ML20150D470
| ML20150D470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 11/29/1978 |
| From: | Pilant J NEBRASKA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT |
| To: | Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7812060148 | |
| Download: ML20150D470 (11) | |
Text
_ _ _ -
GENER AL OFF ICE Nebraska Public Power District
" WA'nE;"M!.""^,"^ ""'.--,
=.
_ _ _ ~. _. - - _.. _ -. _ -.
_ = -
November 29, 1978 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Subj ect: Proposed Changes to Radiological Technical Specifications Cooper Nuclear Station NRC Docket No. 50-298, DPR-46
Dear Mr. Ippolito:
In accordance with the provisions specified in 10CFR50.90, the Nebraska Public Power Dictrict requests that the Radiological Technical Specifications for Cooper Nuclear Station be revised to incorporate the following proposed changes.
Copies of the revised Technical Specification pages are attached with the changes f.ndicated.
1.
Table 3.2.F (Page 65) Primary Containment Surveillance Instrumentation The instruments for the Suppression Chamber air and water temperatures have been changed from an alarm unit to a recorder with an alarm function.
This modification increases the accuracy and reliability of the monitoring system.
2.
Sections 3.3.B and 4.3.B (Page 96) and 3.3. Bases (Page 102) Reactivity Control The safety limit MCPR is being revised from 1.06 to 1.07.
Amendment 46 to the CNS operating license raised the safety limit MCPR from 1.06 to 1.07 for the Cycle 4 core loading and these two pages were inadvertently l
omitted. The vords "or refueling" are being deleted from Section 3.3.B.4 and 4.3.B.4, page 96, because control rod movement and minimum count rates during refueling is addressed in section 3.10, Core Alterations.
3.
Table 3.7.2 (Page 171) Testable Penetrations with Double 0-Ring Seals This table is being revised to include thirteen drywell penetrations recently discovered during a review of station leak test procedures. This f
occurrence was reported in Licensee Event Report No. 50-298-78-30.
7812060IN 4
e
l Mr. Thomas Ippolito November 29, 1978 Page Two 4.
Table 3.6.1 (Pages 137c, 137d and 137e) Safety Related Hydraulic Shock Suppressors (Snubbers)
This table is being updated to list only the safety-related hydraulic unubbers in the station. As a result of the replacement of hydraulic snubbers with mechanical shock arresters in high radiation and inacces-sible areas, four of the seven columns are no longer relevent and are being deleted.
Snubbers MS-S-75 and MS-S-76 are being deleted because they have been shown not to be required for seismic restraint.
The number of snubbers at two locations (AS-S-110 and RH-S-78) are being revised to correct a previous error in the listing.
5.
Section 3.7.E.1.a (Page 167a) Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure The words "of achieving operating temperature and prescure" are being replaced with "after placing the mode switch in run."
This is being changed to more precisely specify the point at which the 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> for establishing differential pressore commences. Additionally, sustained operational hydrostatic testing is not permitted under the former wording.
The safety significance of these proposed changes has been reviewed by appro-priate District personnel, and under 10CFR Part 170, these changes are judged to be a Class II amendment. Payment in the amount of $1,200 is enclosed with this submittal.
Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me.
In addition to three signed originals, 37 copies of the proposed changes are also submitted.
Sincerely yours, M
... Pilant Director of Licensing
& Quality Assurance JMP/jw:str29/8 Attachments
Mr. Thomas Ippolito November 29, 1978 Page 3 STATE OF NEBRASKA )
) ss PLATTE COUNTY
)
Jay M. Pilant, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he is an author-ized representative of the Nebraska Public Power District, a public corporation and political subdivision of the State of Nebraska; that he is duly authorized to execute this request on behalf of Nebraska Public Power District; and that the statements in said application are true to the best of his knowledge and belief.
W4 W ' d. P11 ant Subscribedinmypresenceandsworntobeforemethis[
day of November, 1978.
NOTARY'PUBLIC My Commission expires /
/
~
MNGE 50fMY 8 tate et Notruts MARLYN R. HOHNDORF
_ Hy Ceann. Exp. Oct.14,1 sea
1 1
COOPER NUCLEAR STATION TABLE 3.2.F PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SURVEILIANCE INSTRUMENTATION Minimum Number Action Required When Instrument of Operable Minimum Condition I.strument I.D. No.
Range Instrument Channels Not Satisfied (1)
Reactor Water 1.evel NBI-LI-85A
-150" to 460" 2
A,B,C NBI-LI-85B
-150" to 460" Reactor Pressure RFC-PI-90A 0 - 1200 psig 2
A,B,C RFC-PI-90B 0 - 1200 psig Drywell Pressure PC-PI-512A 0 - 80 psia 2
A,B,C PC-PR-512B 0 - 80 psia Drywell Temperature PC-TR-503 50 - 1700F 2
A,B,C PC-TI-505 50 - 3500F Suppression Chamber PC-TR-21A 0 - 3000F 2
A,B.C Air Temperature PC-TR-23, Ch I & 2 0 - 4000F
[
g Suppression Chamber PC-TR-21B 0 - 3000F 2
A,B,C t
8 Water Temperature PC-TR-22, Ch I & 2 0 - 400 F Suppression Chamber Water 1.evel PC-L1-10
(-4' to +6')
2 A,B,C PC-LR-11
(-4' to +6')
PC-LI-12
-10" to +10" 2
A,B,C,E PC-LI-13
-10" to +10" Suppression Chamber PC-PR-20 0 - 2 psig i
B,C Pressure Control Rod Position N.A.
Indicating Lights 1
A,B,C,D Weutron Monitoring N.A.
S.R.M.,
1.R.M.,
1 A,B,C,D LPRM 0 - 100% power Torus to Drywell PC-dPR-20 0 - 2 psid 1
A,B,C,E Differential Pressure Suppression Chamber /
PC-PR-20/513 (2) 0 - 2 psig 1
Drywell Pressure (AP) l
. _. - =
. _ ~
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.3.B.3 (cont'd) 4.3.B.3.b (cont'd) e.
If Specifications 3.3.B.3a 1)
The correctness of the control through d cannot be met, the rod withdrawal sequence input to reactor shall not be started, the RWM computer shall be veri-or if the reactor is in the fled.
run or startup modes at less than 20% rated power, it shall 2)
The RWM computer on line diag-be brought to a shutdown nostic test shall be sucess-condition immediately, fully performed.
f.
The sequence restraints imposed 3)
Proper annunciation of the se-on the control rods may be re-lection error of at least one moved by tha use of the individual out-of-sequence control rod in F
rod positiar; bypass switches for each fully inserted group shall scram testing only those rods be verified.
which are ibily withdrawn in the 100% to 50% rod density range.
4)
The rod block function of the RWM shall be verified by with-drawing the first rod as an out-of-sequence control rod no more than to the block point.
c.
When required, the presence of a second licensed operator or other qualified employee to verify the following of the correct rod program shall be verified.
4.
Control rods shall not be with-4.
Prior to control rod withdrawal drawn for startup unless at least for startup, verify that at two source range channels have an least two source range channels observed count rate equal to or have an observed count rate of greater than three counts per at least three counts per second.
second.
5.
During operation with limf"ing 5.
When a limiting control rod control rod patterns, as deter-pattern exists an instrument mined by the designated quali-functional test of the RBM shall fied personnel, either:
be performed prior to withdrawal of the designated rod (s).
a.
Both RBM channels shall be operable:
or b.
Control rod withdrawal shall be blocked-or The operating power level shall c.
be limited so that the MCPR will reamin above 1.07 assuming a single error that results in complete withdrawal of any single operable control rod...
~ _, _ _.
1
. 3.3 and 4.3 BASES (cont'd) flux. The requirements of at least 3 counts per second assures that any transient, should it occur, begins at or above the initial value of 10-8% of rated power used in the analyses of transients cold conditions.
Ones operable-SRM channel would be adequate to monitor the approach to criticality using homogeneous patterns of scattered control rod with-
- drawal. A minimum of two operable SRM's are provided as an added conservatism.
5.
The Rod Block Monitor (RBM) is designed to automatically prevent fuel damage in the event of erroneous rod withdrawal from locations of high power density during high power level operation. Two channels are pro-vided, and one of these may be bypassed from the console for maintenance and/or testing. Tripping of one of the channels will block erroneous rod withdrawal soon enough to prevent fuel damage. This system backs up the operator who withdraws control rods according to written se-quences. The specified restrictions with one channel out of service conservatively assure that fuel damage will not occur due to rod with-drawal errors when this condition exists.
A limiting control rod pattern is a pattern which results in the core i
being on a thermal hydraulic limit (i.e., MCPR = 1.07 or LHGR = 18.5kW/f t). l During use of such patterns, it is judged that testing of the RBM system prior to withdrawal of such rods to assure its operability will assure that improper withdrawal does not occur.
It is the responsi-bility of the Reactor Engineer to identify these limiting patterns and the designated rods either when the patterns are initially established or as they develop due to the occurrence of inoperable control rods in other than limiting patterns. Other personnel qualified to perform this function may be designated by the station superintendent.
C.
Scram Insertion Times The control rod system is designed to bring the reactor suberitical at a rate f ast enough to prevent fuel damage; i.e., to prevent the MCPR from becoming less than 1.07.
The limiting power transient is that resulting l
from a turbine stop valve closure with failure of the turbine bypass system.
Analysis of this transient shows that the negative reactivity rates resulting from the scram (FSAR Figure III.6.15) with the average response of all the drives as given in the above specification, provide the required protection, and MCPR remains greater than 1.07.
l On an early BWR, some degradation of control rod scram performance occurred during plant startup and was determined to be caused by particulate material (probably construction debris) plugging an internal control rod drive filter.
The design of the present control rod drive (Model CRDB144B) is grossly improved by the relocation of the filter to a location out of the scram drive path; i.e., it can no longer interfere with scram performance, even if completely blocked.
-102-
.---,,,*=w
-<--**i-,,.-,..
--y.--..
,,-e-,%-.-.--eg
.e,
~,.---,,.--,i-m,--
.e w, w.,n-
,2--e.,.,s-
- -.,,-wwwm+.,mv,-,y.-----,e-,
.-m-..
-e.,-,-*.,-,-
I TABLE 3.7.2 i
TESTABLE PENETRATIONS WITH DOUBLE 0-RING SEALS PEN. NO DESCRIPTION X-1A Drywell equipment hatch X-1B Drywell equipment hatch X-4 Drywell haad access hatch X-6 CRD removal hatch X-35A TIP "D" Penetration X-35B TIP "A" Penetration X-35C TIP "C" Penetration X-35D TIP "B" Penetration X-35E TIP N2 Purge Connection X-200A Suppression chamber access hatch X-200B Suppression chamber access hatch Drywell head Stabilizer Assembly Inspection Ports (8) l l
l
-171-i
- ' ~ ~
Table 3.6.1 SAFETY RELATED HYDRAULIC SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS)
Snubber No.
Location Elevation AS-S-110 Torus Area 890'9" l
AS-S-lll Torus Area 891'9" AS-S-ll2 Torus Area 891'9" AS-S-ll3 Torus Area 893' BS-S-1 B&R Torus 870'8" BS-S-15 Torus Area 893'4" CS-S-1 S.E. Quad 918' CS-S-2 S.E. Quad 929' CS-S-3 S.E. Quad 946'3" CS-S-10 Rx Bldg 931' 946'3" CS-S-11 Rx Bldg, 931' 946'3" i
HP-S-4 S.W. Quad 872'7" HP-S-11 S.W. Quad 869'11" HP-S-15 S.W. Quad 874'11" MS-S-1 S.W. Quad 864' MS-S-2 S.W. Quad 868'5" MS-S-3 S.W. Quad 880'4" MS-S-4 S.W. Quad 873'5" MS-S-7(2)
S.W. Quad 874'11" MS-S-8 Torus Area 885'2" g
MS-S-10 Torus Area 899'11" I
MS-S-11 Torus Area 897' MS-S-12 Torus Area 888' MS-S-13 S. RHR Ex Rm 904'10" MS-S-14 S. RER Hx Rm 923' MS-S-15 S. RHR Hx Rm 934' MS-S-16 Torus Area 885' MS-S-17 N. RHR Hx Rm 904'10" MS-S-18 N. RHR Hx Rm 905'6" MS-S-19 N. RHR Ex Rm 923' MS-5-20 N. RHR Hx Rm 934' g
MS-S-23 Torus Area 898' MS-S-24 Torus Area 898' MS-S-25 N.E. Quad 877'6" MS-S-26 N.E. Quad 879'6"
-137c-
e Table 3.6.1 SAFETY RELATED HYDRAULIC SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) (Cont'd)
Snubber No.
Location Elevation RCC-S-3 Rx Bldg 931' 945'11" RCC-S-4 Rx Bldg, 931' 943'6" RCC-S-20 Rx Bldg, 931' 953'3" RCC-5-21 Rx Bldg 931' 953'3" RCC-S-22 Rx Bldg. 931' 953'3" RF-S-1 N.E. Quad 898'6" RF-S-2 Torus Area 896' RF-S-3 S.W. Quad 870' RF-S-4 Torus Area 894'6" RF-S-5 Torus Area 897'10" RF-S-6 Torus Area 891' RH-S-20 Rx Bldg, 903' 912'6" RH-S-21 Rx Blds, 903' 911' RH-S-22 Torus Area 895'9" RH-S-23 Torus Area 892' RH-S-24 Torus Area 897' RH-S-25 N. RHR Ex Rm 927' RH-S-26 N. RHR Ex Rm 929' RH-S-29 Rx Bldg, 903' 904'6" RH-S-30(2)
Torus Area 898'6" RH-S-32 Torus Area 894'7" RH-S-33D Torus 892'3" RH-S-34 Rx Bldg, 903' 919'6" RH-S-35 S. RHR Ex Rm 912' RH-S-36 S. RER Ex Rm 914'3" RH-S-37 S. RHR Ex Rm 916'4" RH-S-38 S. RHR Hx Rm 930' RH-S-39 S. RHR Ex Rm 927'6" RH-S-40 S. RER Ex Rm 915'6" RH-S-41 S.W. Quad 873' RH-S-42 S.W. Quad 874' RH-S-43 Torus Area 897' RH-S-44 S.W. Quad 884'6" RH-S-45 S.W. Quad 884' RH-S-48 N.W. Quad 884'6" i
RH-S-49 N.W. Quad 885' l
RH-S-51 N. RHR Ex Rm 914'3" RH-S-52 N. RHR Ex Rm 915' RH-S-54 N.W. Quad 873'1" RH-S-55 N.W. Quad 874' RH-S-56 N. RHR Hx Rm 927'6" RH-S-57 N. RHR Ex Rm 927'6" RE-S-58 N. RHR Hx Rm 921'11" RH-S-59 Torus Area 896' RH-S-65 S.W. Quad 887'2" RH-S-66 Rx Bldg, 903' 907'4" l
-137d-
Table 3.6.1 SAFETY RELATED HYDRAULIC SHOCK SUPPRESSORS (SNUBBERS) (Cont'd)
Snubber No.
Location Elevation RH-S-76(2)
~;cus Area 898' RH-S-77 Torus Area 890'11" RH-S-78(2)
Torus Area 897' l
RH-S-80 N.W. Quad 889' RH-S-98 N.W. Quad 891' i
SWH-WH-23A Intake Str.
904'3" SWH-WH-23B Intake Str.
904'3" SWH-WH-23C Intake Str.
904'3" SWH-WH-23D Intake Str.
904'3"
-137e-
LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT 3.7 (cont'd) 4.7 (cont'd)
E.
Drywell-Suppression Chamber E.
Drywell-Suppression Chamber Differential Pressure Differential Pressure 1.
Dif ferential pressure between the 1.
The pressure differential drywell and suppression chamber between the drywell and shall be maintained at equal to suppression chamber shall or greater than 1.47 psid except be recorded at least once as specified in a, b, and c below.
each shift.
a.
This differential shall be established within 26 hours3.009259e-4 days <br />0.00722 hours <br />4.298942e-5 weeks <br />9.893e-6 months <br /> after placing the mode switch in run, b.
This dif ferential may be de-creased to less than 1,47 psid 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to placing mode switch in refuel or shut-down.
c.
This differential may be decreased to less than 1.47 psid for a maximum of four (4) hours during required operability testing of the HPCI system pump, the RCIC system pump, and the drywell-pressure suppression chamber vacuum breakers.
2.
If the differential pressure of specification 3.7.E.1 cannot be maintained, and the differential pressure cannot be restored within the subsequent six (6) hour period, an orderly shutdown shall be initi-ated and the reactor shall be in Hot Standby in six (6) hours and in a Cold Shutdown condition within the following 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
l 1
-167a-
-