, SOMETIME BY 2200 OR 2300 HOURS IN THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL, BORIS YEVDOKIMOVICH -- HAVING LISTENED TO OUR DISCUSSION AND TRUSTING OUR JUDGMENT, HADE THE DECISION ON MANDATORY EVACUATION.
IT WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE THE NEIT DAY.
UNFORTUNATELY, THIS INFORMATION SPREAD BY WORD OF MOUTH, BY PEOPLE CALLING INTO APARTMENT BLOCK LOBBIES, AND BY THE POSTING OF NOTICES, AND IT OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT REACHED EVERYONE BECAUSE IN THE MORNING OF 27 APRIL YOU COULD STILL SEE MOTHERS PUSHING BABY CARRIAGES ALONG THE CITY STREETS, CHILDREN AT PLAY IN THE STREETS, AND THE GENERAL SfGNS OF NORMAL SUNDAY LIFE.
AT 1100 HOURS IT WAS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE ENTIRE CITY WOULD BE EVACUATED.
BY 1400 HOURS ALL THE NECESSARY TRANSPORT HAD BEEN FULLY ASSEMBLED AND TRAVEL ROUTES HAD BEEN DETERMINED.
THE EVACUATION WAS CONDUCTED QUITE TIDILY, SWIFTLY, AND PRECISELY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS TAKING PLACE IN UNUSUAL CONDITIONS AND SOME MISHAPS AND INACCURACIES DID OCCUR.
FOR EXAMPLE, A LARGE GROUP OF CITIZENS ASKED THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL IN THEIR OWN CARS. OF WHICH THERE WERE SEVERAL THOUSAND IN TEH CITY.
FOLLOWING SOME DELIBERATION, PERMISSION WAS GRANTED EVEN THOUGH IT PROBABLY WAS INCORRECT SINCE SOME OF THE CARS WERE CONTAMINATED BUT THE DOSIMETRY CHECKPOINTS TO CHECK THE LEVEL OF CONTAMINATION AND BASHING POINTS WERE SET UP SOMEWHAT LATER.
BUT I REPEAT THAT THE EVACUATION OF THE CITY WAS TAKING PLACE WHILE THE LEVEL OF CONTAMINATION IN THE CITY WAS STILL LOW.
PRACTICE SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWED THAT NO ONE FROM AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION WHO HAD NOT BEEN AT THE POWER STATION ITSELF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT --
ALMOST 50,000 PEOPLE -- SUFFERED ANY SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO HIS HEALTH.
THE SUBSEQUENT MEASURES WERE AIMED AT MORE THOROUGH DOSIMETRIC MONITORING ORGANIZED BY SERVICES FRCH THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR HYDRCMETEORCLCGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, GENERAL PIKALOV'S SERVICES, THE ?OWER STATION'S SERVICES, AND THE PHYSICISTS' SERVICES.
ISOTOPE COMPOSITION WAS STUDIED MORE THOROUGHLY.
GOOD UNCLASSIFIED
9 WORK WAS DONE BY THE MILITARY DOSIMETRY SERVICES, BUT WE RECEIVED THE HOST ACCURATE INFORMATION ON ISOTOPE COMPOSITION AND THE NATURE 0F RADIATION DISTRIBUTION FROM THE LABORATORIES DEPLOYED IN THE INFECTED TERRITORY.
WE PROCEEDED FROM THEIR DATA WHEN MAKING DECISIONS.
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION KEPT CHANGING ALL THE TIME THROUGH THE FIRST FEW DAYS, AS THE MOVEMENT OF AIR MASSES KEPT CHANCING AND AS DUST WAS RAISED NEAR THE NO. 4 Pt,WER UNIT WITH THE DUMPING OF MATERIALS INTO THE REACTOR.
HERE ARE SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THAT PERIOD.
THE STATION STAFF.
WE LOOKED FOR PEOPLE PREPARED FOR ANY OPERATION UNDER ANY CONDITIONS.
80T1370 VRATOPERATIONSW PRECIsmI, wuar MAITT0"SEFDONE IFTHIT3ITUATTON TW WORK SHOULD)
~
BE'PtDNED AND ORGANIZED Y NETTRPE THE' STATIOW'S' MANAGERS NOR THD MIN 13TRi~dP POWERlND ELea.,4 air 1 CATION'$~ltADERSN!P'HAD 'ANY CONCEP) 0F THE.NECESSXRI wastar.ncz.0F ACTIONS ERE.'NEITHER IN THE FORM AS PREVIOUSLY SET OUT AND STUDIED NOR IN THE OPTIONS PRODUCED ON e
THE SPOT.
Ins-rdm, TION OFMPININU~TRE ~5IT[MTION~AND CONDUCTING THENN"IRTBCTIONS 51D-TQFBE' ASSUMED BY THE GOVERNMENT s trueTHIDED THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE CONFUSION EVEN ON MINOR MATTERS.
I RECALL THAT IN THE FIRST DAYS OF THE COMMISSION'S STAY IN PRIPYAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY QUANTITY OF PROTECTIVE RESPIRATOBS, INDIVIDUAL RADIATION METERS -- TLDS ((EIPANSION UNKNOWN)) -- THERE WASN'T EVEN ENOUGH OF THE NOT VERY RELIABLE S0-CALLED PENCILS FOR EVERYONE.
TE STATION DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH AUTOMATIC EXTERNAL RADIATION METERS WHICH WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDED REMOTE DATA ON THE RADIATION SITUATION OVER A RADIUS OF SEVERAL KILOMETERS, SO THAT A LARGE N7MBER OF PEOPLE HAD TO BE ORCANIZED TO CARRY OUT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.
THERE WERE NO RADIO-CONTROLED AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH RADIATION MEASURING INSTRUMENTS, THUS IT NEEDED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PILOTS AND HELICOPTER MEN TO TAKE READINGS AND CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE.
THERE WAS NOT EVEN THE BASIC STANDARD OF HYGIENE, NOT IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS AT LEAST.
PREMISES IN THE TOWN OF PRIPYAT WERE ALREADY QUITE FILTHY BY TE 27TH, 28TH, AND 29TH OF APRIL BUT WHEN FOOD WAS BROUGHT IN -- SAUSAGE, CUCUMBERS, AND BOTTLL3 0F ?EPSI COLA AND FRUIT JUICE -- IT WAS ALL SIMPLY STORED IN ROOMS AND PEOPLE PICKED IT UP AND OPENED IT WITH THEIR BARE HANDS.
THIS WAS A FEW DAYS LATER BEFORE EVERYTHING WAS HORE OR LESS BACK TO NORMAL, WHEN CANTEENS AND TENTS APPEARED AND THE APPROPRIATE HEAI:TH AND HYGIENE CONDITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED, QUITE PRIMITIVE ONES, IT IS TRUE, BUT THEY MADE IT POSSIBLE TO MONITOR PEOPLE'S HANDS AND FOOD QUALITY FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF CONTAMINATION...
/00**** BEGINNING OF TAKE 005 ******/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// VIEWPOINT OF CONTAMINATION...
TEXT:
((TEXT)) ON 2 MAY, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION WAS INSTALLED AT CHERNOBYL NIKOLAY IVANOVICH RYZHKOV AND YEGOR KUZMICH LIGACHEV CAME TO THE ZCNE.
THEIR VISIT WAS CF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.
~ HEY HELD A CONFERENCE AT THE CHERN0BYLSKIY PARTY RAYKCM.
FROM OUR UNCLASSIFIED l
1 i
REPORTS (I WAS THE MAfN SPEAKER) THEY GRASPED TE S8TUATION, THEY UNDERST00D THAT THIS WAS NOT A LOCAL INCfDENT BUT A LARGE-SCALE ACCIDENT WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES AND kOULD REQUIRE TREMENDOUS WORK...
AFTER THE REPORTS AND AFTER WE HAD EXPLAINED TE SITUATION AS WE OURSELVES SAW IT, FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH DETERMINED TE PROCEDURE FOR ORGANILING WORK THROUGHOUT THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD, THE SCALE OF THAT WORK, AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARD IT OF ALL THE DEPARTHENTS AND ENTERPRISES IN OUR COUNTRY.
AN OPERATIONAL GROUP.
WAS SET UP UNDER N.I. RYZHKOV'S LEADERSHIP AND VIRTUALLY ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S INDUSTRY WAS ENLISTED. FROM THAT MOMENT ON THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION WAS ONLY A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM IN THAT VAST STATE WORK WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO'S OPERATIONAL GROUP.
I DO NOT KNOW OF ANY EVENT GREAT OR SMALL WHICH THE POLITBURO'S OPERATIONAL GROUP DID NOT HAVE IN ITS PURVIEW.
I MUST SAY THAT ITS SESSIONS AND DECISIONS WERE VERY CALM AND RESTRAINED, TOTALLY r
GEARED TO RELYING ON SPECIALISTS' VIEWS BUT ALSO TO COMPREHENSIVELY COMPARING THE VIEWS OF DIFFERENT SPECIALISTS.
FOR ME THIS WAS A MODEL OF CORRECTLY ORGANIZED-WORK.
INITIALLY I MAY HAVE SUPPOSED THAT ARBITRARY DECISIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN THERE DESIGNED TO COPE WTTH THE SITUATION MORE QUICKLY AND PERHAPS TO UNDERSTATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INCIDENT. THERE WAS NOTHING LIKE THAT.
WORK WAS ORGANIZED JUST AS IN A GOOD SCIENTIFIC COLLECTIVE.
FIRST -- THE CLOSE STUDY OF INFORMATION, PREFERABLY INFORMATION RECEIVED FRCH VARIOUS SOURCES. OFTEN THERE WERE CASES WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INFORMATION PRODUCED BY THE MILITARY DIFFERED FROM TE INFORMATION Ps0DUCED BY CIVILIAN SCIENTIFIC SERVICES AND IN TURN THE DIFFERENT SCZENTIFIC GROUPS INITIALLY PRODUCED DIFFERENT INFORMATION.
ALL THIS CREATED A QUITE ANXIOUS SITUATION.
BUT THE OPERATIONAL GROUP ITSELF SHOWED NO ANXIETY, IT SIMPLY INSISTED ON ADDITIONAL READINGS AND CLARIFICATIONS, TRYING ITS UTHOST TO UNDERSTAND THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS.
AT THE SAME TIME THE OPERATIONAL GROUP ALWAYS SOUGHT fN ITS DECISIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
FOR EXAMPLE, DECISIONS WERE TAKEN TO BENEFIT THE VICTIMS OF THE ACCIDENT WHEN CONSIDERING ALL THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS GOVERNING THE EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATED ZONE OR THE SCALE OF FINANCIAL COMPENSATION NEEDED FOR THE EVACUEES.
THIS APPLIED IN EVERY CASE.
NOW A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE ARMY.
THE MILITARY'S RANGE OF WORK UAS VERY LARGE.
THE CHEMICAL TROOPS FIRST HAD TO EXAMINE AND D2TERMINE THE CONTAMINATED ZONE.
THE ARMY BORE THE BURDEN OF WORK BOTH AT THE STATION ITSELF AND IN THE 30-KM ZONE IN THE DECONTAMINATION OF VILLAGES, SE'ITLEMENTS, AND HIGHWAYS.
THE ARMY DID A TREMENDCUS AMOUNT OF WORK DECONTAMINATING THE TOWN OF PRIPYAT.
NOT ONCE DID I SEE SOVIET ARMY SPECIALISTS OR NONMILITARY PEOPLE TRY IN SOME WAY TO SHIRK THEIR WORK OR FEEL THAT THEY HAD BEEN GENERALLY PRESS-GANGED INTO DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS WORK.
PERHAPS SUCH CASES DID EXIST BUT I DID NOT SEE A SINGLE ONE.
I MYSELF WENT SEVERAL TIMES INTO QUITE DANGEROUS SECTICNS OF THE NO 4 UNIT.
I f
EXPLAINED TO PEOPLE THE CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE WORKING AND SAID THAT I WANTED TO WORK WITH THOSE PPIPARED TO HELP ME l
l 7OLUNTARILY.
THEPE WASN'T A SINGLE CCCASION WHEN ANYCNE CRCPPED j
GUT, 50 TO SPEAK, OR FAILED TO CCME FORWARD.
UNCLASSIFIED l
l
'CONCE'RNING THE INFORMATION SERVICE.
APPARENTLY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE A USSR STATE COMMIM EE FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWER PUBLISHING HOUSE, MEDICAL PUBLISHING HOUSES, AND A "ZNANIYE" SOCIETY, TERE WAS NO READY-MADE LITERATURE AT ALL THAT COULD HAVE BEEN RAPIDLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE?
POPULATION, TO EXPLAIN WHAT IIND OF DOSES ARE RELATIVELTRARMLEq AS FAR AS HUMANS ARE CONCERNED AND WHAT DOSES'ARE EICEEDINGLY DANGEROUS, HOW TO BEHAVE IN' CONDITION 5 M PEOPLE ARE'IN AN'y)
ENHANCED RADTATI0rDINGER 20NEi~THAT COULD"HAVE GIVEN ' COMPETENT)
ADVICE ON WHATT1EASURETHOW TO EASURE ITrWHAT TO-DO-WI}.
VEGETABLES, FRUIT, AND 50 FORTH.TTHERE WERE MANY BOOKS FOR SPECIALISTS, FAT TOMES, COMPETENTXND CORRECT, BUT THERE PRACTICALLY NO PAMPHLETS OR LEAFLETS-IN THE COUNTRY}
PERHAPS"NOW'IS THE RIGHT TIME TO GIVE SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS ABOUT HOW I BECAE INVOLVED IN THE STORY, WHAT MY CONNECTIONS WITH IT WERE, HOW I SAW THE STORY AND THE QUALITY OF TE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY, AND HOW I SEE IT NOW.
RARELY HAS ANY r
OF US SPOKEN WITH REAL FRANKNESS AND PRECISION ON THIS SCORE.
/'C" " BEGINNING OF TAKE 006 ******/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///0N THIS SCORE.
TEXT:
((TEIT))
I AM A GRADUATE OF THE PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF MOSCOW'S D.I. MENDELEYEV CHEMICAL-TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE. THE DEPARTMENT. TRAINED SPECIALISTS, MAINLY RESEARCERS, TO WORK IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY.
THAT IS, KNOWING HOW TO SEPARATE ISOTOPES AND WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES, KNOWING HOW TO EXTRACT URANIUM FROM ORE, BRING IT TO THE REQUISITE CONDITICN, MAKE NUCLEAR FUEL FROM IT, KNOWING HOW TO PROCESS NUCLCAR FUEL WHICH HAS ALPEADY BEEN IN THE REACTOR AND CONTAINS A POWERFUL RADI0 ACTIVE COMPONENT, IN ORDER TO SEPARATE OUT THE USL/UL PRODUCTS AND ALSO SEPARATE OUT TE DANGEROUS, HARMFUL COMPONENTS, AND KNOW HOW TO COMPACT THEM AND BURY THEM SO THAT THEY ARE NOT HARMFUL TO HUMANS.
AND WHAT PART OF THE RADIOACTIVE SOURCES TO USE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND FOR MEDICINE, PERHAPS.
THIS IS THE GROUP OF SPECIAL QUESTIONS I WAS TAUGHT.
THEN I TOOK A DIPLOMA AT THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE IN THE FIELD OF PROCESSING NUCLEAR FUEL.
ACADEMICIAN I.K. KIKOIN TRIED TO KEEP ME THERE TO DO RESEARCH -- E LIKED HY DIPLCMA WORK.
BUT I AND SCHE COMRADES ARRANGED TO WORK FOR A SPELL AT A NUCLEAR INDUSTRY PLANT TO ACQUIRE PRACTICAL SKILLS IN THE AREA THAT WOULD LATER BECOME THE SUBJECT OF OUR RESEARCH.
I WAS A KIND OF AGITATOR FOR THIS IDEA, SO I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RESEARCH OFFERS, AND I WENT TO SIBERIA.
THERE I WAS INVOLVED IN THE STARTUP OF A RADI0 CHEMICAL PLANT.
IT UAS A VERY LIVELY, INTERESTING PC.RIOD -- AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACTICAL WORK.
I WORKED AT THE PLANT FOR AROUND TWO YEARS AND THEN THEY "DRAGGED" ME BACK INTO RESEARCH AT THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE...
I DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES...
I PRESENTED CANDIDATE'S AND DOCTOR'S DISSERTATIONS.
I WAS ELECTED TO THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.
TE ACADEMIC PART CF THE WORK WON A STATE PRIZE. THAT WAS MY PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY,.
I MANAGED TO INVOLVE UNCLASSIFIED
, VERT INTERESTZNG YOUNG PFOPLE IN IT, WHO UZTH TAS J, s EDUCATION, AND UNDERSTANDfNG ARE STfLL DEVELOPZNG THIS.m.
AE OF PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY AND OUT OF WHICH, I AM SURE, WILL COME MANY MORE EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE FOR PRACTICAL WORK AND FOR THE COGNITIVE PROCESS.
THE SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA OBVIOUSLY ATTRACTED ATTENTICN -- I BECAME INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR. MY ACADEMIC FUNCTIONS WERE CONFINED TO MY OWN SCIENTIFIC WORK.
THE DUTIES ASSIGNED TO E, DUTIES THAT EXISTED THEN AND EXIST TO THIS DAY, WERE PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISIF.Y, AND THE USE OF NUCLEAR AND PLASMA SOURCESr FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PURPOSES.
WHEN A.P. ALEKSANDROV WAS ELECTSD PRESIDENT OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HE RECOMMENDED E AS FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE.
WHAT INTERESTED ME WAS THE PROPORTION OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE SOVRET F0VER-INDUSTRY AND THE REASONS WHY IT WAS PRESENT.
I ORGANIZED SYSTEMATIC RESEARCH CONNECTED WITH WH/.T TYPE OF STATIONS SHOULD BE BUILT FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES, HOW TO USE THEM SENSIBLY, o
WHETHER THEY SHOULD PRODUCE ELECTRICITY ALONE OR OTHER SOURCES OF ENERGY TOO, IN PARTICULAR HYDROGEN.
I PAID SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE HYDROGEN ENERGY.
THEY WERE ALL UNUSUAL QUESTIONS, ANCILLARY TO NUCLEAR POWER.
~
SINCE QUESTIONS OF SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR P00VER INDUST 7Y WERE THE HOST ACUTE ISSUES RAISED DURING DISCUSSIONS IN VARIOUt SPHERES OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, I WAS INTERESTED IN COMPARING THE REAL DANGERS AND THE REAL THREATS POSED BY NUCLEAR POWER WITH THE TMREATS OF OTHER POWER SYSTEMS.
I ENTERED INTO THIS WITH GREAT ENTHUSIASM, MAINLY EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF OTHER, ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF ENERGY TO NUCLEAR POWER.
AT THE INSTITUTE SCIENTIFIC. AND TECHNICACCOUNCTL. DISCUSSION 019 CONCEPTUAL' QUESTIONS '0F WUCCERM DEVELDPMENT 9AS NELATIVELY 4 FREQUENT 7 BITT DISCUSSIOR OF THE TECHNICAL A5PECTS'VAS EITREHELD RARES THE"QUILITTWT'PARTICUCKE REACTOR, ME QUACITT OP-THE 7 FUEL 2 THES8-QUESTICItS'M~ DISCUSSED--AT-SCIENTIFIC' ANIT TECHNICAIn COUNCILS BUTTHE~INFORMATION *I HAD DEMONSTRATED, M SEEMED TO MP3 THAT ALL-WA5 NOT WEEL~TN'THE RATTER '0F ~THE DtVELOPMENT~ 0F~ NUCLEAR 7 POWEm IT WAS AS CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT THAT TIHr'EQUTFEEET VA3D BASICALIY CITTLE DIFFERENT~FR0trYESTERE EQUIPMENT 9IN CONCEPTUAL TERMS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND IT EVEN SURPASSED THEM IN SOME AREAS, BUD
~
THEY WERE SHORT OF100D' CONTRT/ SYSTEMS AND' D'I AGNOSTIC SiSTEMS"3 THE AMERICAN RA5MDSSENgCARRIED OtTP-AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLIAR POWEN STATI0E SAFETT'IN1tHIClr HE"CON 3ISTENTLY LOOKED FOR ALL POSSIBLE)
SOURCE 3' Or'TROUELE LEADINO~ TO' ACCIDENTS,hYSTEMATIZED THEM, ANID MADE FRDRABILITT' ASSESSMENTS OF PARTICULAR EVENTS,7 ASSESSMENTS 03r THE FEDERBILITT OFAR ETENTFS LEADING TO THE RELEASE OF4 RADI0 ACTIVITY, FOR EXAMPLE.
WE LEARNED THAT FRCH FOREIGN SOURCES.
I 'SAF'ECT A"3 INGLE COLLECTIYE IN THE SOVIET UNION ~ THAT WAS POSINCD AND"EXAMINING THESE ' QUESTIONS VIIW ANY DEGREE OF COMPETENCEg THE MOST ACTIVE ADVOCATE OF NUCLEAR POPWER SAFETY HERE WAS B.A.
S8DOPINKO.
HIS APPROACH SEEMED SERIOUS TO ME.
HE HAD REAL KNOULEDGE OF STATION OPERATION, OF THE QUALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT BEING MANUFACTUPID, OF THE TROUBLE THAT SCHETIMES OCCURS.
BUT HIS EFFORTS WEPI GEARED MAINLY *O COPING WITH THE TRCUBLE, FI?IT BY ORGANIZATIONAL MEASURES AND, SECOND, THROUGH A SYSTEM FOR IMPROVING UNCLASSIFIED 1
r
j
' THE DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE IN TE POSSESSION OF STATIONS AND
. DESIGNERS; THIRD, HE WAS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE CREATION OF SUPERVISORY BODIES THAT WOULD CONTROL THE SITUATION.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 007 ******/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// CONTROL THE SITUATION.
TEXT:
1
((TEIT)) HE"ANU'HIS COLLEAGUES WERE'YERY WORRIED ABOUT THF/)
QUALITY-OPTME-EQUIPMENTTHE~STATIONSVERE'BEINGSUPPLIEDWIT3 RECENTLY-WE~ALL BECAME-CONCERNED ABOUT E TRAINING'AND EXPERTI6f OP-THE PERSONNEL WHO~DESIGT, CONSTRUCT,'AND OPERATE'NUCLEARy STATIONS.3"IN FACT, THE-NtHBER-OP-PACIt,ITIES-MAS-INCREAsi4D, BUT THE STANDARD'Or EIFERTISE OF W FERSONNEt; INVOLVED IN THE-PROCESS HA$
TDLLEN.7 V. A. SIDORENKO WAS AT THE FOREFRONT ON THESE QUESTIONS.
UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID FOT GET THE PROPER BACKING. EVERY DOCUMENT, EVERY STEP WAS AN AGONIZING PROCESS.
PSYCHOLOGICALLY IT IS POSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THIS, BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT IN WHICH WE WERE WORKING WAS BUILT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VERY HIGHEST LEVEL CF SKILL OF THE PEOPLE PERFORMING ANY OPERATION AND THE VERY HIGHEST RESPONSIBILITY.
AND INDEED, IN SKILLED HANDS OUR APPARATUSES SEEMED BOTH RELIABLE AND OPERATIONALLY SAFE.
ANXIETY CONCERNING THE ENHANCED SAFETY OF ATOMIC STATIONS APPEARED TO BE A CONTRIVED ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS WAS AN ENVIRONMENT OF HIGHLY SKILLED SPECIALISTS; THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT SAFETY QUESTIONS ARE RESOLVED EXCLUSIVELY BY THE LEVEL OF SKILL AND PRECISION OF INSTRUCTION OF THE PERSONNEL.
AN INCREASING VOLUME OF RESOURCES WENT ON THE CREATION OF FACILITIES WHIUH HAD NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING.
CAPACITIES FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF FUEL ELEMENTS WERE ESTABLISED, AS WERE CAPACITIES IN THE METALS SCIENCE SPHERE; A LARGE QUANTITY OF CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES WENT ON SETTING UP FACILITIES UNRELATED T9 THE DEPARTFINT'S FIELD.
SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE AT ONE TIME THE HOST POWERFUL IN THE COUNTRY BEGAN TO BECOME ENFEEBLED, THE DECREE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT WITH H0DERN HARDWARE BEGAN TO DECLINE, THE PERSONNEL STARTED TO AGE, NEW APP *0 ACHES WERE NOT MUCH WELCOMED.
THE RHYTHM OF WORK GRADUALLv BCC\\ME HABITUAL, AS DID THE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF ONE PROBM OR ANOTHF3.
I SAW ALL THIS, Bt.'T IT WAS HARD FOR ME TO INTERVENE IN THIS 'ROCESS STRICTLY PROFESSIONALLY, WHILE GENERAL DECLARATIONS ON THIS SCORE MET WITH HOSTILITY, INASMUCH AS THE ATTEMPT BY A NONPROFESSIONAL TO INTRODUCE ANT OF HIS OWN UNDERSTANDING INTO THEIR WORK COULD SCARCELY BE ACCEPTABLE.
THERE GREW UP R GENERATION ~CE"ENG1 BEERS WHO WERE SKILLED AT '3 THEIR OWN WORK 1UT WHO DID NOT PERCEIVE IN A CRITICAL FASHION THE'3 VERY APliARATUSES RD~ SYSTEMS ENSURING THEIR SAFETYl..
THE WORM OF DOUBT GNAWED AWAY AT ME, BECAUSE FROM MY PROFESSIONAL VIEWPOINT IT SECMED TO ME THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SOMETHING NEW, TO ATTEMPT TO TURN ASIDE AND DO THINGS OTHERWISE.
I RAN A FAIR NUMBER OF RISKS.
THROUGHOUT MY LIFE I HAVE HAD TO CONDUCT 10 PROJECTS AT THE LEVEL CF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.
FIVE OF l
~NESE, ILED, AND.I COST THE STATE SCFITHING CF THE ORDER OF R25 MILLION ON THESE FAILED PROJECTS.
THEY FAILED NOT BECAUSE THEY UNCLASSIFIED l
t
WERE INCORRECT FROM THE OUTSET.
THEY WERE ATTRACTIVE AND INTERESTING, BUT IT TURNED OUT THAT EITHER THE NECESSARY MATERIALS WERE UNAVAILABLE OR THERE WAS NO ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD TAKE ON THE DEVELOPMENT WORK FOR A NONTRIVIAL ((NETRIVIALNYY)) COMPRESSOR OR A NONTRIVIAL HEAT EXCHANGER, FOR EXAMPLE, AND AS A RESULT AT ThEIR DESIGN ANALYSIS STAGE THE INITIALLY ATTRACTIVE IDEAS PROVED VERY EIPENSIVE, UNWIELDY, AND WERE NOT ADOPTED FOR IMPLEMENTATION.
FOR THESE SAME REASONS, I'M AFRAID, THIS SAME FATE AWAITS 2 OUT OF THE 10 PROJECTS, BUT 3 PROJECTS WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL -- WHERE WE,
FOUND GOOD PARTNERS -- AND AS A RESULT JUST 1 0F THE 3 COMPLETED PROJECTS, ON WHICH WE SPENT R17 MILLION,. BEGAN TO BRING IN AN ANNUAL INCOME THAT REPAID WITH INTEREST THE R25-MILLION-EXPENDITURE ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WORKS WHICH TO THIS DAY HAVE NOT REACHED A POSITIVE CONCLUSION.
BUT THE DEGREE OF RISK IN MV WORK WAS FAIRLY HIGH: SOME 50-70 PERCENT.
I SAW NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE REACTOR FIELD...
TRADITIONAL REACTOR BUILDING WAS OF LITTLE INTEREST TO ME.
OF COURSE, AT THAT TIME I DID NOT CONCEIVE OF THE DEGREE OF DANGER ASSOCIATED WITH IT. THERE WAS A FEELING OF UNEASE, BUT THERE WERE SUCH "BIG GUYS" THERE, SUCH GIANTS AND EXPERIENCED PEOPLE THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THEY WOULD NOT PERPETRATE ANYTHING NASTY.
A COMPARISON OF WESTERN APPARATUSES WITH OUR OWN ALLOWED ME TO DRAW THE CONCLUSIONS THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAFETY OF EXISTING APPARATUSES, ALL THE SAME THEY WERE FEWER THAN THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL POWER GENERATION,'
WITH TTS LARGE QUANTITY OF CARCINOGENIC SUBSTANCES DISCHARGED INTO THE ATHOSPHERE, WITH THE RADI0 ACTIVITY EMITTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM THOSE SAME COAL SEAMS.
l AS FOR.THE RBMK REACTOR, IT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A POOR ONE
((PLOKHIY)) AMONG REACTOR BUILDERS ((REAKTORSHCHIKI)).
IT WAS CONSIDERED A POOR ONE NOT BECAUSE OF SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS; FROM THIS VIEWPOINT IT WAS EVEN MARKED OUT DURING DISCUSSIONS AS BEING ON THE BETTER SIDE.
IT WAS CONSIDERED POOR FOR ECONOMIC REASONS, FOR ITS GREAT FUEL CONSUMPTION, ITS GREAT CAPITAL OUTLAYS, FOR THE NONINDUSTRIAL BASIS OF ITS CONSTRUCTION.
AS A CHEMIST I WAS ALSO ALARMED BY THE FACT THAT THESE APPARATUSES INCORPORATED A GREAT DEAL OF GRAPHITE, ZIRCON, AND WATER.
I WAS ALSO DISTURBED BY THE UNUSUAL AND, IN MY VIEW, INADEQUATE CONSTRUCTION OF PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD OPERATE IN EXTREME SITUATIONS:
ONLY THE OPERATOR COULD INTRODUCE THE EMERGENCY SAFETY RODS EITHER AUTCMATICALLY VIA ONE OF THE GAGES ((S PODACHI ODNOGO IZ DATCHIKOV)) OR MANUALLY. THE MACHINERY COULD WORK WELL OR POORLY, AND THERE WERE NO OTHER PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF THE OPERATOR, WHICH WOULD OPERATE EXCLUSIVELY ON THE BASIS OF THE STATUS OF THE APPARATUS ZONE.
I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE FACT THAT SPECIALISTS HAD SUBMITTED TO THE DESIGNER PROPOSALS AB0tT!'
CHANGING THE EMERGENCY PROTECTION SYSTEMS.3 THEY ERINREJECTEDy BUT THEY WERE DEVELOPED VERY SL0WLT3..
/'C"H BEGINNING OF TAKE 008 ******/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIn 20 MAY///CEVFLCPED VERY SLCWLY...
TEXT:
UNCLASSIFIED
C.
((TETT))
I WOULD LIKE TO STATE A VIEWPO WHICH 8 AM CONVZNCED OF BUT WHICH IS NOT SHARED BY HY COLLEAGUFS AND CREATES FRfCTZON AMONG THEM.
THE THING IS THAT IN THE WEST, IN OUR OWN AVIATION INDUSTRY, IN THE DEVELOPED SECTORS OF INDUSTRY, THERE IS NO CONCEPT OF'"A SCIENTIFIC LEADER" AND "A CONSTRUTOR."
I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT l
THERE CAN EYIST THE SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP OF A PROBLEM -- 0F THE STRATEGY OF AVIATION DEVELOPMENT, FOR INSTANCE.
BUT WHEN IT COMES 3
TO THE DESIGN OF AN AIRCRAFT, THEN THIS LATTER MUST HAVE ONE BOSS
-- AND HE IS CONSTRUCTOR, DESIGNER, AND SCIENTIFIC LEADER, AND ALL.
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY MUST LIE IN HIS HANDS ALONE. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE AN OBVIOUS FACT.
AT THE HOMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY'S CONCEPTION EVERYTHING WAS REASONABLE.
BECAUSE THIS WAS A NEW FIELD OF SCIENCE -- NUCLEAR PHYSICS, NEUTRON PHYS 7CS -- THE CONCEPT OF SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP AMC"NTED TO DESIGNERS BEING GIVEN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR BUILDING THE APPARATUS.
THE SCIENTIFIC LEADER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE PRINCIPLES BEING PHYSICALLY CORRECT AND PHYSICALLf SAFE.
BUT THE e
DESIGNER PUT THESE PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE BY CONSTANTLY CONSULTING WITH PHYSICISTS TO ESTABLISH VMETHER THE LAWS OF PHYSICS GOVERNING THE BUILDING OF THIS APPARATUS WERE BEING BROKEN.
ALL THIS WAS QUITE JUSTIFIED AT THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. IlUT 3 WHEN THE DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS"CREW Y AND' DEVELOPED THEIR OWN COMPUTIEG10tIFFHYSIC5MARTMENTS,11HrtrISTENCR-OF THIS DUAL-P)Wi,R SYSTElt.FOR.OUR-aFFARANS TIN FACT IT WAS A TRIPLE-POWER SYSTEM BCCAUSE THERE WERE NUMEROUS COUNCILS, DEPARTMENTAL AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL) CREETED7 A'3ITUATION'or w=aIYE RESPONSIBILITTT PtDr mr. gdACITY~0f WORK PERF RMED BY THE'5PPARATUS.** TRTCSAMB SITUATION CAN'BWOUN6'f6DTi~iRD~TN~YY UPTWTON? YS 9RONG3 I AM
~~
STILL CONVINCED THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP IS A TYPE OF ORGANIZATION WHICH OFFERS CONSULTATION ON VARIOUS PROJECTS, SELECTS "E BEST OF THEM, AND DETERMINES THE STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY.
THIS IS THE FUNCTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC LEADER -- HIS FUNCTION DOES NOT LAY IN CREATING A SPECIF~C APPARATUS.WITH_ PRESCRIBED _PROPfRTIES.
ALtrTHIS-COMFUSIONp AND T SYSTEM LACKING AN APPARATUS PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR '3 CUALITY }fAS I'ED TO A dREAT DEAL OF IRRESPONSI3ILITY, B SiOWN BY
~~
biE CHERNOBYL EXPERIENCE.
IN NIS SPEECTKTTSES6Idif6N irJdCi"N'.l.~RiZ$idfSiiIDTHAT HC j
~
~
FELT THAT THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL AES WAS NOT PURE CHANCE A)&
/
'"HAT THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY HAD BEEN MOVING TOWARD.THIS) i TERRIBLE EVENT WITH A CERTAIM DEGREE OF INEVITABILITY. h'HESE WORDS STRUCK ME AT TciE TIME BY THEIR ACCURACY, ALTHOUGH I MYSELF WAS IN NO CONDITION TO FORMULATE THE TASK AS SUCH.
I REMEMBERED AN ZNCIDENT AT ONE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, FOR EXAMPLE, VHEN WFLDERS SZMPLY PLACED AN ELECTRODE IN THE MAIN PIPELINE FOR SEAM WELDING AND WELDED IT SLIGHTLY AT THE TOP INSTEAD OF CORRECTLY FOLLOWING WELDING PROCEDURES.
THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A TERRIBLE ACCIDENT WITH THE LARGE PIPELINE EXPLODING AND CAUSING A MALFUNCTION IN THE BATER-MODERATED WATER-COOLED REACTOR APPARATUS WITH A TOTAL LOSS OF THE COOLANT, THE MELTING OF THE REACTOR CORE, AND SO FORTH.
IT IS C00D THAT THE PERSONNEL VERE WELL TRAINED, CAREFUL, AND PRECISE.
BECAUSE I"4E FLAW THAT WAS DETECTED BY THE OPERATOR COULD NOT EVF_N BE SEEN UNDER A MICROSCOPE.
AN INVESTIGATION WAS BECUN AND IT UNCLASSIFIED n
TRANSPIREn THAT THIS PIPELINE WAS SIMPLY SHODDILY C DED.
THEY BEGAN TO 00K INTO THE DOCUMENTATION AND FOUND ALL THE M OHT SIGNATURES:
THE SIGNATURE OF THE WELDER, WE0 CER'fIFIED WAT HE HAD PROPERLY WELDED THE SEAM, AND THE SIGNATURE OF TE GAMMA-RAY FLAV DETECTION OPERATOR WHO HAD CHECKED THE SEAM -- THE SEAM THAT HAD NEVER EXISTED.
ALL THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE NAME OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY -- TO VELD HORE SEAMS.
THIS~EIND OF SHODDY'10RE QS SfNORffEEG grTATFECHECKE!rT!1r"5KMt OF AREAL'AT:MANT VTHER' PCWER '
'AND %ID'NOT*08TAIll'FATORAB M D EVER % ~
' ~ '" ~ ~"''- " " " # ;3' " -
N E.AWS IW CRUCIAL PIPELINES, VALVES WORXING POORLY, HIGH-POWER PRESSURE *UBE REACTOR CHANNELS INOPERATIONAL -- ALL THIS HAPPENED EVERY YEAR.
TEN-YEAR DISCUSSIONS ON TRAINING EQUIPMENT, AT LEAST 5-YEAR DISCUSSIONS ON SET"ING UP A SYSTEM *IO DIAGNOSE THE STATE OF EQUIPMENT --1AEF
- W,"! wt DO IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THE QUALITY OF ENd ND TNElf'PERSO OPERATING THE POWER STATION HAD BEEN GRADUALLY DECLINING.
EVERYBCDY WHO WENT TO AES CONSTRUCTION SITES WAS IMPRESSED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING ON SUCH CRUCIAL PROJECTS AS A MOST HIGH-EARNING PROJECT.
WE HAD ALL THIS IN OUR HEADS AS INDIUVIDUAL EPISODES, BUT WHEN N.I.
RYZHKOV SAID THAT THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY HAD BEEN HEADING TOWARD CHERNOBYL I SAW BEFORE MY EYES THE ENTIRE PICTURE, I SAW SPECIALISTS FROM MY OWN. INSTITUTE WHO HAD DISPLAYED A VERY SPECIFIC, VERY CONVENTIONAL ATTITUDE TO EVERYTHING HAPPENING IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR POWER STATION CONSTRUCTION.
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RFF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// POWER STATION CONSTRUCTION.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) BY VIRTUE OF MY CHARACTER I BEGAN TO STUDY THIS QUESTION HORE CLOSELY AND ADOPT HORE ACTIVE STANCES IN SOME PLACES, SAYING THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS TO BE SAFER -- HIGH-TEMPEPATURE GAS REACTORS OR A SALT-WATER COOLED ((ZHIDKOSOLEVOY)) REACTOR.
THIS GENERATED AN EXCEPTIONAL STORM OF OUTRAGE; I WAS TOLD THAT THESE WERE COMPLETELY DIFFEREN'I THINGS, THAT I WAS AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AND WAS INTEREFERING IN SOMETHING I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT AND THAT THERE IS NO WAY YOU CAN COMPARE ONE KIND OF REACTOR WITH ANOTHER.
THIS WAS THE COMPLEX SITUATION.
WORK WAS BEING QUIETTY DONE 0:1 ALTERNATIVE REACTORS, IMPROVEMENTS WERE QUIETLY BEIN(i MADE TO EXISTING ONES, BUT THE SADDEST THING WAS THAT THERE WAS 30 POSSIBLE VAY TO ORGANIZE SERIOUS, OBJECTIVE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE REAL SITUATION, IDENTIFY THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, ANALYZE ALL THE POSSIBLE PROBLEMS, AND FIND THE WAY TO ELIMINATE THEM.
THIS IS HOW EVERYTHING WAS DEVELOPING ON THE EVE OF THE CHERNOBYL EVENTS, WHILE THE NUMBER OF ENTERPRISE 3 ENTRUSTED WITH THE MANUFACTURE OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR POWER STAT'ON EQUIPMENT CCMPONENTS WAS INCREASING.
THEY STARTED TO BUILD ATOMMASH, AND MANY YOUNG PEOPLE APPEARED THERE.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLANT UAS VERY UUSATISFACTORY.
THE QUALITY OF THE SPECIALISTS WHO WERE I1CED WITH MASTERING THEIR PROFESSION LEFT A GREAT DEAL TO BE LP. SIRED.
THIS WAS ALSO VISIBLE AT THE STATICWS.
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EdBtIRI~ACCHtRN0BfCCDRifiin;,unwvuvM CONCLUSION:ThAT g THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT. WAS TE; APOTHEOSISCTHE; SUMMIT.0Ff ALL' INCORRECT RUNNING OF THE ECONOMY WHICH HAD BEEWfGOINf0KfIN O l
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- COUNTRY FOR'MANT' DECADES.g THERE ARE NOT ABSTRACT BUT SPECIFIC CULPRITS 70R VRATHAPPENE!7 AT CHERNOBYL, OF COURSE.
WE NOW KNOW THAT THE REACTOR PROTECTION CONTROL SYSTEM WAS DEFECTIVE, AND PROPOSALS WERE MADE ON HOW TO ELIMINATE THIS DEFECT.
NOT WISHING TO GET INVOLVED IN QUICK ADDITIONAL WORK, THE DESIGNER WAS IN NO HURRY TO CHANGE THE PROTECTION CONTROL SYSTEM.
WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CHERNOBYL POWER STATION ITSELF HAD BEEN GOING ON FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS:
EXPERIMENTS WEPE CARRIED OUT THE PROGRAM FOR WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP IN AN EXTREMELY NEGLIGENT AND UNTIDY WAY, THERE WERE NO REHEARSALS OF POSSIBLE SITUATIONS BEFORE THE EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED... THE DISREGARD FOR THE VIEWPOINT OF THE DESIGNER AND SCIENTIFIC LEAD 5R WAS TOTAL, AND THE CORREECT FULFILLMENT OF ALL THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROCEDURES HAD TO BE FOUGHT FOR. NO ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE STATE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OR THE STATE OF EQUIPMENT o
BEFORE IT WAS TIME FOR liANNED PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE.
ONE STATION DIRECTOR ACTUALLY SAID:
"WHAT ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT7 A NUCLEAR REACTOR IS ONLY A SAMOVAR; IT'S MUCH SIMPLER THAN A HEAT STATION.
WE HAVE EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL, AND NOTHING WILL EVER HAPPEN."
WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, AT WHY ONE PERSON ACTED IN THIS WAY WHILE ANOTHER ACTED IN THAT WAY, AND SO FORTH, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO NAME A SINGLE GUILTY PERSON, THE INITIATOR OF ThE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE CRIME, BECAUSE IT IS PRECISELY A CLOSED CHAIN:
TE OPERATORS MADE A MISTAKE BECAUSE THEY WANTED WITHOUT FAIL TO COMPLETE THE EXPERIMENT -- THEY CONSIDERED THIS A "MATTER OF HONOR"; THE PLAN FOR CONDUCTING THE EXPERIMENT WAS DRAWN UP IN A VERY SUBSTANDARD AND UNDETAILED MANNER AND WAS NOT SANCTIONED BY THOSE SPECIALISTS WHO SHOULD HAVE SANCTIONED IT.
I KEEP IN MY SAFE A RECORD OF THE OPERATORS' TELEPHONE CGNVERSATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE ACCIDENT.
IT MAKES YOUR FLESH CREEP WHEN YOU READ SUCH RECORDS. ONE OPERATOR TELEPHONED ANOTHER AND ASKED:
"THE PROGRAM IIERE STATES WHAT MUST BE DONE, BUT THEN A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN CRCSSED OUT, SO WHAT AM I TO D07" HIS INTERLOCUTOR THOUGHT FOR A MOMENT, THEN SAID:
"ACT ACCORDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN CROSSED OUT."
THIS WAS THE STANDARD OF PREPARATION OF SERIOUP, DOCUMENTS AT A PROJECT SUCH AS A NUCLEAR STATION:
SOMEONE HA) CROSSED SOMETHING OUT, AND THE OPERATOR MIGHT INTERPRET CORRECTLY OR INCORRECTLY WHAT HAD BEEN CROSSED OUT AND PERFOPy. ARBITRARY ACTIONS.
THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE BLAME CANNOT BE SHIFTED ONTO THE OPERATOR BECAUSE SOMEONE DREW UP THE PLAN AND CROSSED SOMETHING OUT, SOMEONE SIGNED IT, AND SOMEONE DID NOT AGREE IT. THE VERY FACT THAT STATION PERSONNEL COULD INDEPENDENTLY CARRY OUT SOME ACTIONS NOT SANCTIONED BY PROFESSIONALS IS A FLAW IN THE PROFESSIONALS' RELATIONS WITH THIS STATION.
THE FACT T:'AT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE SUPERVISION OF SAFE WORKING PRI,CTICES IN THE ATOMIC POWER INDUSTRY WERE PRESENT AT THE STATION BUT WERE NOT APPRISED OF THE EXPERIMENT BEING CONDUCTED OR OF THE PROGRAM IS NOT ONLY a eACT OF THE STATION'S BIOGRAPHY...
LET US RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO THE CHERNOBYL EVENTS, FRCH WHICH I HAVE STRAYED SO FAR.
THE AIR FORCE AND HELICOPTER GROUPS WORK 3D VERY EFFICIENTLY.
THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF
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' ORGANIZATION. SCORNING ALL DANGER, ALL THE CREWS STROVE ALWAYS TC l
' FUIJILL THE MISSIONS, NO MATTER HOW HARD AND COMPLEX THIS MISSION l
,WAS.
THBY HAD A PARTICULARLY HARD TIME DURING THE FIRST DAYS.
THE ORDER WAS ISSUED TO FILL SANDBAGS. FOR SOME REASON THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE UNABLE AT ONCE TO ORGANIZE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO PREPARE THE BAGS AND PREPARE THE SAND.
I SAW WITH MY OWN EYES HOW CRF.WS AND YOUNG OFFICERS LOADED SANDBAGS INTO HELICOPTERS, FLEW OFF, DhJ'ED THEM ONTO THE TARGET, RETURNED ONCE AGAIN, AND CARRIED OUT THIS JOB ONCE AGAIN.
UNLESS MY MEMORY BETRAYS ME, THESE WERE THE FIGURES: TENS OF TONNES WERE DROPPED DURING THE FIRST 24 HOURS, THEN HUNDREDS OF TONNES WERE DROPPED DURING THE SECOND AND THIRD 24-HOUR PERIODS, AND, FINALLY, MAJOR GENERAL ANTOSHKIN REPCRTED IN THE EVENING THAT 1,100 TONVES OF MATERIALS HAD BEEN DROPPED DURING ONE 24-HOUR PERIOD.
BY 2 MAY THE REACTOR HAD PRACTICALLY BEEN STOPPED UP, AND FROM THAT TIME THE OVERALL RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE REACTOR'S BELLY DIMINISHED
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APPRECIABLY.
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REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// BELLY DIMINISHED APPRECIABLY.
TEIT:
((TEXT))
...AT SOME TIME ON 9 MAY IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE NO.
4 REACTOR UNIT HAD STOPPED BREATHING, BURNING, AND LIVING.
IT WAS OUTWARDLY QUIET, AND ON VICTORY DAY WE WANTED TO CELEBRATE THAT DAY,'
IN THE EVENING.
BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS ON JUST THAT DAY THAT A SMALL BUT BRIGHTLY SHINING CRIMSON SPOT WAS DETECTED WITHIN THE NO.
4 REACTOR UNIT -- WHICH INDICATED THAT THE TEMPERATURE WAS STILL HIGH.
IT WAS HARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS THE PARACHUTES WHICH HAD BEEN b ED TO DROP LEAD AND OTHER MATERIALS THAT WERE BURNING.
IN KY VIEW, THAT.WAS VERY UNLIKELY, AND IT WAS MOST PROBABLY AN INCANDESCENT MASS OF SAND, CLAY, AND EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN THROWN ON.
THE FESTIVAL WAS SPOILED, AND A DECISION W'S ADOPTED TO INTRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL 80 TONNES OF LEAD INTO THE P. CAL.'OR CRATER.
AFTER THAT THE LUMINESCENCE CEASED, AND WE CELEPEATED VICTORY DAY IN A CALMER ATHOSPHERE 10 MAY.
EVEN THEN, DURING THOSE DIFFICULT DAYS, WE VIRE IN WHAT SEEMED A PARADOXICALLY ELATED MOOD.
IT WAS NOT CONNEUrED WITH THE FACT THAT WE WERE ATTENDING THE ELIMINATION OF SUCH A TRAGIC EVENT.
THE TRAGIC ELEMENT WAS THE BASIC BACXGROUND AGAINST WHICH EVERYTHING WAS HAPPENING.
BUT A CERTAIN ELATION WAS CREATED BY THE WAY PEOPLE WORKED, HOW QUICKLY THEY RESPONDED TO OUR REQUESTS, AND HOW QUICKLY VARIOUS ENGINEERING OPTIONS WERE COMPUTED, WHILE WE WERE THERE, ON THE SPOT, STARTING TO COMPUTE THE FIRST OPTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING THE DOME OVER ':"dE DEVASTATED REAC ~0R UNIT...
ADMIN (ENDALL) 20 MAY UNCLASSIFIED
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