ML20149H797
| ML20149H797 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Westinghouse |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1997 |
| From: | Gaskin C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Weber M NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9707250190 | |
| Download: ML20149H797 (7) | |
Text
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8 dl UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION M'
4' WASHINGTON. D.C. 20666-0001 o
+9. m.,o July 23,1997 MEMORANDUM T0:
Michael F. Weber. Chief Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards. NMSS THRU:
Mary T. Adams. Section Chief Licensing Section l' Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards. NMSS fd [
FROM:
Charles E. Gaskin Licensing Section Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards. NMSS
SUBJECT:
TRIP REPORT - WESTINGHOUSE COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL DIVISION APRIL 15 THROUGH 17, 1997 Members of the Fuel Cycle Licensing Branch visited the Westinghouse Commercial Fuel Divisions * (WCFD) site in Columbia. South Carolina, on April 15 through
- 17. 1997, for the purpose of site familiarization, technical discussions regarding Criticality Safety Analysis, and general licensing issues. contains the list of attendees at the various meetings held during this period.
Site Familiarization Tours of the site were conducted by the WCFD technical staff.
Members of the NRC staff were able to discuss in detail areas of specific interest to them.
-The tour started at the UF cylinders and ended with the final product and the environmental interfaces. 6 Criticality Safety Analysis After the tour some members of the NRC staff returned to headquarters while the rest engaged the WCFD staff in technical discussions on the status of the ongoing review of the Criticality Safety Analysis submittals being made by Westinghouse as a follow-on to the license renewal.
These discussions were fruitful and progress was made in resolving several technical issues. contains a discussion of the criticality issues.
'Ob,I 9707250196 970723 1i PDR ADOCK 07001151
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PDR NRC atECEMIER COPY i
. Michael F. Weber 2
Dry Conversion Production Line The dry conversion production line was also toured toward the end of the visit.
This line has been inoperable for about two years.
The purpose of this tour was to discuss with WCFD the future of t51s production line and the possibility of decontamination in the near future This was in keeping with the current NRC position that sites no longer ir use should be decommissioned and released for general use.
In the case of the dry conversion production line the current decommission rules would not apply since the line is under the safe roof of the current operational production line.
Missina Fuel Rods The portion of the production line associated with the missing fuel rods was also toured. This was a preliminary examination of that portion of the production line for information purposes only.
Concerns WCFD is in the process of reacting to market forces.
This has caused changes in personnel, consolidation of management oversight and training burdens.
The NRC can expect a period of some adjustment as WCFD re-calibrates its program.
This' has and may continue to be manifested as break downs in procedures and training.
I asked WCFD if they have had a recent quality assurance review examining their procedures and general license commitments.
I was advised that their quality assurance program has examined the production and safety program but not the regulatory and licensing commitments.
(As a project manager I find this somewhat strange since I would have equated regulatory and licensing commitments with safety.) WCFD advised they would discuss the possibility of having their quality assurance program examine the licensing and procedural commitments.
Conclusions WCFD personnel were cooperative and helpful in assisting NRC staff in the understanding of site operations.
The technical exchange was professional, and mutual cooperation assured that there would be positive results from addressing the technical issues. The NRC staff appreciates WCFD assistance and forbearance in accommodating the NRC staff on this tour.
Attachment:
Attendee List cc:
Mr. Robert A. Williams Safeguards Coordinator Westinghouse Electric Corporation Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division Drawer R Columbia. South Carolina 29250 Distribution Docket 70-1151 PUBLIC NRC File Center Region II FCLB R/F FCSS R/F NMSS R/F CBassett, RII SChotoo CHrabal
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LMichadl F. Weber 2
J Dry Conversion Production Line The dry conversion production line was also toured toward the end of the j'
visit. This line' has been inoperable for about two years. The purpose of this tour was to discuss with 4CFD the future of this production line and the 4
possibility of decontamination in the near future.
This was in keeping with i
~ the current NRC position that sites no longer in use should be decommissioned and released for aeneral use.
In the case of the dry conversion production f
line the current decom:nissioning rules would not apply, since the line is under the same roof as the current operational production line.
J Missina Fuel Rods a
The portion of the production line associated with the missing fuel rods was i
also toured. This was a preliminary examination of that portion of the i
production li.ne for information purposes only.
Concerns WCFD is in the process of reacting to market forces.
This has caused changes j
in personnel, consolidation of management oversight. and training burdens.
The.NRC can expect a period of some adjustment as WCFD re-calibrates its program. This has and may continue to be manifested as break downs in procedures and training.
I asked WCFD if they have had a recent quality 4
l assurance review examining their procedures and general license commitments.
I was advised that their Quality Assurance Program has examined the production and safety program but not the regulatory and licensing commitments.
(As a project manager I find this somewhat strange.since I would have equated regulatory and licensing commitments with safety.) WCFD advised they would discuss the possibility of having their Quality Assurance Program examine the licensing and procedural commitments.
Conclusions F
F
'WCFD personnel were cooperative und helpful in assisting NRC staff in the
[
understanding of site operations.
The technical exchange was professional.
i and mutual cooperation assured that there would be positive results from i
addressing the technical issues. The NRC staff appreciates WCFD assistance and forbearance in accommodating the NRC staff on this tour.
Attachment:
Attendee List I
cc:
Mr. Robert A. Williams l
Safeguards Coordinator.
i Westinghouse Electric Corporation 4
Commercial Nuclear Fuel Division i
Drawer R j
Columbia. South Carolina 29250 L
4
l 3
WESTINGHOUSE COMMERCIAL FUEL DIVISION LICENSING VISIT ATTENDEE LIST APRIL 15-17, 1997 Charles E. Gaskin 301 415-8116 CEGl@NRC. GOV Tommy Shannon 808 726 2610 x 3672
.Craig Hrabal 301 415 5424 CAH1@NRC. GOV Jim Fici 803 776-2610 x 3300 ficiga@ westinghouse.com Robert A. Williams 803 776-2610 x 3393 williara@ westinghouse.com j
Ed Quarterman 803 776-2610 x 3563 Jim Heath 803 776-2610 x 3415 heathjm@ westinghouse.com Jim McCormac 803 776-2610 x 3566 mccormrj@ westinghouse.com Nancy Parr 803 776-2610 x 3338 Parr@ westinghouse.com Wilbur L. Goodwin 803 776-2610 x 3282 goodwiwr@ westinghouse.com Michael Weber 301 415-7110 MFW@NRC. GOV Monica McLaughlin 301 415-7190 MLH2@NRC. GOV Mary T. Adams 301 415 7249 MTA@NRC. GOV Bob Henry 301 776-2610 x 3272 Normon Kent 803 776-2610 x 3552 kenta@ westinghouse.com 1
ATTACHMENT 1
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CRITICALLY DISCUSSION Craig Hrabal of FCLB met with Westinghouse staff (Richard Montgomery and Norman Kent) to discuss several licensing issues with regards to nuclear
. criticality safety. These issues included the following:
1.
Definition of the K,,, limit in Section 6.4.3(a). "K,,, Limit." of the License.
2.
Definition of the Criticality Safety Basis and its tabulation in Section 6.2.3. " Table of Plant Systems.and Parametric Controls." of the License, and 3.
Understanding of information to be included in CSE/CSA submittals and interim review process of these submittals before implementation of the formal ISA process.
These are discussed in the following sections.
1.
Definition of the K,,, limit in Section 6.4.3(a)
Currently. Section 6.4.3(a), "K,,, Limit.".of the license states the following:
Validated comouter analytical methods will be utilized to evaluate individual vessels or Dotential vessel interaction.
The comouted K_
l
-fornormalooeratinaconditionsandexoectedorocessuosetswillbe'Tess than or eaual to 0.95 includina aoolicable biases and calculational uncertainties.
Credible operatina conditions include conditions exoected to be encountered durina routine coerations.
3rocess uosets.
and credible accident situations.
The sensitivity of (ev Darametes With resoect to the effect on K will be evaluated for each system such thatadeactesystemcontrbTsaredefinedfortheanalyzedsystem.
The NRC staff has problems with this section in that the K,,, ingle contingency limit is not described for credible process upsets that could lead to a s (thus leaving only one contingency before possibly having a criticality).
Discussions and negotiations between NRC and Westinghouse staff resulted in the following proposed text for Section 6.4.3(a):
Validated cornputer analytical methods will be used to calculate the K,,,
for systems with individual vessels or potential vessel interaction. ~
l Based on the results of these calculations, the sensitivity of key K
(
ensure that controls defined for the anal,, will be evaluated to parameters with respect to the effect on / zed system demonstrate a
'l 1
sufficient margin of safety. With respect to normal operating conditions and expected process upsets, there will be a sufficient margin of safety to ensure that the calculated K will be s 0.95.
g ATTACFWNT 2
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including applicable biases and calculational uncertainties.
With respect to credible process-upsets that could lead to a single contingency, there will be a sufficient margin of safety to ensure that the calculated K based on these parameters will be < 1.0. including applicable biases,,,and calculational uncertaintles. For those single contingencies that could lead to a K
> 0.95, the margin of safety below a K
'of 1.0 will be demonstraYed to the NRC before process
-implementW$ ion.
This text introduces the demonstration of the margin of safety required for normal' operating conditions and ex)ected process upsets after a single contingency has occurred. Althougl Westinghouse will still be allowed, as in the previous License renewal, to go above a K of 0.95 for credible process upsets that could lead to a single contingency,,the NRC staff will have the opportunity to review these situations before process implementation to ensure a sufficient margin of safety exists.
Westinghouse plans to reflect the changes in Section 6.4.3(a) in a forthcoming License amendment.
2.
Definition of the Criticality Safety Basis and its tabulation in Section 6.2.3 Currently, Section 6.2.3, " Table of Plant Systems and Parametric Controls,"
contains the following:
CRITICALITY SAFETY BASIS: The carameters utilized within the CSE or CSA for defense of nuclear criticality safety for -identified PROCESS OR E_0VIPMENT items.
When multiole entries are Dresent. this means that the defense within the CSE or CSA may be based on either oarameter as aoorooriate.
The NRC staff has problems with this definition in that the CSEs may require both parameters together for defense of nuclear' criticality safety.
Discussions and negotiations between NRC and Westinghouse staff resulted in the following proposed text for Section 6.2.3:
CRITICALITY SAFETY BASIS: At the time of issue of this table. the parameters listed for a given processlequipment are those upon which double contingency protection is based.
(That is, If two parameters are listed. then both are used to provide double contingency prntection; if only one parameter is listed, it alone is used.) Double contingency protection is specified and described in the CSE/CSA.
The following provisions apply for modifications to the Criticality Safety Basis for a given process / equipment:
l
_.. ~
.=
[.
3 e Where more than one parameter is-listed in the table. the licensee may modify the CSE/CSA and use only one of the.
\\
e parameters for double contingency protection.
If the resulting i
margin of safety is not decreased as shown by sensitivity calculations in the CSE/CSA no license amendment is required.
1 If the resulting margin of safety is decreased, the licensee will seek a license amendment prior to implementation.
\\
)
e If a parameter not specifled in the table is used to provide double contingency protection, the licensee will seek 'a license l
amendment prior to imlementation.
This-text ensures that the table in Section 6.2.3 reflects the CSE/CSA while also allowing for changes in controls or controlled parameters that do not
^
decrease the margin of safety.
Westinghouse plans to reflect the changes in Section 6.2.3 in a forthcoming i
license amendment.
l 3.
CSE/CSA submittals and their interim revka before implementation of the i
formal ISA precess.
Current Westinghouse CSE/CSA submittals do not have enough information for NRC staff to adequately review.
In addition. NRC is concerned that most information is not docketed and-is only available for review on-site. As a
.b result of these concerns. the response to the RAI of January 2. 1997. will include the-following commitments by Westinghouse:
1.
Non-proprietary portions of Section 1 (Process Description) and Section 5 (Safety Analysis) of the CSE will be provided to the NRC for docketing, 2.
NRC will be notified of revised CSEs due to control or parameter changes i
before implementation of the formal ISA process. dnd 3.
Westinghouse will keep the table in Section 6.2.3 current for onsite review by.NRC reviewers and inspectors.
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