ML20148G377
| ML20148G377 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 11/17/1987 |
| From: | Kemper J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC |
| To: | Russell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8803290126 | |
| Download: ML20148G377 (20) | |
Text
.
PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 MARKET STREET P.O. BOX SP 39 PHILADELPHIA PA.19101 1215) e 41 4 s00 November 17, 1987
- ,s[o c',sh$,
Docket No. 50-352 Mr. William T. Russell, Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Region 1 631 Park Ave.
King of Prussia, PA 19406 Limerick Generating Station Unit 1
Subject:
!.E.Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Comron Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Inproper Switch Settings" J. S. Kerrper (PECo) letter to T.' E. Murley ORC),
Reference:
dated October 2, 1986 GOVT 1-1 (Bulletins)
File:
Dear Mr. Russell:
This submittr,1 provides Philadelphia Electric Cenpany's (PECo) final The response to I.E.Bulletin 85-03 for Limerick Generatin i
d contains the required design basis differential pressure information and sco The report enclosed herein completes the bulletin's reporting of testing.
reautrements with regard to Limerick Unit 1.
Should you have any questions regarding the information contained in this submittal, please contact us.
Sincerely, VWh
/
l gg6!~'
TSN/pdO9288701 Enclosure L
f E. M. Kelly, LGS Resident Site Inspector fl Copy to:
USNRC, Docurent Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
' l i
8803290126 871117 i
PDR ADOCK 05000352 O
DCD l
t I
~
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 RESPONSE TO I.E. BULLETIN 85-03 y i
l REVISION 0 NOVEMBER 16, 1987 l
c l
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REPORT FOR LIPERICK GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 IN RESPONSE TO I.E. BULLETIN 85-03 PURPOSE _
This report responds to I.E.Bulletin 85-03 which required licensees to develop and irrelement a program to assure that motor-operated valve (MOV) switch settings In certain safety systems are selected, set and maintained correctly such that the MOVs will function during both This report normal and abnormal events within the plant design basis.is in 1.E.Bulletin 85-03 action item (f) for Limerick Unit 1.
RESPONSE TO BULLETIN REOUTREMENTS The following discussion provides PECo's respenses to items (a)
The recuirements of the Bulletin through (f) of I.E.Bulletin 85-03 are restated belcw along with PEco's response.
y Item (a)
"Review and doctrnent the design basis for the operatico of each This doctanentation should include the maximtsn differential pressure expected during both opening an valve.
these valve operations and events are included in the existing, approved design basts, (i.e., the design basis docunented in pertinent IIcensee submittals such as FSAR analyses a When determining the maxirn.rn differential pressure, those single equipment failures and inadvertent eculgrnent operations (such as inadvertent valves closures or openings) that are within the plant design basis shN1d be asstrned."
PECo Resoonse Reference (3) provided PECo's preliminary I.E.Bulletin 85-03 The Information submittal which addressed bulletin action item a). supplied b ik with this action item and describes hcw it relates to the overall L l
progran.
PECo was a participating merrber of the BWROG ccmnittee which established the scope of systems and valves subject to the I.E. Bulletin This ccmnittee also developed and recemnended the rrethodology by which the MOV design basis operational differentialRe 85-03 recuirements.
pressures were to be calculated. report which describes these results a PECo has adopted regarding I.E.Bulletin 85-03 program Irnolementation.
ld the BWROG Ccmnittee's reccmnended program end has expanded it to inc u e other Motor Operated Valves.
3_
For Limerick Units 1 and 2, the systems identified by the BWROG as being subject to I.E.Bulletin 85-03 are the High Pressure Coolant injection CHPCI) and Reactor Core isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems.
The BWROG report further defined the Bulletin scope by stating that only those HPCI/RCIC MOVs designated as having an active safety For the other safety-related MOVs which the function need ccumiy.
BWROG classifled as having no active safety ftnction, slmllarly developed methodologies were used to calculate their maxinun operational differential These calculations are considered conservative, since they include a conservatively nodeled hydrodynamic pressure ccrrponent.
pressures.
The NRC in Reference (4) took exception with the BWROG position on I.E.Bulletin 85-03 The central issue concerned the exclusion of certain MOVs frcm the scope of the Bulletin on the basis that they would not be inadvertently out of pos! tion when called upon to operate.
Inadvertent M3V operation according to the BWROG ls beyond design basis and failures resulting frcm it are considered within system single Since PECo's !.E.Bulletin 85-03 program scope includes all HPCI and RCIC safety-related MOVs, the NRC's major objection '
failure criteria.
with the BWROG is not applicable to Limerick.
The attached Tables 1 and 2 present a stirmary of information, Including differential pressure recuirements, appilcable to the valves /
These tables have been formulated l
operators in the HPCI/RCIC systems.
to provide sufficient technical data to permit identification of rrotor-operated valve assentiles for which similarity (type) testing can In these tables please note the changes In the The differential pressure values previously reported in Reference 3).
be applied.
changes resulted from subsequent evaluation and refining of theAll changes had supporting calculations during the checking process.
a negligible effect on MOV operating requirements as will be dertonstrated in later discussions.
Item (b)
"Using the results from item (a) above, establish the correct This shall include a program to review and switch settings.
revise, as necessary, the methods for selecting and setting all switches, (i.e., torque, torque bypass, position !!mit, overload) for each valve operatton (opening and closing).
"If the I tcensee determines that a valve is inoperable, the IIcensee shall also make an appropriate justification for continued operation in accordance with the applicable technical specification."
~ ~ -
PECo Response Reference (3) provided a brief swmary of the Limerick program The elements that support ccrno11ance with this action item.
Information supplied below provides the specific details which denenstrate cmpliance.
The Limerick program was essentla11y in place prior to issuance of This program provided for torque switch
!.E.Bulletin 85-03.
setpoint testing based on the original specified differential These differential pressure pressure for each valve tested.
values remained as the bases for setting the torque switches on those valves where the values exceeded the newly calculated design Therefore, this Limerick program basis differential pressures.
feature provides additional conservatism with respect to valve capablitty to fmetion under higher than the design basis differential pressure cond!tIons.
With other valves for which the original specified differential pressures were less than the newly calculated values, the as-left settings were confirmed to be adecuate to assure MOV closure To ensure against the higher design basis differential pressures.
that replacement valves are capable of operating against the l
higher design basis differential pressures, the appilcable Limerick l
valve specifications are being revised to reflect the more stringent I
The necessary specification revisions are design requirements.
scheduled to be completea by the end of 1987.
Toroue Switches f
I At Limerick Generating Station, notor-operator torque switches settings are based on the following criteria:
l The mininun acceptable setting shall be such that the developed stem thrust, asessured using the Motor Operated Valve Analysis 1) and Test System (MOVATS), is sufficient to fully close the valve against the as-specified differential pressure.
The maxinun acceptable setting Is constrained by the twer of 2) ths fo11 ming four limits:
The valve maxinun a11mable thrust as specified by the a) l valve manufacturer.
The maxinun allowable thrust for the specific noter I
b) operator type.
The maximun torcue capab!11ty of the rrotor @ degraded 1
c)
- voltage, Spring pack specific maxinun a11mable settings.
d) 1 1
4 9
The valve stem thrust reout rements are as specified on Valve Motor Operator Concatibility Forms (WCCF) which were supp1 t ed by For those valves with the the valve manufacturer for each MOV.
newly calculated differential pressure (per colmris 3 and 4 of Tables 1 and 2) having a value less than the valve design differentla) pressure, a revised stem thrust value is not necessary and has not Valves having a newly calculated differential been provided.
pressure higher than the valve design differential pressure have been !!sted in Table 3 with the higher reQulred stem thrustThese revised stem corresponding to that pressure.
were derived from standard procedures provided by the operator manufacturer and were confinred to be acceptable by the valv w pplier.MOVATS data for all valves within the scope of this program is included in Tables 3 and 4 which denonstrate that the v2ove.
erveloped closing thrusts at torove switch trip (for the established toraue switch settings) exceed the recuired mlnirrun in all cases.
A review of the actual thrust requirements for the valves Indicates This that to valve assently is loaded beyond its allowable maxirrtm.
evaluation was made by comparing the actual measured closing thrusts agaltst valve / operator maxtrrun capabilities specified on the VMOCFs.
Another positive feature of the Limerick program is that the open Therefore, an and close toroue switch settings are Identical.
operator output force at least ecual to that recuired to fu This program conservatism to fully open the valve when actuated.
further assures recovery from Inadvertent valve operation.
The toroue switch setting adjustment and/or verification recuirements discussed above have been implemented on all Limerick safety-related These include K)Vs having SMB-000 through SMS-4 type operators.
all valves within the scope of !.E.Bulletin 85-03 with the exception of HV-55-1F041 which is a limit-seated butterfly valve operating mder relatively low differential pressure conditions.
Over four hundred (400) MOVs at Limerick Unit I have had theirThis sam torcue switches set in this rnanner.The toroue switch setting and stem progress at Limerick Unit 2. thrust testing utilizing MOVATS are Irr ld Engineering Procedures FE-14 or FE-16.an acceptable torque s for verification of as-found conditions.
Limit Swltches The setting of MOV limit switches is procedurally controlled and docurented at Littnrick via Maintenance Procedure PMQ-500-087.
This procedure recuires that:
the open torcue switch bypass switch (f.e. on the sa~e rotor as the close limit) is to remain closed until pesttive ev (1) torque switch operation and noting change in rrotor loading; and
9
~ l the open Ilmit switch is set such that the stem or disk does (2) not coast into the backseat after terminating electrical For SMB-000 operators, the valves are set to stop operation.
For all other 1/2 to I han& heel turn frcrn the backseat.
rising stem operators except SMB-000, the acceptance cril,erla is end of coasting between 1/4" to 1/2" of stem travel off the backseat.
In order to corrply with I.E.Bulletin 85-03, the app 1' cable limit 1
were repeated during switch verification portions of PMQ-500-087 Limerick's first refuel outage (August 1987).
Thermal Overloads At Limerick Generating Station, safety-related trotor-operator thermal overload (TOL) protection has the following features:
Motor-operator overload trips are annunciated in the (1)
Control rocyn.
The motor-operator overload trip is bypassed during (2) autcractuations which increases the probability that the valve will perform its safety function.
Thermal overload protection can be bypassed In an emergency This is accortplished by holding (3) by the control rocm operator.
the control switch In the o en or close positlon.
The overload heaters are sized in accordance with the (4) special service requiremr.nts of intermittent duty motors.
The sizing criteria is such that the trotor will rapidly trip off If a locked rotor condition exists; but provides sufficient margin over nortnal operational loadings.
The cuerload heaters on all I.E.Bulletin 85-03 MOVs were verlfled to be properly sized and oriented during Limerick's first refuel outage.
l t l
Item (c_),
"Ini:llvidual valve settings shall be changed, as appropriate, to Whether the valve setting is those established in item b, above.
changed or not, the valve will be derronstrated to be operable by testing the valve at the rnaxirra.rn differential pressure determined in item (a) above with the exception that testing rrotor-coerated f
valves under conditions simulating a break in the line containing Otherwise, justification should be l
the valve is not reculred.
provided for any cases where testing with the maxtrrtin differential I
I This Justification pressure cannot practicably be performed.
should Include the alternative to maxirrtin differential pressure testing which will be used to verify the correct settings, i
PECo Response _
As described in our response to item b), the MOVS at Limerick Unit I were set and tested during the construction startup phase in accordance Using the with a program developed to assure their proper operation.
calculated valve actuator ferces recuired to overccrne the maxlrrun differential pressures, the valves were stroke tested using MOVATS to This verify the adecuacy of the existing torque Switch settings.
testing, which is an alternative to full differential pressure testing, is an Integral part of the program discussed in our response to Item b).
PECo has.ccrmleted a pre-operational and surveillance test review and performed supplementary MOV differential pressure testing in order to dermnstrate the adecuacy of using MOVATS for setting actuator tor system configurations required to achieve the maxinun differentist switches.
pressures, the supplementary testing was performed at the highestThe data co differential pressures practical.
effort confirms the adecuacy of the torque switch setting technloves and, to the extent practical, the vendor's methodology to predict the The data was necessary stem force for a given differential pressuge.
collected frcrn a large representative sarrole of Limitorque operator types, valve vendors and valve types subject to the I.E. Bulletin.
Tables 5 and 6 provide details of the specific supplementary tests performed.
In conclusion, PECo's Limerick I.E.Bulletin 85-03 program provides a very high confidence that the subject MOVs will perforTn their design basis safety fmet ton.
Item (d)
"Prepare or revise procedures to ensure that correct switch settings are determined and maintained throughout the life of the Ensure that applicable Industry recernnendations are considered in the preparation of these procedures."
plant.
PECo Response Procedures E11.10, FE-1f+ and FE-16 were used durin is used Limerick Maintenance Procedure PMQ-500-087 to ensure that the correct trotor-operator switch settings are maintained used as recuired.
in addition to providing an electrical checkout follcwing maintenance.
This procedure is performed following safety-related MOV maintenance to tb provide a cerrolete functional checkout of the trotor-operator, revisions to the above procedures were determined to be necessary.
As part of the procedures review, PEco developed a specific MOV maintenance Under the PEco program, all future MCV maintenance will be reviewed against this list to determine what testing nust be MOVATS results.
perforTned prior to returning any safety-related MOV to service.
.--..--e,
Item (e)
"Within 180 days of the date of this bullettn, submit a written (1) repo report to the NRC that:
contains the program to acecrnplish items (b) through (d) abovf including a schedule for convietlen of these items."
PEco Response (Ccriolete)
Reference (3) provided PECo's respersse to this action item.
Item (f)
"Provide a written report on convietion of the above program. This report sbx1d provide (1) a verification of cernpletion of the requested program, (2) a swmary of the findings as to valve operabt.11ty prior to any adjustments as a result of this bulletin, and (3) a strrmary of data In accordance with Table 2, Suggested The NRC staff Intends to use this data to Data Strrmary Format.
This report ass 1st in the resolution of Generic Issue II.E.6.1.
shall be submitted to the NRC within 60 days of,icerroletion of the Table 2 should be expanded, if appropriate, to Include a sm mary of all data recurred to evaluate the response to this program.
bulletin."
PECo Response This doctment cerroletes the reporting reautrements of I.E.
A Bulletin 85-03 actton item (f) for Limeriek Unlt 1.
supplementary report to address Limerick Unit 2 speelfic Infonretlon will be provided wtthin three (3) months following certoletion of the remaining Unit 2 work scope (Projected cerroletlon 3/68).
As explained in eari ter discussions, motor-operator switch settings were/are being ver! fled to be adequate during the As a result, a startup/ construction phase of Limerick 1/2.
smmary of the as-found findings as prescribed by the bulletin Limerick fully are not considered appropriate for Limerick.
r.crrolles with the primary purpose and intent of the bulletin by having Instituted a ecmorehensive program to assure the adequacy of its MOV switch settings.
PECo MOV PROGRAMS BEYOND f.E. BULLETIN 85-03 During the Limerick Unit I construction C startup phase, all safety-refurbish and test related MOVs have tndergone a program to inspect,This program was initlated in respon the Limitoroue notor-operators.
to Sig%Ificant heficiency Report - 38 through a joint effort on the Over part of Bechtel Power Corporation, Limitorque Corp. and which is currently planned to be irrelemented on,a_Q Limerick Unit 2 MOVs.
involved with the "hands-on" aspect of the progrern are trained to perform the specified activities and are certifled by Personnel The Limitoroue Rework program is described in procedure Limitorcue.
8031-FM-4 (attached).
CONCLUSION This report has provided a conplete Limerick Unit I response for PECo has exceeded the all action items of I.E.Bulletin 85-03 bulletin's requirements by having implemented a ccrrorehensive notoT-operator On rework prograrn applicable to Limitorque safety-related MOVs.
the basis of Limerick's previously established program and since no physical MOV adjustments were determined to be necessary as a result of ccrrollance with action items (a), (b) or (c), PECo has detennined that the existing condition and capability of the subject valves were and continue to be adequate to assure performance of their design basis safety ftnction.
REFERENCES 1.E.Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-operated Valve Comron Mode Failure During Plant Transients Due to irrproper Switch Settings, Noverrber (1) 15, 1985 BWROG Report on the Operational Design Basis of Selected Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves, NEDC-21322, Septerrber 1986 (2)
J. S. Koncer (PECo) letter to Dr. T. E. Murley JNRC),
(3) dated October 2,1986 E. L. Gordon (NRC) letter to T. A. Pickens (BWROG), dated (4)
January 30, 1987 J. J. Millto letter to C. B. Wyler, dated L.;tober 7,1987 (5)
Precedure FE-14, Procedure to Adjust and Set Limitorque Stem (6)
Thrust, revision 5 Procedure FE-16, Procedure to Evaluate "As-found" Limitorque (7)
Stem Thrust, Revision 5 Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Procedure PMQ-500-087, (8)
Electrical Checkout and Adjustment of Q-L!sted Limitorque Operators, Revision 1 Procedure 8031-FM-4, L1mitorque Rework Program and l
Supplemental Technical and Maintenance Instruction for all (9) l Limitorque Motor Operators at Limerick, Revision 7 l
(10) Procedure EE11.10, Procedure to Insoect and Test Motor Operated Valves, Revision 2 l
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TSN/pdO9298705 i
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NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR TABLES 1 AND 2 NOTES:
Pu:rp not operating.
Does not perform an active safety-related function per the BWROG Report.
or RCIC (Table 2) system
Design differential pressures are obtained from the (1) Design Specification for the valve.
.c Calculated valve differential pressures are per (2)
Bechtel Calc. Misc-47.
(3) Deleted (4) U designates upstream D designates downstream is not required to be tested per BWROG Report, (5) valve paragraph 4.4. Change from values previously reported in Referenc (6) a differential pressure values are presented with each set of assumptions.
The (7) corresponding to a different highest values are used for conservatism although they may be beyond the BWROG design basis.
= --
j TABLE 3 4
RE Til2UST REQUIREMEffTS FOR VALVES WITH HAX1 HUN CAIEULATED DIFF l
EXCh6 DING ORICINAL DESIGN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE Valve Design Maximus Calc.
Dedign l Actual Requ13ed thrust I
Thrust (4)
J for HarJous Thrust Differential
, Valve Differentist (Ibf)(6)
(Ibf) l Calc. Differentist l
Volve I.D.
j BWROC Ceneric Pressure (psid){ Pressure per 1 Pressure (Ibf)(5)
Number l Valve Ref. No.
j l BWROC Report (psid) l l
1172 13,454 18,540
- 16876 I
1000 l
, liv-49-IF022(1)
(
5 i
l 59 1,032 1,620 1507(2) f 30 l
IIV-49-IF084
{
VIII j
l I
1206 64,920 130,500 81500 1
1000 I
IIV-55-lF008(1) '
5 31,060 {
33,670 l 26041 i
1206 llV-55-lF011(1) {
6 i
1000 l
l l
1494 19,821 22.600 21100 l
1400
)
IIV-55-IF012 l
2 I
94 6,407 21,611 8170 I
70 4
IIV-55-IF042 1207 1,640 10,220 6657 llV-55-IF071(-) l 7
50 2271(3)
L 1,641 1
2,620 l
t 30 L
. 59 I
IlV-55-IF095 l
VIII
(
1 I
no active safety function per BUROC.
i (1) Test valve:
HV-49-!F080 (2) Thrust specified is suitable for dif f. pressure of 160 paid per duplicate valve I
(i.e. 1507 lbf) l V 55-IFU93 7
(3) Thrust specified is suitable for dif f. pressure of 185 paid per duplicate valve ll -
I l
(i.e. 2271 lbf) t (H0 VATS) f (4) Actual thrust as obtained from motor operated valve analysse and testing sys em I
measurements.
f t r
(5) Calculated values were based on standard procedures provided by the operator manu ac ure these values.
The applicable HOCFs have'been revised to reflect thrust per Valve Hotor Operator Compatab111ty Forms.
(6) Design i
I Sl~ET 1 OF 2 1
I TABIE 4 SSURE ACT11AI RfTOltrED 11110S1S FOR VAfNES Willi MAX 1MlM CAlfUIATED DIFFERINTIAI, P LESS 111AN ORIGINAi, DESIGN DIFFERlWTIAI. PPESSURE J
Valve Design Maxinnen Calc.
} Design Actual
]
FMPOG Ceneric Differential Valve Differential
%cust
% rust (4)
Reference Ibetsment Valve I.D.
Pressure (psid)
Pressure per 15m0G (Ibf)(3)
(Ibf) for Design % rust Valve Ref. No.
l Number (1)
Report (psid)
(2) 1362 16,293 19,620 P-1040-81-2 l
1500 1
IN-49-1E013 1278 4,432 5,840 P-104C-122-2 1300 IN-49-lF019 2
22 2,047 2,780 P-102C-107-2 125 f
IN-49-IF010 3
49 2,047 8,450 P-102C-107-2 125 4
IN-49-IF029 49 2,047 6,520 P-102C-107-2 125 IN-49-lF031 4a 31 259 1,080 P-114A-110-8 75 1
IN-49-1F002 7
1171 16,293 17,740 P-iO48-81-2 j
1500 8
i IN-49-I F012 1287 4,613 6,676 P-ll4A-247-1 1337 IN-50-lF046 9
l 1337 1130 39,047 49,370 P-104C-54-1 1
i IN-50-lF045 I
1337 1130 9,456 17,580 P-104C-56-1 IN-49-lF007 II 1337 1130 9,456 12,280 P-104C-56-1 l
1N-49-1EV0tf III 1130 4,613 4,840 P-ll4A-110-8 t
1337 V
IN-49-IF076 31 2,498 3,740 P-103-98-3RR 50 IN-49-lit 60 VI 1,507 1,300(6)
P-102A-213-58R 160 j
59 n
i IN-49-lFOBO l
VII 4
e 1-
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- r
bilt.tSi i pr a'
TAllLE 4 ACIIIAT. REl'ORTED Vil0 SIS FOR VALVES WITil MAXIMUM CAtf0tATED DIFFERE LESS 'IllAN ORIGINAL DESIGN DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE Valve D: sign Maxinnan Calc.
Lesign Actual Valve I.D.
BWROG Generic Differential Valve Differential W rust
% rust (4)
Reference Ibcument Nunber Valve Ref. No.
Pressure (psid)
Pressure per BWROG (lbf)(3)
(lbf) for Design % rust' (1)
Report (psid)
(2)
IN-55-lF105 1
1625 1454 40,130 54,980 P-104B-168-1 IIV-55-lF006 la 1625 1463 50,050 91,800 P-104B-93-2 IN-55-lF004 3
125 23 6,407 12,520 P-1020-172-1 IIV-55-lF041 4a 125 94 11,461(5)
(5)
P-119A-166-1 1
IIV-55-lF007 8
1625 1171 55,866 110360 P-1048-94-2 IIV-56-IF059 9
410 55 1,484 2,510 l'114A-246-1 IIV-55-lF001 I
1337 1130 41,888 93,600 P-1040-95-2 IIV-55-1F002 II 1337 1130 107,932 116,000 P-1 HC-52-1 liv-55-IF003 III 1237 1130 107,932 137,500 P-164C-52-1 1:V-55-1P100 V
1337 1130 4,613 5,220 P-114A-110-8 IIV-55-1F072 VI 50 31 N
3,557 3,820 l'103-99-4BR llV-55-IF093 VII 185 59 2,271 3,130 l'102A-212-4BR Design dif ferential pressure was obtained fran the valve Design Specifi NorTES-1) 2)
opening or closing directions. Design thnist per the valve Motor Operator Canpatability Form ba t
3) differential pressure.
Actual thrust as obtained fran motor operated valve analysis and testing syston 4) measuranents (FKNATS).
value is torque (in--lbs), actual torque ' as confinned by testing of similar units.
Actual thrust of 1300 lbs is acceptable since design thrust for dp of 50 psi is 5) 1032 lbs per hientical valve llV-49-IF084, Mien interpolated to 59 psi thrustAlternativ 6) required is 1071 lbs.
4 TABLE 5 CONFIRMATORY DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TESTING OF HPCI SYSTEM MOTO SUPPLEMENTAL AFO SURVEILLANCE D-P TEST RESULTS PRE-OP TEST TEST TYPE E COlOITIONS INFORMATION VALVE il DESCRIPTION Satisfactory None Open D-P Test IN-55-IF105 Injection
@ 1320 psid IN-55-lF006 Valve Satisfactory Open valve and return it close IN-55-1F012 Minin(m Flow Open D-P Test against puip discharge head
@ 1320 psid Bypass Valve at rated conditions.
Satisfactory Open valve against differential N/A HV-55-1F041 Puir Suction -
pressure generated by pressurizing Suppression Pool line via vent valve to 100 psig.
Isolation Valve Satisfactory Close valve and return it to IN-55-IF008 Test loop Throttle N/A throttle position against puio discharge head at rated conditions."
Valve Satisfactory Close valve and return It to Test Loop Isolation N/A open against puip discharge head IN-55-IF011 Valve at rated conditions.
N Satisfactory None IN-55-IF007 Puap Discharge Open D-P Test @ 1320 psid Valve Satisfactory Close valve and return it to open N/A IN-56-1F05')
Turbine Accessory against purp discharge head @
a
{
Cooling Valve rated conditions.:
7 l
Valve is opened and closed against Satisfactory' i
FN-55-IF001 Stean Admission Open D-P Test live steem flow at rated conditions:
4
@ 1160 psid (Cold) during quarterly system surveillance Valve to Turbine l
}
tests.
{
f 9
s 2-SUPPLEENTAL #0 SURVEILIJWC5 D-P PRE-OP TEST TEST TYPE C CONDITIONS TEST RESUI.TS, INFORMATION VALVE I DESCRIPTION Satisfactory tiv-55-lF002 Inboard Stean Open D-P Test None Isolation Valve
@ 1160 psid Satisfactory Close valve agalrist live steam IN-55-1F003 Outboard Steam Open D-P Test j
flow vdille running in test isolation valve
@ 1160 psid mode at rated conditions."
Satisfactory Close valve against contairment IN-55-1F093 Vacutm Breaker Onen D-P Test IN-$5-1F095 Isolation Valves
@ 200 psid ILRT pressure prior to I
contalrunent depressurization.
4 "Rated Conditions - The system terrperature and pressure conditions representative of System punp discharge pressure sufficient to t0TES:
100's reactor power and steam flow.
provide rated flow to Llie reactor.
i a
. 4/aud/10228705 i
4
't I
j i
a
TABLE 6 CONFIRMATORY DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TESTING OF RCIC SYSTEM MOTOR-SUPPLEN NTAL Ato SURVEILL)NCE D-P TEST RESULTS~
PRE-OP TEST TEST TYPE & COtoITIONS INFORMATION VALVE il DESCRIPTION Satisfactory None IN-49-IF013 Injection Valve Open D-P Test
@ 1275 psid Satisfactory Open valve and return it close IN f 9-lF019 Minimtm Flow Open D-P Test i
@ 1240 psid against puno discharge pressure Bypass Valve at. rated conditions.
Satisfactory Open velve against D-P developed tN f 9-1F031 Pum Suction -
N/A by pressurizing suction line i
Suppression Pool via vent valve to 100 psig.
Isolat.lon valve Close valve and return it to throttle Satisfactory N/A IN-49-lF022 Test. Loop position against punp discharge Throttle Valve pressure at rated conditions.
Satisfactory Close valve and return it to open tN-50-1F046 Turbine Accessory N/A against pum discharge pressure Cooling Valve at. rated conditions.
Satisfactory Valveisroutinelyopenedand IN-50-1F045 Steam Admission Valve Open D-P Test closed against IIve steam flow at
@ 1170 psid (Cold) rated conditions during quarterly to Turbine surveillance test.
Satisfactory None Open D-P Test tN-49-lF007 inboard Steam
@ 1160 psid (Cold) isolation Valve Satisfactory j
While in test mode valve closed IN-49-IF008 Outboard Steam Open D-P Test against Ilve stean flow at rated
@ 1160 psid (Cold) isolat.lon Valve conditions.
...o SUPPLEMENTAL #D SURVEILLANCE D-P PRE-OP TEST TEST RESULTS TEST TYPE & COtOITIONS VALVE I DESCRIPTION INFORMATION Satisfactory init. late RCIC Ilne warme by IN-49-1F076 Stean Line N/A opening valve against rated Wannup Valve pressure then close valve.
Satisfactory Open then close valve against IN-49-lF 080 Vacutm Breaker Open D-P containnent ILRT pressure prior Test @ 200 psid tN-49-1F084 Isolation Valves to contalnnent depressurization.
"Rated Conditions - The systan tenverature and pressure conditions representative of System pmp discharge pressure sufficient to NOTES:
100% reactor power and stean flow.
provide rated flow to the reactor.
TSN/pd10238704 N
i
@