ML20148S613
| ML20148S613 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
| Issue date: | 04/06/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148S599 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8804190108 | |
| Download: ML20148S613 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION SUP.'ORTING AMENDMENT NOS. 130 AND 133 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NOS. DPR-44 and DPR-56 PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GA5 COMPANY
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DELMARVA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY ATLANTIC CITY ELECTRIC COMPANY ~
PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-277 AND 50-278
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated June 30, 1986 as supplemented on April 27, 1987 Philadelphia Electric Company requested an amendment to Facility Operating Licerse Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3.
The amendments add a surveillance requirement for a 4-secondtimedelayfeaturewhichhasbeenincorporatedintothedesig(nof the undervoltage protective device for the reactor protection system RPS) alternate power supply.
The April 27 supplemental information did not amend the scope of the original application dated June 30, 1986.
The time delay has been incorporated into the design to prevent unnecessary tripping of the RPS alternative power supply due to momentary voltage fluctuations. This time delay is needed because of voltage fluctuations experienced at the Peach Bottom Power Station when large motors are started.
Peach Bottom Technical Specifications (TS) currently require a calibration check of the undervoltage protective device for the reactor protection system alternate power supply.
However, the time delav feature of this undervoltage protective device was not identified in the Technical Specifications.
The NRC staff, in an April 15, 1985 telephone conversation regarding this natter, requested that the surveillance requirment of the Technical Specifications specify the appropriate testing for the time delay features.
The subject amendment application responds to this request.
2.0 EVALVATION Technical Specification 4.1.D.2, Reactor Protection System Power Supply, has been amended to require periodic surveillance of the time delay that has been incorporated into the design of the undervoltage protective device for the reactor protection systen alternate power supply. The licensee, in justification of this amendment, stated that the use of the h4190100GbO406 AUUCK 05000277 p
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time delay (4 second maximum) for undervoltage tripping will not have any adverse effect on components of the Reactor Protection System (RPSI including the scram solenoid valves.
The lowest voltage expected at the scram solenoid valves during a transient has been calculated to be greater than 95 volts. Since the lowest expected transient voltage is above the manufacturer's minimum limit of 95 volts, the licensee concluded that there will be no degradation of the solenoid valves.
The staff agrees with the licensee's corclusion in that there will be no degradation of the solenoid valves provided they are not subiect to voltage transients below the 95 volt minimum limit recornended by the manufacturer.
For voltage levels below the 95 volt iimit, the licensee, by letter dated April 27, 1987, indicated that the effect of low voltage on scram solenoid valves has been established by tests performed by General Electric in 1986.
The General Electric testing determined that the solenoid valves can be subjected to voltages below 95 volts with no degradation on their ability to perform their safety function.
The licensee, based on these tests, concluded that an abnormal voltage below 95 volts for four seconds will not adversely affect the solenoid valves.
The staff agrees with this conclusion and thus considers this its to be acceptably resolved.
In regard to other equipment, the licensee has indicated, by letter dated April 27, 1987, that the RPS logic relays and scram contactors are the only other equipment supplied through the RPS power supply that could be potentially affected by volteges below 113 volts.
For these relays and contactors, the licensee stated that they do not expect voltages between 113 and 95 volts to affect the operation of this equipment.
For voltages below 95 volts, the licensee stated that the relays and cor.tactors will drop out thereby satisfying their safety function.
Because long time periods (much greater than 4-seconds) of equipment operation at degraded voltage conditions are needed to produce overheating and equipment failure and because degraded voltage conditions will be limited to a maximum of 4-seconds and will occur infrequently when the alternate RPS power supply is in use and large motors are started, the staff agrees with the licensees conclusion that degraded voltage levels are not expected to affect the operation of the RPS relays and scram
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Based on the above, the staff considers this item to be acceptably resolved.
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3.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
S These amendments involve a change to a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve nn significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the l
types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation 1
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exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hhzards consideration and there has been no public connent on such finding. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for catenorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement nor environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendrents.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission mada a proposed determination that the amendments involve nn significant hazards consideration which was published in the Federal Register (51 FR 30579) on August 27, 1986 and consulted with the State of Pennsylvania.
No public aonments were received and the State of Pennsylvania did not have any comments.
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the croposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safecy of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Knox Dated: April 6, 1988