ML20150B080

Comment Opposing Proposed Rule 10CFR50 Re Emergency Planning & Preparedness Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Fuel Loading & Initial Low Power Operations.Changes Would Significantly Weaken Level of Public Protection

ML20150B080
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/23/1988
From:	Richardson D EMPLOYEE'S LEGAL PROJECT
To:	NRC
References
FRN-53FR16435, RULE-PR-50 53FR16435-01575, 53FR16435-1575, NUDOCS 8807110259
Download: ML20150B080 (10)

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THE PACKING BOX TEL No.617308dddl Jun 23.88 11:22 No.001 P.02

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'D' OPOSED RULE -- -

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PR(f3 FR /W3Q UNITED FFATES OF AMERICA 1

% M/k g NUCLEAR REGULATCET COGGSSION Proposed Rule: 10 CFR Part 50 ) oEGca ofSmt /gg k W'g Energency Pleaning and Preparedness

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90b.% 7 df4M fet Fredoeties and Utilisaties )

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l Dr.4YIt'8 LEGAL PROJECT CODNENT8 Introduction The 0.8. Nuclear Regulatory constission has issued s propeeed rule

• to establish more clearly what energency plaaming and preparedness requineents

. are needed for fuel leading and lowr power operatten of soclear power plaats?"

N proteced rule weald amedd 10 CFR %.47. N practical effset of the pre.

posed ru5e would be to replace the cesaltaent made by tne Cosmaission, in the preamble te its rule M.47 (d) issued July 13, 1962, to review certain aspects of the applicaat'< 'Isite plans cited in Sectien 2.47(b)(3),(5),(6),(8),(9),

(12), tand (15), limitaties of the CeamissLes's review to ealy those aspects of the applicant's emerlency plemming and preparedness which would support as easite emergency reopease, cited in the proposed rule as M.47(d)(1) ,

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It is the censidered posities of the Employee's Legal Project that the pro-peeed rule weald significantly weaksa the level of protecties of the public health and safety provided under the Ceamissioe's current eastgency plamains review peliay; that the level of. protection provided urAer current Commission policy serves 19 unet a valid need to ensure ,the public saf.ety, bo);h as 4

.8*seric iseos and specifically with' ragard tm 4e4 brook Station; and that the Coeudasies's proposed rule is inappropriate under these cipecastaa:es, M

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I. Tha Procesed knie Would Stanificantly Weaken the Current Invei_ of fretecties of the public4aelth and Safeity.

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The rule as issued in 1MO did met differestiete be.tvoes low power sed fall I power licencias, se naarde eenrsency pisanias and propendness. Ignea th cesadselen issued its gevised rule in 1M2, altheosh the consissies ruled that prier to issuing a low power license it would be rehired to review eely tha applicaat's easiH plane, it said in the rule preeable that it would at that time review the aspects of the applicast's plans cited to 50,47(b), this stated coenitanat la effect established an esorgency plamaing/preparodotes review prec-tice for les power licensing which has beam followed free that time satil the preeest, imeludies evaluation of the following aspects of offsite plasmies

,, which relate directly te ,the proteetles of the public health and safetyr

- arrangensats for identifying sad stilising assistance researces '(50.47(b)(3)).

astificatles ei respenee erskg:atiens sad peroesnel ,(50,47(4)(5)).

. early notification and imetraction of the peblic (50.47 @)(5)).

- eeumusications emees roepenee organisations, pereeeeel and the public' (50.47 ())(6)).  ;

- in-use monitoring of actual er potential offsite ceneequences (50.47(b)(9)).

- previstes of emergency feetilties and equipment (50.47(b)(8)).

- arrangesents for medical care for-contamiaated injured pereess(50.47(b)(13)).

radielegical energency treir.iag for assistias perseenal (50.47(b)(15)).

The aspects of et.feteacpastsency plameias which an included in the Ceumis-stea's entreat. review policy are precteely these which provide, at a minimum, a mechaatse td enable the identificat es of, and developeemt withis a reasen-able time of a reopease te, potential threets to, the public health sad esfety.

Na must assume that this das inteaded by .the Commission to address a specifically

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actu t construction gustity. la these circumethaces it is not yet established i .

that the level of pnteetles afforded by the eestalassat is as high as may b

' assumed by the Coentastem.

The aheve factere usy sentrikte negatively to the third exted by the Coenis-S siest that enough time wed1d be available te mitigate accident coesequences. 0 Operator errors, equipasst esfacts, and unevallable er less capahls safety sye.

tear esa work, sigly or cellectinly, to rekee the ties available to mitigate the ceasequences of as accident.

, la ' light of the aben, circumstances, ELF don 81deitf'th5 Mt#di Mik to tha pt1.14 from low power operation of Seabrook to be significantly greater them thesCesmission a,'asames as a generie conditten. Any relaxaties etths surrent policy would therefers be inappropriate, i A.

N Ceamieston's preeeeed kule Is Iseeerspriate.

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In the Federal Register metico gf t) propeoed rule, the Commissies ststes 1

that tha basis for the 19,62 rule change, which established the current rule and the eCennission's stated policy of reviewing this specified aspects of offsite plasmias,

"...was the Consissies's estermination that the degree of emergemey planaiag and preparedescs necessary te provies adequate pr6tecties of the public health ** and safety is sigstficantly less them that' required for full power oper-I ation...." Furthermore, the Oeemission states that "...the Commissies reevaluated

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delianted level of risk judged to be present in low power operaties, Under the proposed rule, however, review by the Cosmaissies of these offeite F

plakaiag aspects would be ustricted solely to their previskne for assistance by offsite esencies in the event of an easite emergency, with no review as to the capability or availability of the subject agencies, perseamel, procedores, er equipment to perform say of the functions cited in the current rule which any hacena necessary to pntact the baalth and safety of the public effsite.

N sete esceptione are the notification of response organisations by the 11 consee, and the availability monitoring methode and systems, both of whicha@

weakened by the propeeed ru1,e.

The limitaties of nyiew contained in the proposal would effectively remove any assurance that civil authorities in the area surrounding the plant would have available to them the manpower, communicstionsffacilities and pre-i l

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cedures, traiains, or medical er emergency facilicio er equipeast in piece l to respeed to as incidest having actual or potaatial offsite cessequences, if g one should occur, N Cesmissies maintains that enough time would be available l

to orgaalse and carry eut such a reopense in the absence of these provisions, citing a worst case time period of can hours avellable for precautionary actions to be taken, Decent experience would indicate that this conclusion is not accurate. A fin at the Johnees Chemicals varabeuse in Seabrook, ER,,

ocestring in early spring 1934, nquin4:the evacuation of fewer than ene l

l hundred people from a notShboring trailer park, Despite the esa11dise.4f hthe l'

evacuation effort required, sad the f act that only sea local jurisdicties was inwired, the incident devaleped into a cesfused leadership situaties whieb eegendered a series of destradictory instructions to the reatdeuts. N ene-unties process teek ese to two hours to complete. ELP f f Ws it tacredible that

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the Ceemission states that the safety;of a potentially many tiens larger pop-ulaties can be massaably assund without, at thei least, wrifying the previs-ion of adequate aschanisms and equipsont for N censuaicaties and eeerdisaties of the local public safety authorities.

The proposal would furtberare rescind any requirement that an emergency notificaties system be in place prior to low power licensing. As with the other aspects of offsite plaaming, N Ceemdssion la 1962 committed itself to aview.

ing h satabitshmast of such a system, h Ceessissients justification for rescinding this Nguireatst is of insOfficient merit.

It has not been establishedp not even argued by the Ceumissies, that the risk to tbs pubite which voeld necessitate the previsisu of a notification system has abated sinec 1M2. In f act, the oppeaita is true. W Csemissies states is its original tule that a major f acter in this requiremskt, if not the only facter, is the prettation of panic among the public if as incident were to I occur during low power operaties. Since that time, publicity about W

. Chernobyl accident has increased the concera of N semeral public for their potential danger in the event of any incident. This was brought to E1.p!s I

attentiemby the tesetion to sa incident at Seabrook in February 1987 is which

. a centainment airlock valve malfunctioned, and amether shortly af terward in which steam was released free safety valves at the plant. These events them-selves furNr increased public fears abwt the reliability of the Seabroek f acility. Beth events caused a great deal of cesfusion and concern among the public: Seabroek police received somerous calls aheat the ascend event. It was known at the time that the plant was met operatias. If an incident were to occur while the plant was known to be operating, even at les power, with no provision for immediate mass broadcasting of reliable informatten - which only

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JHE, PACKING BOX' TEL No.6173884d41 Jun 23.88 11:22 No.001 P.07 a esatralised system each se the seabnek sires and prepared massages system  :

.1 eesid he espected to pewide . the result would inevitably be shoes.

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.__ De Level of Protection Provided Under current -

_ _ _s_ sion Polier Serves to that a Talid Reed.~ '

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Is its metice of the propeeed rule the Cownissies acknowledges that is low power operaties inexpertoaced operater* ~'ay 20ce more mistakes, and that there is a seseter pe ential for sadiscovet.'d defects to manifest themselves. As regards BeahM, the Crea'.ssion's admewl%dgsucht is retafereed by recent 20 A ties reports. As umgee. ELP wistee to site the following:

- light est of f!f teen licensee Event Reports oespiled in the latent,$sabrook

$ ALP own des to operator errorf W fin to defective cometraction er coupe *.

nests, musindiested that the rate of operator errors and luk of stteatten to detail in operaties were subjects of eencert. Fine of thd fifteen 1 W e precipitated Engineered safety Feetsne eetuattees.

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Of particular concers te ILP is the proposed modificati,em of the current N

) 50.47(b)(9) requirement for poetisieme for monitorias offsite comoegoences from "in mee" to 'available." his modificaties has the potential to casos delay I in the identification of an eetual o'r potential hasard to the public stenaies I

frwe a redfelegical osargency. Seabroek opersying perseasel have, during as 4

l .' Desenal great on Feb. 11, 1987, and a f a&1ure of the centrol room ventilation inelatten equipment in oprius IM7, and assia in sa emersaaey preparedness drill on Dec. 1.5, 1987, failed repeatedly to identify conditions requiring beightensd awaressestefootegylegv&powerfpeeferunace,,and to take appr=priate eetiene.

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It siwald be noted that the Dec. 15,1984 esercise was specifically designed to demonstrate that thsee falleros of awareases had been corrected, yet the eser-

stee centre 11ers had to prompt staties perdessel to take acties la order to

• t istfill their p omario, Seabrook has yet te demonstrate that its peteennel ,

can be depended 'en to prouptly recognise when ass-rootias measures to tasure the publid safety need te he takaa. ,la. Itsht of hkis cireamstance, ELF attently recounnada that the current requirement that asaltering progrene and systems he "in use" set he modified as propeeed. ,

- Through IM7 a series of ficiencies and malfweetiene of the Centrol Bail-dias Air Bandling lystes eere identified, which prevented the system fres fulfilling ice safety fsnetiens. These were feeed when the system failed in use. A nejer redesign is pionned af ter low power testing.

- Nough 1987 a series of deficiencias and malfunctions were identihted in the Beergemey Feedvetor eystem and shrtup feedweter pway. N eo were feoed when the equipeest fai? perform adequately in testing. My were addressed by system modificatis A relaxaties of seceptsace criteria., 'EFW is a safety system; the SOFF serves as a backup EFW peop. .

- N Primary Ceepenamt Cooling Water heat enchagers were manufentured to a '

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'eenfisoraties whicEau'edtM oroetes of its-tebing 'te the extent that 2/3c4f ,

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• It'of the tubes in een, and a like amount in the other', had to be repaired.

af ter het fumettesal testins. b faulty eenfisvrettes esamet be cerroeted des te speca , limitations; thus tube erestem will centinos. This is a safety system. ,

Seabroek has hoes trylag staco 1985 te gorrect deterioratias seats la a group of valves, identified due to in-service entfonettene. It has met yet been esteh-liehod whethat the latest repair techatque will withstand service. These are seed LisafeEy systems.

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1a as och as the sited tastenoes, fless with eWrs, demonstrate Nt opr,et1,as ,

perseemel errors and sodioceverId defects are met spoeulative het rather actual econe 3s, & Ceemissien should assign taeressed weight tis these fasters in deteralaing W risks of low power operation,

'N Cecisaise cites in oppeetties to the abess achaowledsenesta three facters which it statas reduce & risks of kov power operaties. ,

The first etted is the fact Nt fission product inesatory is miniasi. This is rebutted by W Oslen of Concera*4 Scientists in commaats or, the 1962 rule chasse.

The seceed fatter cited is the f act tk e safety systems are met required to provide N'ir'fv11 capacity at low power. rtrwould again cite the 1982 008 causesta as robottal. In particular E1.P wisces te oeement en the tuplicit assumy.

ties that these systems would he evallable as moeded, part of the propes4d testias would involve the dafsat of certain systems in order to ageess &

perforusses of others. Bowever, incidents such as bos cited in ELP's discus-

, sien of wadioeevered defects densmetrats ht there is' a oeseiderable degree of unreliability la the availability of Maat safety systems.

' As sa spangle, ELP si,tes s 'oerijs of failurse is operaties of ea r:Ma of the service water, primary component cooling, and resietal heat reaeval kystems, ,

T*6ehr these systems serve W foncties of coelius a member of eafety eesposeats is operaties, and alae of removal af' decay heat from b roseter eere.I

- i It 14 aseemed by E12 that they will be required to be operdble to support law i

power teettag, and sabeequest plant coeldova. As cited ahevo, in W past year both PCCW heat exshangers han required repair as well as a group of pit valves.

A154,cemiE RR eystem has f ailed dee(te ereeked welde, and both RR pomys how

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.-' j repind repair as has a PCOW check valw, Because of the interniated' fumetiens of thsee systems, and the tinies with

. which those failuna have occurfed, sees instsacas how dowleted where the ,

has been deprived of the availabilicy of both treine of the Pccr er tem systems

,' siwsitaaseusly. In coping with these ocevrrences, the plas't' has had to oesplete repairs te one trala of a system befete any availability could be restered, and '

in ses easette est4bitbh a highly sedsul and emeralmated coalisuratten involving various components of tise tesias of the 700W, Raa, and centstammet seeling systems is ordar to provide a sisteue available m fsacties.

What is of particular sencera te ILP is that 8sabzwek Ladicated to NRC staff that it would perfefs similar actions in t'ha future as it felt wars desirdle

. te its perpeces, imelodies dering operatien when there are no great ameoste of

' decay heat prosest. Thid voeld preseably include low power operation. This '

r indicates to ELP that the plant anticipates terthar problems with the availability of safety systems, and is attempting to swid cessittius'itos!f to providing '

evallability of all repired safety systems spea which approval of its operaties had haea predicated, lac staff hs.s met yet decided whether this positica is acceptable. la RLP's judgensat each actives cM1d Ledrasse risks to the public associated,with the plast's .,

operaties, ELF wesid aloe mots, aEdgered.O #eabreek contatsnaat latogrity, that it has handled allegattees conceraits impwper wantreeties and oeecute orcking in

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the containment beilding; and that unreselnd items identif'ied by 20 in iswati '

gaties of eescrete goalitys11gutione %ect thru safety stuctures have met yet A.

i been closed est. la toatimesy beF m tbe new aampektre lieuse Ceemdttee se science, Techselegy and Easygy, Jr, Richard Wilson'steted that tbs probabilistic risk usesensat fort scabW had been hamed on the centaimmaat osatsu, met its k .

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.. I 10 and sees no reason to doubt the safety rationale stated by the Coassistion in promulgating its 1962 wie."

In fonulattag the 1962 rule, the Commission does not arlos that rf.dk to the public free low power operation is absent. Rather, the Commission's astablished policy of review of the specified aspects of offsite planning wesid appear to recognise the presence of a definite, albeit possibly reduced, risk to the public. Nor does the Commission argue now that the risk to tha public from low power operation has lessened. Indeed, ELP contends, as :is.deseribed.-

abeve*, that the risk to the public from low power pperation at Seabeook is greater than acknowledged by the Commission.

The Coussission, in its notice of proposed rulemaking, fails to provide any justification based upon abated risk to the public for relaxing its current emergency preparedness review policy for low power licensing, In the absence I

of such justification, iELP..ishab<< concluded that. the attrib 4tes of the offsite energsacy plans which the Commisaies coussittad itself to reviewing in the presable of its 1962 rule must still be reviewed for adequacy prior to the '

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issuance of a low power license for Seabrook er any other nuclear power plant tu order to maintain the prueent level of protection of the public health and safety which the current rule and rwiew policy prwide.

DATED:

g jg Respectf ally esbetitted, h .Dousias E. Richh (rdson &

. Researcher Employee's 143al Projoct P.O. Bot 633 Amesbury, Ma. 01913

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