ML20149D997

Forwards Matls Related to CRGR Meeting 198 Re Draft Final Amend to 10CFR50,App J Concerning Containment Leakage Testing

ML20149D997
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/18/1994
From:	Allison D NRC
To:	NRC
References
NUDOCS 9405260107
Download: ML20149D997 (2)

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'J 0-April 18, 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: Public Document Room Staff FROM: Roy P. Zimmerman, Director RRG/CBLA Program

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR PLACEMENT OF DOCUMENT IN PDR Please place the enclosed document in the public document room: - Memorandum from' William T. Russell to Mr. Paul Blanch, dated April 7, 1994. Thank you for your assistance. Original signed by: Roy P. Zimmerman, Director RRG/CBLA Program

Enclosure:

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Enclosure rahog UNITED STATES +5 QUtff S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (..v(/ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20S$W1 April 7,1994 Mr. Paul Blanch 135 Hyde Road W. Hartford, CT 06117

Dear Mr. Blanch:

A news article transmitted by The Associated Press to newspapers on April 5 attributed to you charges that an NRC " confidential policy" allows dozens of nuclear power plants with safety problems to keep operating. This is simply inaccurate. The April 5 article further attributes to you a statement that a " device" (a Rosemount transmitter) used to monitor pressure and temperature inside a nuclear reactor could give off false readings under some conditions. You concluded, according to the article, that the nuclear plants were in viclation of NRC rules and the NRC was required to shut them down. When significant safety questions arise concerning the operability of equipment in a nuclear power plant, the NRC staff performs an independent evaluation and assessment to ensure that the equipment is capable of performing their intended safety functions. Although not timely, the NRC staff examined the ability of these transmitters to accomplish their safety function and concluded that they were operable. The operability determination was based' on system design, redundancy and diversity, sensor failure history and an increase in the testing frequency using an upgraded test. If the NRC staff had concluded that the transmitters were inoperable, operators of nuclear power plants would have had to a) follow their technical specifications, b) request a license amendment or c) request _the NRC to exercise enforcement discretion. This NRC process is described in Generic Letter 91-18, a copy which is enclosed. Because the NRC staff concluded the transmitters were operable, there was no need to decide whether to exercise enforcement discretion. On a different issue, the first paragraph of the article mentions "a confidential policy" allowing federal regulators to overlook some violations at nuclear power plants. Even though the policy on enforcement discretion is not relevant to the Rosemount ]t@F90"iSD bk

transmitters, it might be app icable el'sewhere. The circumstances under which the NFC may exercise enforcement discretion are not confidential, but are describe in the Commission's Enforcement Policy, published as Appendix C to NRC's Part 2 regulation. For example, a description of "the exercise of enforcement discretion. . where the course of action involves minimal or no safety impact and the NRC staff is clearly satisfied that the exercise of discretion is consistent with the public health and safety" was published in revisions to the Enforcement Policy in the Federal Register, March 17, 1993, pages 14308-10 and is well delineated in the NRC~ Enforcement Manual, a document that is publicly available. Finally, the article says you were unable to obtain a copy of the NRC " policy." Enclosed is a copy for your use. The only document for which the NRC claims client / attorney privilege is the General Counsel's paper discussing, in a pre-decisional analysis, the pros, cons and limited circumstances under which it would be appropriate. These circumstances are described, however, in the Commission's Enforcement Policy. Sincerely, danW William T. Russell, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

j As stated cc: The Associated Press Hartford, CT l i J

] Tederal Register / Vd. se, No. So / Wednesday. March 17,1993 / Rules and Regulations day's production ole producer's milk he the Southwsst P!ahn distsibutin Dated 11.tses; physically r,ceind et a pool t2 meet hir,Duld milk teeds g plan's ?' rma distnbuting plant during b month to Thenfors, thm is no need far

pesa, be eligible far div pioe to e noopool producers histo Wly enociated with faspeceae

Ani,

,rsecrw ary. m 4 song ens L plant. The public ru afforded the b Southwest 1 iins Order, but wbose pie Doc. 3 Fund 8-1643. 8 45 aml opportunity to ce ment on the notics fanns are more stant from distributing by schmitting wr1 en data sriews and euae we plants, to be roc ved one tJme during arguments by Teb utry 23.1993. One the month at su i plants for the sole wntte commact, ras rocsived that docuned the natus of the proposed purpose of mee1 ig pooling NUCuAR REGULATORY . suspension. De comment incJuded full requirements ht end, hir solIk can COMMISSION 7 mon mda k divarted dirmly M CTR Paen - f i-U l %Q'd to manufacturin lanta la the s/ dT production area.J Afler considereuen of al levant scateria!. including nw stso4Es7, notice. 6 commea,the propeaalin the it is bereby faa hf and detsnmined t rocsind, and other 61 thirty days

• motice of the effectin poHey and Procedure for NRC available information, it is h ereby found date hmoris im;Iractical. unnecessaryEnforcement Actione; Policy I

and determined thei the following and contreey to it i public intervet in Statement provisions of 6 order do eof tend to ht: 't Aopec$ Nuclear Regulatory sfrectuate h decldred poli of the Act: 1 In 51106.33.paragraphldj(1)in la gnfm g$nNo Commisalon. I' t and Acmc Policy Statement. Modi $cetion. s Statement of Coesideration to assure orderly narketing conditions suwnRY:The NRCis modifying its { in h marketing [res. in that such Enforcement Policy to describe more i Dis action susp&nds a cartain ection is neceuai y to permit the provision of the Southwest Plains continued poolin i of b milk of dairy fully the circumstanese in which it may i Federal milk order from February 1 farmers who hs%bistorically supplied exerciu anforcernent discation., 1993,through Augst 31,1993.%is the market witha at the need for makinS March 17.1993. Comments rocsived by omg. His modi $ cation la effective on action suspends the requirement that costly and inemt ent movements of April 16,1993 will be considad. I 1 produem must deliver to a pool plant milk: st least one day a production durin the Comments receind after this date will { roonth in erdn for.h remainder o (b) This suspe tsion does not requir, be considered if it la proctical to do so. I their milk to be eligible for dmrsion t . of pmans aUecM substantial or but the Commission le able to assure f 4 en unregulated manufactunng plant. extensive prepaintion prior to the consideration mJy for comments His provision was susyended for the eUecun date "$'d recoind during the 30 day period some period in 1992. This suspension is (c) Notice of goposed rulemaking following leauance. necessary to insure that dairy farmm was ginn intemsted parties and they ADoatsus: Send comments to: who have historically supplied the were afforded opportunity to file wntten Secretary. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory s Southwest plains merket will continue data, views or arguments concaming Commissloa. Washington, DC 20555. to han their milk priced under the this suspansiors One comment in ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch. l Southwest Plains order, thereby support of 6 s aspension was received. Deliver comments to: 11555 Rockeille receiying the bene $ts that accrue from Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852, l poolmg This suspension thus will Therefore. gcod cause exists for berween 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Fedm1 avoid uneconomic and inemelent rnsking this ord Wr effecties less than 30

workdays, movement of milk fer the sole purpose days fmm date >f publication in the Copies of comments receind may be ef establishing eligibility for pocling Tedcral Regieta r' enmined at: the NRC Public Document n

under the order. De suspension wu re List of Subjectada 7 CFR Part 2108 Room,2120 L Street.NW. (lower Mid. America Deirpnen, quested by 1.4nll. Washington, DC. Inc. (Mid Am), hfilk roarkstlyg orders. rom rmtm MPommnose comAcT: a cooperative association operating it is thereforo ordered, that the James Lieberrnan, Omco of under the Southwest Plains order. Mid-Am requested h sospension to prevent following provlaton in title 7, part n06, Enfortement telephone (301) 504-2 the uneconomic and inemeient in06.13,pmgraph(d)(1)of the or J. Randall Hall.Omee of Nuclear Ruetor R alation,telephene f 301) Southwest Plains order is heby movement of milk for the sole purpose suspended frorn February 1.1993 Commission.Washingtcm. gletcry 504-1336 .S. Nuclast Ke of pooling the milk of producers throu6 Au6ustkl.1993. Uc 20555 h histofically assocfoled with the SUPPLDIENTARY MF04KADo*C Southwest Plains Ocder.Mid Am also PART 1106 4tl(K LN THE filed comments su rting the proposed SOUTHWEST PipAINS MARKET)NG

Background

Ir,ceiptsunder the In Jul 1985, the NRC staUizsued AN A L Internafguida:.s to addren situations Southwest Plains Ordn war:1.8% 3.The authorih citation for 7 CFR wbm a rNetor licenset s Com compared to 1991. Gass I utilization in part 1106 contin @e to read as followe. with e Techrdcal Speel$ cation %(TS) or higher on an evereg4 daily basis in 1992 4nce other license condition mey cause an 1992 was 38.7%, w ch was lower than AdW 5eca 1 a 48 mat 31, es unnecs plant translent or the Class I utilisati in 1991 end 1990 amended. ? U.S C et1-474. unnece ly prevent plaot startup and of 39.3% and 41 respectively. gnos.13 (Tempwg suspencied Inart). where,in such instances, the temporary It la projected that-ere wall be ample exercise of discretion by the NRC not to supplies of direct-sht producer gru!k

2. In 61106.12. parogteph (dl(1)is enforos compliancs may be,apprepnate which is located in general area of suspended in its tjrvty, That guidance has been revloed 4

j-- Feders] Kagister

17. 1993 / Rules and Regulations H309 odically with the lat:st revision safety, and does act innivs advane Andorter Seca 1st, tat. se stst 948 ving been made in Tc

1990, con encas to the envitemant and 953, as amoded (42 U.1C 2201. 2231h esc.

The cicumstances in wh! the NRC anye at information b NRC sta5 ut, as amended. Nh L s7-415,7s stat 40e staff may exercise enforcement dwms necessary befors making e (end $5!4. iC 1. E8 L discedon have been ge$staDy decision to surdu disastion. 4 duebd in pedon VU of the In uch can whm b NRC sta5has g cgjen 2101 a!so leeu+d under secs. 53. 42.63. 81,103.104.105,64 Stat 930. 832 Enforcernont Poli (10 CFR part 2. decided to exsrdu its enforcement $33,935. 9}8. 937. 638. u amended (42 ~ appendix C). In o at to consolidats the discytlon, enforcement ecuan wiu U.S C 2073.2092.2093.2111,2133.21M. desciption of aB circumstances whan corrmally be talan for the root causes, to 213 5), sec.114(f). Pub. L 97-425,96 Stat. anforcement discre*Jon may be the artent violations wan involved, that 2213.as amended (42 U 5 C ttr134:f)h sec. exerdsed into ete location, the led to the noncompliance at luve. Such (f2 ' C\\ 32) eE 2 I

• d Cc;amluton hes determined that a enforcement action la intended to U

discussion of the po,ssibilit of emphastu that Ilcansas should not tely 1.105,2.721 also larued undar secs.102.103-U.S C 58711 Sections 2.102,2.103,2.104, enforcement discretJon for or other licensa condition ten:pliants should on the NRC's authority to axerdne 104,105.183.189. 68 Stat. 934. 837. 338, also be placod in section VD of the enforcament discetjon as a routine 954,955, as amended (42 U.S.C 2132,2133. subrtitute for compUance or for 21M. 2135,2233,22391 Secton 2.105 also Enfortsment Policy. in additjon, Section )ues e licanu amendment. I*rsed ander Pub L 37415. te stat 2073 VID of the Er.forcement Policy is beIng ines is action concerns e general (42 U.S C 22391 Sections 2.200-2.206 the Inodined 1o rnale it clear that actions statement of licy, no "," ".[ht55 requind an, thenfore,pdor notice is talen by bcensee employees punuant to 3 tat 444 this such an exordse of discetion wiU not amended (42 U.S C 2236,1242h sec. 208. 88 msult in enforernent aetJen a modificatJon to the Enforcement Pohey Stat 1246 (42 U.S C 54461 Sections 2.600-individJals invc. ed. Finally, gainst the is effective March 17.1993. 2.606 also Isrued undar sec. It*2. Puh L 91-to reflect the inforrmation co!!ection requinments Paperwork Reduction Act Statement too, g3 stat 853. es amended (42 UJ C of this change, to CTR 2.6 is bein8 ,4332). Sections 2.700s. 2.719 sho usued amended to nfmnot that fact. This PoUcy Statement contains under 5 U.S C 554. Sections 2.754,2.760 The Corimiuien believes that the Information collection requirements that IM 2.780 she latued under S U.S.C 857. exerdse of enforcement discretion in are subject to the Pa erwork Reduction sectwe 2164 and Tabh 1 A ef Appenda C this ana is warranted Io avoid Act of 1980 (44 U.S. 3501 et segl. N I"g"3h"$232. 2/1( 2' 101b,t) Section 2.790 also isrued under sec. 5 unnecassa y plant transants, to reduce These requinments were approved by bod ope stional and shutdown risk. the OfEta of Mana ement and Budget 103. 6a stat. osa, as amended (42 U.S C under control num 73150-0136. 2133) and 5 U.S C 552. Sections 2 soo and and to avoid unnecessary delays in. lant startup where the course of actJon The public rting burden for thle 2.808 sise issued under 5 U.s.C ss3. secnon cellectJon ofin rmstion is estimated Io 1.809 also isrued under 5 U.S.C 553 and sec. volves minimal or no asfety impact g3c}ybe 40 hours per msponng the time for reviewibg (42 U.S C 2039). Subpart K also issued undu evers

29. Pub. L 85-256,71 Stat 57f. as amended and the NRC staffis clutly satis 5ed that the exercise of discetien is consirtent d

sec.149,6a Stat 955142 US.C 2239h see. in81 cti 8' rchl . tinI ata 134. Pub. L 97-425. D6 Stat 2230 (42 U.S C with the ublic health and safat . Exerti of enforcs: Dent discr bon le o urtas, oth'enng an matotalning the 10154). Sabpart L also issued under sec.189. dets n ed, and completin and sa sist e55 (42 U.s C 2239). Appenda A propriate only where the exerciw of reviewing the coUection of formation. iscretion la temporary and also luued undu sec. 6. Puh L es-560. 54 nonrecurring The a prepnate R ictal Send comments regttding this burden Stat.1473 (42 U.S C 2135L Appenda 5 also Adminirtrator cr hi designee mi t estimate or an other aspect of this hsued under uc.10. Pub. L 99-240. 99 Stat. collection of fom'Istion, including 1442 (42 U.S.C 2021b et seq ). nonc mp ia. Is ofsu ruggestions for reducing this burden, to

2. In 6 2.8, paragraph (b)is revised to c.

u on that a license amendment could not be the information and Racerds read as foUows: itsced before the need no longer exirts. '[ f# making it impnctical to amend the t 32.8 information potlection requkemente Ucense. lt may also be a riste t Washington, DC 20555, and to the Desk OW appmat exercise discredom for of period Of5cer, Of$ce ofinformation and of time it requires the NRC staff t Regulatory Affain,NEOB-3019 (3150-De approved informade process an emergency or exigent TS 0136) OfEcs of ManaEement and collection requinments contained in arnendinent under the provisions of to Budget' Wuhington, DC 20503* this rt appear in a di.x C 3. e pendix C, udin reading CMt 50 91(a)(5) or (6) Enforcement List of Subjecta la 10 Cn Part 2 " Table o Contents"is edd direedy disestion in these cases would be exercised by the Director, Of5cs of Administrative practles and before the table of contents and a new Nuclear Reactor Regulation, or his proemdure. Antitrust. Byproduct hasdin for Section VU Cis edded to the material, ClaulBed information.

• Table Contents to rud:

E""i" " * "I'I

• '*C N " # 8'I"*'

censee who requesta the NRC to E d Appendl* C-Ceneral Statement of forego enforcement of a TS or other 8"* 8 " "#[*d Policy and Procedure for NRC bcense condit2on must document the asfety basis for the request, including an Source materiaf Specialnuclear M****""***"* evaluation of the safety si Ificanos and material, Waste trutment and disposal. Tobk etcontents Accordingly, the NRC is adopting the e e e e e is ef c na escnption o foU wing ame uts to 1 part 2..C Ezercin of Discretion for en Opereting compensatory murures, a justincetion PART 2-MULES OF PRACTICE FOR for the duretion of the utst, the basis e e e e for the licensee's concJun on that the DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS

4. In AP request does not have a potential

1. The authority ef tstlen for part 2 '

'd 8 I(oda C Sectkrn YD is edded to adverse impact on the public bulth a.ed continues to rud as fouows: vn. Emerdos erDwenties l J

f },

Faderal Registar / Vol Sa, No. 50 / Webaby. Mard 17. 'l993 / Rules and Repl=%: 14310 0 e o .P t=mainb is the current inode CFR So.54 (sj. La., nn. lass the cperstm acted en b thiod of e.n w annamahly muidwbg au h reevant C Esercaw ofDucweicafsr an Oprodttt , piut trsnMant, cr W 6 T3 cr obdt=== cinumst-eurmunding h m.) -i Focur7 On occasion, cirewnstances may ark conditicro mquires e test insperion or e .e e e em realignment that is inappropriere br pe panimlar plant ccmd;tsoca. in thet ti does w bm a t;c,nue.ecxnplance wia e Deted et R g u,,t3 3,,dvtUe. MaryW dh tod dey I Techcical Specifastlos (TSJ Lhnating s 3' de a safsfy boostt. or may, La het. acs L Condition br C6erodon er with other ljcocae la imental to safety la the particular For De Nuclear Reguhtwy Ccamnleekn. coo 6tiou wedd involve an unnecessary plut condanon. $smesd J. Chak. j p!a.nt trusiant or parkmance of testing,. m dscisico to exarch sniwamen! trupecuoc. cr systa= nafignment that is discetion does not change b fact that e Kecnfary ofthe h" Anappropriate with the speciSc plant con 6 tens. or unw==sary delays le plant violation wiu occur act does !! 1mply bA (FR Dr. 33-4155 Filed 3-1tHB3; 8:45 aml enfcecuto'ent discntion la batc4 exarcised ke 8"*******'***# etartup without e correspondirg health and any violation that mey how bed to the safety bene $t la these circumstances. the violataan et terut in each case where the NRC staf may choou not to enforce the NRC staf has choun to exercin enforcament FEDERAL ELECTON COMMfSS10N opplicable T3 or other lic=ca cnodjucut diac,0cm. enfcircament serion wiu normeDy This enforcament discretion wiU only be be talen br b root causes, to 6 ertems 11 CFR Port 110 exercised if M NRC euf is cMt)y satisSed violations were involved. that led to the ht b uuon is consistent wit.h protecting noncomp!!ance for which anfore=mant E'8888 II*IN the public beeJth end safety A hennase disov'lon was und. m ufortsment actico seeking the exercia of snbremment is intended to emphasize ht !!cansees Transfers of Funds From State to discreca must provida a writren ehould not tily oc the NRC's eitherity to Federal Campaigns justi$ cat,on. cv in circe. stances wher, good era. des enforcement discretice as a routine coun is shcrwn. oralluetiScouon followed es rubru..ste for crunp!1ance or far requesting eAN:Foden! Man Commis4h soon u possible by wntian Juan 5 cation. licenw amudment Acnost: Revised im ementation_ plan whkh doc ments & salv*y basis br the Fmally,it is expected that b NRC staN for new rule go g stets to federal request and provides whatever other w!!! exercin ockscament dlacndon La this transfers. infantinen & NRC eta 5 doe =s necessary in arsa infrequently. Although a plant snust shut making a decision or whatbar or act to down. rsNeling activities may be suspended, emertin emfcecoment discrouccL or plant startup may be dalsyed. ebeent 6e susawry: On January 8,1993 the his deer.ce,priate Res;ecal Admir 1strstcr.or exercer of enforcement discwtion, the NRC Comtnission rvpubtl4ed the text of a The appro may exerew d.acrwuoc wher, etaff is under ce obligation to taka such a new rule governing transfers of 8sh the noncoephancs is temporsry and etep merely because at has been requested. from state to federalcompalps and nonneurrina when an amendment is noe m docues to forero enfortamant is announced that this role ha J been pr3ctical m D. rector. Offica of Nuclear discnuonary. Whare enforcament dimovtion retransmitied to Con sa foc legisletlvs Raamor Rep!abon,or his des pos.mey is so be emarcised,it is to be azercised caly review. $8 FR 3474 .uary 6,1993). t es.arcan dacrrtion if 6 expeaed if b NRC eu5is..hrly utiaSed that euch he new rule prohibits the tisn>N of soccoc:pliance will occur durmg b brief action is warranted from e health end asjety funds frorn state to federal campaiga penod or time it requirn 6 NRC r.aff to perspeafn. committeen. This rule le still pending procen an einergency or exigent lkanse. before Congress. However, the a cendmect utder the provisions of to CFR l 50.91(aK5J cr (6) m person exarnising 5 Appendix C, Section VID is amended by en ft.rtament discwtlon wdl decament the revising the last enrapie under the Commission has rev;eed its plan for

decsinn, pa egrsph involving individual enforcemet [mplementing the runa. Ft.rther Fcr an operating plant. this exerties c(

actions. Tce & con re nienes of & user, the information is Provided in the enforcement d.sovunn is L.ctanded to introduaory parapsph concerning supp;ementary (n70rmation ga,,,;ows. indmdaal enfotomenent actions is nprinted FOfl MJstTHEA sdomTION COeCACT: encimita 6 point.aj aafety cocwquences without chanp. Ms. Susan E. Propper. Assistant General of unoneuary pisnt trvnsier.ts with 6 accortsaryir:g operational risks and impacts VU!. brteament hs 1shg Counsel,999 E Strut NW., or to efi=ar.a:e taseng inspectjnn, or systemInda Mads Washington, DC 20463, (202) 219-3690 reshg:Lment which is tespproprista br the e' e e e or (800) 424-9530. particular plant conditions For p1 acts in a Usted below are eaamples which could SUPPLMMW ##0mT1oes: On shutdown ecodition. emercisicg enfnreamant result in enforceroest salons involetag Jeuery 8,1993, the Commiasion da:ntion is letended to reduce shutdown indMduals. licensed or unheensed If the republisbad the text of a new rule risk by. agaa avoiding testing ir.spection or actions descnbod in thew oxamples are takan governing transfers between etate and rystem realgnrnent whu:.h is inappropriate by a hcer. sed operefor or taken dehbarstely br the particular plant condiuons in tAat.it by en unlicensed individua& enforcament federal campaign committees. and door not provide e earety beneSt or snay,in action ma be taise directly aga.nst the announced that this rub had bwn fact. be detnmental to s4fety in the pamcular indwidu. However, violabons lavoJving retransmitted to Congress for lepslative plant condition f.xarcising enforcement willNI conduct not amountir:g to deliberate tuview. 54 m 3474 (January 8,1993). disention for plants attempting to etartup is action by an unlicensed individual in three The now rule at 11 CFR 110.3(d) will less M ely than eserclsteg it for an opersting situations snay result to enfortament ecHon prohibit transfers of funds or other plant. as simply da!ayicg startup does not egainst the licansse that may imped the assets from e candidate's campaign us ally leave the p! sot in a condition in todiridual N situations inclaie, but are. which it cmld erperience undestrable not limited to, violations that involve-committee or socount for any confederal elec11on to his of her prindpal transients in such cases. the Commfuion would expect that dl.nastion would be WihNily taking actions that violate campaign committee or other authorized esertised with rerpect to equipment a Technical Specincetloc I.imiting Cooditions committee for e federal election. erstems only when it has et least concluded br Operstion or other Ikmum condations Section 438(d) of title 2. United Stotes that, acewshtanding & conditions of b (enforcement action for a wil1NI violation Gde'"9ulrw &&f en{y 6e rW w licenu (1)The equipment or rystern does will not be takan if that violation la the result pgulatloc pmscdbed not perform a safety baction in the mode in of scice talan fonowing & NRC's We.n Commiasion to cany out the provm,,ons whwb ope stion is to curur. (2) the safety to forego enferomment of the Technica] of title 2 be tratumitted Io the Speaker function pe-formed by 6 equipment or Spoofication or other licenw czedaune or it of the House of Representatives and the eptem is of only marginal safery beneat. the operstar meets b requirements of to President of the Senate thirty legislatsve e

'o,, UNITED STATES I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g ,a WASHINGTON, D. C. 20865 k....+/ Novembar 7,1991 TO: ALL NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR LICENSEES AND APPLICANTS SUBJECT INFORMATION TO LICENSEES REGARDING TWO NRC INSPECTION MANUAL SECTIONS ON RESOLUTION OF DEGRADED AND NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS AND ON OPERABILITY (GENERIC LETTER 91-18) The NRC staff has issued two sections to be included in Part 9900, Technical Guidance, of the NRC Inspection Manual. The first is, " Resolution of Degraded and Noncor. forming Conditions." The second is, " Operable / Operability: Ensuring the Functional Capability of a System or Component." Copies of the additions to the NRC Inspection Manual (enclosure) are provided for information only. No specific licensee actions are required. The additions to the NRC Inspection Manual are based upon previously issued guidance.

However, because of the complexity involved in operability determinations and the resolution of degraded and nonconforming conditions, there have been differences in application by NRC staff during past inspection activities.

Thus, the purpose of publishing this guidance is to ensure consistency in application of this guidance by the NRC. Regional inspection personnel have been briefed on this guidance. The NRC will conduct further training on these topics.to ensure uniform staff understanding. The use of this guidance by inspectors may raise backfitting issues for specific licensees. The NRC backfitting procedures apply in such cases. Licensees should consult with the Regional office regarding the application of specific staff positions in the guidance. ) Please contact the appropriate NRC Project Manager if you have any questions regarding this matter. 1\\$ & j James G. Partlow AssbeiateDirectorforProjects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure:

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'l RESOLUTION OF DEGRADED AND NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS 1.0 pVRPOSE AND SC0pE: To provide guidance to NRC inspectors on resolution of degraded and nonconforming conditions affecting the following systems, structures, or components (SSCs): (i) Safety related SSCs, which are those relied upon to remain func*ional during and following design basis events (A) to ensure the integrity of the reactor cool nt pressure boundary, (B) to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, i or (C) to ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite consequences comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. Design btsis events are defined the same as in 10 CFR 50.49(b)(1). (ii) All SSCs whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required functions identified in (1) A, B, and C. (iii) All SSCs relied on in the safety analyses or plant evaluations that are a part of the plant's curt -t licensing basis. Such analyses and i amendment evaluations include those -itted to st.,part lice-a requests, exemption requests. relief requests, and tL;e submitted to demonstrate compliance wiu. the Commission's regulations such as fire protection (10 CFR 50.48), environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49), pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61), anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62), and station blackout (10 CFR 50.63). (iv) Any SSCs subject to 10 CFR Pat 50, Appendix B. (v) Any SSC subject to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1. (vi) Any SSCs explicitly subject to facility Techracal Specifications (TS). ~ (vii) Any SSCs subject to facility TS ti ough the c finition of operability (i.e.,supportSSCsoutsideTS). (viii) Any SSCs described in the FSAR. This guidance is directed toward NRC inspectors that are reviewing actions of licensees that hold an operating license. Although this guidance generally reflects existing staff practices, application on spet ic plants may constitute a backfit. Consequently, significant differences in 1;censee practices should be discussed with NRC management to ensure that the guidance is applied in a reasonable and consistent manr'r for all licensees. Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Degraded Conditions

i i

3.0 BACKGROUND

A nuclear power plant's SSCs are designed to meet NRC requirements, satisfy the current licensing basis, and conform to specified codes and standards. For degraded or nonconforming conditions of these SSCs, the licensee may be required to take actions required by the Technical Specifications (TS)..The provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50 Appendix B, criteria XVI, may apply requiring the licensee to identify promptly and correct conditions adverse to safety or quality. Reporting may be required in accordance with Sections 50.72, 50.73, and 50.9(b) of 10 CFR Part 50, 10 CFR Part 21, and ine Technical Specifications (TS). Collectively, these requirements may be viewed as a process for licensees to develop a basis to continue operation or to place the plant in a safe condition, and to take prompt corrective action. Changes to the facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 may be made as part of the corrective action required by Appendix B. The process displayed by means of the attached chart titled, " Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions," recognizes these and other provisions that a licensee may follow to restore or establish acceptable conditions. These provisions are success paths that enable licensees to continue safe operation of their facilities. 4.0 DISCUSSION OF NOTABLE PROVISIONS 4.1 Public Health and Safety All success paths, whether specifically stated or not, are fiist directed to ensuring public health and safety and second to restoring the systems, structures, or components (SSCs) to the current licensing basis of the plant as an acceptable level of safety. Identification of a degraded or nonconforming condition that may pose an immediate threat to the public health and safety requires the plant to be placed in a safe condition. Technical Specifications (TS) address the safety systems and provide Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Allowed Outage Times (A0Ts) required to ensure public health and safety. 4.2 Ooerability Determinations for guidance on operability see the Inspection

Manual, Part

9900, "0PERABLE/0PERABILITY:

ENSURING THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF A SYSTEM OR COMPONENT," and see the Inspection Manual, Part 9900, " STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS STS SECTION 1, OPERABILITY." 4.3 The Current Licensina Basis and 10 CFR 50. Accendix B 4.3.1 10 CFR 50, Appendix B The design and operation of a nuclear plant is to be consistent with the current licensing basis. Whenever degraded or nonconforming conditions of SSCs subject to Appendix B are identified, Appendix B requires prompt corrective action to correct or resolve the condition. The timeliness of this corrective action should be comensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Degraded Conditions 1

CFR50.54(X)isapplied. A JCO, as defined herein for general NRC purposes, is the licensee's technical basis for requesting NRC responses to such action. 4.5.2 JC0 Definition A Justification for Continued Operation' (JCO) is the licensee's technical basis for requesting authorization to operate in a manner that is prohibited (e.g., outside TS or license) absent such authorization. The preparation of JCOs does not constitute authorization to continue operation. 4.5.3 Items for Consideration in a JC0 Some items which are appropriate for consideration in a licensee's development of a JC0 include: o Availability of redundant or backup equipment o Compensatory measures including limited administrative controls o Safety function and events protected against o Conservatism and margins, and o Probability of needing the safety function. o PRA or Individual Plant Evaluation (IPE) results that determine how operating the facility in the manner proposed in the JC0 will impact the core damage frequency. 4.5.4 Discussion of Industry-Type JCOs Currently, some licensees refer to two other documents or processes as JCOs that are not equivalent to and do not perform the same function as the NRC-recognized JC0 (as defined in 4.5.2). This is an acceptable industry practice and to the extent the industry JC0 fulfills other NRC requirements, the JCOs will be selectively reviewed and audited accordingly. In the first industry type JCO, the licensee may consider the entire process depicted in the attached chart as a single JC0 that includes such things as the basis for operability, PRA, corrective action elements, and alternative operations. ~ In the second industry-type JCO, the licensee may consider the documentation that is developed to support faci:ity operation after the operability decision has been made as a JCO. This documentation can cover any or all of the items listed under " Interim Operation" on the attached chart. ' Regulations, generic letters, and bulletins may provide direction on specific issue JCOs, which do not require that they be submitted. Licensees may also use the JC0 for situations other than for operating in a prohibited manner. The JC0 term has been used in Generic Letters 88-07 on Environmental Qualifications of Electrical Equipment and 87-02 on Seismic Adequacy. Licensees should continue to follow earlier guidance regarding the preparation of JCOs on specific issues. f..... n=4. I n /11/01 .t. 00hn naa*, dad fand4+(ane

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o** **% UNITED STATES c fe' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 2 I WASMINGTON. D. C. 3DM6 I / NRC INSPECTION MANUAL OTSB PART 9900: TECHNICAL GUIDANCE OPERABLE /0PERABILITY: ENSURING THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF A SYSTEM OR COMPONENT 'l 1 i 0 Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Operability

k i.- j OPERABLE /0PERABILITY: j ENSURING THE-FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF A SYSTEM OR COMPONENT .l 1 Table of Contents l 5.0 ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS (continued) 5.6 Timeliness of Corrective Action............................ 7 5.7 Justification for Continued Operation..................... 7. 6.0 DETAILED DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC OPERABILITY ISSUES............... 8 I 6.1 Scope and Timing of. Operability Determinations............. 8 6.2 Treatment of Single Failures in Operability Determinations.............................. 9 6.2.I Definition of Single Failure................... 9 6.2.2 Capability to Withstand a Single Failure is a Design Consideration...................... 9 6.2.3 Discovery of a Design Deficiency in Which Capability to Withstand a Single Failure is Lost...................... 10 6.3 Treatment of Consequential Failures in Operability Determinations............................. 10 6.3.1 Definition of Consequential Failure...........10 6.3.2 Consequential Failures and Operability' Determinations.................... 10 6.3.3 Consequential Failures and Appendix B......... 10 6.4 Operability During TS Surveillances and Preventive Maintenance................................ 10 6.5 Surveillance and Operability Testing in Safety Configuration................................... 11 6.6 Missed Technical Specification Surveillance............... 12 6.7 Use of Manual Action in Place.of Automatic Action.........12 Issue.Date:- 10/31/91-9900 Operability

a OPERABLE /0PERABILITY: ENSURING THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF A SYSTEM OR COMPONENT 1.0 PU; POSE AND SCOPE To provide guidance to NRC inspectors for the review of licensee operability determinations affecting the following systems, structures, or components (SSCs): (i) Safety-related SSCs, which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis events (A) to ensure the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, (B) to ensure the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, or (C) to ensure the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite consequences comparable to the 10 CFR Part 100 guidelines. Design basiseventsaredefinedthesameasin10CFR50.49(b)(1). (ii) All SSCs whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the required functions identified in (i) A, B,.and C. (iii) All SSCs relied on in the safety analyses or plant evaluations that are a part of the plant's current licensing basis. Such analyses and evaluations include those submitted to support license amendment requests, exemption. requests, or relief requests, and those submitted to demonstrate compliance with the Commission's regulations such as fire protection (l' CFR 50.48), environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49), pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61), anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62), and station blackout (10 CFR 50.63). (iv) An; SSCs n bject to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendi B. (v) Any SSCs subject to ]? CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 1. (vi) Any SSCs explicitly subject to facility Technical Specifications (TS). (vii) Any SSCs subject to facility TS through the definition of operability (i.e., support SSCs outside TS). (viii) Any SSCs described in the FSAR. This guidance is directed toward NRC inspectors that are reviewing actions o. licensees that hold an operating license. Although this guidance generally reflects existing staff practices, application on specific plants may constitute a backfit. Pnseqcitly, significant differences in liccuee practices should be discusset -ith h-O management to ensure that the guic ace is ap 'ied in a reasonable an. consistent manner for all licensees.

P s 3.0 STANDARD TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OPERABILITY DEFINITION AND DISCUSSION 3.1 Ooerability Definition The Standard Technical Specifications (STS) define operable or operability as follows: "A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPE.RABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified functions, and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, electrical power, cooling or seal water, lubrication or other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its function (s) are also capable of performing their related support function (s)." 3.2 Variations of Ooerability Definition in plant Soecific TS There are several variations in existing plant specific TS of the above basic definition. Therefore, some judgement is required in application of this guidance on operability. Word differences that exist are not viewed by the NRC to imply any significant overall difference in application of the plant specific TS. Any problems that result from existing inconsistencies between a plant specific definition of operability and this guidance should be discussed with regional management, who should discuss the issues with NRR if deemed necessary. In all cases, a licensee's plant-specific definition is governing. 3.3 Soecified Function (s) The definition of operability refers to capability to perform the "specified functions." The specified function (s) of the system, subsystem, train, component, or device (hereafter referred to as system) is that specified safety function (s) in the current licensing basis for the facility. In addition to providing the specified safety function, a system is expected to perform as designed, tested and maintained. When system capability is degraded to a point where it cannot perform with reasonable assurance or reliability, the system should be judged inoperable, even if at this instantaneous point in time the system could provide the specified safety function. See Section 6.11, which discusses ASME Section XI, for an example. ~ 3.4 Sucoort System Ooerability - Understandino System interrelationshios The definition of operability embodies a principle that a system can perform its specified safety function (s) only when all its necessary support systems are capable of performing their related support functions. Therefore, an NRC inspector should expect that each licensee understands which support systems are necessary to ensure the operability of main systems and components that perform specified safety functions. Such an understanding is mandatory. Otherwise the licensee will not be able to implement the definition of operability. Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Doerability

4 When operability verification or other processes indicate a potential deficiency or loss of quality, licensees should make a prompt determination of operability 1 and act on the results of that determination. The licensee should also restore the quality of the system in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. 5.0 ADDITIONAL GVfDANCE FOR OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS In the course of review activities or through normal plant operation, a licensee may become aware of degraded or nonconforming conditions affecting the SSCs defined in Section 1. These activities include, but are not limited to, the following: o Review of operational events o Design modifications to facilities o Examinations of records o Additions to facilities o Vendor reviews or inspections o Plant system walkdowns. These and other paths for identifying degraded or nonconforming conditions, including reports from industry and other utilities, should result in the prompt identification and correction of the deficiency by the licensee. Licensees should make an operability determination and take follow-on corrective action in the following circumstances: o Discovery of degraded conditions of equipment where performance is called into question o Discovery of nonconforming conditions where the qualification of equipment (such as conformance to codes and standards) is called into question o Discovery of an existing but previously unanalyzed condition or accident. NOTE: For a prev'iously unanalyzed condition or accident that is considered a significant safety concern, but is not part of the design basis, the licensee ray subst ;uently be required to take additional action after consideration of backfit issues ~ (See 10 CFR 50.109 (a)(5)). The following guidance for dealing with issues that are closely associated with operability determinations has been derived from the NRC regulations and from previous guidance issued to licensees. 5.1 Focus on Safety The immediate and primary attention must be directed to safety concerns. Reporting and procedural requirements should not interfere with ensuring the health and safety of the public. To continue operation while an operability determination is being made, the licensee must have a reasonable expectation that the system is operable and that the determination process will support that expectation. i Issue Date: 10/31/91 -5 9900 Operability I

5.4 Determinina Ooerability and Plant Safety is a Continuous Decision-Makina Process Licensees are obligated to ensure the continued operability of SSCs as specified by TS, or to take the remedial actions addressed in the TS. For other SSCs which may be in a degraded or nonconforming condition, it must be determined whether a condition adverse to quality exists and whether corrective actions are needed. Operability is verified, as discussed above, by day to-day operation, plant tours, observations from the control room, surveillances, test programs, and other similar activities. Deficiencies in the design basis or safety analysis or problems identified by the operability verification lead to the operability determination process by which the specific deficiency and overall capability of the component or system are examined. The process, in one form or another, is ongoing and continuous. As a practical matter, decision making requires good information and takes time. However, the process used by licensees should call for prompt and continuous attention to deficiencies and potential system inoperabilities. In addition, the licensee's process should call for immediately declaring equipment inoperable when reasonable expectation of operability does not edst er mounting evidence suggests that the final analysis will conclude thn the equipment cannot perform its specified safety function (s). 5.5 Timeliness of Ooerability Determinations Timeliness of operability determinations should be commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. Once the deficiency has been identified and the specific component or system has been identified, the determination can be made regarding the capability to perform the specified function (s). There is not an explicit requirement in the regulations for the timing of the decision. As discussed fur?,her in Section 6.0, timeliness is important and is determined by the safety sigaificance of the issue. The Allowed Outage Times (A0Ts) contained in TS generally provide reasonable guidelines for safety significance. 5.6 Timelinese of Corrective Action Timeliness of corrective action (i.e., the requirements in 10 CFR Part 50, Apprdix B, Criterion XVI, for " prompt" corrective action) should be commensurate with the safety significance of the corrective action. The determination of operability establishes a basis for plant operation while ~ the corrective action establishes or re-establishes the design basis / qualification of the safety or safety support system. As in Section 5.5 above, there is no explicit requirement in the regulations for timeliness of these corrective actions, except that 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI requires it to be " prompt". Again, timeliness is determined by the safety significance of the issue. 5.7 Justification for Continued Ooeration See the NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, Technical Guidance, " Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions," for guidance on JCOs. Issue Date: 10/31/91 -7 9900 Operability

i o Determine safest plant configuration including the effect of transitional action. o Determine the basis for declaring the affected system operable, through: a. analysis b. test or partial test, c. operating experience, and d. engineering judgement. If an NRC-approved action (such as provided in an LCO action statement) is immediately taken to compensate for failed equipment (e.g., placing one channel of reactor protection in the tripped condition upon failure of the channel such that the specified safety function can be maintained), continued operation of the facility is permitted. However, continued operation with an inoperable channel in the tripped condition is not advisable because a subsequent failure will result in a plant trip that will challenge plant safety systems. It is also not advisable from the standpoint of plant availability. 6.2 Treatment of Sinole Failures in Ooerability Determinations 6.2.1 Definition of Single Failure 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, " General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," defines a single failure as: "A single failure means an occurrence which results in the loss of capability of a component to perform its intended safety functions. Multiple failures resulting from a single occurrence are considered to be a single failure." 6.2.2 Capability to Withstand a Single Failure is a Design Consideration 4 Appendix A contains general design criteria (GDC) for SSCs that perform major safety functions. Many of the GDC contain a statement similar to the following: " Suitable redundancy in components and features and suitable interconnections, leak detection, isolation and containment capabilities shall be provided to assure that for onsite electrical power system operation (assuming offsite power in not available) and for offsite electrical power system operation (assuming onsite power is not available) the system safety function can be accomplished assumino a sinole failure." See, for example, GDC 17, 34, 35, 38, 41, 44. Therefore, capability to withstand a single failure in fluid or electrical systems is a plant-specific design consideration, which ensures that a single failure does not result in a loss of the capability of the system to perform its safety functions. Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Operability

4 Specifications (TS), the PM activity and any other action that may be required by the Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs), is expected to be completed within the Allowed Outage Time (A0T). For safety equipment not subject to the TS either explicitly by direct inclusion in the TS or implicitly through the definition of operability, the licensee's PM activities should be consistent with the importance of the equipment to safety and the function (s) of the equipment and a reasonable time goal should be set to complete the PM. In all cases, care should be exercised in removing equipment from service for PM to avoid accumulating long out of service times of safety trains. The licensee should reestablish operability before the equipment is returned to service. The licensee also may need to reestablish operability for systems or components, in whole or in part, that are actively dependent upon the equipment undergoing the PM activity. The need for testing to reestablish operability should be based on a reasonable judgement about how the inoperable equipment may have been affected. If retesting to reestablish operability is not possible or practicable because of safety concerns, analysis or other means should be used to demonstrate operability. If TS surveillances require that safety equipment be removed from service and rendered incapable of performing its safety function, the equipment is inoperable. The LCO action statement shall be entered unless the TS explicitly direct otherwise. Upon completion of the surveillance, the licensee should verify restoration to operable status of at least those portions of the equipment or system features that were altered to accomplish the surveillance. NOTE: With regard to surveillances or other similar activities (such as inservice testing) that render systems inoperable for extended periods (i.e., those that may exceed the Allowed Outage Time (A0T)), licensees must have prior NRC approval by license amendment for the surveillance requirement or redefine the tests. It is not the intent of surveillances or other similar program requirements to cause unwarranted plant shutdowns or to unnecessarily challenge other safety systems. See "Haintenance - Voluntary Entry into Limiting Conditions for Operation Action Statements te Perform Prev'tive Ma'- ance," NRC Inmnion Manual. Part 9900, Technical Go .c e. ~ 6.5 Surveillance and Ooerability Testina in Safety Confiouration i Hany systems are designed to perform both normal operational and safety functions. It is preferable that both the Technical Specification (TS) surveillance requirement testing and any other operability testing be performed in the same configuration as would be required to perform the safety function, i.e., safety mode. However, testing in the normal configuration or mode of operation may be required for systems if testing in the safety mode will result in unwarranted safety concerns or transients. The mode of operation for the TS surveillance requirements test is usually prescribed and the acceptance criteria are established on that basis. If a system should fail while it is being tested in the safety mode of uperation, the system is to be declared inoperable. For ongoing periodic testing that must 4 Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Operability

l l action in place of automatic action for protection of safety limits to consider equipment operable. This does not preclude operator action to put the plant in a safe condition, but operator action cannot be a substitute for automatic safety limit protection. The licensing of specific plant designs includes consideration of automatic and manual action. While approvals have been granted for either or both type actions, not every combination of circumstan:es has been reviewed from an operability standpoint. Although it is possible, it is not expected that many determinations of operability will be successful for manual action in place of automatic action. Credit for manual initiation to mitigate the consemences of design basis accidents should have been established as part of the licensing review of a plant. For any other situation in which substitution of manual action for automatic action may be acceptable, the licensee's determination of operability with regard to the use of manual action must focus on the physical differences between automatic and manual action and the ability of the manual action to accomplish the specified function. The physical differences to be considered include, but are not limited to, the ability to recognize input signals for action, ready access to or recognition of setpoints, design nuances that may complicate subsequent manual operation such as auto-reset, repositioning on temperature or

pressure, timing required for automatic action, etc.,

minimum manning requirements, and emergency operation procedures written for the automatic mode of operation. The licensee should have written procedures in place and training accomplished on those procedures before substitttion of any manual action for the loss of an automatic action. The assignment of a dedicated operator for manual action is not acceptable without written procedures and a 'ull consideration of all pertinent differences. The consideration of manual action in remote areas also must include the ability and timing in getting to the area, training of personnel to accomplish the task, and occupational hazards to be incurred such a radiation, temperature, chemical, sound, or visibility hazards. One rease' :le te - of the reliability and effectiveness of "nual action / be the a:

val e

'anual action fr the same f nction a' a sir ar ph huerthelesa, :is it.xpected to be t.emporary cordition t il t, automa.ic action can be pr.. ;ptl; :orrected in accor.ance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Correct.ve Action. o 6.8 " Indeterminate" State of Ooerability An SSC is operable when it is capable of performing its specified function (s) and when all necessary support SSCs are also capable of performing their related t support functions. See operability definition and discussion in Section 3.0. Otherwise, the SSC is inoperable. When a licensee has cause to question the operability of an SSC, the operability determination is to be prompt; the timeliness must be commensurate with the potential safety significance of the l 1ssue. The determination process during this time; however, must be predicated on the licensee's reasonable expectation that the SSC is operable and that the prompt determination process will support that expectation. f e e..a n.6e. 16(11/01 .11. 00hh nampsh414tv

The following actions should be taken if a licensee is unable to demonstrate equipment operability: o For inoperable equipment in a system subject to the TS, the licensee shall follow the appropriate action statements. This could require that the plant be shut down or remain shut down. o For inoperable equipment in a system not subject to the TS, the licensee may continue reactor operation if the safety function can be accomplished by other designated equipment that is qualified, or if limited administrative controls can be used to ensure the safety function is performed. 6.11 Technical Soecification Ooerability vs. ASME Code. Section XI Ooerative Criteria The Technical Specifications (TS) normally apply to overall system performance but sometimes contain limiting values for certain component performance, which are specified to ensure that the design basis and safety analysis is satisfied. The values (e.g., pump flow rate, valve closure time, valve leakage rate, safety / relief valve set point pressure) are operability verification criteria. If these values are not met at any time, the applicable LCO shall be entered. The ASME Section XI inservice testing plans required under 10 CFR 50.55(a) for pumps and valves may contain the same or different limits and additional component performance acceptance values which, if not met, will indicate that the pump or valve has seriously degraded so that corrective action would be required to ensure or restore the operability and operational readiness of the pump or valve. The ASME Section XI acceptance criteria include " required action ranges" or limiting values for certain component performance parameters. These required action ranges or limiting values as defined by the code as component performance parameters, may be less conservative than the TS values which are safety analysis limits. However, action must be taken yhen the TS requirements are not met. Generic Letter 89-04 Attachment 1, Position 8, defines the starting point for the Allowed Outage Time (A0T) in TS action statements for ASME Section XI pumps and valves. When performance data fall in the required action range, regardless of whether the limit is equal to or more conservative than the TS limit, the pump or valve must be declared inoperable immediately (the term " inoperative" is used i in the text of ASME Section XI; the pump or valve is both " inoperative" and inoperable) and the TS action statement for the associated system must be entered. In cases where the required action range limit is more conservative than its corresponding TS limit, the corrective action may not be limited to replacement or repair; it may be an analysis to demonstrate that the specific performance degradation does not impair operability and that the pump or valve will still fulfill its function, such as delivering the required flow. A new required action range may be established after such analysis which would then allow a new determination of operability. 1 e e n .e se e se e ee amaa A.. ..bf9J&.. e

Technical Specification (TS) system is capable of performing its specified function (s) with an inoperable support system that is not in the TS, then no additional action outside of restoring the inoperable support systems is needed. Furthermore, the licensee may modify the support function like any other change to the facility by use of the 10 CFR 50.59 process and FSAR update. For some support systems, there are specific Allowed Outage Times (A0Ts) specified in the TS. Ideally, the A0T contained in the TS for a support system should be equal to or less than the A0T for any system for which that support system is reouired for system operability. Problems where inconsistencies exist between an A0T for a support system and the A0T for a system for which that support system is required should be discussed with regional management who should discuss the issue with NRR if deemed necessary. While such inconsistencies are being resolved, the more restrictive A0T should be used. In some cases an amendment to the TS may be necessary. In all cases, the following principles should be used: a.' The most important safety concern is to ensure that the capability to perform a specified safety function is not lost as a result of more than one train of a support or supported system being declared inoperable. When a support or supported system is declared inoperable in one train, the corresponding independent support or supported systems and all other associated support systems in the opposite train (s) should be ensured to be operable; i.e., the complete capability to perform the specified safety function has not been lost. The term " ensure" as used here, allows for an i administrative check by examining logs or other information to determine if required features are out-of service for maintenance or other reasons. j These actions are not to be used in lieu of required TS actions. b. Upon determining that a loss of functional capability condition exists, actions specified in the support and supported system LCOs should be taken to mitigate the loss of functional capability. 6.13 Picino and Pine Sucoort Recuirement_s All piping and pipe supports found to be degraded or nonconforming should be subjected to an operability determination. To assist licensees in the determinations, operability guidance has been provided specific to various components. These components include the piping, supports, support plates, and anchor bolts. IE Bulletin No. 79-14 addressed the seismic analysis for as-build safety-related piping systems. The supplement to IE Bulletin 79-14 dated August 15, 1979 and Supplement 2 to IE Bulletin 79-14 dated September 7, 1979 provide additional guidance. Concrete anchor bolts and pipe supports are addressed with specific operability criteria in Supplement I to Revision 1 of IE Bulletin 79-02. The criteria for evaluating operability of seismic design piping supports and anchor bolts relating to Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 are detailed in the E. Jordan memo to the Regions dated July 1979, and the V. Noonan memo dated August 7,1979. Upon discovery of a nonconformance with piping and pipe supports, licensees may use the criteria in Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Code for operability determinations. These criteria and use of Appendix F are valid until the next refueling outage when the support (s) are to be restored to the FSAR criteria. Issue Date: 10/31/91 9900 Operability

4 6.15 Doerational teakaoe If leakage develops in the reactor cool ant system, there are additional requirements. The Technical Specifications (TS) do not permit any pressure boundary leakage. The Operational Leakage Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) must be entered upon discovery of pressure boundary leakage; therefore, an operability determination is not appropriate. Article NB-2121 of Section III of the ASME Code excludes code requirements from materials not associated with the pressure retaining function of a component, such as packing and gaskets. However, leakage from the reactor coolant system is limited to specified values in the TS depending on whether the leakage is from identified, unidentified, or specific sources such as the steam generator tubes er reactor coolant system pressure isolation valves. If the leakage exceeds the TS limits, the LCO must be entered. For reactor coolant system leakage within the limits of the TS, the licensec should determine operability for the degraded component and include in the determination the effects of the leakage onto other components and materials. Furthermore, the regulations and TS require that the structural integrity of ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 components be maintained according to Section XI of the ASME Code. If a leak is discovered in a Class 1, 2, or 3 component in the conduct of inservice inspections, maintenance activities, or during plant operation, IWA-5250 of Section XI requires corrective measures be taken based on repair or replacement in accordance with Section XI. In addition, a through-wall flaw does not meet the acceptance criteria in IWB-3600. Upon discovery of leakage from a Class 1, 2, or 3 component pressure boundary (i.e., pipe wall, valve body, pump casing, etc.) the licensee should declare the component inoperable. The only exception is for Class 3 moderate energy piping as discussed in Generic Letter 90-05. For Class 3 moderate energy piping, the licensee may treat the system containing the through-wall flaw (s), evaluated and found to meet the acceptance criteria in. Generic Letter 90-05, as operable until relief is obtained from the NRC. 6.16 Structural Reouirements Category I structures and supports (referred to herein as structures) which are subject to periodic surveillance and inspection in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specifications (TS) shall be considered operable if the limits stipulated in the TS are met. If these limits are not met, the Limiting Condition for Operations (LCOs) are to be entered for the affected structure. If the degradation affects the ability of the structure to provide the required design support for systems attached to the structure, an operability determination must be performed for these systems as well. Degradation affecting Category I structures include, for example, concrete cracking and spalling, exec:sive deflection or deformation, water leakage, rebar corrosion, missing or bent anchor bolts, etc. If these degradations are identified in Category I structures which are not subject to periodic istua nata-10/11 /o1 -19 9900 Ooerability}}