ML20148K159

Notice of Meeting on 781018 to Discuss Part III of Lic Termination Plan of Subj Plutonium Plant,Which Proposes to Dismantle the Solvent Extraction Equip & Its Associated Glove Box.Site Visit Planned for 781030

ML20148K159
Person / Time
Site:	07001193
Issue date:	10/24/1978
From:	Haughney C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Rouse L NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
References
NUDOCS 7811170033
Download: ML20148K159 (7)

Text

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fh 8 4 UNITED STATES O" & NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

..... OCT 2 41973 l

Docket No. 70-1193 MEMORANDUM FOR: L. C. Rouse, Acting Chief FueT Reprocessing and Recycle Branch FROM: Charles J. Haughney Fuel Reprocessing and Recycle Branch

SUMMARY

OF MEETING WITH KERR-McGEE NUCLEAR CORPORATION

Purpose:

To discuss Part III of the license termination plan for the Cimarron facility plutonium plant.

Part III proposes to dismantle the solvent extraction equipment and its associated glovebox.

Place and Date: NRC Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Silver Spring, Md.

October 17, 1978

Participants:

Please see attached list.

Discussion:

Personnel from Kerr-McGee dise';ssed their planned approach for dismantling the solvent extraction equipment and its associated glovebox. A portion of a drawing showing a plan view of the giovebox is attached. The general sequence of dismantlement includes: removal of all internal equipment, decontamination of l internal glovebox surfaces and dismantlement of the glovebox itself.

l The steps necessary to accomplish dismantlement were discussed in I some detail.

Personnel from Safeguards licensing staff then questioned the Kerr-McGee personnel and described to them the additional information needed to be submitted in order to permit their review and approval. FCSL personnel then discussed the plan using the attached list of comments. Kerr-McGee will take these comments and incorporate them into a revised plan. It is estimated that this revised plan can be completed within about three weeks. A site visit to the Cimarron facility is planned for the week of October 30.

5, 78 M 7CO33 OAu4 h"ue5Nproce tog $"n"NecycleBranch Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety

Enclosure:

Partial drawing

4 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS KERR-McGEE MEETING Charley Haughney USNRC-FCRR Don Thurman USNRC-SGMC Gerald J. Sinke Kerr-McGee Nuclear A. W. Norwood Kerr-McGee Nuclear Mike Smith NRC-SG Russ Rentschler USNRC-SGPS Norman Ketzlach USNRC-FCPF

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E

COMMENTS ON PART III 0F THE TERMINATION PLAN (SOLVENT EXTRACTION EQUIPMENT AND GLOVEBOXREMOVAL)

A. Prevention of Inadvertent Criticality The license conditions for the standby ope ation authorized under License SNM-1174 do not contain requirements to prevent nuclear criticality. The NDA measurements following plant cleanout indi'cate the presence of 1592 grams of plutonium in glovebox 27A.

The activities associated with decontamination and removal of glovebox 27A will cause redistribution of that plutonium.

Although Part III of the termination plan briefly touches upon some methods of preventing an inadvertent criticality, sufficient information has not been provided to allow a determination of the adequacy of criticality prevention measures. The nuclear criticality safety aspects of each step of the decommissioning activities need evaluation and justification.

Some. examples of unresolved criticality safety issues are presented below:

1. There is no mention of the use of a criticality monitoring and alarm system as required by 10 CFR 70.24.

2. Five inch diameter, four liter bottles will be placed in the

, bottom of the glovebox to collect oil from the hydraulic '

pumps. What array of bottles, and justification for its nuclear criticality safety, both inside and outside the glovebox, will be used to prevent criticality? ,

3. The plan states that decontamination solutions inside the ,

glovebox will be diluted to less than 10 grams of plutonium per liter and that these solutions will not accumulate to a s depth greater than two inches in the bottom of the glovebox.

a. How will the concentration of the decontamination solutions be determined to be less than 10 grams per liter?

b. How will the solution depth be maintained less than two inches?

c. Are there any sumps or unusual configurations in the bottom of the glovebox or in the equipment used to transfer used decontamination solutions that are geometrically unsafe?

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d. f,uring unbolting, cutting and removal of equipment inside glovebox.27A, what provisions will be made to collect solution drainage? Will geometrically safe containers be used? What will be the array and spacing of any such containers both inside and outside the glovebox?

e. Specifically which geometrically safe receiver tanks will be used to receive used decontamination solutions?

f. Describe the method of transferring the used decon-

. tamination solutions from the receiver tanks to the solidification equipment. Include assurances that this transfer will take place in geometrically safe equipment.

g. How much of the plutonium in glovebox 27A is in the form of deposi,ted solids, both inside and outside equipment in the glovebox? What measures will be taken to prevent collec-tion and concentration of any such solids in a critical configuration?

4. The administrative controls that are needed for criticality safety have not been addressed. A description of these administrative controls should discuss training and procedural control. .

B. Fire Prevention The dismantling plan for glovebox 27A states that'the halon fire extinguishment system will be preserved as long as possible.

1. At what stage in the dismantlement will the halon system '

be disabled?

2. Can it be preserved until after removal of decontamination solvents?

3. How much cutting of metal components must take place follow-ing disabling of the halon fire system?

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C. Work Practices

1. Cutting and Rigging of Heavy Equipment More information is needed on procedures to be employed when cutting, rigging and removal of heavy equipment from glovebox 27A. Precautions to be employed to prevent dropping heavy components, personnel injury and breaching the glovebox confinement boundary need to be discussed. Discussion of any scaffolding needed to accomplish dismantling is also needed.

2. Glovebox Lighting and Visibility '

Is the existing glovebox lighting adequate for the dismantling activities? Are there sufficient existing glovebox windows to permit disassembly of internal equipment and piping?

Will special lights or windows have.to be installed?

3. Dismantling Sequence Although the Part III termination plan lists major equipment to be removed from glovebox 27A, a sequence of dismantling steps was not provided. In a manner similar to that provided for your revised Part I termination plan submitted October 11, 1977, include the sequence of equipment removal and dismantling steps for glovebox 27A. Identify the specific equipment by number.

4. Control and Scheduling of Daily Work -

Will the dismantling of glovebox 27A take place on day shift only? If so, what provisions are made to insure a safe shutdown of decommissioning activities at the end of a shift?  %

Who will certify that a safe shutdown has been conducted?

D. Contamination Control and Monitoring

1. Part III of the termination plan states that contamination controls described in your general termination plan dated

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November 8,1977 and in your Part I termination plan dated October 11, 1977 will apply to activities conducted under Part III. However, the Part III plan does not discuss the '

use of tents or " greenhouses" for contamination control during dismantlement of glovebox 27A. A description is needed of the use of tents or " greenhouses" for additional contamination control. ,

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.,',- 2. Monitoring Provisions Part III of the termination plan states that monitoring described in the general termination plan dated November 8, 1977 and in the Part I termination plan dated October 11, 1977 will apply. But neither of these plans discuss air monitoring in rooms B-05 and 127 containing glovebox 27A or in the rooms used to package waste shipment containers. The monitoring provisions needed for activities in Part III need to be specifically addressed.

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