ML20149E833
| ML20149E833 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20149E838 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9707210087 | |
| Download: ML20149E833 (2) | |
Text
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TS 15.3.3.D.2), the licensee's SWS operability determinations (change to TS 15.3.3.D.1), and the results of the staff's review of the assessments provided for the environmental qualification of equipment (Section 3.2) and the effect l
on the PASS operation (Section 3.3).
The staff's evaluation of the changes to i
radiological consequences resulting from the revised analysis are provided fn Section 3.4 of the evaluation.
The staff's evaluation of the licensee's operability determinations (September 9 and September 30, 1996, submittals) is preliminary in nature.
The staff will perform a detailed evaluation of the licensee's o)erability submittals as part of its review of the licensee's response to G 96-06. The 4
results of this preliminary evaluation are included in the evaluation of the licensee's proposed change to TS 15.3.3.D.1.
3.0 HALUATION The CFCs of both units are supplied cooling water by the shared SWS during i
normal operating and accident conditions. In the event of an accident in one unit, the SWS flow to that unit's CFCs is automatically increased by the 4
opening of redundant valves on the discharge side of the CFCs. The SWS flow arrangement to the non-accident unit's CFCs would not change and the flow l
would be dependent on the number of running SWS pumps.
The SWS includes six shared motor-driven SWS pumps (three pumps powered from Train A and three pumps powered from Train B) which are connected in parallel to a common discharge header. This common discharge header sup) lies flow to two main SWS j
headers (north and south).
Both the north and sout1 headers feed a common supply header (west) which can be supplied full flow by either the north or J
south header alone if one of the main headers is isolated. All three headers (north, south, and west) supply cooling water flow to a number of shared safety-related components.
The south header supplies flow to a number of Unit 1 only components (including two of the four Unit 1 CFCs) while the north header serves a number of Unit 2 only components (including two of the four i
Unit 2 CFCs). The common west header supplies cooling water flow to the remaining two CFCs of both units in addition to a number of shared components.
Therefore, with either of the three headers totally isolated, operation of one or both units can be affected.
Isolation of the west heade would affect both j
units while isolation of either the north or south header would affect the respective unit whose CFCs can only be supplied by that header.
The SWS headers also supply cooling water flow to four CCW heat exchangers.
two of which are dedicated (heat removal from only one unit's CCW system) to specific units and two of which are shared spare heat exchangers that can be i
lined up to the CCW system of either unit. All four heat exchangers (normally i
only two heat exchangers (one for each unit) are in service with SWS flow lined up) are supplied cooling water from both the north and south SWS headers.
Following a DBA in one unit, only one CCW heat exchanger and one CCW pump are required to remove design-basis heat loads in the accident unit and only one heat exchanger and one CCW pump are required to maintain safe shutdown conditions in the non-accident unit.
Each unit has its own closed loop CCW system with two pumps and normally the two units' CCW systems operate 72 O hk 6
Corrected by letter dated July 16, 1997 i
P
e
.o the containment vessel internal air recirculation system. four ventilation fans and air coolers, from a total heat removal capability of 55.000 Btu /sec to 41.700 Btu /sec under conditions following a LOCA.
This change is consistent with the throttling of the CFC service water outlet valves, and the analyses performed in support of this'TS change request.
It is, therefore, acceptable.
)
3.2 Effect on Eauioment Qualification The licensee identified changes to the DBA conditions that are postulated based on information provided in support of the proposed changes in TSCR-192.
The changes in the DBA conditions required revisions to the DBA tem)erature and pressure profiles utilized in the environmental qualification (E0) program.
The licensee's initial evaluation and supporting information were discussed at a public meeting held February 24. 1997, as documented in a Meeting Summary issued March 3, 1997.
The majority of com were within the new DBA pressure and temperature profiles.ponents evaluated The licensee's submittal of April 18. 1997, and June 3.1997, provided additional clarifying information of the DBA conditions, an overall assessment of all components reviewed, and specific-information on four components whose temperature profiles included in the original evaluation required additional documentation.
The revised DBA analysis results in a peak temperature of 291 F which decreases to 278 F at approximately 7.5 seconds. The revised temperature profile includes the saturated steam temperature based on the partial pressure of steam in containment. The saturation temperature is considered to be a more representative temperature 3rofile for equipment and structures inside the containment which would be su)jected to condensation heat transfer.
The licensee conclusions and bases for adequacy of the four components are described below:
a.
The E0 testing of the Transamerica Delaval Gems Level Transmitter envelops the new postulated PBNP DBA. except for a 5.8-hour aeriod.
This is judged to be acceptable because aging test data in t7e E0 test program envelops the points not met in the new costulated PBNP DBA. The Transamerica Delaval Gems Level Transmitter was tested to DBA conditions significantly harsher than those anticipated at PBNP except for a 5.8-hour )eriod (from 2.1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> at 242 F to 7.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> at 225 F).
Prior to _0CA testing the transmitters were thermally aged at 248 F for 2.161.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />. The demonstrated ability of the transmitter to survive extended periods at 248 F during thermal aging provides assurance that the transmitter will not fail during the 5.8-hour post-LOCA period when maximum temperatures of 242 F (17 F above the E0 test data for the i
transmitter) may occur.
b.
The Rome cable is not required to be qualified because it performs no safety-related function and has no failure mode affecting safety for this DBA. Additionally, the licensee concluded that the failure of the Rome cable in any manner will not prevent any other safety-related equipment from functioning nor will it fail in any manner that could provide misleading information to the plant operators.
Therefore, the Corrected by letter dated July 16, 1997
e DATE0: July 16. 1997 CORRECTIONS T0-AMENDMENT NO. 174 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR POINT BEACH UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT NO. 178 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR POINT BEACH UNIT NO. 2 i
Docket File PUBLIC PDIII-1 Reading J. Roe J. Hannon C. Jamerson L. Gundrum OGC G. Hill (4)
C. Berlinger J. Calvo
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C.L. Miller R. Wessman L. Marsh W. Beckner, 013H-3 R. Emch. 010D4 S. Saba. 07E4 W. LeFave, 08D1 i
J. Rajan, 07E23 W. Long. 08H11 K. Parczewski, 07D4 ACRS J. McCormick-Barger. RIII SEDB (TLH3) i d