ML20148Q875

Informs of Latest NRC Efforts at Millstone & Haddam Neck Facilities of Northeast Utilities & Reports Significant Activities Taken Place Since

ML20148Q875
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone, Haddam Neck  File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	06/25/1997
From:	Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
To:	Dodd C, Gejdenson S, Lieberman J HOUSE OF REP., SENATE
References
NUDOCS 9707070238
Download: ML20148Q875 (6)

Text

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UNITED STATES 41 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l,

,j WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0301 k...../

June 25, 1997 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Lieberman:

I am writing to inform you about the latest U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts at the Millstone and Haddam Neck facilities of Northeast Utilities (NU). This letter reports the significant activities that have taken place since my last letter on December 2,1996.

Since my last update, the NRC Special Projects Office (SP0), which was formed to focus managerial attention on the issues at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, has taken a number of actions with respect to oversight of the recovery efforts at the Millstone units.

Principally, the SP0 has focused on the licensee's efforts to establish an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) and an independent third party to oversee the employee coricerns programs.

Other activities of the SP0 are detailed in the Millstone Restart Assessment Plan, which was last updated on March 24, 1997.

That revision (Enclosun 1) makes the plan applicable to all three Millstone units.

In addition to identifying major elements requiring resolution before plant restart, the plan contains, for each unit, a list of significant issues and actions that the staff intends to review before the restart. At a meeting with the Commission on April 23, 1997, the NRC staff presented a project planning schedule for these restart activities associated with Millstone Unit 3 (Enclosure 2). This schedule is predicated on the licensee's scheduled actions to be ready for the ICAVP and to have the plant physically ready for restart.

In August 1996, the NRC issued an order confirming the NU commitment to establish an ICAVP. The ICAVP is intended to verify the adequacy of NU efforts to establish and control the plants' design bases.

In an April 7, 1997, letter (Enclosure 3), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU contractor, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), for the Millstone Units 1 and 3 ICAVPs.

The approval was conditional on the completion and submittal of certifications of financial independence by S&L and NU corporate officials. The staff has received these certifications.

In considering the NU proposal to use S&L, the NRC considered comments from the public and the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council.

The significant comments received were discussed in the f[

staff's April 7, 1997, letter. The staff based its conclusion on its determination that S&L has the technical expertise and nuclear design experience necessary to conduct the ICAVP review at Millstone Uriits 1 and 3.

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Also, the staff concluded that S&L is sufficiently independent of NU and its design contractors to conduct the ICAVP. NU proposed Parsons Power Group, hl,\\!{}\\l(({ll!ll!!\\\\\\!k!!!!! 9707070238 970625 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

1 1 T l' 2 i j Inc. (Parsons), for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The staff has reviewed the NU i proposal for using Parsons for the Unit 2 ICAVP, considering public comments received at a March 18, 1997, meeting in Waterford, Connecticut. Ir a May 28, 1997 letter (Enclosure 4), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU contractor, Parsons, for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The approval was ) l conditional on the completion and submittal of certifications of financial j independence by Parsons and NU corporate officials. The licensee has i indicated that these certifications will be submitted in the near future. Millstone Unit 3 started the ICAVP on May 27, 1997 and NU projects that Unit 2 will be ready to start the ICAVP on June 30, 1997. The Unit 1 ICAVP will i follow the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ICAVPs. i In October 1996, the NRC issued an order that directs NU to devise and i implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by i Millstone employees and for ensuring an environment free from retaliation and discrimination. The order additionally requires NU to enter into a contract with an independent third party to oversee the employee concerns program. In i an April 7,1997, letter (Enclosure 5), the staff conditionally approved NU use of Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), for the independent, third-party i oversight program (ITPOP) organization overseeing the implementation of the employee safety concerns program at Millstone. As with the decision to approve the ICAVP contractors for the Millstone Units, the staff considered public coments before concluding that LHC was acceptable. The staff based its approval on its determination that LHC has the technica1 expertise and l i appropriate independence to conduct the ITPOP at the Millst,one facility. j Similar to the ICAVP approval, the NRC staff approval of LHC as the third-i party organization was conditional on the submittal of certifications of 3 financial independence by the corporate officials of NU and LHC. The staff i has since received these certifications. ] The NRC continues to evaluate potential enforcement actions concerning the spent fuel pool and design-basis issues at Millstone. Also, potential i enforcement actions may result from the work of the Office of Investigations, the Office of the Inspector General, special team inspections, routine resident ard regional inspections, and the 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. i These activities are being coordinated with the U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut. Issues that result from this process will be evaluated to determine whether they affect restart. Any restart issues identified will be incorporated into the Restart Assessment Plan. As NRC Watch List Category 3 facilities, the Millstone plants will require Comission approval before restart. In support of this action, the Commission has been kept informed of the staff's oversight and the licensee's restart plans through Commission papers and periodic brisfings. On January 30, 1997, and April 23, 1997, NU executives and NRC senior management briefed the Commission on the status of the Millstone recovery efforts. At the last briefing, the Commission expressed dissatisfaction with the level of detail presented by the licensee and commented that, in the future, greater detail was needed for the Commission to assess the progress of the licensee's actions. On May 30, 1997, NU provided a docketed briefing book to the Comission (a copy also is enclosed), which appears to contain the level of detail that the Commission was seeking. The Comission briefings will continue approximately once per quarter until decisions concerning restart are

l '.. ] 3 I final. The next' Commission briefing is scheduled for August 6, 1997. The i staff will also continue to keep the public informed on the status of the Millstone facility through evening meetings, approximately every 2' months, in the vicinity of the Millstone site. The last such meeting was held on May 21, 1997. l With regard to the Haddam Neck facility, on December 4, 1996, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) Board of Directors voted to permanently i i shut down the facility. On December 5, 1996, the licensee submitted ) certification of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal i of fuel from the reactor vessel. Once this certification was docketed (i.e., l formally received) by the NRC, the Haddam Neck facility license no longer l authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement of fuel into the reactor vessel. CYAPC0 is planning for the' decommissioning of its facility. Before l major decommissioning activity takes place, CYAPC0 is required to submit a i Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report in accordance with NRC j regulations. Also, on May 12, 1997, the NRC proposed a $650,000 civil penalty for Haddam Neck due to alleged violations involving (1) multiple examples of i i engineering errors relating to maintenance of the plant design basis, and (2) an incident in late 1996 in which nitrogen gas leaked into the reactor vessel resulting in a reduction in reactor water level. The NRC is continuing to l evaluate taking enforcement action at Haddam Neck in response to other potential violations of NRC requirements. Because Haddam Neck is permanently shut down, the NRC SP0 is no longer responsible for its oversight. Therefore, the status reports that follow will no longer discuss Haddam Neck. However, our respective staffs will continue to be in frequent contact regarding i activities at Haddam Neck. i I trust this information, as supplemented by the enclosures, will give you an j adequate understanding of the current status of the Millstone and Haddam Neck i i facilities and the actions that are required before the Commission will allow the Millstone units to restart. If I can be of further assistance, please do 2 not hesitate to contact me. j t Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson f f

Enclosures:

As stated (6) I

f UNITED STATES p \\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20886-0001 e June 25, 1997

CHAIRMAN The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Dodd:

I am writing to inform you about the latest U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts at the Millstone and Haddam Neck facilities of Northeast Utilities (NU). This letter reports the significant activities that have taken place since my last letter on December 2,1996. Since my last update, the NRC Special Projects Office (SP0), which was formed to focus managerial attention on the issues at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, has taken a number of actions with respect to oversight of the recovery efforts at the Millstone units. Principally, the SP0 has focused on the licensee's efforts to establish an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) and an independent third party to oversee the employee concerns programs. Other activities of the SP0 are detailed in the Millstone Restart Assessment Plan, which was last updated on March 24, 1997. That revision (Enclosure 1) makes the plan applicable to all three Millstone units. In addition to identifying major elements requiring resolution before plant restart, the plan contains, for each unit, a list of significant issues and actions that the staff intends to review before the restart. At a meeting with the Commission on April 23, 1997, the NRC staff presented a project planning schedule for these restart activities associated with Millstone Unit i 3 (Enclosure 2). This schedule is predicated on the licensee's scheduled actions to be ready for the ICAVP and to have the plant physically ready for restart. i In August 1996, the NRC issued :an order confirming the NU commitment to establish an ICAVP. The ICAVP is intended to verify the adequacy of NU 4 efforts to establish and control the plants' design bases. In an April 7, 1997, letter (Enclosure 3), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU 4 contractor, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), for the Millstone Units 1 and 3 ICAVPs. The approval was conditional on the completion and submittal of certifications of financial independence by S&L and NU corporate officials. The staff has received these certifications. In considering the NU proposal to use S&L, the i NRC considered comments from the public and the Connecticut Nuclear Energy L Advisory Council. The significant comments received were discussed in the staff's April 7, 1997, letter. 'The staff based its conclusion on its determination that S&L has the technical expertise and nuclear design j experience necessary to conduct the ICAVP review at Millstone Units 1 and 3. Also, the staff concluded that S&L is sufficiently independent of NU and its design' contractors to conduct the ICAVP. NU proposed Parsons Power Group,

4 i 2 e Inc. (Parsons), for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The staff has reviewed the NU i proposal fnr using Parsons for the Unit 2 ICAVP, considering public comments received at a March 18, 1997, meeting in Waterford, Connecticut. In a May 28, 1997 letter (Enclosure 4), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU contractor, Parsons, for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The approval was conditional on the completion and submittal of certifications of financial independence by Parsons and NU corporate officials. The licensee has indicated that these certifications will be submitted in the near future. Millstone Unit 3 started the ICAVP on May 27, 1997 and NU projects that Unit 2 will be ready to start the ICAVP on June 30, 1997. The Unit 1 ICAVP will i follow the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ICAVPs. In October 1996, the NRC issued an order that directs NU to devise and implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by Millstone employees and for ensuring an environment free from retaliation and 5 discrimination. The order additionally requires NU to enter into a contract i. with an independent third party to oversee the employee concerns program. In an April 7,1997, letter (Enclosure 5), the staff conditionally approved NV 1 use of Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), for the independent, third-party i oversight program (ITPOP) organization overseeing the implementation of the j employee safety concerns program at Millstone. As with the decision to approve'the ICAVP contractors for the Millstone Units, the staff considered j public comments before concluding that LHC was acceptable. The staff based appropriate independence to conduct the ITPOP at the Millst,1 expertise and its approval'on its determination that LHC has the technica one facility, j Similar to the ICAVP approval, the NRC staff approval of LHC as the third-l party organization was conditional en the submittal of certifications of i financial independence by the corporate officials of NU and LHC. The staff l has since received these certifications. The NRC continues to evaluate potential enforcement actions concerning the l spent fuel pool and design-basis issues at Millstone. Also, potential i enforcement actions may result from the work of the Office of Investigations, i the Office of the Inspector General, special team inspections, routine i resident and regional inspections, and the 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. i These activities are being coordinated with the U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut. Issues that result from this process will be evaluated to determine whether they affect restart. Any restart issues identified will be j incorporated into the Restart Assessment Plan. As NRC Watch List Category 3 facilities, the Millstone plants will require Commission approval before restart. In support of this action, the Commission i has been kept informed of the staff's oversight and the licensee's restart plans through Commissica papers and periodic briefings. On January 30, 1997, i and April 23, 1997, NU executives and NRC senior management briefed the i Comission on the status of the Millstone recovery efforts. At the last i briefing, the Commission expressed dissatisfsetion with the level of detail j presented by the licensee and comented that, in the future, greater detail was needed for the Commission to assess the progress of the licensee's 1 actions. On May 30, 1997, NU provided a docketed briefing book to the J Commission (a copy also is enclosed), which appears to contain the level of l detail that the Commission was seeking. The Commission briefings will continue approximately once per quarter until decisions concerning restart are i i

1 3 final. The next Commission briefing is scheduled for August 6, 1997. The staff will also continue to keep the public informed on the status of the Millstone facility through evening meetings, approximately every 2 months, in the vicinity of the Hillstone site. The last such meeting was held on May 21, 1997. With regard to the Haddam Neck facility, on December 4, 1996, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) Board of Directors voted to permanently shut down the facility. On December 5, 1996, the licensee submitted certification of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Once this certification was docketed (i.e., i formally received) by the NRC, the Haddam Neck facility license no longer authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement of fuel into the reactor vessel. CYAPC0 is planning for the decommissioning of its facility. Before major decommissioning activity takes place, CYAPC0 is required to submit a Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report in accordance with NRC e regulations. Also, on May 12, 1997, the NRC proposed a $650,000 civil penalty for Haddam Neck due to alleged violations involving (1) multiple examples of engineering errors relating to maintenance of the plant design basis, and (2) an incident in late 1996 in which nitrogen gas leaked into the reactor vessel resulting in a reduction in reactor water level. The NRC is continuing to evaluate taking enforcement action at Haddam Neck in response to other potential violations of NRC requirements. Because Haddam Neck is permanently shut down, the NRC SP0 is no longer responsible for its oversight. Therefore, tha status reports that follow will no longer discuss Haddam Neck.

However, our respective staffs will continue to be in frequent contact regarding activities at Haddam Neck.

I trust this information, as supplemented by the enclosures, will give you an adequate understanding of the current status of the Millstone and Haddam Neck ~' facilities and the actions that are required before the Commission will allow the Millstone units to restart. if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, f Shirley Ann Jackson

Enclosures:

As stated (6)

/"% UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t .f. Q WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-4001 r June 25, 1997 CHAIRMAN The Honorable Sam Gejdenson United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Congressman Gejdenson:

I am writing to inform you about the latest U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts at the Millstone and Haddam Nack facilities of Northeast - Utilities (NU). This letter reports the significant activities that have taken place since my last letter on December 2,1996. Since my last update, the NRC Special Projects Office (SP0), which was formed to focus managerial attention on the issues at Millstone Nuclear Power Station, has taken a number of actions with respect to oversight of the recovery efforts at the Millstone units. Principally, the SP0 has focused on the licensee's efforts to establish an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) and an independent third party to oversee the employee concerns programs. Other activities of the SP0 are detailed in the Millstone Restart Assessment Plan, which was last updated r,n March 24, 1997. That revision (Enclosure I) makes the plan applicable to all three Millstone units. In addition to identifying major elements requiring resolution before plant restart, the plan contains, for each unit, a list of significant issues and actions that *.he staff intends to review before the restart. At a meeting with the Commissien on April 23, 1997, the NRC staff presented a project planning schedule for these restart activities associated with Millstone Unit 3 (Enclosure 2). This schedule is predicated on the licer.ne's scheduled actions to be ready for the ICAVP and to have the plant physically ready for restart. In August 1996, the NRC issued an order confirming the NU commitment to establish an ICAVP. The ICAVP is intended to verify the adequacy of NU efforts to establish and control the plants' design bases. In an April 7, 1997, letter (Enclosure 3), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU contractor, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), for the 14iiMos Units I and 3 ICAVPs. The approval was conditional on the ampletion a,1d submittal of certifications cr financial independence by S&L and Nb sorporate officials. The staff has received these certifications. In considering the NU proposal to use S&L, the NRC considered comments from the public and the Connecticut Nuclear Energy Advisory Council. The significant comments received were discussed in the staff's April 7, 1997, letter. The staff based its conclusion on its determination that S&L has the technical expertise and nuclear design experience necessary to conduct the ICAVP review at Millstone Units 1 and 3. Also, the staff concluded that S&L is sufficiently independent of NU and its design contractors to conduct the ICAVP. NU proposed Parsons Power Group, l l

i ) 2 i l Inc. (Parsons), for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The staff has reviewed the NU proposal for using Parsons for the Unit 2 ICAVP, considering public coments received at a March 18, 1997, meeting in Waterford, Connecticut. In a May 28, 1997 letter (Enclosure 4), the NRC staff conditionally approved the NU contractor, Parsons, for the Millstone Unit 2 ICAVP. The approval was conditional on the completion and submittal of certifications of financial independence by Parsons and NU corporate officials. The licensee has indicated that these certifications will be submitted in the near future. i Millstone Unit 3 started the ICAVP on May 27, 1997 and NU pro,jects that Unit 2 will be ready to start the ICAVP on June 30, 1997. The Unit 1 ICAVP will follow the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ICAVPs. l In October 1996, the NRC issued an order that directs NU to devise and i implement a comprehensive plan for handling safety concerns raised by i Millstone employees and for ensuring an environment free from retaliation and i discrimination. The order additionally requires NU to enter into a contract with an independent third party to oversee the employee concerns program. In i an April 7,1997, letter (Enclosure 5), the staff conditionally approved NU use of Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), for the independent, third-party i oversight program (ITPOP) organization overseeing the implementation of the 1 employee safety concerns program at Millstone. As with the decision to j approve the ICAVP contractors for the Millstone Units, the staff considered public coments before concluding that LHC was acceptable. The staff based i its approval on its determination that LHC has the technica) expertise and appropriate independence to conduct the ITPOP at the Millstone facility. Similar to the ICAVP approval, the NRC staff approval of LHC as the third-party organization was conditional on the submittal of certifications of i financial independence by the corporate officials of NU and LHC. The staff i has since received these certifications. The NRC continues to evaluate potential enforcement actions concerning the i spent fuel pool and design-basis issues at Millstone. Also, potential j enforcement actions may result from the work of the Office of Investigations, the Office of the Inspector General, special team inspections, routine resident and regional inspections, and the 10 CFR 2.206 petition process. lL These activities are being coordinated with the U.S. Attorney for the District j of Connecticut. Issues that result from this process will be evaluated to j determine whether they affect restart. Any restart issues identified will be j incorporated into the Restart Assessment Plan. j As NRC Watch List Category 3 facilities, the Millstone plants will require Comission approval before restart. In support of this action, the Commission i has been kept informed of the staff's oversight and the licensee's restart plans through Comission papers and periodic briefings. On January 30, 1997, and April 23, 1997, NU executives and NRC senior management briefed the Comission on the status of the Millstone recovery efforts. At the last briefire, the Comission expressed dissatisfaction with the level of detail presented by the licensee and comented that, in the future, greater detail was needed for the Comission to assess the progress of the licensee's actions. On May 30, 1997, NU provided a docketed briefing book to the Comission (a copy also is enclosed), which appears to contain the level of detail that the Comission was seeking. The Commission briefings will i continue approximately once per quarter until decisions concerning restart are 1

s 4 3 final. The next Commission briefing is scheduled for August 6,1997. The staff will also continue to keep the public informed on the status of the 4 Millstone facility through evening meetings, approximately every 2 anths, in the vicinity of the Millstone site. The last such meeting was held on May 21, 1997. With regard to the Haddam Neck facility, on December 4, 1996, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPC0) Board of Directors voted to permanently shut down the facility. On December 5, 1996, the licensee submitted certification of permanent cessation of power operations and permanent removal of fuel from the reactor vessel. Once this certification was docketed (i.e., 4 formally received) by the NRC, the Haddam Neck facility license no longer authorized operation of the reactor or emplacement of fuel into the reactor vessel. CYAPC0 is planning for the decommissioning of its facility. Before major decommissioning activity takes place, CYAPC0 is required to submit a Post-Shutdown Decommissioning Activities Report in accordance with NRC regulations. Also, on May 12, 1997, the NRC proposed a $650,000 civil penalty for Haddam Neck due to alleged violations involving (1) multiple examples of engineering errors relating to maintenance of the plant design basis, and (2) an incident in late 1996 in which nitrogen gas leaked into the reactor vessel resulting in a reduction in reactor water level. The NRC is continuing to evaluate taking enforcement action at Haddam Neck in response to other potential violations of NRC requirements. Because Haddam Neck is permaner.tly shut down, the NRC SP0 is no longer responsible for its oversight. Therefare, the status reports that follow will no longer discuss Haddam Neck. However, our respective staffs will continue to be in frequent contact regarding activities at Haddam Neck. I trust this information, as supplemented by the enclosures, will give you an adequate understanding of the current status of the Millstone and Haddam Neck facilities and the actions that are required before the Commission will allow the Millstone units to restart. If I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson

Enclosures:

As stated (6)

y --~u 7 UNITED STATES g g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t WASHINGTON D.C. 20066 4001 ,s...../ May 28, 1997 4 Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon President and Chief Executive Officer Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385-0128

Dear Mr. Kenyon:

This letter provides conditional approval of your proposed contractor, Parsons Power Group, Inc. (Parsons) for the conduct of the Millstone Unit 2 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP), pending completion and submittal of the enclosed certifications of financial independence by Parsons and the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's ( Licensee's) 4 corporate officials. On the basis of the information provided in your submittals of February 14, March 27, and May 14,1997, and the discussions at the meeting of March 18,1997, we have concluded that Par:;ons has the technical expertise and nuclear design experience necessary to conduct 'he ICAVo review at Millstone Unit 2. We have a. Iso concluded that Parsons is sufficiently indtpendent of the Ucensee and its design contractors for the conduct of the ICAVP. Concems were raised by the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) for the State of Connecticut and by members of the public on the independence of the ICAVP contractors. The NRC has chdsen to adopt a practical standard of independence between the ICAVP contractor and the Licensee. In making our determination, we balanced the need to ensure adequate financial independence with the need to ensure that the contractor had the necessary skills and experience to effectively conduct the ICAVP. We found that Parsons was sufficiently independent from the design and operation of Millstone Unit 2 in that it has not been involved in design activities that would affect its ability to perform the ICAVP. Regarding Parsons' financial independence from the Licensee, we found sufficient independence in that, organizationally, Parsons does not directly own any stock, bonds, or other financial instruments issued by Northeast Utilities (NU), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), or other entities named on the Millstone Unit 2 operating license. The Parsons Powce Group, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Parsons Corporation. The Parsons Corporation is totally owned by the employees through the Parsons Employee Stock Ownership Plan. The Parsons Employees Stock Ownership Plan does not invest in outside companies. The Parsons 401K program is administered by American Express Corporation and no employee of Parsons has control of the investment decisions of any of the five mutual funds involved in the 401K program. In addition, each of the proposed ICAVP team members will be required to provide a written statement regarding conflict of interest that includes financial interests. b O MOOT Nh

i l Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon 2 As previously described, we have concluded that Parsons has sufficient technical and financial inoependence to conduct an objective review of Millstone Unit 2. In addition, we have concluded that Parsons has sufficient technical and financial independence to conduct the necessary seismic reviews that Sargent & l.. ndy is precluded from performing at Millstone Units 1 and 3. However, this approval is conditioned upon the submittal of the enclosed certifications of financialindependence by the corporate officials of the NNECO and Pacons (Enclosure 1). A detailed discussion of the basis for our approval is provided in Enclosure 2. To ensuru the continued independence of the ICAVP team, a communication protocol will be established as part of the contractor's audit plan. This protocol shallinclude the reporting procedures discussed in the Confirmatory Order of August 14,1996. The staff will approve the protocol after discussions with the contractor during the staffs review of the audit plan. We will withhold final approval of individual team members until completion of our interviews in conjunction with our review of the proposed audit plan. The staff will conduct interviews with each team member to verify that he or she is technically and financially independent and to j determine whether the member's technical qualifications and experience are consistent with his or her assigned role as defined in the audit plan. In addition, we request that all team members complete the enclosed Conflict-of-Interest Statement to document their financial and technical independence (Enclosure 3). It is requested that these statements be submitted by Parsons following the NRC staff conducted interviews of the team. Please contact Eugene Imbro at (301) 415-1490 if you need any acutional information or clarification of the enclosures. Sincerely, aLN /- William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Certification of FinancialIndependence

2. Results of the Staffs Review of the Proposed ICAVP Contractor for Millstone Unit 2

3. Conflict-of-Interest Statement cc: see next page

. ~ 4' C, fem {+. p a% UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. g e WASHINGTON. D.C. ScesHooi s%../ March 24,1997 Mr. Bruce Kenyon President and Chief Executive Officer Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385-0128

SUBJECT:

. RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

Dear Mr. Kenyon:

This letter is to inform you of a recent revision to the NRC's Millstone Restart Assessment Plan. This will be the Second revision to the plan since it was initially issued. The Restart Assessment Plan was initially issued in September 1996, and subsequently revised in December 1996, to reflect an NRC reorganization which had established a Special Projects Office for Millstone oversight. The Restart Assessment Plan was revised to make the plan applicable to all three Millstone units rather than just Unit 3 a~nd was based on your decision to allow all three units to focus on restart in parallel, rather than the previous circumstances in which most resources were applied to a Unit 3 restart. The revised l Restart Assessment Plan is enclosed to this letter. j~ The NRC Manual Chapter (MC)--0350, " Restart Approval" checklist, will be the same for j all three Millstor.e units. However, in addition to the Unit 3, the Significant Items List (SIL) [ for Unit 3, which was already in the Restart Assessment Plan, SIL have been added for Units 1 and 2. Also, the Unit 3 SIL has been revised by the addition of more items to the list, and to show what items have already been addressed and closed by the NRC through our inspection process. Editorial changes were made to each Sll to allow for cross } referencing'between the SIL and the MC--0350 " Restart Approval" checklist. The SILs } for each unit are living documents and will be periodically revised. We willinform you by j. letter when there are significant revisions to each SIL. i inspection of items listed in the Restart Assessment Plan will require significant NRC j ' resources. So that we may efficiently schedule the use of our resources to verify that i items listed on the plan have been completed, we request that your staff carefully review b the enclosed plan and provide to our staff scheduled comp 5 tion dates for each item. In 3 addition, you should give us sufficient advance notice of yaur readiness for restart of each - p unit so that we may plan the use of our resources for other planned NRC inspections, as l noted in the Restart Assessment Plan.

.1, Mr. Bruce Kenyon 2-if you have any, questions please contact Mr. Wayne D. Lanning at 610-337-5126 or Mr. Jacque P. Durr at 610-337-5224. I f Sincerely, William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i Enclosure Restart Assessment Plan, dtd March 1997 Docket Nos. 50-245, 50-336, and 50-423 cc w/ enclosure N. S. Carns, Senior Vice President and Chief Officer R. T. Laudenat, Acting Director - Regulatory Affairs for Millstone Station M. H. Brothers, Vice President - Millstone, Unit 3 . J. McElwain, Unit 1 Recovery Officer M. Bowling, Jr., Unit 2 Recovery Officer D. M. Goebel, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight J. K. Thayer, Recovery Officer, Nuclear Engineering and Support P. D. Hinnenkamp, Directer, Unit Operations J. F. Smith, Manager, Operator Training F. C. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services L. M. Cuoco, Esquire J. R. Egan, Esquire V. Juliano, Waterford Library. Department of Public Utility Control S. B. Comley, We The People State of Connecticut SLO Designee Citizens Awareness Network T. Concannon, NEAC E. Woollacott, NEAC

4 I l jj __] y MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLew l c,W 5

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Approved: A] b u ~ Date: 6M 97 " William D. [ ravers, Director Special Program Office __] Revision 03/24/97 I -6900DiGW sq y

l l* MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN

1.0 BACKGROUND

The three Millstone units are shut down to formulate responses to a series of 10 CFR 50.54 (f) letters requiring them to affirm their compliance with the conditions of each unit's license and the regulations. The NRC performed a series of inspections at Units 2 and 3 with a 20-person SpecialInspection Team (SIT) to ascertain the extent of their compliance. Currently, the results of those inspections 1re under assessment by the team and NRC management. The licensee initially focussed on Unit 3 as the lead plant for restart. However, as a result of a licensee reorganization which occurred on October 1,1996, each Millstone unit was assigned a recovery manager who was an executive on temporary loan from another nuclear utility. Resources originally assigned to Unit 3 from the other units were returned to their respective units. Each unit has been tasked with establishing their own restart plan and whichever unit is ready will apply to restart first. Hence this restart assessment plan has been expanded to include Manual Chapter (MC)-0350 evaluations (see paragraph 3.0) for all three units. On June 28,1996, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) issued a letter to the licensee that stated the Commission had decided to make the three Millstone units a Category 3 on the Watch List and would vote on the restart of the Millstone units. It is the intent to implement the appropriate aspects of NRC Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval" for the restart of all three units. The NRC will schedule and implement its inspection program after the licensee has j indicated that the individual activities necessary for restart are complete and ready for inspection. The NRC has been dealing with Northeast Utilities on broader performance issues which go beyond the 10 CFR 50.54(f) concerns. These broader concerns are considered contributory causes for the current poor performance, which the 10 CFR 50.54(f) issues are a subset. These issues have been formalized by the licensee in a program titled " Improving Station Performance" (ISP) and are topics that will be addressed by the licensee and reviewee by the NRC Millstone Restart Assessment Panel. A meeting was conducted on A ril 30,1996, and disclosed that the licensee was not adequately managing the program or tracking progress. The salient concerns embodied in the ISP include leadership, communications (employee concerns), the corrective action program, procedural adherence and procedure upgrades, work planning and control, and operational enhancements. The NRC Restart Assessment Plan will focus on the broader issues of the ISP and REVISION - MARCH 24,1997

m_ 4 2 i i licensee self-assessments and management oversight, recognizing the necessity to 1 -ensure adequate closure cf the 10 CFR 50.54(f) process. The NRC plan for j inspection of the improving Station Performance issues is discussed in more detail 3 in Section 3 of this plan. On November 3,1996, the agency established the Special Projects Office (SPO) to consolidate NRC efforts under a single Senior Executive Service (SES) manager, j who reports to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The Director, SPO assumed the authority and responsibiliies of the Regional e Administrator and the Associate Director of Projects. 2.0 10 CFR 50.54(f) Activities j 1 Each Millstone unit has been requested to submit information describing actions l taken to ensure that future operations will be conducted in accordance with the j terms and conditions of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the Final Safety Analysis Report. In a May 21,1996, !etter, the NRC requested Northeast Utilities'(NU) to provide for each unit its plan for completing the licensing bases reviews. To aid in NRC understanding of how deficiencies were identified and dispositioned, the NRC's May 21,1996, letter also requested that NU provide for each Millstone unit a comprehensive list of design and configuration deficiencies and information related to how each deficiency was identified and will be dispositioned. On August 14,1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP). The independent effort will verify the adequacy of NU's efforts to establish adequate design bases and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures and maintenance and testing practices, verification of system performance, and implementation of modifications since issuance of the initial f acility operating licenses. The NRC oversight of the ICAVP and activities will be in addition to the activities described in this Restart Assessment Plan. The results from this program will be incorporated into this restart plan and considered a significant part of the decision regarding recommended restart. The deficiencies found by the licensee as a result of the 50.54(f) letters will be evaluated by the Millstone Restart Assessment Panel to identify restart issues. 3.0 MC 0350 Process Millstone Unit 1 entered a routine refueling outage on November 3,1995. On December 13,1995, the NRC sent a 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter requiring the licensee to certify compliance with the regulatory requirements before restarting the unit. At the January "996 Senior Management Meeting, the site was placed on the " Watch List" for various reasons, including a concern for regulatory compliance. Subsequently, Millstone Units 2 and 3 were sent similar letters which required responses before restart.

l l l 3 1 The NRC inspection Manual, Manual Chapter (MC) -0350, " Staff Guidelines For Restart Approval", provides guidelines and a list of tasks and activities that must be considered before a plant that has been shutdown for cause can restart. Because of NRC concerns relating to the licensee's management effectiveness, the appropriate aspects of MC 0350 will be applied to the restart of Units 1,2, and 3 to ensure applicable requirements have been met (Enclosure (4). The Director, SPO, in coordination with the Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Programs, and the Director of NRR, will make a recommendation regarding restart. NRR and the SPO willinform the Commission of the staff's and licensee's restart activities through Commission papers, or communications to the EDO The Commission will then vote on whether to approve the restart of each Millstone unit. 3.1 SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE The SPO was created on November 3,1996, to oversee the restart of the Millstone units. The plan was to consolidate the NRC resources devoted to the restart efforts under one SES manager. The office is e ganized into three primary elements, licensing, inspection, and independent corrective action oversight. The Licensing Branch will administer the typical licensing actions performed in NRR; the Inspection Branch willimplement the inspection programs, normally managed from the region, and the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Over!.ight Branch will oversee the licensee's licensing and design bases review process. Within the SPO, the Restart Assessment Panel (RAP) will meet to assess the licensee's performance and their progress in completing the designated restart activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO (chairrnan); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, Inspections, and Indeoendent Corrective Actions Verification Program Oversight; the Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the inspection Branch Chief, the Senior Resident inspectors for the three Millstone units, and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The function of the Millstone RAP is described in MC-0350. 3.2 MILLSTONE OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN On July 2,1996, NU submitted the Unit 3 Operational Readiness Plan, which was discussed at the July 24,1996, meeting and updated at the August 19,1996, meeting. However, the licensee has replaced all of the line managers (President, Vice Presidents, and two of the three unit directors) in the recent past. With this replacement, the submitted pirans for Unit 3 and the proposed plans for Units 1 and 2 are being changed substantially. The RAP will review these plans and hold periodic meetings with NU, open to the public, to discuss the schedule for implementation and coordination of NRC restart activities. The deficiency lists associated with the restart plans for each unit, which will be updated periodically by the licensee, includes restart and deferred items, and will be

b 4 audited by the NRC to verify the acceptability of the criteria used to defer items from the restart list. 3.3 CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM The NU corrective action program has been weak in ensuring comprehensive and effective corrective actions. There are many instances of narrowly focused corrective actions that failed to embrace all aspects of the underlying problem. Additionally, the licensee has failed to follow up on corrective actions to ensure they were effective. Consequently, the RAP has determined that any restart effort should examine the current state of the licensees corrective action program. Because of the large number of Adverse Condition Reports (ACR) being identified by the licensee's staff, the resident and regionalinspection staff will concentrate on issues for each unit identified by the ACR process and audit the licensees corrective actions for completeness. The staff is periodically selecting ACRs for review, based on the licensee's assigned level of importance, or their risk significance, as perceived by the resident staff. Additionally, other ACR's will be examined to provide a spectrum of safety significant and lessor risk issues. These selected ACRs will be added to the SIL for each unit, which are Enclosures 1,2, and 3 to this plan. l The intent is to primarily assess the corrective action program while dealing with the safety significant technicalissues. Examination of the corrective action program needs to review the Action Requests (AR) from the Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) program, which is an extension of the ACR process, and commitments regarding violations and inspection items. Further, a significant input to assessing the licensee's corrective action program is derived from the normal inspection program where valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of corrective actions are routinely collected from the technical safety inspections. Additionally, the NRC Independent Corrective Action Verification Oversight Branch will assess the licensee's corrective actions for degraded and non-conforming conditions. Finally, the Operational Safety Team inspection (OSTI) will audit portions of the corrective action process during the course of its activities. Demonstration of improvements in the process will be judged by the completeness of the licensee's corrective actions for each of the inspected ACR's. There must be a high ratio of successfully completed ACR's to the total population inspected. There should only be minor comments regarding the processing, evaluation, directed corrective actions and closure of an issue. 3.4 WORK PLANNING AND CONTROLS (C.4.)' Work planning and controls are other areas that the licensee has shown a weakness. The ability to plan, control, and complete work is fundamental to ' Reference to applicable MC-0350 sec1 ion

5 achieving adequate corrective actions. Effective work planning and controls are prerequisites for reducing and managing backlogs. Weak work planning and control was demonstrated during the Unit 2 outage, wherein, tagging bour'dary violations resulted in an extensive effort by the licensee to correct. Work control and planning were also issues at Unit 1, which resulted in a management meeting. There will be a complete review of the Automated Work Order (AWO) process by the resident or regional staffs. The automated work order process is an integral part of the work planning and control system and is instrumental in establishing the scope of,the work, providing the appropriate procedures, and establishing the tagging boundaries. Consequently, the Unit 1 resident staff has been directed to use the available initiative inspection hours to do a comprehensive inspection of the AWO process, which is a site-wide process. The OSTI will assess the engineering and maintenance backlogs during its operational readiness inspection. The OSTI will determine if there are safety significant issues that must be resolved before restart. 3.5 PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM (C 3.3.e) The quality and adherence to procedures has been a chronic problem at the Millstone site. The issue was an element in " Improving Station Performance" and was one of the subjects of discussion at the periodic meetings between NU and the NRC. In response to NRC concerns, the licensee developed the Procedure Upgrade 1 Program in the early 1990's to improve station procedures. The resident inspectors will relate procedural inspection findings back to the procedural upgrade program (PUP), identifying whether the procedures reviewed during the course of an inspection have been upgraded and characterize the quality of the document. This will establish a basis for assessing the effectiveness of the licensee's PUP. The NRC staff will develop an inspection plan for examining selected portions of each unit's individual efforts. 3.6 OVERSIGHT (C.1.4 ) l The licensee has identified its oversight function as deficient through self-assessments and external and internal audits and as a contributing factor in the licensee's declining performance. The report of Assessment of Past ineffectiveness i of Indeoendent Oversicht by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC), examined the failure of Quality Assessment Services, the independent Safety Evaluation Group, and the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) to identify the deficient FSAR control process and the radioactive waste conditions. They found that management did not support these functions adequately. In addition, the Joint Utilities Management Association (JUMA) issued its report on July 17,1996. One conclusion was that the quality assurance (QA) progrrm audits, surveillances, and inspections were not effective in the implementation of their

l l l l l 6 mission and resolution of identified problems, in addition, the JUMA audit found that recommendations for improving QA effectiveness identified in previous QA internal and external assessments have not been addressed. The NRC assessment of the nuclear oversight function is addressed as part of the RAP's review of the ISP program and through insights gained from the normal inspection program. In addition, the NRC will perform a specialinspection of the oversight function using the services of its Human Factors Assessment group. Late in the restart process for each unit, there will be an inspection to evaluate the effectiveness of the oversight groups and management's utilization of the oversight process. There should be positive indications that the oversight function has been made an integral part of the licensee's management team assessment process. The oversight function should result in meaningful findings, have access to line management, and provide assessments of process and program effectiveness through periodic reports. There should be evidence that the reports are forwarded to the responsible manager and that they have dealt with the contents appropriately. Oversight should be adequately staffed with qualified and experienced personnel. The audit and surveillance programs need to be clearly defined, proceduralized, and implemented with established schedules. 3.7 ENFORCEMENT Outstanding enforcement items will be reviewed by the resident inspectors to determine if any issues require closure before plant restart. The agency is currently

• accumulating escalated enforcement items concerning the spent fuel pool and design bases issues which may require licensee response before recommending j

restart of each unit. There are also potential enforcement items that will result i from the efforts of the Office of Investigations, the allegation process review group, the Office of the Inspector General, the Special Inspection Team, routine resident i and regional inspection efforts, and the 10 CFR 2.026 petition process. i A P-decisional Enforcement Conference was held with the licensee on December 5,1996, to discuss 64 individual apparent violations. The licensee did j not contest any of the violations at the conference, and the staff is in the process of finalizing the enforcement package. Once enforcement actions have been taken, the NRC will evaluate the licensee's corrective action to those enforcement actions which are determined to impact restart of each unit. 3.8 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS The Millstone site has had a chronic problem in dealing effectively with employee concerns. The NRC continues to receive an inordinate quantity of allegations from tha staff at the Millstone site. The current series of 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters were initiated due to NRC concerns regarding design basis issues at Millstone, as well as an allegation, and a subsequent Millstors 10 CFR 2.206 petition, dealing with the

7 Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The NRC has issued two enforcement actions for harassment and intimidation to NU in the past three years and has a current escalated enforcement action pending. The NRC initiated two task groups to examine the Northeast Utilities handling of employee concerns, and the recent layoffs that affected several previous allegers. The task group examined NU's handling of employee concerns and identified a number of root causes for the licensee's problems in this area. The task group also concluded that past problems and their root causes still remain. Subsequently, the NRC issued an order, dated October 24,1996, requiring NU to establish a comprehensive program to address employee concerns, and hire an independent party to oversee the implementation of the program. The output from these two task groups and the licensee's response to the order will be reviewed for restart issues. 3.9 SIGNIFICANT ISSUES LIST The technique to be used for the restart will be to reach agreement with the licensee on its restart issues list, have it impose controls on adding or deferring items from the list, have the resident inspectors review the list to ensure it includes issues of interest to the NRC, and have the residents review the deferred list to ensure appropriate rationales for deferral have been documented (see item B.4.3. of MC 0350). As a result of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) activities, the licensee initially determined that, for all three Millstone units, hundreds of items did not meet criteria for inclusion as a restart item. The resident inspectors, augmented by headquarters staff, are reviewing these lists periodically and confirming that the licensee is performing an adequate assessment of the discrepancies. This process will be used in the restart assessment of each unit. The RAP will determine that licensee's restart issues list includes appropriate restart items from the licensee's programs such as ACR, AR (AITTS), engineering work requests, and commitments. The enclosed NRC Significant issues Lists for all Millstone units (Enclosure 1,2 and

3) contain some of the items that are being used to audit and evaluate licensee programs such as the corrective action process and significant safety / regulatory technical issues.

Restart issues will meet at least one of the following criteria: I 1. Resolution of the issue is required to ensure safe operation of the facility to include satisfaction of the technical specifications or licensing basis. 2. Inspection of the issue will provide an insight to an identified programmatic deficiency such as the coriective action system. 3. Inspection of the issue will provide assessment of management effectiveness or personnel performance, f i i

l 8 l 3.10 ' RESTART INSPECTIOt{ Selected portions of NRC MC-93802, " Operational Safety Team inspection," will provide the framework for a team inspection of each unit during the restart process. The procedure scope will be modified to address the pertinent issues at Millstone. The inspection will cover self assessments by the licensee, the licensee's implementation of its startup plan, control room observations during the approach to criticality and power ascension, selected systems readiness inspection and observation of management oversight. The resident inspectors will prov!"e close monitoring of each unit during mode changes to ensure compliance with each unit's technical specifications and FSAR design bases. 3.11 PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW On March 19,1997, the Millstone Oversight Team conducted a Plant Performance Review (PPR). The PPR was used to identify the issues that needed to be inspected for the Millstone station. The review identified severalissues that warrant NRC inspection before plant restart of the unit. The unit specific issues, as well as station wide issues identified by the PPR, are contained in the SIL for each unit as inspection items. 3.12 LICENSING ISSUES Each Millstone unit plans '.o submit or has submitted licensing issues (amendments, unresolved safety questions, relief requests, etc.) which willimpact the restart process. The SPO Licensing Branch will disposition each applicable issue prior to restart. The status of NRR actions concerning each issue is documented in Enclosure (5) of this plan.

Enclosures:

(1) Significant items List - Millstone Unit 1 (2) Significant items List - Millstone Unit 2 (3) Significant items List - Millstone Unit 3 (4) MC-0350 - Restart Approval Checklist - All Millstone Units (5) Licensing issues Required for Restart l

a 4- -4 a1 L.m. J g, >Ae oA, Ja - K k __.s a A4 A s l 1 l i e ENCLOSURE 1 4 i E e

4 4 MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN Millstone Unit 1 Sianificant items List-k l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS i 1 ACR 01148 Determine FSAR status before restart SPO (L) 2 ACR 01535 While de watering spent resin, the waste temperature DRS 4 i in the liner raised from 90 to 310 F 3 ORDER Review expectations and standards for employee SPO Hannon Report concerns (L) eSenior management has created difficult working M 96-0921 8 environment EA 96 59 MC 0350 e C.1.4.e, f C.5.d. C.2.2.b l 4 MC 0350 Review enforcement and unresolved items for restart SPO (1) { C.5.e issues i 5 MC 0350 C.5.f Review allegations for restart issues SPO(l) SPO(L) s 6 Review all operability determinations and by pass SPO (1)

~

jumpers before restart 7 LER 96 22 Fatigue cycle open items DRS URI 92 30-2 8 New fuel security (IP 81064) DRS 9 Review licensee event reports for restart issues SPO (l) 10 ACR 05373 Material, equipment and parts SPO M197-0358 list (MEPL) program (L) evaluation 11 ACR 961068 RPS System SPO (l) eScram solenoid pilot valve replacement 12 LER 9648 Overlap testing of RPS/ESF DRS GL 96 01 ACR M197-045 a i i

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 13 Tl 2515/109 Motor operated valve DRS URl94-005-02 program GL89-10 closure URl94 005-04 URl95-001-01 UR196-005-05 LER96 52 ACR 03689 M1 97-0397, 0384 14 ACR Surveillances Program Review SPO (1) M1-96 0992 LER 9618 VIO95-007-02 LER 96 42 15 ACR Control and use of vendor information DRS 10790 (U 3) 16 ACR Radwaste recovery / configuration. DRS M1-96-0915 M 4* g2[

• Insufficient management support for maintenance of radwaste eel 96-003 01
• RW effluent isolation valve QA classification LER 97-001 MC 0350 C.2.2.c i

17 eel 96-09-05 Corrective Actions SPO (1) IR 90-04 URi95 0

• Review licensee corrective action programs for p

6 effectiveness to include ACR's. 0922 ACR 7007 eCorrective actions have been ineffective in resolving ACR 13318 problems M196 0823, M1 96 1035, M1 97-0342, 0343 MC 0350 C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.4.d, C.2.1.h, C.3.1.d 18 Review 0737 action items for completion and SPO (I) adequacy 19 Review engineering backlogs SPO (1) for restart issues (U 1)-4

i o REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 20 ORDER Phase 11 of the ICAVP SPO MC 0350 (L) C.S.d 21 ACR 03117

• Single failure can disable both trains of emergency DRS VIO95 31-03/

power source-LNP lockout relay

• Review LNP integrated procedure and results ACR 1 0323,0417
• LNP post testing does not meet RG 1.41 Requirements a

1 22 ACR 04167 SRV's DRS URl94-014-01

• setpoint drift resolution UR196 4 07
• accelerated testing e

9

• electric lift ' modification adequacy 0622,1120
• electric lift setpoints r'ot fully evaluated 1

j 23 ACR 6264 Configuration Management SPO 4 ACR 05239 (1)/SPO AC Me ew %. Ismes for restad issues g2s ACR M1,

• Unit 1 design deficiencies and issues trends 96-0936
• Review open DBDP items for startup issues ACR M1-
• Review station blackout self assessment items for 96 0345 startup issues

' [201-03

• Significant differences between design bases and as-9 built eel 96 04-03 ACR M1
• Field changes to plant modifications not reviewed for 1009 cause MC 0350 C.2.1.g,f C.3.2.f C.S.d 24 Review FME SPO (1) 0f#

A e deMencies trend for W and M caWy M 96 o280,

• Debris identified in spent fuel pool M 1 96-0728, M 1 96-0913,
• Adverse trend identified in Unit 1 FME program M1-97-0221
• Fuel Pool foreign material and storage controls 4
• LP 24D stuck open due to foreign material 25 ACR 07478, inadequate design modifications DRS 05482
• installed wrong material (pressure rating) for LLRT ER 95-24 connections j

(U1)-5

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 26 ACR 03822 Current CWDs do not show modifications to equipment SPD (1) 27 ACR 06483 Fuse control program inadequate DRS LER96 31 - LER9617 l URl96-004 06 28 ACR 12663 LOCA analysis does not account for instrument DRS uncertainty during surveillance testing 29 PPR E.1 Operator acceptance of degraded con' itions, lack of SPO (l) d MC 0350 ownership, O.D.'s accept degraded conditions, C'8'8'd temporary mods, etc. 30 ACR Work Control Process Review SPO (1) M196 0343 EIOC'88 M 96-0923 PPR E.2 eSignificant long standing work management eel 96-08-01 weaknesses ACR M1 eFailure to completely implement and document { 1057 recommendations of AWO task force report of 1/1995 i MC eTroubleshooting 2 31 PPR E.2 Post maintenance testing / maintenance F/U inspection SPO VIO96-001-02 (1)/DRS V1094-031-01 1 MC 0350 C.4.h 32 URI 96-005 04 Rowork SPO (1) 33 ACR 07454 Seismic issues DRS-LER 96 $" 5 eSeismic review seismic modifications (FWCI, A 46, 8 R ipige.oos.06 79-02/79 14, NUSOER) ACRM196 eSeismic il/l 0843

• Verify resolution of A-46 outliers CEl96-08 03 eCRD operability 8

8

• SEP Topic lil-6 Close out 8

ACR M196-0696, M1 0345,0412 (U1)-6

l l l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 34 m 95-82 Spent Fuel Pool DRS i IF196-004-02 ""I'#13

• SFP Cleanup ACRs M1-96448
• Review resolution of Spent Fuel Pool issues M1-97-0040

1. Assess and disposition numerous open items in IR95-0016,0053, 82 0057,0058, eUnanalyzed condition due to indeterminate boraflex m82 mas, degradation M197-0355, 0356,0456,

• Load drop analysis (Fuel) 0392 35 Review Reg Guide 1.97 modifications DRS 36 ACR NRC Information Notices LENS have incomplete or SPO (l) l M196-0106 Inaccurate responses 1

37-ACR Control rod blades in spent fuel pool lifted inadvertently SPO (1) M1 96-0247 with tri-nuc filter ) URl96-006-02 1 i 38 ACR Ineffective program to monitor and control fasteners DRS M1-96-0545 LER 96 27 eel 96-04-05 39 ACR Adverse trend identified in the control of contracted DRS M196 0564 services c0 ACR M&TE program is ineffective SPO (1) M196-0614 41 ACR Process for controlling distribution and use of SPO (I) M1] documents (procedures) is ineffective O2 ACR Potential deviation from tech specs when changes SPO (1) M196 0810 made to Unit 1 organizational structure i 03 ACR Multiple weaknesses identified during recent E-plan DRS M196 0848 eE-Plan key position staffing 8 ePerformance of dose assessments NU lona

B18195, 2/10/97 MC 0350 C.3.1.m C.2.2.g C.2.2.h (U1)-7

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 44 ACR Potential weaknesses in EEQ program DRS M 1 0876 45 ACR Components in control rod drive system (suction filters DRS M196-0638 and associated piping, Valves and fittings) may not meet the original design requirements 46 ACR Insufficient personnel for key leadership programs SPO (1) M 196-0924 47 ACR PM tasks on plant equipment not performed SPO (1) M 1-96-0925 MC 0350 C.4.1 48 ACR Management. direction insufficient for system DRS M196-0926 engineering MC 0350 C.2.1.a 49 ACR System and design engineering work management SPO M 1 0927 weaknesses (OS) MC 0350 C.2.1 50 ACR Training for engineering personnel not effectively SPO M196 0929 implemented MC 0350 C.3.1.e 51 ACR lmprovements needed in TLD process and program DRS M196 0933 52 ACR Chemistry issues DRS M1-88-0834

• Adverse chemistry conditions increase potential for corrosion M 96-0936 IFl96 004-16
• Weaknesses in chemistry monitoring, trending and evaluation 53 URI 96-12-01 Procedure adequacy / quality of V&V process &

SPO (1) ACR implementation 0['

• Operating procedure deficiencies hinder operators g

MC 0350

• Deviation from operations procedures during C.3.1.k simulator transients C.3.3.s
• Verify off-normal and general operating procedures C.3.3.f revisions / adequacy in e soe'=

54 ACR Component and system degradation during plant SPO (1) M 1-96-0911 shutdown (U 1)-8

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 55 ACR Degraded instrument air system quality SPO (l) M1 96-0912 56 vloss-007-04 Appendix J resolution DRS ACR elnadequate testing M1-8 155 elmplementation of Appendix J modifications g y,,.97 0367 eVerify the basis for not Appendix "J" testing the M1 97-0349 ECCS suction valves eAdequacy of the basis for the shutdown cooling system classification as a closed loop system 57 LER 96-026 LLRT Program Review DRS LER 96-012 eFeedwater system configuration not allow complete MR9 dra n, accept LLRT g 3_9611 eContainment isolation check valve fails inform LLRT { eHistorical LLRT results/ repeat failures of MSIVs, MSIV drains, FWlVs 58

• Review ILRT (required due to the replacement of DRS inboard containment isolation valves LP-14A & LP 14B) 59 ACR SBGT issues resolution DRS M1-96-0995, elmplementation of a low flow isolation modification DE 94 023-05 vio95 31-04 eResolution of all outstanding issues that could affect 177-02 operability (ACR 03735,08248,03403,03402) oTechnical Specification restriction to prevent the use vio95 44-of both standby gas trains when venting the drywell 02/EA95 eUse of a dedicated operator while venting'the drywell via SGTS LER96-11 eDraw down time criteria / testing during a LNP eel 96-08-02 LER 96 62 60 URl95-31-01 Verify resolution of ATWS issues, lack of LCO and SPO (1) turning off the ATWS system to perform battery voltage adjustments 61 LER 96 58 Verify resolutio'n of IPEEE walkdown issues DRS/S eDetermine the need for the licensee to complete the PO (L)

IPEEE (U 1)-9

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 62 ACR M1 Verify implementation of setpoint changes identified by DRS 0219 the setpoint verification program eincorrect RPS setpoints eYarways - 7" Error Low Low Water Level Calculation 63 Verify HELB program completion DRS 64 Verify drywell temperature profile, DRS PDCR completion and closeout necessary to update the plant design basis 65 URl93 24-04 Fire Protection / Appendix R Prograi, Review DRS lFl96-001-03 eReview fire detection and suppression system code compliance issues resolution eAppendix R equipment, test, maintenance program, and surveillance program 66 Review commitment modification program for startup SPO (1) issues 67 ACR Core reload DRS M196-0938

• Error in LOCA modelinput data for GE11 fuel eSIL 581 eThe LOCA results are expected to reduce the operating margin for MAPLHGR below the normal value (10%)

e3D monicore heat balance error correction eReview reload 15/ core design for cycle 16 including the PDCR, safety evaluation and reload report. 68 Core spray suction valves receives a sealin accident SPO (1) signal and can not be shut for leak isolation during an accident 69 SD valves (1,2A,7.B) may not close under HELB SPO (1) conditivas if open with greater than 300 degrees Rx water temperature 70 Review relief valve reliability DRS ACR trend 71 Modifications installed prior to NRC approval and SPO sametimes before the TSAR subm;tted. (shutdown (L) cooling, SRVs) (U1) 10

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS l 72 ACR 8254 lsolation condenser thermal shock operability / service DRS life issue j 73 Leaker fuel bundle root cause SPO (1) 74 CRD scram solenoid pilot valve elastomer degradation SPO (I) 75 eel 96-09-08 Service water inspection (GL8913) DRS eel 96-04-04

• Arcor issue resolution and N system operaMty M 96-0981 ACR 02372 ACR M1 1058 76 M197-0331 Electrical separation DRS/S ACR 8250
• Rx high level trip powered from the same source PO (L)

URl91 14 02

• Cable Separation in Switchgear g 9 PIR95 048 ACR M1-96-0859 M1 97-0144 LER 96 30

] 77 ACR Seismic concern with 4KV breaker racked out SPO (1) M 1 96-0845 LER 96 57 78 ACR 07454 IGSCC Program weaknesses DRS LER 9614 eel 96-09-06 LER 95 29 LER 96 35 URl96-005-03 URl96-005-02 79 ACR 7304 Review failure to meet technical specifications root SPO (1) ACR 7402 cause and corrective actions LER 95 31 Numerous LERs 80 ACR M196-Review TRM for technical specification interpretations SPO (1) 1011

• Method to track conditional LCO's 81 URl90-001 02 Seismic qualification of FWCl valve air supply SPO (1) 82 URl90-001-03 FWCl test results SPO (1) 83 URI 91-081-04 Availability of short circuit / voltage drop cales DRS (U 1 )- 1 l

l REFERENCii MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 84 VIO 95 007-01 Control room habitability SPO LER 96-003

• Use of SCBAs (l)/SPO (L) 85 URl95-028 02 Refueling evolutions contrary to design basis SPO (l)

] 86 VIO95-031-02 Cross connecting 480V safety related buses SPO (1) 87 URI 96-006-01 Drywell fire / Technical Specifications violation SPO (1) LER 96-041 LER 96-043 88 LER 96-008 Nonconservative ATWS low low water level setpoint SPO (1) 89 LER 96-015 Recirc pump flow mismatch surv not perf in SPO (1) accordance with TS 90 LER 96-024 Temporary Modification to the scram air header SPO (l) pressure switch instrument not removed 91 LER 96-032 Unqualified components in drywell preclude long term SPO (1) operability 92 LER 96-03S Potential to bypass turbine stop valve when required to SPO (1) be operable 93 LER 96-037 Automatic depressurization system may not be single SPO (1) failure proof 94 LER 96-029 IST/ISI Program Review DRS LER 96-039 ACR M1-97 0276,0400 95 LER 96 045 LPCI sys inop due to stuck open injection check valve SPO (1) 96 LER 98-061 LOCA concurrent with LNP loss DO power prevents SPO (1) LER 96-050 - closure of LPCI torus cooling valve SNes I ACR M1 6-0941 ACR M1 1 0550 97 URl95 8101 NCR Program ineffective SPO (l) eel 96-006-04 i ACR M1 0454 I (U1)-12 I i i

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 98 1R 96-12 Licensed Operator Training Program DRS URI 96-05-01 ACR 118

• LOIT/ LOUT program requirement discrepancies g

50 5 M197-0117,0148, 0168,0223, 0259,0398, 0437 MC 0350 C.3.1.e C.3.3.c 99 eel 96 01-01 Inoperable Gas Turbine Fuel Pump SPO (1) LER 96-10 100 IF196 08-21 Material Condition Program SPO (1) MC 0350 C.4.f 101 LER 96 53 Radiation Effluents Monitoring Program Review DRS LER 96 54 LER 96 65 LER 97 05 ACR M196 1042,1060, 1059,M 1 97-0242,0424 102 ACR M1 EDG Air Start System Review SPO (1) 0424 eel 96-09-07 LER D6 55 LER 96 56 LER 96 60 103 ACR M197 Use of "Non-Q" parts in "Q" applications SPO (1) 0292,0207, 0026,ACR M1-961097 104 ACR M197-GT Air Start System Review SPO (1) 0260 105 ACR M197 $1ngle failure vulnerability of FWCl/APR historical SPO (1) 0277 failure to meet ECCS acceptance criteria 106 ACR M1 Containment isolation valves exceed allowable stroke SPO (l) 0200 time 107 Review deferred restart items list SPO (1) (U1)-13

l l r l l MEMCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS e u ty issues Corrective Actions DSS

c.. 1 Ett 98 0515 eel 97-1 01 XX VIO 96-09 20 l

1 l l (U1)-14

sma w O h 1 l l l I l l l l ENCLOSURE 2 4 4

= l i l l MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN i Millstone Unit 2 Sianificant items List l The following is a list of the Millstone issues that, as a minimum, require an NRC inspection and evaluation pnor to restart. REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.3, MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND EFFECTIVENESS; SPO(l) C.2.1, C.2 2.a,d,e, C.3.1,a,b,c,d LICENSEE STAFF SAFETY CULTURE 2 MC 0350 SECTION C.1,1, 10 CFR 50.54(f) SPO(O) l C.1.3, C.1.4.g, C.3.2, C.4.f; CONFIRMATORY ORDER DATED 08/14/96 3 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 AND DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS CHANGES TO ADDRESS SPO(O) C.1.3; C.2.2.d; UNIT 1 ACR 7007 UNIT 1 ACR 7007; UNIT 2 ACR 8761 NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF DRAWINGS NOT REFLECTING l ACTUAL PLANT CONFIGURATION j 4 MC 0350 ITEM C.1.4.e, EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM SPO(L) i C.2.2.b.e; I l CONFIRMATORY ORDER DATED j OCTOBER 24,'1996 5 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1, CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM TIMELINESS AND SPO(l) C.1.3, C.1.4.d-1, C.2.1, EFFECTIVENESS; C.2.2.c,e, C.3.1.d.m; C.4.f; iP 96-04 & 08 SELF ASSESSMENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENT,4 TION AND eel 336/96-20130 EFFECTIVENESS; COMMITMENT TRACKING l L l 6 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.d, WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL: PLANT MAINTENANCE DRS C.4.e,f,h,1,j PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS; SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE (OL) ISSUES RESOLVED; MAINTENANCE BACKLOG MANAGED l AND IMPACT ON OPERATION ASSESSED: SURVEILLANCE l TESTING; PLANT HOUSEKEEPING 7 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.3.f, BYPASS JUMPERS, GPERATOR WORK-AROUNCS & SPO(l), C.2.1.e, C.3.2.e, C.4.f,i; CONTROL BOARD DEFICIENCIES OSTI (U2)-16 Revised 3/24/97 i

i REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1 l 8 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.b, PROCEDURE QUALITY AND ADHERENCE SPO(O) 1 C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k, C.3.3.e,f; SPO(1) URI 336/96-01-04; IFl 336/95-SURVEILLANCE QUALITY NUMEROUS OSTI 201-03; URI 336/96-06-08 EXAMPLES OF INADEQUATE PROCEDURES REFLECTED IN LERs AND NRC INSPECTION REPORTS ESTABLISHMENT OF ALL PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY TFrHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.8.1 REVIEW OPERATING PROCEDURES TO PRECLUDE WATER HAMMER EVENTS 9 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.g, OPERATING PROCEDURE 3 CONSISTENT WITH FSAR SPOC) C.2.2.g, C.3.3.e,f; DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM OPERATION eel 336/96 0813, eel 336/96-06-05, eel 336/96-08-06: ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS TO LER 336/97-02, ACR 11104, ENSURE OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LICENSE l 10 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.g. PROGRESS OF EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE DRS C.3.3.e,f; UPGRADES; (OL) IR 336/95-21 ACCEPTABILITY OF DEFERRING ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE UPGRADES 11 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.a,b,c, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT SPO(l) C.2.1.c NRR 12 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 C.1.3, LICENSEE RESTART PUNCH LIST - REVIEW OF ITEMS SPO(l) C.1.4.e, C.2.1.f-g, C.4.f,i DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER RESTART 13 MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.g.h,i,j,1, LICENSED OPERATOR STAFFING: CONTROL ROOM SPO(l) C.3.3.a,b,d,g FORMALITY; ATTENTIVENESS TO DUTY; ATTENTION TO OSTI DETAIL; OFF-HOUR PLANT STAFFING; OVERTIME USAGE: AWARENESS TO PLANT SECURITY; AWARENESS OF EQUIPMENT STATUS; LOG KEEPING PRACTICES: 14 MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.e, INACCURATE LICENSE APPLICATION FORMS SUBMITTED DRS C.3.3.c; TO THE NRC FOR 12 OPERATOR LICENSES; (OL) CONFIRMATORY ACTION LETTER DATED MARCH 7,1997 ADEQUACY OF LICENSED OPERATOR TRAINING PROGRAM; (U2)-17 Revised 3/24/97

I REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 15 MC 0350 ITEMS C.4.a,b,c,d.e,g AUGMENTED INSPECTION COVERAGE DURING RESTART SPO(l) NOTE 1 INSPECTION: OPERABILITY OF TECHNICAL OSTI SPECIFICATION SYSTEMS; OPERABILITY OF SECONDARY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS; SYSTEM LINEUPS; RESULTS OF PRE-STARTUP TESTING; POWER ASCENSION TESTING 16 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g-h, EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE DRS(EP) C.3.1.m, C.3.2.h; ORGANIZATION: COORDINATION WITH OFFSITE NU LETTER (B16195) DATED EMERGENCY PLANNING OFFICIALS; FEBRUARY 10,1997 ON SHIFT DOSE ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY 17 MC 0350 SECTION C.5 AND DISPOSITION OF REGULATORY ISSUES: LICENSE

NRR, C.6 AMENDMENTS: EXEMPTIONS; RELIEFS; ORDERS; SPO(L),

SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES; ALLEGATIONS: OE, 01, AND 10 CFR 2.206 PETITIONS. COORDINATION WITH

DRS, INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES.-

OPA 18 ACRs 02621, M2-96-0239 MATERIAL, EQUIP. AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM

NRR, eel 336/96-20142 & 43 DRS (SEB) 19 ACRs M2 96-0515 & 0795P ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION PROGRAM DRS eel 336/96 201-20; URI 336/93-(EEB) 19-02 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROGRAM 20 IFl 336/95-0101 GENERIC LETTER 89-10 MOTOR OPERATED VALVE DRS PROGRAM; (SEB) eel 336/96 05-09 DYNAMIC TESTING OF AFW TERRY TURBINE STEAM ADMISSION MOV; eel 336/95-08 01,02,03 & 04 PRESSURE LOCKING OF CONTAINMENT SUMP RECIRCULATION VALVES 21 MC 0350 ITEM C.3.3.e:

FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM; DRS IR 336/96 08; - (EEB) LICENSEE SELF. ASSESSMENTS APPENDIX R RELATED ABNORMAL OPERATING AND QA AUDITS: PROCEDURES: ACR M2-96 0460 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THERMO-LAG (U2) 18 Revised 3/24/97

I REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS l 22 ACRs M2-96-051'3; CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE & ECCS PUMP DRS eel 336/96-06-11 THROTTLE VALVE CLOGGING (SEB) 23 ACRs 01991, M2 96-0449, HYDROGEN MONITORS AND POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING SPO(l) 0467, 0654, 0655, & 0656 SYSTEM INOPERABLE AND FAILURE TO MEET DESIGN eel 336/96-0813,14 & 15; eel BASIS AND LICENSING BASIS 336/96-201-03 & 41; URI 336/96-01-05 24 ACRs 08174,04047,06372 & EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP AND SPO(l) OS739 COOLDOWN RATES; EVALUATION OF SIMULTANEOUS URI 336/95-42-03 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION 25 NUMEROUS ACRs; ECCS PUMPS CUCTION LINE FROM RWST HAS DRS URI 336/96-06-08 NUMEROUS DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE PWE (CMME) i SUPPORTS, MANY CAUSED BY WATER HAMMER 26 ACR 11252

• B* EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE.

SPO(l) eel 336/96-0910 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 27 eel 336/96 20109 INADEQUATE DESIGN CONTROL MEASURES FOR SPO(O) VERIFYING ACCURACY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT PACKAGES 28 eel 336/96 201 11, FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY CONTROL INSTALLATION OF SPO(l) eel 336/96-201-31 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO THE RBCCW StlRGE SPO(O) TANK 29 eel 336/96-201-12 SEPARATION AND SINGLE FAILURE CONCERNS FOR SPOll) WIDE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS SPO(O) 30 eel 336/96 20125 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SPO(l) CONCERNING

• DUAL-FUNCTION" ISOLATION VALVES SPO(O) 31 eel 336/96-20128 FAILURE TO ADDRESS STATION BLACKOUT DIESEL SPO(l)

ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE VECTRA ASSESSMENT SPO(O) 32 eel 336/96-201-29 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPO(l) AUDIT ISSUES INVOLVING TRENDING AND SPO(O) PRIORITIZATION OF NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS (U21-19 Revised 3/24/97

REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 33 eel 336/96 201-36 INADEQUATF CORRECT!VE ACTION CONCERNING A DRS SEISMIC DESIGN DEFICIENCY OF A VITAL SWITCHGEAR (CMME) ROOM COOLER 34 eel 336/96-08-06 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION OF SPO(l) CHANGING OPERATING PROCEDURE TO LOCK OPEN REFUELING POOL DRAIN VALVES, AS SPECIFIED IN THE FSAR, WAS INADEQUATE 35 eel 336/96-08-08 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN LER 336/96-24 SPO(1) 36 eel 336/96-0810 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS UNIT SPO(l) 1 HEAVY LOADS LIFTED OVER THE UNIT 2 VITAL SWITCHGEAR ROOM 37 eel 336/95 44-05 ICE BLOCKAGE OF SERVICE WATER STRAINER SPO(l) BACKWASH LINE 38 eel 336/96-0511; SPENT FUEL POOL FSAR UPDATES SPO(O) ENFORCEMENT LETTER DATED 11/13/96 39 eel 336/96-0410 ERRONEOUS RBCCW FLOW VALUES IN CONTAINMENT DRS URI 336/96-201-38 TEMPERATURE PROFILE ANALYSIS AND FAILURE TO (SEB) CONSIDER POST-ACCIDENT FLUID TEMPERATURE IN HPSI FLOW EVALUATION 40 LER 336/96-31 POTENTIAL STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE DUE TO DRS RESTRICTIVE MAIN STEAM SAFETY PIPING (SEB) 41 ACR M2 97-0023 SEIMANS COMPUTEF. MODEL OF REACTOR CORE LARGE NRR AND SMALL BREAK LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENTS 42 IR 336/94-201 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL DAY TANK DOES SPO(L) NOT SATISFY 7-DAY DESIGN BASIS CAPACITY 43 IR 336/96-08; INAPPROPRIATE REMOVAL OF S,TARTUP RATE TRIP SPO(l) LER 336/96 24 l l t (U21-20 Revised 3/24/97 l

~ -....~ - ~.. - 1' ( i 4 4 REFERENCE MILI STONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS s 44 ACR 02797, ACR 09563, AFW REGULATING VALVE LEAKAGE FOLLOWING A MAIN SPO(I) {. ACR M2 96-0153 STEAM LINE BREAK COULD RESULT IN EXCEEDING i CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE ) AFW REGULATING VALVES FAILING OPEN FOLLOWING ) SINGLE FAILURE IN CONTROL CIRCUlT COULD PREVENT 1 ISOLATING A RUPTURED STEAM GENERATOR s AFFECTING CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE l 45 ACR M2 96 0296 FAILURE OF MAIN STEAM CHECK VALVE FOLLOWING A SPO(l) J MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB) COULD CAUSE BOTH SPO(O) j. STEAM GENERATORS TO BLOW DOWN RESULTING IN EXCEEDING CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESSURE. THE i CONTAINMENT HAS LESS THAN ONE PSI DESIGN I MARGIN FOR MSLB. THE LICENSEE'S MEPL PROGRAM DESIGNATES THE MS CHECK VALVES AS NON-QA WHICH THE LICENSEE HAS EVALUATED AS ACCEPTABLE. FSAR DESCRIBES THAT THE IMPACT } DURING CHECK VALVE CLOSURE WOULD CAUSE PORTIONS OF THE DISK AND BODY CASTING TO "GO PLASTIC.* 9 46 LER 336/97-02 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING COMMON INLET SPO(l) DAMPER COULD BECOME STUCK CLOSED, DISABLING BOTH FACILITIES. DAMPER HAS NO MANUAL OPERATOR AS STATED IN FSAR. 47 URi 336/96-08-09 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SPO(l) SAFETY FEATURE RESPONSE TIME TESTING 48 ACRs M2 96 0252 & 0542 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS FOR INOPERABLE SPO(l) URI 336/96-08-16 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES NON-CONSERVATIVE I Note 1: Since this inspection will occur following restart approval, the closure of this item will not be reflected on this list. (U2) 21 Revised 3/24/97

_L = 4 a a m I I e 4 4 4 I ENCLOSURE 3 l

d i 4 1 4 ' MILLSTONE RESTART' ASSESSMENT PLAN Millstone Unit 3 Sianificant items List 4 REFERENCE ME.LSTONE UNIT 3 udSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1 ACR 10773 RSS AND QSS PIPING TEMPERATURE NRR Update j eel 96-0613 MAYBE HIGHER THAN ANALYZED (NRR REVIEW ENG. DRS IR96-06 LER 96-007 ANALYSIS, DRS INSPECT INSTALLATION) 01 & O2 2-eel 96-201 DETERMINE FSAR STATUS BEFORE RESTART SPO(L) 01 1. L 3 ACR 05715 REACTOR POWER INCREASE WHEN UNBORATED CATION DRP CLOSED DEMIN PLACED INTO SERVICE 3CHS-DEMIN2 1R96-08 i - ACR 01895 ' EDG SEQUENCER CDA SIGNAL OUTPUT *A* Tr.AIN DRS CLOSED COMPONENTS STARTED IR96-09 5 ACR 01844 FAILURE TO ENTER AN ACTION STATEMENT WHEN MSIVS SPO(l) VIO 94 24-01 WERE CLOSED 6 ACR 04199 RC? SEAL INJECTION FILTER *B" GASKET FAILED RESULTING IN DRP CLOSED' SPILL OF COOLANT TO FLOOR DRAINS IR96-08 l 7 ACR 06092 RCS CHECK VALVE BODY TO BONNET LEAK: 3 RCS*V146 DRP CLOSED i IR96-06 } 8 ACR 01535 WHILE DEWATERING SPENT RESIN, THE WASTE TEMPERATURE DRP CLOSED j IN THE LINER RAIScD FROM 90 TO 310*F IR96-06 9 ACR 10543 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF RESPONSE TIME TESTING SPO(l) FOR PROCEDURES 4 l 10 ACR 11322 CLOSURE OF PIR WITHOUT ADDRESSING DESIGN FEATURE OF DRP CLOSED AFFECTED COMPONENTS IR96-09 11 NU LTR TUR81NE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER DESIGN CONCERNS SPO(l) (815397) j 11/1/95, ACR 10774 & 10780 i eel 96-201 1 04,05 1 4-URI 96-201-40 12 ACR 97-0317 CONTAINMENT FOUNDATION EROSION NRR ACR 6323 URI 96-04-13 URI 96 04-14 URI 96-0415 IFl 9411-09 Revised 3/24/97 i

E REFBENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 MSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 13 ACR 96 326 CCP SYSTEM OPERATION ABOVE DESIGN TEMPERATURE: 3 SPO(!) Update RHS*HCV 606/607 FAILING OPEN; AND OTHER FAILURE MODES IR96-08 13427 URI 96-08 20 1R 96-201 LER 96 28 & i 96-40 i 14 ACR 7745 SGCS OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION CONTROL SPOll) } URI 96-01-07 15 ACR 96-0159 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER LEAKAGE AND DESIGN SPO(!) Update eel 96 06-15 DISCREPANCIES IR96-06 j 16 Unit 2 DUAL FUNCTION VALVE CONTROL AND TESTING SPO ACR 01935 NRR ~ 17 ACR 7266 RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKAGE AND BOLT CORROSION DRS 18 ACR 10562, CONTROL AND USE OF VENDOR INFORMATION DRS PPR G.2 eel 96 201-15 eel 96 201-18 eel 96 201-19 1 URI 96 201-17 19 URI 96-201-RESOLUTION OF AFW VALVES HELB CONCERN SPO(l) 16 20 VIO 96-5913 REVIEW OUTPUT FROM J. HANNON EMPLOYEE CONCERNS SPO(L) MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.e & C.2.2 b 21 FATIGUE CYCLE OPEN ITEMS IP 37750 DRS CLOSED IUNIT 2 ISSUE) lR96-01 22 PART 70 STORAGE AND INVENTORY IP 84750 (UNIT 1 ISSUE) DRS CLOSED lR96-05 23 FORMALITY OF NON-ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND NEW DRS CLOSED FUEL SECURITY IP 81064 IR96-05 24 URI 96-01-08 OVERLAP TESTING OF RPS/ESF SPO(l) Update LER 9717 IR97-01 ] 25 ACR 912 MATERIAL, EQUIP. AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM DRS Update URI 95-0710 EVALUATION NRR IR96 201 eel 96-201 43 (U3)-24 Revised 3/24/97

.. ~. -. l 4 REFERENCE ME.LSTONE UNIT 3 MSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 26 ACR 96-277, MOTOR OPERATED VALVE PROGRAM GL89-10 DRS 0278,627, 12832 j LER 96-19,20 LER 96-35 URI 9517-09 IFl 95-01 IFl 9517-01, 02,03,04, 05 I 27 PPR G.1.C, MISSED SURVEILLANCES/ TEST CONTROL SPO(1) CLOSED G.2 MC 0350 IR96-08 j ITEMS C.4.s 28 PPR G.1.C DILUTION EVENTS SPO(!) CLOSED IR96-08 29 PPR G.1.C FEEDWATER HAMMER DRS CLOSED 1R96-01 30 IR 95 31, NU AFW CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE DRS LTR (B15397) 11/1/95 PPR G.1.C, ACR 96-0855 l 31 PPR G.1.C, WORK-AROUNDS AND ABUSE OF USE AS-IS DEFICIENCIES SPO(l) G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS I C.1.3.f. C.2.1.e C.3.2.e, C 4.f.& I 32 NOV 94 RESIDENT EMPHASIS: AWO QUALITY AND BACKLOG CONTROL DRS 05 PPR G 2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.e C.4.f,h,I 33 1R 96-201 SEISMIC 11/1 DRS PPR G.2 34 EFFLUENT / ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL DRS Update PROFICIENCY IR96-09 1 35 RADWASTE SYSTEMS / CONTROLS DRS Update ) 1R96-08 (U3)-25 Revised 3/24/97 l

r l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 MSPECTION ITB4 RESP STATUS 36 HEAT EXCHANGER PERFORMANCE (GL 89-13) DRS 37 IR 96-04 REVIEW LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS FOR SPO(1) eel 96 201-EFFECTIVENESS TO INCLUDE ACR's AND NCR's 13,21,22, 23,24,26, 27,28,29 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.1, C.1.3, C.1.4.d,e.g. C.2.1, C.2.2.c,e, C.3.1.d, C.4.f 38 REVIEW 0737 ACTION ITEMS FOR COMPLETION SPO(l) 39 MC 0350 REVIEW ENGINEERING BACKLOGS DRS ITEMS C.3.2.a,c 40 MC 0350 REVIEW 50.54F ISSUES FOR RESTART / REVIEW DEFFERED SPO Update ITEMS C.1.1, RESTART ITEMS LIST IR96 06 C.1.3, C.1.f,& g, C 4.f,i 41 ACR 7007 REVIEW SELF ASSESSMENT ROOT CAUSES AND VERIFY SPO(l) f URI 95-81-01 CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (IP40500) j VIO 96-09-04 j MC 0350 C.1.4.1 1 42 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM DRS 43 ORDER PHASE ll OF THE ICAVP SPO(O) 44 ACR 12116, CYCLE 6 BORON DILUTION ANALYSIS POTENTIALLY NON-DRS 96-0325 CONSERVATIVE AND PGS FLOW RATE TO CHARGING PUIAPS LER 96 26 MAY BE IN ERROR 45 ACR 96-INITIAL SETTINGS FOR ECCS THROTTLE VALVES INADEOUATE SPO(I) Update 0524,08897 AND POTENTIAL CLOGGING IR96-06 URI 96-0614 LER 96-29 & 96-39 46 ACR 96-0183 LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PENETP.ATIONS SPO(l) 47 ACR 96-0391 RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BOLTING SUSCEPTIBLE TO BORIC ACID DRS 48 ACR 10397 LLRT *AS FOUND* TOTAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED MAX DRP CLOSED i ALLOWABLE IR96-08 (U3)-26 Revised 3/24/97

_ _ -.. _ - ~ _.... _ .__m. 1 IEFENRICE ME1 STONE UNIT 3 MSPECTION ITEM M.:SP STATUS 49 ACR 96-0324 FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS SEAL CONNECTION NOT DRP CLOSED TESTED IR96-08 50 ACR 96 0446 DOCUMENTATION OF CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS DRS l DISCREPANCIES j 51 ACR 96-WALWORTH VALVE YOKE GENERIC ISSUE DRS 0339,96-0389 52 ACR 10795 SWP TEMPERATURE SWITCHES DEFEATED BY BYPASS JUMPER SPO(l) eel 96-201-FOR SWP'P3A1B (BOOSTER PUMPS) 02,23 LER 96-005-01 53 ACR 96 0449 PIECES OF ARCOR FOUND IN 3RSS'E1 A AND 3RCC'E1C SPO Update URI 96-09 XX NRR 1R96-09 LER 96 25 54 ACR 36-0181 NUMEROUS BOLTS ON BACK DOOR ON 4160V SWITCHGEAR DRP CLOSED MISSING IR96-06 55 ACR 96-0467 FAST TRANSFER TEST FAILURES DRS CLOSED IR96-09 56 ACR 12495 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR ALARM SETPOINT DRS CLOSED IR96-05 57 ACR 96-POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VIOLATIONS DRS 0080,96-0081 LER 9615, 45,49 LER 96-015-02 58 ACR 96-THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETPOINTS SPO(l) 0557,96-0685 eel 96-201-33 59 ACR 96-USE OF BORAFLEX IN SFP RACKS SPO(L) 0775,9124, 0846 LER 96-33 60 ACR 96 ANALYSIS OF SOV FAILURE MODES DUE TO MOPD SPO(l) Update 0718,0821 IR96-09 eel 96-09 XX 61 UNIT 2 EEQ PROCESS DRS ACR 7923 (U3) 27 Revised 3/24/97

. ~. ~.---

t. -

b i i 4 IEFERENCE MILLSTONE UNTT 3 WSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS f 62 ACR 13788 TSP BASKET SAFETY EVALUATION POSSIBLY NOT VAllD SPO(l) i;. 63 ACR 96-0396 3 MSS *MOV17D MISSED IST SURVElLLANCE REQUIREMENT DRP CLOSED IR96 08 1 64 ACR 08614 REACTOR PROTECTION LEAD LAG CIRCUITS MAY BE SET DRS-CLOSED { NONCONSERVATIVELY IR96-05 65 ACR 96-SIL/SlH VALVES POWERED FROM NONSAFETY TRAIN SPO j 0745, CR 97-NRR 742 i LER 96 36 k 66 ACR 96-0483 CCP AND CCE NON-Q COMPONENTS CAUSE Q-COMPONENTS SPO(l) l NOT TO FAIL SAFE a 67 ACR 96-0621 SBO POSSIBLE OVERLOAD IN EVENT OF AN SIS ACTUATION & TAC No. DESIGN ISSUES. SPO M96054 URI 96 201-14 68 REVIEW ALLEGATIONS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO 69 REVIEW ALL OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY-PASS SPO JUMPERS BEFORE RESTART 70 URI 96-0816 REVIEW TRM FOR TECH. SPEC. INTERPRETATIONS: EVALUATE DRS LERs 96-002-TS AND OPER. LICENSE ISSUES 01,96 37, 9638,9642. 96-43,96-48 CAL 197-010 71 MC 0350 REVIEW LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO(l) C.1.4.1 72 REVIEW ENFORCEMENT AND UNRESOLVED ITEMS FOR ITEMS SPO(l) FOR RESTART ISSUES j 73 REVIEW QA PROGRAM FOR ADEQUACY AND IMPROVEMENT NRR OST' NOV 96 05-12, IFl 96-0617 MC 0350 C.1.4.a,b,c, C.2.1.c 74 URI 96-0818 ISI/IST PROGRAM CONTROL DRS LER 96-21 75 IFl 96-08-15 TIA ISSUES (EDG EXHAUST & REQUIRED # OF SW PUMPS) NRR IFl 96-0917 (U3) 28 Revised 3/24/97

l l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 BdSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 76 IFl 96-08-17 CRACKING OF FUSE FERRULES DRS 77 IFl 9544-06 POTENTIAL FREEZING OF SW 8ACKWASH LINES SPO(l) l 78 URI 93-07-07, SAFETY ANALYSIS (50.59) PROCESS SPO(L) l eel 96 201-l 02,04,05, 06,07,08 79 eel 96 201-DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS REVIEW SPO(O) 09,15,35, (PART OF PHASE l OF THE ICAVP) 37,39 MC 0350 C.3.2.f - 80 ACR 97-348 PROCEDURE ADEQUACY AND ADHERENCE / PUP PP.7 CESS SPO(l) Update eel 96 201-OSTI 1R97-01 18,19 MC 0350 C.2,1.b, C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k, C.3.3.e,f 81. eel 96-201-TESTING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS DRS 32,33,34 82 eel 96 201-QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS SPO(l) 10 83 NU LETTER EFFECTIVENESS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORG; DRS (3161951, COORDINATION WITH OFFSITE EP OFFICIALS: DOSE 2/10/97 ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g, h, j C.3.1.m, C.3.2.h & IFI 95-36 01 84 MC 0350 SECURfTY ISSUES - CORRECTIVE ACTION AND REVIEW DRS TTEM C.3.1.1 eel 96-0515, eel 97-01-XX, U1 VIO 96-09-20 85 ACR 96-496, OTHER RSS AND RELATED DESIGN BASIS CONCERNS DRS 407,620, NRR 107C,a?- 039,128, 409 LER 97-03, 97-15 J l (U3) 29 Revised 3/24/07

s a A a a s a-o- -L -A-- ._s

• n,-

Ann a-A- =E A --e-' l I r i l l i I l l 1 i I I ENCLOSURE 4 I l .,;.e, ,, ~. .- ww w a r

MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN MILLSTONE UNIT ALL UNITS RESTART APPROVAL (MCO350) The following items are considered applicable to the restart of all Millstone Units: RESPONSIBILITIES.AND AUTHORITIES M N i i rr, L NEED-STATUS RESP 4.0 Director. Special Prolects Office (SPO). Notifies the X C NRR 1 Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the - Commission, as appropriate, of the NRC act'ans taken concerning shutdown plants and the proposed followup plan. 4.0 Director. Special Projects Office X C DSPO 2

a. Discusses with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, the Office nf Enforcement (OE), and NRR, as appropriate, the need for an order or confirmatory action letter (CAL) specifying the actions required of the licensee to receive NRC approval to restart the plant and the proposed followup plan, b.

Decides,in consultation with the NRR X C DSPO Associate Director for Projects, whether this manual chapter applies to a specific reactor restart.

c. ?n coordination with the NRR Associate Director for X

C DSPO Projects, decides whether to establish a Restart Panel. i d. Develops a written Restart Assessment Plan, X C RAP including a case specific checklist, to assign responsibilities and schedules for restan actions and interactions with the licensee and outside organizations. Revised 3/24/97

a NEED STATUS RESP

e. Coordinates and implements those actions X

RAP prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be 'he Office of Special Project's responsibility. These include, when appropriate, interactions with State and local agencies and with regional offices of Federal agencies.

f. In conjunction with NRR, reviews and determines X

RAP the acceptability of licensee's corrective action SRI 0 program. NRR g.- Approves restart of the shutdown plant, X DSPO j following consultation with the EDO and the Director of NRR, and approval / vote by the Commission. 4.03 Director SPO a. Acts as the focal point for discussions within X DSPO NRR to establish the appropriate followup actions for a plant that has been shut down. 4.04 Deputy Director, Licensing DSPOL a. Coordinates participation in followup X conference calls and management discussions to ensure that the Director SPO are directly involved, when appropriate, in followup action. b. Coorcinates and implements actions x DSPOL prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be Licensing's responsibility. These include, where applicable, appropriate NRC Office or NRR Division interaction with other Federal agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Department of Justice (DOJ)) pursuant to any applicable Memoranda of Understanding. 4 i (U3132 Revised 3/24/97

NEED STATUS RESP. t B.1 INITIAL NRC RESPONSE NA The facts, the causes, and their apparent impacts should be established early in the process.' This information will assist the NRC in characterizing the problems, the safety significance, and the regulatory issues. Early management appraisal of the situation is also important to ensure the proper immediate actions are taken. The following items should have been completed or should be incorporated into the CSC as appropriate. Refer to Section 5.02 of this manual chapter for additional information, a. Initial notification and NRC NA managernent discussion of known facts and issues b. Identify / implement additional NA inspections (i.e. AIT, llT, or Special) (Region). c. Determine need for formal NA regulatory response (i.e. order or CAL). d. Identify other parties involved NA (i.e., NRC Organizations, other Federal agencies, industry organizations). (U3) 33 Revised 3/24/97

l l NEED STATUS RESP. B.2 NOTIFICATIONS NA l-Initial notification of the event quickly communicates NRC's understanding of the event and its immediate response to the parties having an interest in the event. Notification to regional and headquarters offices of cognizant Federal agencies may be appropriate. As the review process' continues, additional and continuing 4 notifications may be required. a, . lssue Daily and Directors Highlight NA (NRR). 1 b. Issue preliminary notification NA j (Region). c. Conduct Commissioner assistants' NA briefing. d. Issue Commission paper (NRR). NA e. Cognizant Federal agencies NA l notified (i.e., FEMA, EPA, DOJ).

f. State and local officials notified (Region).

h'A g. Congressional notification (NRR) NA l j l (U3)-34 Revised 3/24/97

4 1 i PROCESS B.3 NEED STATUS RESP. d B.3 ESTABLISH AND ORGANIZE THE NRC REVIEW PROCESS ^ a. Establish the Restart Panel. X 0 b. Assess avai!able information (i.e. inspection X RAP results, lit.ensee self assessments, industry reviews). c. Obtain input from involved parties both within X RAP NRC and other Federal agencies such as FEMA, EPA, DOJ. d. Conduct Director SPO briefing. X RAP e. Conduct NRR Executive Team briefing (NRR). X C RAP f. Develop the case-specific checklist (CSC). X C RAP g. Develop the Restart Assessment Plan. X C RAP h. Director SPO approves Restart Assessment X C DSPO Plan. i. NRR Director approves Restart Assessment X C DNRR Plan. J. Implement Restart Assessment Plan. X RAP k. Modify order as necessary X NRR NEED STATUS RESP. 1 B.4 REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION B.4.1 Root Causes and Corrective Actions OSTI a. Evaluate findings of the special team X inspection. b. Licensee performs root cause analysis X NU OSTI and develops corrective action plan for root causes. (U3)-35 Revised 3/24/97

c. NRC evaluates licensee's root cause X RAP determination and corrective action oSTI plan. NEED STATU RESP s sm a B.4.2 B.4.2 Assessment of Eauloment Damaae NA For events where equipment damage occurs, a thorough assessment of the extent of damage is necessary. A root cause determination will be necessary if the darnage was the result of an internal event. The need for indepandent NRC assessment should be considered. The licensee will need to determine corrective actions to repair, test, inspect, and/or analyze affected systems and equipment. These actions are required to restore or verify that the equipment will perform to design requirements. Equipment modifications may also be required to ensure performance to design requirements. Potential offsite emergency response impact for external events such as natural disasters, explosions, or riots should be considered. NRR should obtain information from FEMA headquarters reaffirming the adequacy of State and local offsite emergency plans and preparedness if an event raises reasonable doubts about emergency response capability. a. Licensee assesses damt.ge to systems and NA components. b. NRC evaluates licensee damage assessment. NA c. Licensee determines corrective actions. NA d. NRC evaluates corrective actions. NA =l (U3) 36 Revised 3/24/97

~ ) l-1 i NEED STATUS RESP. l B.4.3 Determine Restart issues and Resolution X RAP The establishment of the restart issues that require resolution before restart demands a clear understanding of the issues and the actions required to addmss those issues by both the NRC and the licensee. This section outlines steps to determine the restart issues and NRC's evaluation of their resolution, a. Review / evaluate licensee generated restart X RAP issues. b. Independent NRC identification of restart X RAP issues 1 c. NRC/ licensee agreement on restart issues. X RAP d. Evaluate licensee's resta t issues X RAP implementation process, e. Evaluate licensee's implementation X SRI verification process. 1 i l i (U3)-37 Revised 3/24/97

4 4 NEED STATUS RESP. B.4.4 Obtain Comments 4 Since some shutdowns involve a broad number of l issues, solicitation of comments from diverse sources j may be appropriate. The decision to solicit comments from a group and the level of participation should be made on a case by case basis. Input from these groups should be factored into the restart process when they contribute positively to the review. Note: If needed, comments concerning the adequacy of state and local emergency planning and preparedness must be obtdned from FEMA headquarters through RAP NRR. X a. Obtain public comments. 4, b. Obtain commente from State and Local X SLO Officials (Region). c. Obtain comments from applicable X RAP Federal agencies. 2 B.4.5 Closecut Actions When thc actions to resolve the restart issues and 3 significant concerns are substantially complete, closeout actions are needed to verify that planned inspections and verifications are complete. The licensee should certify that corrective actions required before restart are complete and that the plant is physically ready for restart. This section provides actions associated with completion of significant NRC reviews and preparations for restart. RAP OSTI a. Evaluate licensee's restart readiness self assessment. X b. NRC evaluation of applicable items from X RAP Section C "lSSUES" complete. c. Restart issues closed. X RAP SRI OSTI d. Conduct NRC restart readiness team X OSTI inspection. (U3)-38 Revised 3/24/97

4. I e. Issue augmented restart coverage inspection X OST plan. NEED STATUS RESP.

f. Comments from other parties considered.

X RAP

g. Determine that all conditions of the Order / CAL are X

RAP satisfied,

h. Re-review of Generic Restart Checklist complete.

X RAP SRI B.5 RESTART AUTHORIZATION (B.5) When the restart review process has reache d the point - that the issues have been identified, corrected, and reviewed, a restart authorization process is begun. At this point the Restart Panel should think broadly and ask: "Are all actions substantially complete? Have we overlooked any items?"

a. Prepare restart recommendation document and basis for restart.

X RAP

b. NRC Restart Panel recommends restart X

RAP

c. No restart objections from other applicable HQ X

MCKee

offices,

d. No restart objections from applicable Federal X

RAP agencies.

e. DSPO concurs in restart recommendation X

DSPO

f. NRR Director concurs in restart recommendation.

X DSPOL

g. EDO concurs in restart recommendation when X

EDO required.

h. Conduct ACRS briefing when requested (NRR).

X SPO

i. Conduct Commission briefing when reqtiested.

X DSPO

j. Commission approves in restart authorization.

X cOMM

k. DSPO authorizes restart.

X EDO I (U3)39 Revised 3/24/97

~. . ~. l r. 8.6 RESTART AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION (B.6) Notify the applicabla parties of the restart authorization. Notifications should generally be made using a memorandum or other format consistent with the level of formality required. Communication of planned l actions is important at this stage to ensure that NRC intentions are clearly understood.

a. Commission (if the Commission did not concur in the Restart Authorization or as requested) (NRR).

NA RAP

b. EDO (if the EDO did not concur in the restart NA EDO recommendation or as requested) (NRR).

c. Congressional Affairs (RAP).

X OCA

d. ACRS (a briefing may be substituted for the written X

sP3 notification if the ACRS requests a briefing) (NRR).

e. Applicable Federal agencies.

X RAP

f. Public Affairs.

X OPA

g. State and local officials.

X SLO

h. Citizens or groups that expressed interest during the X

RAP restart apt aval process. (U3)-40 Revised 3/24/97

... _.. _.. _ _ _.. ~...- ~ ISSUES NEED STATUS-l RESP. l l C.1.1 Root Cause Assessment a. Conditions requiring the shutdown are X RAP clearly understood. b. Root causes of the conditions requiring the X RAP shutdown are clearly understood. c. Root causes of other significant problems X RAP are clearly understood. d. Effectiveness of the root cause analysis X RAP program. C.1.2 Damaae Assessment a. Damage assessment was thorough and NA comprehensive, b. Corrective actions clearly restored systsms NA and equipment or verified they can perform as designed. C.1.3 Corrective Actions a. Thoroughness of the corrective actbn plan X RAP b. Completeness of corrective action X sri programs for specific root causes. c. Control of corrective action item tracking,. X SRI oSTI d. Effective corrective actions for the X SRI oSTI conditions requiring the shutdown have been implemented. e. Effective corrective actions for other X SRI significant problems have been oSTI implemented. f. Control of long-term corrective actions. X SRI oSTI g. Effectiveness of the corrective action X SRI oSTI verification process. (t 83)-41 Revised 3/24/97

I t. l l 4 i NEED STATUS RESP. i C.1.4' Self-Assessme 9 Capability i The occurrence of an event may be indicative of potential weaknesses in the licensee's self-assessment capability. A strong reif-assessment capability creates an environment where problems are readily identified, prioritized, and tracked. Effective cornetive actions require p.oblem root cause identification, solutions to corre:t the cause, and verification methods that er:.ure the issue is resolved. Senior licensee management effectiveness in ensuring effective self assessment is treated separately. i ] a. Effectiveness of Quality Assurance Program. X RAP J b. Effect veness of Industry Experience Review X OSTI Program. c. Effectiveness of licensee's independent X SRI oST: i Review Groups. d. Effectiveness of deficiency reporting system. X SRI OSTI e. Staff willingness to raise concerns. X oE RAP f. Effectiveness of PRA usage. X oST: g. Effectiveness of commitment tracking X SRI RAP program. h. Review applicable external audits X oST 1. Quality of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 X SRI reports. ms m anum.- .. ~. m. numuseumm-NEED STATUS RESP. C.2.1 Manaaement Oversiaht and Effectiveness s a. Goals / expectations communicated to the X oSTI

staff, b.

Demonstrated expectation of adherence to X SRI OSTI procedures. c. Management involvement in self-assessment X RAP and independent self assessment capsbilitY (U3)-42 Revised 3/24/97

d. Effectiveness of management review X SRI OSn committees. e. Management's demonstrated awareness of X SRI OSTI day-to-day operational concerns. f. Management's ability to identify and prioritize X SRI oSn significant issues. g. Management's ability to coordinate resolution X SRI ] oSTI of significant issues. h. Management's ability to implement effective X SRI OST: corrective actions. C.2.2 Mananement Support a. Impact of any management reorganization. X RAP b. Effective and timely resolution of employee X RAP concerns. c. Adequate engineering support as demonstrated X DRS j OSTI by timely resolutloa of issues. d. Adequate plant administrative procedures. X SRI PE e. Effective information exchange with other X SRI oSTI utilities. f. Participation in industry groups. NA g. Effectiveness of Emergency Response X DRS Organization. h. Coordination with offsite emergency X DRS planning officials. NEED STATUS RESP. C.3.1 Assessment of Staff RAP a. Demonstrated commitment to achieving X SRI OSn improved performance. b. Demonstrated safety consciousness. X oSTi SRI c. Understanding of management's expectations X OST: and goals. (U3)-43 Revised 3/24/97

P t d. Understanding of plant issues and corrective X osTi SRI actions. e. Qualifications and training of the staff. X osTi

f.. :

Staff's fitness for duty. NA g. Attentiveness to duty.. X osTi h. Level of attention to detail. X osT l. Off-hour plant staffing. X SRI J. Staff overtime usage. X SRI { SRI k. Procedure usage / adherence. X sri PE I. Awareness of plant security, X DRs m. Understanding of offsite emergency planning X DRS issues.

_

C.3.2 Assessment of Corporate Support and Site gnaineerina Suonort X osTI a. Corporate staff understanding of plant issues, b. Corporate staff site specific knowledge. X osTi c. Effectiveness of the corporate / plant interface X osTI meetings. d. Corporate involvement with plant activities. X osTI e. Effectiveness of site engineering support. X DRs f. Effectiveness of the site design modification X DRs process. g. Effectiveness of licensing support. X RAP NEED STATUS RESP. h. Coordination with offsite emergency planning X RAP ~ officials. C.3.3 Operatc,r issues s. Licensed operator staffing meets requirements and licensee goals. X osTI b. Level of formality in the control room. X osTi SRI i (U3).44 Revised 3/24/97

=. c. Effectiveness of control room simulator X Das . training. d. Control room / plant operator awareness of X osTI equipment status. sR 1 e. Adequacy of plant operating procedures. X SRI PE f. Procedure usage / adherence. X SRI osTi j g. Log keeping practices. X osTi x i.~. s C.4 ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT

a. Operability of technical specification systems.

X osTI l b. Operability of raquired secondary and support X osTi -) systams.

c. Results of pre-startup testing.

X sPo osTl

d. Adequacy of system lineups.

X osTI

e. Adequacy of surveillance tests / test program.

X osTi

f. Significant hardware issues resolved (i.e. damaged X

osTi equipment, equipment ageing, modifications).

g. Adequacy of the power ascension testing program.

X osTi SRI

h. Effectiveness of the plant maintenance program.

X osTi DRs

1. Maintenance backlog managed and impact X

osTi on operation assessed. J. Adequacy of plant housekeeping and equipment X osTi

storage,

= i un - musumamu NEED STATUS RESP. C.5 ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS a. Applicable license amendments have been X ftAP issued. b. Applicable exemptions have been granted. X RAP c. Applicable reliefs have been granted. X RAP (U3)-45 Revised 3/24/97

d. Imposed Orders have been modified or X RAP rescinded. e. Significant enforcement issues have been X RAP resolved. OE f. Allegations have been appropriately X RAP addressed. SRI PE g. 10 CFR 2.206 Petitions have been X NRR appropriately addressed. h. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings NA have been completed. C.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIES AND ! l PARTIES a. Federal Emergency Management Agency X ORS b. Environmental Protection Agency X RAP c. Department of Justice X OE 01 d. Department of Labor X OE e. Appropriate State and local officials X SLO f. Appropriate public interest groups X RAP g. Local news media X 30PA l l I i (U3)-46 Revised 3/24/97 N

O l \\ t 1 l 1 1 ENCLOSURE 5 1 I

- - ~... - ~. _. O Il.. LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART l MILLSTONE UNIT 1 No. TAC No. Issue Status 1 M96062 Safety / Relief Valve Electrical Design Under staff review. Modification 2 M97934 Response Time Testing Under staff review. Clarification / Modification 3 M98123 Allowable Outage Times Revisions Under staff review. Note: The licensee indicated they plan to submit two additional licensing issues which will be needed prior to restart. (U3)-48 Revised 3/24/97

- _. - -.. ~ - - !e l s L. i LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RdSTART MILLSTONE UNIT 2 No. TAC No. Issue Status 1 M92879 Cont. Rm. Emer. Vent Sys.- TSs Under Review 2 M94105 Steam Gen Blowdwn. Mont.- TSs Under Review 3 M94623 Cont. Iso. Valves TSs Need Add. Info. 4 M97741 Org Structure & Titles TSs Under Review 5 M97746 Met. Tower inst.- TSs Need Add. Info. 6 M97680 Siemans LOCA Anal.- Evaluation Under Review 7 Ultimate Heat Sink TSs Submit 03/31/97 8 Enclosure Blde,- TSs Submit 03/31/97 9 ESFAS Time Delay-TSs Submit 04/14/97 10 EDG Fuel Oil TS Basis Change Submit 04/21/97 11 Spent Fuel Vent Sys.- TSs Submit 04/30/97 12 Shut Dwn. Cooling TSs Submit 04/30/97 13 Press. PORV-TSs Submit 04/30/97 14 DNB Parameters-TSs Submit 04/30/97 15 Rx Trip Setpoints SG Safety Valv.-TSs Submit 04/30/97 16 RCS P-T Curves-TSs Submit 04/30/97 j (U3)-49 Revised 3/24/97

.~ i j = l % o LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART l MILLSTONE UNIT 3 No. TAC No. Issue Status 1 M92798 Modifies MSIV surveillance and action Under staff review. statements. 2 M95469 Modifies the description of the time Amendment No.134, constants associated with the issued March 11, Overtemperature and Overpressure Delta-T 1997. calculations, j Note: The licensee has indicated that it plans to submit approximately 23 licensing issues which will be needed prior to restart. i s (U3)-50 Revised 3/24/97

i PROJECT PLANNING SCHEDULE ~ a heLLSTONE UNIT 3 4f15/97 Qtr 1,1997 Qtr2,1997 Otr3,1997 Qtr 4,190T Qtr1,1998 E) Task Narne Start Finish Jan l Feb l Mar Apr l May l Jun Jti l Auk l Sep Od l Nov l Dec Jan l Feb l Mar [ 1 CMP UNIT 3 IMPLEMENTATION

• 6/3/96 7/14/97 2

ICAVP UNIT 3 IMPLEMENTATION ** 5/27!97 W2/97 v 3 NRC ICAVP INSPECTIONS 6/30/97 11/14/97 4 NRC ICAVP IN-OFFICE REVIEWI DOCUMENT 11/3/97 12/1997 l [ 5 INSPECTION PROGRAM 2/14/97 10f12/97 j FEMA NOTIFICATION 9/30r97 10f12/97 i 7 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROCRAM INSPEC 8/18/97 8/2W97 8 UCENSE AMENDMENTS 3/5/97 10f12/97 l 9 OPERATIONAL SAFETY TEAM INSPECTION 10f21/97 11/24/97 l 14 RESTART ASSESSMENT PANEL REVIEW 11/25/97 12/8f97 11 EDOtDIR NRR BRIEF 12/12/97 12/12/97 g 12 COMMISSION BRIEFING 12/1997 12/19t97 g i t i Configuration Management Prograrn (CMP) carried out by the licensee. k ICAVP carried out by Sargent & Lundy contractor. I $fl a r N r

f"% 1 UNITED STATES p s j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON D.C. 2066He01 April 7, 1997 Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon President and Chief Executive Officer Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P.O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385-0128

Dear Mr. Kenyon:

This letter provides conditional approval of your proposed contractor, Sargent & Lundy (S&L), for the conduct of the Millstone Units 1 and 3 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP), pending completion and submittal of the enclosed certifications of financial independence by S&L and the Licensee's corporate officials. On the basis of the information provided in your submittals of December 18,1996, January 15, February 21, and March 26, 1997, and the discussions at the meetings of February 5 and March 18,1997, we have concluded that S&L has the technical expertise and nuclear design experience necessary to conduct the ICAVP review at Millstone Units 1 and 3. We have also concluded that S&L is sufficiently independent of the Licensee and its design contractors for the conduct of the ICAVP. Concems were raised by the Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) for the State of Connecticut and by members of the public on the independence of the contractor. The NRC has chosen to adopt a practical standard of independence between the ICAVP contractor and the Licensee. In making our determination, we balanced the need to ensure adequate financial independence with the need to ensure that the contractor had the necessary skills and experience to effectively conduct the ICAVP. We found that S&L was sufficiently independent from the design and operation of Millstone Units 1 and 3 in that it has not been involved in design activities that would affect its ability to perform the ICAVP,'with the following exceptions: (1) seismic qualifications, specifications, standards, and procedures for Millstone Unit 1 and (2) interactions between nonseismic Category 2 systems and seismic Category 1 safety systems at Millstone Unit 3. On the basis of our review of the information submitted, we find that these two areas represent a conflict of interest and shall not be reviewed by S&L during the ICAVP. If review of these areas is necessary during performance of the ICAVP, it shall be handled by a party other than S&L. Regarding S&L's financial independence from the Licensee, we found sufficient independence in that, organizationally, S&L, its subsidiaries, its Retirement Plan, and its Savings investment Plan do not directly own any Licensee stock, bonds, or other financial instruments issued by Northeast Utilities (NU), Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), or other entities named on the Millstone Units 1 and 3 operating licenses. In addition, each of the proposed ICAVP team members will be required to provide a written stdement regarding conflict of interests that includes financial interests. Fnclosure 3 (0t IYO& G

Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon 2 As previously described, we have concluded that S&L has sufficient technical and financial independence to conduct an objective review. However, this approvalis conditioned upon the submittal of the enclosed certifications of financial independence by the corporate officials of the NNECO and S&L (Enclosure 1). A detailed discussion of the basis for our approvalis provided in Enclosure 2. To ensure the continued independence of the ICAVP team, a communication protocol will be established as part of the contractor's audit plan. 'This protocol shallinclude the reporting procedures discussed in the Confirmatory Order of August 14,1996. The staff will approve the protocoi after discussions with the contractor during the staffs review of the audit plan. As we discussed in our letter of January 13,1997, and subsequent meeting on February 5, 1997, we will withhold final approval of individual team members until completion of our interviews in conjunction with our review of the proposed audit plan. The staff will conduct interviews with each team member to verify that he or she it technically and financially independent and to determine whether the member's technica qualifications and experience are consistent with his or her assigned role as defined in the audit plan. In addition, we request that all team members complete the enclosed Conflict-of-Interest Statement to document their financial and technical independence (Enclosure 3). These stateraents will be collected from S&L when the NRC staff conducts the interviews. Please contact Eugene Imbro at (301) 415-1490 if you need any akAional information or clarification of the enclosures. Sincerely, W- - .7 William D. Travers, Director Special Projects Office Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Certification of FinancialIndependence

2. Results of the Staffs Review of the Proposed ICAVP Contractor for Millstone Units 1 and 3

3. Conflict-of-Interest Statement

i i 1 1 i Certification of FinancialIndependence I, . being first duly sworn, depose and state: That I am President, Sargent & Lundy (the Contractor). That I am authorized to provide the following certification on behalf of the Contractor to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That the Contractor does not own stock, bonds, or other financial instruments issued by Northeast Utilities or its subsidiaries, the organizations that performed the original design for Millstone Units 1 and 3, the suppliers of the nuclear steam supply systems for the Units 1 and 3 j and other entities named on the operating licenses for Units 1 and 3. i ) l Date 4 i

_ _ -. _ ~ _. 3 Certification of Financialindependence i t 1, Bruce D. Kenyon, being first duly sworn, depose and state: That I am President and Chief Executive Officer, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (the Licensee).- ? That I am autholized to provide the following certification on behalf of the Licensee to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. That the Northeast Nuclear Energy Company and the other co-license holders for Millstone - Units 1 and 3 do not own stock, bonds, or other financial instruments issued by Sargent & Lundy or its subsidiaries. 1 Bruce D. Kenyon President and Chief Executive Officer i Date 1

RESULTS OF THE STAFF'S REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED ICAVP CONTRACTOR FOR MILLSTONE UNITS 1 AND 3 INTRODUG.T10N On August 14,1996, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued a Confirmatory Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO, or Licensee) requiring completion of an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) before the restart of any Millstone unit. The order directs the Licensee to obtain the services of an organization independent of the Licensee and its design contractors to conduct a multidisciplinary review of Millstone Units 1,2, and 3. The purpose of the ICAVP, as stated in the Confirmatory Order, is to confirm that the plant's physical and functional characteristics are in conformance with its licensing and design bases. The ICAVP audit required by the NRC is expected to provide independent verification, beyond the Licensee's quality assurance and management oversight, that the Licensee has identified and satisfactorily resolved existing nonconformances with the design and licensing bases; documented and utilized the licensing and design bases to resolve nonconformances; and established programs, processes, and procedures for effective configuration management in the future. BACKGROUND The Licensee submitted information regarding the proposed selection of Sargent & Lundy (S&L) as the contractor for the Unit 3 ICAVP on December 18,1996. The submittal included the principal criteria used in evaluating the contractor bids, a discussion of the methodology used in the bid selection process, program elements to be covered by the ICAVP E: ope, and guidelines for the communication protocol. The submittal also included resumes of the proposed ICAVP team members. In its submittal, the Licensee stated that S&L is financially and organizationally independent of Northeast Utilities (NU) and its co-license holders, and its subsidiaries, and the design contractors for the Millstone units. Additions and corrections to the proposal were submitted on January 8, February 21, and March 26,1997. ] The Licensee submitted the proposed selection of S&L as the contractor for the Unit 1 ICAVP on January 15,1997. This submittal included additional resumes for proposed team member substitutes. On February 5,1997, the staff held a public meeting with the Licensee to discuss the contractor selection process and to respond to staff questions that were provided to the Licensee by letter on January 13,1997. The staff also held an evening meeting with the public on February 5, 1997, to obtain comments regarding the proposed contractor. On February 21,1997, the Licensee submitted additionalinformation regarding the proposed selection to respond to questions and comments from the meeting on February 5,1997. The submittalincluded responses to NRC questions regarding the financialindependence of S&L, previous work performed by S&L for the Licensee, restrictions on future work for the Licensee, 1

ICAVP team member substitution, S&L's differing professional opinion process, quality assurance program requirements, the ICAVP organization, and ICAVP staffing and experience levels. During the staff's evaluation of the submitted information, the staff raised additional questions regarding the financialindependence of S&L. On March 12,1997, the NRC requested that the Licensee provide additionalinformation regarding the financial holdings of S&L's retirement plan and restrictions on S&L from performing future work for the Licensee. On March 26,1997, the Licensee submitted additional information regarding these issues. STAFF EVALUATION The staff conducted a review of the information submitted by the Licensee regarding the proposed contractor, S&L, to ensure that the contractor selected to perform the ICAVP is technically and financially independent of the Licensee and its design contractors, and technically capable of effectively performing the ICAVP. To complete this task, the NRC's ICAVP oversigM staff performed the following activities: 1. Evaluated whether the proposed contractor has any financialinterest or had any technicalinvolvement with the design or construction of the subject Millstone units. 2. Evaluated whether the proposed contractor has adequate technical and managerial qualifications to conduct the ICAVP. 3. Evaluated whether the proposed specialists have the appropriate technical backgrou-d to participate in the ICAVP. The evaluation included a preliminary review of individual team me.nber resumes. The staff will conduct interviews with each team member during review of the audit plan. This effort will also confirm that the individual specialists have no financial interests in NU or other entities named on the operating license, the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor, or the architect-engineer (AE) for the subject Millstone unit by means of a Conflict-of-Interest Statement. In addition, the statement will require the team members to confirm that they have had no prior technical involvement with the subject Millstone unit. DISCUSSION

1. Company's Technical Experience As stated in the Confirmatory Order of August 14,1996, the Licensee was directed to obtain the services of an organization, independent of the Licensee and its design contractors, to conduct a multidisciplinary review of the Millstone units. The purpose of the ICAVP is to verify the adequacy of the Licensee's efforts to establish adequate design bases and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures, maintenance procedures and testing practices; verification of system performance; and implementation of modifications since issuance of the initial facility operating licenses. The review must be comprehensive and 2

i I; j. 'incorporato appropriate engineering disciplines so that the NRC can be confident that the Licensee has been thorough in identifying and resolving problems. Therefore, the contractor must have. sufficient breadth and depth of technical experience in nuclear power plant design requirements to perform an adequate review. ) The Licensee's submittal states that proposed contraw S&L has corporate experience that includes the design of 13 boiling-water reactors (BWR) and 14 pressuriz'ed-water reactors (PWR). For example, S&L was the AE for Braidwood (PWR), Byron (PWR), Clinton (BWR), Dresden (BWR), Fermi (BWR), LaSalle (BWR), Quad Cities (BWR), and Zion (PWR). On the basis of the staff's review of the resumes in the proposal, it appears that, in general, t'he engineering disciplines needed for the review are being provided by the contractor. Some of 4 the proposed team members have expertise in several areas. The 37 proposed team members possess adequate expertise in the areas of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil / structural engineering, nuclear engineering, instrumentation and control engineering or design, reactor plant operations, and probabilistic risk assessment. The NRC will give its final approval of the S&L proposed team members following interviews conducted in conjunction with NRC review of the ICAVP audit plan. [ The staff has previously reviewed a similar independent design review conducted by S&L. A 4 S&L vertical slice review (VGR) was performed in 1988 and 1989 at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. ll The VSR provided an independent, systematic, structured, and comprehensive evaluation of i the adequacy of the design and construction of Watts Bar structures, systems, and - components. The VSR reviewed the component cooling and emergency auxiliary power l systems. The VSR also compared licenting requirements and design-basis documents with design output documents (e.g., drawings and construction specifications) and with installed hardware and associated quality records. The VSR was conducted in accordance with a formal plan that the NRC had reviewed. The VSR identified approximately 500 discrepancies. An NRC team inspected the VSR effort and the results were documented in inspection Reports 50-390/88-09 (February 27,1989) and 50-390/89-02 (May 2,1989). The team inspections found i that the VSR review performed by S&L was thorough and adequate. A summary of the NRC inspection of the VSR is provided in NUREG-0847, Suppement No.17, " Safety Evaluation L Report related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear F% : ?Jnits 1 and 2," dated October 1995. In addition, S&L performed a review similar to the proposed ICAVP on the Hope Creek facility i as part of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP) requested by the NRC prior to j the issuance of the facility's initial operating license. A summary of this effort, which was performed with direct NRC inspection oversight, is contained in NUREG-1048, Supplement 5, " Safety Evaluation Report related to the Operation of Hope Creek Generating Station," dated i April 1986. i l S&L has recently been selected as an NRC contractor to conduct similar design-related inspections at nuclear power facilities,. This competitive selection provides additional i justification to conclude that this organization has the technical experience to conduct the ICAVP. (Details of the contract between NRC and S&L are provided in Section 6 below.) i 1 3 4 ,. ~ - _. _e, r -

l j l On the basis of the information in the Licensee's submittals and the staffs previous experience with S&L, the staff concluded that the proposed contractor has the technical expertise and j experience to conduct this complex, multidisciplinary review.

2. Company's TechnicalIndependence During the selection process, the Licensee established an essential criterion that the supplier must be independent of NU and its design contractors The Licensee's submittal states that S&L was not involved in the original design of any of the Millstone units. The staffs review of NRC records indicates that S&L was not the AE for any Millstone unit. The AEs for the Millstone units were as follows-Millstone Unit 1 Ebasco Millstone Unit 2 Bechtel Millstone Unit 3 Stone & Webster The Licensee's submittal also states that S&L has received approximately $707,000 in revenues from the Licensee in the past 10 years. The staff requested additional details regarding the work performed by S&L to determina whether a potential conflict exists.

The Licensee provided additional details at the meeting of February 5,1997, regarding the contractor's work activities at Millstone as a primary contractor or as a subcontractor. The staff reviewed the summary of the work performed by S&L and found several areas of potential conflict. In 1986, S&L assisted the Licensee in developing seismic qualifications, specifications, standards, and procedures for Millstone Unit 1. In addition, in 1985, S&L conducted an analytical study regarding interaction between nonseismic Category 2 systems and seismic Category 1 safety systems at Millstone Unit 3. S&L has also performed work pertaining to a standardized fuse control process and life cycle management. To address these potential areas of conflict, the staff requested that the Licensee provide the specific actions that would be taken if ICAVP audit plan activities resulted in the need to review the adequacy of previous S&L work. In the Licensee's submittal of February 21,1997, the Licensee stated that prior involvement of S&L would be handled on a case-by-case basis, and that the NRC's ICAVP oversight team would be notified of the circumstances of the involvement and how each case would be handled before proceeding with the work. The staff concluded that,in general, the case-by-case approach would be acceptable. The staff found that S&L's work pertaining to the standardized fuse control process and life cycle management does not affect its ability to perform the ICAVP. However, because of the !nvolvement of S&L in the development of the seismic qualifications, specifications, standards, and procedures for Millstone Unit 1, and its involvement in an analytical study regarding interaction between nonseismic Category 2 systems and seismic Category 1 safety systems at Millstone Unit 3, S&L shall be excluded from conducting reviews of these two areas during its performance of the ICAVP at the respective Millstene units. 4

3. Company's Financialindependence To effectively balance the need to have an organization that has the required technical capabilities to perform the ICAVP with the need for that organization to have adequate financial and technical independence, the NRC has chosen to adopt a practical standard of independence between the ICAVP contractor and the Licensee. This standard recognized that relatively few organizations have the necessary technical capabilities to perform the ICAVP, and allowed NNECO sufficient latitude to propose for NRC approval, a contractor that has the requisite experience and capabilities to conduct a credible technical review as set forth in the Confirmatory Order issued by the NRC on August 14,1996. The financialindependence criteria discussed by the NRC staff with NNECO at a publicly held meeting on September 24, 1996, stated that (1) the proposed contractor should have no ownership interest in NU, and (2) the proposed contractor should have no current involvement with the unit being reviewed.

The Confirmatory Order of August 14,1996, directs the Licensee to obtain the services of an organization independent of the Licensee and design contractors. The Licensee stated in its submittal that S&L did not own or control Licensee stock and had no financial interest in the Licensee, any of its subsidiaries, or its design contractors. The Licensee's submittal on February 21,1997, included a " Certification of Ownership Interests"in which S&L affirmed that it and its subsidiaries did not hold, directly or indirectly, stock or other ownership interests in any of the entities listed on the Units 1 and 3 operating licenses, the respective NSSS vendors (General Electric and Westinghouse) or the respective original AE organizations (Ebasco, now owned by Raytheon, and Stone & Webster). The " Certification of Ownership Interests" also stated that although S&L had no ownership interest as indicated above, its Retirement Plan and Savings investment Plan (including its 401(k) plan) may have direct or indirect ownership interests in one or more of the entities previously discussed. However, the investments made by the Retirement Plan were made througn a Trust Fund and S&L did not participate directly in the selection of individual securities in which the Trust Fund invests. The staff requested further information on both the Retirement Plan and the Savings Investment Plan. A summary of holdings of the Retirement Plan dated February 28,1997, indicated no ownership interest in any of the above-mentioned entities. The investment options from which employees participating in the Savings Investment Plan can select were provided, along with prospectuses. The staff reviewed these items and concluded that the investment options are managed independent of S&L and each individualinvestment option is widely diversified. Therefore, the staff finds S&L to be sufficiently financially independent of the Licensee and design contractors to conduct the ICAVP required by the Confirmatory Order. The other criterion for independence discussed by the staff at the meeting of September 24, 1996, was that the proposed ICAVP contractor should have no current involvement with the Licensee at the unit being reviewed. S&L had no current involvement with either Units 1 or 3 before it was proposed by NNECO as the ICAVP contractor. In addition to the NRC criterion, the Licensee further restricted the selection of a contractor to one that had limited past involvement with NNECO. The Licensee's submittal stated that while S&L has annual revenues of more than $200 million, it had only received approximately $700,000 in revenues from the Licensee over the past 10 years. The Licensee concluded that these small revenues in comparison to the annual revenues of S&L did not comprise a sufficient financialinterest on which to question the objectivity of the contractor. The staff agrees with this conc!usion. 5

i The Licensee's submittal stated that S&L did not provide for any restrictions on future work at l Millstone. To ensure an objective review, the staff requested that the Licensee further discuss restrictions on future work At the meeting of February 5,1997, the Licensee stated that the contract will preclude any future S&L work within 6 months of completion of the ICAVP to resolve discrepancies identified in the ICAVP review. Although this course of action would impose some restrictions, the staff requested that the Licensee review the proposal The staff was concemed that followup work, even 6 months after completion of the ICAVP, coulo call into question the objectivity of the ICAVP review. During subsequent discussions, the Licensee agreed to a 12-month restriction on future work for S&L at all NU facilities. These discussions were the suoject of a followup letter dated March 12,1997. The Licensee's response dated March 26,1997, stated that S&L will be restricted from performing or seeking new work at any NU faciPy for the duration of the ICAVP contract and that S&L will not seek work at any NU facility for 12 months following the completion of the ICAVP project for Millstone Units 1 and 3. This restriction is similar to that imposed by the NRC on its contractors. Therefore, the staff finds this restriction acceptable.

4. Technical Experience of Team Members As previously stated, the staffs review found that the appropriate technical disciplines are being provided by the contractor. However, the staff intends to review each resume in detail and to conduct interviews of each proposed member at a later date. The resume review and interviews will be conducted concurrent with the staffs review of the proposed audit plan and team shucture. This separate review and approvalis necessary so that the NRC staff can ev:!uate the adequacy of each team member's expertise and experience, with an understanding of the specific tasks that the ICAVP team members will perform during the review.

The Licensee's submittal states that S&L's proposal did not discuss a plan for possible substitution of team members. The submittal also states that the need for a stated position regarding substitution of project team members will be factored into the contract award so that new members and substitutions will be made using an approved process. The staff requested that this issue be discussed further at the meeting of February 5,1997. At that meeting, the Licensee stated that the S&L procedure for substituting personnel would be provided to the NRC for approval. The procedure for substitution of personnel will be reviewed and approved during NRC's review and approval of the audit plan.

5. Technical and Financial Independence of Team Members The Confi,matory Order of August 14,1996, states that in evaluating the independence of each team member, the factors the NRC staff will consider include, but are not limited to, whether the individual has had prior involvement in design reviews for the Licensee and whether the individual has any financialinterest in the Licensee. The Licensee's submittal stated that all proposed team members had been screened to ensure that they have no prior involvement with design reviews for the Licensee.

6

The staff reviewed the resumes provided by the Licensee to verify that the proposed team members have not had prior involvement in design reviews at Millstone. On the basis of a preliminary review of the resumes, the staff determined that none of the proposed team members had prior involvement in the design, design reviews, operation, testing, or maintenance of Millstone Units 1 and 3. As discussed at the meeting on February 5,1997, and in an earlier letter of January 13,1997, the staff will withhold final approval of the individual team members until completion of individual interviews and review of the proposed audit plan. The staff will conduct interviews of all team members to verify that they are technically and financially independent, and to determine whether the members' technical qualifications and experience are compatible with their assigned roles as defined in the audit plan. In addition, the staff will request that all team members complete a Conflict-of-interest Statement to document their finan'cial and technical independence. These statements will be collected from S&L when the staff conducts the interviews.

6. Public Comments The Nuclear Energy Advisory Council (NEAC) and the public have exyessed concems, regarding the independence and objectivity of S&L, at meetings held by the NRC with the public and at meetings of the NEAC at which the NRC has been asked to participate. These comments can be grouped into several categories: (1) S&L derives a substantial portion of its income from the nuclear industry, (2) the ICAVP contractor v!ill be selected and paid by the Licensee, (3) S&L has been proposed by the Licensee to conduct the ICAVP at more than one unit, (4) S&L is currently under contract to the NRC to provide technical expertise in the conduct of design-related inspections, and (5) S&L has previously performed work at Millstone. The staff has considered and weighed these comments in its evaluation of S&L as the possible ICAVP contractor.

The NRC staff has responded to these comments in the public forums previously noted and its responses are summarized as follows:

a. S&L Involvement in the Nuclear Industry The review of the design of a commercial nuclear power plant and its operating procedures requires specialized knowledge of NRC regulatory guidance, design I

standards, and facility operation, This knowledge is held by those individuals and organizations that work in the commercial nuclear power generation industry. A review performed by individuals and organizations without this specialized knowledge would not give the NRC and the public a sufficient level of confidence that NNECO programs have been effective in identifying and correcting problems.

b. S&L Payment by NNECO lt is the responsibility of the Licensee to operate its facility in a safe manner, maintain the facility in compliance with its licensing bases, and identify and resolve any problems.

Therefore, it is appropriate that the Licensee assume any cost associated with the 7 l

3 c l ICAVP. Further, the ICAVP process will impose rigid communication protocols to contro! the NNECO/S&L Interaction, and it will be closely overseen by the NRC, with NEAC L observing the NRC oversight function. Those actions provide substantial assurance of l i. an indvendent objective review by the contractor. J

c. CWuct of an !CAVP at Units 1 and 3

} The conduct of an ICAVP by a single contractor at more than one unit does, iri the view ] - of some members of the public, create the perception of a biased outcome. However, ~ as previously described, the staff is confident that the ICAVP process, including NRC oversight, will provide substantial assurance that the review of each unit will be thorough and of sufficient scope and depth to provide insights into the effectiveness of the Ucensee's corrective action process. ~ i

d. Current S&L Work for the NRC The NRC awarded contract NRC-03-96-028 to S&L on October 1,1996. The total j

estimated cost for full performance of the contract is $1,845,431. The contract is for L nuclear AE technical assistance for design inspections. Under this contract, S&L will l provide a PWR team of five design specialists. These specialists will perform design. inspections to assist the NRC in determining whether operating nuclear power plants meet their original design bases. The period of the contre::t is 2 years, beginning from i' October 1,1996, with two 1-year renewal options. The fact that S&L was selected by NRC to perform design reviews indicates that, in the staff's judgment, it is a technically capable organization. 1 i The NRC contract restricts S&L, during the term of the contract, from entering into I consulting or other contractual arrangements with a nuclear power plant to perform any work that results from the inspections. Since S&L has been selected by the Licensee to. l perform the ICAVP at Millstone Units 1 and 3, c&L will be restricted from participating in - [ the NRC's design inspections of these units under NRC's contract NRC-03-96-028. \\ l. The ICAVP process was modeled after the IDVP required by the NRC of Licensees in-l the 1980s before the NRC would grant an 'nitial operating license, The IDVP was not i independent of the NRC but relied upon a design review conducted by a contractor E independent of the original design organization and overseen by the NRC. Similarly, the ICAVP was not intended to establish independence from the NRC.

e. Prior Work by S&L at Millstone i

Proportional to its total annual revenue of $200 million, S&L has had minimal involvement with NNECO ($0.7 million over the preceding 10 years). This represents O.035 percent of S&L's gross revenue during _that 10-year period. Further, the NRC has restricted S&L from directly reviewing prior work or work performed under programs j developed by S&L for the Licensee, for example, Unit i seismic qualification. i 4 s 8 6 + e- - - -,-* w4 m, y ,.m-s. +---m-me. ~ ~ v --1

o

7. Otherissues Olffering Professional Opinions Because of the history of employee concerns issues at Millstone, the staff requested that the proposed contractor provide a description of the process used to handle differing professional opinions (DPO) that may arise among the staff performing the ICAVP. In its submittal of February 21,1997, the Licensee stated that the DPO process would include a step to notify the NRC of the initiation of a DPO and its rasolution. In adoition, the S&L process instruction covering the DPO process was included in the audit plan submitted for NRC's approval on March 19,1997. The NRC staff's review of the audit plan willinclude a review of the S&L process instruction covering the DPO process CONCLUSION i

On the basis of the information provided in the Licensee's submittals of December 18,1996, January 15, February 21, and March 26 1997, and the discussions at the meetings of February 5,1997, and March 18,1997, the staff has concluded that S&L has the technical expertise and nuclear design experience necessary to conduct the ICAVP review at Millstone Units 1 and 3. In addition, the staff concluded that S&L has sufficient technical and financial independence to conduct an objective review but restricted S&L from performing reviews of (1) seismic qualifications, specifications, standards, and proceduret 'r Millstone Unit 1, and (2) interactions between nonseismic Category 2 systems and seismic Oategory 1 safety systems at Millstone Unit 3. However, this approvalis conditioned upon submittal of the certification of financialindependence by both a corporate official of the Licensee and S&L. As discussed in a letter of January 13,1997, and subsequent meeting on February 5,1997, the staff will withhold final approval of the individual ICAVP team members until it completes individualinterviews and reviews the proposed audit plan. 9

CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST STATEMENT MILLSTONE - Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP) Proposed Consultant Consultant's Employer My participation in the Millstone Unh ICAVP [() does () does not] involve situations or relationships in which I had direct previous involvement with activities at the plant that I will be reviewing and I [( ) have ( ) do not have] conflicting roles that might bias my judgment in relation to my work on the ICAVP. In addition

1. () I have not been previously employed by Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) or any of its predecessors.

() I have been previously employed by NNECO or some of its predecessors. (State the nature of the employment.) i i

2. () I have not previously provided design or engir,aering services to NNECO for the subject Millstone unit as a contractor or a subcontractor.

() I have previously provided design or engineering services to NNECO for the subject Millstone unit as a contractor or a subcontractor.

3. () I have no other business relations (mernber of NNECO's Board of Directors, member of an Offsite Review Committee, etc.) with NNECO for the subject Millstone unit that may create the appearance of a conflict of interest.

() I have other business relations with NNECO for the subject Millstone unit that may create the appearance of a conflict of interest.

4. () I have not been previously employed by the subject Millstone unit's architect-engineer (AE)

( ), the nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) vendor ( ), or any of their predecessors associated with design or construction of the subject Millstone unit. () I have been previously employed by the subject Millstone unit's AE ( ), the NSSS vendor ( __), or one or more of their predecessors associated with design or construction of the subject Millstone unit. (State the nature of the employment.)

5. ( ) I, and my immediate family, do not own or control financialinterests (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.)in NNECO, the subject Millstone unit's AE (

), or the NSSS vendor ( ). ( ) I, or a member of my immediate family, own or control financial interests (stocks, bonds, mutual funds, etc.)in NNECO, the subject Millst:ne unit's AE ( ), or the NSSS vendor ( ). 1 of 2

Proposed Consultant Consultant's Employer

6. () Members of my immediate family are not employed by NNECO, the subject Millstone unit's AE

( ), or the NSSS vendor ( ) associe'ed with design or construction of the subject Mi!! stone unit. () Members of my immediate family are employed by NNECO, the subject Millstone unit's AE ( ), or the NSSS vendor ( ) associated with design or construction of the subject Millstone unit. (State the nature of the employment.)

7. () My close relatives (aunts, uncles, first cousins) are not employed by NNECO, the subject Millstone unit's AE (

), or the NSSS vendor ( ) in a management capacity. () My close relatives (aunts, uncles, first cousins) are employed by NNECO, the subject Millstone unit's AE ( ), or the NSSS vendor ( )in a management capacity. (State the nature of the employment.) i

8. Have you been prom: sed any additional compensation, reward or anything of value, contingent upon the position you take on any issue being considered by you in connection with the subject Millstone unit ICAVP7 If yes, provide a detailed description of the circumstances.

()NO ( ) YES. Explain.

9. Do you know of any reason, whether or not inquired about in this questionnaire, that would affect your ability to be completely objective in performing any of the tasks assigned to you in connection with the subject Millstone unit's ICAVP7 If yes, provide a detailed description of the circumstances.

()NO ( ) YES. Explain. 10. Are you aware of anything that might create a perception that you would not act with objectivity in performing any of the tasks assigned to you in connection with the subject Millstone unit's ICAVP? If yes, provide a detailed description of the circumstances. ()NO ( ) Yes. Explain. I certify that 'he statements I have ",iade on this form are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and 4 the circumsta%es surrounding the responses change during performance of the ICAVP for the suun 1 PS**:,e unit, I will inform the NRC of those changes. Signature Date in the above statements, the term

• employed" is construed to mean any form of employment. either direct. as a contractor, or as a subcontractor. The term *immediate famity* includes the interviewee's children. stepchildren, spouse, parents, stepparents, mother 4n4aw. lather 4n4aw, brothers 4new, sisters-in-law, or any person living with the interviewee.

? nf ?

.\\ [g"% $ UNITED STATES 4 j j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t WASHINGTON, D.C. 20666-0001 o 8 April 7, 1997 \\.....,o Mr. Neil S. Carns Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Northeast Nuclear Energy Company c/o Mr. Richard T. Laudenat Director - Regulatory Affairs P.O. Box 128 Waterfcrd, CT 06385 m

Dear Mr. Carns:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) dated October 24, 1996, required NNEC0 to submit the name of a proposed third-party organization to oversee the implementation of a i comprehensive plan for reviewing and dispositioning safety issues raised by NNEC0 employees. The Order requires NRC's approval of the proposed organization and also provides for relaxation of the Order upon demonstration of good cause by NNECO. This letter provides the conditional approval of your proposed contractor, Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), for the independent, third-party oversight program (ITP0P) organization overseeing the implementation of the employee safety concerns program. This letter also relaxes part of the NRC's Order of October 24, 1996, concerning the inclusion of Ms. Garde as a member of the ITPOP team. On the basis of the information provided in your submittals of December 23, 1996, January 14, and February 4, 1997, and the discussions at the meeting on February 5,1997, we have concluded that LHC has the technical expertise and appropriate independence to conduct the ITPOP at the Millstone facility. We have concluded that the various technical disciplines needed for the ITPOP are adequately represented by the resum6s included in your submittals and from our telephone intarviews conducted on March 4, 1997. A detailed discussion of the basis for NRC's approval is given in Enclosure 1. Although we have received certifications of financial independence from each of the proposed members of the ITPOP, we have not obtained certifications of financial independence of NNECO and LHC from each other. Therefore, our approval of LHC as the third-party organization is conditional pending submittal of the enclosed certifications of financial independence by the corporate officials of the licensee and LHC (Enclosure 2). As stated in our letter of January 30, 1997, and discussed at the meeting on February 5, 1997, after we approve an organization and receive the proposed oversight plan, we will conduct additional resums reviews, and possibly interviews, to confirm that individuals are appropriately assigned tasks in their areas of expertise. med!0D !Q m9 "o~c5

-Neil S. Carns This letter also relaxes part of the NRC's Order of October 24, 1996. In our ) letter of February 14, 1997, we-noted that two people, Ms. Garde and Dr. Wood, have direct, previous involvement with NNECO. We noted that J Dr. Wood's involvement in the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for Millstone Unit 3 and Ms. Garde's work on the. employee safety concerns _ comprehensive' plan appear to represent direct, previous involvement with. activities at the Millstone station that the organization will be overseeing. Therefore, the inclusion of Dr. Wood and Ms. Garde on the ITPOP team would be contrary to the Order unless good cause was documented for relaxation. By letter dated February 28, 1997, you requested relaxation of the Order for Ms. Garde and Dr.. Wood. I grant relaxation of the Order for Ms. Garde to be a member of the ITP0P team. We agree that the addition.of someone like Ms. Garde to the ITPOP team-brings a valuable perspective of both the employee and the whistleblower and addresses one of the topic areas raised in our letter of January 30, 1997 It also addresses one of the areas of concern raised by members of the public at the public meeting on February 5, 1997. In your letter of February 28, 1997, you indicate that appropriate administrative controls will be placed on Ms. Garde's involvement with the ITP0P to ensure that any actual or potential conflicts are avoided. j l However, I deny the relaxation of the Order that would permit Dr. Wood to be a i member of the ITP0P team. We find that you did not provide an adequate basis in your February 28 letter for relaxing the Order for Dr. Wood. The NRC staff does not consider that sufficient justification has been provided with respect j to Dr. Wood's providing unique skills necessary to the ITP0P. Because of his 1 previous involvement with NNEC0 and the insufficient justification provided by NNEC0, the staff.does not consider that his participation would be ) indispensable to the ITPOP mission. Although you consider Dr. Wood's previous work for NNECO as serving in an advisory capacity in connection with the development of the PRA for Millstone Unit 3, you did not provide adequate justification or good cause for relaxing the Order. On February 5, 1997, the NRC held a meeting with members of the public to receive comments on the proposed ITPOP organization, LHC. A discussion of the public's comments is included in Enclosure 1. l

1. 4 Neil S. Carns, j Please call Phillip McKee at '(301) 415-2040 if you need any additional L information or clarification of the enclosures. Sincerely, / 2-j x Jaiue ins, Director j Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-245,-50-336, and 50-423

Enclosures:

1. Results of the Staff l

Review of the Proposed .ITP0P Organization

2. Certifications of Financial Independence cc w/encls: See next page T

l i f i 1 4 L 4 '1 9 4 1 . l

t RESULTS OF STAFF REVIEW OF PROPOSED INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY OVERSIGHT PROGRAM CONTRACTOR Introduction On October 24, 1995, the NRC issued an Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO), the licensee for Hillstone, requiring (1) a comprehensive plan for resolving the Hillstone station employees' safety concerns and (2) an independent, third-party oversight program (ITP0P) organization to oversee NNECO's implementation of the employee safety concerns program (ESCP). The ITP0P organization must be independent of NNECO and its vendor and architect-engineer (AE) contractors. The ITP0P is to provide independent verification that the licensee's ESCP effectively resolves employee concerns. The Order states that the NRC staff will approve the ITPOP organization to ensure that the organization has qualified individuals who will conduct the review adequately and irdependently of NNECO. The purpose of the !TPOP, as stated in the Order, is to confirm that Millstone's ESCP resolves and disposes of employee safety concerns. The ITP0P audit required by the NRC is expected to provi& indepenaent verification, beyond the licensee's quality assurance and management oversight, that NNEC0 has identified and satisfactorily resolved ESCP concerns and has established programs, processes, and procedures for effective ESCP management in the future. Backaround On December 23, 1996, NNEC0 submitted information on the proposed selection of Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), as the contractor or organization for the Millstone ITP0P. The submittal identified the principal individuals involved in each major aspect of the ITPOP and their resumes. The submittal also included the proposed ITPOP team structure. On January 14, 1997, NNECO submitted additional information on the ITPOP organization. The information included a copy of LHC's technical proposal and independence certification statemer.ts signed by the team members. On January 30, 1997, the NRC sent a letter to NNEC0 requesting additional information about the ITPOP organization. One of the questions asked NNEC0 to describe any experience or qualifications of LHC or the proposed team in assessing ESCPs from the perspective of employees. On February 5, 1997, the staff held a public meeting with NNECO to discuss the ITP0P organization selection and to receive answers to staff questions. Befcre the meeting, NNEC0 provided the staff with a February 4, 1997, letter that p oposeo the addition of two people to the ITPOP team. NNEC0 proposed to add M'.. James K. Perry, Jr., and Ms. Billie P. Garde.

.' In the evening of February 5,1997, the NRC staff held a public meeting in the Waterford Town Hall to receive comments from the residents of Waterford on NNEC0's selection of LHC as the ITP0P organization to oversee NNECO's ESCP. On February 14, 1997, NNECO responded to the staff's questions. Also on February 14, 1997, the NRC staff sent a letter to NNECO stating that in reviewing its letters, the NRC staff noted that two people, Ms. Garde and Dr. Wood, have had direct, previous involvement with NNECO. The NRC staff stated that while it agreed that adding someone like Ms. Garde to the oversight team brings a valuable pe spective of the employee and of the whistleblower and addresses one of the tooic areas raised in NRC's letter of January 30, 1997, the NRC staff found that Ms. Garde did not meet a provision of the Order. Dr. Wood also did not meet this provision. The February 14 letter stated that if NNEC0 wanted to pursue having Dr. Wood or Ms. Garde or any otF'r individual having direct, previous involvement at + NNECO, participate as, ember of the ITPOP team, NNECO needs to demonstrate good cause for the NRC t., relax the provisions of the Order. On February 28, 1997, NNEC0 sent a letter requesting a relaxation of the Order for Dr. Wood and Ms. Garde. On March 4, 1997, the NRC staff conducted interviews by telephone with each of the ITPOP team members. The staff asked questions on the individuals' qualifications, his or her role on the ITP0P team, and the anticipated level his or her participation. It_a_f_flval uation The Order states that the NRC staff must approve the ITPOP organization. The staff conducted a review of the information.,abmitted by NNECO on the proposed ITPOP organization, LHC, to ensure that the team members selected to perform the ITPOP are technically and financially independent of NNEC0, the NSSS vendors, and the architect-engineers (AEs). To compiete this evaluation, the NRC staff performed the following activities: Determined whetfer the proposed ITPOP organization, LHC, has any a. i financial interest or had any technical involvement with the Millstone station. b. Determined whether LHC has adequate technical and managerial qualifications to conduct the ITP0P. c. Determined whether LHC specialists have the a},propriate technical background to participate in the ITPOP. The evaluation included a review of the individual team member resume-d. Interviewed each individual team member of LUC. The staff may conduct additional resums reviews, and possibly, interviews

l.- I . concurrent with its review of the proposed ITPOP plan and organizational structure to assure that individuals are appropriately assigned to tasks within their expertise. This approach would permit the NRC staff to evaluate the adequacy of the team's expertise and experience, with an understanding of the specific tasks that each member will perform in the review. Discussion LHC Oraanization LHC is a sub-chapter S corporation formed in 1992 to serve as the corporate vehicle for the consulting practice of its President, John W. Beck. LHC has assembled individuals to perform the ITP0P. Many of the ITPOP members have worked together before on activities associated with Comanche Peak and at Tenera Corporation. The ITP0P team currently has 12 members covering the following areas of expertise: management, operations, engineering, maintenance, ESCP, safety analysis, regulatory, legal, training. The individual for health physics, chemistry, and radwaste has since decided to leave the team because his company has decided to pursue other work, which may pose a conflict of interest. LHC has stated that they will find a substitute for this position. Futurf New Team Member Selection Process The selection of new team members will be made using the same criteria and methodology used in assembling the current team. After successfully verifying the independence of the new team member, information on the new team member will be forwarded to the NRC for review and approval. LHC intends to allow the new team member to begin to participate in ITP0P activities as soon as the independence verification process is completed by NNECO and information on the individual has been sent to the NRC. Should the NRC not approve the new team member, compensatory actions will be taken, such as secondary review of the work the individual had performed, based on the nature of the NRC's rejection of the individual. This process will be formalized in the ITP0P project controls that will be prepared by LHC and approved by the NRC. Verification of Financial and Oraanizational Independence of LHC from NNEC0 The President of LHC, Mr. John W. Beck, certified that he has never worked as a contractor or consultant to Northeast Utilities System, Northeast Utilities Service Company (NU), or Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. NNECO has reviewed the NU purchase order database and determined that LHC, as a corporate entity, has never been under contract to NV. As discussed below, the NRC has received certificates of financial independence fron each of the proposed members of the ITPOP. Certification of financial independence of LHC from NNEC0 and NNEC0 from LHC has not been received. Therefore, staff approval of LHC as the third-party organization will be contingent upon certification of financial independence by the corporate officials of the licensee and LHC. l Each LHC team member executed a certification that addresses organizational, experience, and financial independence from NU and NNEC0 and copies of these

!" certifications have been provided in licensee submittals. Each team member certified that they had not been an employee or director of Northeast Utilities System, Northeast Utilities Service Company, or Northaast Nuclear Energy Company or owned or directly controlled any equity pocition or bonds from these companies. None of the team members has had, up until the time of being named to the ITPOP team, unescorted access to any NU nuclear facility. The individual certifications and licensee correspondence ident!fied that four individuals proposed as team members had some past consultant involvement with NU. The past involvement of these individuals, other than that of Ms. Garde and Dr. Wood, was peripheral to Millstone site activities. Relaxation to the Order with respect to Ms. Garde is provided in the succeeding paragraph. The NRC staff has not provided relaxation from the Order for Dr. Wood. In cases where some manner of past involvement with NU or NNEC0 has occurred, as is the case with Ms. Garde, individual-specific administrative controls will be imposed on the individual's involvement on the ITPOP to ensure they are not involved in assessment of activities relating to their previous involvemen Ms. Garde provided consulting services in December 1996 and January 1997 to the team of employees NNECO charged with the development of the ESCP l Comprehensive Plan for Millstone. Her consulting services on that project i have ended with the publication of the Plan on January 31, 1997. In a February 28, 1997, letter, NNEC0 requested relaxation of the NRC Order to allow Ms. Garde to participate as an ITP0P team member of LHC. Tha lettar states that Ms. Garde has spent the majority of her legal career representing employees in the nuclear and energy industry in connection with rettliation claims. She has experienced, first hand, harassment and intimidation by her employer, including termination from her job for exposing criminal misconduct of her supervisor. She has represented over 500 individual employees in leg _1 proceedings involving various aspects of harassment, intimidation, and discrimination. Her activities have put her in positions to evaluate ESCPs at many of the nuclear power plants with such programs. The NRC staff believes that relaxation of the Order should be granted for Ms. Garde to be a member of the LHC team. The staff agrees that adding someone like Ms. Garde to the oversight team brings a valuable perspective of the employee and of the whistleblower and addresses ene of the topic a' 3as raised in its January 30, 1997, letter. It also addresses one of the oceas of concerns raised by members of the public at the February 5,1997, public meeting. In its letter of February 28, 1997, NNECO indicates that appropriate administrative controls will be placed on Ms. Garde's involvement with the ITP0P to ensure any actual or potential conflicts are avoided. NNECO characterizes Dr. Wood's prior work as serving in an advisory capacity in connection with the development of the PRA for Millstone Unit 3. NNEC0 describes Dr. Wood's as someone whose background in safety analysis and related a'ialytical techniques will provide a unique perspective to ITPOP. The NRC staff does not consider that sufficient justification has been provided with respect to Dr. Wood's providing unique skills necessary to the ITPOP. Because of his previous involvement with NNECO and the insufficient justification provided by NNEC0, the staff does not consider that his participation would be indispensable to the ITP0P mission. Therefore, relaxation of the Order that would permit Dr. Wood to be a member of the ITPOP team is denied.

7, ' The ~ staff, in meetings with members of the public near the Millstone facility, has received comments on the issue of the independence of LHC from NNECO. The principle comment from several members of the public is that LHC is not truly in'lependent because most of its team members have worked in the nt-lear I industry before.. The NRC staff notes that the NRC Order states that, "The i third-partj organization chosen to oversee the conduct of the' Licensee's comprehensive plan must be independent of the Licensee, such that none of its members has had any direct, previous involvement with the activities at the Millstone Station that the organization will be overseeing." The NRC staff has evaluated LHC and believes that with one exception, where a relaxation to the Order will be granted, that LHC and the team members have not had any direct previous involvement with NNECO. The staff does not view team members' previous nuclear industry experience as a factor which would significantly impact their ability to fairly evaluate NNEC0's implementation of its ESCP. As a prac'.ical matter, some nuclear industry experience is necessary to facilitate the team's evaluation of technical issues which are raised to the ESCP. Exoerience in Assessina ESCPs from the Persoective of the Employees NNEC0 provided the following information in this area. .Mr. John W. Beck was involved in the development of a methodology used in assessing the effectiveness of ESCPs and characterizing nuclear safety cultures. The methodology was developed to elicit the response of employees using structured interviews. The output was then synthesized into underlying themes and recommendations for improvement. The themes and recommendations were then verified in a series of employee-led workshops, facilitated by the 4 consultant. Mr. Bob Engelmeir worked at South Texas on the ESCP. Most of Ms. Billie Garde's work in the nuclear utility has been on the behalf of employees. Her training'and teaching consultations in assisting nuclear utility management develop a better appreciation of what motivates and is important to the whistleblower is fundamentally driven by her understanding and familiarity with the perspective of the employee. This is particularly beneficial with respect to employees who have become disaffected for reasons having to do with intimidation, harassment, or discrimination. The staff, in meetings with members of the public near the Millstone facility, has received comments on the issue of previous experience of the LHC team members. One comment received from the public was that LHC has too many team members who are managers or executives. The NRC etaff agrees that LHC has many team members who have previous experience in management or held executive positions. The staff believes that this situation is not necessarily detrimental because these team members' management experience would be beneficial in facilitating the oversight af the implementation of the ESCP at Millstone. Their experience also would help in communicating to management potential improvements in the ESCP. However, the staff does believe it is important to have a team member who represents the employees or

l2 t, e. I l whistleblowers' perspective. This issue is discussed further in the following response. Another comment received from the public was that LHC has no tcam member representing the perspective of the employee. The NRC staff agrees that LHC was lacking in team members representing the employee's perspective. In its j January 30, 1997, letter requesting additional information from NNECO on LHC, the NRC staff asked NNECO to describe any experience or qualifications of LHC or the proposed team in assessing employee concerns programs from the perspective of the employees. In response to this question, NNECO proposed in a February 4,1997, letter to supplement the team with two team members. One of the team members -is Ms. Garde who was a whistleblower herself and has represented numerous employees in cases against utilities involving harassment, intimidation, or discrimination. The NRC staff agrees that adding someone like Ms. Garde to the oversight team brings a valuable perspective of the employee and of the whistleblower. Exnerience in Root Cause Eva~ma*.icns. Developino Corrective Actions, and Imolementina Corrective Actions In its January 30, 1997, letter and in its March 4, 1997, interviews, the NRC staff asked for the ITPOP members experience in this area. The staff received the following information. While the entire LHC team has not worked together as a team on past projects, various team men,bers have worked together and individually on projects that required them to perform root cause evaluations and to develop and implement corrective actions. A few examples where team members have demonstrated the ability to identify root causes and develop and implement corrective actions are: (1) Independent Comanche Peak Review Team; (2) Comanche Peak Operational Readiness Evaluation; (3) Commonwealth Edison Evaluation of Nucles.r Division Performance; (4) Zion Station Diesel Generator Task Force; and (5) South Texas ESCP. Level of Particiodion e The NRC staff discussed the level of participation of the team members because LHC is a shell corporation bringing in individual consultants to staff the ITP0P project. LHC states that it has obtained a commitment from each team member to support the ITPOP project for its duration. LHC anticipates that Messrs. Beck and Griffin will be involved on, essentially, a full-time basis, and either Mr. Beck or Mr. Griffin will maintain a full-time site presence at Millstone for the duration of this effort. The team members will be involved on an as-needed basis, as required by structured interview activities and spacific technical issue demands. This level of effort will average 1 to 2 weeks per month, depending on the nature of the ITP0P activities. LHC Process to Handle Differina Professional Opinions The LHC team will attempt to reach a consensus for all findings and recommendations resulting from the oversight activities. This objective creates an atmosphere in which team members must vigorously defend their particular views to other involved team members, when differing opinions exist. Should there be instances where team consensus cannot be reached, the applicable oversight report will identify that a differing professional

I 1 opinion exists and include a written description of the differing professional opinion prepared by the dissenting team member (s). Conclusion Based on the various submittals from NNECO, the telephone interviews, the j meeting with NNECO, and the public meeting with the residents of Waterford, i the NRC staff concludes that LHC is an acceptable selection by NNECO as the ITPOP organization to oversee the implementation of the ESCP at Millstone. j i i I e i

l l.' Certification of Financial Indeoendence I John W. Beck, being first duly sworn, depose, and state: That I am President, little Harbor Consultants. Inc. (the Contractor). That I am authorized to provide the followina certification on behalf of the Contractor to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cv nission (NRC). That the Contractor does not own stock, bonds, or other financial inve tment s mechanisms in Northeast Nuclear Energy Company. the Licensee to whom the NRC issued an October 24. 1996. Order requiring an independent, third-party oversight program (ITPOP). John W. Beck. President l l

l Certification of Financial Indeoendence I. Neil S. Carns. being first duly sworn. depose, and state: That I am President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Northeast Nuclear Energy Corporation (the Licensee). That I am authorized to provide the following certification on behalf of the l Licensee to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). That the Licensee does not own stock bonds. or other financial investment mechanisms in Little Harbor Consultants. Inc. the Contractor proposed by the Licensee to fulfill the requirements of the NRC's Order of October 24, 1996. i Neil 5. Carns. President and CEO l

y., ...%...s ? Northeast Nuclear Energy' Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1. 2. and 3 cc: Lillian M. Cuoco. Esquire-Mr. Wayne D. Lanning Senior Nuclear Counsel' Deputy Director of Inspections Northeast Utilities Service Company Special Projects Office P.O. Box 270 475 Allendale Road Hartford..CT 06141-0270 King of Prussia. PA 19406-1415 - Mr. Kevin T. A. McCarthy. Director Mr. F. C. Rothen Monitoring and Radiation Division Vice President - Nuclear Work Services De)artment of Environmental Northeast Nuclear Energy Company 3rotection P.O. Box 128 79 Elm Street Waterford CT 06385 ' Hartford. CT 06106-5127 Charles Brinkman. Manager Mr. Allaa Johanson, Assistant Washington Nuclear Operations Director ABB Combustion Engineering Office of Policy and Management 12300 Twinbrook Pkwy. Suite 330 Policy' Development ard-Planning Rockville. MD 20852 Division 450 Capitol Avenue - MS 52ERN Mr. D. M. Goebel P.O. Box 341441 Vice President - Nuclear Oversight Hartford. CT 06134-1441 Northeast Nuclear Energy. Company P. O. Box 128 Regional Administrator. Region I Waterford. CT 06385 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road Mr. M. L. Bowling. Jr. King of Prussia. PA 19406 Millstone Unit No. 2 Nuclear Recovery Officer First Selectmen Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Town of Waterford P. 0.-Box 128 Hall of Records.. Waterford, CT 06385 200 Boston Post Road Waterford CT 06385 Senior Resident Inspector Millstone Nuclear Power Station Mr. J P. McElwain c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Millstone Unit No. 1 Nuclear P.O. Box 513 Recovery Officer Niantic. CT 06357 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 128 Mr. J. K. Thayer Waterford CT 06385 Recovery Officer - Nuclear Engineering and Support Deborah-Katz President Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Citizens Awareness Network P. O. Box 128 Waterfod. CT 06385 P.O. Box S3 03170 Shelburne Falls. MA 1 i

l l Northeast Nuclear Energy Company Millstone Nuclear Power Station Units 1. 2. and 3 CC. Mr. M. H. Brothers Vice President - Millstone Unit 3 Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 128 j Waterford. CT 06385 i Burlington Electric Department c/o Robert E. Fletcher. Esq. 271 South Union Street i Burlington. VT 05402 Mr. M. R. Scully. Executive Director Connecticut Municipal Electric Energy Cooperative 30 Stott Avenue Norwich. CT 06360 Mr. William D. Meinert Nuclear Engineer Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company P.O. Box 426 Ludlow. MA 01056 Ernest C. Hadley. Esquire 1040 B Main Street P.O. Box 549 West Wareham. MA 02576 Joseph R. Egan. Esq. Egan & Associates. P.C. l 2300 N Street. NW Washington D.C. 20037 Citizens Regulatory Commission ATTN: Ms. Susan Perry Luxton 180 Great Neck Road Waterford. Connecticut 06385}}