ML20148H534
| ML20148H534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/24/1987 |
| From: | Barton P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Wylie C Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1908, NUDOCS 8801270247 | |
| Download: ML20148H534 (3) | |
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, aamier wftr Memorandum to: C. Wylie, Chairman J.
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on ggj
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TVA Reorganization i Attention:. Richard Savio '
, Senior Staff Engineer '
From: Paul H. Barton, Consultant
Subject:
ACRS Subcommittee on TVA Organizationa.1 Issues - i Revised Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan I Revision 4, March, 1987, ' '
NUREG-1232 Vol. 1, Safety Evaluation Report November 4, 1987 Meeting of Subcommittee The following comments are submitted to supplement the letter repo2t (CT-1901), which was addressed to M". C. J. Wylie I and written pilor to the November 4, 1987 meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on TVA Organizational Issues. These comments are based on a further review of the subject documents and the material presented at the November 4, 1987 meeting of the Subcommittee in Washington.
The opening presentation by the NRC Staff was quite revealing and portrayed a much deeper depth of technical review than I expected. The depth of review that has been undertaken by the Integrated Design Inspection of the Sequoyah Essential Raw Cooling Water System revealed considerably more problems in the TVA design process than I expected. The generic implications for the other Sequoyah Systems generates concerns, but the Staff Personnel l present at the meeting gave the impression that they believe these l issues are being properly handled and any remaining concerns can be l satisfactorily resolved for a Sequoyah restart. At;the pres,ent time I have confidence in the staff continuing to be conservative with l the technical safety issues involved.
I The presentation on the Sequoyah Electrical Cable Integrity' l Assessment resulted in considerable confusion. I do not have ,
sufficient information to reach any conclusion concerning establish-ing electrical cable integrity. It appears that this concern has been poorly handled by both TVA and the Staff.
88012{0247B71124 Das!CNATED ORIGINAL C -1W certified By .
. 2 The presentation by the TVA Personnel on the status of their Objectives to Assure Safe Plant Operation re-enforced my opinion that they have in place a strong, .
ex per i en c ed ', and well' qualified management team, but I still have reservations concerning how this team is organized under -
the C ?fice of Nuclear Power. There are.too many people reporting directly to Mr. White. Having two highly qualified Deputy Managers of Nuclear Power and an Assistant Manager all. reporting directly to Mr. White with no one else reporting to them, is very pooi utilizatiun of talent. These positions do not even have top management authority delegated to them in the absence of Mr.
White. This top-heavy organization needs to be broken down with more responsibility and authority delegated to the well qualified managers that have been assembled. TVA is to be commended for assembling the large team of senior-level managers with all but nine now being TVA employees. The plans and programs for developing the management talent within the organization that has been there all the while looks promising.
programs for establishing disciplined ways of doing business and insuring the technical integrity of the plants are well on their way to becoming effective.
The activities directed toward re-establishing trust and confidence between management and employees appear to be headed in the right dircution and are being staffed by competent people. The program for resolving employee concerns appears to be an over-kill, but this large effort may be necessary, considering the way this problem was originally approached.
The Management Se?.ection and Development prugram, )
described by the revised Corporate Nuclear Performance Plan and being developed by in-house resources, is now underway and personnel ,
l are being trained. The program as outlined and the number of , j personnel trained to date and projected for 1988, looks encouraging, j The information presented represents a good start, but the pro-jected program will take several years to produce an adequate l
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number of highly qualified in-house managers for the total ,,
TVA Nuclear Program.
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The structure, activities, and membership of the.
three Nuclea Safety Review Boards are quire impressive. The Organizational Description, or NSRB Charter, describing the organization and responsibilities of the Board, is a very concise and precise document and adequately covers the requirements for this function to assure proper Nuclear Safety Review. The Membership and Advisors for each of the three Boards have out-standing-credentials as to education, experience and management responsibility, but as a total group, there is a shortage of actual commercial nuclear power plant operating experience. A review of the documents provided indicates that the Sequoyah NSRB has two members that have held Senior Reactor Operator Licenses. This is adequate. The Browns Ferry Board has only one, and the Watts Bar, none. In addition, the Chairman for all three Boards apparently has very little experience with operation of commercial nuclear power plants.
The November 4 meeting with the ACRS Subcommittee, the Staff, and the TVA Managers, gave me considerable more confidence that the management structure established under the Office of Nuclear Power is taking control of the TVA Nuclear Program, and they are headed in the right direction to assure that the TVA plants can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the pu'olic.
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