ML20148K171

Notice of 781017 Meeting w/Kerr-McGee Nuc Corp to Discuss Part 3 of Termination Plan for Lic SNM-1174.Incl Dismantling & Removal of Plutonium Plant'S Solvent Extraction Equip & Associated Glovebox

ML20148K171
Person / Time
Site:	07001193
Issue date:	10/13/1978
From:	Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Haughney C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
NUDOCS 7811170040
Download: ML20148K171 (5)

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/ 4, UNITED STATES

['r 4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON jI

, I. I j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

% 'N OCT t 3 -- .

..... yo-nes !I Docket No.1193 MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Starostecki, Chief

Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety FROM: Charles J. Haughney Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety

SUBJECT:

UPCOMING MEETING WITH KERR-MCGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION o

Date and Time: October 17, 1978, 9:00 a.m. '

. Location: 5th Floor Conference Room (Rm 517)

Willste Building, 7915 Eastern Avenue ,

Silver Spring, MD i f

Purpose:

To discuss Part III of the Termination Plan for License SNM-1174.

Part III deals with the dismantling and removal of the plutonium plant's solvent extraction equipment and its associated glovebox. The attached list of conments will serve as a basis for discussion during the meeting.

Participants NRC Kerr-McGee C. J. Haughney G. L. Sinke C. N. Smith A. W. Norwood, et al.

N. Ketzlach, et,al_.

Attendance by persons other than meeting participants is permitted.

However, in order to accomplish the purpose of the meeting, discussion during the meeting will be limited to the meeting participants.

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Charles J. aughney b 781117db 40 Fuel Reprocessing and hecych.L ranch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety

Enclosure:

List of comments

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COMMENTS ON PART III 0F THE TERMINATION PLAN (SOLVENT EXTRACTION EQUIPMENT AND GLOVEB0X REMOVAL)

A. Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality The license conditions for the standby operation authorized' under License SNM-1174 do not contain requirements to prevent nuclear criticality. The NDA measurements following plant cleanout indicate the presence of 1592 grams of plutonium in glovebox 27A.

The activities associated with decontamination and removal of glovebox 27A will cause redistribution of that plutonium.

Although Part III of the termination plan briefly touches upon some methods of preventing an inadvertent criticality, sufficient information has not been provided to allow a determination of the adequacy of criticality prevention measures. The nuclear criticality safety aspects of each step of. the decommissioning activities need evaluation and justification.

Some examples of unresolved criticality safety issues are presented below:

1. There is no mention of the use of a criticality monitoring and' alarm system as required by 10 CFR 70.24.

. 2. Five inch diameter, four. liter bottles will be placed in the

, bottom of the glovebox to collect oil from the hydraulic pumps. What array of bottles, and justification for its nuclear criticality safety, both inside and outside the glovebox, will be used to prevent criticality?

3. The plan states that decontamination solutions inside the glovebox will be diluted to less than 10 grams of plutonium per liter and that these solutions will not accumulate to a depth greater than two inches in the bottom of the glovebox,

a. How will the concentration of the decontamination solutions be determined to be less than 10 grams per liter?

b. How will the solution depth be maintained less than two inches?

c. Are there any sumps or unusual configurations in the bottom of the glovebox or in the equipment used to transfer used decontamination solutions that are geometrically unsafe?

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'd. IDuring unbolting, cutting and removal of equipment-

.inside glovebox 27A, what. provisions will'be made to collect ' solution _ drainage?1 Nill geometrically safe containers be used?' What will be the array.and spacing.of>any such containers both inside and outside,

-the glovebox?

e. Specifically which geometrically safe receiver tanks will be used to receive used decontamination solutions?~

f. Describe the method of1 transferring the used decon -

tamination solutions from the receiver tanks.to the solidification equipment. Include. assurances that '

this transfer will take place in geometrically safe equipment..

g. How much of the' plutonium in glovebox 27A is in the form of 4 deposited solids,.both inside a'nd outside equipment in the glovebox? What measures will be taken to prevent collec- i tion and concentration of any such solids in a critical

. configuration?.

4. The administrative controls that are needed for criticality safety have not been addressed. A description of these administrative controls should discuss training and procedural

control.  ;

B. Fire Prevention The dismantling plan for glovebox 27A states that the halon fire extinguishment system will be preserved as long as possible.

1. . At what stage in the dismantlement will the halon system-be disabled?

2. Can it be preserved until after removal of decontamination solvents? .

3. How much cutting of metal components must take place follow-ing disabling of the halon firo system?

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C. Work Practices i

1. Cutting and Rigging of Heavy Equipment More information is needed on procedures to be employed when cutting, rigging and removal of heavy equipment from glovebox 27A. Precautions to be employed to prevent dropping heavy components, personnel injury and breaching the glovebox confinement boundary need to be discussed. Discussion of any scaffolding needed to accomplish dismantling is also needed.

2. Glovebox Lighting and Visibility Is the existing glovebox lighting adequate for the dismantling activities? Are there sufficient existing glovebox windows to permit disassembly of internal equipment and piping?

Will special lights or windows have to be installed?

3. Dismantling Sequence Although the Part III termination plan lists major equipment to be removed from glovebox 27A, a sequence of dismantling steps was not provided. In a manner similar to that provided for your revised Part I termination plan submitted October 11, 1977, include the sequence of equipment removal and dismantling steps for glovebox 27A. Identify the specific equipment by number.

4. Control and Scheduling of Daily Work Will the dismantling of glovebox 27A take place on day shift only? If so, what provisions are made to insure a safe shutdown of decommissioning activities at the end of a shift?

Who will certify that a safe shutdown has been conducted?

D. Contamination Control and Monitoring

1. Part III of the termination plan states that contamination controls' described in your general termination plan dated  ;

November 8,1977 and in your Part I termination plan dated October 11, 1977 will apply to activities conducted under Part III. However, the Part III plan does not discuss the use of tents or " greenhouses" for contamination control during dismantlement of glovebox 27A. - A description is needed of the use of tents or " greenhouses" for additional contamination control, j l

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- 2.:iMonitoring Provisions j

' Part' III of the' termination ' plan. states that.monitorirJJ il

' described -in the general termination plan dated November 8, 6'

.1977 and in the Part I termination plan dated October .ll',1977 ,

!will apply. But neither of these plans ' discuss air inonitoring d' in rooms B-05 and 127 containing glovebox 27A or in ~the rooms

~used to package waste shipment-containers. The monitoring f:

provisions needed for activities in Part III. need to be specifically addressed. ;t t:

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