ML20148U574
| ML20148U574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/27/1988 |
| From: | Matchett S HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#188-5482 OL-3, NUDOCS 8802040061 | |
| Download: ML20148U574 (37) | |
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i C M/f2 LILCO, January 27,1980 4
C0t.KE ten UNITED STATES OF A5fERICA NC NUCLEAR REGULATORY C051511SSION 1B FEB -1 P4 :08 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 0FFICE Ci !!u, jg, 00CM[t Ng 6 5t4,c7*
BRANCH In the 51atter of
)
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO51PANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
) (EDS Issue)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO'S OBJECTIONS TO INTERVENORS'"E51ERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTION RELATING TO LILCO'S NEW E51ERGENCY BROADCAST SYSTE51 PROPOSAL" On January 12, 1988, Interve7 ors filed their "Emergency Planning Contention Relating to LILCO's New Emergency Broadcast System Proposal" (Contention).M Al-though styled as a single contention, Intervenors' 10-page filing actually consists of a preamble followed by four contentions with nine subparts. These contentions purport to address "LILCO's new provisions" for radio transmission of EBS messages and activation of tone alert radios. Contention at 1.
For the reasons set forth below.
LILCO objects to the admission of these contentions.
1. Background
The Shoreham EBS mntinues to be an open issue only Neause the record was re-opened as a result of WALK Radio's withdrawal from the system. LILCO originally relied upon WALK-FS1 and -A51 to trigger a Shcreham-only EBS, which then consisted of WALK and 11 other local radio stations. _See Long Island Lightinz Co. (Shoreham Nu-clear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644 at 704 (1985) ("P!D"). WALK was t/
The service certificate attached to Intervenors' contentions states that the con-tentions were served by mail on January 12, 1988. However, LILCO did not in f act re-ceive them until January 19.
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8802040061 000127 PDR ADOCK 05000322 5
0 PDR Q
e 2-O to broadcast EBS messages upon receipt of a phone call from LERO (or the State or County) giving an authenticat!on number, in addition to broadcasting the messages itself, WALK's signal would automatically alert the broadcasting facilities of the 11 other radio stations, which would in turn broadcast the same messages simultaneously 4
i over their own frequencies or tape the messages for later broadcast. Ld. WALK's signal would also activate tone alert radios that LILCO had provided to special facilities such as schools, hospitals, nursing homes, handicapped f acilities and large employers, to pro-vide those f acilities with a third means of notification of a Shoreham emergency (in ad-dition to sirens and LERO phone calls). P!D at 759-60.
Intervenors filed only two contentions challenging the WALK-led EBS. Conten-tion EP 20 alleged that since LILCO relied on WALK-FS! and -Ah! to !:roadcast EDS messages, and WALK-Ah! did not normally operate at night, persons without FS1 radios would be unable to hear the messages at night. PID at 763. Contention EP 57 alleged that the tone alert system was f aulty for the same reason, he, that the tone alert ra-2 dios could not be activated by WALK-Ah! at night. Ld. at 759-60. The Board decided both contentions in LILCO's f avor, finding that WALK-A31 and the other participating stations were all prepared to broadcast EDS messages (and, in WALK's case, activate tone alert radios) at any time, day or night. Ld. at 760,764 E The Board dismissed sev-eral issues raised for the first time by intervenors in their proposed findings, namely.
WALK's range of coverage, the need for station management to approve nighttime broadcasting, and technicalttles concerning applicable FCC regulations. Ld. Interve-nors did not challenge these findings before the Appeal Board.
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As the Board noted. Contention EP 57 missed the mark because it mentioned WALK-Ah! as the station that would trigger the tone alerts, when in f act WALK-FS!
would trigger them. PID at 760 n.2.
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WALK Radio withdrew from the Shoreham EDS on September 16,1986.E Upon motion by the Intervenors, the Commission reopened the EBS issue with instructions to the Licensing Board to admit "new" contentions "only to the extent they assist in fo-cusing further the litigation on earlier-admitted issues, and only af ter LILCO provides updated information on public notification procedures." CLI-87-05, 25 NRC (June !!,1987), s_jlp oJ. at 10.
LILCO provided the "updated information" on its EBS or November 6,1987, and moved this Board to grant summary disposition, See LILCO's Motion for Summary Dis-position of the WALK Radio Issue, November 6,1987. The Board denied LILCO's motion as premature, without addressing in detail the merits of the motion or the technical documents attached in support. N imorandum and Order (Ruling on Applicant's Motion of November 6,1987 for Summary Disposition of the WALK Radio Issue), December 21, 1987, liowever, the Board permitted Intervenors to file new contentions only "on a limited basis," explaining as follows:
The issues concerning public notification procedures that were previously litigated in this proceeding concerned the ad-equacy of the emergency plan's provision for radio tran: mis-sion of EBS messages and activation of tone alert radios. Any new contentions must focus on these issues as they are im-pacted by LILCO's new arrangements for conducting emer-gency notifications.
Id. at 5.
Consistent with the Board's Dec. 21 Memorandum and Order, then, Intervenors' contentions are admissible only to the extent they address the impact of the substitu-tion of WPLR for WALK on the adequacy of LILCO's arrangements for radio transmis-sion of EBS messages and activation of tone alert radios. In addition, however, it is 3/
The history of WALK's withdrawal and the subsequent reopening of the record are set out more fully in LILCO's November 6,1987 Motion for Summary Disposition of the WALK Radio issue.
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! i L!LCO's position that to be admissible, the contentions must raise issues that are spe-cific to the new radio stations. That is, contentions that raise generic issues that Inter-venors could have raised earlier (in connection with WALK) but did not, should not be i
admitted now. See CLI-87-05, sig op, at 10. Only contentions that address relevant 1
system changes and their etfeet on compliance with NRC regulations, and that raise is-sues that (1) were in fact litigated earlier or (2) could got have tan litigated earlier should be admitted in this reopened proceeding.
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!!. Admissibilltv Standards j
Intervenors must set forth the bases of proffered contentions with "reasonable specificity." 10 C.F.R. S 2.714(b). The purposes of this requirement are as follows:
1.
to help assure that the hearing process is not improp-erly invoked, for example, to attack statutory require-j ments or regulations; i
2.
to help assure that other parties are sufficiently put on notice so that they will know at least generally what 4
they will have to defend against or oppose:
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to assure that the proposed issues are proper for adju-J dication in the particular proceeding ~ 12 generalized l
views of what applicable policies ought to be are not l
proper fer adjudication:
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to assure that the contentions apply to the f acility at
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to assure that there has been sufficient foundation as-
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signed for the contentions to warrant further explora-
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l tion.
f GPU Nuclear Corporation (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1 ), LBP-36-10,23 1
NRC 283 at 285 (1986), cMnj Philadelphia Electric Co, (Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3), ALAB-216,8 AEC 13,20-21 (1974).
l In deciding whether these criteria are met, a licensing board does not consider whether the proposed contentions have merit. Alabama Power Co. (Joseph M. Farley l
f Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-183. 7 AEC 210,216 (1974). The regulations do not
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i require intervenors to detail the evidence that will be offered to support the conton-tions. Mississippl Power & Light Co. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB 130,6 AEC 423,426 (1973), However, intervenors are required to give a "reason-i able explanation or plausible authority" for f actual assertions, Cleveland Electric illuminating Co, (Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-81-24,14 NRC 175, 184 (1981); they must "assign reasons for [ their) belief," See Houston Lighting and j
Power Co. (Allen's Creek Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1) ALAB-590,11 NRC 542, r
548 (1980). This means that an intervenor cannot simply make bare allegations that the emergency plan is deficient; he is obliged to supply some cognizable support for his charges, by either citing or providing to the board and other parties the documents on P
which the contention (s) are based. See Phtfadelphia Electric Co, (Limerick Generating l
Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-804,21 NRC 587 at 593-94 (1985).
I Finally, the specific bases for a contention must be provided in the contention itself, and cannot be lef t to later development, Philadelphia Electric Co, (Limerick j
Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB 845,24 NRC 220,235,241 n. 24 (1986). Com-T i
i mission regulations "do not allow the filing of vague, unparticularized contentions, to be I
followed by an attempt to flesh them out through discovery of Applicant or Staff."
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Carolina Power & Light Co. (H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2), Docket No, i
1 50-261-OLA (April 12,1983)(unpublished), citing Duke Power Co,(Catawba Nuclear Sta-f l
t tion, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-687,16 NRC 460 (1982), This is especially true where, as i
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here, the contentions are drawn by counsel experienced in NRC practice. Pacific Gas
& Electric Co, (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-21,23 NRC
)
849 at 852 (1936).
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!!!. _L_egal Standards for EBS Systems A pervasive deficiency in the new contentions is that, even if accepted as true, they do not show a failure to meet NRC regulations, indeed, though Intervenors have cited the regulations, they have ignored their substance.
To meet NRC regulations LILCO need only show "means to provide early notifi-cation and clear instructions to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emer-gency Planning Zone." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(5). This means "administrative and physical means." 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E 5 IV.D.3.M in their contentions Intervenors raise numerous spurious issues that have no basis whatsoever in these NRC regulations. Their contentions have been draf ted to standards of their own making, not to NRC regulations. For example, they claim that the EBS station or system must "be generally known and listened to by the public"(Contention y
Guidance for satisfying these requirements F ornvided in NUREG 0654, Supp.1, 5 ll.E.5 and 6, in Appendix 3 thereto. and in FEM A-REP-10. Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, Chapter 1 (November 1985).
NUREG-0654 55 !!.E.5 and E.6 state as follows:
- 5. The of fsite response organization shall establish a system for disseminating to the public appropriate information contained in initial and followup messages received from the licensee including the appropriate notification to appropri-ate broadcast media, e_.L., the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).
- 6. The of fsite response organization shall establish admints-trative and physical means, and the time required for noti-fying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone. The offsite response organization shall have the administrative and physical means to activate the system.
NUREG-0654, Supp.1. "Criteria for Utility Offsite Planning and Preparedness Draf t Report for Interim Use and Comment," at 11 (Nov.1987). The only sut2stantive criteria that FEMA-REP-10 adds are that the transmission signal of the broadcast station must be of adequate strength in the coverage area (the 10-mile EPZ) and that "capability ex-ists to broadcast official information 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 7 days a week." FEM A-R E P-10.
Chap.1, at E.1-6.
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t 1.D and 2.B); that it must be "credible" and "authoritative" (Contention 1.E and 2.B);
that it must provide coverage to areas beyond the 10-mile EPZ, including the entire 50-j mile ingestion pathway (Contention 1.A.1.B.1.E. 2.A. 2.B. 2.C. and 3); and that it must have the capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> AM and FM coverage (Contention 1.C. 2.A. and 3).
None of these ideas can be found in the regulations; none can be found in the guide!!nes 2
of NUREG-0654. The Intervenors' contentions, therefore, are simply not relevant to l
l what the regulations require, which is that LILCO has a means to provide 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> noti-t l
l fication and instruction to the public in the 10-mile EPZ. The Board should not permit 1
Intervenors to expand the scope of that limited inquiry.
1 IV. LILCO's Objectio. 3 LILCO's objections to the EBS contentions f all into 5 general categories, which can be summarized as follows:
i Relevance.
Specified portions of the contentions are irrelevant to whether
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LILCO's EBS arrangements satisfy NRC requirements. Within this category, there are
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two specific ways in which most of Intervenors' contentions are irrelevant:
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a.
WALK Comparisons. Throughout their contentions, In-
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tervenors attempt to hold WPLR to certain alleged WALK standards or characteristics. Such comparisons are not rele-l t
I vant to whether LILCO's current EBS satisfies NRC regula-I tions.E
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b.
Outside EPZ. Intervenors also attempt to hold LILCO
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4 to a coverage standard not founded in the regulations. As 4
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Intervenors sing the praises of WALK radio in their contentions, describing it as
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l "Long Island's most powerful radio station, the one most listened to, and the one most l
regularly relied upon for local and emergency information." and concluding that "WALK has a high degree of visibility, credibility and f amiliarity to Long Island residents."
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Contentions at 4. It is ironic that the station Intervenors opposed vigorously in 11tiga-j tion has now become the yardstick by which they would have the Board measure others.
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discussed above, the regulations require only that LILCO show broadcast coverage within the 10-mile EPZ. not beyond. 10 C.F.R S 50.47(bX5) and Part 50, App. E.IV.D 3.
Ba_ sis. The contention either lacks f actual basis in that it f alls to give "a reason-able explanation or plausible authority" for its assertions, or the contention lacks legal basis in that it challenges NRC regulations or there is no regulatory requirement for that which the contention alleges is lacking or delicient.
Specificity. The contention is not suf fielently precise to f airly apprise the other parties of what Intervenors seek to litigate.
Reopens _Old Issues. The Intervenors raise an issue that was litigated conclu-l sively or that could have been litigated in the WALK hearing but was not.
Redundant. The contention repeats other contentions.
I LILCO sets out a subpart-by-subpart analysis of the contentions below.
Contention 1 (preamble and legal citations)
Paragraph 1 of the contention states that "the Plan f atis to comply with 10 C.F.R. SS 50.47(aX1), (bX5) and (bX6),10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E SS IV.D.2 and 3 NUREG-0654 55 !!.E.5 and E.6 and Appendix 3 thereto, and FEStA-REP-10."
Intervenors' reference to 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D.2 is inapposite here. That section refers only to the public information brochure that is disseminated yearly to the public. The brochure is not at issue in this proceeding. Storeover.10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (bX6)0# goes to communications among emergency response orgar.ita-tions and personnel and therefore is not directly relevant to "radio transmission of EBS messages and activation of tone alert radios." See NUREG-0654 5 l!.F (Evaluation 6/
10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (bh6) requires that "provisions extst for prompt communica-tions among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the pub-11e."
9 criteria do not mention communications to the public). Finally, although 10 C.F.R.
$ 50.4Na)(1) is generally applicable to the extent the Board must decide whether the LILCO Plan provides the requisite "reasonable assurance," it is not helpful in de-termining the adequacy of LILCO's EBS arrangements.
Contention 1.A (WPLR's broadcast signal is too weak)
Bas _is. Contention 1.A is objectionable in its entirety because Intervenors f all to state any support for the allegation that "WPLR's broadcast signal is too weak to con-voy a strong and clear broadcast message throughout the EPZ and surrounding areas."
In f act, there is no basis for this statement, a3 shown in attachments 5 and 6 to LILCO's summary disposition motion on the WALK Radio issue. As shown in those sworn studies, 1
which Intervenors did not attempt to dispute, WPLR provides futi coverage to the 10-I mile EPZ.
i Basis: WALK CompartvLn Intervenors' comparison of the power levels of WPLR i
and WALK in the second and third sentences is irrelevant. Moreover, Intervenord do not provide any basts for their purported connection between WPLR's power rating and the assertion that WPLR's signal is too weak. In f act, there is no direct connection.
WPLR and WALK are tnth Class B f acilities under FCC regulations, meaning that they are equivalent f acilities. This 13 because pcwer ratings are offset by antenna heigh:s, and WPLR has a higher transmitting antenna than does WALK. Thus, the corte.ition's i
bare comparison of broadcasting power is meaningless, l
I putside EPZ. LILCO objects specif teally to the inclusion of the phrase "and sur-rounding areas" to the contention because that phrase constitutes a cha!!enge to the regulations. The Commission's regulations require only a "means to provide early noti-fication and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway," not beyond.
No NRC regulation requires a capability for troadcast coverage of "sur-roundlet areas."
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Contention t.B_(Long Island geography exacerbates weak signal) i r
Basis. Contention 1.B is objectionable in its entirety because Intervenors do not state any support for their allegations that the Long Island geography "exacerbates the weakness of WPLR's broadcast signal." or that "the hilly landscape of the north shore..
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. diminish [es) the quality of reception of WPLR's signal." in f act, there is no basis. As L
f shown in the sworn engineering studies that are attachments 5 and 6 to L!LCO's sum-mary disposition motion, which Intervenors did not attempt to d!spute, WPLR provides I
full broadcast coverage to the entire EPZ.
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Outside EPZ. LILCO objects specifically to the inclusion of the phrase "and around the EPZ because, for the reasons stated in LILCO's response to Contention 1.A.
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there is no legal requirement for EBS broadcast coverage beyond, or "around," the 10-mile EPZ.
Contention 1.C (WPLR has no A51 broadcastinLab_ility)
Bas _is. Contention 1.C lacks b.tsis for two reasons. First, no NRC regulation or
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guidance document requires 24 hour-a-day A51 and F51 coverage.
Appendix 3 to NUREG-0654 states that an emergency plan should include "a capability for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day alerting and notification." NUREG-0654, App. 3 at 3-1.
Likewise, FESt A-REP-10 t
says that EBS stations and systems should be selected such that a "capability exists to
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broadcast official information 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, 7 days a week." FE5t A REP-10 at E-2 i
I (Nov.1985). Therefore, the f act that WPLR is an F51 station says nothing about wheth-l er ULCO's arrangements show "a capability to issue warning messages on a 24-nour
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Second, Intervenors f ail to mention in Contention 1.C anything about the seven
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I Ah! radio stations in the Shoreham EBS, although they refer to them in other conten-i tions. Thus, the f act that WPLR has no A51 broadcasting capability does not prove that "LILCO fails to comply with the requiremu that there be a capability to issue warning messages on a 24-hour basis". since there are seven stations that provide Of coverage.
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I WALK Comp _atisoj). The second sentence of Contention 1.C, stating that WALK l
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could broadcast on AM by flipping a switch, is irrelevant to whether WPLR satisifies 1
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NRC regulations.
i Contention 1.D (WPLR has lowlo_ng Island listenershipj I
Hasis.
Contention 1.D lacks any basis in NRC regulations.
Title 10 C.F.R. 1
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S 50.47(b)(5) requires only a "means* to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace in the 10 mile EPZ. NeLiter that section nor any other requires a 11-l l
eensee to show that its EBS station (s) is the most popular or most listened-to in the 10-l m!!e area. See NIJREG-0654, App. 3 at 3-13 ("The Emergency Broadcast System exists d
i to furnish an expedited means of furnishing reat time communications to the public in l
the event of war, threat of war, or grave national, or regional or local crisis.")
l Relevance. "Listenership" is not relevant to an ELS station's adequacy. This is l
espeelally true given the fact, acknowledged in the PID, that the public will be told be-i I
forehand which radio stations comprise the Shoreham EBS and thus which stations they should turn to during an emergency.
As the Board found, several components of 1
LILCO's public information program, including the brochure, refrigerator magnets, i
glove box stlekers, and stickers in commercial establishments, will identif y the EBS sta-I tions. See P!D at 765-66.
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WALK Comparison. The last sentence of Contention 1.D. conecrning WALK's i
i listenership rate, is irrelevant.
i Contention 1.E (EBS station must be authoritative, credible, reliablegeurate) j j
Basis. Contention 1.E lacks b,Lsts for the same reasons 1.D does, latervenors j
have not given a "reasonable explanation or plausible authority' for the contention, j
They have provided no support for their opinion that "an EBS station must also be per-ceived by the public as one likely and able to broadcast authoritative, accurate, reliable i
l and credible information." and their opinion is not grounded in NRC requirements. It is i
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true that Intervenors have given reasons (IHi!!) for their assertion that WPl.R would not be deemed "credible, authoritative, accurate, or reliable." But Intervenors have not given any basis for the underlying premise ~ that a,J1y E3S station itself "must be per-eeived by the public as one likely and able to broadcast authoritative, accurate, reliable and credible information."
ReJevacc. There is no legal requirement that LILCO choose an EBS station that e
l is "perecived by the pub!!c as one likely and able to broadcast authoritative, accurate reliable and credible information." NRC regulations require only that LILCO show that its plan includes "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the popu-
! ace within the plume exposure path vay Emergency Planning Zone."
10 C.F.R. 5 50.4NbX5). Intervenors are attempting to read into the regulations additional re-quirements that the NRC (and FEMA, in its guidance documents) have never estab-lished.I#
Outside EPZ As a separate matter, the phrase "and around"(referring to people outside the EPZ) on page 4 of the contentions must be excluded as imposing require-ments beyond those of the regulations, which require only the provision of notification and clear instruction to people within the 10 mile EPZ.
WAL>LQomparBon. The last two sentences of Contention 1.E and their accom-panying footnote 3 are inadmissible because WALK's characteristics, and the agreement between LILCO and WALK, are irrelevant.
Reopens Old issu_es. Contention 1.E Jgain attempts to raise the issue of the credibility and re!! ability of emergency information and instructions broadcast by LILCO's EBS station. But the credibility of LILCO and its EBS messages was fully I/
The pre-emergency market pasition of a station Ls not a criterion for an EBS station. The only relevant criterion is its technical capacity to broadcast information during an emergency.
l litigated in the Plan hearings. P!D at 687-98, and the credibility of LILCO's EDS mes-sages was again litigated under the cuspicos of Contentions EX 38 and 39 in the Exer-l else (OL-5) proceeding. A decision on the Exercise issues is still pending. Intervenors l
now try to raise the issue of the credibility gf the radin station itself, for which there is l
l no NRC requirement. This is nothing more than the same e edibility package in ditfer-l ent wrappinI. The Board should exclude it.
l Contention 1.F (WPLR not a local station) l ILasjs. Contention 1.F is devoid of legal foundation, it purports to say that LILCO's re!!ance on a Connecticut radio station as the lead EBS station violates NRC regulations, elting 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Appendix E.!V.D.2. But nowhere in the cited pro-l vision has the NRC prescribed the location of participating EBS stations, or proscribed j
out-of-state stations from serving as EBS stations for another state. All Appendix E.!V.D.2 sa)3 is that the public information brochure should list "local broadcast sta-tions that will be used for dissemination of information curing an emergency." The reg-u!ations do not define the term "local."nor do they even require the lead EBS station to be a "local' station.0# Thus, there is no legal basis for the claim that WPLR is not a local station, or that WPLR's inclusion in the Shoreham EBS is incomistent with NRC regulations.E#
Contention 2.A JEBS has eapljrtnjjth time AM coveragej l
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Indeed, the lead station (CPCS-1) for the State EBS for Long Island is WCBS, which is located in New York City, approximately 70 miles from Shoreham. In addition, as Intervenors know full well from information obtained from FEMA the EBS gateway stations and some other stations affiliated with the EBS network for the Artifielat 1s-land (Salem) plant in New Jersey taiso in FEMA Region 2) are in Delaware. Those sta-tions have not been excluded as "non-local" stations.
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Even if the Board were to determine that Contention 1.F is admissible, the issue raised is a legal. not a f actual one, and it should te addrefsed in legal briefs, not eviden-tiary hearings,
Datt!. LILCO objects to Contention 2.A for the same reason it objected to Con-tention 1.C. Le, the contention lacks legal foundation. No NRC regulation requires a a
!!censee to show a capaelty for 24 hour-a-day AM and FM coverage of the 10-mile EPZ.
All that is required is "a capacity for 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day alerting and notification."
NUREG-0654, App. 3 at 31: FEMA-REP 10 at E-2. LILCO submits that WPLR by itself has this capacity, as shown in the supporting documents attached to LlLCO's summary disposition motion.
Outside EPZ. LILCO objects specifically to the inclusion of the phrase "and around" in the fourth sentence of Contention 2.A. The phrase "and around" raises the issue of broadcast reception outside the 10-mile EPZ and thus goes beyond regulatory requirements, which require only a means to provide notification and clear instruction to people inside the EPZ.
WALK ComparisonL eopens _Old Msues. The last sentence of Contention 2.A is R
not relevant. The only inquiry here is whether WPLR satisfies NRC regulations. Thus, the replations are the proper guidepost, not the capabilities of WALK.
C_ontention 2.B (EBS has low listen _ership;is r.ot credible, authoQtative etej u
Das_is1 elevance. Contention 2.8 lacks legal basis because there is no NRC regu-R lation or guidance document which imptses Lny listenership criteria for EDS stations, much less that EBS stations should be the ones with the highest ratings. All the regula-tions require is that LILCO show a "means to provide early notification and clear in-struction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency P!anning Zone." 10 C.F.R. $ 50.4Nb45); Part 50 App. E.!V.D 3.
The popularity, ilstenership, credibility, authoritativeness, and rating of EBS stations are spurious tssues with no rel-evance to or underpinnings in N R C requirements.
. Reopens Old usues. LILCO also objects to Contention 2.B in that it attempts to litigate, for the third time, the credibility of emergency information or instructior.s.
See LILCO's objection to Contention 1.E.
WALK Comparison. Intervenors' comparison (in the second, fourth, and fif th sentences) of the current EBS stations with stations no longer in the system is not role-
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vant to whether the current system satisfies the regulations.
Contention 2,C (EBS does not eqver ingestion pathway) 4 Basis:Outside EPZ. Contention 2.C says that the Shoreham EBS is inadequate to broadcast information to people in the 50-mlie ingestion pathway to the west of the 10-mile EPZ. This claim is nothing but a challenge to the regulations. As noted previous-ly, the applicable NRC requirement is that LILCO show a "means to provide early noti-a fication and clear instruction to the populace within the ohme exposure pathway EPZ."
10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5)(emphasis added); Part 50, App. E.IV.D.3.
Moreover, the legal citations in Contention 2.C do not support Intervenors' claim. Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed
{
and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion expo-sure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been devel-l oped.
This section imposes no reqJirements on the EBS sytem; it or.ly requires that protective actions for the ingestion pathway be "developed"in advance of an emergency. Nothing in NUREG-0654 S II.J.11 suggests anything else. Clearly, its thrust is that the offsite response organization must specify protective actions for the ingestion pathway, not EBS coverage.
4 Reopens Old issues. The last sentence on pp. 7-8 is objectionable because it is j
simply a gratuitous attempt to relitigate whether LILCO can "control the content and flow of emergency information and EBS messages." That precise matter was squarely at issue in the Exercise (OL-5) hearings on Contentions EX 38 and 39. A copy of those conterations is Attachment 1 to this pleading. A decision by the Frye licensing Board on i
that and other Exercise issues is pending, a
i i
1
Contention 3 (shadow phenomenon from inside and outside EPZ)
Reopens Old Issues. Contention 3 should be rejected in its entirety because it attempts to relitigate "shadow phenomenon," this time in the context of EBS coverage.
The attention, time, and resources devoted to the "shadow phencmenon" issue in this proceeding can only be described as excessive. Testimony on the "shadow phenomenon" was filed by both LILCO and Suffolk County in the onsite ("Phase I") portion of this pro-ceeding in 1982. In 1983 and 1984 testimony on the "shadow phenomenon" was filed again, and this time heard, under Contention 23. At that time the Intervenors claimed that fear of radiation would cause a large "shadow phenomenon." They also alleged, in connection with Contentions 23 and 15, that LILCO's lack of "credibility" would affect the "shadow." These issues were fully litigated. See PID, 21 NRC 655-71, 687-701 (1985). At the same time, the Intervenors claimed, in Contention 22, that the "shadow phenomenon" required an expansion of the plume EPZ, a claim that was only recently put to rest by the Commission. CLI-87-12, slip op, at 5-17 (Nov. 5,1987).
Last spring the Intervenors were again allowed to litigate their "Shadow phenom-enon" claims in the Exercise proceeding (Contentions EX 22.F. 40.C. 44 and 49.C). Last summer, in the proceeding about the adequacy of the reception centers for the public, the "shadow phenomenon" was litigated yet again this time the Intervenors claimed that the location of the reception centers would affect the "shadow." All the evidence that the Intervenors wanted to present, including that which was clearly redundant of earlier testimony, was heard by the Board See, eA, Suffolk County Exhibit 15 (Direct Testimony of James H. Johnson, Jr. and Susan C. Saegert on Behalf of Suffolk County Concerning LILCO's Reception C mters (Evacuation Shadow Phenomenon and Traffic Issues), admitted at Tr.17,998.
Now, again, the Intervenors attempt to raise the "shadow phenomenon" issue, which has been heard so many times before. The Board should reject this attempt.
4,
Outside EPZ. LILCO objects to Contention 3 because it lacks legal basis. The first full paragraph of Contention 3 complains about an alleged lack of "nighttime EBS i
coverage west of the EPZ." Contentions at 8. As noted previously, however, NRC reg-ulations require only that LILCO demonstrate a means to broadcast emergency infor-mation within the plume exposure EPZ. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5)and App. E.IV.D 3t s_e_e NUREG-0654, App. 3 at 3-3.
t Basis. If the Board decides over LILCO's objection to admit this shadow phenom-enon contention, it is LILCO's position that only considaration of shadow originating i
from within the EPZ is proper. That issue is raised in the first full paragraph on p. 9 of the Contentions. Only factor (1) in that paragraph (alleging gaps in EBS coverage) l t
should be admitted as a litigable basis. Factor (2)is not admissible because, for the rea-sons stated in LILCO's response to Contentions 1.E F, and 2.B, the "credibility and au-thoritativeness attaching to emergency broadcast information originating largely from a non-local, out-of-state EBS station" has no basis and is not relevant to this proceed-ing. In addition, factor (2) lacks basis because it ignores the seven AM stations in the i
I Shoreham EBS that would also broadcast EBS messages. Therefore, the information l
woul6 not "originate largely" f rom an out of-state station.
Factor (3), concerning "the unavailability of emergency information from famil-lar local stations," is not an adequate basis for several reasons. First, intervenors do not say why, or give "plausible authority" for their premise that emergency information
?
3 j
would be unavailable from other stations. Second Intervenors do not say specifically what "familiar local stations" they are referring to and why information would be ex-pected from them. Third, it is irrelevant to meeting the NRC regulations whether peo-i ple receive emergency information over "familiar" radio stations. Finally, Intervonors give no "reasonable explanation or plausible authority" for their claim that shadow would result if emergency information were not broadcast over "f amiliar" stations, r
l t
l I
l l
E.
4
+ +
i k
Factor (4) is an inadequate basis because there is absolutely no reason or support
- at least Intervenors fall to cite any - for the claim that there would be a "substantial l
l likelihood of distorted and... conflicting emergency information" as a result of the present EBS configuration.
Contention 4 (informal alerting systems inadequate)
[
Basis. LILCO objects to Contention 4 because it lacks any factual basis. In f act,
[
th) contention mischaracterizes and misapprehends the role of informal alerting in the f
notification process. LILCO has not created "informal alerting systems" as part of a "proposal" for providing alerting, notification, and essential emergency information" to l
]
the public. Informal alerting is simply a phenomenon whose occurrence at least one Li-p j
eensing Board --and the Appeal Board -- have recognized as helpful in alerting the pub-j h
j lic of an emergency. See Carolina Power & Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power i
Plant), l.BP-86-11, 23 NRC 294, 388-89, aff'd, ALAB-852, 24 NRC 532(1986).
The f
l Shearon Harris board found it reasonable to assume that 50% of the alerted households Ic., 23 NRC at 389.El Thus, would engage in informal or secondary notification.
d j
LILCO does not rely to any degree on any special"informal alerting systems" to provide i
2 l
prompt notification throughout the EPZ. Rather, LILCO believes that informal alerting may help to spread notification of a Shoreham accident just as the Licensing Board and i
i Appeal Board found it would help at Shearon Harris. In any case, there is no litigable issue because LILCO does not rely on the informai alerting process.
4 l
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Both the applicant and FEMA presented testimony in the Shearon Harris pro-i ceeding supporting the existence of "Informal alerting." One study offered by the ap-l plicant's witness found that 75% of people engaged in "informal alerting", and the l
FEMA witness offered a study that said that 87.5% of the people would engage in it.
Shearon Harris, 23 NRC at 388-89. The Board noted that the data base was "not very I
robust," but nonetheless found that "the assumption that 50% of the alerted households l
would engage in such activities is a reasonable and, perhaps, conservative estimate."
% at 389.
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I
o
-19 C_onclusion For the reasons stated above, LILCO asks that the Board reject in its entirety the Intervenors' "Emergency Planning Contention Relating to LILCO's New Emergency Broadcast System Proposal."
Respectfully submitted, Y-W Donald P. Irwin James N. Christman Kathy E.B. McCleskey Scott D. Matchett Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 27,1988 i
i l
i i
i
M Attach:mnt 1 J
4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
)
(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
l L
l Emeroency Plannino Contentions Relatino to the February 13, 1986 Exercise l
August 1, 1986 Filed by:
Suffolk County, The State of New York, and The Town of Southampton i
m I
P
e mately 11 30).
Dose projections were available by 11:49.
However, LILCO never warned the public of possible food chain contamination, even though the LILCO players were told that approximately 18 percent of the public had not yet evacuated from the 10-mile EPZ by 2:40.
D.
During tne exercise, LERO personnel apparently never completed the "Ground Deposition Calculation Worksheet for Particulate Radionuclide Releases," OPIP 3.5.2, Att.
3, although the necessary data were apparently available and completion of such a form is required by OPIF 3.5.2, S 5.3, and OPIP 3.6.6.
For the foregoing reasons, the exercise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan ccmplies with 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.ll, and precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken i
in the event of e Shoreham accident.
VIII. CONTENTIONS EX 38-39:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING TO PUBLIC INFORMATION CONTE.; TION EX 38.
Tae exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that LILCO was unable to provide timely, accurate, consistent and non-confusing information to the news media at the Emergency News Center ("ENC"), thus failing to implement Section 3.8.B and OPIP 3.8.1 of the LILCO Plan.
The Plan provides, in pertinent part, that:
"All Public Information personnel will confer on a regular basis to ensure that accurate i
1 l
l 97
8 e
and consistent emergency information is being shared and discussed" (Plan at 3.8-4); news briefings at the ENC "shall serve three purposes:
to provide accurate information on a timely basis to ensure public and media confidence to prevent misinformation and rumors" (Plan at 3.8-S); and, press conferences will "provide up-to-date information, respond to any rumor received, and answer any questions the media may have."
Plan at 3.8-6.
Similarly, OPIP 3.8.1 provides that the LERO Coordinator of Public Information is to "confer with the Director of Local Response and the Public Information Staff at the ENC on a regular basis to main-tain consistent information content"; "obtain up-to-date infor-nation regarding offsite erergency response in preparing press releases"; and, "correct misinformation by.
. providing ac-curate information to LILCO Rumor Control pers:nnel and answering questions regarding local response."
As the examples in subparts A-Q below reveal, however, during the exercise LILCO was incapa-ble of complying with these directives.
Thus, LILCO failed to J
satisfy objectives ENC 1 and 3-6, and the exercise demonstrated that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it cannot be j
implemented by LERo personnel and fails to comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654 S II.G.4.
1 l
4 l
98 -
Exercise results which individually and collectively evi-dence these LILCO failures and therefore preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident include the following:
A.
The ENC was not declared operational until 8:25, and there was apparently no contact with the media by LERO personnel at the ENC until after that time.
The first press briefing was not held until 8:40.
Thus, the ENC provided no information at all to the media until almost three hours after the emergency was declared, and long after the 6:52 EBS message announcing the Alert condition and school closings had been broadcast.
In a real emergency such a delay would result in substantial confusion, speculation, rumor generation, lack of confidence in LILCO's ability to deal with the emergency, and refusal to believe information, advice or instructions subsequently disseminated by LILCO personnel.
B.
LERO News Release No. 1 announcing an Alert condition and the alleged fact that there had been no release of radiation was not provided to the press by the ENC until 8:21.
Although a Site Area Emergency had been declared at 8:19 and the ENC was informed of that declaration at that time (FEMA Report at 25), no mention was made to the media at 8:21 that a Site Area Emergency had been declared, that a minor release of radiation had occurred, and that dairy animals should be placed on stored feed.
Thus, the first LERO press release did not contain up-to-l date information, and it was inaccurate.
l 1
C.
The Site Area Emergency, radiation release, and f
dairy animal recommendation was announced by EBS broadcast at 8:41.
Despite the fact that the decision to issue that EBS l
message was made by the LERO Director by 8:37, LERO News Release No.
2, which included the information in that EBS message, was i
not approved by the Director until 9:00.
As of 9:15, it had r
still not been distributed to the press.
D.
Insufficient copying capabilities at the ENC contributed to delays in the distribution of information, including EBS messages and press releases, to the media.
FEMA r
Report at 53.
l E.
Insufficient and inadequate maps and displays in r
the media briefing room contributed to the confusing and unclear i.
information being disseminated by LERO personnel.
FEMA Report at i
52, 54.
[
F.
Copies of EBS messages provided t: the media con-f tained extraneous information that should have ceen deleted, and s
thus were unclear, confusing, and inconsistent with radio broad-casts.
Egg FEMA Report at 53, 54.
G.
LERO press releases were distributed much too late, and were inaccurate and in conflict with other data in the public domain by the time they were provided to the media.
Although the ENC received LERO Press Release No. 3 at 10:15, it was not posted at the ENC for the press until 11:10.
LERO Release No. 4 was received by the ENC at 10:45, but was noc posted until 11:56.
LERO Release No. 5 covered the 10:24 evacuation recommendation for zones A-M, Q and R.
- was approved by the LERO Director at 100 -
k 11:02, but did not even arrive at the ENC until 11:36, and was not made available tc the press until sometime later.
LERO Release No. 6, approved by the Director at 12:25, was not posted at the ENC until 2:10; LERO Release Nc.
7, approved at 1:11, was received by the ENC at 1:47, but not posted for the press until 3:07.
H.
The LERO Director decided to recommend evacuation i
of the entire EPZ at 11:46 and the recommendation was announced L
to the public in a 12:00 noon EBS message.
FEMA Report at 26.
However, the ENC did not inform the media of the Director's
(
i decision, or the content of the 12:00 EBS message, which was
[
supposedly repeated every 15 minutes thereafter, until 12:47.
I.
Although LERO workers were instructed to ingest KI tablets at 9:45, LERO ENC personnel did not decide to inform the media of that fact until 1:05, and the media sas then requested not to print that information.
Such a delay and the attempt to conceal pertinent information about the healtn-threatening effects of the accident would result in further reductions in LILCO's credibility and refusals of the media and the public to.
l obey LILCO's advice during a real emergency, i
j J.
During press conferences, LERO personnel were unable to respond satisfactorily or accurately to questions about evacuation.
In addition, the ENC personnel were unable to provide any information to the media, much less accurate and z
i l
timely data, concerning traffic conditions, conditions or evacuation activity on the water portion of the EPZ, or f
protective actions for the correctional facility in the EPZ.
I i
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They also were unable to respond to questions about manpower at bridges and tunnels on evacuation routes, or the activities of the Nassau County Police.
In addition, LERO Public Information f
personnel were unable to contact Marketing Evaluations, Inc. in a L
timely manner and therefore had no information concerning siren activation failure.
K.
The ENC did not learn of the pretended. Red Cross designation of'15 congregate care centers until 2:40.
The EOC' had this information, however, at 12:03.
Thus, the ENC did'not receive, and therefore was not in a position to'di~sseminate
'1Nformationinatfkelymanner.
/
L.
The log kept by ENC personnel recorded that at 12:01, the gravel truck impediment was being removed.
In fact, as of that time, no equipment had yet arrived at the site of the i
gravel truck impediment, and when it eventua;'y did arrive, it i
was inadequate to remove the impediment.
11 FEMA Report at 36-37.
Thus, ENC personnel had inaccurate information which, if t
j released, would have misled the public into believing the inter-l i
section was clear when in fact it was not.
i 1
M.
At the 1:48 press conference, LERO personnel at the ENC were not able to respond to questions about the fuel truck i
impediment, although that impediment had arisen almost 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> earlier.
[
q N.
At press conferences, LERO personnel frequently J
g misstated facts and provided inaccurate information.
For l
1 l
example, at 9:16, it was incorrectly announced that the Site Area l
Emergency had been declared at 8:23, and that plant shutdown had 4
j
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J
.,,a.
-,n,.-
-,--m
occurred at 5:15.
The correct times were 8:19 and 5:15.
Similarly, at 11:38, LERO incorrectly announced that the winter is h'her than the summer population.
population of the EPZ g
i O.
Although LILCO Press Releases 4 and 5 were received by the ENC at 8:45 and 9:05, respectively, they were not given to
[
the Media Monitoring personnel at the ENC until 9:31.
P.
The Rumor Control operation, which is coordinated
[
and controlled by LERO Public Information and ENC personnel, was ineffective as described in Contention Ex 39.
Q.
Neither LILCO's proposal to expedite the dissem-ination of information by substituting summary information for press releases and transmitting it by computer to the ENC, nor its proposal to add an extra LERO spokesperson at the ENC, would i
resolve the deficiencies revealed during the exercise, including those listed in this contention and in Conter.; ion Ex 38.
Nor would replacement of copying machines.
Egg letter dated June 20, I
1986, from John D.
Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 l
at 7; letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D.
Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-1270), Att. I at 2.
l CONTENTION EX 39.
The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO plan in that LILCO is incapable cf dealing with I
rumors or responding to inquiries from the public during an t
i emergency as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 l
I
$ II.G.
According to the LILCO Plan, in an emergency the public f
1 is expected to call LILCO Customer Relations District Offices and
(
j Customer Call Boards to obtain information and ask questions, f
i j
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.I Plan at 3.8-5; OPIP 3.8.1.
And, during the exercise, simulated EBS messages instructed the public to call LILCO District Offices to have questions answered.
Thus, the Plan provides, under the heading "Correcting Misinformation," that "LILCO personnel at these locations will be provided with updated press releases.
If they cannot answer the inquiry they will call the ENC where a coordinated rumor control point will be manned by representatives from LERO and the Utility."
Plan at 3.8-5.
During the exercise, LILCO employees from several LILCO District Offices and call Boards responded to simulated inquiries from the public.
As demonstrated by the examples set forth below, however, such responses demonstrated LILCO's inability to dispel rumors, to correct misinformation, to provide necessary and accurate information to the public, to provide such information in a timely manner, and to provide consistent, cc:rdinated, and non-conflicting information to the public.
Thus, LILCO failed to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), and NUREG 0654 5 II.G.
It also failed to comply with the provisions of its own Plan, or to satisfy objectives ENC 1, 3-6.
These examples of repeated errors and failures demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.
A.
During the exercise, the LILCO District Offices and
\\
Call Boards consistently had incorrect or superseded information concerning the status of the emergency, protective action recommendations, and other basic data.
Thus, they were unable to provide accurate and essential information to members of the public or the press.
Instead, if Call Board operators received calls from the public, as postulated in the L!LCO Plan to occur
- 104 -
lI
~
l i
during an actual emergency, they could have provided only information that was inaccurate, incomplete, inconsistent and in conflict with that being released by other LILCO personnel at other locations (for example, in EBS messages or press releases).
i Egg FEMA Report at 53.
For examples i
(i)
The logs kept by all the LILCO Call Board operators, including, for example, those kept by the Port 4
1 Jefferson, Patchogue, and Brentwood Customer Call Board l
operators, indicate that the information available to them until approximately 11:00 stated that a Site Area Emergency existed, r
i even though a General Emergency had been declared at 9:39.
(ii)
The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that people in zones A-M, Q, and R had been advised to evacuate until I
approximately 12:35, even though that advisory had first been issued to the public at 10:24.
(iii)
The icgs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word that LERO had recommended evacuation of the entire EPZ until approximately 2:00, even though that advisory had first been made at approx-l imately 12:00 noon.
l 1
t (iv)
The logs kept by the Call Board operators indicate that the operators did not receive word of the dec-laration of an Unusual Event until approximately 8:15, although j
that declaration was in fact made at 5:40 similarly, the Call t
j j
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t l
__,, _,..~ ------..._..,
=-
l Board operators did not receive word that an Alert had been declared until approximately 8:30, although the declaration was made at 6:17 and an EBS message was simulated at 6:52.
(v)
The Call Board logs indicate that most Call Board operators did not receive word that schools were supposed to be implementing early dismissals until approximately 8:50, although an EBS message regarding early school closings was I
simulated at 6:52.
B.
During the exercise, LILCO personnel were unable to provide prompt responses to simulated rumor messecas, which ware in the scenario purporting to be telephone inquiries from members cf the public to LILCO Call Boards and District Offices.
In-stead, responses were generally delayed by more than 30 minutes, and frequently longer.
For example (i)
A rumor message inquiring whether the appli-ances in the caller's home were radioactive was given to the l
Patchogue Call Board operator at 1:45; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:24.
i r
(ii)
A rumor message inquiring what to do about a-t daughter not yet home from Shoreham-Wading River High School was
)
l given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 10:00; a response
{
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was not relayed to the caller until 10:52.
t (iii)
A rumor message inquiring whether the caller, i
l from Bellport, should evacuate was given to the Patchogue Call Board operator at 12:05; a response was not relayed to the caller f
until 1:00.
(
1 l
l
[
l
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(
I
4 (iv)
A rumor message inquiring about how extensive evacuation will be, and what to do about trucks going into the Shoreham area, was given to the Hicksville Call Board operator at 7:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 8:20.
(v)
A rumor message inquiring whether the cooling towers on the Shoreham plant had blown up was given to the Riverhead Call Board operator at 1:30; a response was not relayed to the caller until 2:48.
(vi)
A rumor message inquiring if lobsters caught off the Shoreham jetty that morning were safe to eat was recalved by the Riverhead District Office ac 11:30s a response was not f
relayed to the originating party u.itil 12:28.
i (vii)
A rumor message from a caller whose humband f
i works at the plant and was not home yet, inquiring whether he had been hurt, was given to the Brentwood Call Board operator at i
12:43; a response was not relayed to the ca.ler until 1:30.
l (viii)
A rumor message inquiring whether the plant had been taken over by Arab terrorists was received at 9:54;.
response was not relayed to the caller until 10:37.
(ix)
A rumor message inquiring what to do with a horse was given to the Port Jefferson Call Board operator at i
10:14; a response was not relayed to the caller until 10:47.
(x)
A rumor message inquiring how to get off Shelter Island because the ferry had been cancelled was given to l
the Hamptons Call Board operator at 2:51; a response was not relayed to the caller until 3:24.
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?
(xi)
A rumor message from a caller who lived in i
i Medford, but worked in Melville, inquiring what he should do was given to the Huntington Call Board operator at 2:32 a response l
i was not relayed to the caller until 3:05.
f (xii)
A rumor message inquiring if he could eat the
)
i food in his refrigerator was given to the Babylon Call Board operator at 11:59 a response was not relayed to the caller until t
12:29.
l (xiii)
A rumor message from a dairy farmer asking what to do if he is asked to evacuate was rceeived at 9t38 a
j response was not relayed to the caller until 10:12.
I C.
During the exercise, rumor control personnel were t
unable to provide accurate, satisfactory, or reasonable advice or l
information to simulated public inquiries set forth in rumor i
messages.
Instead, such personnel frequently provided inaccurate or superseded information or demonstrated peer judgment in responding.
For examples (i)
In response to an inquiry (at 7:51) from a person who "has trucks going to Suffolk," as to how extensive f
i evacuation would be, the Hicksville Call Board operator responded l
4 L
l (at 8:20) that the only protective action was the closing of 1
l schools, and that there had been no evacuation recommended.
As l
of 8:20, however, LERO was already beginning to "pre-stage" for f
i I
an evacuation, and a site Area Emergency had been declared.
In l
t light of these facts, it was inappropriate and dange.ous to l
l advise the simulated caller to proceed as planned with sending
[
I trucks into the EPZ area.
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i i
1 i
9F 4
I (ii)
In response to an inquiry at 11:30 (Rumor Control Question No. 11) whether lobsters caught that morning on the Shoreham jetty were safe to eat or touch, the Riverhead Call f
Board operator responded (at 12:28) that there was no reason to believe, and no data to indicate, that anything was wrong with the lobsters.
As of 12:28, however, there had already been a major release of radiation, and the entire EPZ had been advised i
to evacuate.
In light of these facts, it was inappropriate to
+
advise the simulated caller to eat the lobsters, without even 4
inquiring as to when that morning they had been caught, and where the caller was located.
(iii)
In response to a rumor message from The New York Times, simulated at 8:45, and inquiring "what's going on" at the Shoreham plant, the rumor control responder related that at 5:40 an Unusual Event had been declared, and at 6:17 an Alert had I
been declared.
By 8:45, however, a Site Area Emergency had been i
l declared, schools had been closed and simulated EBS messages had l
l advised that dairy animals be put on stored feed.
Thus, the l
t information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inac-curate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being dis-l 1
i seminated by other LILCO personnel.
(iv)
In response to a rumor message simulated at 3:15, j
1 inquiring whether there had been a release, the rumor control
}
responder provided data as of 1:00.
Thus, the information pro-vided was inaccurate at the time given, and was misleading and
[
i inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO j
personnel.
i
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t i
I i
r (v)
A rumor message simulated at 11:45 was purportedly from Dan Rather, who wanted "to take a TV crew into the Shoreham plant," and inquired how to get there.
In response, the rumor control responder stated "We don't advise going to the plant.
There is a Site Area Emergency.
You will be in the way."
The responder then gave directions to the plant.
At 9:39, however, a General Emergency had been declared and as of 11:45, LILCO was recommending that almost all of the EPZ be evacuated.
(At 11:46, the decision was made to evacuate the entire 10-mile EPZ.)
The suggestion that going to the plant was inadvisable but nonetheless possible was incorrect, and such suggestion, combined with the giving of road directions to the plant, indicated extremely poor judgment.
(vi)
In response to a rumor message simulated at 1:17 inquiring "what areas are to be evacuated," the rumor control responder at 1:21 related that zones A-M, Q and R should evacu-ate.
By 12:00, however, a simulated EBS message had advised that the entire 10-mile EPZ was to evacuate.
Thus, the information provided by LILCO's rumor control personnel was inaccurate, misleading, and inconsistent with information being disseminated by other LILCO personnel.
(vii)
A rumor message was simulated at 1:15 from a caller in Wading River who reported that people on his street were evacuating, that he could not walk, and did not know what to do.
The response to this call apparently was a recording that the office had been "closed due to conditions at the Shoreham plant," and giving the telephone numbers for electrical emer-
- 110 -
gencies.
The failure to properly advise the caller how to arrange for transportation for the mobility impaired was grossly improper.
l As the foregoing examples illustrate, the exercise demon-strated that LILCO is incapable of implementing its proposed i
rumor control procedures, or providing accurate, necessary, and consistent information to the public during an emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(7) and NUREG 0654, 5 II.G.3.c.
l Accordingly, the Plan is fundamentally flawed and the exercise l
precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate l
protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
IX.
CONTENTIONS EX 40-45:
FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS RELATING
,TO IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE ACTIONS i
CONTENTION EX 40.
The exercise demonstrated a fundamental i
/
t flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Picn fails t: provide any I
traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long after they l
r are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate.
Under the LILCO Plan and the evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Control Posts, "guiding" motorists at.d f
i implementing traffic control strategies to assure that evacuees will follow the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan, during the entire evacuation process.
Egg, 1434, App. A at IV-5 thru l
-72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3.
Indeed, every LILCO IBS message sup-f t
posedly broadcast every fifteen minutes, beginning with the l
l h
111 -
LILCO, January 27,1988 00tXETED UsRC
'88 FEB -1 P4 :08 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE QFFICE Of SECALTAr v U0CMCilNG A M4VICf.
BRANCH in the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY i
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Unit 1)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 j
! hereby certify that copics of LILCO'S Objections to Intervenors'"Emergency Planning Contention Relating to LILCO'S New Emergency Broadcast System Proposal" were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by one aster-isk, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.
l James P. Gleason, Chairman
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Board Panel l
513 Gilmoure Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline
- George E. Johnson, Esq.
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
l Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission i
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike l
East-West Towers, Rm. 427 One White Flint North 4350 East-West Hwy.
Bethesda, MD 20814 i
Bethesda, MD 20814 Herbert H. Brown, Esq.
- l Mr. Frederick J. Shon
- Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Karla J. Letsche, Esq.
Board Kirkpatrick & Lockhart U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission South Lobby - 9th Floor East West Towers, Rm. 430 1800 M Street N.W.
1 4350 East-West Hwy.
Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Bethesda, MD 20814 Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
- l Secretary of the Commission Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Attention Docketing and Service Special Counsel to the Governor Section Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 J
1717 H Street, N.W.
State Capitol i
Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, New York 12224 I
Atomic Safety and Licensing Alf red L. Nardelli Esq.
Appeal Board Pane!
Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 120 Broadway Washington, D.C. 20555 Room 3-118 New York, New York 10271
, Spence W. Perry, Esq.
- Ms. Nora Bredes William R. Cumming, Esq.
Executive Coordinator Federal Emergency Management Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Agency 195 East Main Street 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20472 Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.
Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Counsel to the Governor New York State Energy Office Executive Chamber Agency Building 2 State Capitol Empire State P4za Albany, New York 12224 Albany, New York 12223 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq.
Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
- Suifolk County Attorney Twomoy, Latham & Shea Building 158 North County Complex 33 West Second Street Veterans Memorial Highway P.O. Box 298 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Riverhead, New York 11901 Dr. Monroe Schneider Mr. Philip McIntire North Shore Committee Federal Emergency Management P.O. Box 231 Agency Wading River, NY 11792 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 Jonathan D. Feinberg, dsq.
New York State Department of Public Service Staff Counsel Three Rockefeller Plaza Albany, New York 12223 W
.k Scott D. Matchett Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: January 27,1988