ML20148N102

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Amend 7 to Gibb Balance of Plant Standard Safety Analysis Rept Re RESAR-414 for Sub Facil.Incls Various Responses to Branch Questons Re Conversion & Containment Sys & Radiological Assessment
ML20148N102
Person / Time
Site: 05000584
Issue date: 11/16/1978
From:
GIBBS & HILL, INC. (SUBS. OF DRAVO CORP.)
To:
Shared Package
ML20148N109 List:
References
NUDOCS 7811240128
Download: ML20148N102 (270)
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{{#Wiki_filter:. ...~ P i l TOLEDO %s EDISON LOWELL E. ROE Docket No. 50-346 Vice President Facchtves Development License No. NPF-3 uisi esSsen . Serial No. 468. -File Nos, 0017, 1480 November 25, 1978 Director of Nuclear. Reactor Regulation Attention: Mr. Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Operating' Reactors U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. Reid:

In accordance with our commitment made during the October 25, 1978 meeting with the NRC staff on the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Fire Protection Program, enclosed is Revision 4 to our Fire Hazard Analysis Report. Revision 4 provides responses to items 8, 9, 11, 13, 26, 35, 37. and supplemental question no. 2. Yours very truly, l C, li'c,c.fEChfl}Jh@l. al e/1 LER:CRD Enclosure 78120402d8 f\\ THE TOLEDO EOISON COMPANY EDISON PLAZA 300 MADISON AVENUE TOLEOD, OHIO 43652 ..,. - -... _. ~ _... _... _ _.. _..

D-B DIRECTIONS FOR INSERTING REVISION 4 0F THE FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT During insertion of the revised pages, a dash (-) in the remove or insert column of the directions means no action is required. REMOVE INSERT VOLUME I SECTION 4 Table 4-1 (Sheet 3d/4) Table 4-1 (Sheet 3d/4) Table 4-1 (Sheet 24/25) Table 4-1 (Sheet 24/25) Table 4-1 (Sheet 39/39a-1) Table 4-1 (Sheet 39/39a-1) Table 4-1 (Sheet 48c-3/48d) Table 4-1 (Sheet 48c-3/48d-1) Table 4-1 (Sheet 48e/-) Table 4-1 (Sheet 48d-2/48e) SECTION 5 Page 5.A-5/6 Page 5.A-5/6 Page 5.T-3/3a Page 5.T-3/3a VOLUME II Appendix 1 Page 1/2 Page 1/2 Page 3/- Dwgs. SK-18, SK-19

  • Dwgs. M-012A, M-041 Appendix 5 Page 1/-

Page 1/- NRC Questions Page Q 8-1/- Page Q 8-1/- Page Q 11-1/2 Page Q 11-1/2 Page Q11-3/4 Page Q 13-1/- Page Q 13-1/- Page Q 26-1/2 Page Q 26-1/2 Page Q 35-1/2 Page Q 35-1/2 Page Q 35-3/- Page Q 37-1/2 Page Q 37-1/2 Page R 2-1/- Page R 2-1/-

  • Dwgs. M-012A and M-041 follow Dwg. SK-19 O

Table 4-1 (Sheet 3d) Appendix A Position Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 3 A6. Fuel Storage Areas Schedule for implementation of modifications, Comply - Schedule calls for. fire protection system if any, will be established on a case-by-case to be fully operational before fuel is stored in the basis. unit. This has been accomplished. 4 A7. Schedule for implementation of modifications, Any requirements for future modifications or additions if any, will be established on a case-by-case to fire protection systems will be the case exceptions. basis. Note that we comply with the more restrictive guidelines for plants without CP's in that our schedule calls for l l l l l l l Revision 2 l l L- -

..w i Table 4-1 (Sheet 4) 1 Appendix A Position I Fare Section Davis-Besse Unit I the existing fire protec* ton system to be fully operational before fuel is loaded in reactor. 4 A8. Multiple-Reactor Sites on multiple-reactor sites where there are Not applicable. operating reactors and construction of remaining units is being completed, the fire protection 1 program should provide continuing evaluation and include additional fire barriers, fire protec-tion capability, and administrative controls necessary to protect the operating units from construction fire hazards. The superintendent of the operating plant should have the lead responsibility for site fire protection. 4 A9. Simultaneous Fires Siruitaneous fires in more than one reactor need Not applicable, not be postulated, where separation requirements are met. A fire involving more than one reactor unit need not be postulated except for facilities shared between units. 4 Bl. Administrative Procedures, Controls and Fire Brigade The Fire Protection Administrative Centrols and Administrative procedures consistent with the Procedures will use the Vassallo letter dated need for maintaining the performance of the fire August 29, 1977 for guidance. Procedures on (a) protection system and personnel in nuclear power Fire Brigade Training, (b) Control of Combust-plants should be provided. bles, and (c) Control of Ignition Sources are 4 planned to be completed by February 1979. Guidance is contained in the following Procedures on (d) Fire Fighting Procedures publications: (Preplans) are planned to be completed by October 1979. NFPA 4 - Organization for Fire Services NFPA 4A - Organization for Fire Department 1 i Revisien 4 9 O 9

p ~y O Table 4-1 (Sheet 24) 4 i Appendix A Position Faye Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 21 D4. (f) Stairwells should be designed to minimize Comply - See first part of discussion for section smoke infiltration during a fire. Staircases D1(j) regarding construction. Fire drills are held once should serve as escape coutes and access routes a week on various shifts so that each brigade member for fire fighting. Fire exit routes should be participates once a month. l clearly marked. Stairwells, elevators and chutes should be enclosed in masonry towers with minimum fire rating of three hours and automatic i fire doors at least equal to the enclosure con-struction, at each opening into the building. Elevators should not be used during fire emergencies. Where stairwells or elevators (nnnot be enclosed 2 in three-hour fire rated barrier with equf __snt fire doors, escape and access routes should be established by pre-fire plan and practiced in drills by operating and fire brigade personnel. j 21 D4. (g) Smoke and heat vents may be useful in Comply - Smoke venting is discussed in Section 5. specific areas such as cable spreading rooms and diesel fuel oil storage areas and switch-gear rooms. When natural-convection ventila-tion is used, a minimum ratio of 1 sq. foot of j venting area per 200 sq. feet of floor area should be provided. If forced-convection ventilation is used, 300 CFM should be provided for every 200 sq. feet of floor area. See NFPA No. 204 for additional guidance on smoke control. 21 D4. (h) Self-contained breathing apparatus, using Comply - Self-contained breathing apparatus will be the e full face positive pressure masks, approved by NIOSH approved one half hour, full-face, positive pres-t NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational sure type masks with extra air bottles available on site. Safety and Health - approval formerly given by At present there are 20 Scott Air Paks with 40 spare air the U. S. Bureau of Mines) should be provided bottles at the plant. The onsite charging system is 4 for fire brigade, damage control and control a cascade system which uses bottled breathing air. room personnel. Control room personnel may be Reserve air is limited only by the number of unused furnished breathing air by a tenifold system supply bottles for the. cascade system. Procedures i piped from a storage reservoir if practical. are currently being revised to insure enough supply Service or operating life should be a minimum . bottles are available on site to maintain a 6-hour of one half hour for the self-centained units. reserve supply of bottled breathing air. t Revision 4 l t

Table 4-1 (Sheet 25) Appendix A Position }are Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 At least two extra air bottles should be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit. In addition, an ensite 6-hour supply of reserve air should be provided and arranged to permit quick and complete replenishment of exhausted supply air bottles as they are returned. If compressors are used as a source of breathing air, only units appreved for breathing air should be used. Special care must be taken to locate the compressor in areas free of dust and contaminants. 22 D4. (1) Where total flooding gas extinguishing Not applicable - No total flooding gas systers are systems are used, area intake and exhaust ven-used. tilation dampers should close upon initiation of gas flow to maintain necessary gas concen-tration. (See UFFA 12, " Carbon Dioxide Systems," and 12A, "Halon 1301 Systems.") 22 D5. Lighting and Communication Lighting and two way voice communication are Fixed and portable emergency lighting and communication vital to safe shutdown and crergency response devices are available or will be provided as stated in in the event of fire. Suitable fixed and Section 5. portable emergency lighting and communication devices should be provided to satisfy the following requirements: 22 D5. (a) Fixed emergency lighting should consist of Comply - In the event of loss of offsite power, sealed beat units with individual 8-hour emergency lighting is powered from the diesel genera-minimum battery power supplies. tors. In the unlikely event that both diesel power trains were not available, emergency lighting has a 2 hour battery supply; however, it is through a conduit and not individual battery supplies. In the event of failure of emergency lighting, fixed self-contained lighting ccasisting of scaled-beam units with individual 8-hour mininum battery power units will be installed in areas utilized to achieve cold shutdown and in routes utilized 2 for access and egress for those areas. Revision 2 e le o

i Table 4-1 (Sheet 39 ) r Appendix A Position Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 Equivalent protection from portable systems should be previded if it is impractical to install standpipe with hose stations. Adequate self-contained breathing There are 20 self-contained breathing apparatus units, i apparatus should be provided near the available for manual fire fighting use, distributed in containment entrances for fire fighting various locations throughout the' unit. Near.the entr-and damage control personnel. These units ance to the containment vessel-in Room-426, personnel should be independent of any breating lock area (see Appendix A, Drawing-A-6), there are three apparatus or air supply systems provided self-contained breathing apparatus units mounted on the for general plant' activities, east wall. Each self-contained air pack, when fully l charged, contains 45 cubic feet of breathing air at 2216 psi and is rated at :M) minutes duration. Each air pack 2 provides the user with pure breathing air, precisely regulated to need (demand) from a cylinder carried on the wearer's back in a backpack. The alt pack is provided with a built-in alarm which rings and vibrates to warn the wearer of a diminishing air supply. The regulator has two modes of operation. The first mode provides air on de-mand only; the second mode, with the selector switch in the up position, provides air on demand and maintains a pos-- itive pressure within the facepiece above that of the outside atmosphere. This positive pressure is maintained-by the exhalation valve under all breathing conditions and L . totally excludes toxic, external air from the facepiece for the duration of the air pack supply. I Presently, there are 40 spare air pack cylinders. 4 The charging system on site.; a cascade system using bottled breathing air. The reserve air supply is limited only by the number of unused supply cylinders for the cascade system. Procedures are currently being revised to. insure that enough supply cylinders are available for a 6-hour reserve supply. Revision 4

Table 4-1 (Sheet 39a-1) l2 Appendix A Position -Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 35 F2. Control Room The control room is essential to safe Comply - Refer to Section 5.FF for the fire hazard evalu-reactor operation. It must be protected ation of the control room area. The control room is sep-agaicst disabling fire damage and should arated from the turbine building, auxiliary building, from be separated from other areas of the plant the cable spreading room below, and mechanical equipment by floors, walls and roofs having minimum room above by reinforced concrete walls, floors and ceil-fire resistance ratings of three hours. ing which meet the required 3-hour fire rating. The sus-pended acoustical tile ceiling in the control room has Control room cabinets and consoles are been tested in accordance with NFPA No. 251 and has ob-2 subject to damage from two distinct fire tained a fire-resistance rating of not less than I hour. hazards: Doors leading into the control room from the turbine building side are Class "A" rated for 3-hour fire resistance. The (a) Fire originating within a cabinet or door between the control room and the auxiliary building console; and is a watertight metal door. This door is not fire rated. The body of the door is constructed of 5/8-inch thick (b) Exposure fire involving combustibles steel plate. All parts of the door except the heat and in the general room area, oil treated neoprene gasket around the perimeter of the door are noncombustible. The gasket material on the Manual fire fighting _apability should be perimeter of the door is required to provide a watertight provided for both hazards. seal. This door is made watertight to prevent steam and water flooding into the control room from the auxiliary Hose stations adjacent to the control room building in the event of a pipe rupture. A 3-hour rated with portable extinguishera in the control door will be added in series with this watertight door room are acceptable. to assure the required fire resistance rating of 3 hours. As discussed in Section 5 FF, the design of the control room is such that a fire in an essential cabinet would Revision 2 O O O

hv v Table 4-1 (Sheet 48c-3) l3 Appendix A Position Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 Fil. Safety Related Pumps (Cont.) Therefore, automatic fire suppression and conduit pro-tection is proposed, as discussed below. In the service water pump and valve room, a 1/2-hour fire-rated enclosed barrier will be provided around the entire length of conduits associated with power and con-3 trol for the service water pumps and the power and control for the service water valves on the return line to the forebay and the cooling tower makeup. The 1/2-hour fire-rated enclosed barrier for these shutdown-related conduits will be achieved by wrapping the respective conduits with a 1-inch blanket of Kaowool. The service water 4 valve motors will also be enclosed with a 1/2-hour fire-rated barrier. Revision 4

Tabic 4-1 (Sheet 48d-1) l4 Appendix A Posi. ion Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 Fil. Safety Related Pumps (Cont.) The service water pump room and service water valve room will be protected against an exposure fire by an auto-matic vet pipe-type sprinkler system. The sprinkler piping will be sized hydraulically in accordanct with the requirements of NFPA 13 and 15. The sprinkler system design for the service water pump and valve rooms incorporates a fire water sprinkler supply header; an alarm check valve and trim set; OS&Y system control valve; and a typical commercial sprinkler riser, feeder, branch line piping, and sprinkler head arrangement. The sprinkler heads, with installed heat l collectors in accordance with NFPA 13, will be distri-buted immediately below the conduit and above the pump l motors and adjacent open areas approximately 7 to 8 feet 4 l from the floor. The spacing between heads will be no l more than 10 feet and no less than 6 feet on centers. The sprink.lers will use fast response heads with a tempera-ture setting of 135F. f l The OS&Y sprinkler control valves and their associated alarm check valve for the service water pump and valve rooms will be located in the service water valve room. Water will be supplied to OS&Y sprinkler control valves and their associated alarm check valve directly of f l the 12-inch underground fire water main yard loop, which is fed from two separate directions (see Appendix 1 Dug. SK-5 for supply piping and control valve layout). If a fire was to become established in the service water pump room or service water valve room, the heat l I that would be produced would fuse a sprinkler head or heads, depending on the size of the fire, thus causing water to flow directly from the sprinkler head (s)

O O O Table 4-1 (Sheet 48d-2) l4 i Appendix A Position Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 affected by the fire. Either the service water pump room or valve room alarm check valve clapper, depending in which room the fire exists, will be opened by the flow and allow pressurized water to fill the retarding dhamber. The water flow will overcome the retarding chamber's small capacity drain and, thus, fill Revision 4

Table 4-1 (Sheet 48e) g3 Appendix A Position Page Section Davis-Besse Unit 1 Fil. Safety Related Pumps (Con t. ) the alarm line which closes the associated alarm check valve's pressure switch. The closing of the pressure switch will activate a local audible fire alarm. The pressure switch closure, which indicates a water flow condition, will be visually and audibly annunciated in the control room. The pressure switch signal contact points and its circuits will be designed and installed so that they cannot be readily tampered with or removed without causing a trouble signal to be produced. This system trouble condition will sound a local, audible alarm and 3 will sound an audible alarm and be visually annunciated in the control room. The OS&Y sprinkler control valves will be electrically supervised to obtain two separate and distinctive signals; one indicating movement of the valve from its normal position and the other indicating restoration of the valve to its normal position. l Water-sensitive electrical equipment, located in the se rvice water pump room, w:.1 be evaluated in such a manner that baffles will be provided to protect against water coming in contact with such equipment. This assures that both adve r tant and inadvertant operation of the sprinkler system will not render sensitive electrical equipment inoperable. There is an existing intertie between the service water system and the circulating water system which could be used in the remote instance that the circulating water pumps would be utilized as an alternate to the service water pumps. For long-term backup service water capability, an inter-tie will be provided from the Unit 2 service water sys-tem to the Unit I service water system. O 9 Revision *,#

D-B The structural features of the above areas are of noncombustible fire resistive f type construction. Walls are reinforced concrete or concrete masonry block, floors are concrete, and all structural steel supporting members are protected with a 3-hour, fire-rated, sprayed-on type fire proofing. (Note areas protected with fireproofing. See drawings in Appendix 1.) The fire is not expected to propagate from the initial area of origin based on the following rationale: a. All structural features are noncombustible. The structural features and the type of construction will not support combustion, hence the walls, floors, and ceiling are not considered to be media which a fire can consume as a fuel source. b. Cables routed in conduit are not considered to be a fuel source for externally originated fires, c. Cable trays are ladder-type with solid 22-gage metal bottoms (see Section 4, item D3(a) on cable tray construction) and are covered with Kaowool blankets. With respect to a fire originating from a cable overload, an overloaded cable will not provide a source of fire nor self-ignite surrounding cables. As discussed in Section 6, it is shown that such a fire is not credible. I ') As shown by the fire tests discussed in Section 6, a cable tray \\d covered with a Kaowool blanket revealed the following: 1. There were lower than expected temperatures on the surf ace of the Knowool. This was due to the smothering effect of the Kaowool in trapping flame retardant gases from cabic and thereby not allowing cable fire to propagate or become well established within the cable tray. l 2. Heat transfer through Kaowool will not danage cables in trays or conduit above. 3. Kaowool greatly reduces release of smoke to surrounding atmosphere. 5.A.5 Fire Detection The Channel 1 decay heat p uup, containment spray pump, and high pressure injection pump are located in a room separated from the Channel 2 pumps. The fire detection consists of one ionization area-type fire detector in ECCS Pung Room 115, ECCS Pump Room 105, and Decay llent Cooler Room 113. The detectors alarm at a local panel and in the control room. The fire detection for Passage 110 consists of one ionization-type, duct-mounted detector in the llVAC return air duct in Room 105. The distance from air inlet to detector sampling point is approximately 300 feet. y Additional detection will be installed (see Section 5. A.9). 5.A-5 Revision 1

D-B 5.A.6 Fire Suppression Portable fire suppression equipment, in the form of 15-lb CO2 hand portable extinguishers and standpipe hose line, is accessible to manually fight a fire in each ECCS pump room, the decay heat cooler room, and Passage 110. Hose Station (HCS) 32 is located in ECCS Pump Room 115 and is capable of reaching all areas of the room. Hose Station (HCS) 33, located in ECCS Pump Room 105, can be used as backup to or as an alternate to Hose Station (HCS) 32 (see Dwg. A-3). ECCS Pump Room 115 has a drainage capacity of 72 gpm. The water is routed to ECCS sump No. 89-3, which is pur. ped at a rate greater than 75 gpm to the miscellaneous waste drain tank. Hose Station (HCS) 33 is located in ECCS Pump Room 105 and is capable of reaching all areas of the room. If a backup or alternate hose station is required, Hose Station (HCS) 32 can be used (see Dwg. A-3). ECCS Room 105 har a d rainage capacity of 72 gpm. The water is routed to ECCS sur p No. E9-1, which is pumped at a rate greater than 75 gpm to the mhcellaneous waste drain tank. Hose Station (HCS) 33 can be introduced into the Decay Heat Cooler Room 113. The hose line can be layed down the walkway, which is along the south wall of ECCS Room 105, then down through the floor opening near Door 105 and down the ladder which leads down into the decay heat cooler room. This hose line is accessible to all areas in the decay heat cooler room (see Dwg. A-3). Hose Station (HCS) 29 is located in Passage 110 and is capable of reaching all areas of the passage. A nozzle and hose line can be connected to the Fire Department connection C-12 in the stairway adjacent to the passage and can be used as a backup or alternate to Hose Station (HCS) 29. Water could be contained in Room 115 with no eff ect on the redundant shut-down equipment. Water could be contained in Room 105 and adjoining Rooms 100 (Fire Zone B-2) and 101 (Fire Zone B-1) such that the essential MCC f eeding the ECCS room coolers would not be flooded until in excess of 45 minutes. Water contained in Room 113 would have no ef fect on shutdown l capability. l Portable fi re suppression equipment in the form of 15-lb CO2 hand portable fi re extinguishers are accessible to the Clean Waste Receive Tank Room 124 f rom ECCS Pump Room 115 and Detergent Waste Drain and Pump Room 125. A hose line from Hose Station (HCS) 32 in ECCS Pump Room 115 is accessible. The hose line can be layed down the walkway in ECCS Pump Room 115, through Door 108, down the walkway in the Detergent Waste Drain and Pump Room 105 and into Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room 124. Based on tl.e ef fects that a postulated fire may have on Room 124, as discussed in Section 5.A.8, sprinklers are proposed to be installed. The system will be an automatic wet pipe-type sprinkler system. The sprinkler piping will be 3 sized hydraulically in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 13 and 15 and will cover the exposed floor area in the vicinity of the cable trays around the clean waste receiver tank, and in each corner of the room. 5.A-6 Revision 4

D-B DU Additional area-type ionization products of combustion detectors are proposed to be ;nstalled in this area. 5.T.6 Fire Suppression Portable fire suppressfoa equipment, in the form of a 15-lb CO2 hand portable fire extinguisher is mounted on the north wall of the room. Additional 20-lb dry chemical hand portable extinguishers,-one extinguisher in the stairway and three extinguishers in the turbine building, are directly accessible to the area. A manual-fire fighting water hose line from Hose Station (HR) 4 is accessible to the component cooling water heat exchanger and pump room by laying the hose line through Door 328 into the stairway, then through Door 332 into the component cooling water heat exchanger and pump room area (see Dwg. A-5). The component cooling water room will be protected against an exposure fire by an automatic wet pipe-type sprinkler system below the conduits and I under the mezzanine floor grating under the valves at the opposite end of 4 the room from the pumps. The sprinkler piping will be sized hydraulically in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 13 and 15. A 1/2-hour rated barrier will be provided around the condust, containing control cables for the component cooling water pumps. A 1/2-hour rated barrier will also be provided around the conduits containing control or power cables for CCW crossover valves 5095 and 5096 to prevent both O channels from being affected by a fire. These barriers will consist of a 1-inch blanket of Knowool. The underside of the valve motors will also 4 be protected with 1/2-hour rated barriers. The sprinkler system design incorporates a fire water sprinkler supply header; alarm check valve and trim set; OS&Y system control valve; and a typical commercial sprinkler riser, feeder, branch line piping, and sprinkler head arrangement. The alarm check and OS&Y sprinkler control valve will be located outside Room 328 in the turoine building on elevation 585'-0", adjacent to Door 332A. The OS&Y sprinkler control valve and its alarm check valve located in the turbine building will be supplied fire water from the 10-inch turbine building fire water loop. The water supply to the 10-inch turbine building fire war.er loop is fed from two separate directions (see Appendix 1, Dwg SK-2, for supely piping and control valve layout). If a fire were to become established in the component cooling water pump room, the heat that would be produced would fuse a sprinkler head or heads, depending on the size of the fire, thus causing water to flow directly from the sprinkler head (s) af fected by the fire. The alarm check valve clapper will open by the flow and allow pressurized water to fill the retarding chamber asso-ciated with the valve. The water flow will overcome the retarding chamber's small capacity drain and, thus, fill the alarm line which closes the O associated alarm check valve's pressure switch. The closing of the V 5.T-3 Revision 4 r

D-B pressure switch will activate a local, audible fire alarm. The pressure switch closure, which indicates a water flow condition, will be visually and audibly anaunciated in the control room. The pressure switch signal contact points and its circuits will be designed and installed so that they cannot be readily tampered with or removed without causing a trouble signal to be produced. This system trouble cond '. tion will sound a local, audible alarm and will sound an audible alarm and be visually annunciated in the control room. The OS&Y sprinkler control valve will be electrically supervised to obtain tw 3 indicating movement of the valve from separate and distinctive signals; one its normal position and the other incicating restoration of the valve to its normal position. Water-sensitive electrical equipment, located in the component cooling water pump room, will be evaluated in such a manner that baffles will be provided to protect against water coming in contact with such equipment. This assures that both advertant and inadvertant operation of the sprinkler system will not render sensitive electrical equipment inoperable. The drainagn capacity available to remove fire water runof f in this area is 67 gpm. In order to maintain the fire resistive integrity of the north wall of the CCW heat exchanger and pump room, an automatic water curtain will be installed to protect the tube-pull openings. 5.T.7 Isolation and Smoke Venting The component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area (Room 328) is ex-hausted by two 14,200 cfm capacity cooling fans (C75-1 and 2) and an additional 2000 cfm by turbine building exhaust fan C24-6. All exhaust paths are supplied with 3-hour rated fire dampers. Fans C75-1 and 2 and their controls are located in Room 328. Two motorized inlet dampers admit outside air into the room. Fans C75-1 and 2 discharge to the heater hay area of the turbine building. Fan C24-5 discharges through the roof of the auxiliary building. Should these fans not be available for smoke removal, portable equipment would be utilized to remove smoke to the turbine building. 5.T.8 Evaluation of Fire and Shutdown Capability 5.T.8.1 Fire Zone T-1, Component Cooling IIeat Exchanger and Pump Room, (Room 328) The following equipment is located in this room: a. CCW pumps

  • b.

CCW valving

  • c.

CCW flow switches f or pump discharge headers

  • 5.T-3a Revision 3 l3 1

D-B APPENDIX 1 FIRE PROTECTION DRAWINGS The drawings (listed below) in this appendix indicate the location of the presently fe' elled fire protection system at Davis-Besse. These drawings have been re-1-.enced, by drawing number, throughout the Fire Hazards Analysis Report. The passive croponents of the fire protection system include: (1) fire rated barriers, (2) areas with sprayed fire proofing, (3) rated louvers and, (4) rated fire doors. All of these components are delineated and indicated on the drawings. The detection devices of the fire protection system include area type fire detectors and fire detection in ductwork. These detectors are of the following types: (1) ionization, (2) fixed temperature rate copensated, (3) fire water flow, (4) fire water pressure, (5) fixed temperature rate compensated and, (6)-flame. They are shown on the drawings where the type of detector is also indicated. Active and manual fire suppression systems of the fire protection system are in-dicated on the drawings. These include: (1) automatic sprinklers, (2) manual sprinklers, (3) CO2 fire extinguishers, (4) dry chemical fire extinguishers, (5) manual hose stations, and (6) the yard loop system. O The fire areas, fire sones, and room numbers referenced throughout this report are indicated on the drawings of this appendix. Appendix 1 - List of Drawings Drawing No. A-3 Fire Protection - Containment and Auxiliary Buildings - Elevation 545 feet A-4 Fire Protection - Shield, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings - Elevation 565 feet A-5 Fire Protection - Shield, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings - Elevation 585 feet A-6 Fire Protection - Shield, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings - Elevation 603 feet A-7 Fire Protection - Shield, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings - Elevation 623 feet A-8 Fire Protection - Shield, Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings - Elevation 643 feet M-016 Fire Protection System P&ID OV 1 Revision 1

D-B APPENDIX 1 LIST OF DRAWINGS (Cont 'd) Drawing No. SK-1 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System-Elevation 565 feet SK-2 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System-Elevation 585 feet SK-3 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System-Elevation 603 feet SK-4 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System-Elevation 623 feet SK-5 Fire Protection-Intake Structure SK-6 Cable Spreading Room Sprinkler System SK-7A Blowout Panel Water Curtain Preliminary Design Arrangement (Typical) SK-7B Blowout Panel Water Curtain Preliminary Design Arrangement Side View (Typical) SK-7C Blowout Panel Water Curtain Preliminary Design Arrangement 2 Overhead View (Typical) SK-8 Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room 124-Cable Tray Layout SK-9 Fire Detection Arrangement-Mechanical Penetration Rooms 1 and 2 Elevation 565 feet SK-10 Fire Detection Arrangement-Mechanical Penetration Rooms 3 and 4 Elevation 585 feet SK-ll Fire Detection Arrangement-Electrical Penetration Rooms 1 and 2 Elevation 603 feet SK-12 Single Line Diagram-Fire Protection System Power Supply SK-13 Single Line Diagram-Fire Protection System Power Supply SK-14 Single Line Diagram-Fire Protection System Power Supply SK-15 Single Line Diagram-Fire Detection System Power Supply SK-16 Single Line Diagram-Fire Detection System Power Supply SK-17 Typical Interconnection Diagram-Fire Alarm System } SK-18 Wet Pipe Sprinkler System Sprinkler Arrangement for Service Water Pump Room Revision 4 2

5 4 h D-B APPENDIX l' LIST OF DRAWINGS (Cont'd) Drawing No. SK-19 Crosstie from Unit 2 to Unit 1 Service Water Systems M-041 Service Water System P&ID 4 M-012A Circulating Water System P&ID i e I O i f i l 1 i I ) O i 3 Revision 4 ~...

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y.- i i D-B \\ APPENDIX _5 SHUTDOWN PROCEDURAL INFORMATION This appendix provides a summary of information which will supplement existing unit procedures to provide the operators with the actions necessary to achieve a hot and subsequent cold shutdown under a postu-lated fire condition. The normal and alternate components that can be utilized to achieve cold shutdown are listed in Table A5-1. This serves as a basis for alternate actions by the operator. Each room in which a damaging fire is postulated has been evaluated and the results discussed in Section 5 of this report. Based on these results, alternate actions will be identified and summarized for affected Each of these room summaries will be developed into an addendum rooms. to the existing unit procedures. Where.a damaging fire has been deemed to have the potential-to preclude the ability to achieve cold shutdown, modifications, as required, have been proposed and will be implemented to reduce the likelihood of such a damaging fire. 4 O k U 1 Revision 4 I

D-B 8. Table 4-1, Item 6c, Cable Spreading Room (RSP) i Based on our, site visit, we consider that the. present arrangement of the conduit and cable trays in the cable spreading room make manual' fire fighting difficult as entrance cannot be gained into the major area of.the room. Both divisions are contained within the room.'and there is presently no fire suppression system installed. Hose stations and portabic fire extinguishers are located near the entrances.to this' room. Taking these factors in'to account and providing a defense-in-depth protection for this room, it is our position that an automatic spray i fog system be provided at the ceiling level. Provide preliminary drawings of such a system showing piping and spray head locations. In addition, we will require the licensee to establish emergency remote shutdown capability and procedures for Davis-Basse, Unit No. 1, to achieve cold shutdown in the event of a cable spreading room fire or a control room cabinet fire, which disables redundant cable divi-sions of. systems necessary for safe-shutdown, assuming a turbine gen-erator trip. Use of non-safety related systems may be considered for this purpose. Confirm that you will meet the above positions.

RESPONSE

An automatic water spray (fog)-type sprinkler system will be installed in the cable spreading room. The sprinkler system design will incorporate redundant fire water' supply headers, redundant alarm check valves and trim sets, redun-dant OS&Y system control valves, and a typical commercial sprinkler riser, feeder, branch line piping,'and an automatic water spray-type nozzle arrange-ment. The system will be designed so that a single failure of an alarm check valve, OS&Y system control valve, or a fire water supply header to the system will not adversely affect the operation of the system under emergency fire conditions (see Table 4-1, Section F-3, and Section 5.DD.6 for additional information on the sprinkler design). .Section 5.DD describes the cable spreading room design characteristics that provide protection against fires of either electrical or other than electrical origin. As discussed above, the original design will be supplemented with an automatic spray fog system. Section 5.FF describes' the control room com-plex design characteristics that provide protection against a fire. 4 j Refer to the response to Question 37 ' and Appendix 5 for a discussion of pro-cedures. 4 l Q 8-1 Revision 4

D-B O 11. Table 4-1, Item 6h, Related Safety Pumps (RSP) All three service water pumps and two cooling tower makeup pumps are located in one room of the intake structure. It is our position that a noncombustible.1/2-hour rated barrier separate each service water pump and motor from its redundant train (two barriers required). The barriers should be extended from floor to ceiling. Also provide a preaction sprinkler system to cover the entire room, except the motor control center with alarm and annunciation in the control room. Any redundant cabling or conduit from one train within the barrier of the other should be totally enclosed in Kaowool or other suitable material to give at least a half hour _ fire rating. All openings in the wall separating this roo.n from the diesel fire pump room should be sealed with a material to achieve a 3-hour fire rating. Also provide a curb around the entrance to the SW pump area on the fire pump side to prohibit a liquid from running under the door separating the two rooms. It is-also our position that you provide a 1-1/2 inch hose station in the immediate area of the service water pump room within the intake structure to cover all portions of any area containing safety related equipment. O

RESPONSE

The fire protection provisions at the intake structure are shown on Dwg. SK-5 in Appendix 1. The intake structure is divided into three fire areas. The service water pump room is denoted as Fire Area RR. The diesel fire pump room is denoted as Fire Area SS. The service water valve room is denoted as Fire Area TT. All openings in the wall separating fire areas RR and SS will be sealed with a material to achieve a 3-hour fire rating. A curb will be pro-vided at the entrance to the service water pump area on the diesel fire pump side to preclude a liquid from running under the door separating the two fire areas. The requirement to provide a noncombustible 1/2-hour rated barrier from floor to ceiling separating each service water pump and motor from its redundant train is not required on the basis that the proposed sprinkler system and con-duit protection discussed below is adequate for fire protection. Such bar-riers are also not physically feasible due to space limitations and seismic requirements. Fire-rated barriers between the pumps would not be desirable, even if physically feasible, due to the resulting severe operational and maintenance restrictions. Additionally, the creation of three " rooms" would adversely affect the ventilation of the area which is designed for one common Substantial ventilation redesign would not be possible within the area. as-built room configuration. Q 11-1 Revision 3

D-B The sprinkler system will be designed to spray each pump and motor. Eaci of the service water pump motors will be baffled to protect it from impingement of water other than in the vertical direction. The motor is protected from water impinging vertically due to its drip proof design. The system will also cover the room floor area for protection from an exposure fire. (Water-sensitive components such as MCC's will be protected.) The sprinkler heads, with installed heat collectcrs in accordance with NFPA 13, will be distributed immediately below the conduit and above the pump motors and adjacent open areas approximately 7 to 8 feet from the floor. The spacing between heads will be no more than 10 feet nor less than 6 teet on centers. A preliminary arrangement is provided in appendix 1 as Drawing SK-18. 'Ihe sprinklers will use fast-response heads with a temperature setting of 4 135F. These are Grinnell Model F931-type sprinklers which consist of a Duraspeed-type head and a quick-response actuator. They are designed for rapid thermal detection of a fire and do not impair normal operation or i water discharge characteristics of the sprinkler. When tested by Underwriters l Laboratories (listed under the " Sprinklers, Quick-Response Sprinkler Assemblies (VORQ)" classification), the average mean tine of actuation, when subjected to the Laboratory's aprinkler air-oven operation test, was 33.9 seconds at an aver-age operating temperature of 186.7F. As noted above, the automatic sprinkler system coverage will be sufficient to protect the service water pumps from a postulated fire without having to rely on floor to ceiling 1/2-hour fire-rated barriers. The floor around each service water pump will be sloped or curbed sufficiently so that oil leaking from any one pump or motor or a flammable liquid spill at the pump motor will be confined to the immediate pump area. In order to provide manual fire-fighting back up, a 1-1/2-inch hose station will be provided in the area of the service water pump room within the intake I structure. I A 1/2-hour fire-rated barrier will be provided around the conduits associated with power and control for the service water pumps and power and control for the service water valves on the return line to the forebay and the cooling i tower makeup. The 1/'?-hour fire-rated enclosed barrier for these shutdown-i related conduits wi'il be achieved by wrapping the respective conduits with a 1-inch blanket of Kaowool. Thece service water valve motors will be enclosed 4 I with a 1/2-hour fire-rated barrier also. It should be noted that the cables in conduit have the ability to withstand heat from external sources for a significant period without loss of circuit integrity. This is discussed more fully in Appendix 3, Test 7. O Q 11-2 Revision 4 1

D-B It should also be noted that the circulating water system is intertied with the service water system connecting the discharge of the circulating water pumps to the service vater system and returning to the ciretlating water pumps' suction. The circulating water system intertie is shown on Drawings M-041 (Service Water System P&ID) and M-012A (Circulating Water System P&ID) in Appendix 1. Each' circulating water pump discharge flow rate is 120,000 gpm. The service water flow capacity per pump is 10,250 Rom. This small flow could be diverted to the service water system by operator action from the control room through intertie 20"-HED-295. The service water return would flow through cooling tower makeup line 30"-HBD-194 to 36"-HBD-28 to the circulating water pump suction. The elevation head requirement is 35 feet. The pump head of 105 feet is adequate to overcome line losses. Therefore, both head and flow character-istics of the circulating water pumps are such that they can be utilized as an alternate to the service water pumps. Each circulating water pump is a 4500 hp 4 - pump fed from the 13.8 kV distribution system. This load could not be powered from the emergency diesel. However, the circulating water pumps could be utilized as an alternate to the service water pumps, since a fire in the service water pump room would not cause a loss of offsite power. This was agreed at the meeting with the NRC staff on October 25, 1978. The conduit in the pump room, associated with the service water isolation valve sepa ating the safety grade and nonsafety grade portions of service water, will be enclosed with a 1/2-hour fire-rated barrier such that the valve can be opened (or remain open) in the remote instance that the cir-culating water pumps would be utilized as an alternate to the service water pumps. For long-term backup service water capability, an intertie will be provided 3 from the Unit 2 service water system to the Unit 1 service water system. The schematic of this design is provided in Appendix 1 as Drawing SK-19 There will be a connection from one loop of the Unit 2 service water system to one loop of the Unit 1 service water system. This connection will be Seismic Category I and will include one manually operable, normally closed 4 isolation valve at each end. The specific physical routing of the connection has not been finalized. However, there will be sufficient time for cperator action to open the valves since they need not be opened for well in excess of 20 minutes, based on the following: A fire in the Unit 1 service water pump room would not cause a. failure of the cable in conduit for at least 30 minutes. The conduit will be protected with a 1/2-hour fire barrier. This does not even take credit for the time to failure for circuits in conduit based on Test 7 in Appendix 3. These tests showed that unprotected circuits in conduit did not f ail for at least 13.6 minutes. Additionally, if all service water was lost, the Unit 1 shutdown equipment would l This not be adversely affected for a time period of 11 minutes. 1s based on an analysis of the cooling water requirements of shutdown equipment, including the emergency diesel generator. Therefore, there is sufficient time for operator action to justify the use of manual isolation valves on the connection between the Unit 1 and Unit i 2 service water systems. O Revision 4 Q 11-3 1 ,..,-n n-

l D-B b. This design meets the requirements of General Design Criterion 5, Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components, of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. Connecting the two systems will not impair the ability of either system to perform its safety function including, in the event of an accident in one unit, an orderly shutdown and cooldown of the other unit. This requirement will be met assuming a single failure. f c. The surveillance requirements of the Unit Technical Specifications, 4 Section 4.7.4.1, will be applied to the valving in that, at least once per 31 days, the correct position of the manual valving will be verified. Additional information is provided in Table 4-1, Section Fil. O O Q 11-4 Revision 4 l

i l l D-B f V 13. Item 5. A.3.5, Fire Zone A-3, Clean Waste Receiver Tank Room 124, (RSP) Auxiliary Building At present, both cable trains in fire area A-3, clean waste receiver tank room 124, elevation 545, are separated from each other by 30 feet and are approximately 31 feet above the floor of this room. One of the redundant trains contains cables for the component cooling water pumps, diesel generator, and 4.16 KV feeder breakers of the substation. It is our position that the trays of each train be protected from an exposure fire on the floor by a 1/2 hour fire rated barrier. In addi-tion, provide automatic sprinkler system to cover the area between the cable divisions.

RESPONSE

Ac discussed in Section 5.A.8.6, a fire in this room should not preclude the ability to shutdown. There is no source of ignition in the room, the fire tests show that an overloaded cable will not provide a source of fire to sur-rounding cable, and the 30-foot distance between the redundant cable trays is considered more than adequate to preclude the other division from being affected. Additionally, the vast majority of the room and, thus, the space between the redundant divisions, is taken up by the huge clean waste receiver tank, as shown in Appendix !, Dwg. SK-8. Due to the above, and as resolved with the NRC staff on September 7, 1978, no 1/2-hour fire-rated barrier will be necessary, but an automatic wet pipe sprinkler system will be provided under the cable trays to spray the exposed floor area in the vicinity of the trays around the tank and will also be extended to cover the open floor area in each corner of the room. 4 i Q 13-1 Revision 4

i l D-B 1 - (' 26. Item 5.1.3-1, Fire Zone T-1, Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger \\ (RSP) and Pump Room 328, Auxiliary Building It is our position that automatic sprinklers be provided in the area of the three component cooling water exchanger and pump room 328, fire zone T-1, elevation 585 feet of the auxiliary building for pro-tection against an exposure fire. Also provide a noncombustible barrier of at least 1/2 hour rated from the floor to the ceiling to separate each pump from the other. Activation of the sprinkler system should alarm and annunciate in the control room. It is our position that the hydrogen line passing through this area be relocated to another location not containing safety related equip-ment. Verify that no piped hydrogen lines are located through or exposes any other saf ety related equipment or conduit cable. For any areas where such condition exists, these lines should be relocated to a saf e distance away, or demonstrate that the hydrogen can be safety vented.

RESPONSE

The requirement to provide a noncombustible, 1/2-hour rated barrier from floor to ceiling separating each component cooling water pump in Room 328 from its redundant train is not required on the basis that the proposed rg sprinkler system and conduit protection discussed below is adequate for fire (,,/ protection. Such barriers are also not physically feasible due to space limitations and seismic requirements. Fire-rated barriers between the pumps would not be desirable, even if physically feasible, due to the resulting severe operational and maintenance restrictions. Additionally, the creation of three " rooms" would adversely affect the ventilation of the area which is designed for one common area, Substantial-ventilation redesign would not be possible within the as-built room configuration. The sprinkler system will be designed to spray each pump and motor. Each of the component cooling water pump motors will be baffled to protect it from impingement of water other than in the vertical direction. The motor is pro-tected from water impinging vertically due to its drip proof design. The system will also cover the floor area of the room for protection from an exposure fire. This will include sprinklers under the mezzanine floor grating under the valves at the opposite end of the room from the pumps. 4 As noted above, the automatic sprinkler system coverage will be sufficient to protect the CCW pumps from a postulated fire without having to rely on floor to ceiling 1/2-hour fire rated barriers. The floor around each component cooling water pump will be sloped or curbed sufficiently so that oil leaking from any one pump or motor or a flammable liquid spill at the pump cotor will be confined to the immediate pump area. The leak or spill will not pool across the floor and accumulate around the base of the redundant component cooling water pump. tN Q 26-1 Revision 4 . -., _ _. ~,. -,,.,,,, ....m.. .,-,m.. ..,. ~, ._...,,m_ ~... _,.,.. _ g_...

D-B O A 1/2-hour rated barrier will be provided around the conduits associated with control for the compenent cooling water pumps and power or control for the CCW crossover valves. The underside of the valve cotors will also be pro-tected with 1/2-hour rated barriers. Additional information if provided in revised Section 5.T.6. The hydrogen line passing through this area will be relocated to another location not containing safety-related equip =ent. Further, the hydrogen supply piping which passes through areas containing safety-related equipment or which exposes safety-related equipment (including cable) will be relocated so as not to potentially affect such equiptent. ) O O Q 26-2 Revision 4

D-B 35. State whether the collapse of the turbine building roof due to ('s a fire would ef fect the integrity of safe shutdown or associated equipment in the area or adjacent to the turbine building. Demon-strate that safe shutdown can be accomplished in the event of the l turbine building roof collapse.

RESPONSE

The turbine building is constructed of noncombustible uaterials. This type of construction does not contribute fuel to a fire originating in the contents of the building. A fire safety advantage of noncom-bustible construction is its freedom from the spread of fire through-out the roof and intermediate floot structures. The clean and used turbine lube oil storage tanks are enclosed in 3-hour fire-rated enclosures. These room enclosures are designed to hold the entire contents of the tank in the event of a tank rupture. The tank enclosure opening is provided with a self-closing Class A fire door. The door opening is protected by a sill which is high enough to contain the entire contents of the tank within the room. The sill has been built to withstand the lateral pressure due to the liquid head, and the walls and floor are waterproof. Automatic wet pipe sprinklers are installed in the clean and used Turbine Lube Oil Tank Rooms 249 and 432. A ( The various lubricants are dispensed from oil Drum Storage Room 337, as required, to perform routine maintenance. ' The walls, floor, and ceiling are fire rated for 3 hours. Automatic wet pipe-type sprinklers are installed in, and provide primary fire suppression for, the oil drum storage room. Based on the fire tests discussed in Section 6 of the Fire Hazards Analysis Report, an overloaded cable in a tray.or conduit will not pro-vide a source of fire to surrounding external cables, thus surrounding cables will not se l f-ign i t e. The re fore, a cable fire is. considered not credible in the turbine building. Based on data accumulated from 1970 to 1974 by the National Fire Pro-tection Association (NFPA), 92 percent of all fires reported in sprir.klered buildings were controlled by 20' sprinkler heads or less. Therefore if an event, such as an exposure-type fire, were to occur from a transient fire load on floor elevations under the turbine cpera-ting ficar, there is a high probability that the sprinkler system would control and suppress the fire before it reached a temperature magnitude that could cause structural deformation to turbine building steel. Turbine building elevations 565'-0", 585'-0", and 603'-0" are sprink-1ered (see Appendix 1, Dwgs. Al through A6 for sprinklered areas). The three sprinkler systems protecting the turbine building are pre-action-type sy s t em s. O 0 35-1 Revision 2

D-B Each of the systems' piping is sized hydraulically in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 13. During non-fire or normal conditions the system piping is dry and is supervised by air. Should a sprinkler head be fused or the system piping damaged, the loss of supervisory air pres-sure will af fect a pressure switch. This system condition sounds a local trouble alarm and, concurrently, this system condition is alarmed and annunciated in the control room. The preaction deluge control valves will not trip (activate) on a loss of supervisory air pressure. Each preaction deluge control valve is actuated by its own thermal detec-tion and actuation circuit. The rate-compensated type heat detectors are installed in accordance with the requirements of NFPA 72E and the manufacturer's recommended installation instructions. These detectors also activate a local, audible fire alarm. During emergency fire conditions the heat generated by the fire con-dition will be sensed by the rate-compensated thermal detectors. Once the thermal set point of the rate-compensated thermal detector is reached the circuit is completed and the system control panel activates the preaction deluge system control valve. The activation of this valve will admit water into the sprinkler system piping. If the temperature continues to increase the fusible link will drop out of the affected sprinkler head, thus, allowing water to be sprayed directly on the fire by the af fected sprinkler head (s). The sprinkler systems incorporated in the turbine building design pro-vide a density of 0.3 gpm per sq. ft. of floor area for any (including the most remote 3,000-sq. ft.) area and, at the same time, provide essentially a density of 0.2 gpm per sq. ft. for any 10,000-sq. ft. of floor area under the turbine operating floor. Manual, backup fire fighting is distributed throughout the turbine building in the form of portchie CO2 and multipurpose dry chemical fire extinguishers and hose rack stations (see Dwgs. A4 through A7 in Appen-dix 1 for manual fire suppression equipment locations). Each hose rack station is equipped with 75 feet of 1 1/2-inch rubber covered fire hose, with an adjustable nozzle. Adjacent to each hose ( rack station is a separate 2 1/2-inch hose connection for fire depart-ment use. j The main turbine bearings including the exciter bearings are protected by a manual deluge water spray system. l i Additionally, the turbine building has smoke and heat vents installed l in the roof which are equipped with 165 F fusible links. When the tur-j bine building ceiling temperature exceeds 165 F, the vents open auto-matica11y assuring the release of smoke and heat with a resultant de-crease in ceiling temperatures making the collapse of the turbine building roof unlikely. O 4 l l l Q 35-2 Revision 4 l -1

D-B g U The turbine building has a finite free expension capability before it could possibly impose forces on the adjoining auxiliary building wall. Since the fire is assumed transient, the resulting combination of expansion and possible failures could result in adverse effects on the auxiliary building. We, therefore, will perform a detailed analysis of the various combinations and provide the necessary fire protection via fire proofing for those structural 4 members that could pose a potential problem. The analysis and resulting prote,ction will be such that structural collapse in the turbine building will not be sufficient enough to cause damage to the auxiliary building. This evaluation will be completed by February 28, 1979. O O Q 35-3 Revision 4

D-3 37. General Design Criterion 19 requires that control room be provided O to control operation of-the reactor during normal conditions and to maintain it in a safe condition under accident conditions. The criterion also requires remote capability (outside of the con-trol room) for prompt hot shutdown and the potential capability for subsequent cold shutdown of the reactor. From our site visit it was not clear how the Davis Besse design satisfies GDC 19 in the event of fire. Therefore, we require that complete descriptions for safely shutting down the reactor be provided as'follows: (a) 1. Safely shutting down the reactor from the main control room when fire disables any safe shutdown equipment con-trolled from remote locations. 2. Safely shutting down the reactor from remote locations. when the main control room is uninhabitable and when ' fire disables safe shutdown equipment controlled from the main control room or the cable spreading room. (b) These descriptions should include: 1. A list of all instrumentation and controls required by and which will be available to the operator to safely shutdown the plant from the main control room. () 2. A list of all instrumentation. controls.and communica-tions equipment required by and available to the opera-tors to. safely shutdown the plant from locations that are remote from the control room. Also identify the location of each instrument, each control components and the communications eouipment available to the opera-tors for remote safe shutdown of the plant. 3. The design provisions made to preclude a fire at any location from preventing safe shutdown of the plant. 4. Procedures to achieve hot shutdown and also to achieve cold shutdown for each case of item A above.

RESPONSE

As discussed in Section 5 of the Fire Hazard Analysis Report, each fire area of the unit has been evaluated to determine the affects of a fire on the ability to achieve cold shutdown. The evaluation criteria uti-lized is discussed in Section 2, Evaluation Criteria. As noted in ~ Section 3, Method of Evaluation, where it cannot be shown as a result of this-in-depth evaluation that the unit can be shut down, given a fire in the area, then modifications have been proposed to decrease the probability of such a fire occurring. Q 37-1 Revision 2

f l l I D-B O i Table AS-1 in Appendix 5 lists the components, including instrumenta-tion and controls, utilized for achieving cold shutdown. Alternate equipment is listed should the primary equipment not be available due to the fire. The location of the major primary and alternate equip-ment is also provided in the table. This information was utilized in the Section 5 evaluation of shutdown capability and it will be utilized in developing procedural modifications. Alternate actions will be iden-tified by room. Addenda to the existing procedures will be developed to define these alternate actions. These procedures addressing hot shutdown will be available for I 6 E Region III inspection by February 28, 1979. Preparation and implementation of the remaining procedures for cold shutdown will continue, with all expected to be completed by October 30, 1979. 4 O The location of communications equipment is not finalized at this time. However, communications equipment will be available where required based on the evaluation of Section 5 and the specific needs as defined by l the procedures. l The design provisions that preclude a fire from preventing shutdown are already discussed in Section 5. Each fire area of the unit is discussed, including reference to a description of fire barriers, the fire propagation control features for fire containment, fi re detection, and fire suppression. O Q 37-2 Revision 4

D-B A 2. Mr. Vassa11o's letter of August 29, IL~7 on fire protection provides supplemental guidance on QA. Modify your submittal contained in Revision 1 to the Fire Hazard Analysis Report for the Davis Besse Station to be responsive to the latest supplemental guidance on QA for fire protection or provide an alternative for the Staff's evaluation. We note that if the > ire protection QA program criteria are met at part of the QA program (Chapter 17 of FSAR) which meets Append 1. B to 10 CFR 50, it is not necessary to submit a detailed deveription for NRC review. SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTION #2 Confirm that your fire protection administrative controls procedures follow the NRC staff suppitmental guidelines (Vassallo letter dated August 29, 1977) for: a) Fire Brigade Training 4 b) Control of Combustibles c) Control of Ignition Sources d) Fire Fighting Procedures /N

RESPONSE

Table 4-1 (Sheets 4 and 10) of the Davis-Basse Nucicar Power Station Fire Hazard Analysis Report has been revised to address the NRC (Vassallo) 8-29-77 letter. Revision 4 R 2-1}}

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