ML20150C463
| ML20150C463 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | Harold Denton NRC OFFICE OF GOVERNMENTAL & PUBLIC AFFAIRS (GPA) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-PII, TASK-SE SECY-88-171, NUDOCS 8807120489 | |
| Download: ML20150C463 (18) | |
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SECY-88-171 June 22, 1988 g
(Information)
For:
The Commissioners From:
Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Governmental an A
Public Affairs
Subject:
S0VIET ACADEMICIAN LEGAS0V'S "MEMOIRS"
Purpose:
To inform the Commission of a description of nuclear safety in the Soviet Union by the head of the team investigating the causes of the Chernobyl accident, Valery A. Legasc't, First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov I,stitute.
Discussion:
I am attaching a remarkable document recently published in Pravda and picked up by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
It is the "memoirs" of V. A.
Legasov, dictated just prior to his suicide on the 2nd anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.
Of most interest is Legasov's indictment of the Soviet L
system of development of nuclear power which, while begun "reasonably", developed into a bereaucratic organization which fostered abdication of any "personal" responsibility for safety, continued excellence and quality.
This leads him to agree with a view he attributes to N. I. Ryzhkov, who observed that the accident at Chernobyl was not pure chance and that, "the nuclear power industry had been moving toward this terrible event with a certain degree of inevitability."
Contact:
Michael B. Congdon, GPA hf8b 49-21786 h
I 6807120489 880622 PDR SECY 88-171 PDC Certified By 0
a s
c-e-.g-r,
.y Legasov praises the work done by'the emergency personnel and describes first-hand the period
.right after the accident.
He also po, ts up the the inadequacy of Soviet emergency preparedness planning.
Attachment:
As-Stated
. DISTRIBUTION:
' Commissioners OGC OI OIA GPA
-REGIONAL OFFICES EDO ACRS ASLBP ASLAP SECY L
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/OuseGGGA555 g333g3555555/
UOUNTRY: USSR
~
SUBJ:
TAKE 1 0F 10 -- LEGASOV MEMOIRS SLAM NUCLEAR INDUSTRY SOURCE:
MOSCOW PRAVDA IN RUSSIAN 20 MAY 88 FIRST EDITION PP 3, 8 TEXT:
//((EXTRACTS "FROM TE NOTES OF ACADEMICIAN V. LEGASOV":
"'IT IS MY DUTY TO VRITE ABOUT THIS...'" -- FIRST FOUR PARAGRAPHS 'ARE IN1'RODUCTION BY PRAVDA SCIENCE EDITOR V. GUBAREV))
((TEXT))
((GUBAREV INTRODUCTION))
VALERIY ALEXSEYEVICH LEGASOV WROTE TESE NOTES FOR PRAVDA.
LAST YEAR WE ASKED HIM TO WRITE ABOUT CHERNOBYL AND SHARE HIS THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE NUCLEAR POVER INDUSTRY.
IT WAS THEN THAT THE ACADEMICIAN BECAN WORK ON HIS "MEMOIRS," AS HE CALLED THESE NOTE.S...
VALERIY ALEKSEYEVICH NEVER HAD ENOUGH TIME, AND THEREFORE HE DICTATED HIS THOUGHTS ONTO TAPE.
WE TALKED WITH HIM ON THE EVE OF HIS TRAGIC DEATH.
"UNFORTlNATELY, WE DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH BOOKS ABOUT CHERNOBYL, ALL THE LESSCNS OF WHAT HAPPENED HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY ANALYZED," HE SAID.
WE RIGFTLY MENTION ACADEMICIAN V.A. LEGASOV AS ONE OF THE FIRST TO EXTING'.ISH THE FLAMES OF CHERNOBYL.
IN MY VIEW HIS FEAT THERE HAS YET TD BE PROPERLY EVALUATED.
"LEGASOV IS DON QUIXOTE AND JOAN OF ARC AT TuE SAME TIME.
AN INCONVENIENT AND DIFFICULT PERSON FOR
'THOSE AROJND HIM, BUT WITHOUT HIM YOU HAVE A SENSE OF EMPTINESS AND LOSS OF LOMETHING CLOSE TO THE MEANING OF LIFE" -- THAT IS WHAT ACADEMIr,IAN YU.'TRETYAKOV SAID ABOUT HIM.
HE EXPRESSED THE FEELIGS AND THOUGHTS OF EVERYONE WHO WAS FORTUNATE ENOUGH TO KNOV V. A. LEGASOV AND WORK WITH HIM.
VALERIY ALEKSEYEVICH'S DEPARTURE FROM THIS LIFE IS HARD TO EXPLAIN OR UNDERSTAND -- VHILE AT THE HEIGHT OF HIS POWERS, HE KILLED HIMSELF. THIS TRAGEDY SHOULD BE A LESSON TO ALL OF US AND A REPROACH TO THOSE FOR WHOM TRANQUILLITY AND WELL-BEING COME FIRST.
t
- C'5AFIV ENDS))
NEVER IN MY LIFE DID I THINK I WOULD HAVE TO SET ABCUT VRITING MEMOIRS WHEN I HAD ONLY JUST PASSED MY SOTH BIRTHDAY.
BUT SUCH UNCLASSIFIED
EVENTS HAPPENED, ON SUCH A SCALE AND INVOLVING PEOPLE WITH SUCH CONTRADICTORY INTERESTS, WITH SO MANY DIFFETINT INTERPRETATIONS OF
.HOW IT HAPPENED, THAT IT IS SURELY MY DUTY, TO SOME EXTENT, TO WRITE ABOUT WHAT I KNOW, HOW I UNDERSTAND IT, HOW I SAW THE EVENTS THAT OCCURPID.
IT WAS 26 APRIL 1986.. A SATURDAY, A FINE DAY.
I WAS WONDERING WHETHER TO GO TO MY FACULTY AT THE UNIVERSITY (SATURDAY IS MY USUAL DAY FOR THE FACULTY) OR TO THE PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV SCEDULED FOR 1000 HOURS, OR SHOULD I PERHAPS FORGET ABOUT ALL OF IT AND SET OFF WITH MARGARITA MIKHAYLOVNA, MY WIFE AND FRIENO, FOR A BREAK SOMEWHERE7 NATURALLY, DECAUSE OF MY NATURE AND MANY YEARS OF HABIT, I WENT TO THE PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV.
BEFORE IT STARTED, I HEARD THERE HAD BEEN AN ACCIDENT AT THE CERNOBYL AES.
I WAS TOLD THIS BY THE CHIEF OF A MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEPARTMENT UNDER WHOSE JURISDICTION OUR INSTITUTE IS ((LEGASOV'S INSTITUTE, THE KURCHATOV ATOMIC ENERGY INSTITUTE, WAS UNDER THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY -- FBIS)).
E TOLD E CALMLY ENOUGH, THOUGH WITH SOME VEXATION.
THE PEPORT BEGAN.
THE REPORT WAS, FRANKLY, BORING AND CONVENTIONAL.
WE WERE ALREADY USED TO EARING THAT IN OUR DEPARTMENT EVERYTHING IS WONDERFUL AND FINE, ALL THE INDICATORS ARE GOOD, WE FULFILL ALL TE PLAN TARGETS.
THE REPORT WAS OF THE NATURE OF A VICTORY DISPATCH.
SINGING THE PRAISES OF NUCtEAh POWER AND THE GREAT SUCCESSES ACHIEVED, THE SPEAKER MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT, TRUE, SOME KIND OF ACCIDENT HAD NOW HAPPENED IN CHERNOBYL (THE CHERNOBYL STATION BELONCED TO THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION), "THEY HAVE DONE SOMETHING OR OTHER THERE, THERE IS SOME KIND OF ACCIDENT, BUT IT WILL NOT STOP THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY..."
/G"*** BEGINNING OF TAKE 002 ******/
REF:
. MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY..."
7XT:
((TEXT))
AT A30UT 1200 HOURS A BREAK WAS ANNOUNCED.
I WENT UP TO THE SECOND FLOOR, TO THE ACADEMIC SECRETARY'S ROOM.
THERE I LEARNED UIAT A GOVERNMENT COMMISSION HAD BEEN SET UP, AND I WAS A MEMBER OF IT.
THE COMMISSION WAS TO BF AT VNUKOVO AIRPORT BY 1600 HOURS.
I IMMEDIATELY SET OFF FOR MY INSTITUTE.
I TRIED TO FIND ONE OF THE REACTOR EXPERTS THERE.
WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY I MANAGED TO FIND A SECTION CHIEF WHO DESIGNED AND OPERATED A STATION WITH AN RBMK REACTOR -- THAT WAS THE KIND THAT WAS INSTALLED AT THE CHERNOBYL AES -- ALEKSANDR KONSTANTINOVICH KALUGIN.
HE ALREADY KNEW ABOUT THE ACCIDENT, BECAUSE A SIGNAL HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE STATION DURING THE NIGHT -
"0NE, TWO, THREE, FOUR." THAT MEANT:
A SITUATION HAD ARISEN AT TE STATION INVOLVING NUCLEAR, RADI ATION, FIRE, AND EXPLOSIVE DANGER, THAT IS, ALL THE FORMS OF DANCER VERE PRESENT.
AFTER THE INSTITUTE -- STRAIGHT HOME.
MY WIFE CA; 7 HCME EARLY FRCM WORK, I TOLD HER I VAS COING ON AN CIFICIAL TRIP, I DID NOT UNDERSTAND ~HE SITUATICN, I DID NOT KNCW HCW LCNG I WCULD BE AWAY UNCLASSIFIED
a OR WHAT I WOULD FIND THERE.
AT VNUKOVO I WAS TOLD THAT BORIS YEVDOKOMOVICH SHCERBINA, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR COUNCIL OF HINISTERS, HAD BEEN APPOINTED LEADER OF THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION -- HE WAS CHAIRMAN UF THE BUREAU FOR THE FUEL AND POWER COMPLEX.
AT THE TIME E WAS CONDUCTING A PARTY AND ECONOMIC AKTIV MEETING OUTSIDE MOSCOW.
WHEN HE APPEARED, WE WERE TO BOARD THE PLANE THAT WAS ALREADY READY AND FLY TO KIEV, FROM NHERE WE WOULD SET OFF FOR THE SCENE OF THE. EVENT IN CARS.
DURING THE FLIGHT THE CONVERSATION WAS WORRYING.
I TOLD BORIS YEVDOKIMOVICH ABOUT THE ACCIvENT THAT HAPPENED AT THREE MILE ISLAND IN THE UNITED STATES IN 1979.
MOST LIKELY THE FACTOR 3 THAT LED TO THAT ACCIDENT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE EVENTS AT CHERNOBYL, BECAUSE OF THE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT DESIGNS OF THE DEVICES.
THE HOUR-LONG FLIGHT PASSED IN DISCUSSION AND_ SPECULATION.
IN KIEV, WHEN WE LEFT THE PLANE, THE FIRST THING WE SAW WAS A LARGE CAVALCADE OF BLACK GOVERNMENT CARS AND A WORRIED CROWD OF e
UKRAINIAN LEADERS.
THEY HAD NO ACCURATE INFORMATION, BUT THEY SAID THINGS WERE BAD.
WE CLIMBED QUICKLY INTO TE CARS AND SET OFF FOR THE NUCLEAR PO'ER STATION.
I MUST SAY THAT AT TIC TIME IT DID NOT ENTER MY HEAD THAT WE WERE MOVING TOWARD AN EVENT ON A PLANETARY SCALE, AN EVENT WHI 9 WOULD APPARENTLY GO DOWN FOPIVER IN MANKIND'S HISTORY, LIKE THE ERUPTION OF FAMOUS VOLCAN0 2, THE DESTRUCTION OF POMPEII, OR SOMETHING OF THAT KIND.
ALTHOUGH THE NUCLEAR POWEC STATION TAKES ITS NAMS FROM CHERNOBYL, IT IS LOCATED 18 KM FROM THIS RAYON CITY, A VERY GREEN, VERY PLEASANT, RURAL CITY.
THIS IS THE IMPRESSION IT MADE ON US.
IT WAS QUIET, TRANQUIL, LIVING ITS EVERYDAY LIFE.
BUT IN PRIPYAT WE ALFEADY SENSED THE ALARM.
WE DROVE STRAIGHT TO THE BUILDING OF THE PARTY GORKOM LOCATED ON THE CITY'S CENTRAL SQUARE.
HERE WE WERE.. MET LOCAL ORGAN LEADERS.
WE WERE TOLD THAT DURING AN UNOFFICI TEST OF THE FUNCTION OF THE TURBO-UNIT TWO EXPLOSIONS, ONE AFTER ANOTHER, HAD OCCURRED IN RUNAWAY CONDITIONS IN THE NO. 4 UNIT OF THE POWER STATION; THE REACTOR BUILDING HAD BEEN DESTROYED, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED PEOPLS HAD BEEN IRRADIATED.
WE WERE ALSO TOLD THAT 2 PEOPLE HAD DIED, THE OTHERS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN HOSPITALS IN THE CITY, AND THAT THE RADIATION SITUATION AT THE NO. 4 UNIT WAS RATHER SERIOUS.
TFE RADIATION SITUATION IN PRIPYAT DIFFERED SUBSTATIALLY FROM THE NORMAL SITUATION BUT DID NOT YET PRESENT A GREAT DANGER TO PEOPLE.
THE GOVERNHENT COMMISSION, WHOSE SESSION WAS ORGANIZED VERY ENERGETICALLY BY B.YE. SRCERBINA IN A MANNER CHARACTERISTIC OF HIM, IMMEDIATELY DIVIDED ALL MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION INTO GROUPS.
EACH OF THEM WAS SET ITS OWN TASK.
I HEADED THE GROUP WHICH WAS TO ELABORATE MEASURES AIMED AT LOCALIZING THE EFFECTS OF THE ACCIDENT.
AS WE APPRCACHED THE JTATION WE WERE TAKEN ABACK BY THE APPEARANCE CF THE SKY.
ATADISTANCSOFSOME8-10KMFRCMTid STATION WE COUIC SEE A CRIMSON GLOW.J.IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT A NUCLEAR POWER STATION WITH ALL ITS INSTALLATIONS AND PIPES FRCM WHICH THERE ARE NO VISIBLE EMANATICNS REPRESENTS A VERY CLEAN AND METICULOUS STRUCTURE.
AND SUDDENLY IT LCDKED LIKE A METALLURGICAL PLANT OR A MAJOR CEMICAL ENTERPRISE OVER WHICH THERE HUNG A HUGE UNCLASSIFIED
CRIMSON Gi0W COVERING HALF THE SKY.
IT WAS IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS THAT THE MANAGEMENT OF TE STATIOp ITSELF AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND /.
TLECTRIFICATICN WHICH WAS PRESENT AT THE SITE ACTED ON THE WOLE7
~
INONSISTENTLY. "30N THE ONE HAND, A LARGE SECTION OF THE PERSONNEL, THE STATION MANAGEMENT AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION ACTED RESOLUTELY.
OPERATORS OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS WERE AT THEIR STATIONS AND SO WERE THE STAFF WORKING AT NO. 3 UNIT WHICH WAS IN THE SAME BUILDING AS THE NO. 4 UNIT.
VARIOUS SERVICES WERE IN A STATE OF READINESS, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO FIND ANY PERSON, TO,. ISSUE.ANY_,1NS_TJ1UC.TIONS ( ANILTHEL WOULD 3EL. IMPLEMENTED) t BUT PRIOR-TO THE ARRIVAL.,0P__THE GO.VERNMENT.COMMISS. ION THERE WAS N7,
DEFINITEPCANASTOWHATORDERSAWD.INTRUCTIONSHOULDBEISSUED,/
OR HOW THE SITUATION ~5HOULD.BE DEFINED (# THE. GOVERNME ARRIVED ON 26 APRIL AT 8 0' CLOCK IN THE EVENING AND.ALL THIS HAD TO BE DONE BY THE COMMISSION.
s
/ m een BEGINNING OF TAKE 003 H "'6/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///BY THE COMMISSION.
TEXT:
((TEXT))
FIRST OF ALL THE NO. 3 UNIT RECEIVED THE ORDER TO SWITCH OFF THE REACTOR AND COOL IT DOWN. TE NO.1 AND 2 UNITS CONTINUED OPERATING DESPITE THE FACT THE INTERNAL LEVELS OF RADIATION CONTAMINATION WERE ALREADY RELATIVELY HIGH.
THE INTERNAL','
CONTAMINATION OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS OCCURRED AS A RESULT OF TE VENTILATION AIR INTAKE WHICH WAS NOT SWITCHED OFF IMMEDIATELY WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURPID AND THE CONTAMINATED AIR FROM THE SITE OF THE CHERNOBYL AES REACHED THE PREMISES OF THE NO. 1 AND 2 UNITS VIA THE VENTILATION AIR INTAKE VENTS.
B.YE. SHCERBINA IMMEDIATELY CALLED IN THE CHEMICAL TROOPS, WHO AliRIVED RELATIVELY PROMPTLY HEADED BY GENERAL PIKALOV, AND HELICOPTER UNITS.
THE HELICOPTER MEN WERE HEADED BY GENERAL ANTOSHKIN.
FLIGHTS AND EXTERNAL INSPECTIONS OF THE STATE OF THE NO. 4 UNIT BEGAN.
FROM THE FIRST FLIGHT IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE REACE R HAD BEEN COMPLETELY DESTROYED, THE TOP SLAB WHICH HERMETICALLY SEALS THE REACTOR COMPARTMENT WAS Ih AN ALMOST VERTICAL POSITION BUT AT SOMETHING OF AN ANGLE.
IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT IT HAD BEEN DISLODGED AND THAT THIS MUST HAVE TAKEN CONSIDERABLE FORCE.
THE UPPER PART OF THE REACTOR HALL WAS CCKPLETELY DESTROYED AND THE ROOFS OF THE MACHINE HALL AND THE SURROUNDING SITE hAS LITTERED WITH PIECES OF THE GRAPHITE BLOCKS, BOTH WHOLE AND BROKEN.
JUDGING BY THE SCALE OF DESTRUCTION, IT WAS CLEAR TO ME THAT A SIZEABLE EXPLOSION HAD OCCURRED.
FROM THE REACTOR CRATER THEIR ROSE A CONSTANT WHITE COLUMN OF THE PRODUCTS OF CCMBUSTION -- GRAPHITE, THAT IS -- SEVERAL HUNDRED METERS HIGH, AND INSIDE THE REACTOR SPACE INDIVIDUAL LARGE PATCHES OF A POWEPSUL CRIMSON GLOW WERE VISIBLE.
AT THE SAME TIME IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SAY WITH CERTAINTY VHETHER THE SOURCE OF THIS GLOW WERE THE RED-HOT GRAPHITE RODS, WHICH REMAINED IN PLACE, OR BURNING GRAPHITE, BECAUSE GRAPHITE BURNS EVENLY GIVING OFF THE WHITISH PRODUCT CF THE CHEh! CAL PEACTICN -- THE SUM CF CARBON OXICES -- AND THE CCLCR "?.AT UAS REFLECTED IN THE SKY WAS THE TEMPERATURE OF THE GLCWING UNCLASSIFIED
GRAPHITE, THE POWERFUL GLOW OF THE GRAPHITE BLOCKS.
THE FIRST QUESTION WHICH PERTURBED US ALL WAS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE REACTOR OR PART OF IT WAS STILL FUNCTIONING OR NOT, IN OTHER WORDS WHETHER THE PROCESS OF EMISSION OF SHORT-LIVED RADICAL 7IVE ISOTOPES WAS.CONTINUI."G...THE VERY FIRST MEASUPIMENT8 WHICH VERE TAKEN INDICATED THE PCiSIBLE PRESENCE OF POWERFUD NEUTROM RADIATION 3 THIS COULD H/lE MEANT THAT THE REACTOR 9AS STILL FUNCTIONING.
I HAD TO GET iO R IT IN AN APHORED PERSONNEL CARRIER AND MAKE SURE THAT THE s WAS NO SUCH RADIATION.
BY THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL ALL POSSIBLE METHODS FOR FLOODING TE ZONE HAD BEEN TESTED, BUT THEY PRODUCED NO EFFECT APART FROM A HIGH LEVEL OF STEAM FORMATION AND THE SPREAD OF WATER TO NEIGHBORING POWER UNITS ALONG VARIOUS TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS.
THE FIREFIGHTERS ELIMINATED THE SEAT OF THE FIRE IN TE MACHINE HALL THAT VERY FIRST NIGHT, DOING THIS WITH GREAT EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY.
IT IS THOUGHT AT TIMES THAT SOE FIREFIGHTERS WERE a v e'Y >W-EXPOSED TO HIGH DOSES OF RADIATION BECAUSE THEY HAD TAKEN POSITIONS IN CERTAIN SPOTS AS OBSERVERS, WAITING TO MAKE SURE THAT NO NEW FIRES STARTED.
THIS IS NOT SO, BECAUSE TE MACHINE HALL CONTAINED MUCH OIL, HYDROGEN IN THE GENERATORS, AND MANY SOURCES WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED NOT ONLY FIRES BUT EVEN EXPLOSIONS WHICH COULD HAVE DESTROYED THE NO. 3 POWER UNIT.
THE FIREFIGHTERS' ACTIONS IN TMESE CONDITIONS WERE NOT ONLY HEROIC BUT ALSO CORRECT, INrELLIGENT, AND EFFECTIVE, SINCE THEY APPLIED THE FIRST PRECISE MEASURES TO CONTAIN THE POSSIBLE SPREAD OF THE ACCIDENT.
TE NEXT QUESTION AROSE WHEN IT BECAME CLEAR THAT A RATHER POWERFUL STREAM OF AEROSOL GAS RADIOACTIVITY WAS BEING EMIITED FROM THE CRATER OF THE DESTROYED No. 4 POWER UNIT. THE GRAPHITE.WAS ON FIPI, AND EACH PARTICLE CARRIED A. PRETTY'HIGH QUANTITY OF RADI0 ACTIVE SOURCES.
A COMPLEX TASK PRESENTED ITSELF.
TE AVERAGE COMBUSTION SPEED OF GRAPHITE IS SOMETHING LIKE 1 TONNE PER HOUR.
THE NO. 4 POWER UNIT CONTAINED ABOUT 2,500 TONNES.
CONSEQUENTLY, IN 240 HOURS OF NORMAL COMBUSTION, RADI ACTIVITY COULD HAVE SPREAD OVER A LARGE AREA WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN INTENSIVELY CONTAMINATED BY VARIOUS RADIONUCLIDES.
SINCE THE RADIATION CONDITIONS MADR IT POSSIBLE TO CONDUCT EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS ONLY FROM THE AIR AND FRCH AN ALTITUDE OF AT LEAST200METERSABOVETHEREACTOR,WHILtTHEAPPROPRIATEEQUI{MEd WHICH COULU HAVE^EITINGUISHED THE GRAPHITE FIRE BY TRADITIONALI METHODS,' USING TIATER,' FOAM, AND OTER MEANS, WAS NOT AVAILABLE, kT WAS NECESSARY TO SEEK NONTRADITIONAL SOLUTIONS.
WE STARTED THINKING ABOUT THAT. OUR DELIBERATIONS VERE ACCOMPAN!ED BY CCNSTANT CONSULTATIONS WITH HOSCOW, WITH A.P. ALEKSANDROV, STAFFERS FRCH THE ATHOIC ENERGY INSTITUTE, AND SPECIALISTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION AT THE OTHER END OF THE LIN(. 'ON THQ VERY NEIT DAY WE STARTED RECEIVING VARIOUS TELEGRAMS AND r SUGGESTIONS FROM ABROAM. PROPOSING DIFFERENT OPTIONS FOR TREATINC)
~
TE BURNING GRAPHITE USING VARIOUS MIXTUREQ
/C""'
BEGINNING CF TAKE 004 *****'/
REF:
MCSCCW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///
TEXT:
UNCLASSIFIED
((TEXT))
FbLLOW2NGTHEDISCUSS10NSANDNUMEROUSCONSULTAT10NS,
. TWO COMPONENTS -- LEAD AND DOLOMITE -- WERE CHOSEN AS TEMPERATURE STABILIZERS....
AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION TO BE SOLVED BY TE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION WAS THE QUESTION OF THE FATE OF THE CITY OF PRIPYAT.
THE RADIATION SITUATION THERE IN THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL VAS MORE OR LESS FAVORABLE, RANGING FROM 1 MILLIROENTCEN PER HOUR TO TENS OF MILLIROENTGENS PER HOURS. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, AN UNHEALTHY
' SITUATION, BUT IT STILL LEFT TIE FOR SOME DELIBERATION. THE MEDICAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE LIMITED:
AN EVACUATION COULD BE STARTED IN TE EVENT OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION BEING IN DANGER OF RECEIVING 25 BIOLOGICAL ROENTGENS PER PERSON.
EVACUATION WOULD BECOME MANDATORY IF THERE WAS A THREAT OF RECEIVING 75 BIOLOGICAL ROENTGENS DURING THE TIME SPENT IN THE INFECTED ZOE. THE RIGHT TO MAKE A DECISION ON EVACUATION IN THE INTERVAL BETWEEN 25 AND 75 ROENTGENS WAS VESTED IN LOCAL ORGANS. DISCUSSIONS WERE BEING HELD o
IN THESE CONDITIONS.
SENSING THAT THE DYNAMICS WOULD NOT CHANGE FOR TE BETTER, PHYSICISTS INSISTED ON MANDATORY EVACUATION.
MEDICS SEEMED TO CONCEDE TO THE PHYSICISTS AND, SOMETIME BY 2200 OR 2300 HOURS IN THE EVENING OF 26 APRIL, BORIS YEVDOKIMOVICH -- HAVING LISTENED TO OUR DISCUSSION AND TRUSTING OUR JUDGMENT, MADE THE DECIbI0N ON MANDATORY EVACUATION.
IT WAS DUE TO TAKE PLACE THE NEXT DAY.
UNFORTUNATELY, THIS INFORMATION SPREAD BY. WORD OF MOUTH, BY PEOPLE CALLING INTO APARTMENT BLOCX LOBBIES, AND BY THE POSTING OF NOTICES, AND IT OBVIOUSLY HAD NOT REACHED EVERY0E BECAUSE IN THE MORNING OF 27 APRIL YOU COULD STILL SEE MOTHERS PUSHING BABY CARRIAGES ALONG THE CITY STREETS, CHILDREN AT PLAY IN THE STREETS, AND THE GENERAL S8CNS OF NORMAL SUNDAY LIFE.
AT 1100 HOURS IT WAS OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE ENTIRE CITY WOULD BE EVACUATED.
BY 1400 HOURS ALL THE NECESSARY TRANSPORT HAD BEEN FULLY ASSEMBLED AND TRAVEL ROUTES HAD BEEN DETERMINED.
THE EVACUATION WAS CONDUCTED QUITE TIDILY, SWIFTLY, AND PRECISELY, EVEN THOUGH IT WAS TAKING PLACE IN UNUSUAL CONDITIONS AND SOME MISHAPS AND INACCURACIES DID OCCUR.
FOR EXAMPLE, A LARGE GROUP OF CITIZENS ASKED THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL IN THEIR OBN CARS, OF WHICH THERE WERE SEVEFJL THOUSAND.!N TEH CITY.
FOLLOWING SOME DELIBERATION, PERMISSION WAS GRANTED EVEN THOUGH IT PROBABLY WAS INCORRECT SINCE SOME OF TE CARS WERE CONTAMINATED BUT THE DOSIETRY CHECKPOINTS TO CHECK THE LEVEL OF CONTAMINATION AND UASHING POINTS WERE SET UP SCFIWHAT LATER.
BUT I REPEAT THAT TE EVACUATION OF THE CITY WAS TAKING PLACE WHILE THE LEVEL OF CONTAMINATION IN THE CIT" WAS STILL LOW.
PRACTICE SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWED THAT NO ONE FROM AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION VHO HAD NOT BEEN AT THE POWER STATION ITSELF AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT --
ALMOST 50,000 PEOPLE -- SUFFERED ANY SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGE TO HIS HEALTH.
THE SUBSEQUENT MIASURES WERE AIMED AT MORE THOROUGH DOSIFITRIC MCNITORING ORGANIZED BY SERVICES FROM THE STATE CCMMITTEE FOR HYDRCHETEORCLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, GENERAL PIKALOV'S SERVICES, THE POWER STATICN'S SERVICES,-AND THE PHYSIC!STS' SERVICES.
ISOTOPE COMPOSITION WA,S STUDIED HORE THOROUGHLY.
GOOD UNCLASSIFIED
WORK WAS BONE BY TE MILITARY DOSIETRY SERVICES, BUT WE RECEIVED
.THE MOST ACCURATE INFORMATION ON ISOTOPE COMPOSITION AND THE NATURE OF RADIATION DISTRIBUTION FROM TE LABORATORIES DEPLOYED IN THE INFECTED TERRITORY.
WE PROCEEDED FROM THEIR DATA WHEN MAKING DECISIONS.
IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SITUATION KEPT CHANGING ALL THE TIME
)
THROUGH THE FIRST FEW DAYS, AS THE MOVEMENT OF AIR MASSES KEPT CHANGING AND AS DUST WAS RAISED NEAR THE NO. 4 POWER UNIT WITH THE DUMPING OF MATERIALS INTO ThE REACTOR.
HERE ARE SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THAT PERIOD.
THE STATION STAFF.
WE LOOKED FOR PEOPLE PREPARED FOR ANY OPERATION UNDER ANY CONDITIONS.
BWIS-'!D VRATTPERATIONSW PRECIsazI, unF!"MAIFTO'BrDONrIFTHIYTITUATION.E WORK SHOULD 7
~
~
BE'PlikNED AND 0RGANIZED
- 1. NET"'INTTHE STATION'S' MANAGERS NOR THE7 MINISTRi orPOWER1ND ELawntriCATION'$ ~!JADERSHIP~ ~HAD ANY CONCEP)
^
0F. THE MECESSDI wnstussz.0F ACTIONS HERE.'NEITHER IN THE FORM AS PREVIOUSLY SET OUT AND STUDIED NOR IN THE OPTIONS PRODUCED ON e
THE SPOT.
TKiMWTIOFFN!'FININU~TRE ~5ITtTAT!0N'1ND CONDUCTING TWRTACTIOtWH1DWB8' ASSUMED'BY~TE GOVERNMENT s f1METEMIDED THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE CONFUSION EVEN ON MINOR MATTERS.
I RECALL THAT IN TE FIRST DAYS OF THE COMMISSION'S STAY IN PRIPYAT THEY DID NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY QUANTITY OF PROTECTIVE RESPIRATORS, INDIVIDUAL RADIATION METERS -- TLDS ((EYPANSION UNKNOWN)) -- THERE WASN'T EVEN ENOUGH OF THE NOT VERY RELIABLE S0-CALLED PENCILS FOR EVERYONE.
THE STATION DID NOT HAVE ENOUCH AUTOMATIC EXTERNAL RADIATION METERS WHICH WOULD HAVE AUTOMATICALLY PROVIDED REMOTE DATA ON THE RADIATION SITUATION OVER A RADIUS OF SEVERAL KILOETERS, SO THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF PEOPLE HAD TO BE ORGANIZED TO CARRY OUT RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS.
THERE WERE NO RADIO-CONTROLED AIF. CRAFT EQUIPPED WITH RADIATION MEASURING INSTRUMENTS, THUS IT NEEDED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF PILOTS AND HELICOPTER MEN TO TAKE READINGS AND CONDUCT RECONNAISSANCE.
THERE WAS NOT EVEN THE BASIC STANDARD OF HYGIENE,.;0T IN "HE FIRST FEW DAYS AT LEAST.
PREMISE 3 IN THE TOWN OF PRIPYAT WERE ALREADY QUITE FILTHY BY THE 27TH, 2BTH, AND 29TH OF APRIL BUT WHEN FOOD WAS BROUGHT IN -- SAUSAGE, CUCUMBERS, AND BOTTLES OF PEPSI COLA AND FRUIT JUICE -- IT WAS ALL SIMPLY STORED IN ROOMS AND PEOPLE PICKED IT UP AND OPENED IT WITH THEIR BARE MANDS.
THIS WAS A FEW DAYS LATER BEFORE EVERYTHING WAS MORE OR LESS BACK TO NORMAL, WHEN CANTEENS AND TENTS APPEARED AND THE APPROPRIATE HEALTH AND HYGIENE CCNDITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED, QUITE PRIMITIVE ONES, IT IS TRUE, BUT THEY MADE IT POSSIBLE TO MONITOR PEOPLE'S HANDS AND FOOD QUALITY FRCH THE VIEWPOINT OF CONTAMINATION...
/000"' BEGINNING OF TAKE 005 "'"'/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// VIEWPOINT OF CCNTAMINATION...
TEXT:
((TEXT)) ON 2 MAY, WHEN THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSICN WAS INSTALLED AT CHERNOBYL N!KOLAY IVANOVICH RY HKOV AND YEGOR KUZMICH LICACHEV CAME TO THE ZCNE.
THEIR VISIT WAS CF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.
HEY HELD A CONFERENCE AT THE CHERNOBYLSKIY PARTY RAYXCM.
FRCH OUR UNCLASSIFIED
a REPORTS (I WAS THE MA8N SPEAKER) THEY GRASPED THE SZTUATION, THEY UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS VAS NOT A LOCAL INCIDENT BUT A LARGE-SCALE ACCIDENT WHICH WOULD HAVE VERY LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES AND WOULD REQUIRE TREMENDOUS WORK...
AFTER THE REPORTS AND AFTER WE HAD EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AS WE C'JRSELVES SAW IT, FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS WERE TAKEN WHICH DETERMINED THE PROCEDURE FOR ORGANIZING WORK THROUGHOUT THE SUBSEQUENT PERIOD, THE SCALE OF THAT WORK, AND THE ATTITUDE TOWARD IT OF ALL THE DEPARTMENTS AND ENTERPRISES IN OUR COUNTRY.
AN OPERATIONAL GROUP..
WAS SET UP UNDER N.I. RYZHKOV'S LEADERSHIP AND VIRTUALLY ALL THE SOVIET UNION'S INDUSTRY WAS ENLISTED.
FROM THAT N0ENT ON THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION WAS ONLY A SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIVE MECHANISM IN THAT VAST STATE WORK WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO'S OPERATIONAL GROUP.
I DO NOT KNOW OF ANY EVENT GREAT OR SMALL WHICH THE POLITBURO'S OPERSTIONAL GROUP DID NOT HAVE IN ITS PURVIEW.
I MUST SAY THAT ITS SESSE,NS AND DECISIONS WERE VERY CALM AND RESTRAINED, TOTALLY o
GEARED TO RELYING ON SPECIALISTS' VIEWS BUT ALSO TO COMPREHENSIVELY COMPARING THE VIEWS OF DIFFERENT SPECIALISTS.
FOR ME THIS WAS A MODEL OF CORRECTLY ORGANIZED WORK.
INITIALLY I MAY HAVE SUPPOSED THAT ARBITRARY DECISIONS MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN THERE DESIGNED TO COPE WITH THE SITUATION MORE QUICKLY AND PERHAPS TO UNDERSTATE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INCIDENT.
THERE WA9 NOTHING LIKt, THAT. WORK WAS ORGANIZED JUST AS IN A GOOD SCIENTIFIC COLLECTIVE. FIRST -- THE CLOSE STUDY OF INFORMATION, PREFERABLY INFORMATION RECEIVED FRCM 9ARIOUS SOURCES.
OFTEN THERE WERE CASES WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, THE INFORMATION PRODUCED BY THE MILITARY DIFFERED FROM THE INFORMATION PRODUCED BY CIVILIAN SCIENTIFIC SERVICES AND IN TURN THE DIFFERENT SCIENTIFIC GROUPS INITIALLY PRODUCED DIFFERENT INFORMATION.
ALL TH85 CREATED A QUITE ANXIOUS SITUATION.
BUT THE OPERATIONAL GROUP TTSELF SHOWED NO ANYIETY, IT SIMPLY INSISTED ON ADDITIONAL READINGS AND CLARIFICATIONS, TRYO'G ITS UWOST TO UNDERSTAND THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS.
AT THE SAME TIME THE OPERATIONAL GROUP ALWAYS SOUGHT 8N ITS DECISIONS TO SAFEGUARD THE INTERESTS OF PEOPLE AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.
FOR EXAMPLE, LECISIONS WERE TAKEN TO BENEFIT THE VICTIMS OF THE ACCIDENT WHEN CONSIDERING ALL THE POSSIBLE OPTIONS GOVERNING THE EXTENT OF THE CONTAMINATED ZONE OR THE SCALE OF FINANCIAL COMPENSATION NEEDED FOR THE EVACUEES.
THIS APPLIED IN EVERY CASE.
NOW A FEW WORDS ABOUT THE ARMY.
ThE MILITARY'S RANGE OF WORK WAS VERY LARGE.
THE CHEMICAL TROOPS FIRST HAD TO EXAMINE AND DETERMINE THE CONTAMINATED ZONE.
THE ARMY BORE THE BURDEN OF WORK BOTH AT THE STATION ITSELF AND IN THE 30-KM ZONE IN THE DECONTAMINATION OF VILLAGES, SE'ITLEMENTS, AND HIGHWAYS.
THE ARMY DID A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WORK DECONTAMINATING THE TOWN OF PRIPYAT.
NOT ONCE DID I SEE SOVIET ARMY SPECIALISTS OR NONMILITARY PEOPLE TRY IN SOME WAY TO SHIRX THEIR WORK OR FEEL THAT THEY HAD BEEN GENERALLY PRESS-GANGED INTO DIFFICULT AND DANGEROUS WORK.
PERHAPS SUCH CASES DID EXIST BUT I DID NOT SEE A SINGLE ONE.
I MYSELF WENT SEVERAL TIMES INTO QUITE DANGEROUS SECTICNS OF THE NO. 4 UNIT.
I EXPLAINED TO PEOPLE THE CONDITICNS IN WHICH THEY WOULD BE WORKING i
AND SAID THAT I WANTED TO WORK WITH THOSE PPIPARED TO HELP ME VOLUNTARILY.
THERE WASN'T A SINGLE OCCASION WHEN ANYCNE CRCPPED CUT, SO TO SPEAK, OR FAILED TO CCME FORWARD.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSlFIED CONCERNING THE INFORMATION SERVICE.
)
APPARENTLY, DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE A USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE USE OF N_UCLEAR POWER PUBLISHING HOUSE, MEDICAL PUBLISHING HOUSES, AND A " M ANIYE" SOCIETY, THERE WAS NO READY-MADE LITERATURE AT ALL THAT~COULD HAVE BEEN RAPIDLY DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE?
POPULATION,TOEIPLAINWHATKINDOFDOSESARERELATIVELYWRMLE33 AS FAR AS HUMANS AKE CONCERNED AND WHAT DOSES ~ARE EICEEDINGLY IjANGEROUS, HOW TO BFHAUE IN' CONDITION 51HERE PEOPLE ARE~ IN AN))
ENHANCED RADTATICK'DMIGEN"IUNEi-THAT COUtD"MAVE -GI1,EN COMPETENT) s.
ADVICE OK WHAT 701 TEA 3UREPHCW TO MEASURE"ITi WHAT T0-DO-WI}
VEGETABLES, FRUIT, AND 50 FORTH.7 THERE WERE MANY BOOKS SFECIALISTS, FAT TOMES, COMPETENTIND CORRECT, BUT THERE PRACTICALLY NO PAMPHLETS OR LEA?LETS-IN THE COUNTRYj-FERHAPS'NOW IS THE RIGHT TIME TO GIVE SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS ABOUT HOW I BECAME INVOLVED IN THE STORY, WHAT MY CONNECTIONS WITH IT WE8E, HOW I SAW THE STORY AND THE QUALITY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INDUSTRY, AND HOW I SEE IT NOW.
RARELY HAS ANY e
OF US SPOKEN WITH REAL FRANKNESS AND PRECI'SION ON THIS SCORE.
/"" BEGINNING OF TAKE 006 HHH/
REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY///0N THIS SCORE.
TEIT:
((TEXT))
I AM A GRADUATE OF THE PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT OF MOSCOW'S D.I. MENDELEYEV CHEMICAL-TECHNOLOGICAL INSTITUTE.
THE DEPARTMENT TRAINED SPECIALISTS, MAINLY RESEAPGERS, TO WORK IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY.
THAT IS, KNOWING HOW TO SEPARATE ISOTCPES AND WORK WITH RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES, KNOWING HOW TO EXTRACT URANIUM FECM ORE, BRING IT TO THE REQUISITE CONDITION, MAKE NUCLEAR FUEL FROM IT, KNOWING HOW TO PROCESS. NUCLEAR FUEL WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN IN THE REACTOR AND CONTAINS A POWERFUL RADI0 ACTIVE COMPONENT, IN ORDER TO SEPARATE OUT THE USEFUL PRODUCTS AND ALSO SEPARATE OUT THE DANGEROUS, HARMFUL COMPONENTS, AND KNOW HOW TO COMPACT THEM AND BURX THEM SO THAT THEY ARE NOT HARMFUL TO HUMANS.
AND WHAT PART OF THE RADI0 ACTIVE SOURCES TO USE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE NAT1ONAL ECONOMY AND FOR MEDICINE, PERHAPS.
THIS IS THE GROUP OF SPECIAL QUESTIONS I WAS TAUGHi'.
THEN I TOCK A DIPLOMA AT THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE IN THE FIELD OF PROCESSING NUCLEAR FUEL.
ACADEMICIAN I.K. KIKOIN TRIED TO KEEP ME THERE TO DO RESEARCH -- HE LIKED MY DIPLCMA WORK.
BUT I AND SCHE CCMRADES ARRANGED TO WORX FOR A SPELL AT A NUCLEAR INDUSTRY PLANT TO ACQUIRE PRACTICAL SKILLS IN THE AREA THAT WOULD LATER BECOME THE SUBJECT OF OUR RESEARCH.
I WAS A KIND OF AGITATOR FOR THIS IDEA, SO I COULD NOT ACCEPT THE RESEARCH OFFERS, AND I WENT TO SIBERIA.
THERE I WAS INVOLVED IN THE STARTUP OF A RADI0 CHEMICAL PLANT.
IT UAS A VERY LIVELY, INTERESTING PERIOD -- AN INTRODUCTION TO PRACTICAL WORK.
I WORKED AT THE PLANT FOR AROUND TWO YEARS AND THEN THEY "DRACGED" ME BACK INTO RESEARCH AT THE KURCHATOV INSTITUTE...
I DEVELOPED A NUMBER OF TECHNOLOGICAL PROCESSES...
I PPISENTED CANDIDATE'S AND DCCTCR'S DISSERTATMNS.
I WAS ELECTED TO THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES.
THE t.CADEMIC PART CF THE WORK WON A STATE PRfZE. THAT WAS MY PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY.
I MANAGED TO INV7LVE UNCLASSIFIED
VERY INTERESTfNG YOUNG PEOPLE IN IT, WHO WTTH TASTE, FINE EDUCATION, AND UND3RSTANDING ARE STILL DEVELOPING THIS SPHERE OF PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY AND OUT OF WHICH, I AM SURE, WILL COME MANY MORE EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE FOR PRACTICAL WORK AND FOR THE COGNITIVE PROCESS.
THE SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITY IN THAT AREA OBVIOUSLY ATTRACTED ATTENTION -- I BECAME INSTITUTE DEPUTY DIRECTOR.
MY ACADEMIC FUNCTIONS WERE CONFINED TO MY OWN SCIENTIFIC WOFX. THE DUTIES ASSIGNED 7V ME, DUTIES THAT EXISTED THEN AND EIIST TO THIS DAY, WERE PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY, RADI0 CHEMISTRY, AND THE USE OF NUCLEAR AND PLASMA SOURCES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL PURPOSES.
WHEN A.P. ALEKSANDROV i
WAS ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES HE RECOMMENDED ME AS FIRST DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE.
WHAT INTERESTED ME WAS THE PROPORTION OF NUCLEAR POW 8R IN THE SOV8ET POWER INDUSTRY AND THE REASONS WHY IT WAS PRESENT.
I ORGANIZED SYSTEMATIC RESEARCH CONNECTED WITH WHAT TYPE OF STATIONS SHOULD BE BUILT FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES, HOW TO USE THEM SENSIBLY, o
WHETHER THEY SHOULD PRODUCE ELECTRICITY ALONE OR OTHER SOURCES OF ENERGY TOO, IN PARTICULAR HYDROGEN.
I PAID SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE HYDROGEN ENERGY.
THEY WERE ALL UNUSUAL QUESTIONS, ANCILLARY TO NUCLEAR POWER.
SINCE QUESTIONS OF SAFETY IN THE NUCLEAR POOWER INDUSTRY WERE THE MOST ACUTE ISSUES RAISED DURING DISCUS $ IONS IN VARIOUS SPHERES OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, I WAS INTERESTED IN COMFARING THE REAL DANGERS AND THE REAL THREATS POSED BY NUCLEAR POWER WITH ~HE THREATS OF OTHER POWER SYSTEMS.
I ENTERED INTO THIS WITH C?IAT ENTHUSIASM, MAINLY EXPLAINING THE DANGERS OF OTHER, ALTERNAT!VE SOURCES OF ENERGY TO NUCLEAR POWER.
AT THE INSTITUTE SCIENTIFIC AND'TECHNICACCOUNCIL' UISCUSSION OPP CONCEPTUAL QUESTIONS'O'F N'UCCEATPOWER DEVELOPMENT 9AS NELATIVELY'*
FREQUENT 7 BUT DISCUSSICA 0F THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS WAS TITREMEL'D RARES THE' QUALITTWT7 ARTICULAR REACTOR,1EE QUACITT OF-THE 7 FUEL 3 THESE-QUESTIOM11fERE"DISCUSSED"At TIENTIFIC~ ANIT TECHNICAIr3 COUNCIL 3t BUT TRrINFORMATION I HAD DEMONSTRATED, M SEEMED TO M53 THAT ALL-WAS NOT WELL"TN THE RATTER'0F~THE DsVELOPMENT~0F NUCLEAR 7 POWEM IT WAS AS CLEAR AS DAYLIGHT THATN' WASD BASICALLTLITTIE'DIFFERENT~FROttVESTERE EQUIPMENT 4IN CONCEPTUAL TERMS, FOR EXAMPLE, AND IT EVEN SURPASSED THEM IN SOME AREAS, BITI")
~
THEY WERE SHORT OFM CONTROL"SYSTEMS AND DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS 7 THE AMERICAN RASMDSSEMgCARRIED3XIT-AN ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWEM STATION ~SAFETT IN'WHICE Mr CONSISTENTLY LOOKED FOR ALL POSSIBL D SOURCES'Or TROUELE LEADIEG'10 ACCIDENTS,7 SYSTEMATIZED THER, ANID MADE FRURABILITT' ASSESSMENTS OF PARTICULAR EVENTS,7 ASSESSMENTS O5r TR OFEDERNILITT O F AE ETENT'S LEADING TO TFE RELEASE OF' RADI0 ACTIVITY, F9R EXAMPLE.
WE LEARNED THAT FRCH FOREIGN SOURCES.
8 SAY'NOT A' SINGLE COLLECTIVE IN THE SOVIET UNION THAT WAS POSINCD AhD-EXAMINING THESE QUESTIONS WITH ANY DEGREE OF COMPETENCEhy THE MOST ACTIVE ADVOCATE OF NUCLEAR POPWER SAFETY HEPI WAS B.A.
SICOPINKO.
HIS APPROACH SEEFID SERIOUS TO ME.
HE HAD REAL KNOULEDGE OF STATION OPERATION, OF THE QUALITY OF -THE EQUIPMINT BEING MANUFACTURED, CF THE TROUBLE THAT SCMETIMES OCCURS.
BUT HIS EFFCRTS WEPI GEARED MAINLY TO COPING WITH THE' TROUBLE, FIRST BY ORGANIZATICNAL MEASURES AND, SECCND, THRCUGH A SYSTEM FOR IMPROVING UNCLASSIFIED
~
-THF DOCUMENTS THAT SHOULD BE IN THE POSSESSION OF STATIONS AND
, DESIGNERS; THIRD, HE WAS GREATLY CONCERNED ABOUT IHE CREATION OF SUPERVISORY BODIES THAT WOULD CONTROL TE SITUATION.
/****** BEGINNING OF TAKE 007 ******/
REF:
HOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// CONTROL THE SITUATION.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) HE"AND'HIS COLLEAGUE 3 WERE'YERY WORRIED ABOUT THE QUALITPOP THE-EQUI.PMENT THE' STATIONS ~ VERE BEING SUPPLIE RECENTLY WE~ ALL BECAMECONCERNED ABOUT TIDI TRAINING 'AND EXPERTI6f OPTHEPERSONNELWHODESIGN', CONSTRUCT"ANDOPERATENUCLEAh STATIONS.3'IN FACT, THE-NUMBER-OP-FACR,ITIES-1tA3'INCREASiiD, BUT TE STANDARD *0FEIPERTISE:0FWFER$0NNEI -INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS H4 7 tILLEN.7 V.A. SIDORENKO WAS AT THE FOREFRONT ON THESE QUESTIONS.
UNFORTUNATELY, HE DID NOT GET THE PROPER BACKING.
EVERY DOCUMENT, EVE 3Y STEP WAS AN AGONIZING PROCESS.
PSYCHOLOGICALLY IT IS POSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND THIS, BECAUSE THE DEPARTMENT IN WHICH WE WERE WORKING WAS BUILT ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE VERY HIGEST LEVEL OF SKILL OF THE PEOPLE PEPIORMING ANY OPERATION AND THE VERY HIGHEST RESPONSIBILITY.
AND INDEED, IN SKILLED HANDS OUR APPARATUSES SEEMED BOTH RELIABLE AND OPERATIONALLY SAFE.
ANXIETY CONCERNING THC ENHANCED SAFETY OF ATCHIC STATIONS APPEARED TO BE A CONTRIVED ISSUE, BECAUSE THIS WAS AN ENVIRONMENT CF HIGHLY SKILLED SPECIALISTS; THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT SAFETY QUESTIONS ARE RESOLVED EYCLUSIVELY BY THE LEVEL OF SKILL AND PRECISION OF INSTRUCTION OF THE PERSONEL.
AN INCREASING VOLUME OF RESOURCES WENT ON THE CREATION OF FACILITIES WHICH HAD NO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO NUCLEAR POWER ENGINEERING.
CAPACITIES FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF FUEL ELEFINTS WERE ESTABLISHED, AS WERE CAPACITIES IN THE METALS SCIENCE SPHERE; A LARGE QUANTITY OF CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES VENT ON SETT;NG UP FACILITIES UNRELATED TO THE DEPARTPINT'S FIELD.
SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS WHICH WERE AT ONE TIME THE HOST POWERFUL IN THE COUNTRY BEGAN TO BECOME ENFEEBLED, THE CEGREE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT WITH H0DERN HARDWARE BEGAN TO DECLINE, THE PERSONNEL STARTED TO AGE, NEW APPROACHES WERE NOT MUCH WELCCKED.
THE RHYTHM OF WORK GRADUALLY BECAME HABITUAL, AS DID THE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF CNE PROBLEM OR ANOTHER.
I SAW ALL THIS, BUT IT WAS HARD FOR ME TO INTERVENE IN THIS PROCESS STRICTLY PROFESSIONALLY, WHILE GENERAL DECLARATIONS ON THIS SCORE MET WITH HOSTILITY, INASMUCH AS THE ATTEMPT BY A NONPROFESSIONAL TO INTRODUCE ANY OF HIS OWN UNDERSTANDING INTO THEIR WORK COULD SCARCELY BE ACCEPTABLE.
THERE GREW UP A GENERATION'0FENGINEERS WHO WERE SKILLED AT 3 THEIR OWN WORK 1UT WHO DID NOT PERCEIVE IN A CRITICAL FASHION THE7 VERY APPARATUSES RD' SYSTEMS ENSURING THEIR SAFETYl..
THE WORM OF DOUBT GNAWED AWAY AT ME, BECAUSE FROM MY PROFESSICNAL VIEWPOINT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DO SCMETHING NEW, TO ATTEMPT TO TURN ASIDE AND DO THINGS OTHERWISE.
I RAN A FAIR NUMBER CF RISKS.
THROUGHOUT MY LIFE I HAVE HAD TO CCNDUCT 10 PROJECTS AT THE LEVEL CF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.
FIVE CF
~MESE FAILED, AND I COST THE STATE SCMETHING CF THE ORDER OF RCS MILLICN CN THESE FAILED PROJECTS.
THEY FAILED NOT BECAUSE THEY UNCLASSIFIED
WERE INCORRECT FROM THE OUTSET.
THEY WERE A'ITRACTIVE AND INTERESTING, BUT IT TURNED OUT THAT EITHER THE NECESSARY MATERIALS VERE UNAVAILABLE OR THERE WAS NO ORGANIZATION WHICH WOULD TAKE ON THE DEVELOPMENT WORK FOR A NONTRIVIAL ((NETRIVIALNYY)) COMPRES5OR OR A NONTRIVIAL HEAT EXCHANGER, FOR EXAMPLE, AND /S A RESULT AT THEIR DESIGN ANALYSIS STAGE THE INITIALLY ATTRACTIVE IDEAS PROVED VERY EXPENSIVE, UNWIELDY, AND WERE NOT ADOPTED FOR IMPLEMENTATION.
FOR THESE SAME REASONS, I'M AFRAID, THIS SAME FATE AWAITS 2 OUT OF THE 10 PROJECTS, BUT 3 PROJECTS WERE VERY SUCCESSFUL -- WHERE WE.
FOUND GOOD PARTNERS -- AND AS A RESULT JUST 10F THE 3 COMPLETED PROJECTS, ON WHICH WE SPENT R17 MILLION,.BECAN TO BRING IN AN ANNUAL INCOME THAT REPAID WITH INTEREST THE R25-MIIAION-EXPENDITURE ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WORKS WHICH TO THIS DAY HAVE NOT REACHED A POSITIVE CONCLUSION.
BUT WE DEGREE OF RISK IN MY WORK WAS FAIRLY HIGH: SOME S0-70 PERCENT.
I SAW NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE REACTOR FIELD...
TRADITIONAL NEACTOR BUILDING WAS OF LI'ITLE INTEREST TO ME.
OF COURSE, AT THAT TIMS I DID NOT CONCEIVE OF THE DEGREE OF DANGER ASSOCIATED WI B IT.
THERE WAS A FEELING OF UNEASE, BUT THERE WERE SUCH "BIG GUYS" THERE, SUCH GIANTS AND EXPERIENCED PEOPLE THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THEY WOULD NOT PERPETRATE ANYTHING NASTY.
A COMPARISON OF WESTERN APPARATUSES WITH OUR OWN ALLOWED ME TO DRAW THE CONCLUSIONS THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE SAFETY OF EXISTING APPARATUSES, ALL THE SAME THEY WERE FEVER TWN THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH TRADITIONAL POWER GENERATION WITH ITS LARGE QUANTITY OF CARCINOGENIC SUBSTANCES DISCHARGED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE, WITH THE RADI0 ACTIVITY EMITTED INTO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM THOSE SAME COAL SEAMS.
AS FOR THE REMX REACTOR, IT WAS CONSIDERED TO BE A POOR ONE
((PLOKHIY)) AMONG REACN R BUILDERS ((REAKTORSHCHIKI)).
IT WAS CONSIDERED A POOR ONE NOT BECAUSE OF SAFET'1 CONSIDERATIONS; FRCH THIS VIEWPOINT IT WAS EVEN MARKED OUT DURING DISCUSSIONS AS BEING ON THE BETTER SIDE.
IT WAS CONSIDERED PCOR FOR ECONOMIC REASONS, FOR ITS GREAT FUEL CONSUMPTION, ITS GREAT CAPITAL OUTLAYC, FOR THE NONINDUSTRIAL BASIS OF ITS CONSTRUCTION.
AS A CHEMIST I WAS ALSO ALARMED BY THE FACT THAT THESE APPARATUSES INCORPORATED A GREAT DEAL OF GRAPHITE, ZIRCON, AND WATER.
I #S ALSO DISTURBED BY THE UNUSUAL AND, IN MY VIEW, INADEQUATE CONSTRUCTION OF PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD OPERATE IN EXTPIME SITUATIONS:
ONLY THE OPERATOR COULD INTRODUCE THE EMERGENCY SAFETY RODS EITHER AUTCMATICALLY VIA ONE OF THE GAGES ((S P0DACHI ODNOGO IZ DATCHIKOV)) OR MANUALLY.
THE MACHINERY COULD WORK WELL OR POORLY, AND THERE WERE NO OTHER PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS WHICH WOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF THE OPERATOR, WHICH WOULD OPERATE EXCLUSIVELY ON TFI BASIS OF THE STATUS OF THE APPARATUS ZONE.
I WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE FACT THAT SPECIALISTS RAD SUBMITTED TO THE DESIGNER PP.0POSALS ABOUT CHANCING THE EMERGENCY PROTECTION SYSTEMS.3 THEY WERIENOTREJECTEDy BUT'THET WERE DEVELOPED VERY SLOWLY 3..
/00"" BEGINNING OF TAKE 008 ******/
REF:
MOSCCW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// DEVELOPED VERY SLCWLY...
TEXT:
UNCLASSIFIED J
\\
c
((TEIT))
WOULD LIKE TO STATE A VIEVPO WHICH I AM CONVINCED OF BUT VHICH IS NOT SHARED BY MY COLLEAGUES AND CREATES FRICTION AHONG THEM.
TE THING IS THAT IN THE WEST, IN OUR OWN AVIATION INDUSTRY, IN THE DEVELOPED SECTORS OF INDUSTRY, THERE IS NO CONCEPT OF "A SCIENTIFIC LEADER" AND "A CONSTRUTOR." I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE CAN EXIST THE SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP OF A PROBLEM -- 0F TE STRATEGY OF AVIATION DEVELOPMENT, FOR INSTAMCE.
BUT WHEN IT COMES TO THE DESIGN OF AN AIRCRAFT, THEN THIS LA'AfER HUST HAVE ONE BOSS
-- AND HE IS CONSTRUCTOR, DESIGNER, AND SCIENTIFIC LEADER, AND ALL.
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY MUST LIE IN HIS HANDS ALONE.
THIS SEEMED TO ME TO BE AN OBVIOUS FACT.
~
AT THE HOMENT OF NUCLEAR ENERGY'S CONCEPTION EVERYTHING WAS REASONABLE.
BECAUSE THIS WAS A NEW FIELD OF SCIENCE -- NUCLEAR PHYSICS, NEUTRON PHYSICS -- THE CONCEPT OF SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP AMOUNTED TO DESIGNERS BEING GIVEN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR BUILDING THE APPARATUS.
THE SCIENTIFIC LEADER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR TESE PRINCIPLES BEING PHYSICALLY CORRECT AND PHYSICALLY SAFE.
BUT THE e
DESIGNER PUT THESE PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE BY CONSTANTLY CONSULTING WITH PHYSICISTS YO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE LAWS OF PHYSICS GOVERNING THE BUILDING OF THIS APPARATUS WERE BEING BROKEN.
ALL THIS WAS QUITE JUSTIFIED AT THE DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY. EUT)
WHEN THE DESIGN ORGANIZATIONS ~CRETI!P70tD' DEVELOPED THEIR OWN COMPUTIWANtrFHYSICSWAKTMENTS, THIrEIT3TENCE~0F THIS DUAL-P)WF,R SYSTEW FOiEQME 1FFARATUS TIN FACT IT WAS A TRIPLE-POWER SYSTEM BECAUSE THERE WERE NUMEROUS COUNCILS, DEPARTMENTAL AND INTERDEPARTMENTAL) CREITED'A'3TfUATIOT UF M N TIVE RESPONSIBILIT n FCIETHE-QUACITY~0F WORK PERFORMED BY TE'XPPARATUS.4 TRI5~SAMD SITUATION CAN~BYTOWf0DIY'AND7TN~'WY1FTWl'0WJ YS VRONG'3 I AM STILL CONVINCED THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP IS A TYPE OF ORGANIZATION WHICH OFFERS CONSULTATION ON VARIOUS PROJECTS, SELECTS THE BEST OF THEM, AND DETERMINES THE STRATEGY FOR TE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUST 3Y.
THIS IS THE FUNCTION OF TE SCIENTIFIC LEADER -- HIS FUNCTION DOES NOT LAY IN CREATING A SPECIFIC APPARATUS WITH_ PRESCRIBED, PROPERTIES.
ALL-THitt0MFUSIOS AND T SYSTEM LACKING AN APPARATUS PERSONALLY RE'SPONSIBLE FOR 3 CUALITY IfAS LED TO A dREAT DEAL OF IRRESPONSIBILITY, "K3 SICWN BY
-~
TE CERNOBYL EXPERIENCE.
)f If HIS SPEEC?r KTT SES6IdfdN iCfULi"N.I.~Rf iiXUVESEIUTHAT HD I
~
~
j FELT THAT THE ACCIDENT AT '1IE CHERNOBYL AES WAS NOT PURE C(ANCE AN3 1
- HAT THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY HAD BEEN MOVIN?. TOWARD.THISI l
TERRIBLE EVENT WITH A CERTAIN DEGREE OF INEVITABILITY.
. SE WORDS i
STRUCK ME AT THE TIME BY THEIR ACCURACY, ALTHOUCH I MYSELF WAS IN NO CONDITION TO FORMULATE THE TASK AS SUCH.
I RI. MEMBERED AN INCIDENT AT ONE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN WELDERS SIMPLY PLACED AN ELECTRODE IN THE MAIN PIPELINE FOR SEAM WELDING AND WELDED IT SLIGHTLY AT THE TOP INSTEAD OF CORRECTLY FOLLOWING UELDING PRCCEDURES.
THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A TERRIBLE ACCIDENT WITH THE LARGE PIPELINE EXPLODING AND CAUSING A MALFUNCTION IN THE VATER-HODERATED WATER-CCOLED REACTOR APPARATUS W7TH A TOTAL LOSS C>F THE CCCLANT THE MELTING OF THE REACTOR CORE, AND SO FORTH.
IT IS CCOD THAT THE PERSONNEL VERE WELL TRAINED, CAREFUL, AND PPECISE.
SECAUSE THE FLAW THAT WAS DETECTED BY THE CPERATOR COULD NOT EVEN BE SEEN UNDER A MICROSCOPE.
AN INVESTIGATION WAS BEGUN AND IT UNCLASSIFIED 1
8 TRANSPIRED THAT THIS PIPELINE WAS SIMPLY SHODDILY WELDED. THEY BEGAN TO LOCK INTO THE DOCUMENTATION AND FOUND ALL THE RIGHT SIGNATURES: THE SIGNATURE OF THE WELDER, WHO CERTIFIED THAT HE HAD PROPERLY WELDED THE SEAM, AND THE SIGNATURE OF THE GAMMA-RAY FLAW DETECTION OPERATOR WHO HAD CHECKED THE SEAM -- THE SEAM THAT HAD NEVER EXISTED.
ALL THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE NAME OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY -- TO WELD MORE SEAMS.
THIS~ KIND OF SHODDT T RI' M S SIMPfJ~IMITYNtT~EEf0R!f1tG UrTATEYtHECKEU~TRg"3 ANEW OF AREAS;ATM T/IHER"POWEN "AND'-DID NOT'OSTAIr FATORAB MSULTS EVER%~ CRUCIAL PIPELINES, VALVES WORKING POORLY,
~'-~~~"*'";"i-N E AWS-IW HIGH-POWER PRESSURE-TUBE REACTOR CHANNELS INOPERATIONAL -- ALL THIS HAPPENED EVERY YEAR.
TEN-YEAR DISCUSSIONS ON TRAINING EQUIPMENT, AT LEAST 5-YEAR DISCUSSIONS ON SET"ING UP_A_ SYSTEM TO DIAGNOSE THE STATE OF EQUIPMENT --LANE 43 wr IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THE QUALITY OF ENd ND OTHEITPERSO OPERATING THE POWER STATION HAD BEEN GRADUALLY DECLINING.
EVERYBODY WHO WENT TO AES CONSTRUCTION SITES WAS IMPRESSED BY THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING ON SUCH CRUCIAL PROJECTS AS A HOST HIGH-EARNING PROJECT. WE HAD ALL THIS IN OUR HEADS AS INDIUVIDUAL EPISODES, BUT WHEN N.I.
RYZHKOV SAID THAT THE NUCLEAR POWER INDUSTRY HAD BEEN HEADING TOWARD CHERNOBYL I SAW BEFORE MY EYES THE ENTIRE PICTURE, I f
SPECIALISTS FROM MY OWN INSTITUTE WHO HAD DISPLAYED A VERY SPECIFIC, VERY CONVENTIONAL ATTITUDE TO EVERYTHING HAPPENING IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR POWER STATION CONSTRUCTION.
/02"'* BEGINNING OF TAKE 009 ******/
PEF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// POWER STATION CONSTRUCTION.
TEXT:
((TEXT)) BY VIRTUE OF MY CHARACTER I BEGAN TO STUDY THIS QUESTION MOPE CLOSELY AND ADOPT HORE ACTIVE STANCES IN SOME PLACES, SAYING THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS TO BE SAFER -- HIGH-TEMPERATURE GAS REACTORS OR A St.LT-WATER COOLED ((ZHIDKOSOLEVOY)) REACTOR.
THIS GENERATED AN EXCEPTIONAL STORM OF OUTRAGE; I WAS TOLD THAT THESE WERE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT THINGS, THAT I WAS AN INCOMPETENT PERSON AND WAS INTEREFERING IN SOMETHING I KNEW NOTHING ABOUT AND THAT THERE IS NO WAY YOU CAN CCMPARE ONE KIND OF REACTOR WITH ANOTHER.
THIS WAS THE COMPLEX SITUATION.
WORK WAS BEING QUIETLY DONE ON ALTERNATIVE fiEACTORS, IMPROVEHENTS WERE QUIETLY BEING MADE TO EXISTING ONES, BUT THE SADDEST THING WAS THAT THERE WAS NO POSSIBLE WAY TO ORGANIZE SERIOUS, OBJECTIVE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF THE REAL SITUATION, IDENTIFY THE ENTIRE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS, ANALYZE ALL THE l
POSSIBLE PROBLEMS, AND FIND THE WAY TO ELIMINATE THEM.
l THIS IS HOW EVERYTHING WAS DEVELOPING ON THE EVE OF THE CHERNOBYL EVENTS, WHILE THE NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES ENTRUSTED WITH THE MANUFACTURE OF VARIOUS NUCLEAR POWER STATION EQUIPMENT CCMPONENTS WAS INCREASING.
THEY STARTED TO BUILD ATOMMASH, AND MANY YOUNC PEOPLE APPEARED THERE.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PLANT UAS VERY UNSATISFACTORY.
THE QUALITY OF THE SPECIALISTS WHO WERE l
FACED WITH MASTERING THEIR PROFESSION LEFT A CPIAT DEAL TO BE DESIRED.
THIS WAS ALSO VISIBLE AT THE STATIONS.
UNCLASSIFIED
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AFTER 8tINMCHE2NOBfCZ'D127iu,unruutyvCAL"C0iiCLUSION:ThATg THE CERNOBYL ACCIDENT WAS TEl APOTHEOSIS,7TE. SUMMIT OP. ALL' INCORRCCT RUNNIN0 0F THE ECONONY WHICH HADfBEEN,00INQiON.LIN O COUNTRY FOR'MANT DECADES.3 THERE ARE NOT ABSTRACT BUT SPECIFIC CULPRITS TOR VRATRAPPENEff AT CHERNOBYL, OF COURSE.
WE NOW KNOW THAT TE REACTOR PROTECTION CONTROL SYSTEM WAS DEFECTIVE, AND F?OPOSALS WERE MADE ON HOW TO ELIMINATE THIS DEFECT.
NOT WISHING TO GET INVOLVED IN QdICK ADDITIONAL WORE, THE DESIGNER WAS IN NO l
HURRY TO CHANGE THE PROTECTION CONTROL SYSTEM.
WHAT HAPPENED AT I
THE CHERNOBYL POWER STATION }TSELF HAD BEEN 00ING ON FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS:
EXPERIMENTS WERE C ARRIED OUT THE PROGRAM FOR WHICH HAD BEEN DRAWN UP IN AN EXTREMELY NEGLIGENT AND UNTIDY WAY, THERE WERE NO REHEARSALS OF POSSIBLE SITUATIONS BEFORE THE EXPERIMENTS WERE CONDUCTED... THE DISREGARD FOR THE VIEWPOINT OF THE DESIGNER AND SCIENTIFIC LEADER WAS TOTAL, AND THE CORREECT FULFILLMENT OF ALL THE TECHNOLOGICAL PROCEDURES RAD TO BE FOUGHT FOR.
NO ATTENTION WAS PAID TO THE STATE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OR TE STATE OF EQUIPMENT BEFORE IT WAS TIME FOR PLANNfD PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE. ONE STATION DIRECTOR ACTUALLY SAID:
"WHAT ARE YOU WORRIED ABOUT7 A NUCLEAR REACTOR IS ONLY A SAMOVAR; IT'S MUCH SIMPLER THAN A HEAT STATION.
WE HAVE EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL, AND NOTHING WILL EVER HAPPEN."
WHEN YOU LOOK AT THE CHAIN OF EVENTS, AT WHY ONE PERSON ACTED IN THIS WAY WHILE ANOTHER ACTED IN THAT WAY, AND 50 FORTH, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO NAME A SINGLE GUILTY FERSON, THE INITIATOR OF THE EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE CRIME. BECAUSE IT IS PRECISELY A CLOSED CHAIN: THE OPERATOR 3 MADE 4 MISTAKE BECAUSE THEY WANTED WITHOUT FAIL TO COMPLETE THE EXP M MENT -- THEY CONSIDERED THIS A "MATTER OF HONOR"; THE PLAN FOR COCUCTING THE EXPERIMENT WAS DRAWN UP IN A VERY SUBSTANDARD AND UNDETAILED MANNER AND WAS NOT SANCTIONED BY THOSE SPECIALISTS WHO SHOULD HAVE SANCTIONED IT.
I KEEP IN MY SAFE A RECORD OF THE OPERATORS' TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS ON TE EVE OF THE ACCIDENT.
IT MAKES YOUR FLESH CREEP WHEN YOU PIAD SUCH RECORDS.
ONE OPERATOR TELEPH;NED ANOTHER AND ASKED:
"THE PROGRAM ERE STATES WHAT MUST BE DONE, BUT THEN A GREAT DEAL HAS BEEN CROSSED OUT, SO WHAT AM I TO D07" HIS INTERLOCUTOR THOUGHT FOR A MCMENT, THEN SAID:
"ACT ACCCRDING TO WHAT HAS BEEN CROSSED OUT."
THIS WAS THE STANDARD OF PREPARATION OF SERIOUS DOCUMENTS AT A PT;0 JECT SUCH AS A NUCLEAR STATION:
SOMEONE HAD CROSSED SOMETHING OUT, AND THE OPERATOR MIGHT INTERPRET CORRECTLY OR INCORRECTLY WHAT HAD BEEN CROSSED OUT AND PERFORM ARBITRARY ACTIONS.
THE WHOLE WEIGHT OF THE BLAME CANNOT BE SHIFTED ONTO THE OPERATOR BECAUSE SOMEONE DREW UP THE PLAN AND CROSSED SOMETHING OUT, SOMEONE SIGNED IT, AND SOMEONE DID NOT AGREE IT.
THE VERY FACI ""!AT STATION PERSONNEL COULD INDEPENDENTLY CARRY OUT SOME ACTIONS NOT SANCTIONED BY PROFESSIONALS IS A FLAW IN THE PROFESSIONALS' RELATIONS WITH THIS STATION.
THE FACT THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE SUPERVISION OF SAFE WORKING PRACTICES IN THE ATCHIC POWER INDUSTRY WERE PRESENT AT THE STATION BUT WERE NOT APPRISED OF THE EXPERIMENT BEING CONDUCTED OR OF THE PROGRAM IS NOT ONLY A FACT OF THE STATION'S BIOGRAPHY...
LET US RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO THE CHERNOBYL EVENTS, FROM WHICH I HAVE STRAYED SO FAR.
THE AIR FORCE AND HELICOPTER GROUPS WORKED VERY EFFICIENTLY.
THIS WAS AN EXAMPLE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF UNCLASSIFIED
ORGANIZATION. ' SCORNING ALL DANGER, ALL THE CREWS STROVE ALWAYS TO FULFILL THE MIS 3 IONS, NO MATIER HOW HARD AND COMPLEI THIS MISSION
.WAS.
THEY HAD A PARTICULARLY HARD TIME DURING THE FIRST DAYS.
THE ORDER WAS ISSUED TO FILL SANDBAGS.
FOR SOME REASON TE LOCAL AUTHORITIES WERE UNABLE AT ONCE TO ORGANIZE A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF PEOPLE TO PREPARE THE BAGS AND PREPARE THE SAND.
I SAW WITH MY OWN-EYES HOW CREWS AND YOUNG OFFICERS LOADED SANDBAGS INTO HELICOPTERS, FLEW OFF, DROPPED THEM ONTO THE TARGET, RETURNED ONCE AGAIN, AND CAR' IED OUT THIS JOB ONCE AGAIN.
UNLESS MY MEMORY BETRAYS ME, R
THESE WERE THE FIGURES: TENS OF TONNES WERE DROPPED DURING THE FIRST 24 HOURS, THEN HUNDREDS OF TONNES WERE DROPPED DURING THE
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SECOND AND THIRD 24-HOUR PERIODS, AND, FINALLY, MAJOR GENERAL _
ANTOSHKIN REPORTED IN THE EVENING THAT 1,100 TONNES OF MATERIALS HAD BEEN DROPPED D'JRING ONE 24-HOUR PERIOD.
BY 2 MAY THE REACTOR HAD PRACTICALLY BEEN STOPPED UP, AND FROM THAT TIME THE OVERALL RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE REACTOR'S BELLY DIMINISHED APPRECIABLY.
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REF:
MOSCOW PRAVDA RUSSIAN 20 MAY/// BELLY DIMINISHED APPRECIABLY.
TEXT:
((TEXT))
...AT SOME TIME ON 9 MAY IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE NO.
4 REACTOR UNIT HAD S'IVPPED BREATHING, BURNING, AND LIVING.
IT WAS OUTWARDLY QUIET, AND ON VICTORY DAY WE WANTED TO CELEBRATE THAT DAY, '
IN THE EVENING.
BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS ON JUST THAT DAY THAT A SMALL BUT BRIGHTLY SHINING CRIMSON SPOT WAS DETECTED WITHIN THE NO.
4 REACTOR UNIT -- WHICH INDICATED THAT THE TEMPERATURE WAS STILL HIGH.
IT WAS HARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WAS THE PARACHUTES WHICH HAD BEEN USED TO DROP LEAD AND OTHER MATERIALS THAT WERE BURNING.
IN MY VIEW, THAT.WAS VERY UNLIKELY, AND IT WAS MOST PROBABLY AN INCANDESCENT MASS OF SAND, CLAY, AND EVERYTHING THAT HAD BEEN THROWN ON.
THE FESTIVAL WAS SPOILED, AND A DECISION WAS ADOPTED TO INTRODUCE AN ADDITIONAL 80 TONNES OF LEAD INTO THE REACTOR CRATER.
AFTER THAT THE LUMINESCENCE CEASED, AND WE CELEBRATED VICTORY DAY IN A CALMER ATMOSPHERE 10 MAY.
EVEN THEN, DURING THOSE DIFFICULT DAYS, WE WERE IN WHAT SEEMED A PARADOXICALLY ELATED MOOD.
IT WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE FACT THAT WE WERE ATTENDING THE ELIMINATION OF SUCH A TRAGIC EVENT.
THE TRAGIC ELEMENT WAS THE BASIC BACXCROUND AGAINST WHICH EVERYTHING WAS HAPPENING.
BUT A CERTAIN ELATION WAS CREATED BY THE WAY PEOPLE WOTJCED, HOW QUICKLY THEY RESPONDED TO OUR REQUESTS, AND HOW QUICKLY VARIOUS ENGINEERING OPTIONS WERE COMPUTED, WHILE WE WERE THERE, ON THE SPOT, STARTING TO COMPUTE THE FIRST OPTIONS FOR CONSTRUCTING THE DOME OVER THE DEVASTATED REACTOR UNIT...
ADMIN (ENDALL) 20 MAY UNCLASSIFIED
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