ML20149F255
| ML20149F255 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/20/1987 |
| From: | Cuthbertson B, Nigg J ARIZONA STATE UNIV., TEMPE, AZ, ST. VINCENT'S MEDICAL CENTER OF RICHMOND STATEN |
| To: | |
| References | |
| OL-I-COMM-007, OL-I-COMM-7, NUDOCS 8802120125 | |
| Download: ML20149F255 (14) | |
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Cuthbertson. N.gg / D 3A31ER AND THE COMuuNiTY 43
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7Of Y y'[.kU A number of researchers have discussed the amergence of f _ {b //y - a therapeutic cornmunity followir*g a natural disaster.
Variably conceptualized as a social utopia (Fritz,1961), a E8 FEB -2 A8 27 post-disaster utopia (Wolfenstein,1957; Taylor et al.,1970).
or an altruistic community (Barton 1969), tha therapeutic r co-c ~ ~' .- community provides the victims of natural disasters with ir . ' " ; >.
R
' important demonstrations of playsical and emotional sup-port and creates within lite stricken community an ambi-TECHNOLOGICAL DISASTER AND THE ence of solidarity and unity of purpose essential for begin-ning the process of disaster recovery. Feelings of loneliness NONTHERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY are replaced with camaraderie; *eelings of despair over A Question of True Victimization iosses are shared and supplanted with communal hope for a return to normalcy.
O Technological disasters, like natural disasters, may have serious emotional as well as physical consequences for B EVERLEY H. CUTHBERTSON. ,s currearsy compsermg aa mterasnep sa d>= cad == door as se voc.ar s uoso, ear. oepsismeat of esrctua8'r. N'" Yo'* their victims. As the nature of chemical hazards became ner iesearch muerorus sue the socoosogv oremotoons. disaster stud *es. aad chmc a, pubhcly known at Love Canal, for example
- residents felt anger, frustration, and fear (Gibbs.1983). And,in the days Iollowing the accidental emission of radiation at Three Mile JO ANNE M. NIGG .3 currently 8he oe'ec80' oH'* O"'c' 0'Ha'a'd8 S'"d**
' ' Island, many residents reported considerable stress (Flynn.
ua,.e,s s ved a h*3 'd5 '*5. cn e, ,"[e,"esea,c . 1982). Certainly, such experiences demonstrate that those p,o,ec,s su... tocused on no. md, .dus's mad commu'w'**8 d* *'oP P8'cepisoas exposed to environmentally hazardous agents have iden- '
os naia,a enseas assess insa. =ad sospoad to thos* a55*55**a'8 tified Ihemselves as disaster victims whose health and welfare have been jeopardized.
Aus T H Ac i T rw isnponance of a trwragwul.c commund y has bomi pmgmsso es a The occurrence of such technologically hazardous situ-us ui mm. nan. san ior o.mcom.ng irw irauma and siress apmenced by cus:
..a.ms in.s an.o. rev.e.s the ongm. components. mao app 8acateas o' "* ations raises an interesting question: Does a therapeutic u.e,apeui.c comm..nay concepi son naionai ossasim muahuas T r= qeeshoa is community develop to provide emotional support and
,a.seo .nen e. sucn a mect n.sm emmaes n eesponw oomi woanr=atas haemos practical assistance for technological disaster victims?
on , n. .ap.o onsei. nsimas o sssim genis us.g case siuor osis trosn e.o This question was addressed by identifying. from the
'o* ' , , .
ospToNs os7.sUgs .3 oeic unom i
", relevant literature, factors contnbuting to the emergence of cucuo.sim.c... e. cass.c n=,apeut.c commu.iar .s vanaesy no oe.esop m a therapeutic community followir o a natural disaster and secimonog.cas desasters The facto,s m.t. gat.ng agamst .is oewelop neat are unm.,.eo .an a p,wnary sucus on tre question et 'true vu.hmusuon. ine determining whether these same 'at. tors existed f ollowing a so,mai.un os ..cirn ousams. and tr= magence os commundy conhact technological disaster. Two case studies. carried out bY the authors, were focused upon: a technological disaster in-t m.o se t ano tu nAvion. vos is no 4. A svinsiaea maa yg gggg ggg
. iver s., emai.un.. inc g g
%2 division and a technological disaster involving the aerial application of agricultural pesticides on cotton fields 10-21 hh 3
1 r 464 ENvlHONMENT AND BEHAvtoH / JulV 1961 CuttAwtson, N*99 / oisAsiEH AND THE COMMUNITY 465 i
THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY IN carelessness. Therefore, the potentially harmful effects of l NATURAL DISASTERS the disaster agent, the reasons for its occurrence, and its j pattern of impact do not become a divisive issue for Fritz (1961) was one of the first disaster researchers t community members.'
identify a number of postdisaster features that created a unifying effect on an affected society. Barton (1969) pro-sented a set of 71 interrelated propositions about individual EMOTIONAL AMBIENCE and collective behavior that he felt accounted for the conditions under which a therapeutic community emerged. Overall, an emotional ambience of common sulfering Oynes (1970), in discussing the development of norms and altruistic concern pervades the postimpact community.
encouraging altruistic behavior in disaster-affected com- Because the disaster agent followed an indiscriminate path munities, summarized and elaborated on Barton's prop-ositions, outlining a number of reasons that community and could not have been prevented, community members experiencing serious loss are not likely to feel intentionally h
conflict tended to be minimized during an emergency or unjustly victimized. Moreover, they can usually fmd situaison. More recently, Quarantelli and Dynes (1976) others who are worse off than themselves or who have identified seven factors associated with the absence of undergone an equivalent loss. They are also likely to community conflict in natural disaster situations. The bebe M me weniW a Me W MfW sipfi-following discussion of factors contributing to the emer-gence of a therapeutic cornmunity draws upon contri- tion is distributed across a wide variety of ethnic groups and butions from these important works.
socioeconomic classes. These factors ccntribute to the development of what Fritz (1961: 686) has termed a "com-munity of sulferers." Victims can set aside, at least tempo-THE DISASTER AGENT AND ITS rarily, the "Why me"?" phenomenon found in other types of PATH OF DESTRUCTION crises and develop the perspeClive that "all of us have suffered; we are a!! in it together" (Fritz, 1961: 685).
A primary feature of natural disasters is the known, Community members who survive the disaster with little threatening nature of the disaster agent. Whether an earth-or no adverse consequences may feel fortunate in com-4uake tornado, hurricane, or other disaster agent, hazard-ous consequences are known to affect the populations parison to other more severely victimized individuals. They involved; and there is little ambiguity regardmg possi e destructive effects. A t',efinitivs threat, therefore, exists around which generally shared feelings of apprehension and fear may develop.
At the same time, the disaster agent has an indefinite Context exists for nonvictimized community members to course of possible des ruction. The path of its impact ano calamitous conseq mces are not preordamed. They are lodged to be the resd of nature s whim, God, or f ate rather than the outcomes of malicious mient, neglect, or human
7r
466 ENVIRot*MLNT AND BEHAVioH / JutY 1981 Cuthbertson,Negg / or3A3TEH ANo THE COMMUNITY 467 THE EMERGENCE OF CONSENSUS of handling situations are unavailable or inoperable. Indi-viduals also find that they have new opportunities to go Suffering and damage in the aftermath of a natura' beyond their predisaster, everyday, routine roles and to disaster is highly visib!J to community members. Further- participate in activities benefiting the entire community more, remedial needs are obvious and urgent, f acilitating (see Fogelman and Parenton,1959, Nigg and Mushkatel, their becoming the foca for feelings of sympathy and 1984), a situation labeled by Dynes (1970. 96) as a redefini-concern. Within this context Ot arantelli and Dynes (1976: tion and expansion of the citizenship role.
142) describe how a high consensus of prionty actions in ef fect, emotion, thought, and behavior are directed at develops, consisting of widespread agreement on what engaging in mutual helpfulness and responding etlectively should be done in the disaster situation anu_ in what order. and cooperatively to restore the normal social life of the This postdisaster consensus assigns primary consideration community.
to the care of victims, for example, administering first and or providing food, clothing and shelter, followed by concern g
for communitywide problems: (1) the restoration and main-tenance of essential community services, (2) maintenance ENACTING SOLloARITY:
A COMMUNM RESOURCE of public order, and (3) the maintenance of public morale (Dynes,1970: 87). When an identified disaster ager't brings about non-The postimpact situation is also highly conducive to purposive, randomly distributed, and obvious destruction, altruistic behavior on an interpersonal level. When victims' community members are likely to develop definitions of needs are clear-cut, the emotional context is one of sym- common sulfering, sympathy, and concern. The apparent pathy and concern. Because opportunities for individuals individual 3nd community necas in the postimpact disaster to provide direct aid to others are abundant, et forts to assist situation provide foci for those definitions and facilitate the usually produce discernible, beneficial esults within a development of a consensual adaptation during initial short period of time. community recovery.
The development of creative, cooperative responses on a As community members engage in acts of mutual help- -
communitywide level also exists because problems are fulness and cooperatively take part in beginning the return obvious and imperative. Many taken-for-granted com- to normalcy, they actively demonstrate to themselves and munity services, for example, comrrmication and trans- others that it is possible to create a sense of community portation f acilities, have been disrupted; and a number of even though taken-for-granted institutional resources have official resources commonly telied upon for assistance are been destroyed or at least temporanly disrupted. Com-unable to function in the immediate postimpact period. It munity members have undergone loss and deprivation, but becomes readily apparent that new strategies to deal with they have also experienced compassion, gratitude, and the these problems must be devised quickly and that cooper- esprit de corps of working together toward a common goal.
atsve action among community residents is necessary to As they see the beneficial results of their eIforts, a general meet these new needs. Ef f orts are oriented to the immediate sense of community identification and unity emerges.
s?tuation. Behavior becomes guided by emergent norms Together, community residents enact sohdanty (Turner (Turner and Killian,1972: 21-25) as tradational, rout:ne ways 1967: 2), providing each other with the emotional suste-l
% . . A 4NI ENv HONMENT ANo BEHAvioH / July 198r Cuthtwatson Negg / 083 ASTER ANo THE COMMUNITY 469 nance necessary to overcome disaster trauma. Enacted the general context of natural disasters. These differences solidarity also forms the basis of the community's positive changed the character of the events in a manner facs! stating attitude toward the future and is reflected in an "amplified the development of conflict and impeding the formation of a rebound'*effect (Fntz,1961:692)that carriesthe community traditional therapeutic community.
beyond its predisaster levels of integration, productivity, and capacity for growth, sustaining them temporarily until institutional resources begin the long-term process of reconstruction. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS FACILITATING THE EMERGENCE OF CONFLICT in summary, there is substantial empirical evidence of a therapeutic community emerging in the immedate, post-impact phase of natural disasters. Moreover,its emergence usry mm mmmm w appears closely related to the presence of important con-ossasTen ActNr g
textual factors such as general consensus on the nature The known, threatening nature of the disaster agent and and risk leval of the disaster agent; beliefs that the disaster isttle ambiguity regarding its destructive effects is an could not have been presented; indiscominate, highly important factor in the development of a consensual adap-visible, and communitywide damage; and obvious and tation following natural 0 aster. In contrast, ambiguity urgent needs toward which feelings and remedial action regarding the nature and consequences of disaster agents can be directed. was a major factor contnbuting to the emergence of conflict in the pesticide and asbestos events.4 in general, individuals involved in the pesticide and THE THERAPEUTIC COMMUNITY IN asbestos events attempted to Clanfy Iwo types of ambiguity:
TECHNOLOGICAL disasters the nature of the disaster agent (whether or not it was hazardous) and the possibility or extent of health con-A number of researchers report the presence of consid- sequences (whether or not a disaster had occurred).
erable conflict following technological disaster (see levine, Personal decision making under conditions of uncer-1982; Mazur,1981; Nelkin,1984; Nigg and Cuthbertson, tainty and the acceptance of living-at-risk in pioximity to 1982; Nigg and Young,1979). The pervasiveness of conflict natural, environmental conditions has been well studied suggests that a therapeutic community of the type usually (see Simon,1956,1959; Slovic et al.,1974; Young and Nigg, found in natural disasters does not always emerge following 1979). With respect to natural hazards, risk is usually a public disclosure that a community has been or is being predisaster consideration-whether or not to reside in a exposed to a technological hazard. '
flood plain, in a rugged woodland, neara known earthquake To understand how a conflictive, rather than consensual, fault, or on a low-lying island. With respect to technological adaptation develops following a technological disaster, a agents, however, whether a hazard truly exists at all is of ten detailed examination was made of the pesticide and asbes- a question that must be answered.
tos events.3 both of which involved considerable community conflict. A number of important differences were noted Furthermore, if the technological agent does have neg-alive effects on human health, who is most susceptible to between the context of the two technological events and effects, how concentrated does the exposure need to be
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<10 LNVinoNMENT ANo BEHAvion / JutY G87 Custhwtson. Negg / ossASILH ANo IEE CoMMuN4Ty an i
beiore health etlects occur, and what length of time must an systems of the potential victims and their significant others I individual be exposed to the agent before harmful effects (Williams,1957). '
are likely? Or probable? Or certain? Ambiguous or contradictory messages from ex perts also These questions are often difficult to answer within establish a context within which individuals producing or existing frameworks of knowledge about the nature of utilizing technological disaster agents frame their defini-vanous physical and chemical substances and their relation- tions of the situation. Such contexts enable them to ship to human health. Even when substances are con- legitimatetaken-for-granted.experientialviewsof thetechno-sidered hazardous,it is difficult to establish "safe"levels of logical agent and support the positions of experts pro-exposure. Most chemical or substance testing is conducted claiming the technological agent safe. In general,Iwo basic with labora;ory ammals over a fairly short time span. That perspectives emerge: the belief that a technological hazard such findings can be projected to human bemgs is a basic exists and could cause harmful health etfects and the assumption of medical research, an assumption that is assertion that a substance is not hazardous to those currently bemg widely challenged. Also,deimitive scientific exposed to it.
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evidence is not available (especially for recently developed The nature and consequences of asbestos, for example, ;
chemicals) to hnk physiological, biological, or psycho- became differentially defined. A number of subdivision '
logical symptoms to pariscular exposure episodes or events. residents, the majority of community residents, asbestos Whether specific harmful effects can be linked to earher millers. and several government of ficials considered asbes-exposure (especially when some effects, such as cancer or los an important, valuable, and nonhazardous substance.
asbestosis, may take years or decades to develop to a Other subdivision and community residents as well as debshtating stage) creates debates within the medical federal and state officials considered asbestos definitely community concerning the relationship between most hazardous.
chemicals and disease or sliness. Given this climate of in the case of pesticides, residents, expenencing symp-controversy within the scientific community, experts fre- toms such as headaches, diarrhea, nausea, and respiratory quently disagree about the nature of the exposure and the irritation, had noted definite associations between their amount of nsk to pubhc health. symptoms and agricultural pesticide applications. Chronic Ordinary citizens, however, f requently rely on the assess- pesticide poisoning, however, was hard to identify; local ments of experts for formulating their own definitions of the doctors did not know how to test ior it, and expert, scientific extent of nsk inherent in situations involving technological knowledge on pesticide poisoning was limited and incon-agents. Ambiguous or contradictory messages from experts clusive. As a result, differing defmitions of the nature and leave open the realm of possible decisions concerning the consequences of the disaster agent developed. Residents nskmess of the situation, allowmg for disagreement to maintained that they were being poisoned by pesticides; emerge (Nelkin,1984; Nigg and Young,1979; Mazur,1981). pesticide regulatory officials and agribusiness community These mdividual decisions concerning the hazardousness representatives rejected that contention and attributed of the agent are them framed (Goffman,1974) within residents' complaints to allergies, hysterical reactions to mformal social circles (Kadushm.1968). Decisioris are, pesticide odors, or the dust stirred up by aerial applicators' therefore, based on similar past expenences (Young and helicopters.
Nigg,1979) or in accordance with the personal value
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1f 072 ENVinoNMENT ANO BEHAVioH / July 1961 Cutteethon.N gg / olSAsTEH ANO THE CoMMuNarY 473 sELEcriv TY or a:SASTER AGENT often the focus of sympathy in natural disasters, was seen in natural hazard events, the disaster agent is indis- inauthentic or simply the consequence of scare tactscs m a or OHicials.
criminate, striking actoss geographic as well as social class lines. Becoming a victim, therefore,is a matter of fate. In the Even when physical symptoms were present, as in the pesticide and asbestos events, however, the threat was pesticide case, sympathy and concern were iacking. Within centered in a specific focation, causing many residents to the context of differing delsnitions regarding the nature and feel unfairly singled out as victims. Because the disaster onsequences of agricuuural pesticides, symptoms were agent was no longer random and nonpurposive, residents een as %stencal reactions or allergies, not true health effects from pesticide exposure.
could attribute their circumstances to human intention or neglect; furthermore, they could focus blame (see Bacm et al.,1983: 352). Often, the occurrence of the hazardous amEDIAL MEASURES:
condition was seen as resulting from social arrangements uMMARANTED OR Def tlCulT To DEVISE that provided benefits to vested interest groups, such as the agt business community in the pesticide situation and in contrast to the obviouJ need of natural disaster victims and the emer ence i *'
asbestos millers in the asbestos situation. For vested action" remedi i interests or officials to have allowed the condition to occur eventswerediffic I tode se if it could have been prevented or to permit it to continue m ple n orcons r*d unnecessary.
' unabated often led to definitions of injustice and related ln the pesticide and asbestos events'i anger. In general, blame, along with definitions of iniustice, ~ " * "
officials bel became the standpoint from which collective sentiment effects woul n t occ r did no d i t emerged and was directed against the alleged perpetrators disaster. Consequently they attached of victimization (see Turner and Killian,1972; Downs, urgency to the need to ameliorate the situation. Moreover, when they did
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define the situation as a disaster, they of ten had difficulty obtaining conclusive test results or providing the resources DISASTER CONSEQUENCES: and OXpertise for appropriate remedial aCleon. In turn sNvisasLE OR IMAuTH(NTIC gesidents Who believed that a hazard existed felt tha Unlike the visible devastation associated with a natural thciais were unable or unwiliang fo respond to, ameliorate
- disaster, the consequences of a hazardous chemical or or mitigate the hazard satisfactorily.
in ddition, community residents did not provide the substance may not be readi!y apparent. Asbestos disease, for example, has a latency period of from 20 to 30 years; s cjal support technological disaster victims desired. Be-consequently, no visible physical symptoms were present lievmg the disaster agent was safe, many community to provide evidence of suffering or facilitate altruistic residents considered remedial ef forts unnecessary; feeling concern. unsure about a thseat or believing that the disaster agent Furthermore,in view of beliefs that harmful effects would was hazardous, they iacked the knowledge and resources to provide assistance.
not occur or would be insignificant, emotional distress, e
a f
r -
- 1V 414 ENV HONMLNT ANO eEHAVloH / JutY i981 Cuthbertson.Nigg / oisAsTEH AND THE coMWJNiiY Us ,
TRUE VICTIMlZATioN located near two other mills (one operative) and asbestos tailings piles.
Within the context of ambiguity over the existence and level of nsk, the extent of harmf ul consequences, the unjust allocation of nsk, damage that was invisible or considered inauthentic, and the problem of inef fective or unnecessary remedial action, the question of true victimization became paramount. Where no threat is perceived, can there be a victim? When risk is believed to be negligible, is it appro-priate to render assistance 711 so, what can be done? When harmf ul etlects are only probable at some time in the distant f uture or cannot be definitively linked to ti e disaster agent, is it necessary to commit resources to ameliorate projected
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f uture problems? Also, when a public issue has been made over what is perceived to be an unjustified situation, who are the "true victims"? delimte threat. Whether they were suffering from explicit in sef erence to these questions and to empincal evidence generated from the asbestos and pesticide case studies, a typology of technological disaster victims was developed. It is suggested that through the emergence of particular victim clusfors and the behavior of cluster participants, community conflict, not solidarity, was enacted. eMimemm e h hw h own and their families' welfare. g To complicate matters, hazard-endangered victims re-A COMMUNITY OF VICTIMS garded themselves not only as victims of the disaster agent but as victims of unresponsive or inept officials, profit-minded, unethical industry personnel, and, in some cases.
Phlt4ARY VICTIMS an uncaring Community. Often, officials were seen as Primary victims were those individuals who lived ,in acting irresponsibly in a number of ways: allowing the proximity to or were knowingly exposed to the techno- hazardous situatioin to develop in the first place, not logically created hazard that was likely to have negative p,0viding conclusive health or hazard test results soon af ter ef fects en physical health. Primary victims included those the situation became a public concern, and not taking residents who lived adjacent to agricultural lands and were immediate and eifective remedial action. In addition, indus-exposed to pesticides and defoliants for several months try personnel who had a stake in the production or use of each year and the residents of the mobile home park the technological agent were quite of ten viewed as inten-constructed on the site of an abandoned asbestos mill and tionally greedy, deceptive, and insensitive. Usually, hazard-
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g 413 LNvlHoNMENT ANo BEHAVloH / July 198r Cuthtwtwn. Negg / oisASILH AND TK1 COMMUNITY 4rF endangered victims believed that industrial mterests knew logical agent; however, they did not view the agent as about the hazardous nature of the agent beforehand and dangerous nor did they consider themselves likely lo suf fer that they engaged m cover-up activities based on profit all ef'ects. For example, a significant minority of subdivision motives. Furthermore, hazard-endangered victims often residents did not consider asbestos hazardous or were not c9nsidered community members who defined the techno- at all concerned about developing asbestos-related disease.
109 t.31 disaster agent as nonhazardous as a source of in addition, hazard-disclaimer victims did not consider threat, not support. hazard-endangered victims to be the true victims of the in general hazard-endangered victims lost their feelings technological threat; they pnmarily viewed them as con-of confidence in the possibility of a supportive and safe- tributors to controversy or opportunists desiring a free guarding social milieu. They felt they were in a crisis handout from the government. At times, hazard-disclaimer situation, but they did not f eel confident the crisis would be victims felt sympathy for hazard-endangered victims; they legitimated and resolved. Moreover, they were unable to sympathized with them, however, as victims of the media, butfer their distress by experiencing general community of f acials, or irrational fear, not as tr ue victims of an environ-support. mental hazard.
Forming a hazard-endangered victim cluster became a Hazard-disclaimer victims often felt they were the true means for hazard-endangered residents to achieve a sense victims of disaster. Their lives had been disrupted, and their of solidarity and control over the disaster situation. Acting property values had plummeted as a result of publicity. In together, hazard-endangered victims focused their efforts addition, in the asbestos case, hazard-disclaimer victims on proving that the disaster agent was hazardous and felt they were being forced to move from an area they obtaining official action to ameliorate the situation. For considered safe. Relocation, which was viewed as a bene-example, hazard-endangered victims in the pesticide situa- ficial remedial measure by hazard-endangered victims, was tion organized two pesticide groups-Citizens for Pure Air perceived as government interference by hazard-disclairr,ar and People's Environmental Organization for Pesticide victims.
Legislation and Enforcement-and took part in anti- Hazard-disclaimer victims forced to relocate found they pesticide rallies and legislative letter-writing campaigns, all were not able to count on previous, taken-for-granted core focused on obtaining official action to curtail the use of values such as freedom of choice or the right to private agricultural pesticides near urban neighborhoods. And, property.They.hke hazard-endangered victims developed hazard-endangered asbestos victims formed a homeowners mistrust for government officials as well as for particular association to facilitate interaction with officials and the media or experts who represented positions at variance media. These activities did enhance solidanty within ihe from theirs.
victim clusters; at the same time, they impeded the develop- Overall, hazard-endangered and hazard-disclaimer vic-ment of communitywida solidarity and established the tims found themselves in a situation where their differing basis for future conflict. perspectives on the situation and the reasons for its occurrence disrupted any predisaster neighborly cohesive- ,
ifazard-disclaimer victims. Hazard-disclaimer victims, ness. Hazard-disclaimer victims felt resentful toward haz- !
hke hazard-endangered victims, were exoosed to the techno- ard-endangered victims phony demonstrations of dis-tress, geest for media attention, and involvement in lawsuits.
ENviRONMENi AND BEHAvion / July 19tly Cumtx-stwn. Negg / DisASILH AND THE COMMUNITY 413 418 Hazard-endangered victims defined former friends and Perpetrator victims reported considerable emotional dis-neighbors as callous or ignorant and considered their tress, especially anger, over being classified as "villains." It hazard-disclaimer stance a barrier to issue resolution. was difficult for them to imagine that a chemical or substance with many beneficial uses was hazardous. Further-Solidarity among primary victims as a whole was not enacted. Furthermore, hazard-disclaimer victims created a more, they did not feel that they or users of their products viciim cluster with others of similar views and sentiments, had suffered any harmful effects even af ter many years of and, in opposition to hazard-endangered victims' efforts, use or exposure. Accordingly, they were of fended at being attempted to gain proof for the safety of the disas*er agent. accused of knowingly using dangerous substances and of intentionally endangering human health to make a profit.
Perpetrator victims saw themselves and their industries as the victims of opportunistic and overzealous officials, Apart from those individuals who resided at or near the environmentainsts. misinformed cstizens, and certain media.
disaster site and ditlered over their definitions of the They saw hazard-endangered victims--and of ten had sym-disaster agent and its health effects were the secondary pathy for them-as victims of fear and panic created by victims of technological disaster. These community resi_ offscials and the media, not as victims of an authentic dentsconsideredIhemselvesvictimsof thepublicacknowl- hazard.
edgment of a technological event. Whether they were the Feeling ostracized, misunderstood, and unfairly con-alleged perpetrators of the technological disaster or were demned by many community members, perpetrator victims simply members of the general community in which the also joined together in victim clusters. Sharing similar disaster site was located, they felt that they were involuo. beliefs and sentiments, they attempted to prove, with the tanly sulfenng theconsequencesof media portrayalsof the help of expert testimony, that the technological agent was issue, official remediation attempts, and continual, issue. not haz rdous. They also worked toward gettmg their side related controversy. of the story presented in the media.
Perpetrator vichms. Perpetrator victims were those indi- Bystander victims. Bystander victims were those mem-viduals tabeled as unethical. opportunistic, and uncaring by bers of the community who were not living within the area hazard-endangered victims and their supporters They exposed to ,the technological agent but who still saw frequently were "big business" representatives, for ex- themselves as victims. Their victimization arose from con-ample, cotton f armers, the aerial pesticide a;splicators, and nection with the issue itself. They became embarrassed by agrichemical company representatives in the pesticide the issue's portrayal in the public arena; they saw their own situation, and the millers in the asbestos situation. They and the community's economic welfare endangered by were the people who had allegedly committed the crime, publicity over the hazardous situation; they became frus-that is, negligently disposed of toxic wastes or continued to trated at official delays in clearing up the situation and distribute and apply hazardous substances despite infor- returning their community to normal; and they personally mation suggestive of their threatening nature.s suffered from outsiders
- remarks or fears about the danger of their community.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . - ____ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ . _ . - _- . _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ m__-. ___ ___-
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go ENVIHONMLNr ANo utHAvsOH / JutY 19tir '
This seemed to occur whomer not b stander victims ther pclarizing the groups and deepening community definedthedisasteragentas ha a sa dwhetherunot conflict. As the issues were prolonged. Icveis of stress they felt hazard-endangere deserved sympathy remained high, and earlier conceptions of community andassistance.lf theyconside d1 ent hazardous and sohdarity were disrupted, imped:ng the extension of social felt sympathy for hazar e ed victims, they often support and empathic understanding to members of other felt personally unable to do an n about the situation. victim groups. Clearly, in these particular technological They. therefore. usually e m noming to assist disasters, factors conducive to the emergence of a thera-hazard-endangered victims persona Iy contnbuting tohaz- peutic commumty did not exist. Within the context of ard-endangered victims feeling tack of commumty ambiguity regarding the nature and health consequences support. of the disaster agent, damage that was invisible or con-On the other hand, w en bystander victims felt the sidered inauthentic, selectivity of the disaster agent, and situation was unjustified or exag led they did not view problems regarding the necessity or oflectiveness of reme-hazard-endangered vi tu victims. Rather, they e undeservedly harassed dial measures, community conflict, rather than solidarity, considered the:calvic was enacted.
perpetrators. hazard-disclaimer victims, and the community at large.
in general, most secondary victims felt victimized by an unfair drawn-out, and ambiguous issue were also NOTES disappointed, erritated, and disillusione V i i t,.3 ,3 peo.ny i,o. . ir, em perceived as o hciallack of response and control. They,like ,,,oc, p.,,oo os m, o,,,3,,, ,,o ,,oo no,,,,,,. m .nai uoore ossa assi nu conceptuah1.d as the b..casai stage, pnmary victims, lost confidence in the competence and hosiaay may deveiop over ,ehab.samhon p,ocedu,es o, measom inai coud ha,e accountability of scientific experts and 9overnment author- 'ad'9d'*2 5pacd'c dd=*9* M quawas u*c*am9 tra p**swa d tw d,s ie, *g ni, m. coo,3. m an d...,oc,,on. o, .h.me, as ha,miu enects .es.
itses. ,edi ,orna.n bas.cally .,,elewant
- 2. Fo, a discuss.on us the relahonsh.p bet.een guess and nesping behavio, see be, sche.d and Walsta, (1961). Ca,ismati and G,oss (19694. and om,hogton and Macke, (19b6) 3 An even, .s bee,.g deshngueshed i,om an emesgency Tbe substant.as ,elease ul a h nown haza, duos matenas ento the onee,orwnen es a emped-onset eme,gency Overall. from the standpoint oi vatsable definitions of 1he saustion t% a ,*sponded to by eme,gency managemens pe,sonnes n the same asbestos and pesticide situations, members of various ** "*' * * ** V **"8d ' **
,,c,",ooiog.c ...oi, o, m,'**P""d " *a'* * * * hd*8 om,,, n "oo. .,","o,",,,,, og o,co ^
victim clusters attempted to demonstrate the correctness of . .*,,,,*,",8
,,cy souahon depend.ng on how, me muected popuas.on d :.,ies a their own interpretations e nature and risk level of the 4 Amb.guay sa noi s maior iacto, sn an wchnoiog.csi desasters An the case os disaster agent and the consequences of exposure. The v-a m.myn,oc,,',,,,g.,Du a8 8a**. 'o *aamp8*. *** = sans a any. quesi.on n i ,. g .. o,,o ,o ,,, ,
emotional Climate that emerged was one of anger, frus- p ,,,,c, ,,, ,,n ,, ,, ,,,, ,,,, a p ,op,, ,,,,,, ,, ,,,no,,cio,,
and anxiety. Feelings of ,,,,,, gg%,,,
,gocono,,,
tration resentment. iachnolog.cas o.sniens i.he shopas. ne.. ihere is i<tue amb.guay ove, in, helplessness and inability to controI the environment devel- io o.,,'iopd'5*58* *9'a5 *ad d5 coa 5*4u*ac'5. * 'h*'8pauhc com'auadr ma r be mo' oped within victim clusters, creating a resis ers of other victim groups. Defen- s u .s .mpo,iani no noi mai perpenators one usuauy nos heid ,npons,rse io, in ,,,c, ,osog,c ,s
,ni , yo, ,,mpio,,o n posi,c,o ,sao ,uoo po p ,,,,,,,,
e co un a ions proliferated among the clusters. fur-
= b 482 LNVlHONMENT AND BLt4AvlOH / JULY 1987 Cuthtestson. Negg / DISASILH AND INE COMMUNITV 483 wese look ed at as callous and unconcesned. and poshaps mtentaosully mahonous. MOOHL.H E (1958) T ornadoes Over Tomas A Sta.:dy of Wacoand San Angelo on We es was the desehti psotectoss-segulatory authosstees arus other local. state, and lederal officaats-who wese held sosponsble for alJowmg the stustion to D W l pq hmq hm W g%g g% %
occur and r os controalmg or discspierung the perpetsatoes Par CA $9 NIGG.J M andh H CUIHBERTSON(1982)'Pestacadeepphcassonsneaturban areas a "ct;ms an confidence
- for pubhc health agencies" J of Health and Human Hesources Admerustrahon 4.3 284 302.
NIGG J M and A H MUSHKATEL (15484) ~Orgeruzahonal responses to the REFERENCES Coahnga earthquake." m R E Schott and James L. Steatta (eds ) Coahnea.
Cahtorma. Earthquake os May 2.1983 Heconnaissance Heport 1%,heaey" CA' LLH4 BARTON.A H (1969) Commuruties an Disaster. A Sooological Analysas of Collective Steess Sduations New York. Doubleday NiGG.J M andB S YOUNG (1979)'Communatyressstance arespor setosocad BAUM. A . H f LLMING. and L. M DAVtOSON (1983)15 "Natural disaster and potsc y unplementation " Presented at the American Socaotogical Assocaahon ~
tectuxitog. cal catastrophe ~ Envisonment and Behavior 333-353 , gosto,t ^ -
BL 64SCH1 :0. E and t W ALSI L H (1967) *VJhon does a harm-door compensate a flect sisabsenceah vecternT J of Personahty and Social Psychology 6 435-441 (DUAHANIELLI.E L andH
.ts p,esence m naturat disastera DYNES
~ Mass imerge (1916)~Commurut 39 152 CAHLSutTH.J M and A E GHOSS(19693 Someeffectsolgu.stoncomphance, grumygg ggg%, , 7 J of Personahty and Socaal Psychology 11:232-239 Psych Rev 63 129-138 CL L ARY. P O asu1 P. S HOUIS (1982)"The psychologKal ampact of the T hsee SIMON. H A (1959) "Theo,.es og deos,on making in economacs of behavior M se sgand encadent - Psesented at the AmericanSocoological Assouatoon. San gg,nc, Amor Econ How 49 253.gg3 reanosco SLOVsC. P. H KUNHLUIHLH. and G G WHs!L (1974) Deauon p,or. esse 3]
DAHLINGTON.H B and C L MACKLH(1966)~Desplacementof guett produced edhoewhty. and adpustment to natural hasards." en G F White (and ) Natural altsuestic behaveos " J os Poesonahty and Social Psychology il 208-213 n,,,,ds t ocal. P44tional. Global New York Omlord Un. Psess l OOWNS, A (1912) "Up and down with ecology-the 'assue attenteon cycle _, I AYLOH J B . L A IUHCHLH. and W H KLY (1970) Tornado A Cor wnumsy Puba.c interest 28 38 SO Hesponse so Disastes Seattle usuv og Wash nglosi Press DYNES.H L (1970)Osgerused Behavior en Disastes teamgton.MA D C Heath IUHNLH.H H (1961) Typesolsohdarity.n thes const.tutmgorgroups"Pac.s.c LHIKSON, K (1916) Everythang so its Path New York Sernon & Si.huster Soc Hew 10 60 68 i LYNN. C B (1962)"f4eactions of local seudents to the acom)ent at I hsee Mile IUHNLH.H H and L H KILLIAN (19T2) Co86echve Behavior Englewood Cletts*
Island." in D L. Seats et al (eds ) Actwent at Ihvee Male Island The Human NJ Psentece-Hail D.mer;uons Bouloer Westview Press WILLaAMS. H B (195T)"Some functions of commurucataon m crasas behav.or "
iOGELMAN,C W andV J PAI4LNTON(1959)~Desastesandaftesmath selected Human Organisation 16.2 15-19 aspects of end vedual and group behavior en crihcas situations " Soodi f osces WOLF LNSILIN. M (1951) Disaster A Psychological Essay New York 5,ee 38 129 135 Press IHall. C E (1961) "Desastes." m H K Merton and H A Nesbet (eds ) YOUNG. B S and J M NIGG (1979) *The determsnants of acceptable assh ~
Contertiposary Soual Psoblems New Yosh Hercourt. Brace & World Presented at the UNLSCO lniernationaa symposaum on Earthquake Prod.ction.
G4BBS. L M (1983) ~'Commuruty sosponse 10 an emergeracy pluation psycho- p togecas destiuct on and the Love Canal Amee. J of Comanuruty Psychology 11,2 1it 125.127-139 GOif MAN.E (1914)Itame Analysss New York Harper Colophon 1 K ADU$H8N. C (1986) ~ Power. mtnuence, and sooal orcles a new methodology
. toe studyeng openson mahees" Ames Soc He, 33 bil5 699 LLVINL. A G (1982) Love Canal Science. Poht cs, and People Lemmgton. MA.
Lenington Books .
MAZUH. A (1981) The Dynamacs of Technical Controversy Washengton, DC Commurucahons Pross a
.e
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w MISSING EXHIBITS N22: Massachusetts' Attorney General NUMBER: g DESCRIPTION: EBS Messages Draft j
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i REASON FOR ITS ABSENCE: Never received into evidence
- NAME OF ITS CUSTODIAN
- Massachusetts Attorney General I
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MISSING EXHIBITS '
NAME: Massachusetts Attorney General NUMBER: 9 DESCRIPTION: Videotape by Thomas Adler REASON FOR ITS ABSENCE: Never Given to Reporter NAME OT ITS CUSTODIAN: Massachusetts Attorney General's Office (Allen Fuerst) t
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- g UNITED STATES
! NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h e .
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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fiay 26, 1987 MEMORANDUM FOR: John Milligan Technassociates FROM: Emile L. Julian Weting Chief Docketing and Service Branch
SUBJECT:
S E.A brook EXHIBITS Any documents filed on the open record in the feabrook,Ipro-ceeding and made a part of the official hearing record as an exhibit is considered exempt from the provisions of the United
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