ML20148N222
| ML20148N222 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cooper  |
| Issue date: | 03/28/1988 |
| From: | Bennett W, Holler E, Plettner E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20148N188 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-298-88-06, 50-298-88-6, IEB-84-02, IEB-84-2, NUDOCS 8804060397 | |
| Download: ML20148N222 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000298/1988006
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APPEN0!X 0
f) , S . MK L E M REGUL COP.Y C0."J:15510h
REGION !Y
NRC Inspection Report:
50-293/88-06
License:
Cockat:
50-298
1.icensee: Nebriska Public Power District (NPPD)
P. O. Box 499
Columbus, NE
68601
facility hame:
Cooper NJelear Station (CN5)
Inc,pection At: Cooper Nuclear Station, Nmah County, Nebraska
Inspection Conducted:
February 1-29, 1988
Inspectors
.
. M.
IT[th _
3// /P.P
E. A. Plettner, Destdent !v rector, (RI)
Ofte'
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acnt : n e. p e c t o r', (ET)~ "~
Date
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/p9 roved:
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E. J, Iblier, Chie.', Prejc:t wtion C,
Date
Reactor Projects Division
8804060397 000329
ADOCK 05000290
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Inspection Summary
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Inspection Conducted through, 1987 (Report 50-298/86-06)
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Areas Insoected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on
previous inspection findings, operational safety verification, licensee event
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report followup, IE Bul?; tin 84-02 followup, monthly surveillance and
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maintenance observations, radiological protection, and security.
Results: Within the areas inspected, three violations were identified
(failure to vei *y jet pump operabili e, paragraph 3, failure to follow fire
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protection p.o adures, paragraph 3, and failure to perform adeqr
eview,
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paragraph 3).
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DETAILS
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1.
Persons Contacted
Principal Licensee Employees
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- G. R. Horn, Division Manager of Nuclear Opere'ons
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"J. M. Heacham, Senior Manager, Technical Supp.,
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- LuAnn Bray, Regulatory Compliance Specialist
- G
[. Smith, Manager, Operations Quality Assurance
- R. D. Black, Supervisor, Operations
- D
M. Norvell, Manager, Maintenance
- M. D. Hamm, Supervisor, Security
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'R. Brungardt, Manager, Operations
- E. M. Mace, Manager, Engineering
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The NRC inspectors also interviewed other licensee employees during the
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course of the inspection.
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- Denotes tnose present during exit interview March 1, 1988,
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2.
Licensee Action on Previous Insrection Findings
(Closed) Violation 298/8601-01:
Failure to Have Procedures for
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Preventative Maintenance.
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This item involved the lack of Preventative Maintenance (PM) procedures
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for all of the plant equipment that could affect nuclear safety.
Cooper
Nuclear Station did not have pr(
iures which pre;cribed the manner in
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which the existing PM program ht
, ten developed, or which required the
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station program to be maintained
trent with changing vendor
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recommendations.
Corrective acu
taken by the licensee was to initiate
a PM upgrade program.
The prograu
nsisted of comparing the existing
station PM requirements to the ven,
recommendation, and resolving the
differences either by generating
..e PMs or surveillance procedures, or by
an engineering evaluation to provide a doct.mented disposition for not
performing vendor recommended actions.
The NRC Resident Inspector (RI)
reviewed Cooper Nuclear Station's Operation Manual Procedure 0.24
"Generating and Dispor.itioning Vendor Manual Change Requests," Revision 2
dated July 30, 1987, and CNS Procedure 0.25, "Vendor Manual Change Order
Review and Approval," Revision 3, dated December 23, 1987 to verify that
formal procedure controls for maintaining the program were implemented.
Vendor manuals relating to plant equipment that could affect safety were
reviewed to verify that vendnr manual updates had been received.
This item is closed.
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(Closed) Open Item 8724-01:
Labeling Deficiencies
This item identified labeling deficiencies among System Operating
Procedures (SOP) 2.2.23, "120 V/240 V AC Instrument Fower System,"
Revision 14, dated December 28, 1986, Appendix "B" Breaker and Fuse Index,
Revision 12; S0P 2.2.24, "250 V DC Electrical System," Revision 13, dated
February 6,1986, Appendix "B" Breaker and Fuse Index, Revision 10;
S0P 2.2.25, "125 V DC Electrical System," Revision 16, dated February 20,
1987, Appendix "B" Breaker and Fuse Index, Revision 10; and 50P 2.2.26,
"24 V DC Electrical System," Revision 7, dated March 5,1987, Appendix "B"
Breaker and Fuse Index, Revision 4.
The licensee's corrective actions
were to issue correct labels on the breaker boxes and submit new revisions
to Appendix "B" for each of the S0Ps listed above. The RI reviewed the
latest revisions to the'above S0Ps dated January 14, 1988, and compared
those revisions to various breaker panels to verify that licensee's
corrective actions were completed and adequate.
This item is closed.
3.
Operational Safety Verification
The NRC inspectors observed operational activities throughout the
inspection period.
Control room activities and conduct were observed to
be well controlled.
Proper control room staffing was maintained.
Discussions with operators determined that they were cognizant of plant
status and understood the importance of, and reason for, each lit
annunciator. The NRC inspectors observed selected shift turnover meetings
and noted that information concerning plant status was communicated to the
oncoming operators.
On February 7,1988, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector (SRI) observed a
reactor startup. The plant had experienced a reactor scram on January 28,
1988, which was documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-298/87-33. All
conditions for startup were properly met and documented in General
Operating Procedure (GOP) 2.1.1.2, "Technical Specification Pre-Startup
Checks," Revision 7, dated December 10, 1987. The startup was conducted
in a controlled, professional manner in accordance with GOP 2.1.1, "Cold
Startup Procedure," Revision 48, dated December 10, 1987.
Some difficulty was initially encountered in verifying normal jet pump
indication as required by GOP 2.1.1.2 and jet pump operability as required
by Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.E.1.
The December 10, 1987, revision
to GOP 2.1.1.2 added a reference to CNS Surveillance Procedure (SP) 6.2.4.1,
which does the daily jet pump operability check. When the surveillance
test was run, it failed.
Subsequently, TS requirements were met when log
readings for the previous startup were compared with actual readings. The
SRI asked operations personnel how jet pump operability had been verified
for previous startups and was informed that it had generally not been done
until the reactor was at power. Subsequent questioning of other senior
operators verified that the TS was not specifically checked until the
reactor was at power, however, several operators stated that they checked
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jet pump differential pressure to verify it was normal prior to startup.
This failure to verify jet pump operability prior to startup is an
apparent violation (298/8806-01) of TS 3.6.E.1.
Tours of a:cessible areas at the facility were conducted to confirm
operability of plant equipment including the fire suppression systems and
other emergency equipment.
Facility operations were performed in
accordance with the requirements established in the CNS Operating License
and TS.
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On February 8,1988, the NRC inspector was performing a normal routine
plant inspection. While reviewing fire extinguisher monthly inspection
tags for fire extinguishers located on electric welders and oxygen-
acetylene welders, it was noted that inspections had not been performed
during the month of January.
Review of SP 6.4.5.17, "Fire Fighting
Equipment Monthly Inspection," Revision 14, dated July 16, 1987, performed
January 1988, confirmed that the monthly inspection had not been periormed
on fire extinguishers located on electric and oxygen-acetylene welders.
Interviews conducted with the individuals involved verified that the
surveillance procedure had not been performed.
The results of the interviews indicate the rocc cause of the missed
surveillance to be both a programmatic problem and a personnel error. The
programmatic problem is that no formal program exists to alert other
individuals of surveillance requirements when the regularly assigned
person is not available for an extended period of time.
The personnel
error in this case was that the individual regularly assigned for
scheduling the surveillance forgot to update his desk calendar when the
new year started. The desk calendar was the means he used to identify the
time frame for the surveillance.
Failure to perform SP 6.4.5.17, "Fire Fighting Equipment Monthly
Inspection," Revision 14, dated July 15, 1987, Attachment "A,"
for fire
extinguishers located on vario u electric and oxygen-acetylene welders
during January 1988 is an apparent violation.
(298/8806-02)
The RI reviewed the test results of completed SP 6.4.5.17 covering the
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time from August 1987 to January 1988. During the review it was noted
that the "verified-by" block had not been initialed as completed on page 3
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of Attachment E for 23 entries for the inspection performed during the
month of December 1987. The "verified-by" block had not been initialed as
completed on page 3 of Attachment E for 1 entry for the inspection
perfonned during January 1988.
The documents were reviewed by the
surveillance coordinator and reviewed and signed by the system engineer.
The RI reviewed the test results of SP 6.4.5.1, "Fire Protection System
monthly Inspection," Revision 44, dated March 19, 1987, and Revision 45,
dated December 17, 1987 performed from August 1987 to January 1988.
During the review it was noted that an out-of-specifications reading was
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recorded in Attachment "A," page 7, Section E, performed on December 19,
1987. The main output amps reading for fire protection tank 1A was
recorded as 0.16 amps with the limits printed next to the reading as
(0-0.15 amps.) This procedure was reviewed by a shif t supervisor and the
surveillance coordinator, and reviewed and signed by the system engineer.
The SRI reviewed GOP 2.1.1.2 "Technical Specifications Pre-Startup Checks,"
Revision 7, dated December 10, 1987, performed on February 7,1988.
During the review it was noted that Item 13 on page 5 was not signed as
completed.
This procedure was reviewed by the shift supervisor. The
procedure does not require review in addition to that of the shift
supervisor. The NRC inspectors were able to determine through interviews
that the SPs and G0P had been completed as required.
Failure to perform
an adequate review of the SPs and G0P identified above is an apparent
violation. (298/8806-03)
No other violations or deviations were identified in this area.
4.
Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup
(Closed) LER 87-009, "Unanticipated Reactor Scram and Group Isolations Due
to Low Reactor Vessel Water Level Caused by Inadvertent Manual Trip of the
Operating Reactor Feedwater Pump."
This event occurred when a station operator (nonlicensed) locally tripped
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the only running reactor feed pump during a local trip test for placing
the second feed pump in service. This action resulted in a low reactor
water level scram. Normal scram recovery procedures were implemented and
the plant was placed into cold shutdown. A contributing factor to this
event was a lack of human factor labeling of plant components and
equipment. Corrective actions taken by the licensee included:
(a) discussion of the event with operations department shift personnel
during weekly meetings, (b) a comprehensive review of plant
component / equipment identification and the marking for human factors
consideration, and (c) an engineering evaluation to determine the basis
for the local trip test. The RI reviewed attendance forms for weekly
meetings for operations department shift operating personnel and
interviewed sev-~1 operators to verify that the event was discussed with
the required personnel. The licensee completed the plant
component / equipment identification program in December 1987. All major
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plant components were appropriately labeled with large placards painted on
the item to clearly mark the component.
The licensee through its
engineering evaluation determined that the local trip test should be
performed during a startup after a planned outage.
System Operating
Procedure (S0P) 2.2.28, "Feedwater System," Revision 43, dated July 1,
1987, contained the appropriate revision.
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This item is closed,
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5.
IE Bulletin 84-02 concerns failures of General Electric Type HFA relays in
use in class 1E safety systems.
The licensee, in Letter NLS8400018, dated
July 16, 1984, committed to replace all HFA relays assnciated.with
safety-related systems at CNS during the Fall, 1984 refueling outage.
This bulletin was interpreted by the licensee to require changeout of AC
HFA relays only.
This bulletin was closed out in NRC Inspection Report
50-298/84-20.
During review of the bulletin, the licensee determined that the bulletin
required replacement of all (AC and DC) HFA relays.
This error was
discussed by the licensee with the SRI, and the licensee committed to
issue a supplemental response to IE Bulletin 84-02 explaining the
additional actions which will be taken in response to the bulletin.
The
bulletin is considered open for purposes of tracking.
No. violations or deviations were identified in this area.
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observations
The NRC inspectors observed and reviewed the performance of Surveillance
Procedure (SP) 6.3.5.1, "RHR Test Mode Surveillance Operation,"
SP 6.2.4.1, "CS Test Mode Surveillance Operation," SP 6.3.5.5, "RHR Pump
Opersbility Test," and SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI Test Mode Surveillance
Operation."
SP 6.3.5.1 "RHR Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 26, dated
October 8, 1987; SP 6.3.4.1, CS Test Mode Surveillance Operation,"
Revision 21, dated September 11, 1987; and SP 6.3.5.5, "RHR Pump
Operability Test," Revision 15, dated October 8, 1987.
These
surveillances were performed on February 7, 1988, to prove
operability after testing and maintenance (described in paragraph 7
of this report), and prior to startup.
SP 6.3.5.5 verified
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operability of RHR Pump "B' and flow verifications for Pump "B"
and
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loop "B"
(pumps "B" and "0").
These surveillances were performed by
qualified operators who were cognizant of all surveillance
requirements.
Limiting conditions for operations were properly
entered for the surveillance testing. .The SRI observed that the
operators performing the tests were aware of all precautions
associated with the tests, and performed the tests in accordance with
applicable procedures.
All data was properly reviewed and verified
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to be acceptable per the procedures and TS.
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The RI observed in its entirety the performance of SP 6.3.3.1, "HPCI
Test Mode Surveillance Operation," Revision 27, dated October 29,
1987.
The surveillance was performed on February 24, 1988, to meet
the HPCI Pump Monthly Operability Requirement of TS.
Testing was
performed by two licensed reactor operators in accordance with the
procedure which included minor changes as designated by a temporary
procedure change notica
The operators performed the procedure in a
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professional manner and were cognizant of all procedure requirements.
The NRC Resident Inspector reviewed the completed procedure to verify
that all test results conformed with TS and procedtre requirements.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observation
The NRC inspectors verified that the maintenance activities were conducted
in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with Technical Specifications.
The SRI monitored maintenance action associated with "B" Residual Heat
Removal (RHR) pump.
On January 28, 1988, "B" RHR pump breaker tripped
when the pump was started to transfer water following the reactor scram
which occurred on the same day.
Troubleshooting determined that there was
a ground in the motor.
The motor was subsequently removed and saipped to
General Electric tc determine the source of the ground.
It was
subsequently determined that there was an "end turn" ground on one of the
coils of the motor.
No root cause for the ground has been determined as
yet.
To ensure that the ground was not associated with other ECCS pumps,
the licensee performed a polarization index mea:;urement on all ECCS pump
motors to evaluate the insulation.
In additica, an AC hipot test was
performed on RHR pump "C" and "D" motors to demonstrate ample ground wall
insulation strength.
After testing proved operability of all other ECCS
pumps, RHR "B" pump motor was replaced with another motor whict was
equivalent.
The new motor was qualified by the licensee and replaced in
accordance with Design Change 88-071 "RHR Pump Motor Replacement" and
Maintenance Work Request 88-0598.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
8.
Security
The NRC inspectors observed security personnel perform their duties of
vehicle, personnel, and package search.
Vehicles were properly authorized
and escorted or controlled within the protected area (PA).
The RI
reviewed an employee time report for assigned security personnel for
February 10, 1988.
The review was performed to verify that manning
requirements stated in the security plan in the CNS operating license were
in compliance.
Site tours were conducted by the NRC inspectors to ensure
that compensatory measures were properly implemented as required because
of some nonfunctional security equipment.
Tha PA barrier had adequate
illumination and the isolation zones were free of transient m'aterial.
No violations or deviations were identified in this area.
9.
Radiological Protection Observations
The NRC inspectors verified that selected activities of the licensee's
radiological protection program were implemented in conformance with
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facility policies, procedures, and regulatory requirements.
Radiation
work permito contained appropriate information to ensure that work could
be performed in a safe and controlled manner.
Personnel in radiation
controlled areas were wearing the required personnel monitoring equipment
and protective clothing.
Radiation and/or contaminated areas were
properly posted and controlled based on the activity levels within the
area.
Radiation monitors were utilized to check for contamination.
No vic
ions or deviations were identified in this area.
10.
Exic Interviews
An exit interview was conducted on March 1, 1988, with licensee
representatives (identified in paragraph 1).
During this interview the
SRI and the RI reviewed the scope and findings of the inspection.
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